ACCORD Peacebuilding Handbook Guide

ACCORD PEACEBUILDING HANDBOOK
1st Edition April 2013
ACCORD Peacebuilding Handbook
ACCORD, April 2013: First Edition All rights reserved. This Handbook is a product of the African Peacebuilding Coordination Programme (APCP), under ACCORDs Peacebuilding Unit. APCP is funded by the Government of Finland. This Handbook was co-edited by Dr Cedric de Coning and Mr Gustavo de Carvalho. Published by: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), Private Bag X012, Umhlanga Rocks, 4320, South Africa. The Handbook can be found online at: <http://www.accord.org.za/our-work/peacebuilding/peacebuilding-handbook>. This Handbook draws on the cumulative experiences of several years of ACCORD engagement in the conflict management and peacebuilding fields. Whilst external sources are referenced and listed in a bibliography available at the back of this Handbook, content that builds on previously published materials by ACCORD and ACCORD staff is not referenced, except when specifically quoted. The Handbook builds particularly on the following ACCORD publications:
CIMIC in UN & African Peace Operations (2006), ACCORD, edited by Cedric de Coning Conflict Management for Peacekeepers and Peacebuilders (2008), ACCORD, written by
Ian Henderson and Cedric de Coning
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations / Department of Field Support Civil Affairs Handbook (2012), a joint development by UN DPKO/DFS and ACCORD, edited by
Joanna Harvey, Cedric de Coning and Lillah Fearnley. Language: English ISBN: 978-0-620-56512-7
Note on 1st Edition
his is the first edition of ACCORDs Peacebuilding Handbook. It is intended to be an evolving platform on which to build and refine future reference for peacebuilding work and trainings. After publishing, in early 2013, the
Handbook will go through an extensive review process; it will be reviewed by local and international peacebuilding practitioners and scholars, tested in training courses and then refined into a second edition. All comments and suggestions about content are welcome and will be considered for the second edition of the Handbook, to be published in late 2013. These can be forwarded to pbhandbook@accord.org.za.
Acknowledgements
CCORDs Peacebuilding Handbook has been developed by the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), through its African Peacebuilding Coordination Programme (APCP), with financial support
from the Government of Finland. The Handbook has been developed as part of an ongoing internal lessons learned and organisational development process since the programmes inception. The process started in September 2008, when ACCORD invited a wide range of stakeholders to a Curriculum Development Workshop in Durban, South Africa, to discuss the proposed Handbook, its content, and its development process. Many people have since actively contributed to the development of the Handbook over the years. The Handbook has been co-edited by Dr Cedric de Coning, Advisor for ACCORDs Peacebuilding Unit, and Mr Gustavo de Carvalho, Coordinator of ACCORDs Peacebuilding Unit. In earlier stages of this process, Ms Warigia Razia and Dr Walter Lotze, previous Coordinators of ACCORDs Peacebuilding Unit, led the development of the Handbook. In particular, several chapters of the Handbook are based specifically on the PhD dissertation and related work of Dr de Coning. Many others at ACCORD contributed to the Handbook, by writing sections and chapters, providing comments or contributing to various supporting processes. We wish to acknowledge the hard work that has been put into this Handbook over the years by the whole team. Their work showed the commitment to produce a Handbook that reflects the cumulative experience and knowledge of those that participated in APCP initiatives, and that is sensitive to the everyday experiences of the local communities that live through peacebuilding interventions. In particular we would like to acknowledge the contributions of Lesley Connolly, Sacha Knox, Dr Martha Mutisi, Abu Sherif, Joyce Muraya, Nontobeko Hadebe, Dorcas Ettang, Beatrice Nzovu, Martha Bakwasegha-Osula, Karishma Rajoo, Kemi Ogunsanya, and Dr Pascal da Rocha for their active contribution and support to this process. A large number of ACCORD friends contributed with practical reflections, case studies, and examples to the Handbook. We thank them for their contribution to this process and we hope to continue counting on their support in the processes of strengthening and reviewing this current edition. Lastly, a special word of thanks to the Government of Finland, for its belief in, and support of the development of this Handbook, the work of the Peacebuilding Unit and ACCORD in general, and for many contributions to the ongoing process of improving knowledge and practice of sustainable peacebuilding.
Preface
here have been many important developments in the conflict resolution field over the past twenty years. During this period several approaches towards consolidating peace have been strengthened and increased attention has been
given to the promotion of long-term sustainable solutions in countries coming out of conflicts. It is in this context that peacebuilding has emerged as one of the most significant new developments aimed at supporting the establishment of lasting peace in post-conflict societies. Peacebuilding initiatives target a countrys institutional and human capacities in addressing post-conflict challenges. These involve strengthening social institutions, processes and mechanisms as a means of preventing the resumption (or escalation) of violent conflict and establishing the foundations for a durable and self-sustaining peace. As can be expected from such an ambitious undertaking, a large variety of peacebuilding tasks are conducted at different levels (grass-roots, sub-national, national and international) and at different stages of a conflict-to-peace spectrum (pre-conflict through to post-conflict environments). These tasks range from the disarming of warring factions to the rebuilding or establishment of new political, economic, security, judicial, social and civil institutions. Over the past 20 years, ACCORD has been engaged in capacity building initiatives that increase the individual and collective knowledge and skills of key peacebuilding stakeholders. The aim of these initiatives has always been to help peacebuilders to gain a better understanding of the environments and contexts in which they work and the processes through which they can support local and national actors to develop the institutions necessary to sustain their own peace processes. At all these levels and stages a core issue is the roles and capacities of local and national actors to lead a countrys or a communitys own peacebuilding processes. Closely linked are a number of issues relating to the relationship between international and national-local peacebuilders, including what their respective roles are or should be, and what kind of support is appropriate in this context. The core theme of this Handbook is thus the central role of local and national ownership in securing sustainable peace. This Handbook is the cumulation of an organisational learning process that ACCORD has been involved in since its inception. Our aim is to strengthen the capacities for sustainable peacebuilding in Africa and beyond. The African Peacebuilding Coordination Programme (APCP), funded by the Government of Finland, has since 2008 been an integral part of this process. It works to enhance coherence and coordination in peacebuilding, to promote and enhance local ownership in peacebuilding processes, and to support the design and implementation of peacebuilding policy frameworks.
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The programme has grounded its work around the peacebuilding processes of Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Liberia, Sudan and South Sudan, and the training materials including this Handbook and related knowledge that was developed by the programme, has emerged through the programmes engagement with local and national peacebuilders in these and other countries. We are thus deeply indebted to the shared experiences and accumulated knowledge of all the people that this programme, and ACCORD in general, had the privilege to engage with over the years. We hope that you will find this Handbook stimulating and meaningful and we look forward to engaging with you in the use, and further improvement, of this Handbook in different peacebuilding initiatives over the coming years. We hope that you will find this Handbook stimulating and meaningful and we look forward to engaging with you in the use, and further improvement, of this Handbook in different peacebuilding initiatives over the coming years.
Gustavo de Carvalho Coordinator: Peacebuilding Unit ACCORD
Cedric de Coning Advisor: Peacebuilding Unit ACCORD
Contents
How to use this Handbook Part One: Understanding Peacebuilding
Chapter 1: Understanding Peacebuilding Concepts and Definitions Chapter 2: Peacebuilding Phases and Actors Chapter 3: Peacebuilding Dimensions Chapter 4: Local Ownership
8 10
11 28 43 80
Part Two: Implementing Peacebuilding

Chapter 5: Understanding, Analysing and Addressing Conflict Chapter 6: Coherence and Coordination Chapter 7: Peacebuilding Planning
92
93 103 116
Conclusion to the Handbook Concepts Acronyms Bibliography and Reading List About ACCORD and the Peacebuilding Unit
126 128 135 139 149
How to use this Handbook
his Handbook is intended to serve as both a training tool and a self-study field guide for peacebuilding practitioners, and is designed to prove useful to a wide range of peacebuilding actors, including representatives of non-governmental
organisations (NGOs), government agencies, development partners, and intergovernmental organisations, including the African Union, the United Nations and sub-regional mechanisms. The Handbook is intended so that a wide-audience of internal and external actors can read and gain knowledge from it on their own, but it will also be used as a training aid by ACCORD in support of its peacebuilding training courses and processes. The Handbook is expected to give a broad-based introduction to aspects of peacebuilding. Its methodology builds on ACCORDs experience of two decades of conflict management training and policy and research experience in Africa. It is specifically designed to meet the needs of peacebuilders elsewhere by providing a better understanding of several different approaches to peacebuilding, including its concepts, definitions and historical context but also practical skills that might be useful for peacebuilding practitioners acting in different fields and arenas. This Handbook is intended to support an ongoing learning and study. There is much in the Handbook that will only be touched on briefly, and users will need to read further to understand the concepts in more detail. Repeated reference will be found in the Handbook, and it will assist a continuing development as a peacebuilding practitioner. It is suggested that the Handbook is used as a workbook writing notes and reflecting on personal and professional experiences will increase its usefulness. There is a lot of detailed information packed into these pages users should feel free to skip some sections and refer back to them as appropriate. This Handbook uses an integrated approach to learning. Each chapter has been designed so it can be used independently and provides links to other sections of the book which may be relevant to the user. The structure has been designed such that each section has its own objectives independently of the Handbook, yet also adds to the general aim of the Handbook: developing knowledge on peacebuilding.
ACCORD Peacebuilding Handbook as Part of an Evolving Process This Handbook is based on the premise that in order to be relevant, peacebuilding needs to be strongly anchored in the principles of local ownership and context adaptability. As such, whilst this Handbooks edition was written by ACCORD staff, it will go through an extensive piloting and reviewing process, ensuring it is reflective of views, expectations and needs of peacebuilding practitioners and related actors. Comments, suggestions and criticism are very much welcomed and will be taken into consideration in the production of further editions. These can be forwarded to pbhandbook@accord.org.za The Structure of the Handbook and its Learning Process The Handbook is divided into two main parts, which will respectively cover different aspects that are relevant for peacebuilders. Firstly, it will focus on generating a general understanding of peacebuilding for the reader, and on contextualising peacebuilding. By presenting principles, concepts, ideas and dimensions around peacebuilding, the Handbook expects to provide users an overview of what are some of the key issues related to promoting sustainable peace in post-conflict countries, how have these evolved throughout the years, and who are the key actors and issues involved. This section intends to show the broad aspect of peacebuilding, and how interconnected different dimensions are from each other. Secondly, building on the above chapters, this section addresses the practical elements of peacebuilding, focusing on tools that can be used by practitioners. This section will focus on more practical based chapters, looking at how to implement all the theory and topics that part one introduces. The skills and approaches contained in this section are generic and are based on the core principle that, in the vast majority of peacebuilding situations, core similar challenges can be encountered.
Part one: Understanding Peacebuilding

UN Phot o/Sophia Paris
In this section we will explore some views relevant to the concept of peacebuilding. First, we will begin by unpacking this concept; tracing the historic context in which it developed and discussing some of its emerging characteristics. Second, we will present an overview of some of the phases, actors, dimensions and tools that are relevant to peacebuilding. As there are many different dimensions important for peacebuilding, this section will be presented in the most detail. Finally, we will look at a central theme for peacebuilding through elaboration of the concept and practice of local ownership.
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Chapter 1: Understanding Peacebuilding Concepts and Definitions
What will this chapter do? This chapter will outline the different aspects of peacebuilding and show how they are inter-linked yet have different functions. Why is it important? This chapter will assist readers to understand how peacebuilding can be used in different situations. What should you learn? By the end of this chapter, the reader should have developed a deeper understanding of peacebuilding and its applications.
1.1 Introduction
The notion of peacebuilding is a complex and continuously changing term. Peacebuilding itself has several key characteristics, including the long-term nature of the process, the interdependence of the actors, the multidimensional nature of the process and its concern with the consolidation of peace. In the post-cold war era, the idea of what peacebuilding is became an important process in the fight for sustainable peace across the world. In this chapter, the historic context in which the peacebuilding concept has developed is traced, and some of its emerging characteristics are discussed. Whilst the peacebuilding concept is now more widely used than ever, there is still a lot of confusion as to what exactly it means in practice, and what is included in the concept. Broadly speaking, peacebuilding seeks to help people recover from, prevent, reduce, and transform violence. As such, the broad nature of peacebuilding often leads to its use as a catch-all concept for many of the so called conflict management activities. Peacebuilding involves concepts of conflict prevention, management and transformation, all of which must be undertaken to address comprehensively conflicts that arise in post-conflict settings, but should also aim to transform the conflict system as a whole, preventing violent conflict from arising in the future. At the same time, peacebuilding empowers people to foster relationships at all levels that sustain them and their environment. It is a systematic process that facilitates the establishment of durable peace and tries to prevent the reoccurrence of violence by addressing the root causes and effects of conflict. Peacebuilding is the responsibility
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of many different actors, including governments, religious organisations, civil society, traditional leaders and mechanisms, media and the private sector. This chapter is designed to equip those working to build peace with a functional understanding of key concepts and terms, and key approaches to peacebuilding. As such, this chapter will focus on the definition of peacebuilding, showing that whilst it has a broad nature, it is also possible to narrow it down to an idea that is practically viable. It will present a brief historical overview, followed by a discussion on two ways in which peacebuilding can be determined, namely in the context of specific programmes as well as an overall systemic approach. Finally, the chapter will present emerging trends in the peacebuilding field.
1.2 Peacebuilding as Peace Consolidation

Although the term peacebuilding was coined by Johan Galtung in the 1970s, the concept only became widely used as part of contemporary conflict management vocabulary when then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali used it as one of the key concepts of his 1992 report titled An agenda for peace: preventative diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping. In this report, peacebuilding was described as:
action to identify and support structures which tend to strengthen and solidify peace to avoid a relapse into conflict.
Peacebuilding was explained as the counterpart of preventive diplomacy, where preventive diplomacy was seen as action aimed at avoiding a crisis whilst peacebuilding was aimed at preventing its recurrence. In this report, conflict prevention and peacebuilding were thus juxtaposed at the opposite ends of the conflict management spectrum, with preventive diplomacy representing the first or opening stage of an intervention and peacebuilding the last or closing stage. It can thus be said that peacebuilding aims to consolidate and institutionalise peace by undertaking a range of actions that go beyond merely preventing a lapse into violent conflict, what Galtung (1985) termed negative peace. It aims to address the underlying root causes of conflict and to create the conditions for a just social order, what Galtung (1985) termed positive peace. This core focus on avoiding a lapse into violent conflict is also referred to as peace consolidation, and that is why it can be said that the core aim of peacebuilding is peace consolidation.
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Galtungs ideas of Negative and Positive Peace Negative peace is a situation where there is an absence of violence and war. Positive peace is a situation where open conflict as well as the threat of conflict is absent; the causes of conflict have been removed from the situation.
Source: Gautung, Johan (1985) Twenty-Five years of peace research: ten challenges and some responses, Journal of Peace Research 22 (2).
Peacebuilding thus aims to generate a range of measures that will create positive peace conditions, with a view to avoid a lapse, or re-lapse into violent conflict.
Re f l e c
Pr a c t c a l
ons
Impact and challenges in dealing with the notions of positive and negative peace Frauke de Weijer, Policy Officer Conflict, Security and Resilience European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM)
Positive peace is much more difficult to define and measure than negative peace. This may lead to an overly strong focus on this negative definition of peace with strategies therefore centering on managing, or at best mitigating conflict. This can therefore lead to a concentration of resources and energy to short-term measures rather than long-term ones. Doing a better job at measuring positive peace may rebalance this somewhat. Theories of peacebuilding are often highly ideological and intuitive. A more systematic challenge of the underlying assumptions can help reveal some of these assumptions, and test them for the degree to which they are justified and very importantly fitting that particular context. Peacebuilding strategies are and need to be highly context specific. As important as knowledge and experience sharing are, in particular in relation to innovative ideas, it can lead to an overreliance on best practice. The notion of best practice goes quite strongly against the notion of context-specificity, especially if it is used as if often is as a strategy that can thus work anywhere. This is clearly not the case, as the wealth of critical analysis on transplanting international best practice shows. Knowledge sharing, experience sharing, and learning must therefore lead to localised best practice, which can at best serve as a source of inspiration for other situations. However, in a political economy of aid where best practice is still
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widely used for benchmarking and resource allocation decisions, this is a real risk. A more evidenced-based analysis of the success or failures of different peacebuilding theories would facilitate learning and knowledge sharing.
1.3 Peacebuilding in Historic Context

In the post-cold war era, the focus of international conflict management has increasingly shifted from peacekeeping, which was about maintaining the status quo, to peacebuilding, which has to do with managing change. The nexus between development, peace and security has become key in the development of international conflict management strategies. From the way peacebuilding has been used in major UN policy documents such as In Larger Freedom: Towards Security, Development and Human Rights for All (2005) and Delivering as One (2006) we can argue that peacebuilding is increasingly seen as the collective framework under which the peace, security, humanitarian, rule of law, (RoL) human rights and development dimensions can be brought together under one common strategy at country level. In the early 1990s the approach to international conflict management, as developed in the context of then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghalis 1992 An agenda for peace, was first to try to prevent violent conflict (conflict prevention). If that failed the next step was to make peace by facilitating dialogue among the belligerent parties (peacemaking). If a cease-fire or peace agreement was reached that included a neutral third-party monitoring role, the UN (or a regional organisation authorised by the Security Council) would typically deploy a peace operation to monitor the cease-fire and to support the implementation of the peace agreement (peacekeeping). Once the conflict had been stabilised, emergency humanitarian needs addressed and a peace process agreed upon, the international community would shift its focus to post-conflict reconstruction. This phase was focused on rebuilding and reconciliation (peacebuilding) with the aim of addressing the root causes of the violent conflict to prevent it from reoccurring. As a result of a series of peacekeeping failures and challenges in the 1990s, especially the experiences in Somalia, Rwanda and Srebrenica, the understanding of international conflict management has become more nuanced. It is now recognised that the different elements of the international response introduced in An agenda for peace do not necessarily follow on from one another neatly in a linear or chronological progression as An agenda for peace suggested.
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In
p r ac tic e
c o n flic t
p r e ve nti o n,
p e ac e m a ki n g,
peacekeeping and peacebuilding seem to overlap; they are interlinked, mutually support each other and often take place simultaneously.
The emergence of peacebuilding should thus be understood in the context of an increasingly complex and interdependent international conflict management system. During the cold war period, the UN, regional organisations and independent agencies were called upon to undertake humanitarian relief, peacemaking and peacekeeping actions at a scale usually manageable within the scope of the independent capabilities of these organisations, or at a level that could be managed with limited cooperative arrangements. In the post-cold war era, the scale and complexity of the conflict management programmes designed to deal with crises faced by the international community were of a different magnitude. As a result, it was often the case that no single actor being that a government, international organisation or agency, could manage them on their own. These organisations were ill prepared to deal with the complexity of the challenges posed by the emerging post-conflict reconstruction challenges of the postcold war era. Furthermore, as a result of the international communitys experiences in El Salvador, Cambodia, Namibia, Nicaragua, and Mozambique in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a major shift in focus and approach became necessary. The question was no longer how a situation can be stabilised to maintain the precarious cold war balance. Instead the focus shifted to a new agenda: how could the collective international, regional, national and local community better facilitate and support the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements in countries emerging from violent conflict and civil war? In the context of these developments, peacebuilding was increasingly seen as the collective framework under which the political, security, rule of law, governance, human rights and development dimensions of these international interventions could be brought together under one common strategic framework at a country level.
As a result of thes e developments peacebuilding
emerged as a new form of peace intervention; one aimed at assisting societies emerging out of conflict to manage their peace processes. However, beyond this broad notion, the concept was highly contested.
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UN Photo/Martine Perret
As perspectives shifted, peacebuilding became more comprehensive to incorporate broader dimensions of society thus increasing its ability to aid more people in the affected societies
1.4 Approaches to Peacebuilding

We can identify several approaches in which the understanding of peacebuilding can be operationalised. The next sub-sections will present two different perspectives and approaches which are often guides for different peacebuilding approaches, namely both programmatic peacebuilding and systemic peacebuilding. Programmatic peacebuilding Programmatic peacebuilding refers to specific activities aimed at addressing urgent or imminent risks to a peace process. The following bullets summarise some of the key aspects of programmatic peacebuilding:
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Risks refers to an assessment that a certain situation or condition may contribute to the increased likelihood of lapse or relapses into violent conflict; It focuses on conflict factors that may potentially impact negatively on the peace process, and that can be addressed through specific targeted programme responses; This can also be thought of as preventative peacebuilding or instrumental peacebuilding in that it refers to specific programming that is meant to prevent a lapse or relapse into conflict; and The time-frame for programmatic peacebuilding is necessarily short- to mediumterm, because it is focussed on countering immediate or imminent threats to the peace process. Some donors now have funds specifically earmarked for peacebuilding, and those funds would most likely be used to fund specific programmes in this category. For instance, the activities supported by the UN Peacebuilding Fund typically also fall in this category and are aimed at addressing specific peace consolidation needs that have either remained unfunded, or under-funded, or which have newly emerged. Programmatic peacebuilding initiatives Examples of such peacebuilding programmes include conflict resolution training and capacity building, the development of institutional capabilities needed for conflict prevention (such as the Peace Commission in Southern Sudan or the Ituri Pacification Commission in the DRC), support for civil society or womens groups to participate in peacemaking initiatives, and support for national reconciliation initiatives, including aspects of transitional justice. Some donors also include support for specific programme activities that form part of, or support, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), rule of law and Security Sector Reform (SSR) in this peacebuilding category. However, in Sierra Leone, Burundi and Liberia, it has been noted that some of the activities earmarked in this category may appear to be very similar to traditional development categories, such as youth employment, infrastructure development and basic social services. This is because the frustrations with the lack of progress in these areas have become so critical in some of these communities that they become grievances which can be a source of a potential relapse into violent conflict, and urgent action is required to show that some of these needs are being met. This potential relapse links to the notion of structural
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violence and it is vital to address the structural root causes of violence and grievances to truly prevent future outbreaks of conflict. Some donors do not allocate funds specifically for peacebuilding, but prefer to encourage a conflict sensitive approach to development when working in conflictaffected countries. Conflict-sensitive development programmes have a developmental objective i.e. poverty reduction but are sensitive to the conflict environment within which they operate, in that specific steps are taken in the design and management of the programme to avoid aggravating the situation. In some cases, the design of the programme can also be intended to support conflict prevention efforts proactively, and, in the latter case, such activities are almost indistinguishable from targeted peacebuilding.
An i m po r ta nt p r e - r e q u i sit e programme to for be a p r o g r a m m ati c is an
p e a c e b u i l di n g
e f f ec ti v e,
understanding of the risks to the peace process, and the conflict factors that characterise the conflict system.
Forms of risk analysis are recommended to be undertaken as part of the process leading up to the design of appropriate targeted peacebuilding programmes. That analysis is meant to assist the peacebuilding agent, and key stakeholders to work towards a common understanding of what the conflict factors in a particular context are from the earliest planning stages and continuously throughout the life-cycle of the peacebuilding system. Funding for, and capacity- building towards, effective participation in an appropriate analysis approach could also be regarded as a programmatic peacebuilding activity, because it makes the peacebuilding activities context-specific and therefore more likely to succeed. Systemic peacebuilding
I n c o nt r ast to p rog r a m m atic p e ac e b ui l di n g, syst emic peacebuilding emerges out of the total combined effort of the activities undertaken under the various peacebuilding dimensions, and thus exists in the form of a system-wide or holistic process.
This overall effort may sometimes be anchored in a strategy or vision, for example, an integrated strategic framework such as the Lift Liberia Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) or the Afghan Compact in Afghanistan. There may be specific processes and structures that facilitate the development, management and monitoring of such peacebuilding frameworks and these may be purposely funded.
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In general, however, support for systemic peacebuilding occurs in a highly fragmented manner in that the various agents that participate in, and contributes to, the overall process, each independently design, manage, monitor and evaluate and secure funding for their own programmes. These activities are not necessarily identified, or funded, as peacebuilding activities at the programme level, although some of the programmes discussed in the previous section on programmatic peacebuilding can be included here. Instead, they are considered and funded as peacekeeping, development, human rights, job creation, or rule of law activities. It is when these activities are considered together over time, in the context of their combined and cumulative peace consolidation effect, which their systemic peacebuilding identity emerges. A strategic or integrated framework, that is aimed at an overall strategic vision for the systemic peacebuilding process, such as a conflict-sensitive poverty reduction strategy (PRS), maps out the overall priorities and objectives of the systemic peacebuilding strategy for a particular country. Examples include the Results Based Transitional Framework (RFTF), interim Integrated Regional Support Programme (IRSP) and Regional Strategy Paper (RSP) in Liberia, the Peace Consolidation Strategy and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) in Sierra Leone, and the Integrated Peacebuilding Frameworks in Burundi and the Central African Republic. Individual programmes become part of the systemic peacebuilding process when they contribute to, and are considered as part of the overall effort directed towards achieving the objectives set out in the strategic vision. In some cases, the individual agencies may be conscious of their role in the overall framework, but in many cases this link is drawn only at the systemic level, for instance in strategic evaluations or in annual PRS reports. This does not imply that the connections are artificial, but rather that those at the programme level are not always aware of the degree to which their individual activities contribute to an overall systemic peacebuilding framework. There is disagreement over the extent to which a development activity such as a programme aimed at poverty reduction or infrastructure development (for example, the construction of a road) can be regarded as having a peace consolidation effect, and thus be considered part of a peacebuilding system. The confusion lies in perspective and context. An individual donor or implementing agent may not think of, or categorise the funding of an activity (for example, the construction of a road), as peacebuilding, from a programme level or budget-line perspective. However, from a systemic perspective for instance, in the context of an integrated peacebuilding framework and sticking with the example, the construction of roads may be regarded as an important element of a larger systemic peacebuilding framework. It may perhaps create work for ex-combatants, it may stimulate local economies and improve livelihoods by
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providing access to markets, it may stimulate local contractor capacity, it may open up outlying areas previously marginalised because of their inaccessibility, and assist in the extension of the authority of the state into those territories, and it may contribute to overall economic growth, all of which are important aspects of an environment conducive to a successful peace process and preventing a relapse into conflict. Any particular system is framed by the observer, and it thus requires an overall systems perspective to recognise that a specific programme activity, such as the road building project in this example, has a positive feedback effect for peace consolidation, and is thus regarded as being part of the peacebuilding system. It is not necessary for the agent to be aware that it is part of a particular system, for it to contribute to the overall system effect. CHARACTERISTICS Time frame Funding PROGRAMMATIC PEACEBUILDING
Short or medium term Funding is generally project specific, and so each programme will be individually funded. Problem specific Immediate threats
SYSTEMATIC PEACEBUILDING
Long term Often fragmented from various funders.
Approach Focus
Holistic approach Conflict as a whole: targeted through a broad strategy.
UN Photo/Olivier Chassot
When various activities, undertaken by various stakeholders, are considered together, in the context of their peace consolidation effect, a systemic peacebuilding identity emerges. 20
1.5 Emerging Characteristics

Whilst there is no one common definition, approach or model for peacebuilding that is yet widely accepted, some common characteristics that have emerged over the last decade and a half of peacebuilding practice can start to be identified. Characteristics of Peacebuilding
MultiDimensional
Interdependance of actors
Peace consolidation
Emerging Characteristics
Long-Term process with short-term realities
Peace Agreement
Multiple Peacebuilding Instruments
Peacebuilding is primarily concerned with peace consolidation The first characteristic is that peacebuilding is primarily concerned with securing or consolidating peace. It is concerned with preventing a lapse, or relapse, into violent conflict. Peacebuilding is aimed at consolidating peace by addressing those conflict factors that may, in the short to medium term, threaten a lapse or relapse into conflict as well as addressing root causes of conflicts, that may threaten the peace in the long term. Sierra leone peacebuilding initiatives
After the civil war ended in Sierra Leone, the government made commitments to peacebuilding commitments which involved addressing the following aspects: consolidation of democracy and good governance; justice and security sector reform; youth employment and empowerment; capacity-building; energy
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sector development and sub-regional peacekeeping (involving presidential and
ministerial summits for the Manu River Regions leaders). This is distinct from the governments development commitments, which involve development of infrastructure, productive sectors and human development. Whilst this agenda of development will have positive effects on Sierra Leones stability and peace, it is distinct from the peacebuilding agenda in that the latter is primarily concerned with peace consolidation and long-term development in the country.
Source: United Nations Peacebuilding Commission. (2008) Progress report on the implementation of the Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework. PBC/3/SLE/3
Peacebuilding is multi-dimensional The second characteristic is that peacebuilding is a multi-dimensional or system-wide undertaking that spans several dimensions. There are different models or approaches, but most range from differentiating between three core dimensions to the more elaborate approaches listing six to eight different dimensions. The UN SecretaryGeneral Report S/2001/394 No Exit without Strategy (2001), argues that peacebuilding should be understood as fostering the capacity to resolve future conflicts by: Consolidating security, Strengthening political institutions and Promoting economic and social reconstruction. Other UN policy documents, for instance the Secretary-Generals Note on the Integrated Approach (2006), prefer a more elaborate list that includes: political, development, humanitarian, human rights, rule of law, social reconciliation and security dimensions. The AUs Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development Framework (2006) comprises six similar constitutive elements, but adds gender as a self-standing dimension. Humanitarian assistance should be highlighted as one dimension that is treated differently in the various models. A number of peacebuilding models such as the UNs Integrated Approach and NEPADs Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework for Africa (2004 include humanitarian dimensions. However, some in the humanitarian community argue that humanitarian assistance should not be seen as being part of peacebuilding, because it needs to be recognised as independent, neutral and impartial. In other words, whilst peacebuilding is inherently political, humanitarian assistance is at pains to remain above the politics of the day. Some models, including the UNs integrated approach, nevertheless include humanitarian assistance within their peacebuilding framework, because they argue that the humanitarian dimension needs to be factored into the overall peacebuilding planning and coordination
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mechanisms. However, they explicitly recognise that the humanitarian dimension has a special status and that it needs to be treated as an independent, but parallel, peacebuilding dimension. Five dimensions of peacebuilding system Security and Rule of Law Providing a Safe and Secure Environment Protection of Civilians Mine Action Security Sector Reform Disarmament and Demobilisation Police, Corrections and Judicial Reform (Rule of Law) Political and Governance Support the Peace Process and Oversee the Political Transition Political Participation, National Dialogue and Reconciliation Electoral Capacity Building and Oversight (Observation) State and Government Institutions, Public Administration and Civil Service Capacity Building (Governance) Extend State Authority Throughout the Territory Conflict Management Capacity Socio-economic Recovery Physical Infrastructure: Roads, Ports, Airports; Electricity; Telecommunications Social Services: Health, Education, Social Welfare, Population Registration Stimulate and Facilitate Economic Growth and Employment Strengthen Civil Society Human Rights Humanitarian Assistance Human Rights Education, Advocacy and Monitoring Emergency and Early Recovery Services in the areas of Food, Water & Sanitation, Shelter, Health, Protection and Returns of Refugees/ internally displaced peoples (IDPs) The interdependence of peacebuilding actors The emergence of peacebuilding should be understood in the context of an increasingly complex and interdependent conflict management system. One of its defining
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characteristics is the large number of diverse international and local actors that are engaged in any particular peacebuilding systems, including states, multilateral institutions, NGOs, local communities and corporations. The work of these actors spans all dimensions of life: political, security, development, governance, economics and socio-cultural. In each specific case the full spectrum of national actors including government, political parties, militias, traditional leaders, civil society, and others are engaged in the peacebuilding process. The relationships and links between these varied internal actors, between the many different external actors, and between the internal and external actors, generate the structure, hierarchy and selforganisation that characterise the complexity of peacebuilding systems. There is a continual tension between the independence and interdependence of these peacebuilding actors. The various peacebuilding actors exist as independent agents with their own mandates, programmes and resources, yet they are interdependent on each other to achieve their respective objectives, and that of the overall peacebuilding undertaking. Most peacebuilding related programmes only make sense as part of a larger system of related programmes. Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes Disarmament and demobilisation programmes rely on the assumption that others will provide a series of reintegration programmes, and they all rely on the assumption that there are other programmes or initiatives in place that will create security, improve opportunities for education and healthcare, and create employment for ex-combatants or alternative opportunities for sustainable livelihoods. Such a network of programmes exist both as independent programmes with their own sources of funding and separate implementing arrangements, and as a system of interdependent programmes whose combined output produce an outcome that their individual efforts could not have achieved independently. Peacebuilding is a long-term process, but it is driven by short-term realities The fourth aspect relates to the perspective of time. There seems to be broad agreement around two time-related issues. The first is recognition, at least at the policy level, that post-conflict peacebuilding is a long-term process, and that a longer and more sustained international commitment is necessary than was understood a decade ago. The acceptance that a longer-term time frame was necessary for post-conflict peacebuilding was agreed on at the World Summit in
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2005 and resulted in the establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). The core aim of the PBC was to ensure that the international community in general and the UN in particular, remains engaged in countries in the post-conflict peacebuilding stage. This was regarded as necessary because the UN Security Councils attention tends to be focused on those crises where the UN has a direct stake, usually in the form of a UN peacekeeping operation. When such operations come to an end, the post-conflict countries in question tend to move off the Security Council agenda. Failures to sustain international engagement in countries like Haiti, Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s was seen as an important factor in the serial-relapse into violent conflict experienced in these countries a decade later. The international community now seems to recognise a causal link between sustained international attention and longer-lasting peace processes. However, there is still a large gap between the time-period that the UN, World Bank and international donors seem willing to plan and commit to, which rarely exceeds one to three years, and the time it takes for these transformative processes to take hold, which seems to take at least two to three decades.
Liberia and Sierra Leones post-conflict peacebuilding time-frames States such as Sierra Leone and Liberia have been fluctuating between war and peace, further decreasing the chances of ceasefire and affecting the local population. The short-lived periods of relative peace have usually been established after foreign aid and international experts have been allocated to the regions. The concerted efforts of the local governments, NGOs, and various international actors achieve relatively easy the [sic] short-term goals of political and economic stability in the country. However, once the foreign financial aid and international assistance is gradually reduced, the states fail to sustain the peace due to the lack of local human resources that are able to continue the already initiated policies. The poor social development in these areas affects the long-term goals of peacebuilding, thus exposing the country to a risk of conflict reoccurrence.
Source: Filipov, F (2006) Post-conflict Peacebuilding: Strategies and Lessons from Bosnia and Herzegovina, El Salvador and Sierra Leone. Available: <http://www.eclac.org/publicaciones/ xml/6/27306/sps123_lcl2613.pdf>.
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The second time related characteristic is the recognition that although post-conflict peacebuilding requires a long-term commitment, there is also a need for immediate and short-term gains to solidify the peace, build confidence in the peace process and stimulate a vision of a better future. This has resulted in practices such as the now standard inclusion of funds for quick impact projects in UN peacekeeping budgets, and an acceptance that some aspects of DDR, RoL and SSR should be funded out of the assessed contributions to the UN peacekeeping operations budget. This is an area that still leaves room for significant debate, and the peacekeeping-peacebuilding nexus discussion in the UN system raises the question as to where the limits should be drawn when it comes to the use of the assessed contribution budget, and how UN peacekeeping can, in post-conflict situations, best be used as early-peacebuilders. Peace agreements and its impact on peacebuilding and statebuilding A central issue relates on how to further explore the fact that a large number of peace agreement end up falling apart, allowing countries to return to conflict. One issue refers particularly to the fact that many, directly or indirectly, see peace agreements as an opportunity for disengagement, as it can be seen by partners and the international community as a potential milestone for departure. Several examples and cases can be highlighted, including cases of South Sudan, Rwanda, Liberia, the DRC, Burundi and others. In order for peacebuilding to be successful, there is a strong need to understand local contexts and to develop strategies that address root causes of conflict. It is important to highlight that peace agreements are the starting point for the development of longer-term solutions for a country. In this context, where conflicts end through reaching a negotiated settlement, there is a potential for longer-term impact that particular compromises that were made by the parties in relation to the sustainability of peace processes. Existence of multiple peacebuilding and statebuilding instruments Post-conflict countries are frequently engaged in the development of several frameworks and initiatives to aim to deal with peacebuilding and statebuilding challenges. Some of these initiatives are nationally led, others are internationally led. Internationally, many examples and references can be made, including for instance those happening at the at the AU level and its Post conflict reconstruction and development framework; the UN larger peacebuilding framework, including through the work of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and many others; the work and practice of the World Bank; the development of the New Deal and the g7+; amongst others. Some of those instruments will be further explained further in this Handbook. Nationally, in each peacebuilding context
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and country several different initiatives can be referenced as instruments utilised to address peacebuilding related issues. Those include Peacebuilding Strategies, Poverty Reduction mechanisms, peacebuilding and development compact, amongst many others national frameworks. With the developments of many instruments that aim to structure and support peacebuilding processes, there is certainly a stronger space for better convergence between many of these platforms and frameworks. The frequent lack of convergence between processes creates, to a large extent, sentiments of confusion between local actors and international actors, and challenges on identifying priorities of engagement and action. This confusing process leads to dangerous risks. For instance, in this approach many actors end up engaging in processes due to the funding potential, rather than the belief of the relevance of the process. A better coherence between policies and frameworks is required both at the national and international levels. Nationally, the design of frameworks that are complementary to each other would benefit national, local and international actors opportunities to constructively engage in peacebuilding processes. Internationally, actors could certainly provide better coordination of how policies can better channel responses towards peacebuilding.
1.6 Conclusion
This chapter has explained that there are two distinct ways in which peacebuilding tends to be approached. Some see peacebuilding in the context of specific programmes that aim to contribute to peace consolidation, whilst others see peacebuilding as an overall or system-wide effort, i.e. from a holistic perspective. The first approach is focussed on what can be done, whilst the second is focussed on understanding how and why peacebuilding works the way it does. These two approaches are related: for programmatic peacebuilding to be meaningful and sustainable, it needs to be part of a peacebuilding system that is actively pursuing a strategic direction. This chapter has also looked at a number of emerging characteristics that taken together may assist with understanding the peacebuilding concept better. Characteristics such as peace consolidation; the multi-dimensional nature of peacebuilding; the interdependence of peacebuilding actors; the longer-term vs. shorter-term approaches to peacebuilding; the existence of multiple frameworks for peacebuilding, the linkage with the development of peace agreements; all have been discussed.
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Chapter 2: Peacebuilding Phases and Actors

What will this chapter do? This chapter outlines the three phases of peacebuilding and the role of both internal and external actors. Why is it important? The value of this chapter is to provide a deeper understanding of the phases of peacebuilding as well as of the actors involved. What should you learn? By the end of this chapter, the reader should have a deeper understanding of peacebuilding and the actors involved in the process.
2.1 Introduction
The first chapter of this Handbook mentions several emerging characteristics of peacebuilding. In this chapter we will elaborate further on two of them. The first relates to time, in other words the phases that peacebuilding processes go through in the transition from violent conflict to sustainable peace. The second relates to the large and diverse number of actors that together constitute peacebuilding systems. These actors and the very different actions they take together build momentum towards peace, provided that their support is coherent with the needs of the process.
2.2 Peacebuilding Phases

Peacebuilding is situated in the time-period between the cessation of violent conflict and the return to a normal development process. It is possible to identify three phases that may be generally applicable to most peacebuilding processes: the stabilisation phase, the transitional phase and the consolidation phase. This process may take decades, and it is helpful to break it down into phases so that the different phases of peacebuilding can be better understood, planned and managed, based on the distinct priorities and dynamics of each phase. However, these phases should not be understood as clear chronological stages that follow on each other with identifiable boundaries where the one step starts and the other step stops. They are more like oceans that flow into each other, there are parts that are clearly identifiable as belonging in one of these phases, but there are also parts that are greatly influenced by the transition between phases. They thus overlap and flow into each other, and it is very difficult to identify clearly where one phase ends and another begins.
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Peacebuilding as a long-term process
Re f l e c t o
Pr a c t c a l
s
Cedric de Coning, Peacebuilding Advisor, ACCORD I think most international peacebuilders underestimate the amount of time (duration) that is necessary for social transformation to take hold, i.e. to become sustainable.
Change can be something that disturbs a social system, and then it recovers to more or less the way it functioned before, or change can be transformative. For change to be transformative it requires that societies process, adapt and establish new patterns of behaviour. It takes time for any social system to develop a new collective understanding of its own situation, and for such common knowledge to be processed into new, agreed-upon norms and values. For peacebuilding to be sustainable, it would need to invest in processes that are slow-maturing. It thus requires long-term engagement, and processes that allow societies the time and space they need for their internal, home-grown self-organising processes to emerge and to mature. Unfortunately, most international peacebuilding institutions do not have the patience to engage is such long-term and slow-maturing processes. They are driven by results and are under pressure to constantly demonstrate the effects they have been able to generate. This results in unrealistic planning, and programming that is driven by supply side pressure rather than local needs and tempo, as the wealth of critical analysis on transplanting international best practice shows. Knowledge sharing, experience sharing, and learning must therefore lead to localised The political milestones presented in this chapter to describe the three phases are more clearly identifiable in situations where peacebuilding follows on severe disruptions of the state. This does not mean that it is not applicable to situations where a government has remained in control of part of the country affected by conflict, for instance in Sudan, but the nuance needs to be appreciated when considering how these phases should be presented in such conditions. Stabilisation phase The stabilisation phase is the period that either precedes, or follows immediately after, the formal ending of hostilities, and typically focuses on: establishing a safe and secure environment; responding to the consequences of the conflict through emergency relief operations; introducing political stability in the form of a credible peace process.
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In some cases, for instance the AU-UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) or the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), a peacekeeping mission may have been deployed prior to a cease-fire or peace agreement in order to protect civilians and secure humanitarian assistance, whilst a political process seeks an end to the conflict. In others, for instance the UN missions in Liberia (UNMIL) and Burundi (ONUB), peace operations have been deployed to assist with the implementation of a peace agreement, but, even in these cases, the initial phase of the mission is focused on stabilising the situation. As this is the first phase, it is also the start-up phase of the peacebuilding intervention, and it is often accompanied by the deployment of a peacekeeping operation. In this initial period the immediate focus is on security, humanitarian relief and political transition, and this first stage of the stabilisation phase can be referred to as the emergency stage. A focus of this start-up phase is devoted to getting the resources in place that are necessary for the next phase of the intervention. In most cases the initial planning would have been limited to the emergency response, and more planning is now being done for the next phase of the international response. Most agencies and NGOs are engaged in undertaking assessments, designing programmes and mobilising resources. Those NGOs and agencies that are already on the ground and engaged in the humanitarian response start to plan for shifting their focus from the emergency phase to the recovery and rehabilitation phases. The peacekeeping mission is focussed on getting people and resources in place for the next phase of its work. The duration of this phase may be as short a one year, for example in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Burundi, or it may drag on in certain parts of a country for several years. For instance, the eastern part of the DRC in general, and north and south Kivu in particular, have remained partly in the stabilisation phase for more than a decade after the peace process started. In Sudan a similar situation seems to have developed in the disputed border region between the north and the south.
The primary focus of the stabilisation phase is thus ensuring physical securit y, addressing immediate humanitarian needs and putting in place the first steps necessary to signal the start of the implementation of the peace agreement and the process of political transition.
Intensive diplomatic activity may be typically witnessed in both the peace and security domain, and in the development and reconstruction domain, most probably manifesting in the form of a follow-on peacebuilding-orientated UN Security Council resolution, and an international donor conference, that is aimed at mobilising the resources necessary for the transition phase.
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The stabilisation phase is, by its nature, largely determined by the external players. However, once the situation has been sufficiently stabilised the attention turns to the process of handing the initiative back to local actors. Naturally, the political process needs to be agreed to, and is determined by the local context, but very often external actors play an important role in mediating and facilitating such peace agreements. If a peacekeeping mission is required to guarantee or impose security, it naturally will have a significant impact on the local conflict dynamics. Stabilisation phase in East Timor and South Sudan For instance, in East Timor and South Sudan where new states have been formed, new constitutions had to be written and new institutions had to be established. In other cases, where some form of institutions existed prior to the violent conflict, for instance in Liberia, Sierra Leone and the DRC, the focus is on the reform and further development of these institutions. In some cases, most typically in the case of security institutions, these institutions may have been strongly associated with one party to the conflict, and they thus have to be transformed so that they serve society as a whole. Transitional phase The transitional phase often starts with the selection of a transition government, followed by some form of election or legitimate traditional process to elect a transitional government or some other institutions responsible for developing a constitution and other administrative and political functions. The transitional stage ends with hosting of elections, and then is able to run according to the rules established in the transitional phase, including the constitution and the established elected government. The transition being referred to is thus that from an interim to an elected, and thus legitimately sovereign, local political process. The Interim Governing Council of Iraq or the Government of South Sudan prior to independence in 2011 are good examples of such initial interim authorities, that were replaced after a period of transition, with elected governments. Because of their limited credibility such interim governing bodies typically have restricted powers and they are dependent on the physical security and political legitimacy of the international intervention and the credibility and legitimacy of the internal political process that has generated the interim authority. It is thus also a transition from partial to full sovereignty. The length of this phase is determined by the time it takes to make the necessary arrangements for a more legitimate process to take place to elect the first
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post-conflict government, but it typically lasts between two and four years. A lot depends on how intensive the process has to be.
Whilst the overall focus is on the political transition, many other aspects of the overall peacebuilding campaign will start to be implemented in this phase, with an emphasis on DDR process, the return of refugees and IDPs, the rehabilitation of infrastructure, and the development of the institutions of government and civil society.
During the transitional stage the initial appointed interim government is typically followed by some form of more legitimate temporary government, with a mandate to govern for a limited period of time whilst a new constitution is being developed, and prior to the first post-conflict national elections. This may typically include some form of interim elections, for instance for a constituent assembly, or some formal traditional system of represented selection, that results in the formation of a constituent assembly and/or parliaments where a new constitution may be drafted, and where other transitional legislation, such as electoral laws may be passed. The transitional stage typically ends with an election, run according to the new constitution, after which full sovereignty and legitimacy is restored to the state. Then a new government is elected which, for the first time since the conflict ended, and in many cases for years before and during the conflict, can be said to represent the legitimate voice of society as a whole. Consolidation phase
The consolidation phase is aimed at supporting the newly elected government and civil society with a broad range of programmes aimed at fostering reconciliation, boosting socio-economic recovery and supporting the ongoing processes of change and development. Consolidation refers to the consolidation of the peace process and the newly implemented constitution and/or other agreed aspects of the peace process.
The consolidation phase also represents a change in the posture of the international engagement in two important ways. First, during the stabilisation and transitional phases, the external actors had to be seen to be politically impartial, but once all the parties have agreed to a new constitution or a comprehensive political process, the role of the international actors changes in that they now become responsible for consolidating the implementation of this new agreed process. This does not mean that they are no longer impartial when it comes
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to local politics, but they are now firmly in support of the newly agreed political order. In some cases, for instance in the DRC, Somalia and Afghanistan, this means that the international political and security actors may have to support the new government to fight against insurgencies that aim to undermine the new peace process. This may be misunderstood as international support for the government of the day, as opposed to international support for the newly instituted constitutional order or new peace process. The second way in which the consolidation phase represents a change in the posture of the international engagement is that there is now an elected government in place which legitimately speaks on behalf of the society. Whilst local needs and local context needed to be the driving forces behind the peacebuilding process from the beginning, the consolidation phase now represents the official point at which a legitimate national government can take full local control and ownership of the peace process and the future of the society and people it represents. The consolidation phase thus also represents a formal shift in responsibility to the national government, and the point at which it should formally take over the lead role in the coordination of the international peacebuilding effort. This shift in local ownership and sovereign legitimacy is most relevant for those societies that have experienced a complete breakdown of state order, such as those in Liberia or Sierra Leone, or those where a new state has been formed, such as in East Timor and South Sudan. In other cases where the sovereign governance of the state was never interrupted, such as in Sudan and Burundi, this shift is more nuanced, in that the government would have officially retained its lead role throughout the process. However, the international community, whilst recognising its sovereignty, would have dealt with these governments as a party to the conflict, but in the consolidation phase, they will now be dealt with as a partner in the peace process. In Burundi and Sierra Leone there have been peaceful hand-overs of power between the ruling and opposition parties. In these cases, the distinction between the state and the government of the day has thus been more clearly demonstrated than in the other cases cited. The peacebuilding work in this phase covers all aspects of a society in transition, and thus all the dimensions, including SSR, rule of law, governance, socio-economic recovery and development, human rights and reconciliation, and others. The transition from the peacebuilding process to a normal development process is gradual and it will typically be very difficult to pinpoint the exact period when such a transition occurred. The consolidation phase, and with it the peacebuilding
process, can be said to have come to an end when a society is no longer in danger of lapsing into violent conflict, and its development is thus no longer determined
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by a peace consolidation imperative. This is why this post-peacebuilding phase is referred to as normal development, in other words a phase where the development of the country is not determined by preventing a return to violent conflict, but rather traditional development concerns such as the fight against poverty, developmental capacity, etc. The duration of this phase can last anything from a decade to several decades, depending on how peace consolidation is measured. Typically, it can be said that a peace process has been consolidated when there have been two or three post-conflict elections without a relapse into violent conflict. However, as an example, both the DRC and Liberia held their second post-conflict elections in 2011, and both were contested and resulted in some violent clashes and loss of life, although, in both cases, the peace process avoided relapsing into violent conflict and remained overall stable, but showed continuous signs of fragility. As discussed in Chapter 1, what is clear is that it takes several generations, and thus several decades for a society to truly transform its identity, and whilst it is not necessary for this entire period to be seen as peacebuilding, it is important for all the stakeholders to recognise that this is a long-term process. South Africas consolidation phase Perhaps South Africa is a good example, as it is soon reaching the end of its second decade since the end of apartheid in 1994, and it has gone through four elections. The peace process in South Africa has been consolidated in the sense that there is almost no risk of a lapse into violent conflict, but it is also a society that is still experiencing a high level of political and socio-economic transformation, and thus uncertainty. In South Africa political racial inequality was transformed in a relatively short period of time, but the underlying socioeconomic inequalities between races and classes have been much more resistant to change and will require many more decades and generations to change significantly enough to say that the legacy of apartheid has been eroded. Peace processes that are truly transformational, and which address the root causes of conflict will usher in decades of change and uncertainty, and this will be characterised
by political strife between those who want faster and more radical change and those who want slower and more stable change.
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Peacebuilding, is thus about peace consolidation in the sense that it is focused on avoiding a lapse into violent conflict, but this should not be confused with political stability and socio-economic certainty.
On the contrary, all stakeholders engaged in peacebuilding should know that they are unleashing change dynamics that will play out over several generations and many decades, and that the role of peacebuilding is to facilitate these processes of change whilst avoiding a lapse into violent conflict. Need for prioritisation and sequencing Peacebuilding is a field that covers a wide variety of tasks and dimensions, and as such, a core issue in peacebuilding relates to how to prioritise and order responses to post-conflict challenges. Countries emerging from conflict are frequently faced with a wide variety of possible priorities and thus, it is important to identify what aspect should be addressed first in terms of its ability to also allow for other priorities to be addressed. A first step in post-conflict countries relates to the need for a clear definition of priorities in relation to peacebuilding processes, the impacts these will have on overall sustainability, and the legitimacy of these processes for local actors.
2.3 Peacebuilding Actors

When considering the range of actors engaged in peacebuilding, a distinction between internal and external actors can be made. Internal refers to those actors that are indigenous to the conflict system. For example, in South Sudan, the internal actors are all of the South Sudanese actors, the political parties and other political actors, government institutions, civil society, the private sector, traditional leaders, etc. External refers to those actors that are engaged in a given conflict system, but which are outside or international actors, in other words, they are neighbouring states, they are international organisations like the UN, or regional organisations like the AU, international NGOs, donor countries or countries that have commercial interests, the international private sector, etc. The first or macro-level distinction is thus between actors that are local and those that are international. International actors come and go, and many are professional peacebuilders, in other words, they do peacebuilding for a living wherever it is needed.
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Internal actors, on the other hand, have lived through the conflict and their future will be shaped by its legacy and the transformative power of the peace process. They have become peacebuilders by necessity. The internal actors own the space and should own the process, because they will suffer, or benefit from, its consequences. Local actors also have the greatest cultural, regional and national understanding, placing them in the best strategic position to develop a relevant and appropriate peacebuilding process. Only they can make peace, and only they can take responsibility for its outcome. External actors have an important role to play in supporting facilitation. They are interested parties because they stand to gain or lose from a lapse into violent conflict, sustained instability and fragility, or a successful and sustainable peace. They have the agency to influence the process, but they cannot make peace on behalf of the internal actors. Their role is thus influential but limited. An important principle that is emphasised throughout this Handbook is that external actors need to be self-aware of their limited agency.
They have the responsibility not to cause harm, and not to substitute the capacities that should rightfully be performed by internal actors. When they do they delay local ownership, and occupy the space that need to be filled by internal actors in order for the system to self-organise and, in so doing, they contribute to the fragility of the system.
External actors thus have to limit their role to providing a broad secure space within which local actors can find a safe grip to regain their footing. Their role should be limited to capacity and to providing support, with the aim of assisting the internal actors to manage themselves. Unfortunately, many external actors have failed to uphold these principles. Many external actors try to direct and control the conflict systems in which they are engaged. Some do so by intent, others through ignorance. Some believe that it is only by adopting certain characteristics, such as Western-style democracy and rule of law, that a society will avoid lapsing into conflict. This is the so-called neo-liberal state model and it has been the prevailing approach to peacebuilding since the end of the cold war. Others are simply eager to provide assistance, and their own lack of self-discipline ends-up substituting, or eroding local capacity for example, by hiring local expertise to serve external actors, rather than internal actors needs. This undermines the very local institutions and capacities they intended to support, and perversely contributes to the very fragility they intended to counter. A major theme in the second generation approach to peacebuilding is thus to find the optimal balance between the role of the external and internal actors.
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External actors There are a number of external actors that need to be considered in the peacebuilding context typically, a core group that is dedicated to the peacebuilding effort. These usually include international or regional peacekeeping operations, a number of UN agencies, organised as the UN Country Team, a large range of international NGOs organised around a number of clusters such as food security, health, etc. and a number of interested governments, including neighbours, countries with commercial interests and donor agencies. In many post-conflict situations the UN, the AU or sub-regional organisations, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), or the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in the Horn of Africa deploy a peace operation to stabilise the situation and to monitor and support the peace process. The bulk of a peace operations effort and resources are focused on ensuring a safe and secure environment so that the rest of the peacebuilding can be carried out without fear of disruption.
These peace operations usually deploy at the start of the stabilisation phase, play a major role during the transitional phase, and withdraw during the consolidation phase when the risk of lapsing into violent conflict is no longer deemed to be a serious short- to medium-term likelihood.
The different members of the UN system in a given country are commonly referred to as the UN Country Team (UNCT). The UNCT is headed by a Resident Representative. The Resident Representative (RR) is also the Resident Coordinator (RC) of the UN System in the country and usually also the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC). Members of the UNCT may include the UNDP, the World Bank, the UN High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Programme (WFP), the UN Childrens Fund (UNICEF), the World Health Organisation (WHO), the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and others. All of these agencies, funds and offices have their own mandates, budgets and programmes and the RC/HCs function is to ensure that the UNCT develops a coherent overall effort in support of the needs of the country where they are based. The members of the UNCT meet on a regular basis and use various coordination mechanisms to harmonise their policies and programmes. The members of the UNCT and the government of the country in which they are operating usually agree on a common strategic framework, called the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), which specifies how the UN system will support the
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government over a given time-frame (typically three to five years). The UNDAF is typically aligned with an even broader strategic framework, which encompasses the government and all the external actors, including the UN the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the donor countries. This overall strategic framework is usually called the PRSP. In some cases there will also be a specific peacebuilding strategy, or strategic framework, sometimes facilitated by the engagement of the UN PBC. International NGOs include a broad range of independent not-for-profit organisations that work in the humanitarian assistance and development spheres. Most NGOs have developed a specific field of specialisation. Some like Mdecins sans Frontires (Doctors without Borders/ MSF) focus on the health sector. Oxfam is known for its work in the water, sanitation and preventive health sectors. Others, such as Care International and World Vision, have a more cross-cutting approach and may be involved in food distribution, agriculture projects and support of refugees or internally displaced people (IDPs). In some cases, these NGOs will execute programmes for which they have obtained their own funding, in others cases they may act as implementing partners for UN agencies like the UNHCR (refugees) or WFP (food distribution). Many of these NGOs are primarily humanitarian agencies that will be most active in the stabilisation phase, but some remain engaged after the humanitarian emergency in the recovery and rehabilitation periods, and some are now also active in peacebuilding programmes. The donor community includes multilateral donor agencies such as the European Union (EU) and European Commission (EC/ECHO), and bilateral donor agencies such as: the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) (Japan), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (United States of America), DFID (United Kingdom), the Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) (Germany), the Norwegian Agency for Development Coordination (NORAD) (Norway), the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) (Sweden), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) (Canada), and GOAL (Ireland). Usually, most of these donor agencies are present at the country level, but they dont execute programmes themselves. They provide the resources for the UN system and the NGOs that do the actual work. Many UN agencies subcontract the actual work to NGOs approximately 80 % of all programme activity in the field is carried out by NGOs. The international private sector and governments with specific economic interests typically in the natural resources sectors like energy and minerals also play an important role in the peacebuilding process. They should be a force for good that supports the peace process by investing in the economy, which generates revenue for the state, creates employment and stimulates economic activity and growth. However, they can also be a destructive influence when they try to influence local politics to their benefit, or
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when their activities are perceived to benefit one of the parties to the conflict. In many cases state fragility attract trans-national organised crime, and these organised criminal groups may, at times, mask part of their activities as legitimate private sector interests, so as to give them a legal presence in a given country. The private sector is thus a critical peacebuilding partner, but it has a dark-side that needs to be kept in check. Last, but perhaps most important is the larger political interest at stake, as represented by the interest of neighbouring states, or other states that have a particular historic or other stake in the conflict system. The external politics percolate up and influence the decisions of the UN Security Council, as well as regional bodies such as the AU, and in the African context, sub-regional bodies such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The external politics also percolate down and influence the political space and choices of the parties to the conflict. The peacebuilding actors are ultimately directed by the mandates they derive from the UN Security Council and the governing boards of the UN agencies as well as by the funding decisions of the donor countries and the decisions of the neighbouring and another interested countries. These different actions affect the degree to which these countries support the peace process, influencing issues such as how many troops will be contributed to UN or AU operations, how much technical assistance and how much encouraging investment will be provided, etc. The political dimension of peacebuilding, including the external political dimension, is thus a strong factor that exerts influence on the peacebuilding system. However, this influence flows both ways and the dynamics among the internal actors, and the relationships and interactions between the internal and external actors, greatly influence the politics of the peacebuilding system. Internal actors Internal actors are the ones who have the most to benefit or lose from peacebuilding processes. They are the ones that benefit directly from it and should thus have the highest degree of ownership within the process. The internal actors are comprised of a wide variety of stakeholders , as every element of society is affected by the conflict and has a stake in the peace process.
Examples of these internal stakeholders include; the government of the day, the parties to the conflict, the private sector and civil society in all of its different varieties. The internal actors represent all elements of society: political parties, social movements, traditional leaders, religious organisations, the private sector, professional associations, youth and womens movements, trade unions, NGOs, universities and research institutes, families, farmers, schools, the judiciary, and the media.
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Most external peacebuilding actors specialise in one or a few of these dimensions, and their engagement with the peacebuilding process thus primarily takes place through the lens of the specific area they are engaged in, for instance SSR and RoL. Internal actors on the other hand, in their individual and family contexts, experience peacebuilding as a whole-of-system effect. They feel safe enough to send their children to school, or to return to their places of origin, and they have confidence enough to invest in building a home or investing in the economy, or not, based on their overall sense of the peace process, and their assessment of the likelihood of a lapse or re-lapse into violent conflict. In their professional capacities some may work in a specific sector, such as SSR and RoL, but they also have a deep-rooted stake in the overall outcome of the process. Civil society often plays a critical role in peacebuilding processes. Whilst they are not, nor should necessarily, act as a substitute for the state, they are meant to provide support to the peacebuilding process. Civil society actors can play various roles at different stages of conflict, often positive or negative. In this context, not all civil society organisations are necessarily dedicated to peace and peacebuilding, and instead can contribute to the fostering of violent conflict. Civil Society roles in peacebuilding
Civil society can play many roles in peacebuilding. The following list, whilst not exclusive, present a few of the roles that are often played by these organisations: Monitoring and early warning analysis; Conflict analysis; Advocacy and education; Protection; Track-two mediation and facilitation; Alternative media; War and peace reporting; Service delivery and livelihood generation; Youth work; Initiatives to foster social cohesion; Social capital; Psycho-social support; Documentation and initiatives for dealing with the past.
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2.4 Conclusion
In principle, the host government and other internal actors should play lead roles in the peacebuilding process, since it is their own future that hangs in the balance. Unfortunately, in many cases, the capacity of internal actors has been so severely diminished by the conflict that their ability to lead the process is lacking, especially in the earlier phases of the peacebuilding process. As a result, the international peacebuilding community, by default, has often played more of a leading role than is appropriate or desired. At a minimum, peacebuilding coordination processes should ensure that the host community participates in all decisions that affect them, and that there is a process in place to support them to develop capacity in order to play their rightful role. The African Peacebuilding Coordination Programme (APCP), in the context of which this Handbook has been developed, particularly aims to support and build the capacity of internal actors to engage in the coordination process, so that they are better able to influence the outcome and direction of the peacebuilding process. As the peacebuilding process develops, internal actors should play an increasingly important role. In a sense, the phases outlined at the beginning of this chapter are indicative of the situation and role of the internal actors. The stabilisation phase is focussed on regaining the security and basic needs of the local society. The transitional phase is the start of the process of regaining political, social and economic control, and the consolidation phase represents the establishment and maintenance of local control over the politics, economy and security of the society in question. Often, in the first generation of peacebuilding, external actors make the mistake of seeing internal actors as the objects of their intervention. They see the internal actors as patients who need to be healed and cared for and the actors as the doctors that have the agency to do the healing. In the second generation of peacebuilding the medical patient-doctor relationship, and its assumed power relationship between the internal and external actors, is rejected. Internal actors are not sick passive patients who need to be healed, and external actors are not doctors that have a professional standing to diagnose and administer a cure. It is now known that external actors do not have any claim to superior knowledge about state formation, institution building or peacebuilding, and that externally imposed models do not work. Peacebuilding, state formation and institution-building have to be local-context and self-generated processes that generate indigenous and locally owned bottom-up institutions. This is the only sustainable way in which societies, institutions and states are formed. This is the way in which all sustainable states and institutions have been formed elsewhere, including in the West. This also implies that internal actors have to do it for themselves. The role of external actors needs to be limited to creating conducive space within which this
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self-development can take place, and to providing the minimum support necessary. Anything beyond that can actually undermine the peacebuilding process. The most important transformation in the second generation of peacebuilding is the transformation of attitudes and policies among external actors. The external actors have to formulate and adopt new principles and approaches that challenge their own deep-rooted identity, self-image and roles. They need to learn to exert self-discipline, learn to take a much longer-term and patient approach, and learn how to limit themselves to their external role.
ACCORD Photo
In the consolidation phase of peacebuilding, it is necessary to work with various stakeholders in order to create consolidation and to move from the peacebuilding process to a normal development process.
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Chapter 3: Dimensions of Peacebuilding

What will this chapter do? This chapter outlines the various dimensions of peacebuilding which should be considered when unpacking what peacebuilding means. Why is it important? An understanding of the dimensions of peacebuilding is vital for practitioner, trainer or trainee as these parties within the state should be consulted and worked with during peacebuilding processes. What should you learn? By the end of this chapter, the reader should have an understanding of what the various dimensions of peacebuilding are.
3.1 Introduction
There are various dimensions involved in the understanding and analysis of peacebuilding. As mentioned in the previous chapters, peacebuilding is a complex process where a series of actors and issues are relevant in order to achieve and effective peace. This chapter aims to deepen the understanding of peacebuilding and provide insight into the processes that must be executed within peacebuilding activities. By no means is it a conclusive analysis of all of the dimensions of peacebuilding, but it does provide insight into a few of the key dimensions that are appropriate in terms of enabling the reader to effectively understand important aspects involved in peacebuilding. To start, this chapter will look at what is needed to ensure the population feels safe and secure in their new post-conflict society. This will involve initiating disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration processes as well as security sector reform. Once a society is stable and secure, the process of the development of legitimate political institutions can begin and processes which allow the population to exercise their right to vote and air their grievances in an effective manner should be implemented. The development of operative systems of law, justice and governance will stabilise the society and aid the state in consolidating its new found peaceful existence. Once this has happened, the process of developing the economy and reconciling the people will follow. It is important to be aware that there are a range of vulnerable actors and groups within society which must be actively involved and considered within all
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peacebuilding activities. Once again, the listing, provided here of possibly vulnerable groups in post-conflict settings, is not comprehensive rather, three key groups are highlighted namely, those of women, children and displaced people.
3.2 Establishing an effective state of security in a post-conflict setting

Security, in a narrow form, has been defined exclusively in terms of the ability of the state to defend its territory and its principal values against military threat. However, over the past fifty years, the notion of security has expanded. As Robert McNamara suggests, Security is development and without development there can be no security [...] development means economic, social and political progress. It means a reasonable standard of living, and reasonable in this context requires continual redefinition(1968), and this view has been reflected in the international arena with regards to issues of economics, development, the environment, human rights, and migration, among others. Toolkit: What is needed for a secure environment The development of an effective state of security; Functioning governance system; Nonviolent conflict management; The development of a working economy; Promotion of a culture of inclusivity; Dealing with the past; and Reconciliation initiatives.
Adapted from: Rigby, Andrew (2006) Is there a role for the military in peacebuilding?, Committee for Conflict Transformation Support, No 32.
This notion of security can be more specifically linked to the notion of human security. Human security measures security as more than merely the physical security from threats of violence but also includes economic and social security. In this context, human security stresses the need for focusing more on human well-being as a security component. With regards to peacebuilding, one needs to deal with issues of inequality and economic threats in order to ensure that a person feels completely safe in the post-conflict state. However, as the challenges affecting states grow, so too does the notion of what is needed for a state to be secured; security needs to take into account issues such as transnational drug trafficking, disease pandemics, global climate change, resources scarcities and international terrorism among many other complexities. When
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a state is moving through a peacebuilding process, there are various processes that it needs to go through in order to consolidate security, including DDR, SSR and ensuring effective use of the military in the peacebuilding process. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) The processes of DDR are critical and necessary in post-conflict contexts. These processes transform agents of war into agents of peace. This process is broad and extensive as it addresses a wide range of actors: children, the elderly, women, ex-combatants and individuals with disabilities. It is important that their wide interests and needs must be addressed through the right structures and mechanisms; for example, UNICEF plays a major role in facilitating DDR processes for children. DDR processes also require a coordinated and coherent approach between the government, the UN mission and agencies, and other non-governmental and international financial organisations. Disarmament The process of disarmament involves the relinquishing of arms by rebel groups and ex-combatants. The submission of weapons such as heavy machine guns, hand grenades, and small arms and light weapons is critical for determining the success of demobilisation and reintegration processes. Without the thorough removal and destruction of these weapons, they can be recycled in future conflicts. A major challenge with the disarmament process is the reluctance of ex-combatants to let go of these weapons as they have depended on them for protection and other means. Demobilisation Demobilisation can be defined as the process whereby former non-state armed groups are disbanded and discharged. This process attempts to change the perceptions and mind-sets of ex-combatants and aims to transform them to support the peace process. This process is critical because if ties between members of armed militia and rebel groups are not broken, they are able to re-mobilise in the future. Successful demobilisation processes create the space for the full reintegration and inclusion of ex-combatants back into society. Reintegration Reintegration is the process whereby ex-combatants are reintroduced to their or other communities. These processes aim at creating a smooth transition of returning combatants to civilian life and a life of peace instead of violence. A process of reconciliation should take place during reintegration processes so that communities welcome ex-combatants and are able to assist in reintegrating them back into their communities. Reintegration also goes further and provides the resources, both financial and in-kind, for these ex-combatants to settle back into their communities comfortably.
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DDR as a core peacebuilding dimension
Re f l e c t o
Pr a c t c a l
s
Abu Sherif, Senior Programme Officer, Peacebuilding Unit, ACCORD Working for years with the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation
and Reintegration in Liberia, involved in the DDR of approximately 100 000 ex-combatants, it is clear to me that security is a vitally important aspect of peacebuilding. I think that this is especially the case in post-conflict initiatives. Really, you cannot have a peacebuilding initiative without security; the two are inseparable. So, while peacebuilding involves many different aspects aimed at addressing the root causes of conflict such as providing humanitarian assistance, establishing the rule of law, and fostering economic revitalisation-security is, in many ways, deeply implicated in and linked to all of these. For example, without disarmament, economic revitalisation is often severely curtailed the presence of weapons in the streets, in the hands of those who have illegally acquired them, regardless of whether or not fighting is actually occurring, is threatening and frightens off potential investors. Another example is the direct link between RoL and security; in the absence of ROL, there is no way that security can actually be guaranteed. In terms of DDR programmes generally, and considering the case of Liberia, what is sometimes problematic is that they are established during emergency phases. Thus it is difficult for programmes to be designed in way that are context specific and cater adequately for particular needs practitioners do not even know who they will be working with until the processes of disarmament and demobilisation have taken place. This problematic aspect is increased by the fact that there cannot be any delays between the different stages. Delays are unacceptable as the expectations and the vulnerability of ex-combatant is very high during DDR if there are delays you may therefore be exposing both communities and ex-combatants to danger. Speaking from this experience, the most difficult aspect to actually implement and ensure within the field is that of rehabilitation and reintegration. When you talk about disarmament, this process is led by the military. If civilians are involved it is usually in documentation or monitoring capacity. When you talk about demobilisation, you are talking about breaking down and dismantling existing command structures. This was somewhat challenging in the case of Liberia as the project was actually developed in New York and only five days were allocated for this process I am therefore not sure that this part of the process was as effective as it could have been. However, disarmament and demobilisation are more direct
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processes than rehabilitation and reintegration and often do have more established time frames. When it comes to rehabilitation and reintegration, you are trying to equip ex-combatants for the future providing them with livelihood skills and attempting to address psycho-social aspects such as trauma these processes can take many months or even years. Reintegration is also extremely complex as you have to also consider the communities into which the ex-combatants will be reintegrated. Working in Liberia, there was often friction between ex-combatants and the communities that would be receiving them. Communities often (justifiably) felt that it was unfair for ex-combatants, as perpetrators of violence, to be receiving support and assistance while they, as the victims of violence, had no programmes tailored to assist them in meeting their particular needs. Packages for the affected victims may have gone some way in curbing these hostilities. Returning to the economic aspect of rehabilitation and reintegration, it is absolutely essential that programmes are structured in ways that incorporate the market realities of the country. So, for example, in Liberia, there are some towns that where you dont find more than 100 vehicles; training ex-combatants to become mechanics would be completely unrealistic in this context and render the process largely ineffectual. Also, in Liberia, the unemployment rate is very high; thus, even when training ex-combatants in skills and trades, they may not be able to support themselves. In order to address this problem, we tried in our programme to create awareness among participants that regardless of whether they are formally employed, they can still make a living by starting up their own businesses. While dealing with constraints of time and funding, peacebuilding practitioners nonetheless have to be flexible and aware enough to respond to these complexities in order to implement effective DDR actions.
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Case File: Sierra Leone building trust between ex-combatants and communities The Lom Peace Agreement of 1999 incorporated the development of a DDR Programme targeting approximately 45,000 ex-combatants of the Armed Forces of Sierra Leone, Revolutionary United Front (RUF), Civil Defence Forces (CDF) and paramilitary forces. The DDR programme was carried out in three phases between September 1998 and January 2002. It initially faced serious setbacks, but the third phase of DDR was successful mainly because both the government and the RUF had realised that military victory was not possible. Nonetheless, local social reintegration was not easy. Ex-combatants fear(ed) they would be targeted and ostracised, while civilians fear(ed) a return of violence, or resent(ed) the crimes the ex-combatants were frequently alleged to have committed. To reduce tension and facilitate the reintegration of ex-combatants into communities, the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR) set up social reconciliation programmes in areas of critical tension in the south, east and northern parts of Sierra Leone. The NCDDR provided pre-discharge counselling to ex-combatants. In communities, pre-demobilisation activities included community sensitisation exercises and media and radio campaigns. Traditional reconciliation mechanisms were also utilised. In potentially serious cases, where war crimes were alleged, NCDDR acted as a facilitator with traditional leaders to facilitate the return of ex-combatants. In a further bid to strengthen reconciliation, the NCDDR has encouraged ex-combatants to undertake tasks that may be beneficial to communities, such as civil works, street cleaning, and helping to rehabilitate shelter. It has also supported adult education programmes, civic and peace education, music, sports groups, and other projects that help to rebuild social capital.
Source: Ginifer, Jeremy (2003) S i e rra Le o n e Building the Road to Recovery, Institute of Security Studies, Monograph No 80, March 2003, available at <http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/monographs/No80/Chap2.html>.
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Security Sector Reform (SSR) The security sector can be broadly defined as encompassing a group of actors and institutions that are tasked with providing security. More specifically, these actors are tasked with protecting the state and citizens from internal and external threats to their security and ensuring their safety. With the fragile state of a country after conflict, SSR involves drafting a new national security strategy and designing a new security architecture that assesses the security situation, outlines security gaps and threats, and evaluates the available and needed resources (human and financial) to address these security gaps and threats.
SSR goes beyond the traditional norms of security which are linked to the military, army and police branches of government to include customs, borders, and intelligence services. Governance structures such as parliament and legislature provide oversight functions to the security actors, as well as the judiciary and traditional justice structures in order to ensure the rule of law.
As a process, SSR should be governed by legality, transparency, accountability and inclusivity. Furthermore it is respectful of human rights, includes democratic norms and is within the rule of law.
Very importantly it should be a process led by the people through their active involvement in the process of planning and implementation as the threats are closely felt by them.
In immediate post-conflict situations, new security structures have to be developed. These require the recruitment, training, and equipping of personnel. For example, ex-combatants go through a vetting process to ensure that they are eligible and qualify for recruitment. In many cases external security actors have to be relied upon to assist in developing these structures. The end goal therefore is to create a professional security sector grounded in the rule of law. Both DDR and SSR processes should be carried out together as these processes impact upon one another. For example, as ex-combatants complete the DDR processes, they can be recruited and integrated into national security structures. On this basis, the restructuring of security institutions will also examine how to include former ex-combatants into these processes. The success of these parallel processes will contribute to peace and long term stability in the post-conflict state. The role of the military in securing the post-conflict state There is a close relationship between military intervention and peacebuilding. It is vital that military troops work with international organisations to stabilise the
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Toolkit: Actors involved in SSR processes Core security actors: armed forces (including international and regional forces), police, Core security actors: armed forces (including international and regional forces), police, gendarmeries, paramilitary forces, presidential guards, intelligence and security services, coast guards, border guards, customs authorities, and reserve and local security units. Security management and oversight bodies: parliament/legislature and its relevant legislative committees; government/the executive, including ministries of defense, internal and foreign affairs; national security advisory bodies; customary and traditional authorities; financial management bodies; and civil society actors, including the media, academia and non-governmental organisations. Justice and rule of law institutions: justice ministries, prisons, criminal investigation and prosecution services, the judiciary (courts and tribunals), implementation justice services (bailiffs and ushers), other customary and traditional justice systems, human rights commissions and ombudsmen. Non-statutory security forces: liberation armies, guerrilla armies, private body-guard units, private security companies, private military companies and political party militias. Non-statutory civil society groups: professional groups, the media, research organisations, advocacy organisations, religious organisations, non-governmental organisations and community groups
Source: Valasek, Kristin (2008) Security Sector Reform and Gender Gender and Security Sector Reform Toolkit . Eds. Megan Bastick and Kristin Valasek. Geneva: DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR, UN-INSTRAW. Available at <http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/MENA/tool_1-security_sector_ reform_and_gender.pdf>
situation, but there is a fine line between when the military should withdraw and allow peacebuilding operations to take over. If the military is there too long, a dependency on them is formed that hampers peacebuilding efforts. However, if they leave too early, the situation may not be secure enough to prevent a breakdown into more conflict. This relationship is not always simple to manage and there are several challenges that face peacebuilding and military intervention (Schnabel and Ehrhart, 2005). The military should not be used as the first stage of a response where the reasoning is to merely buy time for more considered political thinking. It is intrinsic in some way to all stages of peacebuilding if it is relevant at all. And if the military is to be deployed, it should be deployed heavily in the early stages and drawn down thereafter, not
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vice-versa. There is a natural resistance to creating a heavy military involvement in the early stages of an operation, not least because it may appear aggressive or have political implications at a regional level. However, having military number withdraw during the process will increase the notion that the country is stabilising and allow a transition to international and local institutions.
3.3 Developing a Functioning Governance System

An effective political process is vital to ensuring long-lasting peace and stability in a post-conflict country. Political processes encompass rule of law, good governance and are guided by legitimate elections and just authority. Rule of law is centred around three core elections, namely that the power of the state should not be exercised arbitrarily; the state, its organs and its representatives are subjected to the same rules and authority as those within the state; and that the law must apply to all without discrimination and monitored by an independent institution. Rule of law is typically designed by an independent process and monitored by an impartial judiciary. Good governance is linked to rule of law. Without good governance a state will often be ripe with corruption, abuse of power, stifling of funds and unfair distribution of resources, all of which will destabilise a country and increase the likelihood of conflict. Good governance, according to the World Bank, is said to consist of processes by which governments are selected monitored and replaced, particularly through the capacity of governments to effectively formulate and implement sound policies. Also, governance relate to the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions said to govern and oversee the economic and social interactions among the state and citizens themselves (Bevir, 2009).
UN Photo/Martine Perret
A government elected by the majority of the people is seen as legitimate and maintains this legitimacy though ensuring it meets the needs and ideals of the people who elected it. 51
There are 8 common characteristics that are considered to be the benchmarks of good governance: Consensus oriented Good governance requires mediation of the different interests in society to reach a broad consensus on what is in the best interest of the whole community. Participatory Good governance requires involvement from both men and women and all categories of peoples including the vulnerable. Follows the rule of law Effectiveness and efficiency Accountable Good governance entails respecting and abiding by the rule of law. Processes and institutions produce results that meet the needs of society while making the best use of resources at their disposal. Not only governmental institutions but also the private sector and civil society organisations must be accountable to the public and to their institutional stakeholders. Includes the possibility to change teams. Accountability cannot be enforced without transparency and the rule of law. Transparent Decisions taken and their enforcement are done in a manner that follows rules and regulations. It also means that information is freely available and directly accessible to those who will be affected by such decisions and their enforcement. Responsive Good governance requires that institutions and processes try to serve all stakeholders within a reasonable timeframe. Equitable and inclusive A societys well-being depends on ensuring that all its members feel part of the process with concerns taken into account in a fair manner.
Source: What is Governance Available at: <www.unescap.org/pdd/prs/governance.asp>.
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There are still many challenges with good governance processes which affect the African continent. Many of these governance institutions and practices that were inherited at independence from colonialism were, for the most part, not adapted to African realities, nor to the continents specific developmental challenges. Some of the key challenges include: 1. Coping with Africas complex political environment defined in terms of the fact that there are 54 unique states in the continent that differ both in their historical experiences and inheritances and also in the realities they face. 2. The rules of the game are yet to be clearly defined and internalised, so that the outcomes of major democratic processes, such as elections, could become both predictable and readily acceptable. What prevails at the moment is that some of those who wield political power are disposed to bending the rules of the game in their favour, while those who perceive themselves as outsiders, have constantly challenged democratic processes. This was witnessed in Zimbabwe, Kenya, Uganda and Cote dIvoire. 3. The strength of civil society varies greatly across Africa, and often civil society can be characterised as being weak and fragmented. As a result, civil society is susceptible and vulnerable to co-option by government. Moreover, rather than building bonds along shared interest, civil society groups tend to reinforce societal divisions through organised intergroup differences. Similarly, these organisations are often governed with the same limitations on participation, expression, free and fair leadership and accountability as a governing regime, making them poor and hypocritical training grounds for democratic models of governance. 4. There is the emergence of a new threat of incumbent governments seeking to alter their constitutions in order to extend their mandates (.examples may be found in the cases of Uganda, Zimbabwe and Cameroon). Policy frameworks that have evolved to address some of the continents governance challenges have at times been overtaken by new emerging dynamics that were not foreseen at the time of crafting these frameworks. The challenge is to make these frameworks broad enough to accommodate more complex situations. The importance of elections for good governance Elections are a core aspect of good governance and would be a means to overcome many issues listed above. Elections are the means by which the leadership is elected and given legitimate power. A government elected by the majority of the people is seen as legitimate and maintains this legitimate power though ensuring it meets the needs and ideals of the people who elected it. Elections are seen as a beacon of hope for democracy and usually end a transition from conflict to a democratic state.
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Elections are able to allow the population to have a say in who leads them and also provide processes and institutions in which the population is able express grievances and exercise their voice. A government elected through free and fair elections will hold not only legitimacy but will uphold the rule of law and the governance structures which will enable the state to consolidate itself and increase the likelihood of sustainable peace and development. Free and fair elections which are overseen by international observers are seen to hold legitimacy and will increase the statue of the country in the eyes of the international community. Case File: Changing the governance equation in Africa In the 21st century, the Arab Spring has ignited the need to begin to debate the issue and relevance of governance and respect for the rule of law. Fifty years after independence for many African countries, this debate has still not been accorded the attention it deserves. The uprisings have: 1. legitimised and brought to the fore the relationship between the state and its citizenry 2. further enhanced the realisation that there is a need for governments to begin to set up acceptable governance standards, or to review and amend existing standards and ensure that they are in line with the realities of the time The political equation is changing from the continents semi-authoritarian and autocratic regimes. Despite the change, the state remains the principle driver in ensuring good governance. However, this responsibility does not lie solely with the state. The citizenry must ensure that their active participation consolidates state efforts. State institutions should empower and unite the people they are serving, providing equal opportunities, inclusion and access to resources. However, the empowerment of people can only be achieved in its totality if the legal and judicial systems and other processes are functional and fully operational.
There are many challenges, however, with elections especially in new states which do not have the infrastructure in place to hold an election. The table below highlights some of the issues with elections. Problems that prevent an election from being free and fair take various forms:
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Problem L ack of open political debate or an informed electorate
Explanation The population of the state eligible to vote may be poorly informed about the key issues or running candidates because of specific freedoms being compromised, namely lack of press freedom, lack of objectivity in the press due to state or corporate control, or lack of access to news and political media. A specific problem could be when freedom of speech is curtailed due to press sources being controlled by the state and the press thus favouring cer tain viewpoints or enhancing state propaganda.
Example In a poll taken in the USA, a majorit y of th e USA electorate believe that the country gives away far too much foreign aid. However, when asked about the exact number, the number given was a vast exaggeration from what it is in reality.
Unfair rules
E xcluding of opposition candidates from eligibility for elections and for office, and the act of manipulating thresholds for elec toral success. T hese are t wo o f t h e w ay s i n w h i c h electoral processes can be manipulated to ensure the success of one candidate over another.
In the 2012 Russian elections, Grigory Yarlinsky, from the liberal opposition par t y) faced exclusion from the elections based on alleged violations in his application to run for president. Without his inclusion in the race, thousands of election monitors would be barred from deployment. In China, during the neighbourhoods Peoples Congress Elections (small local elections), Qiao Mu and his student campaigners experienced name off the ballot. much harassment, and kept his
Interference with campaigns
Those in power may arrest or assassinate candidates, suppress or even criminalise campaigning, close campaign headquar ters, harass or beat campaign workers, or intimidate voters with violence.
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Tampering with the election mechanism
This can include confusing or misleading voters about how to vote, tampering with voting machines, violation of the secret ballot, ballot stuffing, voter registration fraud, destruction of legitimately cast ballots, voter suppression, fraudulent tabulation of results, and use of physical force or verbal intimation at polling places.
In Kenya, during the elections prior to 2013, the outdated voter registry meant that thousands of people who had passed away were still on the registry: 15% of registered voters were actually dead. This process was used by political parties to stuff the ballot boxes.
Source: Thompson, Dennis (2002) Just Elections: Creating a free electoral system in the United States, United States: The University of Chicago Press.
Some of the methods used to ensure the legitimacy of elections and decrease the likelihood of the above challenges would include: the development and maintenance of an accurate electoral role, regularly updated and inspected by international observers; the use of widespread electoral campaigns, which are open to all opposition parties free of intimidation and violence and the use of external observers would increase the legitimacy of the process; the counting of ballots in a public manner to ensure transparency, and the safe-guarding of ballot boxes to decrease the chance of tampering; and lastly, the use of free and fair media opportunities given equally to all participating in the elections. If these aspects are utilised during electoral processes, and regular elections are held and accounted for in the constitution, the likelihood of good governance, legitimate authority and stable rule of law are much higher. Once a post-conflict state has been able to provide security to its citizens, provide a means for them to express their grievances, and has allowed them to exercise their right to vote, the post-conflict society will begin to develop economically and issues of poverty and inequality may then come to the forefront of the peacebuilding agenda.
3.4 Economic Recovery and Developing a Working Economy

Economic recovery is an aspect of rebuilding a post-conflict society that involves addressing a series of issues, such as inequality and abuse of resources within the state, and a wide range of actors, working together, in order to ensure that the post-conflict state is able to flourish and move forward. According to International Alert, a significant element of peacebuilding, going beyond aspects of military security, is ensuring that there is a strong socio-economic foundation (International Alert, 2013). Economic recovery is intrinsically linked to political processes in that one needs a legitimate
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government, stable institutions and an effective rule of law system in order to develop and oversee the use of mechanisms which encourage this recovery. The process of economic recovery can be seen as complete when an economy is sustainable and functioning on its own. This would be evident through the following indicators: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Reconstructed physical infrastructure; Employment and livelihood generation; Developed private sector; Efficient natural resource management; Equitable and fair resource allocation; and Creation of markets, banking and financial institutions.
On a broader scale, economic recovery involves improving the standard of living for all people. Positive economic transformation is required to ensure the success and longevity of peacebuilding processes. Unemployment and poverty are two key factors that often cripple peacebuilding processes. This can be addressed through the provision of training and apprenticeships for individuals so that they can contribute to the communitys economy. One strategy involves encouraging local businesses to hire and train apprentices through compensation. If individuals are provided with these opportunities, then they are not forced to migrate in search of employment. The importance of initiating a process of economic recovery come is often established when identifying which issues most importantly need to be addressed in a post-conflict society and how to address these. One of the most important aspects of economic recovery is addressing issues of inequality. Inequalities and economic disparities can ignite conflict and causes tensions in a society. While one may argue that the growth of an economy allows the livelihoods of members within the society to be bettered, if the benefits of this growth are not equitably distributed, it can actually create further inequality thus increasing poverty for the majority and tensions within the society. However, if one is able to ensure that inequality is held constant while economic growth is taking place, poverty is likely to fall. Poverty reduction strategies
Many countries develop poverty reduction strategies whilst building a national peacebuilding framework. These strategies aim to be comprehensive and inclusive and thus ensure that they represent the views of the majority of the population.
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Poverty reduction strategies address: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Economic marginalisation of groups such as women, unemployed youth and ethnic minorities through mainstreaming; Development of infrastructure and resources needed to develop these; Effective utilisation of local economic and natural resources; Planning and implementation of economic policies; and Tackling un- and underemployment
The end goal of PRS is to understand the links between economic drivers and sources of conflicts, adequately targeting them in the peacebuilding process. Involved in these processes, as mentioned earlier, are various actors, namely; the government, civil society, and the private sector. Governments are tasked with developing solid economic institutions and policies and generating resources and wealth. Economic policies should pay particular attention to ex-combatants, unemployed youth, pensioners, security actors, refugees, disabled persons, internally displaced persons (IDP), women, and children. The government is also responsible for creating an enabling environment for the private sector to flourish. Most importantly, there should be efforts by government not to depend solely on aid or foreign assistance. The private sector is vital to promoting economic recovery. Nick Killick highlights that one of the most significant challenges to the development of post-conflict societies is a lack of recognition for the potentialities of the private sector in the economic recovery processes (Killick, 2005). Advocates of a role for business in peacebuilding argue that context. Local private sectors have much to contribute through their economic influence and political contacts, their (relatively) large financial resources, their skilled workforce, their capacity to drive balanced development and their connections at all levels of society (Collaborative Learning Projects, 2012). A challenge for the role of the private sector in peacebuilding is that businesses may prioritise their own interests above local needs. As stated in a Collaborative Learning Projects report, Much of this debate is falsely based on the assumption that companies operating in conflict areas are neutral actors, separated from and unrelated to the environment of violence in which they operate. This assumption is untrue (Collaborative Learning Projects, 2012) . This could however be monitored through extensive consultations with a broad range of actors, including political parties, displaced populations and local and international private sector actors. A point which must here be taken into account is that often, whether intentional or not, companies are complicit in the conflict, and they can only play a positive role in conflict resolution or peacebuilding once they are seen by communities as not contributing to the conflict.
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An issues relating to both the private sector and the government with regards to economic development is the issue of natural resources and who controls theses. Many conflicts in Africa are said to be resource based. Natural resources include water, land, cattle, oil and diamonds. Often, illicit economies emerge in post-conflict situations and may be backed and funded by militants and rebel groups. Many individuals and groups benefit from war and so are compelled to incite and support it. In addressing resource based conflicts between various stakeholders, it is important that government control of resources is seen as impartial and as benefiting the masses. Peacebuilding efforts should focus on how to develop structures and mechanisms to manage natural resources effectively so that these are used in a sustainable manner and can contribute to economic growth and long term development. These resources should be used to generate employment and sustain the economic livelihoods of many. Furthermore, mechanisms should be in place to ensure transparency in the mining of these resources and to instil corporate
UN Photo/Tim McKulka
One of the most important aspects of economic recovery is addressing issues of inequality and social disparity. Both of these are common roots of conflict. 59
social responsibility. Neighbouring communities can cooperate and share various resources, with methods for this being decided through dialogue which ensures that all groups benefit from the process. This will help to contribute to the peaceful resolution of disputes before they escalate into conflicts. It is also important that economic triggers for violence are addressed adequately and on an ongoing basis by communities.
Natural resources in Sierra Leone One of the root causes of the civil war in Sierra Leone has been linked to minerals and control of the mineral producing areas. In 1996, when the National Provisional Rulling Council (NPRC) came to power, they had the intention of stabilising the country and introducing effective rule of law measures. However, when diamonds entered the equation, corruption took over and the NPRC concluded that the way to stay in power was to continue to plunder and oppress the nation and to meet resistance with force. The NPRC avoided fighting its ally, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), which controlled the diamond mines, and instead targeted civilians whom they were supposed to protect. On some occasions, members of the NPRC served as soldiers fighting the enemy during the day and looted with them at night. This phenomenon was common enough to make the term sobel (a combination of soldier and rebel) part of common parlance. The NPRC eventually came to be seen as a government largely responsible for the ransacking of the resources of its country, as well as for the death, pain and misery of the Sierra Leone people.
Source: Hany Besada and Ariane Goetz (2010) The Path to Long Path to Stability in Sierra Leone in Hany Besada (ed) Crafting an African Security Architecture: Addressing Regional Peace and Conflict in the 21st Century.
The next sections will briefly examine issues of dealing with the past, promoting a culture of inclusivity and developing reconciliation initiatives, all three of which are vital to consolidating and developing the post-conflict state.
3.5 Dealing with the Past

In order to effectively deal with the issues of the past, one needs to address the issues which took place during the conflict and address the roots of the conflict. Conflict transformation seeks to transform the fundamental and structural issues in the society which encourage and perpetuate issues of inequality, discrimination and marginalisation often the roots of violence. It looks beyond the scope of the
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immediate conflict to the underlying factors of violence and to why it has become normalised in a society. Forms of structural violence remain the most stubborn form of continued violence in a community, usually perpetuating violence from past events, such as a civil war (Boesten et al, 2010). It involves a long-term transformation of the society in order to fully address all areas that perpetuate issues which could lead to conflict and promote sustainable development and long-term peace; it is a process which involves peacebuilding but goes a step further to enhance the prospects of peaceful living for a post-conflict country. Transitional justice seeks to provide a framework for democratic transitions. It aims to restore or create the conditions for peace and stability through a process in which factors such as truth, accountability and reconciliation are central. Transitional Justice usually follows an era of violence and mass human rights violations- whether because of a dictatorship, an apartheid-type system, genocide, or civil war which leaves the society divided, with many victims of the abuses still suffering. The process of transitional justice requires a comprehensive set of strategies that must both deal with the events of the past but also look to the future in order to prevent a recurrence of conflict and abuse. These strategies need to include elements of truth and justice (Bickford, 2005). Within the field of transitional justice there is a choice of approaches countries can choose to employ, namely retributive justice, restorative justice, or a combination of the two. While retributive justice refers to a system of crime met with punishment and often refers to criminal or judicial justice, we will here focus on restorative justice as this has important implications for reconciliation and thus for the positive transformation of post-conflict situations. Both restorative justice and reconciliation will be explored below. Restorative justice involves a process which aims to collectively identify and address the issues and harms of the past, while simultaneously identifying the needs and obligations of the people and the state in order to allow for the society to move forward (Zehr, 2002). According to Zehr, restorative justice reflects three basic assumptions: that crime is a violation of people and relationships; that violations create obligations and that the central obligation is to put right the wrongs (2002). An increasingly popular form of restorative justice may be found in the form of Truth Commissions. Truth commissions are often tasked with integrating many perspectives and experiences in order to come up with what may be regarded as an official truth of what happened during the conflict. A second role of truth commissions can be that of providing recommendations regarding legal, administrative and institutional measures that should be taken to prevent the recurrence of human rights abuse by the governments of the countries involved. A third role or function of truth commissions is to seek to promote reconciliation in post-conflict societies (Hayner, 1995).
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Restorative justice can also provide opportunities for the incorporation of local and traditional justice systems into the peacebuilding process. Traditional justice mechanisms can be important for fostering social trust and community reintegration and also for increasing the effectiveness and sustainability of peacebuilding efforts due to local ownership. Also, including traditional justice systems can potentially address some of problems associated with the formal (or retributive) justice system. These problematic aspects are related in the box below:
Toolkit: Frequent reasons that affect the use of formal justice systems 1. Mistrust of the law, fear, and intimidation 2. Lack of understanding language issues, unfamiliarity of formal procedures and court atmosphere, low legal literacy 3. Unequal power relations 4. Physical and financial inaccessibility 5. Formal systems are culturally uncomfortable 6. Formal system lacks legitimacy can be complicit in conflict and past oppression, corruption 7. It usually takes a long time to process cases, opportunity costs 8. Going through the formal system may lead to more problems between the disputing parties
Source: Wojkowska, E. (2006) Doing Justice: How Informal Justice Systems Can Contribute (Oslo: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) - Oslo Governance Centre, 13.
3.6 Reconciliation
Reconciliation is a notion that is very much associated with restorative justice and is vital to building a peaceful and stable society. Societies that emerge from periods of mass atrocity and widespread conflict are often full of deep suspicions, grievances and animosities. These divisions almost always endure after the period of conflict and create the potential for a return to violence and a recurrence of human rights abuses. This is particularly true where conflicts had an identity dimension in which categories such as religion, language, gender, race or ethnicity have been used to sow division and justify human rights abuse (Kiss, 2000). In order to contribute to the establishment of a reconciled community, it is also vital to address and deal with issues of trauma.
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The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (SATRC) was the first commission to attempt to rectify the balance between truth and reconciliation. The SATRC added some unique features to the transitional-justice process by drawing on the past experiences in Latin America and elsewhere by adding the new element of a conditional or earned amnesty process. The Amnesty Committee, one of the three committees set up by the SATRC, was the most unique feature of the new model, and introduced the notion of conditional amnesty into the transitional-justice process. It was established to adjudicate and facilitate the granting of amnesty to persons who, in its opinion, fulfilled the criteria laid down in the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34, 1995, which set up the SATRC. These criteria included the stipulation that individuals must themselves apply for amnesty for acts which they had committed, group applications were not permitted. In their applications, individuals had to make full disclosures about their role in the act for which amnesty was being applied. They also had to demonstrate that their action was politically motivated, meaning it had to be associated with the objectives of a recognised political party or organisation or liberation movement of which they were members or supporters. For instance, if the applicants were previously members of the security forces, they had to show that they had received orders from a legitimate superior officer to commit the action for which amnesty was being sought. Finally, even if these criteria were met, applicants could be denied amnesty if the committee felt that the act was disproportionate to the objective pursued.
Source: Lesley Connolly. 2012. Justice and Peacebuilding in Post-conflict situations: An argument for including gender analysis in a new post-conflict model, Occasional Paper 1, 2012, ACCORD. Available online: <http://www.accord.org.za/downloads/op/ACCORD-occasionalpaper-2012-1.pdf>
Trauma has been referred to as an encounter with an event or series of events so shocking that our understanding of how the world works is severely disrupted (Hutchison and Bleiker, 2008). Within the context of peacebuilding, trauma is vitally important to both acknowledge and address, as it may have a wide variety of far reaching effects both between and within individual existence and societal existence. The fact that the effects of trauma can have implications at a wide variety of different levels, highlights the importance of acknowledging the connections between the private and the public, the personal and the political. Thus, it is possible that even where peacebuilding efforts have been made, peace will not necessarily prevail, unless these
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approaches are complemented by an approach that deals with the psychological effects of conflict. Restorative justice, retributive justice, and reconciliation link together in order to enable conflict transformation and to encourage a post-conflict society to address issues of the past while moving towards the consolidation of peace and stability. Once these efforts have been undertaken, the prospect of consolidated peace becomes increasingly high. However, it is important to recognise that these efforts will only be effective if they represent all voices from the society, especially those considered vulnerable or marginalised. This chapter will now briefly look at three of these groups within societies which should be considered and included in peacebuilding and post-conflict development processes.
3.7 Youth
The term youth is often used to refer to the transition period between childhood and adulthood. This definition is contextual in nature; it is dependent on culture, history, political, psychological and behavioural aspects. Who falls into the category of youth can also be affected by factors such as development (for example, who is included in the job market), sociological aspects (for example, those who are of a child-bearing age may be considered adults), experience (for example, children who have been leaders within armed groups may consider themselves to be adult), and health (for example, in households where parents are suffering from AIDS, children often have to take on the roles of adults). While youth are particularly vulnerable to the impacts of conflict and are thus often disproportionately affected, it is important that they are not merely understood as victims. Youth may often be subjected to violence but may also be perpetrators of violence. For example, during times of conflict, youth may be forced into militarisation with armed groups however; they may also voluntarily join such groups. Baring in mind these complexities, it is important that peacebuilders address the vulnerability of youth in ways that still acknowledge their agency and choice. Engaging youth in peacebuilding requires a multi-faceted coincident approach that has political, social-cultural, economic and psychological aspects. This is essential in order to preserve the future human capital of the country and to ensure a sustainable culture of peace.
For instance, with regards to a multi-faceted approach; teaching youth carpentry skills without dealing with their trauma and providing them with basic education does not necessarily reduce their susceptibility to engage in or become victims of violence and manipulation.
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Case file: Radio strategies for youth in the DRC In Bukavu (east DRC), the radio of the Centre Lokole (Search for Common Ground) has special programs for youth produced by a team of adolescents (Sisi Watoto). They address topics that matter to young people of their age. A guide for youth radio production for peacebuilding published by Search for Common Ground examines the big positive impact youth radio can have on young people in the midst of terrible circumstances. Youth radio can: Fill the information void that most young people experience in conflict zones. Young people say that the lack of access to accurate information leaves them vulnerable to manipulation; Help youth to understand root causes of conflict. Youth are often pulled onto one side or another without understanding why there is conflict in the first place. Teach youth about their rights and how to protect those rights. In situations where young peoples rights are so severely violated, it is important that they know what rights they have; Help youth make good decisions in response to things that are happening to them. Young people often feel that they have no choice but to respond with violence; Spark youth to action so that they take on positive roles in their own communities; Create outlets for youth voices, helping them communicate with each other and with adult decision-makers. Radio programmes which put young peoples voices on the air help them speak directly to their elders about the issues that they face. And when young people hear themselves on the radio they begin to feel that someone does care about the issues that concern them; Model positive responses which youth can have to conflict, showing all listeners that youth dont have to be seen as the problem, that they can play a positive role in building peace.
Source: The Peacebuilding Initiative Website, Empowerment: Children & Youth: Children, Youth & Peacebuilding Processes. Available online at: <http://www.peacebuildinginitiative.org/ index.cfm?pageId=2026>.
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There are various aspects which may be considered when developing strategies to involve youth in peacebuilding processes. Some of these include: Formation of a youth identity During violent conflict, youth often acquire a culture of violence. In situations of conflict, youth have often been deprived of the supportive structures that would have encouraged their development in terms of a healthy transition from childhood into young adults. It is thus important for youth to be brought together to develop a postconflict youth identity. This identity should be based on shared values which include a common sense of belongings, ownership, fairness and justice. The development and maintenance of a positive individual and group youth identity powerfully contributes to co-operation and can lead youths to be internally motivated to engage, co-operate, and contribute. Attitudes and values are an important part of this process as, if youth... ... are internally motivated, they engage in co-operative behaviours for personal reasons, and they do not need to receive incentives (rewards) or to face the risk of sanctions (punishments) to encourage their group-related behaviours (Tyler and Blader, 2003). Rehabilitation Trauma healing is often considered a soft issue and not prioritised during peacebuilding. Yet, without it being addressed, it could jeopardise all other efforts.
Unaddressed trauma leads to feelings of alienation, depression and frustration which could manifest into forms of violence such as sexual and gender based violence and an increase in gang related crimes and abuses.
It is important that collective trauma among the youth be addressed. This enables them to frame a communal way forward that is agreeable to the majority. Social youth programmes are usually non-existent or inaccessible in post-conflict situations and the establishment of these is one way to positively bridge socialisation gaps and lead to positive transformation. Reconciliation Dialogue spaces should be created that provide youth with an opportunity to speak amongst themselves, heal and plan for the future of their country. It is important that youth not only listen to each other but also feel that they are heard by the rest of the population and that they are not overlooked and classified as the problem.
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Reconciliation should happen both internally and externally and at different levels (Lederach, 1998). This includes reconciling with the past, the present, envisioning the future and creating alternatives: The past Reflecting on actions that may have been enforced by armed group leaders, parents/relatives and peers, and finding ways to move past it. It also involves learning lessons that would be useful to ensure there is no return to violent conflict. The present Engaging with political leaders, peers and parents/relatives on pertinent issues of nationhood. It includes being cognisant of available structures in place for instance education and healthcare systems and how they can best benefit the majority. Alternatives like forgiveness and reparation rather than revenge should be explored and fostered. Envisioning for the future Youth should be involved in the development and implementation of frameworks and strategies for state building. They should play a crucial part in envisioning their countrys future. This will increase their sense of ownership and responsibility, increasing the possibility of sustainable peacebuilding. Creation of alternatives Having gone through violent conflict, probably for most of their lives, youth may not remember or know how else to engage without resorting to violence. One of the key aspects in creating alternatives is the creation of a shift of attitudes. Youths perceptions of equal access to economic, political and social opportunities are especially relevant to their willingness to cooperate in the post-conflict phase. It is important that youth understand the ways in which they can benefit from the dividends of peace. Aspects which should be considered when incorporating youth into peacebuilding processes include: Identification of need Youth should be identified as a category that needs special attention because of their multiple vulnerabilities (physical and emotional suffering, interference of social systems, disruption of role models and moral standards) and for purposes of protecting their rights, giving them justice and ensuring sustainable peacebuilding efforts Resources Adequate human and financial resources should be directed towards youth programmes. Youth interventions tend to be small-scale, short-term and lumped
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together with gender, sports, culture and other concerns. Thus they do not get the required attention, and end up with miniscule budgets (Hartwell, 2006); Inclusion and participation Youth should be consulted in all future visioning processes that take place in the aftermath of violent conflict. Their participation right from the onset is important. This will inculcate a sense of belonging and ownership which could make them more responsible in and responsive for taking care of national assets Commitment Peacebuilding initiatives targeted at youth should be realistic and have a long-term focus. With the youth having lost out on years of education as well as on their formative adolescent years, their positive transformation is likely to take long periods of time. It is not enough to pay lip-service and simply state that they are the future; this should be translated into their inclusion in viable multi-sectoral peacebuilding efforts. Information and participation Youth should be kept abreast of all peacebuilding efforts within their contexts. This will enable them to make informed choices and will give them agency to voice their opinions and concerns. A vacuum of information will often lead to feelings of marginalisation, exclusion and disempowerment which may, in turn, lead to violence.
UN Photo/Patricia Esteve
It is important to bring the youth together to develop a post-conflict youth identity and help reintegrate those youths back into society. 68
Toolkit: What can be done? In post-conflict situations, it has been established that peacebuilding processes will benefit from the inclusion of young people. One way of providing youth with their own voices in these processes is to create action-oriented studies, designed and led by adolescent research teams, which can then be used to further ascertain their particular needs. When such projects have been incorporated into peacebuilding processes, youth have reported the following. Young people in emergencies and post-conflict said they undertook research, advocacy and engaged in humanitarian programs to: overcome boredom, and to distract themselves from thoughts of war and loss; make friends; connect with the international community; gain status and a sense of belonging/inclusion as part of a group; help themselves and their communities; develop leadership, research and other skills. They said they emerged with: increased self-esteem; communication and social skills; knowledge about themselves and their peers and community; solutions and ideas for action; connections to one another and key adults; improved community status; a sense of identity and direction; a sense of being better understood by some adults.
Source: Womens Commission for Refugee Women and Children. Youth Speak Out: New Voices on the Protection and Participation of Young People Affected by Armed Conflict. January 2005, 30.
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Women and Gender

Gender as a concept is not reducible to women or to specific femininities and masculinities (Zarkov, 2008). Rather, the term is used to indicate the process by which particular woman and men acquire their social place, and particular masculinities and femininities come into being (Zarkov, 2008). Gender relations differ from age-group to age-group, class to class, culture to culture, and during times of conflict and peace. Taking into account the centrality of gender to social systems, an examination of engendered discourses and practices within both conflict and post-conflict situations is necessary in order to understand and address the complexities of particular contexts as well as individuals lived and embodied experiences of these. Conflict often has a profound effect on gendered relations as traditional social structures are thrown into disarray and both women and men find themselves unable to fulfill their traditional gendered roles. The figure below highlights some of these linkages and effects.
Immediate impacts of conflict Impoverishment Displacement Physical/psychological damage Loss of social fabric Human rights abuses INABILITY TO MEET GENDERED EXPECTATIONS
CONFLICT
Distorted ethnic/ gender identities Breakdown of social mechanisms and structures
Fustration, humiliation Secondary impacts of conflict Depression, suicide, drug and alcohol abuse Militarisation, violent crime Domestic friction Intergenerational confict
Possible positive impacts New forms of gender relations Coping Resisting Exerting agency
MOVING OUT OF CONFLICT
Source: El-Bushra, J (2004) Fused in Conflict: Gender Relations and Armed Conflict, in Afshar, H and Eade, D. (eds.) Development, Women and War; Feminist Perspectives. United Kingdom: Oxfam.
Furthermore, while women are sometimes among those who perpetrate violence, they tend, often, to be those that are subject to the greatest harm for example, being particularly vulnerable to sexual violence and thus, also, to increased vulnerability to HIV. However, while acknowledging this context, it also remains important to acknowledge the dangers of associating women with victims as this contributes
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to patriarchal gendered divisions and inequitable geo-political power structures (Zarkov, 2006).
A deliberate incorporation of women s needs and interests into peacebuilding is thus crucial and should take into consideration that preconflict gender relations have not remained the same.
There are various aspects of peacebuilding which often neglect to account for gender. Some of these aspects have been listed below in an attempt to address this and through recognition that it is vital to ensure that peacebuilding processes are gender sensitive and take into account particular vulnerabilities. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) DDR often fails to take into account the specific needs and realities of former female combatants (many of whom have small dependent children), which makes it difficult for them to readjust in post-war society (Delgado, 2010). Based on the conditionality that a weapon should be surrendered in exchange for financial/material support, a great deal of women lose out; having played crucial roles during conflict that do not necessarily involve owning their own weapon/s. Even in cases where women do not have a weapon to surrender they should still be eligible for DDR programmes, which would to enable them to start up new livelihoods. Economic recovery programmes Deliberate effort should be made to ensure women are involved in programmes geared towards the improvement of livelihoods. Sometimes, women are left out because, in terms of established gender roles, men are often considered to be the breadwinners. Violent conflict can change this, as due to shifts in gender roles women can often end up heading households. This dynamic must be taken into account in all postconflict settings (Farr, 2002). Resources should be allocated to women-specific projects but with the same overarching objectives of inclusiveness and ownership from the decision-making to implementation phase. It should not be assumed that because it is a womenspecific project, all women that should benefit will do so.
The need to enhance womens skills in order to take up new roles in the economic sphere, which would enhance their productivity, should be considered. Political participation
As a process geared for long-term sustainability, peacebuilding is political in nature. In post-conflict contexts, it involves
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UN Photo/Evan Schneider
It is important that institutional reforms that would provide women with the power consistent with newly forged roles and responsibilities are not neglected in post-conflict contexts.
making decisions that shape a countrys future in all aspects. While women often become more engaged in the public sphere during times of conflict, when it comes to the peacebuilding process, they are often excluded. Women should thus be actively involved at the mediation/negotiation table in order to give them the opportunity to articulate their needs and ensure that there is an adequate focus on womens priorities, often translating into societal gains (UNIFEM, 2009). Aspects which enable this participation should be considered priorities and should be allocated sufficient budgets (even while other reconstruction efforts are occurring). Example of these include: the provision of maternal and specialised healthcare, mechanisms to address the effects of gender-based violence, education, the provision of security, and access to justice systems and social services
The inclusion of women at this stage would ensure that they are involved at the policy making level and are included in vital positions in state machineries.
Security sector reform In the aftermath of violent conflict, positions and job opportunities the security sector are often given to disbanded armed groups and
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government soldiers, who, due to particular gendered roles, are primarily identified as men. This can leave women vulnerable as it may threaten their accessibility to justice mechanisms and make them afraid to report abuses committed against them, at times by the same people who are supposed to be protecting them. In peacebuilding, the approach to security must be holistic and looked at from a humanistic angle. Security is not about presence of security personnel but about: (i) An individuals state of mind do they feel secure?, (ii) Who is involved in the provision of security and who is benefiting from it, (iii) How is security defined, what does it entail and how is it meted out, and (iv) What security organs and structures are in place and what is their effectiveness? SSR must be gender sensitive throughout its planning, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation phases. It must also include the reform of recruitment processes and improvement in the delivery of security services to address and prevent sexual and gender based violence (Bastick, 2010). The inclusion of women in the security sector is crucial because it will enhance community responsibility and local ownership with regards to the provision and maintenance of security. In addition to efforts to include women in the security sector being conscious and deliberate. Womens security needs differ and should be taken into account when designing security policies. Transitional justice Womens access to justice may be hampered by their lack of access to education or knowledge of the existence of opportunities. In post-conflict scenarios, transitional justice is often approached from top-down where retributive justice tends to benefit perpetrators rather than victims because the perpetrators often end up in positions of political power.
Transitional justice mechanisms thus need to be designed to ensure womens societal positioning is taken into account and their grievances addressed. Whose justice? is a question that calls for continuous reflection.
Trauma healing When trauma is not dealt with, women often bear the brunt of its consequences because trauma begets violence. Sometimes the oppressed become oppressors and former armed combatants may resort to both physical and sexual violence as a way of dealing with their own trauma (Reimann, 2001). It is worth noting
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here that sexual violence against men (for example, when a man is raped to undermine his gendered identity), can also feed into this cycle. It is thus essential for peacebuilders to be aware of possible cycles of abuse. In the aftermath of conflict, weak justice systems and socio-economic and cultural factors deter women from reporting and promote a culture of impunity. Provision of trauma healing for all members of society is therefore crucial and this should not be considered a womens issue because if trauma is not addressed in relation to both women and men, then cycles of violence may continue. Toolkit: Strategies to incorporate women in peacebuilding Advocacy and awareness creation The enhancement of womens par ticipation in peacebuilding is a process. It requires addressing deeprooted cultural and structural aspects that would change relations between women and men within a given society. Linkages should be formed connecting women and men at the decision-making level to enhance communication between them. Accountability Actors in peacebuilding should have a gendered lens that ensures womens inclusion which can be monitored; Compromise and cooperation Peacebuilding frameworks should not be rigid and there must be opportunities to readjust and include women in more significant roles. Both women and men should be empowered to work together and to appreciate the unique strengths that each adds to peacebuilding processes; Inclusivity Womens involvement in peacebuilding is a right because they are an essential constituent of any peacebuilding context. Inclusivity also assists in fostering their human rights by enabling them to be involved from the decision-making to implementation levels. Disaggregation of beneficiaries Interventions should consider who the direct and indirect beneficiaries will be and how they will benefit; and the impact of the location identified and timelines set particularly when it comes to womens participation (UNIFEM, 2002). Determination of Actors How and where are women involved, are they relegated to secretarial roles or are they involved right from the decision-making level at the design, implementation
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and review phases? If women are involved, is it at the top, mid or grassroots level and is it only elite/educated women? Design of interventions A peacebuilding intervention that does not take women into consideration right from the start is not likely to be successful (Delgado, 2010). However, interventions geared towards benefiting women should never be homogenous. They must be context-specific and take into account womens varying needs and priorities. Resources Prioritisation of womens capacity-building and training needs will ensure their inclusion is enhanced. Women-focused interventions are often poorly-funded and short-term; a proper long-term financial commitment should be made.
Womens roles are made more dynamic during violent conflict as they often take up roles that were traditionally the preserve of men. It is crucial that in the post-conflict phase this momentum and the deliberate construction of new gender relations be concretised. For peacebuilding to be locally owned and for the achievement of sustainable peace it is imperative that women are involved. The inclusion of women should not only be at the policy level but well reflected in the operational level as well so that it becomes part of societal structures and systems, the norm rather than the exception.
3.9 Displaced People

Forced migration is a general term that refers to the movements of refugees and internally displaced people as well as people displaced by natural or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, famine or development projects (Forced migration online, 2011). One of the types of forced migration is conflict-induced displacement, which often leads to the creation of large numbers of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). This is when people are forced to flee their homes for one or more of the following reasons and where the state authorities are unable or unwilling to protect them: armed conflict including civil war; generalised violence; and persecution on the grounds of nationality, race, religion, political opinion or social group (Forced migration online, 2011). The table on page 78 highlights some of the consequences associated with conflictinduced displacement which needs to be considered when develop strategies to incorporate IDPs and refugees into peacebuilding activities.
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Case File: ACCORDs work in Burundi Reflection by Adelin Hatungimana, Senior Development Programme Officer: Burundi Programme ACCORD started working in Burundi in 1995, and opened its first in-country office in Bujumbura in 2003. In 2004, ACCORD opened two additional offices in the towns of Ruyigi and Rumonge, followed by the opening of a fourth office in the town of Rutana in beginning 2008. Among other activities, this Burundi initiative contributes to ensuring that the ongoing process of the repatriation and reintegration of Burundian refugees takes place in a smooth and conflict-free manner by providing legal assistance and mediation services to both returning refugees as well as welcoming communities. Burundi is a small, landlocked country with one of the highest population densities in the world and an economy that is vastly based upon subsistence agriculture. Throughout the years, violent conflicts within Burundi have created high numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and have also led to many Burundian citizens fleeing the country, becoming refugees in neighbouring countries. Following the signing of peace agreements, the government of Burundi has become obligated to facilitate and allow for the reintegration of all returnees and IDPs, ensuring that their rights are respected and that reconciliation occurs. Upon returning to their homes, many refugees and IDPs find that their land has been sold or granted to other persons by administration, and occupied by individuals or new infrastructures. As conflicts within Burundi have seriously weakened government institutions, including the judiciary, the solution has been to create a National Commission on Land and Other Properties (CNTB) in order to manage land disputes. However, due to the high volume and complexity of these disputes, the commission is assisted in responding to these needs by various other stakeholders, including ACCORDs Legal Aid Clinic Project (LACP), assisted by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The overall objective of the LACP is to contribute to the reintegration of returnees to their host communities. These services have contributed to the promotion of dialogue between returnees and hosting communities, whereby the parties are enabled and empowered to reach an agreements in which the situation of a winner and a loser is avoided. If the mediation is successful, it tends to result in increased reconciliation between the parties which helps to establish positive long-term relationships. In order to promote the reintegration of returnees, the LACP focuses on contributing to a sustainable reintegration process, improving access to legal assistance, and promoting peaceful coexistence at the community level. Sustainable reintegration is addressed through sensitisation services and mediation. This process begins by having a meeting with local
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community members where beneficiaries are made aware of the LACPs mediation approach, objectives and methodology. In order to reach solutions between refugees or IDPs and host communities, mediation techniques acquired through practice are employed and once an agreement is reached, the implementation of this is assigned to a trustworthy local leader or community member. Through these processes, local ownership is encouraged and enhanced and it is for these reasons that mediation is the preferable method for resolving land conflicts. In cases where mediation is inappropriate or unsuccessful, the LACP will provide legal assistance and refer the cases to the either the judiciary or other institutions such as the police or the CNTB. In order to promote reconciliation and peaceful coexistence, the LACP provides conflict management skills capacity building for local administrative authorities and community leaders and is also investigating the potentiality of media, in the form of radio and TV programs which sensitises, educates and informs. The interconnectedness of the LACP and peacebuilding is clear in terms of creating positive and empowering relationships and it is becoming increasingly evident that issues of land need to be integrated as a high priority when formulating peacebuilding projects or when dealing with peacebuilding challenges.
UN Photo/SYLVAIN LIECHTI
IDPS are persons who are forced to flee their homes for reasons to do with the conflict and where the state authorities are unable or unwilling to protect them.
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Creation of logistical and humanitarian needs
Those fleeing from their homes require places to inhabit, which are commonly temporary and inhospitable. Some organisations like the UNHCR offer assistance, for example tents, food and medication to refugees and in some instances, to. This assistance can however not be adequately planned for because it is highly dependent on other factors like the levels and nature of violence that could lead to more displacements. Refugees, if not actively incorporated as productive citizens into their host countries, can become a strain on the basic social services of the host country. They may also contribute to an influx of small arms and light weapons. Many refugees and IDPs, run to relatives or other clan affiliates. These groups are then often faced with the challenge of taking care not only of their own needs but also those of the refugees and IDPs. Refugees and IDPs are faced with human rights vulnerabilities to armed attacks and abuse, family separation, risk of sexual and gender based violence, land deprivation, stigma and marginalisation.
Threat to international security Increased financial and spatial strain on hosts Multiple vulnerabilities
It is important for peacebuilding processes to take into account the needs of returnees to ensure ownership and sustainability. Some of the approaches that should be implemented simultaneously include: Preparation of the receiving community The receiving community should well-informed of the implications of hosting returnees. Trauma healing and capacity-building for co-existence should be offered to both returnees and the receiving community. This will make them more receptive to each others needs. A different cultural and structural system may be in place after years of conflict. Returnees, whenever possible should be made aware of the system. This enables them to adapt easier and enhances positive relations with the receiving community. Post-conflict peacebuilding frameworks need to prioritise essential services for returnees, including the provision of healthcare and education.
Re/socialisation
Provision of adequate basic social services
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Disaggregation of needs
Returnees should be categorised into different groups such as; children, peoples with disabilities, youth (male and female), women, men and the elderly in order for their needs to be addressed accordingly. This disaggregation should take into account returnees diverse skills and professions and thereby consider how they can best contribute to the peacebuilding process. The states in collaboration with other peacebuilding stakeholders should provide, for example, land, housing, and seedlings for those who are not able to identify or return to their previous homes. This will help in preventing a resurgence of violence, while a longterm solution is being sought. The receiving community and returnees should be included in all planning meetings in order to contribute to how the process will be undertaken. This will increase a sense of ownership and responsibility towards peaceful coexistence. T he government and other p eacebuilding stakeholders dealing with returnees should work together to maximise available resources, and avoid the duplication of initiatives. Peacebuilding frameworks and policies should take into account the unique needs of IDPs and refugees because they are not homogeneous. A monitoring and evaluation framework should be developed to assess the feasibility of the reintegration process.
Creation of alternatives
Inclusion and participation
Coherence and coordination
Strategic approach
Displaced people are often neglected in peace processes because they are not seen as being directly involved in the conflict they are not usually part of warring parties. Yet, if their needs are not addressed, an entire section of society will be marginalised and will be unable to rise above the effects of the conflict due to lack of opportunities and resources.
3.10 Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to highlight the various dimensions which should be considered, executed and incorporated into peacebuilding processes in order to ensure that a society is stable and will be able to develop and maintain its peace on a long-term basis. This chapter has also included three aspects of society which are seen as vital to consider when designing, implementing and evaluating peacebuilding activities.
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Chapter 4: Local Ownership

What will this chapter do? This chapter outlines what is meant by local ownership and why it is so vital for peacebuilding. Why is it important? An understanding of local ownership is important because without the consideration and integration of this, the likelihood for the long-term sustainability and success of any initiative is low. Thus, it is essential to understand how and when to incorporate aspects of local ownership within peacebuilding initiatives. What should you learn? By the end of this chapter, the reader should have an understanding of what local ownership is and why it is so important for peacebuilding.
4.1 Introduction
The art of peacebuilding lies in pursuing the appropriate balance between international support and home-grown, context-specific solutions. Local ownership is a key concept in peacebuilding contexts, and can be referred to as a principle that emphasises that the future direction of a particular country should be in the hands of the people of that country. In other words, transitions should be country-led and country-owned. This Handbook utilises the following concept to determine local ownership:
Local ownership refers to the degree of control that domestic actors wield over domestic political processes, in post-conflict contexts; the notion conveys the commonsense wisdom that any peace process not embraced by those who have to live with it is likely to fail. (Donais, 2012:1)
This principle is now widely accepted as a guiding principle for peacebuilding; yet how it should be achieved, and what this implies for the ideal internal/external actor relationship is still hotly debated. In order to improve the sustainability of peacebuilding systems, improved coherence is needed in three critical areas; namely local ownership, local context and local capabilities. This chapter outlines what is meant by local ownership and why it is essential for peacebuilding, looking at methods that can be used to encourage the development of a relationship between peacebuilding and local ownership.
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4.2 Local Ownership and Peacebuilding

Local actors need to make their own decisions, but they also have to recognise that their local system is embedded within a larger international system. This implies that there is a larger international culture, with norms, structures and expected forms of behaviour, which acts as a constraint, and which will determine the parameters within which the local actors can make decisions about their future (Richmond, 2011). International law, such as the UN Charter, and international conventions, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as a web of other agreements and arrangements, for example, relating to trade, the environment and cooperation on international organised crime, create a network of international system governance arrangements that any one country would need to conform to if it also wants to benefit from being a part of an interconnected international system. Internal and external actors in the phases of peacebuilding.
Internal Actors
External Actors
Stabilisation
Transition
Consolidation
However, even if it is acknowledged that being part of the international system places some limits or parameters on the range of choices that a state can make, states still have ample room to manoeuvre when it comes to deciding on the shape and future direction of their internal political, economic, security and socio-cultural systems. Countries in transition have a unique opportunity to re-consider how they wish to structure their own systems. Most established countries have made these choices as some point in the past, and are now locked into a process of slow evolution and adaptation, but countries in transition have the opportunity to re-consider their own systems of governance. Naturally, such an opportunity is both exciting and dangerous, because whatever choices are made will have an enormous influence on the lives of societies and people. Much is at stake, and therefore many internal and external stakeholders will try to influence the choices being made.
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Three key characteristics of local ownership Externally driven peacebuilding processes are unsustainable; Peacebuilding should be need-based, and the priorities, sequencing and pace of delivery should be informed by the dynamics of the conflict system, through local ownership and meaningful internal/external coordination; The rate of delivery should be synchronised with the rate of absorption. The local ownership principle states that these choices should be made by the people who will have to live with the consequences (MacGinty, 2011). The central principle is the ownership and participation of communities. Change needs to be determined and controlled by the people themselves. Participation of affected peoples on all levels of intervention is the key element of restoring dignity and developing trust in transformation (Krppen, Ropers & Giessmann, 2011). Whilst the principle of local ownership is now widely accepted, including at the highest policy levels (OECD, 2011b), so much is at stake that it has often not been honoured in practice. Ownership exists when they do what we want them to do, but they do so voluntarily? Although less dramatically imposed, the model of local ownership is nevertheless also the template that is being used to inform UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding interventions in countries in transition, such as Burundi, the DRC, Liberia, Sierra Leone and South Sudan, to mention a few current examples. The net effect of these interventions is that these countries are under sustained pressure, from almost all the external and some internal peacebuilding agents, to conform to the liberal peace ideology when making decisions about the future direction of their internal political, economic, security and social-cultural systems. In the liberal peace context, local ownership takes on a new meaning: Ownership exists when they do what we want them to do, but they do so voluntarily (Donais, 2012:4). What should also be noted is that a model that is seen to work well in one context cannot be transferred to another context and be expected to work equally well there. This is because each model has a history that is specific to the context within
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which it emerged. Once it is divorced from that history, it loses the context within which it had meaning, thus it is vital that local forces are involved in designing and implementing the system used. A broadly accepted theory of change is that a period of social upheaval and renewal in a country should result in a new social contract among the people, which addresses the shortcomings of the past and articulates the peoples common understanding of the role of the state and the relationship among the different communities that make up the society (Call & Wyeth, 2008). Such a social contract has to be home grown, and has to be come to be owned through a process of reconciliation and transformation (Lederach, 1997).
4.3 Local Ownership and Statebuilding

In most peacebuilding experiences to date, however, the focus has been on statebuilding rather than on state formation (OECD, 2008). The difference is that the former is focused on the executive branch or technical apparatus of the state, for instance on reforming the security services, whilst the latter is aimed at facilitating the social contract between the people and the state and addressing the way in which a state is formed and how it relates to the people. Statebuilding is too often narrowly focused on the executive branch. Peacebuilding today is overly associated with SSR and RoL (World Bank, 2011). These areas are popular because they are technical and easily lend themselves to the kind of targeted peacebuilding interventions external actors are used to (Tschirgi, Lund and Mancini, 2010). Most importantly, they help to strengthen the executive branch and are thus often welcomed by the government in power. The result is that external actors invest in the instruments of governance, instead of in those elements that balance the power of the various aspects of the state. They invest in building institutions, instead of building the relationship between the people and the institutions that are meant to serve them. This typically leaves the executive and thus any government that is already in, or that may come to power in the future in a position where it is not adequately kept in check by the legislative and judicial branches, as well as other independent bodies of the state (Call and Wyeth, 2008). Peacebuilding that focuses only on the executive branch of the state is not a good recipe for a sustainable peace process, and may sow the seeds of future discontent (Mills, 2009). Statebuilding tends to generate new or reformed central state capacities, especially in the rule of law and security contexts, and there is often the tendency to de-legitimise and sometimes even criminalise existing local social capacities, in the form of traditional justice systems and local security arrangements, without ensuring that an adequate alternative is in place. The result is a drop in overall capacity because the existing social capacity is weakened before viable, credible and legitimate alternatives
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have been suggested or established. Whilst it may be the case that the existing structures are weak and unsatisfactory, it should be recognised that they provide some level of service that should not be disrupted until such time as a better alternative is in place. An alternative approach may be to develop new systems that compliment and build on existing social systems (World Bank, 2011). Where existing social practises are regarded as inappropriate they can be encouraged to transform over time, but one needs to recognise that social systems cannot be changed overnight, and that such change needs to occur at a pace acceptable to the local community for it to be legitimatised and sustainable. An approach that aims for longer-term sustainable peace should refocus the local ownership debate around state formation, rather than statebuilding, and find innovative ways of facilitating the development of new social contracts between people and state in the countries in which it is engaged (OECD, 2012). In this context, peacebuilding systems need to encourage processes that make the leadership accountable to the people, rather than to the international community (Caplan, 2005). This implies a shift away from statebuilding towards state-formation, and will require an investment in facilitating national dialogue, and the development or reform of constitutional frameworks. It also implies a renewed focus on aspects such as strengthening the overall socio-political framework, for instance the division of powers between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, and the strengthening of civil society and social capital in the form of a free press, a free and independent judiciary, as well as human rights, electoral and other independent commissions that perform a critical role in the functioning of the overall socio-political framework.
4.4 Local Context and External Legitimacy

Many, if not most, international peacebuilding missions to date have made the mistake of interfering so much that they ended up undermining the ability of the local system to self-organise. External peacebuilders impose neoliberal political and judicial norms and model institutions according to their own ideal types. In the process, these societies are denied the room to develop their own institutions, which are emergent from their own history, culture and context. External peacebuilders fail to recognise the degree to which their own norms and institutions are the product of their own history, culture and context. Consequently, they underestimate the challenge of transferring these norms and institutions to other cultures and contexts. One of reasons why external actors continue to persist with this top-down approach could be that they have become locked into a specific type of statebuilding model (OECD, 2008). They choose to focus on the administrative functions and structural
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dimensions of the institutions, and they have become blind to considerations of how these institutions come into being, or what their relationships are to the society in which they are embedded. In other words, in the statebuilding approach, the virtue of the institutions are taken as given and as fully formed, either because they existed before, or because they fit the liberal peace model, and the focus is on making them as administratively effective and efficient as poss tioning whether the institutions shou ld exist in the first place, or whether there are alternative ways in which similar needs can be addressed in the local context. For instance, the virtue of the template modern police force is seldom questioned. There is rarely room for questioning whether the needs of the people for what the international community would refer to as rule of law and law enforcement can be better satisfied in other home-grown ways. And yet, in many countries, it is well known that the official police force is highly corrupt or in other ways experienced as predatory, and that local communities turn instead to alternative means for ensuring community safety and security (Andvig, 2010). In these contexts, further investing in strengthening the capacity of the official police force may actually undermine security, as perceived and experienced by local communities. Local context means that peacebuilding needs to be informed by local rather than international, needs, priorities and contexts (Baranyi, 2008). This is an obvious principle
Toolkit: Considerations for local ownership into practice While the approach will vary depending on the specific context and activity, there are some general good practices that can be applied. Take a participatory approach and engage local actors at the earliest possible stage through liaison, coordination and consultation, gathering information about needs and perceptions, and engaging local stakeholders in planning processes. Channel information from the local level about local constituencies and marginalised populations needs, concerns and priorities, and support the articulation of local grievances, interests and needs to inform national-level processes. Tailor the approach to the specific context and the nature of the activity by looking at local systems, structures, strengths, weaknesses and dynamics. Conduct regular analysis of the micro-level socio-political, economic and cultural context and calibrate the approach accordingly. Value and make use of local or insider knowledge and expertise, including that of local counterparts.
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Avoid undermining local capacity by doing or replacing rather than enabling, identify and build on existing processes and structures (informal and formal). Guard against brining preconceived ideas or assumptions about what the problems or solutions are, by conducting joint assessments with local counterparts, by asking local stakeholders what they consider their needs or capacity gaps to be, or what they believe are the root causes of and solutions of conflict.
that few will challenge, but in reality, it is difficult to operationalise, and there are very few examples of cases where this has actually been achieved. There are two forces that articulate a coherent set of needs and priorities remains weak for years thereafter. The second is that external actors have a well-resourced and internationally legitimised system that thinks it is acting on local needs, when in fact, it is overly influenced by previous experiences and internationally generated models and theories of change (Sending, 2009). International actors need to be trained to understand and counter their own tendency to replicate their last experience elsewhere and to overwhelm, or drown out the local voices (Berdal, 2009; Call and Wyeth, 2008). They need to be trained in how best to facilitate and encourage local voices and capacities without undermining them. And local actors need to be trained and encouraged in how to identify and articulate local needs and priorities, how to facilitate local dialogues and discussions that can identify needs and priorities and how to reach out to and empower all the voices in society, including those that may not normally be heard in official discussions. Benefits of locally owned peacebuilding processes? Increased sustainability; Smoother external support transition; Minimising or preventing dependency; Context and cultural appropriateness; Improved links between local and national peace efforts. The true implications of taking local context into account may be difficult for the external system to accept (Chesterman, 2004). Local needs and priorities may be different from what the international system is willing or able to provide. Promoting norms that have a high priority for the donor community may not necessarily be
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the priority for the local community, and the international community may not have the technical expertise or systems to provide support for local priorities such as small-scale animal husbandry and agriculture. At another level, local priorities might result in different time frames than what the international community is used too. For instance, local leaders may seek an upfront investment in capacity-building prior to the implementation of various medium- to long-term governance and development initiatives, so that these programmes can be managed by local managers, whilst the international community may be under pressure to launch such programmes earlier in the process.
4.5 Local Capacities and Internal Challenges

The issue of capacity can be referred to as a core missing link in post-conflict countries. Where capacity and institutions are not strengthened in post-conflict countries, the development of sustainable processes will be widely undermined. A key approach in relation to this issue refers to the need for the strengthening of national capacities and support of core statebuilding and peacebuilding functions. In that sense, the challenges provided by a lack of capacity combined with the existing peacebuilding and statebuilding frameworks has often led to what some refer to as an impatient approach; where immediate results are expected but not enough time or effort is taken to build capacities that would be able to sustain peaceful processes in the longer term. In this context, it is important that new approaches to peacebuilding are able to define new ways to provide support for how to better strengthen the capacities of post-conflict countries in order to achieve lasting peace. Toolkit: Questions to ask to ensure locally owned peacebuilding processes Post-conflict spaces are often characterised by an environment of diversity and division Who speaks on behalf of the local people? An all-inclusive approach can delay the process and damage confidence Is the process inclusive enough? Local actor may seem to lack capacity and/or willingness Where are the capacity gaps in terms of taking full ownership? The local ownership principle is partly a normative position that makes claims as to who should rightfully have responsibility for the problem and the solution, and therefore, the legitimacy to take decisions which would determine the future course of events (Duffield, 2001). It is now officially recognised that the internal actors clearly
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own the problem, and should therefore also have the right to own the solution. As they will have to live with the consequences, they should have the right to make the decisions that will determine their future (Call and Wyeth, 2008). In the absence of an internationally recognised elected government such elections are typically only held three to five years into a transition process it is unclear which voices truly articulate the needs and preferences of the people, and there is thus much room for interpretation and manipulation during this period (Paris, 2011). Crucial decisions are taken about the structure and policy direction of new institutions, such as the security forces and key ministries. In the absence of an elected government, most of these decisions are informed and influenced by the international actors that choose to engage in a given sector and project. These international actors typically attempt to consult and elicit local input into these programmes; being aware of their own official policies that relate to local ownership, they are often able to explain the steps they have taken to consult and otherwise ensure that decisions have been endorsed by the transitional government, or otherwise have some other claim to local legitimacy. One of the reasons why local ownership is so elusive is that, despite the fact that the principle is in place and widely accepted, the choice of who the local actors are and who should take the lead during the transition period is often made by the international actors, at least until the first internationally recognised elections have been held. At that point, however, so many aspects of the new state have already been decided, that the newly elected government typically has no choice but simply to continue to implement the policies and continue to work with the institutions established under mostly external influence during the transition period. However, local ownership is also a functional argument, in that local ownership is a prerequisite for sustainability (Eriksen, 2009). Lederach (1997) argues that, for solutions to be sustainable they have to be home-grown and have to emerge out of locallyowned processes of reconciliation and social transformation. Regan (2010) stresses that sustainable public sector reform does not occur unless there is a domestic demand for itthere will be little chance of sustainable reformunless the local populations are committed to and taking a leading role in the design and implementation of reform. Capacity-building needs to be transformed; from the existing paradigm of replacing local capacity, to one where existing local capacities are recognised as the basis from which new capacities can be developed. This approach should be informed by recognition that local capacities have been shaped by local historic and socio-cultural contexts which make them uniquely suited to the local context, and thus locally l egitimate (Newman, Paris, and Richmond, 2009). New untested capacities need to earn local legitimacy before replacing existing local capacities. Capacity-building needs to be transformed from its current predominant north-south knowledge and skills
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transfer approach to one where the local social capital and inherent capacities are recognised and used as a basis for further development. Toolkit: Towards a Do No Harm approach to external peacebuilders Peacebuilders need to understand how their work interacts with existing power relationships, customs, values, systems and institutions. Conflict sensitivity, based on regular conflict analysis, should be mainstreamed from planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of activities
4.6 Local Capacities and Local Ownership

Civilian components make vital contributions to the restoration or extension of legitimate state authority, including the provision of security, establishment of rule of law in a wide sense, and delivery of basic services at national and local levels. However, the significance of civilians has not always been recognised. The concept civilian is a term framed by the military to refer to those that are not military, and by civilians to distinguish themselves from the military, especially in times of war. The latter distinction may, at times, be broadly associated with that drawn in international humanitarian law (IHL) between combatants and non-combatants but, in fact, IHL is much more nuanced than merely echoing civilian-military distinctions. It provides for military personnel to become non-combatants when they lay down arms for instance, when they are wounded or prisoners of war. It also provides for civilians to become combatants when they are central to the war effort. The June 2009 Report of the UN Secretary-General (Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict) on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict provides a useful summary of the core tasks that the UN is called upon to undertake in post-conflict peace processes, namely: Support to basic safety and security including mine action; protection of civilians; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration; strengthening the rule of law; and initiation of security sector reform; Support to political processes including electoral processes; promoting inclusive dialogue and reconciliation; and developing conflict-management capacity at national and sub-national levels; Support to the provision of basic services such as water and sanitation; health and primary education; and support to the safe and sustainable return and reintegration of internally displaced persons and refugees;
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Support to restoring core government functions in particular, basic public administration and public finance, at national and sub-national levels; Support to economic revitalisation including employment generation and livelihoods (in agriculture and public works), particularly for youth and demobilised former combatants, as well as the rehabilitation of basic infrastructure. However, making use of local capacity should not result in a brain drain from local institutions to the UN, World Bank and international NGOs. More innovative ways need to be explored by the UN and others in order to identify, work with, and tap into local expertise, whilst at the same time ensuring and supporting the local institutions where these civilian experts can be found. In this way local capacity can remain principally a local asset. There should be an understanding within the international peacebuilding system regarding the critical need for maintaining and strengthening local civilian capacity, including the institutions employing and organising this capacity, in order to achieve self-sustainable peace. Importantly, civilian expertise which is locally employed and embedded is in a much better position to serve both the needs of the international actors as well as credible local counterparts. When international actors hire local expertise they harm the systems ability to become self-sustainable and by doing so, they undermine the very goals peacebuilding is meant to achieve. Instead, ways of compensating local institutions for providing knowledge to international actors should be explored in order to ensure that local experts remain local. This principle against local-to-international brain-drain should become a standard part of local-international compacts for peacebuilding cooperation.
4.7 Conclusion
There are not many natural laws in politics and peacebuilding, but the principle of local ownership comes as close to a natural law as can be, in other words, it can be confidently stated that a system cannot be self-sustainable (function on its own without external support) if it is not locally owned. In other words, systems of governance that are externally imposed, and with whom the local society and people fail to identify, will not be supported, maintained and utilised once the external influence is removed. If a significant percentage of the citizenry perceives that their formal state provided justice and security system is foreign, incomprehensible, and contrary to their beliefs, cultural values, and expectations, there is little likelihood that the system can be legitimate, accessible or effective (Scheye, 2010). Furthermore, as Donais (2012) warns: Local ownership may be deferred, but it cannot ultimately be avoided. This functional motivation for local ownership is powerful in explaining the fragility and weakness of states that have recently undergone, or are still undergoing, transition. These societies fail to identify with externally imposed liberal peace institutions, and
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instead informally govern themselves by using their own resilient forms of social organisation, such as traditional kinship systems and traditional forms of justice. In many of these cases, hybrid forms of governance have emerged, where the informal social practice and formal state models of governance co-exist (MacGinty, 2011). International peacebuilding interventions should provide security guarantees and maintain the outer parameters of acceptable state behaviour in the international system, and they should stimulate, facilitate and create the space for the emergence of robust and resilient self-organised systems. International peacebuilding interventions should not interfere in the local social process with the goal of engineering specific outcomes, such as trying to produce a neoliberal state. Trying to control the outcome produces the opposite of what peacebuilding aims to achieve it generates ongoing instability and dependence, and undermines self-sustainability.
UN Photo/Eric Kanalstein
Countries in transition have the opportunity to re-consider their own systems of governance.
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Part Two: Implementing Peacebuilding

UN Photo/Patricia Esteve
Now that there is a better understanding of the dimensions of peacebuilding, the different areas that should be considered and the different players that should be involved, the actual practical elements that should be considered and implemented before, during, and after peacebuilding initiatives will be addressed. The purpose of this part of the Handbook is to help the reader with the practical realities facing peacebuilding initiatives and to provide information for how to plan and implement effective peacebuilding processes.
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Chapter 5: Understanding, Analysing and Addressing Conflict

What will this chapter do? This chapter provides background for an understanding of what conflict means and provides insight into some of the tools that can be used for conflict mapping and tracking. Why is it important? This is extremely valuable as it provides the foundation upon which initiatives for conflict resolution may be built and is thus essential for peacebuilding. What should you learn? By the end of this chapter, the reader should have a deeper understanding of conflict and some of the tools available to interpret and analyse issues of conflict.
5.1 Introduction
Not all conflicts are the same and thus, not all the peacebuilding strategies should be the same. It is important to identify the conflict drivers for particular contexts, and adapt peacebuilding strategies to ensure that they are relevant to a particular country and to the possible changes that would occur within that specific environment. If the overall analysis and interpretation of the local conflict dynamics is inaccurate or removed from the realities on the ground, the overarching peacebuilding strategy is likely to be misdirected. In that sense, being able to understand conflict drivers can be seen as a critical tool in designing effective strategies, helping countries build national consensus on issues, and also in the construction of early warning mechanisms. This chapter aims to provide an understanding of conflict through a discussion of different concepts integral to it. Conflict is generally viewed as an undesirable negative force in society, to be eradicated as we come across it. And yet, conflict can also be a painful, or uncomfortable, stage of a system undergoing a process of change, and offers the potential to transform and bring about positive growth if handled appropriately. This chapter attempts to provide some practical tools which can enable these appropriate actions and responses.
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Toolkit: Why do we need to analyse conflict? To understand the background and history of the situation as well as current events; To identify all the relevant groups involved, not just the main or obvious ones; To understand the perspectives of all these groups and to know more about how they relate to each other; To identify factors and trends that underpin conflicts; To learn from failures as well as successes.
Source: Fischer, S. et al (eds.), 2005. Working with Conflict; skills and strategies for action. Zed Books
5.2 Definition of Conflict

Conflict or dispute is the pursuit of incompatible goals by two or more actors. Conflict is a fluid social phenomenon, not starting at a decisive point in time nor ending completely. The ever-changing processes of conflict are important occurrences in life. It is when the struggle of interests and the contestation of needs happen in a conflict prone zone that conflict can become violent. Conflict is not good or bad it simply is. It is a facet of everyday human experience. The natural systems of nature also involve conflict at many different levels whether it be one animal eating another for survival, or competing for leadership of the herd, which leads to selection of the strongest genes for future generations.
Conflict is often seen as negative, but can also: Create an opportunity for balancing the power within a relationship or the wider society, and the reconciliation of peoples legitimate interests; Lead to greater self-awareness and understanding, and awareness of diversity and differences between people, organisations and societies; Lead to personal, organisational and even systemic growth and development; Act as a useful medium for airing and solving problems; Allow for different interests to be reconciled; and Foster unity within groups.
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Case File: Dispute in school reconstruction in Sierra Leone During the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), one of the battalions thought that it may be a good idea to assist the community with the reconstruction of a school in their area of responsibility, which was destroyed during the conflict. They started discussing the idea with the local community, with the intention of ensuring that the community choose which school should be reconstructed. They soon realised that their enquiries had resulted in a dispute between two neighbouring villages over which school should be reconstructed. After some time, it transpired that the school reconstruction dispute was actually just a symptom of a long-standing dispute between the two villages, about the utilisation of an area of grazing land that separated them. The peacekeepers decided to assist the community with the reconstruction of both schools, but they asked them to set up a committee, with representatives from both villages, that would manage these and other community projects undertaken with the support of the peacekeepers in future. Through the process of working together on the school reconstruction project, and later on a bridge reconstruction project, the two villages were able to establish such a positive cooperative relationship that they were eventually able to resolve the grazing dispute as well. The initial heightened tension brought about by the school reconstruction dispute thus generated a process that eventually resolved the underlying dispute.
5.3 Steps for Conflict Analysis

Any successful intervention aimed at changing or resolving a conflict requires that a peacebuilder understands clearly what is going on in the conflict, and its root causes. It is important to develop several steps that will aid the actor to better assess the nature of the conflict, identify its parties, understand the causes and finally, identify solutions and strategies for responses. The following steps will provide an overview of strategies that support the overall analysis of a conflict.
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Step 1: Locating the conflict Getting a clear picture of the location of the conflict helps contextualising not only the conflict itself but also, various elements of a conflict situation, including the parties, the issues, and even indigenous methods of conflict resolution. As conflict does not exist in a vacuum, but rather operates within and interacts with a complex web of determinants, patterns, and frames (for example, interstate, intrastate or international) this process of contextualisation becomes essential. Knowing the stages through which a conflict evolves or in which it may be deadlocked proves to be equally important. Both of these aspects reveal important and valuable indicators for deepening the level of analysis with regards to the location of the conflict. Step 2: Conflict mapping The meaning of any conflict resides in its context. Context can refer to the background of the conflict, the environment where the conflict is taking place, or the circumstances that create the conflict. Conflict mapping enables the peacebuilder to assess the power dynamics between various actors in a given context. Toolkit: Elements of conflict 1. People or Stakeholders The life and dynamics of conflict depend on the emotions, personalities, perceptions, culture, interests or agendas, and relative influence of the stakeholders in the conflict. These stakeholders may be highly visible or may remain largely unseen. Stakeholders can be primary, secondary, or interested. 2. Core Problem or Issue The contending issues that results in a conflict between stakeholders are often multi-dimensional. Resolving one aspect does not necessary end the conflict. Problems often involve highly visible aspects, as well as less perceptible root causes. It is important to try to understand all of these dimensions and sources of the conflict. Problems are dynamic. They change, multiply, or decrease during the life of the conflict.
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3. Process Process refers to how the parties are responding to the conflict. There are two main responses, although these are often expressed in several different forms violence and nonviolence. Process also changes with time; for example, violence can either intensify or the parties involved can turn to nonviolent means. Societies have often evolved particular ways of responding to conflict. Each society has unique nuances relevant to their specific context. 4. Context Refers to conditions that embed a conflict situation. They can be crosscutting conditions: such as prevailing perceptions, geographic location, and demographic composition. They can also be historical: such as political, social, economic, religious, and so on. Important question to ask include: 1. What are the geographical boundaries? 2. What natural resources are fuelling the conflict? and 3. How do local, national and international actors define the context? Step 3: Analysis of stakeholders Stakeholders are defined as those individuals or groups who are directly or indirectly involved in the conflict and who have a stake in the outcomes. Once the stakeholders have been identified, sorting them can be helpful to in order to further understand how they relate to one another and to the conflict. The framework below may assist in this process: Primary parties: are those who interact directly in pursuit of their respective goals. They are the direct investors in the conflict. As the conflict evolves, they may become secondary stakeholders. Secondary parties: are affected by the outcome of the conflict but are not directly involved. As the conflict progresses, they may become primary stakeholders. Peripheral parties: have an interest in the conflict. They stand to benefit from the outcomes whether peaceful or not. The difference between interested and secondary stakeholders is that the interested stakeholders suffer no direct impact from the conflict, at least not in the short to medium term.
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Peripheral parties Secondary parties Primary parties
The unimportant parties

`The peripheral parties those outside the circle may not seem significant to th e n e g otiati o n process, but they are very important to bear in mind. T h ey c an have a marked positive or negative impact on your progress in the negotiation for instance, by supporting th e o th e r si d e, o r by providing your side or the mediator with resources.
Step 4: Issue analysis During the conflict analysis, one has to identify the positions and interests attached to and articulated by the various stakeholders. This is a starting point for peacebuilders to understand the strategy process and approaches they can design, in order to effectively engage with the conflicting parties. It is crucial to understand that in high intensity conflicts, positions and interests tend to overlap and that there are certain methods for intervention that work best with either positions or interests, or, with a combination of the two. In order to analyse issues in terms of their characteristics, as well as in terms of their importance and value to the different stakeholders, it is important to understand the interrelation and connections between stakeholders and issues. Critical interrelated aspects include: Power, Identity, Rights Step 5: Utilising tools for conflict analysis The Circle of Conflict is a tool to assist in identifying the causes of a conflict. A common misconception is that a conflict should have one cause, or fit in one segment of the
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Culture, Gender, and
circle. Most conflicts will actually have causes in every sector of the circle although some sectors will tend to dominate. By asking certain questions, one can identify which aspect/s tend(s) to be the dominant cause/s of conflict. The Circle of Conflict
Relationships
misperceptions poor communication rivalry/competition
Information Issues
lack of information different interpretations of data different procedures for information assessment different views on what is relevant misinformation
Values
different ways of seeing the world apparently contradicting value systems
Interests
d ifferent needs/wants
Structural Aspects
unacceptable status quo
hidden interests not being acknowledged
structural social injustice or discrimination unequal power/authority unequal access to and/or control of resources external influences
Another tool that can help in assessing the causes and effects of a conflict is called the conflict tree. The conflict tree symbolises the core problem of the conflict (represented by the trunk of the tree), the underlying causes (represented by the roots of the tree) and the effects of the conflict (represented by the branches and leaves of the tree). A conflict tree is a useful tool for generating discussion, agreeing on a core problem to be addressed, and developing links between underlying causes and effects. Discussions can also be initiated regarding the hierarchy of different branches or roots (for example, with deeper roots being those things that are perceived as the most persistent or difficult to address causes, and with the higher branches being the effects perceived as most important or powerful). These discussions can inform peacebuilding practitioners of a range of perceptions held by different groups and thus, the various things that are important to these groups, informing more effective strategies and actions for intervention.
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Conflict mapping example: the conflict tree
E f f ec ts
The consequences of a conflict are visible they manifest above ground as the fruit of a tree, and present as disharmony, violence, the breakdown of relationships, and other forms of suffering.
Co r e P r o b l e m
The causes of a conflict, like a trees roots, are often hidden, and can be deep seated. Some conflicts have long-term historical causes, and may be part of a cycle of ongoing conflict.
Causes
Step 6: Addressing conflict sensitive considerations A particularly useful approach for any practitioner working in a conflict or post-conflict setting is that of conflict-sensitivity. A conflict-sensitive approach is about taking into account complexities as they relate to specific contexts. It thus entails acting with specific and contextual awareness of particular issues as well as with an understanding of the underlying power relations. This understanding is invaluable in ensuring that any work undertaken is, in actuality, promoting conflict resolution, rather than increasing tensions and ensures that those working within the field of peacebuilding will be more able to analyse the impact of their own work in these contexts. The table below highlights some of the considerations relevant to a conflict-sensitive approach.
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Case File: Using the conflict tree in Northwest Uganda Karamoja Region In Uganda, at Losilang, beneficiaries referred to signs/symptoms of conflict (branches) such as loss, grief, death, gender-based violence, rape, human rights abuses, fear, trauma, violence and theft. When referring to the problem (trunk), raiding and arms trades were emphasised, Coming to the roots of the problem, the factors mentioned were the loss of authority of elders, unemployment, lack of strategies for livelihoods, little or no income, and lack of water. This tool was useful to collectively reflect on the root causes of conflict, the associated problems and the impact these have in their communities. It also helped to address dialogue and participation, generating possible solutions needed to address the root causes of conflict. Conducting this exercise with a number of communities can assist in identifying commonalities and differences, as well as different strategies implemented by communities to address problems.
Source: Trcaire (2011) Conflict sensitivity toolkit. Trcaire [Internet]. Available from: <http://www.trocaire.org/sites/ trocaire/files/pdfs/policy/Conflict_Sensitivity_Toolkit_Oct_2011>
UN Photo/Tim McKulka
In Uganda, beneficiaries referred to symptoms of conflict such as loss, grief, death, gender-based violence, rape, human rights abuses, fear, trauma, violence and theft. 101
IMPACT AREAS
CONFLICT IMPACTS
IMPACT LEVEL:
PEACE IMPACTS
IMPACT AREAS
How might an initiative affect surrounding conflicts in the following impact areas? Conflict management capacities Militarised violence and human security e.g. No Alternative dispute skills supported. e.g. Tensions exacerbated by military presence fostered by stakeholders. e.g. Participation of civil society overlooked at high-level peace negotiations e.g. Livelihoods needs not addressed by programme e.g. Womens participation not addressed Programme favours only some actors of the conflict
Low (L) Medium (M) High (H)
How might an initiative affect the opportunities for peace/conflict management in the following impact areas? e.g. Mediation and facilitation skills enhanced. e.g. Peace settlement enhanced by military presence. e.g. Participation of civil society acknowledged/ supported in the context of peace negotiations. e.g. Livelihoods needs addressed by programme e.g. Womens participation fostered. Inclusion: all actors participating in all the programme activities/stages. Conflict management capacities Militarised violence and human security
Political structures and processes
Political structures and processes
Economic structures and processes Social impacts/ empowerment
Economic structures and processes Social impacts/ empowerment
Source: Trocaire, 2011. Conflict Sensitivity Toolkit. Available: <http://www.trocaire.org/sites/trocaire/files/ pdfs/policy/Conflict_Sensitivity_Toolkit_Oct_2011>
5.4 Conclusion
This chapter has sought to provide a background to conflict and some of the different concepts that are integral to understanding conflict. It has provided some practical tools that can be used to understand and analyse conflict and conflict situations and thus create appropriate, context-specific responses. This chapter forms the foundation upon which one can develop peacebuilding and conflict resolution tools to be used in post-conflict situations.
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Chapter 6: Coherence and Coordination

What will this chapter do? This chapter outlines the importance of coordination and coherence in peacebuilding processes and provides an example of how this can be done. Why is it important? This chapter is important because uncoordinated peacebuilding processes are unlikely to be successful or sustainable. What should you learn? By the end of this chapter, the reader should understand why and how to ensure coordination takes place at all levels of peacebuilding.
6.1 Introduction
Coordination and coherence in peacebuilding processes is vital to the success of these initiatives. However, while coordination and coherence are worth investing in, they are also riddled with challenges, including concerns of which actors or stakeholders to involve, which timeline to follow and which approach to use. The examples of different integrated approaches, used in this chapter, will outline how, in an ideal sense, a coordinated peacebuilding mission could or should take place. This chapter draws upon examples from the AU and the UN in order to illustrate some of the challenges to coordination, and suggests a few ways to move past these in order to ensure better and more effective peacebuilding processes.
6.2 Coordination
Perhaps the best place to start is with looking at some relevant definitions. The Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary) explains that coordination means; Making things, people and parts function together efficiently and in an organised way (2011). The Collins English Dictionary provides an insight into coordination that is perhaps even more relevant for our purposes; it defines coordination as; The organisation of the activities of two or more groups in such a way that each may work more efficiently and be aware of what the other group(s) are doing(2013).
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In terms of peacebuilding, coordination refers to the relationships and communications between the different actors and parties involved in peacebuilding processes. As both the transition to peacekeeping and from peacekeeping to peacebuilding are complex, often involving tensions between the military and actors involved in these contexts, comprehensive and efficient communication between all of the stakeholders and parties involved is vital. This involves the above mentioned steps of strategic planning, gathering information, mobilising resources, providing clear divisions of tasks, and ensuring efficient leadership of the process. The more communication that exists between the different actors, the more coordination there will be and the better the chances of coherent actions.
Examples of coordination instruments Strategic planning; Gathering data and managing information; Mobilising resources and ensuring accountability; Orchestrating a functional division of labour; Negotiating and maintaining a framework with host political authorities; Providing leadership.
6.3 Coherence
In this Handbook coherence is understood as the effort to seek shared strategic direction among the international and local actors and the political and governance, security and rule of law, socio-economic recovery, human rights and humanitarian assistance dimensions of peacebuilding.
The need for, and benefits of, improved coherence are widely accepted. There is now broad consensus that inconsistent policies and fragmented programmes entail a higher risk of duplication, inefficient spending, a lower quality of service, difficulty in meeting goals and, ultimately; a reduced capacity for delivery, and thus impact. As a result of this consensus, there is also a widely held assumption that pursuing a more coherent approach will result in a more relevant, effective, efficient and sustainable impacts on any given peacebuilding process.
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A large number of evaluation reports and research studies which have analysed the record of peacebuilding efforts have found that most of these have had significant problems with coherence and coordination. Many of these studies and reports have concluded that a lack of coherence and coordination in peacebuilding efforts has contributed to the poor rate of sustainability of these operations to date. Peacebuilding projects assessment The Joint Utstein Study of peacebuilding which analysed 336 peacebuilding projects implemented by Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and Norway, over the period of a decade has identified a lack of coherence at the strategic level, what it terms a strategic deficit, as the most significant obstacle to sustainable peacebuilding. The Utstein study found that more than 55% of the programmes it evaluated did not show any link to a larger country strategy. In the context of the concepts introduced earlier, programmes in the previous sentence relates to programmatic peacebuilding and the reference to a larger country strategy reflects the need for systemic peacebuilding. The Utstein study thus found that for programmatic peacebuilding to be meaningful and sustainable, it needs to be part of a peacebuilding system that is actively pursuing a strategic direction. The need for coherence is widely recognised and accepted and yet, achieving it in practice is very difficult. As the Utstein and other studies have pointed out, the lack of a clearly articulated overall strategy is a critical shortcoming in many peacebuilding systems. If there is no shared understanding of the direction being pursued, peacebuilding actors will have no benchmark against which they can judge the degree to which they are coherent and thus, operating with a common strategy.
6.4 The Limits of Coordination and Coherence

Coherence also needs to be understood in the context of the inherent tensions and contradictions that exists between the various peacebuilding dimensions and among the different peacebuilding actors. The agencies that are responsible for programmes and campaigns will often have to settle for partially coherent or good enough solutions in order to manage these tensions while establishing a workable foundation for cooperation. The degree to which coherence can be pursued in any given situation is determined by the context. The context determines the scope for coherence and thus establishes the
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broad parameters beyond which pursuing more than the optimal degree of coherence will have no further benefits. In fact, pursuing coherence beyond these limits typically generate perverse effects, in other words the effects start to undermine the very coherence they are meant to pursue. There are many factors that frustrate coordination and coherence in the peacebuilding context, but the following two deserve particular attention: 1. The sheer number of international and local actors involved in peacebuilding processes; 2. The wide-ranging scope of activities undertaken by these actors. Both the interactions among these many different actors and the interplay between the multiple dimensions, contribute to the complexity of peacebuilding. While the information revolution (referring to the radical increase in the accessibility of technologies for communication and information sharing) has significantly increased the number of actors involved in peacebuilding, it has also multiplied the amount of information that peacebuilding actors have to process. It has amplified the influence of the media and increased the number of institutions and agencies that are aware of and thus engaged in peace, security, relief and reconstruction actions. There is often the assumption that if a specific approach to coherence and coordination has worked well in one context say, for instance in Liberia that applying it to another context should produce similar results. However, one of the most important indicators of the degree to which meaningful coherence can be achieved in any given context is the level of conflict and hostility within the conflict system. The more tense or violent the conflict, the less conducive it is to coherence among peacebuilding agents. This is because the differences between the various actors are more likely to be pronounced under pressure. It is, thus, neither the coherence and coordination model, nor the intensity of the efforts invested in coordination and coherence, that primarily determine the degree to which coherence can be achieved in a given situation. Rather, it is context that has the most profound effect; in other words, the degree to which the situation is conducive, or not, to the resolution of the conflict. Context is, however, not a stable or given state; it is continuously changing and so is the scope for coordination and coherence. Peacebuilders should thus be aware of and monitor these changes states in order to best take advantage of favourable conditions for the implementation of effective actions.
6.5 Conflicting Principles, Mandates and Approaches

There are a number of ways in which the differences between the principles, mandates and approaches of the various actors can manifest themselves. These are elaborated in the table below.
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Area of potential conflict Approaches to which aspects to prioritise political versus security actors
Example Political and security actors may typically prefer to focus on stabilising a situation before dealing with corruption, black market trading, racketeering, narcotics, human rights, etc. Those specialising in crime and human rights will argue, however, that robustly dealing earlier with those responsible for human rights atrocities or criminal behaviour will result in more sustainable stability.
Approaches to which aspects to prioritise peace versus justice
The justice versus peace tension is the second example: those favouring justice will argue that efforts to identify and bring war criminals to justice should have priority, whilst others argue that peace should first be achieved. The latter argue, for example, that the actions against President Bashir of Sudan and Joseph Koni of the Lords Resistance Army have resulted in a prolongation of these conflicts and thus more deaths and suffering than would have been the case if they were indicted after peace agreements had been concluded and implemented.
The timetable of one dimension may be in conflict with the principles of another short term versus long term goals
One case in point is the election time-table in Liberia (2004 2006) which motivated those responsible for the first post-conflict election to encourage the IDPs in Monrovia to return to their original communities so that they could be registered there to vote. However, these agencies disagreed with the return timetable because their assessments informed them that the conditions were not yet sufficient to provide alternative sustainable livelihoods for the returnees in their home locations. This situation caused tension between the political and developmental/ humanitarian actors because their respective goals short term versus long term and operating values and principles brought them into opposition with one another.
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The inherent contradictions and tensions among the principles, mandates and approaches of various peacebuilding actors can thus potentially limit the scope for coherence and coordination.
This does not imply that it is meaningless to pursue coherence and coordination, but recognising these limitations helps to avoid unrealistic assumptions about the degree of coherence and coordination that actors should aim to achieve, and provides more awareness of the given context within which actors operate.
6.6 Conflicting Rules, Regulations and Resource Management Processes

There are also structural impediments to coherence and coordination that, although technical, create significant obstacles at the field-level. These structural impediments fall into two broad categories: administrative rules and regulations, and resource management processes. In the rules and regulations category, organisational procedures which discourage coordination can be found. These are often tactical level practical arrangements which have a high impact on the ability of people to work together within the field. However, the rules and/or regulations themselves have often been established at a higher level typically at the higher-headquarters level and, for different reasons, (for example, insurance or security of personnel) they are usually very difficult to change in the short term. Often, especially in the early stages of a crisis, some agencies have resources in the field whilst others are still waiting for their resources to arrive. In these circumstances better coordination among different agencies to share available resources may seem logical, but organisational rules and regulations, and complicated reimbursement processes have resulted in the sub-optimum sharing of resources. Very often, the underlying cause in these cases relates to financial management issues. For good and sound financial reasons, organisations have to budget for resources, and once allocated, have to use the resources as planned. Where deviations occur they have to pre-cleared and reported. Although these systems make for good financial management, and need to be especially vigorous as public funds are at stake, they do not make it any easier for field level managers to adapt their operations to highly dynamic situations. Furthermore, each actor has their own budget, as well as financial rules and regulations, and these typically do not easily provide for aspects such as; the pooling of funds or resources, the sharing resources, or other forms of funding coordination. With regards to organisations that rely on voluntary funding, they often need to be able to show the funding agency how their specific contributions have had an impact, and as this
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is increasingly difficult in coordinated ventures; such organisations are often under pressure to act independently. There are thus a range of structural issues that discourage coherence and coordination among agencies within the field, and many of these are difficult to address, or may take a long time to change.
6.7 Coping with the Limits to Coherence and Coordination

Coping with the inherent contradictions and dilemmas of peacebuilding requires that those responsible for programmes or organisations understand not only their independent reality, but also understand that they are interdependent upon one other. Each programme is independent because it is executed under the auspices of a certain organisation that exist as a legal entity, and which has its own budget and the authority to manage the programme. Each programme is, however, also interdependent in that its meaning is derived from its part in the larger peacebuilding system in other words, it contributes to achieving a specific effect that only makes sense if you take into account what others are contributing towards other effects. In order to achieve the wide-ranging objectives of peacebuilding, a total combined perspective and effort is necessary. In such a context a programme manager needs to be able to establish and maintain a network that ensures that the particular programme is connected with other programmes which may have an influence on its outcome, and that will result in it being able to adjust to changes elsewhere in the system. In other words it is not just about managing the independent reality, but also the interdependent reality of being part of a highly dynamic and complex system. This requires that the individual programme needs to be coherent with, at least some aspects of the larger system and that coordination with others, and adaptation to changes elsewhere in the system, become additional requirements. In this context changes to the plan should not be frowned upon but rather, expected, and managers should be required to plan for and report on their efforts in pursuit of coherence, coordination and adaptation. Adequately pursuing coherence can be said to require a paradigm shift within the higher realms of management and planning. This shift requires that those responsible for developing policy, as well as planning and managing specific interventions, recognise and counter the tendency of their own bureaucracies to be self-serving, and to be pre-occupied with self-preservation. Instead, they should encourage an organisational culture, both at headquarters and in the field that embraces both the independent and interdependent realities of working in highly dynamic and complex environments.
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Measuring the success of a DDR programme. A specific developmental programme may provide vocational training as part of a larger DDR programme in a post-conflict context. However, that programme only makes sense if it is understood in its overall context as being part of a larger peace process that includes a DDR programme, in which several organisations are taking part. The vocational training programme can only be considered as success if others identify, register and disarm combatants, and if others work toward sustained livelihoods and economic recovery that will create the environment within which the vocation can be applied.
6.8 The UN Integrated Approach

The Integrated Approach should be understood in the context of an increasingly complex and interdependent international conflict management system. The scope of crisis faced by the international community is often of such scale that no one entity can manage it completely on its own. The aim of the integrated approach is to pursue optimal coherence with what optimal constitutes being determined by the specific context among the political and governance; security and rule of law; socio-economic recovery; and human rights and humanitarian assistance dimensions of peacebuilding. The objective of the integrated approach is to coordinate the activities of the many different international and local actors, with this happening across the analysis, planning, implementation, as well as management and evaluation aspects of any programme cycle. Most of the international approaches to integration have converged around three main dimensions namely; security, development and governance. These indicate that while there may be several different international approaches to integration, they do, nonetheless share many of the same general characteristics. These characteristics, around which international strategies tend to converge, are referred to in the table below as core dimensions. The UN system responded to the complex challenges it was facing in the late 1990s by commissioning a series of high-level panels and working groups, and by experimenting with a number of strategic and operational coordination models. Over the last decade, these efforts culminated in the integrated approach. In the context of complex peace operations, the integrated approach refers to specific operational processes and designs, where the planning and coordination that would usually be done by different elements within the UN are integrated into a single country-level system.
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Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan first described the concept as follows: An Integrated Mission is based on a common strategic plan and a shared understanding of the priorities and types of programme interventions that need to be undertaken at various stages of the recovery process. Through this integrated process, the UN system seeks to maximise its contribution towards countries emerging from conflict by engaging its different capabilities in a coherent and mutually supportive manner (UN, 2006). The Note of the Secretary-General on Integrated Missions (2006) establishes the integrated approach as the guiding principle for the design and implementation of complex UN peace operations in post-conflict situations and for linking the different dimensions of peacebuilding into a coherent support strategy. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon has reaffirmed the integrated approach as the guiding principle for all conflict and post-conflict situations where the UN has a Country Team and a multidimensional peace operation, or a political peacebuilding office, regardless of whether these missions are structurally integrated or not.
The Integrated Missions concept refers to a type of mission where there are processes, mechanisms and structures in place that generate and sustain a common strategic objective, as well as a comprehensive operational approach, among the political, security, development, human rights, and where appropriate, humanitarian and UN actors at country level.
The core features of the UNs integrated approach: Context: This is a multidimensional and system-wide UN family support to the stabilisation of a conflict or the implementation of a comprehensive peace process in a post-conflict setting, i.e. actions to establish a meaningful peace process, or where such a peace process is in place, support to the parties with the implementation of this process; Purpose: The main purpose of the integrated approach is to maximise the individual and collective impact of the UNs response, concentrating on those activities required to consolidate peace;
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Dimensions:
Recognising that a comprehensive approach requires a system-wide process, that covers the political, security, development, human rights, rule of law and where appropriate, humanitarian, dimensions;
Participating UN Agents:
Understanding that for all these dimension to be brought into play in a synchronised, appropriately sequenced and coherent fashion, the UN family, which consist of a diverse range of departments in the Secretariat, independently constituted funds, agencies and programmes, and the Bretton Woods institutions, need to operate as one integrated UN system at country level;
Operational Coordination:
Establishment of a range of processes, mechanisms and struc tures that will generate common assessment s, inte grate d plans, op erational coordination mechanisms, common monitoring tools and an ability to evaluate the overall effect and impact of the Integrated Approach that has been brought about among all the relevant elements of the UN system.
The assumption of the integrated approach is that a more coherent model, which manages to produce a comprehensive and coordinated system-wide effort, will have a more relevant, effective, efficient and sustainable impact on the peace process.
Within the UN system there are various semi-autonomous agencies, funds, offices and programmes that have a humanitarian and development mandate, as well as departments of the UN Secretariat that have the responsibility for peace operations. Although the core of the UN integration effort will be aimed at achieving system-wide coherence among these members of the UN system, the comprehensive approach is not meant to be limited to the members of the UN family. The members of the UN system that participate in the UN integrated approach, should facilitate and participate in, various other coordination initiatives aimed at promoting overall harmonisation among the external actors, and alignment between the internal and external actors in any given country or regional conflict system. The integrated approach thus needs to be understood in a wider international context where coherence is being pursued at national level among government departments.
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6.9 The AUs integrated approach

The AU has started to adopt some of the integrated missions terminology, both in its missions and in the African Standby Force (ASF) Policy Framework. It is important, however, to distinguish between the scope for integration that exists within the UN system and within the AU system. Whilst it is possible, under certain circumstances, to integrate the UN RC/HC Coordinator functions in UN peace operations, it is inconceivable that the UN RC/HC function can be integrated with AU, EU, NATO or any other non-UN peace operations, because the humanitarian and development coordination mandate has been entrusted to the UN system (General Assembly Resolution, April 1992). The opposite, however, is possible and this has been the case, for example, in both Kosovo and Darfur. In Kosovo, the European Union (EU) was responsible for a specific pillar, under the overall direction of the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). In Darfur, the UN and AU jointly operated a hybrid mission, with the AU being nominally responsible for the military component. This does not imply that it is impossible for the UN development and humanitarian coordination system to work with AU, EU or NATO operations such cooperation has been taking place with AU (Darfur), EU (Chad and Central African Republic) and NATO (Afghanistan) missions. However, the point is that it is inconceivable that they can be integrated with the same meaning that this concept implied in the UN system context. Instead, integration in the AU context is used in a generic sense to refer to multidimensional coordination and cooperation. For instance, the AUs Integrated Mission Planning Team (IMPT) refers to a mechanism where the military, police and civilian planning functions are combined in one process (the Policy framework for the civilian dimension of the African standby force of 2008), as opposed to the UNs Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF), which refers a system-wide initiative. Integration in the AU and other non-UN contexts should thus be understood as combining certain functions typically the military, police and civilian (which includes substantive and mission support functions) in multidimensional or complex operations. The policy framework for the civilian dimension of the African Standby Force (ASF) provides for a civilian head of mission, who is called the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission (SRCC). The SRCC can be supported by one or more deputies, and/or a Chief of Staff. The SRCC leads a senior leadership team consisting of the SRCC, the deputy SRCCs, the Force Commander, the Police Commissioner, senior civilian heads of departments, and the Head of Mission Support.
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The policy framework also provides for an Office of the SRCC and supporting processes that allow for the mission-coordination mechanisms necessary to ensure coherence in a peace operation of this nature, including a Mission Operations Centre (MOC), a Mission Analysis Cell (MAC) and a Mission Planning and Evaluation Cell (MPEC). In addition, the policy framework allows for the multidimensional management structures at mission headquarters to be mirrored, for coordination purposes, at sector level. There are, however, constraints in allowing the AU to realise such an approach: 1. The AU is primarily a political and security organisation with very limited capacity to play a meaningful role in the humanitarian, developmental and peacebuilding areas, except for mustering political support and participating in enabling frameworks. 2. The three peace operations that the AU has undertaken to date, in Burundi, Darfur and Somalia, have been primarily military operations. Although the mission in Darfur (AMIS) eventually had a sizeable police component, and although all three missions had small civilian components, these missions were dominated by their military aspects. This is both because the civilian dimension of peace operations is still underdeveloped in the AU, and because these have all been stabilisation-type operations where there is less scope for civilian roles than in, for instance, postconflict reconstruction missions. 3. In the African Standby Force (ASF) context there is a concerted effort underway to develop the civilian dimension of the ASF, but these efforts have to be understood in an environment where peacekeeping is still viewed primarily as a military responsibility. For instance, the ASF initiative is steered by the AU Ministers of Defence and Security, and whilst they are broadly supportive of the civilian dimension, their natural interest and focus lies with the military dimension of peace operations. 4. The AU has developed and adopted a policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD), but this policy has not yet resulted in the AU playing a significant peacebuilding role. This is mainly for the reasons highlighted in the first point raised above namely; that the AU is not a significant development actor. This is also because the PCRD concept has not yet been integrated into the AUs Peace Support Operations concept for the second reason discussed earlier namely; that the focus to date has been on stability operations. However, the AU has a good working relationship with the UN and the EU when it comes to peacebuilding, both in terms of support and cooperation with existing operations, for example, in the context of the hybrid AU-UN operation in Darfur, and in terms of capacity building for the future in the context of the ASF.
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6.10 Conclusion
A key characteristic of the peacebuilding process is that all of its dimensions are interlinked and interdependent. Thus, in relation to the various programmes and activities, and the agencies that carry them out, no single programme can achieve the goal of the peacebuilding operation addressing the consequences and causes of the conflict and laying the foundation for social justice and sustainable peace on its own. It is only through combined and sustained effort that peacebuilding can prove successful in the long term and that the investment made by each individual programme can be said to be truly worthwhile. It is thus the total collective and cumulative effect of all the programmes undertaken in these different dimensions that slowly builds positive momentum towards sustainable peace. This is why coordination and coherence are such critical success factors for peacebuilding. A means of this coordination is the integrated approach. It ensures coherence among members and cooperation and coordination throughout the process, enabling effective peacebuilding.
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Chapter 7: Peacebuilding Planning

What will this chapter do? This chapter will outline the analysis, planning, management and evaluation processes involved in peacebuilding. Why is it important? Without effective analysis, planning, management and evaluation, peacebuilding processes can become ineffective, unsustainable, and fail to meet their intended goals. What should you learn? Upon ending this chapter, the reader should have a deeper understanding of the role of planning in ensuring that peacebuilding initiatives are successful and sustainable.
7.1 Introduction
Planning peacebuilding interventions that intend to influence highly dynamic and complex social systems are fraught with dangers. This chapter aims to introduce the reader to some of the key considerations that should inform peacebuilding planning, including analysis and assessments, management, monitoring and evaluation, resource mobilisation and unintended consequences.
7.2 Analysis and Assessments

The current best practice in international peacebuilding is to start any new mission or programme, or any serious review of a current mission, with a conflict analysis that is aimed at determining the root causes of the conflict, with a view to then generate a set of actions that will address, and ultimately resolve these root causes. This dominant approach is deterministic, i.e. it is based on two beliefs: firstly that there is problem that can be discovered and solved, and secondly that the international peacebuilding system has the ability to diagnose such a problem and to design and administer a cure (the solution to the problem). In fact, most peacebuilding agencies have a pre-determined supply driven response capacity, and the purpose of the analysis is simply to link the supply and the perceived need. If your agency deals in food security, there is a high probability that your needs assessment, or your representative in a joint needs assessment, will find that there is a food security problem. If your agency delivers peacekeeping missions, or mediation
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services, you are likely to find that the problem requires a peacekeeping or mediation solution. The analysis is thus not aimed so much at diagnosing the problem, because the solution has already been pre-designed by the mandate of the agency, the only real question, in this context, is how big the need is. An alternative approach would: Firstly; be mindful not just of the specific aspect that the particular organisation may focus on, but also consider this focus within the wider systems of operationincluding in the particular contexts and environments of operation. Secondly; be aware of and monitor the dynamic and non-linear interconnections among different agents, and also, be aware of the ways in which these interactions generate context specific meanings. Any given manifestation of a problem is unique to the context in which it occurs. What resolves a problem in one context may not resolve the same problem in another context. Thirdly; take into account the fact there is no one single state of affairs or set of root causes that can always be identified and solved. We cannot intervene in a conflict system in isolation, and even if it was possible to do so, no system is static. Peacebuilders always have to deal with multiple factors that are constantly in the process of interacting with one another and with larger international and regional environments. To understand the context is which one is working, it is important to see that as being in motion, and as being influenced and affected by its environment. Fourthly; conflict, as a system that is complex, does not follow any pre-determined causal design where certain root causes determine certain specific outcomes that can be easily discovered through the simple application of a cut-and-paste method. Conflict analysis thus has to be an ongoing process of exploration and self-critical analysis, informed by an awareness of an inability to fully understand the complexity of the systems that are being dealt with, and by an awareness of fluidity and change. Many of the current pre-mission analyses are informed by short field visits that generate once-off reports, on the basis of which missions are planned. Often it is the case that both the analysis and plan are only revisited periodically, for instance, annually as part of new budget planning and reporting cycles. It is therefore essential that conflict analyses are informed by flexibility in the face of complexities that cannot necessarily be quickly understood, and should be guided by an approach that takes into account highly dynamic, non-linear and context specific aspects. Any analysis would thus have to be limited in scope and relevant for a relatively short period of time. Information gathering will also need to take a multi-pronged and
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highly adaptive approach, so that it can be open and sensitive to feedback and changes in the conflict system and the environment. This alternative approach may be referred to as a complex systems approach and it cautions us against processes, tools and mechanisms that generate simplified actionable priorities that encourage blind implementation. It also informs us that if a period has passed without adjustment of analysis, then this needs to be addressed - the one thing we can predict is that the conflict system will constantly be changing.
7.3 Planning
The relevance of any given plan can, at best, only have a very short potential lifespan during which it can be expected to have a direct influence. As soon as any plan is implemented the context in which it is implemented will begin to react to it. This is, of course, the intension of the plan, but the point is that in complex contexts, these reactions cannot be predicted, and very soon these reactions are likely to go in directions that the plan could not originally envisage or foresee. This has several important implications for how planning is understood in the peacebuilding context: Toolkit: Planning tips for practitioners Planning cannot be limite d to the start of a peacebuilding mission or programme, but need to be part of an ongoing process of adaptation, throughout the lifetime of the operation or programme. The planning process should involve the broadest possible representative group of agents in the peacebuilding system, so that it can be informed by the widest possible cross-section of information. The design process should generate multiple options, and the planning process should experiment with those that it thinks may be most likely to have the desired effect/s. Peacebuilding practitioners need to understand that change is a continuous process as the situation will keep changing, interventions need continuous adjustments. Practitioners need to be open and willing to abandon old solutions, including those that once may have worked well but no longer seem to generate the desired effect/s. Planning should therefore not be seen as a method for identifying a straight path to an end point but rather should be seen as a continuous process that is aimed at helping peacebuilding processes to adapt to their environments, in pursuance of the objective of peace consolidation.
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Graeme Edwards famously said that it is not the plan that is important, but the planning. The peacebuilding process will generate milestones, such as annual planning documents, intermediate reviews or updates, but the most important aspect is the continuous process of engagement by as many peacebuilding agents as possible in the dialectic process of making sense, together, of the how the system functions, how it can be influenced, how it is responding to earlier attempts to influence it, how it is changing, and so on. A complex systems approach generates processes for continuously managing adaptation to complex environments, rather than simply generating cut-and-paste strategies. Peacebuilders can only know if a specific approach is having the intended effect through feedback from various stakeholders, with the implication that ways in which peacebuilders choose to operate have to be designed in ways that are able to monitor and take into account feedback generated by the systems operated within and by the environment (Wilson-Grau, 2008). One of the prerequisites for a coherent peacebuilding operation is a clearly articulated overall strategy against which individual units, offices and programmes can benchmark their own plans and progress. The overall country strategy is produced by the cumulative and collective planning efforts of all units, offices and programmes in the system.
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Integrating Gender into Peacebuilding Planning Kemi Ogunsanya, Adviser, Gender and Political Development at Commonwealth Secretariat
In the 21st century the message is being carried positively at the international, regional and national levels to involve men and women in peacebuilding. So the first breakthrough is awareness and sensitisation on the inequalities for women and why it is essential to involve male champions in the cause of womens empowerment. It is necessary to ensure that actions in the field include; sensitisation of men and women to understand gender and the importance of mainstreaming women in peacebuilding initiatives and processes; monitoring and evaluation to measure outputs, outcomes and impact of gender mainstreaming at the local, national and international levels; networking and exchange programmes to strengthen existing processes and to build on successes. It is also important that peacebuilding practitioners work towards the generation of the political will to realise constitutional, legislative, political and institutional reforms which will enable relevant changes in policies, programmes and structures. Examples of these changes include: affirmative action policies, introducing quotas and similar intervening strategies to mandate womens representation. Furthermore, mainstreaming should not be isolated in gender ministries or divisions, but should reach across all state parastatals. Gender Responsive Budgeting can go some way to ensuring the above. An encouraging example of this may be found in the case of Bangladesh. Here, the finance ministry has a dedicated budget for gender specific projects, and has ensured that funds allocated to ministries are not approved until gender programmes are identified. The Ministry has set criteria to track budgets and gender responsiveness is a condition for funding. Ongoing challenges include inadequate resources to support gender and peacebuilding efforts; the limited participation or involvement of women in peacebuilding processes; literacy and education challenges for women due to cultural barriers and social norms that discourage womens effective participation; and, on a personal level, in terms of convincing senior management who are yet to understand or be sensitised to gender mainstreaming, it becomes an uphill battle to move agendas favourably- in this regard, evidence of outputs, outcomes and impacts of womens contribution to peacebuilding becomes critical to facilitate measurable resources for gender related programming. Women are key players in conflict management, resolution and transformation processes, and contribute effectively in peace-making, peacekeeping and peacebuilding processes. The impact of their contribution in peace and security cannot be ignored. Moreover, it is vital to involve half of the worlds population in all sectors and at all levels of decision-making.
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7.4 Management and Leadership

We will make a distinction between leadership and management, where leadership refers to the strategic coordination of the system as a whole, and management refers to how each particular actor manages their respective programmes. In the peacebuilding context, the role of management is to facilitate the assessment, planning, coordination and monitoring processes that are needed to ensure that any particular peacebuilding programme is pursuing its own objectives, including meaningfully contributing to the larger peacebuilding process. Managers typically have the responsibility and authority to direct resources in order to achieve goals. Managers are typically the head of a specific agency or office or the commander of a specific contingent. System-leaders generate and facilitate processes where information can be shared by creating opportunities for peacebuilding agents to participate in, for instance, joint analysis, joint planning, joint coordination processes and joint monitoring and evaluation processes. Leadership in the peacebuilding context is about recognising that the complexity of the system requires distributed management in the form of selforganisation, and that the role of leadership is limited to modulating and facilitating that process.
7.5 Mobilising Resources

The international community has developed various tools to mobilise resources. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) coordinates the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP). The CAP is first and foremost a strategic planning and coordination tool. The humanitarian community sees the CAP as the main strategy-setting tool for responding to man-made and slow-onset disasters. In the development dimension, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) or the World Bank will typically take the lead to coordinate fundraising for common priorities through donor conferences. The donor conference for Afghanistan in January 2001 and the conference for Liberia in February 2004 are two such examples. In some cases transitional appeals are launched on the basis of a Common Country Assessment (CCA), and then serve as the foundation for a UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and/or a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), as appropriate. Once the funds have been allocated the coordination shifts to implementation and operational coordination. In the case of UN peace operations, the missions are funded through assessed contributions. Part of the work of the Civil-Military Relations Officer will be to understand how these different funding mechanisms work and which mechanisms
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Monitoring and Evaluation and Peacebuilding
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Frauke de Weijer, Policy Officer - Conflict, Security and Resilience European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM)
Globally, the agenda for showing results and value-for-money is growing. There is therefore a need to show results, also in this field. Peacebuilding is an area that can be defined in many different ways, with varying scope and depth. Some progress on monitoring and evaluation could go a long way in a better and more broadly shared definition of what constitutes peacebuilding. The drive for values for results can lead to an disproportionate focus on those things that can be measured. This has two potential negative consequences; firstly, the things that are toughest to measure are often the most important, these include issues like social cohesion and capital, collaborative capacity, trust, the degree of instrumentalisation of identity and religion, etc. This can lead to these issues being swept under the carpet and dismissed as irrelevant. Peacebuilders on the ground however know very well how important these are, and use more intuitive measures. Secondly, it can lead to the target becoming the goal; i.e. the focus goes to achieving the target, which is often a weak proxy for that which is seen to matter. These risks are always there, when measuring anything, but considering that peacebuilding is notoriously hard to measure, this risk becomes even greater. Monitoring and evaluation tends to get done through a logical framework methodology; whereby inputs, outputs and outcomes are (theoretically) clearly linked to each other. M&E then focuses on the descriptions and targets presented in the logical framework. M&E is therefore an exercise in tunnel vision, whereby the logical framework provides the frame of the glasses. Risk and assumptions may be presented in a separate column, but this rarely receives real attention and is hardly ever monitored against (it is mostly used as a get out of jail free card in case results are not met. This means that unintended consequences are often missed, or at least not actively looked out for. In a field of peacebuilding, which is complex and rather unpredictable, this can be dangerous. It is especially dangerous when the accountability framework does not allow for changes in strategy, outputs or activities due to contractual considerations. New approaches to M&E have been developed, such as outcome mapping and development evaluation, as well as some experimentation with approaches based on complexity thinking, that can overcome some of the obstacles and risks described above. Furthermore, and most importantly, it is essential to place learning at the forefront. Learning is distinct from M&E, in the sense that it is not intended to hold one accountable, but it is intended to learn from past experience. This creates much more space for a continuous process of reflection on every step taken, an appreciation of failure, a willingness to challenge ones assumptions, and a willingness to change
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course. A structured learning process can strengthen peacebuilding theory and practice, knowledge sharing (through sharing experience on process and insights gained into blind spots regarding ones assumptions, rather than by establishing best practice), and if carefully guarded and with some changes in institutional culture on both donor and recipient can even serve as a basis for evaluation. After all, the donor should also want the recipient to learn and improve. As a final remark, I want to stress how important it is for the peacebuilding community to start showing impact and strengthen its evidence base. However, in a field as complex, intricate and sensitive as this, simple managerial approaches cannot simply be transferred from other fields. There is a need to think creatively and innovatively about ways to do M&E that mitigate some of the risks described above.
both within and outside the mission budget can be accessed to facilitate specific projects, for example, Quick Impact Projects.
7.6 Monitoring and Evaluation

Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) is vital because it generates the feedback that is used to assess the effect that the peacebuilding intervention is having on the peace process that it is intervening in. M&E should also be used to generate feedback on the effect each individual peacebuilding programme is having. M&E thus facilitates feedback at both the programmatic and systemic levels, and its cumulative effect helps to generate the overall situational awareness that peacebuilding actors have about the state of the peacebuilding system and their impact on it. The M&E process needs to be a continuous and iterative process. Under the influence of the engineering approach, M&E was often only used to judge whether the causal assumptions of programme design had been validated in the execution of a programme, and M&E was often relegated to narrow monitoring of outputs during implementation and of the evaluation of outcomes, effects and impacts at the end of the programme cycle. There should be an integration of M&E processes into the day-to-day and monthto-month management of peacebuilding programmes, with a view to generate the feedback needed to inform the management of the adjustments they need to make to their plans and operational activities. Monitoring should be an ongoing process whilst evaluation can be used to look deeper into specific aspects and to ask higher order questions. The key point is that instead of using M&E only to inform reporting to the funding agency, as is predominantly the current practice, M&E should be used to generate the feedback individual programmes, and the system as a whole, need to evolve and adjust.
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Case file: Making recommendations for donors and the government of South Sudan The evaluation team in charge of assessing donor support to conflict prevention and peacebuilding in South Sudan from 2005 to 2010 (Bennett and Farran, 2010) drew on the evaluation findings to formulate specific, targeted recommendations to donors and the government of South Sudan. Concluding that donors did not adjust what they were doing on the basis of a sophisticated and nuanced analysis of power relations, causes of vulnerability, drivers of conflict and resilience indicators (conflict analysis), the evaluation team recommended that donors and the wider aid community: Ensure that revised and new programmes are always preceded by a conflict analysis that links wider dynamics to those specific to the area of operation. Plan, monitor and evaluate interventions according to the critical factors identified. Rate interventions on responsiveness to conflict factors. Allocate major resources towards creating and maintaining livelihood programmes for those who are currently too easily drawn into criminal activity. Enable traditional authorities (chiefs) to address root causes of conflict (including disputes over land) at their customary courts by providing capacity building programmes for these courts. Develop effective oversight mechanisms to monitor security agencies.
Source: Bennett, Jon, and Albert Gonzalez Farran. Aiding the Peace: A Multi-donor Evaluation of Support to Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities in Southern Sudan 20052010: Final Report. (2010). <http://www.sida.se/Publications/Import/ pdf/sv/Aiding-the-Peace-A-Multi-donor-Evaluation-of-Supportto-Conflict-Prevention-and-Peacebuilding-Activities-in-SouthernSudan-200582112010.pdf>
7.7 Unintended Consequences

The complexity that has been emphasised throughout this chapter does not mean that peacebuilders are powerless in the face of unpredictable and unstable effects. On the contrary, an improved understanding of the dynamics of complex systems should improve our ability to anticipate that there will be unpredictable and unintended consequences, and this should enable us to be more sensitive to such consequences when they do occur, and to take steps to mitigate their effects or to adjust our actions accordingly.
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Those responsible for the planning, management and assessment of peacebuilding missions thus need to recognise that unintended consequences are a normal consequence of the dynamic nature of complex systems. The UN and other institutions which undertake peacebuilding missions need to develop institutional mechanisms for addressing unintended consequences, and should institutionalise planning and assessment mechanisms that will enable them to anticipate and respond to emerging unintended consequences.
7.8 Conclusion
Peacebuilding has become more complex and complicated over the past decade, with more actors and parties involved. Effective planning, management and evaluation have thus become even more vital aspects for peacebuilding processes in order to ensure coherence and coordination of peacebuilding efforts. This chapter has sought to provide information and guidelines for these processes so as to make peacebuilding efforts as effective as possible.
UN Photo/Isaac Billy
Pursuing a more coherent approach will result in a more relevant, effective, efficient and sustainable impacts on any given peacebuilding process.
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Conclusion to the handbook
eacebuilding seeks to prevent, reduce, transform and help people recover from violence in all of its forms, visible, as well as latent; for example, structural violence that has not yet led to civil unrest. It actively attempts to create the
capacity to meet all forms of human needs and rights, in accordance with the definition of human security provided within this handbook. At the same time, it attempts to empower people to foster relationships at all levels which sustain both them and their environment. It also seeks to break cycles of violence and conflict by taking a series of conflict sensitive actions or approaches. Peacebuilding is a systematic process that facilitates the establishment of durable peace and tries to prevent the reoccurrence of violence by addressing the root causes of conflict, as well as its effects. The Handbook has been divided into two sections in order to cover many aspects that are necessary to understanding peacebuilding, as well as to designing and implementing effective peacebuilding processes and actions. The Handbook has attempted to draw together theory and practice, illuminating the links between them through discussion of theoretical debates and the ways in which these apply to or affect peacebuilding within the field. Understanding peacebuilding as a process that requires long-term investment means that peacebuilders need to be realistic about how programmes are planned and implemented. The rate of change has to be sensitive to the societys capacity to absorb change in order for transformative systems to be sustainable. Imposing more change than can be absorbed results, at best, in overflow and waste. At worst, it harms the resilience of a society to self-organise and thus delays and undermines self-sustainable peacebuilding. In terms of challenges within the field, international peacebuilders often seem unable to exercise self-restraint. They tend to interfere in local social processes with the goal of engineering specific outcomes. Trying to control the outcome of a complex social process is likely to produce the opposite of what peacebuilding aims to achieve; it generates ongoing instability and dependence, and it undermines self-sustainability. Peacebuilding should be about safeguarding, stimulating, facilitating and creating the space for societies to develop robust and resilient capacities for self-organisation. International peacebuilding interventions should provide security guarantees and maintain the outer parameters of acceptable state behaviour in the international system, while stimulating, facilitating and creating space for the emergence of robust and resilient self-organised systems. The art of peacebuilding thus lies in pursuing the appropriate balance between international support and home-grown solutions, with both of these being reflexive and context specific.
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Peacebuildings essential ingredient is local, emergent, self-organised complexity, in other words, a society needs to develop its own capacity to manage itself without lapsing into violent conflict. Self-sustainable peace is directly linked to, and influenced by, the extent to which a society has the capacity and space to self-regulate. For peace consolidation to be self-sustainable it has to be the result of a home-grown, bottom-up and context-specific processes. Peacebuilding must be understood as a dynamic and flexible process and must be adapted to each situation in which it is being operationalised. For this reason this Handbook has provided a number of case studied and reflections from the field in order to illustrate some specific view points and situations in which peacebuilding activities take place. The Handbook has also touched upon challenges which are endured during peacebuilding and has made suggestions as to how to overcome these. The Handbook is intended to be practical and simple to use and allow both practitioners and those being trained to understand and advance their knowledge of peacebuilding. With peacebuilding increasingly being understood as a vital part of conflict resolution, conflict management, and conflict prevention, it is our hope that this Handbook has provided an insight into peacebuilding as a post-conflict tool while illustrating some of the complexities surrounding this process. And hopefully, we expect this Handbook was able to provide some guidance of the aspects of peacebuilding that can be considered when ensuring that development and long-lasting peace are achieved.
UN Photo/Albert Gonzlez Farran
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Concepts
Benchmark: This refers to a reference point or standard, against which performance or achievements can be assessed.1 Civilian: Is a term framed by the military to refer to those that are not military, and by civilians to distinguish themselves from the military, especially during times of war. The latter distinction may, at times, be broadly associated with that drawn in international humanitarian law (IHL) between combatants and non-combatants but, in fact, IHL is much more nuanced than merely echoing civilian-military distinctions. It provides for military personnel to become non-combatants when they lay down arms for instance, when they are wounded or when they are prisoners of war. It also provides for civilians to be combatants when they are central to the war effort. Coherence: In this Handbook, this is understood as the effort to seek shared strategic direction among the international and local actors and the political and governance, security and rule of law, socio-economic recovery, human rights and humanitarian assistance dimensions of peacebuilding. Consolidation phase: Is aimed at supporting the newly elected government and civil society with a broad range of programmes for fostering reconciliation, boosting socioeconomic recovery and supporting ongoing processes of change and development. Consolidation refers to the consolidation of the peace process and the newly implemented constitution and/or other agreed aspects of the peace process. Coordination: This refers to the organisation of the activities of two or more groups in such a way that each may work more efficiently and be aware of what the other group(s) are doing and to the systematic utilisation of policy instruments, such as strategic planning and processes to ensure accountability, in order to deliver in a cohesive and effective manner. Cooperation: This refers to working together for a common purpose. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration: Collectively, the process of DDR allows ex-combatants to become civilians once again and simultaneously deconstructs the mechanisms that would allow for conflict to continue. The objective of DDR is to contribute towards the stability of the post-conflict environment in order for development and recovery to take place. Disarmament: Is the collection, documentation and controlled disposal of all arms and ammunition from both combatants and often from civilians as well.
1 OECD (2012), Evaluating peacebuilding activities in settings of conflict and fragility: improving learning for results. DAC Guidelines and References Series: OECD Publishing. Available from: <http://dx.doi. org/10.1787/9789264106802-en> 128
Demobilisation: This can be defined as the process whereby former non-state armed groups are disbanded and discharged. Successful demobilisation processes create the space for full reintegration and for the inclusion of ex-combatants back into society. Thus, it is the process of dismantling the armed forces involved in the conflict and of providing temporary support to the ex-combatants. Disarmament: The process of disarmament involves the relinquishing of arms by rebel groups and ex-combatants. Without a thorough removal and destruction of these weapons, they could possibly be recycled in future conflicts. Early Recovery: The transition period between humanitarian relief and long-term recovery. Economic Reconstruction: This is a broad term used to describe the structural reform and stabilisation of post-conflict economies, as well as the building of institutions and capacities to support sustainable development. Economic Recovery: Refers to the goal of closing the gap between relief and development and restoring the capacity of government and communities to both rebuild and recover from conflict and sustain peace. Economic Rehabilitation: This refers to large-scale reconstruction to reinvigorate the economic structures of a particular country. Economic Stabilisation: This refers to a neoliberal economic strategy based on economic growth and free trade. This strategy is connected to structural adjustment programs and based on orthodox deflationary principles. Evaluation: This is the systematic and objective assessment of the design, implementation, and results of ongoing or completed interventions. The aim is to determine the relevance and fulfilment of objectives, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, and sustainability. Evaluation may also assist in assessing changing conditions in order for peacebuilding processes to respond appropriately to these. 2 Everyday violence: Often comes in forms of oppression which are justified in the name of punishment or retaliation, in response to a particular form of behaviour and perceptions of deviance. Violence against particular groups tends to permeate institutions of both state and society and to be reproduced on a daily basis through these institutions. This form of violence is often normalised by labels that remove it from the political sphere into criminal, domestic, or social spheres. As a result, everyday violence often escapes the attention of processes of peacemaking.
2 OECD. 2012. Evaluating peacebuilding activities in settings of Conflict and fragility: improving learning for results. DAC Guidelines and References Series: OECD Publishing. Available from: <http://dx.doi. org/10.1787/9789264106802-en>. 129
Forced migration: This is a general term that refers to the movements of refugees and internally displaced people due to situations of conflict, as well as to people displaced by natural or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, famines, and development projects. Gender Identities: This refers to expected or idealised characteristics and behaviours of different sexes, further distinguished by other categories such as age, ethnicity, economic class, and social status. 3 Gender Ideologies: This refers to system of values which underpin gender roles and identities and which validate gendered power structures insystems of social relations, framed within particular cultures. 4 Gendered Power Structures: The social Institutions which control resources (e.g. the household, the community, the school, the state) when examined from the point of view of how women and men respectively gain access or membership to them, are influenced by them, and receive or are denied support, status, resources, or protection from them. 5 Gender Roles: This refers to the activities that men and women are expected to carry out within a given household or community, differing according to socio-cultural context. 6 Humanitarian Assistance: This refers to a response to an emergency situation intended to alleviate human suffering by providing basic immediate needs. This is not limited to violent conflict and post-conflict contexts; however it is a response priority in these situations. Humanitarian and peacebuilding actors can both collaborate and contribute to a conflict sensitive, timely and sustainable resolution of conflict. Human Security: The perspective used in this Handbook asserts that security is constituted by not only by the physical insecurity of persons, but also by social, political, and economic inequalities. The focus is thus on a security-development nexus where the relationship between freedom from fear, and freedom from want and indignity, is established. Impacts: In terms of measuring results, this is the highest level of analysis. The focus is on the contribution of inputs to the achievement of broad and sustainable goals, such as poverty reduction and educational development.
3 El-Bushra, J. 2004. Fused in conflict: gender relations and armed conflict , in Afshar, H and Eade, D. (eds.) Development, women and war; feminist perspectives. Oxfam. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid. 130
Local ownership: This refers to the degree of control that domestic actors wield over domestic political processes. In post-conflict contexts this notion conveys the commonsense wisdom that any peace process not embraced by those who have to live with it is likely to fail. Monitoring: This is a continuous function that uses systematic collection of data (quantitative and qualitative) on specific indicators to provide both management and the main stakeholders of an ongoing intervention with indications of the extent of progress and achievement towards objectives.7 Negative Peace: This is a situation where there is an absence of violence and war. Outcomes: This refers to the results achieved beyond immediate project outputs. For example, if a project was mandated to improve educational opportunities in a certain region, measurable outputs could focus on whether overall literacy rates had increased in the region. 8 Outputs: An output is a direct and quantifiable result from an input. For example, if a project was mandated to improve educational opportunities in a certain region, measurable outputs could include the number of schools built and teachers trained, or increases in attendance over previous years. 9 Political Process: This can be defined as the process of the formulation and administration of public policy by interaction between social groups and political institutions or between political leadership and public opinion. It is vital to have functioning, legitimate political processes in a country in order to ensure the lawful governance and rule of law of a newly peaceful country. Positive peace: This is a situation where open conflict as well as the threat of conflict is absent and the underlying root causes of conflict have been addressed, often through the creation of a more just social order. Poverty Reduction Strategies: These strategies aim to understand the linkages between the economic drivers and the sources of conflict and adequately target them within the peacebuilding process. In addressing the root causes of a conflict, many countries develop a poverty reduction strategy whilst building a national peacebuilding framework. These strategies are aimed to be comprehensive and inclusive, ensure representation of the views of the majority of the population.
7 OECD. 2012. Evaluating peacebuilding activities in settings of Conflict and fragility: improving learning for results. DAC Guidelines and References Series: OECD Publishing. Available from: <http://dx.doi. org/10.1787/9789264106802-en>. 8 Goody, A. 2009. International development: the aid effectiveness debate, Canada, Parliamentary Information and Research Services, Library of Parliament. Available from: <http://www.parl.gc.ca/ Content/LOP/ResearchPublications/prb0907-e.pdf> 9 Ibid. 131
Programmatic Peacebuilding: This refers to specific activities aimed at addressing urgent or imminent risks to a peace process. Refugee: Any person who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.10 Reintegration: is the political, social and economic transformation of ex-combatant into civilians. This is a process whereby ex-combatants are reintroduced to their or other communities. These processes aim at creating a smooth transition for returning combatants to civilian life and a life of peace instead of violence. A process of reconciliation should take place during reintegration processes so that communities welcome ex-combatants and are able to assist them in re-joining their communities. Restorative justice: This is a process to involve, to the extent possible, those who have a stake in a specific offense, and to collectively identify and address harms, needs and obligations, in order to heal and put things as right as possible. Restorative justice reflects three basic assumptions: that crime is a violation of people and relationships; that violations create obligations and; the central obligation is to put right the wrongs. It uses inclusive, collaborative processes to the extent possible and involves those with a legitimate stake in the situation, including victims, offenders, community members and society. Truth commissions are one form that restorative justice takes.11 Retributive justice: This is otherwise known as criminal justice and is commonly used instead of transitional justice. Retributive justice is a theory of justice that considers punishment, if proportionate, to be the best response to crime; it often employs the eye for an eye thought: when an offender breaks the law, s/he thereby forfeits or suspends her/his right to something of equal value, and justice requires that this forfeit be enacted. The use of the International Criminal Court is the most common form of retributive justice seen in post-conflict development.12 Rule of Law: Is a principle that states that everything within the state, including the state itself, is ruled by, and subject to, the law. This law should be promulgated by a body that speaks on behalf of the people. These laws should be equally enforced and adjudicated independently to ensure fairness it is therefore one of the main reasons why judicial independence is so vital.
10 Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts Project. 2011. Rule of law in armed conflicts project (RULAC) Available from: <http://www.adh-geneva.ch/RULAC/international_refugee_law.php 11 Zehr, H. 2002. The Little Book of Restorative Justice. Good Books: Intercourse, PA. 12 Teitel, R. 2000. Transitional Justice. Oxford University Press. 132
Security: Refers to being protected from any threats to ones life and property. With regard to the individual, security is the feeling of safety to live free of threats and provide for oneself and their family. In the post-conflict context, security is a situation that guarantees the lack of future reoccurrences of conflict. This concept differs from the concept of human security. Security Sector: This can be broadly defined as encompassing a group of actors and institutions that are tasked with providing security. More specifically, these actors are tasked with protecting the state and citizens from internal and external threats to their security and ensuring their safety. Security Sector Reform: The security sector includes all entities that have the power to use force, or the threat of force in order to protect the state and civilians. Security sector reform is necessary when its scope of activity, budget, and size allow it to behave undemocratically. For example: suppress the opposition, increase the militarisation of society or overthrow civilian governments. SSR is therefore the political, institutional, economic and social restructuring and often downsizing of the security sector, in order to promote peace and stability. Stabilisation phase: This refers to the period that precedes or follows immediately after, the formal ending of hostilities, and typically focuses on establishing a safe and secure environment, responding to the consequences of the conflict through emergency relief operations, and introducing political stability in the form of a credible peace process. Statebuilding: This refers to the creation of new government institutions and the strengthening of existing ones. Structural Violence: This refers to the systematic violence of social institutions that oppress certain social groups, (often condemning them to abject poverty) and to the marginalisation that accompanies severe inequality. Systemic Peacebuilding: This emerges out of the total combined effort of the activities undertaken under the various peacebuilding dimensions, and thus exists in the form of a system-wide or holistic process. Transitional justice: This seeks to provide a framework for democratic transitions. It aims to restore or create the conditions for peace and stability through a process in which factors such as truth, accountability and reconciliation are central. Transitional justice is relevant to a time and process of change, after a key transformative event such as a peace accord, a power-sharing deal, or elections.13
13 Connolly, L. 2012. Justice and peacebuilding in post-conflict situations: an argument for including gender analysis in a new post-conflict model . ACCORD, Occasional Paper Series. Issue 1, 2012. Available from: <http://www.accord.org.za/downloads/op/ACCORD-occasionalpaper-2012-1.pdf> 133
Transitional phase: Typically starts with the appointment of an interim government, followed by, in the shortest reasonable period, some form of election or legitimate traditional process to elect a transitional government, constituent assembly or some other body responsible for writing a constitution or otherwise laying the foundation for a future political dispensation. The transitional stage typically ends with an election, and runs according to the new constitution, after which a fully sovereign and legitimately elected government is in power. The transition being referred to is thus that from an interim to an elected, and thus legitimately sovereign, local political process.14 Trauma: This refers to an encounter with an event or series of events so shocking that an individuals understanding of how the world works is severely disrupted. Within the context of peacebuilding, trauma is vitally important to both acknowledge and address, as it may have a wide variety of far reaching effects.
14 NEPAD. 2005. African post-conflict reconstruction policy framework . Governance, Peace and Security Programme. Available from: <http://chs.ubc.ca/archives/files/African%20Post-conflict%20 Recontrustion%20Policy%20Framework.pdf> 134
ACRONYMS
ACCORD APCP AAA ASF AU AMIS AMISOM APRM ASF BRICS CAP CCA CEWS CHAP CIDA CIMIC CSO DDR DFID DFS DPA DPKO DRC DSRSG EAD EC/ECHO The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes African Peacebuilding Coordination Programme at ACCORD Accra Agenda for Action African Standby Force African Union African Union Mission in Sudan African Union Mission in Somalia African Peer Review Mechanism African Standby Force Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa Consolidated Appeals Process Common Country Assessment Continental Early Warning System Common Humanitarian Action Plan Canadian International Development Agency Civil Military Coordination Civil Society Organisation Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration Department of Foreign and International Development (United Kingdom) Department of Field Support Department of Political Affairs Department of Peacekeeping Operations Democratic Republic of the Congo Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General Electoral Assistance Division European Commission
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MSF MSU NATO NEPAD NGO NORAD NORCAP NY OCHA ODA OECD ONUB OSCE PBC PBD PBF PBSO PCI PCIA PCRD PLANELM PRS PRSP PSC PSO PSOD PTSD RBB
Medecins sans Frontires (Doctors Without Borders) Mediation Support Unit North Atlantic Treaty Organisation New Partnership for Africas Development Non-Governmental Organisation Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation Norwegian Refugee Councils Emergency Roster New York Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Official Development Assistance Organisation for Economic Coordination and Development United Nations Operations in Burundi Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe Peacebuilding Commission Peacebuilding Commission Peacebuilding Fund Peacebuilding Support Office Per Capita Income Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Planning Element Poverty Reduction Strategy Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Peace and Security Council Peace Support Operation Peace Support Operations Division Post Traumatic Stress Disorder Results Based Budgeting
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RC RECs RFTF RoL RSP RR SADC SATRC SG SIDA SME SRCC SRSG SSR TRC UN UNAMID UNCT UNDAF UNDG UNDP UNHCR UNICEF UNIFEM UNMIK UNMIL UNMIS UNTP
Resident Coordinator Regional Economic Communities Results Focused Transitional Framework Rule of law Regional Strategy Paper Resident Representative Southern African Development Community South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission Secretary General Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency Small and Medium Enterprises Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission Special Representative of the Secretary General Security Sector Reform Truth and Reconciliation Commission United Nations African Union United Nations hybrid Mission in Darfur United Nations Country Team United Nations Development Assistance Framework United Nations Development Group United Nations Development Programme United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations Childrens Fund United Nations Development Fund for Women United Nations Mission in Kosovo United Nations Mission in Liberia United Nations Mission in Sudan United Nations Transitional Plan for Somalia
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UNVs UNSCR USAID WB WFP WHO
United Nations Volunteers United Nations Security Council Resolution United States Agency for International Development World Bank World Food Programme World Health Organisation
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ACCORD Peacebuilding Handbook McDougal, T. L. 2008. The Liberian State of Emergency: What do Civil War and State-Led Industrialization Have in Common? Massachusetts: Working Group on Violent Conflict and Economic Institutions, MIT. McEvoy-Levy, S. 2001. Occasional Paper: Youth as Social and Political Agents; Issues in PostSettlement Peace Building. 21(2). Indiana: Kroc Institute. McIntyre, A., and Thusi, T. 2003. Children and Youth in Sierra Leones Peacebuilding Process. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. McNamara, R. 1968. The Essence of Security London: Hodder and Stoughton. Miall, H. et al. 1999. Contemporary Conflict Resolution: the prevention, management and transformation of deadly conflicts. Cambridge: Polity Press. Mills, G. 2009. What the West needs in Afghanistan: humility, in Christian Science Monitor, 17 August. Available from: <http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2009/0817/p09s03-coop.html> Morgan, K., Thapar-Bjorkert, S., and Yuval-Davis, N. (eds.) 2006. Framing Gendered Identities: local conflicts/global violence, in Womens Studies International Forum. Vol. 29. Nussbaum, M. 2003. Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Social Justice, in Feminist Economics. 9(2/3). Newman, E., Paris, R. And Richmond, O. (eds.). 2009. New perspectives on liberal peacebuilding. Tokyo: United Nations University Press. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 2008. Concepts and dilemmas of state building in fragile situations: from fragility to resilience, in Journal of Development, 9(3). Paris: OECD. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 2011. A new deal for engagement in fragile states. International dialogue on peacebuilding and statebuilding. Paris: OECD. Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development. 2012. DAC Guidelines and Reference Series, Evaluating Peacebuilding Activities in Settings of Conflict and Fragility. OECD Publishing. Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary of Current English Online Version. 2011. Available from: <http:// oald8.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/>. Paris, R and Sisk, T. D. 2007. Managing Contradictions: The Inherent Dilemmas of Postwar Statebuilding.New York: International Peace Academy. Ponzio, R. J. 2011. Democratic peacebuilding: aiding Afghanistan and other fragile states. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pouligny, B. 2004. Civil Society and Post-Conflict Peace Building: Ambiguities of International Programs Aimed at Building New Societies. London, Hurst. Rai, S. 2008. Civic Driven Change: Facing Risk , ISS-CDC Policy Brief. No. 4 The Hague: Institute of Social Studies. Regan, A. J. 2010. Light intervention: lessons from Bougainville. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace. Regan, R. 2011. Revolution in North Africa, in The fund for global human rights Online. Available from: < http://globalhumanrights.org/en/country-programs/revolution-in-north-africa-1>. Reimann C. 2001. Towards gender mainstreaming in crisis prevention and conflict management . Germany: Eschborn. Reimann C. 2004a. Gender in problem solving workshops: A wolf in sheeps clothing? Bern: Swisspeace.
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ACCORD Peacebuilding Handbook Reimann, C. 2004b. Roles of women and men in violent conflicts. Bern: KOFF. Richmond, O. P. 2011. Resistance and the post-liberal peace, in Campbell, S.P., Chandler, D. and Sabaratnam, M. (eds.), A liberal peace? The problems and practices of peacebuilding . London: Zed Books. Roberts, D. 2006. Review Essay: human security or human insecurity? Moving the debate forward, in Security Dialogue. 37(249). Rosn, F. F. and Tarp, K. N. 2012. Coaching and mentoring for capacity development, in African Security Review 21(1). Rotberg, R. 2000. Truth Commissions and the Provision of Truth, Justice and Reconciliation, in Rotberg, R and Thompson, D. (eds.) Truth versus Justice: the Morality of Truth Commissions. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts Project. 2011. Available from <http://www.adh-geneva.ch/RULAC/ international_refugee_law.php>. Salih, M. 1993. The Role of Social Science in Conflict Analysis, in Nordic Journal of African Studies, 2(2). Scheye, E. 2010. Redeeming statebuildings misconceptions: power, politics and social efficacy and capital in fragile and conflict-affected states, in Journal of International Peacekeeping , 14(34). Schirch, L. 2005. Ritual and Symbol in Peacebuilding. Kumarian Press. Schloms, M. 2001. On the (Im-)possible Inclusion of Humanitarian Assistance into Peacebuilding Efforts, in Journal of Humanitarian Assistance. Bradford, University of Bradford. Schmidt, B and Schroeder, I. (eds.) 2001 Anthropology of Violence and Conflict London: Routledge Schneider, E. 1993. Feminism and the false dichotomy between victimization and agency in New York Law School Review. No. 387. Sen, A. 1999. Development as Freedom. New York: Oxford University Press. Sending, O. J. 2009. Why peacebuilders fail to secure ownership and be sensitive to context in Security in Practice. Vol. 1, 2009. Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. Smillie, I. 1998. Relief and Development: The Struggle for Synergy. Occasional Paper No. 33. Providence, RI: Thomas Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies/Brown University. Spencer, T. 1998. A Synthesis of Evaluations of Peacebuilding Activities Undertaken by Humanitarian Agencies and Conflict Resolution Organisations. London, ODI. Stewart. F. 2004. Development for Security. Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, working paper 3. Oxford: University of Oxford Press. The Collins English Dictionary. 2013. Coordination or co-ordination. Available from: <http://www. collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/coordination?showCookiePolicy=true>. Teitel, R. 2000. Transitional Justice. New York Oxford University Press. Tilly, C. 1992.Coercion, Capital, and European States Cambridge: Basil Blackwell. Triulzi, A. 2006. The Past as Contested Terrain: commemorating new sites of memory in war-torn Ethiopia, in Kraasholm, P (ed.) Violence, Political Culture and Development in Africa. Oxford. Trocaire, 2011. Conflict Sensitivity Toolkit. Available from: <http://www.trocaire.org/sites/trocaire/files/ pdfs/policy/Conflict_Sensitivity_Toolkit_Oct_2011> Tyler, T. R., and Blader, S. 2003. The Group Engagement Model: Procedural Justice.
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ACCORD Peacebuilding Handbook Social Identity, and Co-operative Behavior, in Personality and Social Psychology Review. 7. United Nations. 1992. Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 46/182. 14 April. Available from: <http:// www.unhcr.org/refworld/topic,4565c22535,4a8e57802,3b00f18620,0,UNGA,RESOLUTION,.html>. United Nations. 2005. In Larger Freedom: Towards Security, Development and Human Rights for All. Report of the Secretary-General for decision by Head of States and Government, September. Available from: <http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/>. United Nations. 2006. Delivering as One. Report of the Secretary-Generals High-Level Panel on UN System-wide Coherence in the Areas of Development, Humanitarian Assistance, and the Environment, November 9, New York, United States of America. Available from: <http://www.un.org/events/panel/ resources/pdfs/HLP-SWC-FinalReport.pdf>. United Nations. 2009. UN, Audit Report: Human Resources management for peacekeeping operations: recruitment, placement and retention of staff. New York: UN Office of Internal Oversight Services. Available from: <http://usun.state.gov/documents/organization/140488.pdf>. United Nations. 2010. Report of the secretary general on womens participation in peacebuilding. New York: United Nations. United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support. 2009. A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping . New York: DPKODFS. Available from: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/newhorizon.pdf>. United Nations Development Fund for Women. 2009. Womens participation in peace negotiations: Connections between presence and influence. Available from: <http://www.unwomen.org/wp-content/ uploads/2012/10/03A-Women-Peace-Neg.pdf>. United Nations Development Programme. 2005. United Nations Human Development Report 2005: International cooperation at a crossroads- aid, trade and security in an unequal world. UNDP. United Nations Development Programme. 2005. Sustaining Post-conflict Economic Recovery; lessons and challenges . Available from: <http://www.countrycompass.com/_docs/library/UNDP%20-%20 Sustaining%20Post-Conflict%20Economic%20Recovery%20-%20Lessons%20and%20Challenges.pdf>. United Nations Development Programme. 2006a. Ad Melkert on the Role of Civil Society in Social Inclusion and the MDGs, UNDP Newsroom 4 October. United Nations Development Programme. 2006b. Youth and Violent Conflict: Society and Development in Crisis? Available from: <http://reliefweb.int/report/world/youth-and-violent-conflict-society-anddevelopment-crisis>. United Nations Development Programme. 2007 Democratic governance: Implementation of the RFTF. Available from: <http://www.lr.undp.org/governances1.htm>. United Nations General Assembly and Security Council. 2009. Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict, A/63/881S/2009/304, 11 June. Available from: <http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/63/881>. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 1992. Persons covered by the OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa and by the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees (Submitted by the African Group and the Latin American Group) Available from: <http:// www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae68cd214.html>. United Nations High Commission on Refugees. 2006. The State of the Worlds Refugees 2006: Human Displacement in the New Millennium. New York, Oxford University Press.
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ACCORD Peacebuilding Handbook United Nations Peacebuilding Commission. 2008 Progress report on the implementation of the Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework . Available from: <http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_ doc.asp?symbol=PBC/3/SLE/3>. United Nations Peacekeeping. 2013. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. Available from: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/ddr.shtml>. United Nations Rule of Law. 1992. An Agenda for Peace; Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping. Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council, June 17. Available from: <http://www.unrol.org/files/A_47_277.pdf>. United Nations Secretary General. 2006. Note of guidance on integrated missions. New York: United Nations. Available from: <http://reliefweb.int/report/world/secretary-generals-note-guidance-integratedmissions>. United Nations Secretary-General. 2011. Reports on Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict Independent report of the advisory group. Available from: <http://www.civcapreview.org/>. United Nations Security Council. 2001. No exit without strategy: Security Council decision-making and the closure or transition of United Nations peacekeeping operations. Report of the Secretary-General, April 20. Available from: <http://pksoi.army.mil/doctrine_concepts/documents/UN%20Policy%20 Documents/No%20exit%20without%20strategy.pdf>. United Nations Security Council. 2010. Youth Unemployment Poses Latent Threat to Sierra Leones Stability. Security Council/ 9890. 22 March. Available from: <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/ sc9890.doc.htm>. Walt, S. 1991. The Renaissance of Security Studies, in International Studies Quarterly. 35(2). Weinstein, J. 2005. Autonomous Recovery and International Intervention in Comparative Perspective. Working Paper No. 57. Stanford: Stanford University Centre for Global Development Woolner, C. 2009. Naming war, counting dead: Ploughshares armed conflict report in perspective, in The Ploughshares Monitor, 30 (3). World Bank, 2011. World Development Report 2011: Conflict, security, and development. Washington D.C: The World Bank Group. Woodward, S. 2002. Economic Priorities for Successful Peace Implementation, in Stedman, S. J., Rothchild, D., and Cousens, E. (eds.) Ending Civil Wars: the Implementation of Peace Agreements , Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Woroniuk, B. 2001. Gender equality and peacebuilding: An operational framework. Canada: Canadian International Development Agency. Zarkov, D. 2006. Towards a new theorising of women, gender and war, in Evans, M., Davis, K., and Lorber, J. (eds.) Handbook of Gender and Womens Studies. London: Sage. Zarkov, D. 2008. Gender, Conflict, Development. Delhi: Zubaan. Zehr, H. 2002. The Little Book of Restorative Justice. Good Books: Intercourse, PA. Zehr, H. 2008. Doing Justice, Healing Trauma; The Role of Restorative Justice in Peacebuilding, in Peace Prints: South Asian Journal of Peacebuilding , 1(1).
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About ACCORD and the Peacebuilding Unit
he African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) is an independent, non-governmental, conflict management organisation established in 1992 to build African capacity and skills through conflict intervention, training
and research to prevent, resolve, manage, and transform conflict in Africa. ACCORD advances, strengthens and compliments peace and conflict initiatives in Africa through, among other activities, mediation in conflicts; providing technical advisory services to facilitators in peace talks such as in Madagascar, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sudan; training in conflict management skills; policy formulation; and bringing together thinkers and practitioners in the field of conflict management to share strategies through dialogue forums as well as facilitating learning exchanges. ACCORDs head office is in South Africa, and ACCORD has field offices in Burundi and South Sudan. ACCORDs two major arms, the Interventions Department (ID) and Knowledge Production Department (KPD), play key roles to enhance these initiatives. The Interventions Department has four units namely; the Peacemaking Unit, the Peacekeeping Unit, the Peacebuilding Unit and a Training Unit, which are tasked with the design and execution of intervention programmes along the full conflict spectrum. These Units operate through a number of programmes funded by a variety of funders. The Knowledge Production Department produces critical research outputs that enhance ACCORDs interventions efforts. ACCORDs activities are implemented through a diverse and international staff complement. ACCORD has been recognised by the United Nations as a model for conflict prevention and resolution for Africa. ACCORD works with a number of local, regional and global partners in achieving its objectives. Over the past twenty years, the capabilities that ACCORD has developed include: Conflict assessment and analysis, ultimately leading to the identification of strategic options which contribute to the constructive management and transformation of conflict; Mediating in conflict and providing technical support to mediators in political conflicts, and preparing parties in conflict for mediation and constructive engagement. Examples include ACCORDs on-going Mediation Support project which targets the African Unions mediation support teams. ACCORDs portfolio in peacemaking also includes the institutions contribution to the Burundi Peace Process, the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, and briefly towards the Madagascar peace process;
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Developing and implementing conflict transformation programmes through wellestablished tools and approaches for all phases of a conflict. Previous and current programme experiences include activities in preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping training, peacemaking and peacebuilding. In these programmes, ACCORD has partnered with institutions such as the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office (UN PBSO), and the African Union Conflict Management Division;
Facilitating dialogue among stakeholders to highlight issues of conflict and their root causes. These dialogue sessions assist in the development of strategic initiatives with follow-up activities for confidence-building, intervention trainings and study/exchange programmes;
Developing the conflict management capacity of a diverse range of stakeholders for various types of conflict and within different contexts. Since 1992, ACCORD has trained in excess of 15 000 people in conflict management skills. These trainees range from former and current Heads of State, senior government officials, UN and AU Peacekeepers to leaders in civil society and members of communities;
Supporting peace processes and post-conflict reconstruction efforts by developing the capacity of civil society to make a shift towards constructive engagement. Among other approaches, this can be achieved through Study Tours, sharing lessons learned and best practices as well as promoting dialogue proactively between civil society and political institutions on the root causes of conflict towards co-existence and durable peace;
Contributing to existing knowledge and developing and shaping new knowledge in the field of conflict resolution in the areas of peacemaking, mediation, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding through timely research and publications. This role is largely played by ACCORDs Knowledge Production Department whose outputs range from policy and practice briefs, to conflict scans and the flagship magazine, Conflict Trends; and
Mainstreaming gender in peace processes. ACCORD actively seeks to achieve the objectives on women, peace and security outlined in the UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 1325, 1820, 1888, 1889 and 1960.
For detailed information on ACCORDs programmes, please visit <http://www.accord. org.za> The Peacebuilding Unit The Peacebuilding Unit is situated in the Interventions Department at ACCORD. The Unit aims to positively impact and consolidate peacebuilding efforts on the African continent, by utilising a range of multidimensional and inter-related engagements.
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These efforts collectively and cumulatively aim to support and enhance efforts at strengthening security, political stability, socio-economic development and reconciliation across the continent, whilst dually addressing both the consequences and the root causes of conflict in Africa. Ultimately, these engagements aim to embolden and contribute to the achievement of creative African solutions to peacebuilding challenges on the continent, as part of ACCORDs overarching objectives and vision. The Peacebuilding Unit currently implements its vision through one programme, the African Peacebuilding Coordination Programme (APCP), supported by the Government of Finland, which has been operational since 2007. The APCP aims at supporting enhanced coherence and coordination, across the peace, security, humanitarian, development and human rights dimensions in peacebuilding operations in Africa. Within this aim, the Programme works in support of the attainment of just and sustainable peace in countries emerging from conflict, focusing on three particular sub-objectives: 1. The enhancement of local capacity and ownership for peacebuilding processes; 2. Support to national, regional and international policy frameworks and approaches; and 3. Create a platform for dialogue and identification of best practices and knowledge. Specifically, the APCP aims to have a direct impact in supporting the peacebuilding process in five African countries: Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia, South Sudan and Sudan. Each of these focus countries is in the process of strengthening its long term peacebuilding efforts through the development and implementation of nationally owned and sustainable agendas. Outside of the focus countries, the Programme has also supported the development of Peacebuilding efforts through contributions to policy approaches and knowledge sharing. In this context, the Unit has worked towards strengthening peacebuilding efforts through international and regional mechanisms (e.g. the United Nations (UN), and the African Union (AU), aiming to provide better policy responses to peacebuilding challenges on the continent. This handbook is an attempt to increase the knowledge available on peacebuilding and provide a guide on capacity building, dialogue and policy development, as well as sharing lessons and best practices from the experience of the Unit and ACCORD. This is handbook is designed to be the flagship publication of the Peacebuilding Unit which will be used in future training on peacebuilding.
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1st Edition April 2013

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Note on 1st Edition

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Gustavo de Carvalho Coordinator: Peacebuilding Unit ACCORD

Cedric de Coning Advisor: Peacebuilding Unit ACCORD

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Part one: Understanding Peacebuilding

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Chapter 1: Understanding Peacebuilding Concepts and Definitions

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1.2 Peacebuilding as Peace Consolidation

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1.3 Peacebuilding in Historic Context

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1.4 Approaches to Peacebuilding

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Holistic approach Conflict as a whole: targeted through a broad strategy.

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1.5 Emerging Characteristics

Long-Term process with short-term realities

Multiple Peacebuilding Instruments

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sector development and sub-regional peacekeeping (involving presidential and

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2.2 Peacebuilding Phases

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Peacebuilding as a long-term process

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