CHAVEZ vs PEA FACTS:

Development Plan. The BOD of PEA and Pres. Ramos approved the JVA.

Government signed a contract with CDCP to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay which also included the construction of Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the works in consideration of fifty percent of the total reclaimed land.

Senate President Ernesto Maceda delivered a privilege speech in the Senate and denounced the JVA as the "grandmother of all scams. As a result joint investigation was conducted and found out that JVA is illegal for alienating reclaimed lands which is land of public domain.

Pres. Marcos created and tasked PEA to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas and to develop, improve, acquire, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands. By virtue of PD No. 1085, he transferred to PEA the lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay.

Pres. Ramos created a task force to investigate the legality of JVA, which tasked force upheld the legality of JVA contrary to conclusions reached by Senate committees. Inquirer and Today published reports that there were ongoing renegotiations between PEA and AMARI under an order issued by then President Fidel V. Ramos.

Then President Aquino issued Special Patent granting and transferring to PEA the parcels of land so reclaimed under MCCRR Project. Subsequently, the Register of Deeds of Paraaque issued Transfer Certificates of Titles in the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed islands known as the Freedom Islands.

Chavez, petitioner as a taxpayer, filed the instant Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order contending that:

a. government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI

PEA entered into a JVA with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands through negotiation without public bidding. The JVA also required the reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of submerged areas surrounding these islands to complete the configuration in the Master

b. praying public disclosure of terms of any negotiation pursuant to right of people to information on matters of public concern.

c. assailing also the sale of PEA to AMARI of lands of the public domain as a blatant violation of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private corporations.

IV. WHETHER PETITIONER HAS LOCUS STANDI TO BRING THIS SUIT;

PEA and AMARI signed the Amended JVA and the office of the Pres. approved under the administration of then Pres. Estrada approved the Amended JVA.

V. WHETHER THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO INFORMATION INCLUDES OFFICIAL INFORMATION ON ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE A FINAL AGREEMENT;

Due to the approval of the Amended JVA petitioner now prays that on "constitutional and statutory grounds the renegotiated contract be declared null and void. ISSUES:

VI. WHETHER THE STIPULATIONS IN THE AMENDED JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT FOR THE TRANSFER TO AMARI OF CERTAIN LANDS, RECLAIMED AND STILL TO BE RECLAIMED, VIOLATE THE 1987 CONSTITUTION; AND

I. WHETHER THE PRINCIPAL RELIEFS PRAYED FOR IN THE PETITION ARE MOOT AND ACADEMIC BECAUSE OF SUBSEQUENT EVENTS;

VII. WHETHER THE COURT IS THE PROPER FORUM FOR RAISING THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE AMENDED JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT IS GROSSLY DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GOVERNMENT.

HELD:

II. WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS DISMISSAL FOR FAILING TO OBSERVE THE PRINCIPLE GOVERNING THE HIERARCHY OF COURTS;

First issue: whether the principal reliefs prayed for in the petition are moot and academic because of subsequent events.

III. WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS DISMISSAL FOR NON-EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES;

We rule that the signing of the Amended JVA by PEA and AMARI and its approval by the President cannot operate to moot the petition and divest the Court of its jurisdiction.

PEA and AMARI have still to implement the Amended JVA. The prayer to enjoin the signing of the Amended JVA on constitutional grounds necessarily includes preventing its implementation.

Principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally to cases involving factual questions.

Supervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent the Court from rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution.

The instant case raises constitutional issues of transcendental importance to the public. The Court can resolve this case without determining any factual issue related to the case.

Even in cases where supervening events had made the cases moot, the Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar, and the public.

Third issue: whether the petition merits dismissal for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.

The instant petition is a case of first impression.

We rule that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply in the instant case.

The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when the issue involved is a purely legal or constitutional question.

There is a need to resolve immediately the constitutional issue raised in this petition because of the possible transfer at any time by PEA to AMARI of title and ownership to portions of the reclaimed lands.

The principal issue in the instant case is the capacity of AMARI to acquire lands held by PEA in view of the constitutional ban prohibiting the alienation of lands of the public domain to private corporations.

Second issue: whether the petition merits dismissal for failing to observe the principle governing the hierarchy of courts.

Fourth issue: whether petitioner has locus standi to bring this suit

Since the instant petition brought by a citizen involves the enforcement of

constitutional rights - to information and to the equitable diffusion of natural resources - matters of transcendental public importance. If PEA fails to make this disclosure, any citizen can demand from PEA this information at any time during the bidding process. Information on on-going evaluation or review of bids or proposals being undertaken by the bidding or review committee is not immediately accessible under the right to information.

The petitioner has the requisite locus standi.

Fifth issue: whether the constitutional right to information includes official information on ongoing negotiations before a final agreement.

Section 7 Art. III and Section 28 Art. II of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in the operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to exercise effectively other constitutional rights.

However, once the committee makes its official recommendation, there arises a "definite proposition" on the part of the government.

The court distinguish between information the law on public bidding requires PEA to disclose publicly, and information the constitutional right to information requires PEA to release to the public.

From this moment, the public's right to information attaches, and any citizen can access all the non-proprietary information leading to such definite proposition.

The right to information, however, does not extend to matters recognized as privileged information.

Govt Auditing Code requires public bidding on matters relating to the disposition of property of PEA.

So PEA must on its own and without demand from anyone, disclose to the public matters relating to the disposition of its property.

Since there is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is privileged information, we rule, therefore, that the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final contract.

Sixth issue: whether stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution.

The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is rooted in the Regalian doctrine.

Private parties could lease lands reclaimed by the government only if these lands were no longer needed for public purpose and mandated public bidding in the lease of government reclaimed lands.

Under the Spanish Law of Waters, land reclaimed from the sea belonged to the party undertaking the reclamation, provided the government issued the necessary permit and did not reserve ownership of the reclaimed land to the State.

This act made government reclaimed lands sui generis in that unlike other public lands which the government could sell to private parties; these reclaimed lands were available only for lease to private parties.

Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889 provides that property of public dominion referred not only to property devoted to public use, but also to property not so used but employed to develop the national wealth.

This act did not repeal the provision of Spanish Law of Waters allowing private parties to reclaim parts of the sea with governments permission and such reclaimed lands remained private lands.

Article 341 of the Civil Code of 1889, a not self-executing provision; declare that property of public dominion, when no longer devoted to public use or to the defense of the territory, shall become a part of the private property of the State upon declaration of the executive and passing of a law by the legislative.

Act No. 2874 the Public Land Act authorized the Governor-General to "classify lands of the public domain, to "declare what lands are open to disposition or concession and also limited alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have been "officially delimited and classified.

Act No. 1654 mandated that the government should retain title to all lands reclaimed by the government. It also vests in the government control and disposition of foreshore lands.

This act categorically mandated that disposable lands of the public domain classified as government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands "shall be disposed of to private parties by lease only and not otherwise.

Government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands remained sui generis, as the only alienable or disposable lands of the public domain that the government could not sell to private parties.

government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain.

Under Act No. 2874, the government could not sell government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands to private parties, unless the legislature passed a law allowing their sale.49

Commonwealth Act No. 141 of the Philippine National Assembly readopted the prohibition in 1935 Constitution of sale of government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy disposable lands of the public domain. All these lands are intended for residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural purposes.

It did not prohibit private parties from reclaiming parts of the sea pursuant to Spanish Law of Waters and lands reclaimed from the sea by private parties with government permission remained private lands.

The government could sell to private parties only those lands for nonagricultural purposes not classified as government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy disposable lands of the public domain.

The 1935 Constitution did not prohibit individuals and corporations from acquiring government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain that were classified as agricultural lands under existing public land laws.

This act states that disposable lands of the public domain intended for residential, commercial, industrial or other productive purposes other than agricultural "shall be disposed of under the provisions of this chapter and not otherwise."

The prohibition on private parties from acquiring ownership of government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain was only a statutory prohibition and the legislature could therefore remove such prohibition.

But the legislature did not repeal Act 2874 but continued the long established State policy of retaining for the government title and ownership of

Since then and until now, the only way the government can sell to private parties government reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of the public domain is for the legislature to pass a law authorizing such sale.

One reason for the congressional authority is that Section 60 of CA No. 141 exempted government units and entities from the maximum area of public lands that could be acquired from the State.

It also included as property of public dominion those properties without being for public use, are intended for public service or the "development of the national wealth."

These government units and entities should not just turn around and sell these lands to private parties in violation of constitutional or statutory limitations.

Thus, government reclaimed and marshy lands of the State, even if not employed for public use or public service, if developed to enhance the national wealth, are classified as property of public dominion.

In case of sale or lease of disposable lands of the public domain, CA No. 141 mandates the Government to put to public auction all leases or sales.

1973 Constitutions prohibited the alienation of all natural resources except agricultural lands of the public domain.

CA No. 141 did not repeal Spanish Law of Waters provision allowing private parties to reclaim portions of the sea with government permission. However, this time the reclaimed is not automatically a private land.

Under 1973 Constitution, private corporations could hold alienable lands of the public domain only through lease. Only individuals could now acquire alienable lands of the public domain, and private corporations became absolutely barred from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

It could become private land only after being classified as alienable agricultural land of the public domain open to disposition.

The Civil Code of 1950 the government must formally declare that the property of public dominion is no longer needed for public use or public service, before the same could be classified as patrimonial property of the State.

The constitutional ban extended to all kinds of alienable lands of the public domain, while the statutory ban under CA No. 141 applied only to government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the public domain.

PD No. 1084 Creating the Public Estates Authority

The ban in the 1973 Constitution on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain did not apply to PEA since it was

Hence, such legislative authority could only benefit private individuals.

then, and until today, a fully owned government corporation.

The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution banning private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

PD No. 1084 expressly empowers PEA "to hold lands of the public domain" even "in excess of the area permitted to private corporations by statute." Thus, PEA can hold title to private lands, as well as title to lands of the public domain.

Like the 1973 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows private corporations to hold alienable lands of the public domain only through lease.

In order for PEA to sell its reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public domain, there must be legislative authority empowering PEA to sell these lands in view of CA 141.

As in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the general law governing the lease to private corporations of reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the public domain is still CA No. 141.

Without such legislative authority, PEA could not sell but only lease its reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public domain.

The constitutional ban strengthens the constitutional limitation on individuals from acquiring more than the allowed area of alienable lands of the public domain.

Nevertheless, any legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain would be subject to the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain.

Without the constitutional ban, individuals who already acquired the maximum area of alienable lands of the public domain could easily set up corporations to acquire more alienable public lands. An individual could own as many corporations as his means would allow him.

The Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 hectares. Only

157.84 hectares of the 750-hectare reclamation project have been reclaimed, and the rest of the 592.15 hectares are still submerged areas forming part of Manila Bay.

As such, foreshore and submerged areas "shall not be alienated," unless they are classified as "agricultural lands" of the public domain.

Under the Amended JVA AMARI will acquire and own a maximum of 367.5 hectares of reclaimed land which will be titled in its name in line of 70-30% of total net usable area.

The mere reclamation of these areas by PEA does not convert these inalienable natural resources of the State into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain.

To implement the Amended JVA, PEA delegated to the unincorporated PEAAMARI joint venture PEA's statutory authority, rights and privileges to reclaim foreshore and submerged areas in Manila Bay.

Likewise, the mere transfer by the National Government of lands of the public domain to PEA does not make the lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA.

The Threshold Issue

CA No. 141 provides that "only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have been officially delimited and classified.

The threshold issue is whether AMARI, a private corporation, can acquire and own under the Amended JVA 367.5 hectares of reclaimed foreshore and submerged areas in Manila Bay in view of Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

There must be a law or presidential proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and open to disposition or concession and must not been reserved for some public or quasi-public use.

Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, the foreshore and submerged areas of Manila Bay are part of the "lands of the public domain and consequently "owned by the State."

PD No. 1085 authorized the issuance of special land patents for lands reclaimed by PEA from the foreshore or submerged areas of Manila Bay coupled with President Aquino's actual issuance of a special patent covering the Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an official proclamation classifying the

Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain.

The Freedom Islands are thus alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, open to disposition or concession to qualified parties.

For the Special Patent issued to PEA expressly acknowledge that the provisions of CA No. 141 apply to the disposition of reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain unless otherwise provided by law.

The classification of PEA's reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands into alienable or disposable lands open to disposition is necessary because PEA is tasked under its charter to undertake public services that require the use of lands of the public domain.

Executive Order No. 654 which authorizes PEA "to determine the kind and manner of payment in contracts it entered into for reclamation does not exempt PEA from the requirement of public auction.

Thus, part of the reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands held by the PEA would actually be needed for public use or service since many of the functions imposed on PEA by its charter constitute essential public services.

No. 1445, the Government Auditing Code required sale of valuable government property through public bidding.

Absent two official acts a classification that these lands are alienable or disposable and open to

It is only when the public auction fails that a negotiated sale is allowed, in which case the Commission on Audit must approve the selling price.

disposition and a declaration that these lands are not needed for public service, lands reclaimed by PEA remain inalienable lands of the public domain.

At the public auction sale, only Philippine citizens are qualified to bid for PEA's reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public domain. Private corporations are barred from bidding at the auction sale of any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

PEA must observe the provisions of CA No. 141 requiring public auction, in the absence of a law exempting PEA from holding a public auction.

The failure of public bidding conducted on December 10, 1991, by PEA involving only 407.84 hectares is not a valid justification for a negotiated sale of

750 hectares, almost double the area publicly auctioned. Besides, the failure of public bidding happened more than three years before the signing of the original JVA on April 25, 1995. The economic situation in the country had greatly improved during the intervening period. Registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership but is merely evidence of ownership previously conferred by any of the recognized modes of acquiring ownership.

The Ban on Private corporations or associations holding alienable lands of the public domain except by lease is clear and absolute.

Registration does not give the registrant a better right than what the registrant had prior to the registration.

A private corporation, even one that undertakes the physical reclamation of a government project, cannot acquire reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain in view of the constitutional ban.

The registration of lands of the public domain under the Torrens system, by itself, cannot convert public lands into private lands.

Thus whatever repayment Scheme in the contract entered by PEA if the contractor or developer is a private corporation like AMARI can only be paid with leaseholds on portions of the reclaimed lands to avoid a direct collision with the Constitution.

Several laws authorize lands of the public domain to be registered under the Torrens System without losing their character as public lands.

The issuance of special patent and certificate of title to PEA does convert the FREEDOM ISLAND into private land contrary to what defendants contended.

Such registration, however, is expressly subject to the condition in CA No. 141 that the land "shall not be alienated, encumbered or otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its title, except when authorized by Congress."

The need for legislative authority prevents the registered land of the public domain from becoming private land that can be disposed of to qualified private parties.

Whether the Amended JVA is a sale or a joint venture, the fact remains that the Amended JVA requires PEA to "cause the issuance and delivery of the certificates of title conveying AMARI's Land Share in the name of AMARI.

This stipulation still contravenes Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which provides that private corporations "shall not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease.

The Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution, and therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio.

Seventh issue: whether the Court is the proper forum to raise the issue of whether the Amended JVA is grossly disadvantageous to the government.

Considering that the Amended JVA is null and void ab initio, there is no necessity to rule on this last issue. Besides, the Court is not a trier of facts, and this last issue involves a determination of factual matters

Republic vs. Court of Appeals 131 SCRA 532 (1984)

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the parcel of land in question is public land; and 2. Whether or not applicant private respondent has registerable title to the land.

FACTS: The subject land in this case is situated 20 meters away from the shores of Laguna de Bay. Said land was owned by Benedicto del Rio. After the death of Benedicto, the land was acquired by his son Santos Del Rio. The private oppositors in this case sought and obtained permission from Santos Del Rio to construct duck houses on said land. The private oppositors, however, violated their agreement and instead constructed residential houses thereon. Santos then filed an ejectment suit against the private oppositors and later on sought to register the land. Meanwhile, private oppositors simultaneously filed their respective sales applications with Bureau of Lands, and they opposed Santos del Rios application for registration.

HELD: The inundation of a portion of the land is not due to "flux and reflux of tides." It cannot be considered a foreshore land, hence it is not a public land and therefore capable of registration as private property provided that the applicant proves that he has a registerable title. The purpose of land registration under the Torrens System is not the acquisition of lands but only the registration of title which applicant already possesses over the land. While it is true that by themselves tax re ceipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they become strong evidence of ownership acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property. Applicant by himself and through his father before him, has been i n open, continuous, public, peaceful, exclusive and adverse possession of the disputed land for more than thirty (30) years and has presented tax declarations and tax receipts. Applicant has more than satisfied the legal requirements. Thus, he is clearly entitled to the registration in his favor of said land.

The CFI of Laguna dismissed the application for registration. Applicant appealed and obtained a favourable judgment from the Court of Appeals. The Director of Lands and the private oppositors filed their respective petitions for review on said decision to the Supreme Court.

The Director of Lands contends that since a portion of the land is covered with water four to five months a year, the same is part of the lake bed of Laguna de Bay and therefore it cannot be the subject of registration.

Antipolo v. Zapanta FACTS: On 8 August 1977, a single application for the registration of two distinct parcels of land was filed by two distinct applicants before the then CFI Rizal, Branch XV, Makati (the Registration Court). One of the two applicants was Conrado Eniceo. He had applied for registration under the Torrens system of a parcel of land containing 258 sq. m. The other applicant was "Heirs of Joaquin Avendao", and the land they were applying for registration was a parcel containing 9,826 sq. m. (the disputed property) surveyed in the name of the Municipality of Antipolo. Both parcels were situated in the Municipality of Antipolo. The application were approved by the Registration Court on 26 February 1980. ANTIPOLO took steps to interpose an appeal but because it failed to amend the Record on Appeal, its appeal was disallowed. On 22 May 1981, ANTIPOLO filed a complaint (Civil Case 41353) of the CFI Rizal, Branch XIII, Pasig against named "Heirs of Joaquin Avendao", and their assignees praying for nullification of the judgment rendered by the Registration Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the property is of public domain, and thus, could not be alienated. HELD: At the time the application for registration was filed on 8 August 1977, the

disputed property was already devoted to public use and public service. Therefore, it was outside the commerce of man and could no longer be subject to private registration. The claim of the Avendano heirs that they merely tolerated occupancy by ANTIPOLO which had borrowed the disputed property from them, since they had been in possession, since as far back as 1916, erroneously presupposes ownership thereof since that time.

Cebu Oxygen vs Bercilles 66 SCRA 481 Facts: This is a case on a petition for the review of the order of the Court of First Instance of Cebu dismissing petitioner's application for registration of title over a parcel of land situated in the City of Cebu. The parcel of land sought to be registered was only a portion of M. Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu City. On September 23, 1968, the City Council of Cebu, through Resolution No. 2193, approved on October 3, 1968, declared the terminal portion of M. Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu City, as an abandoned road, the same not being included in the City Development Plan. Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cebu filed a motion to dismiss the application on the ground that the property sought to be registered being a public road intended for public use is considered part of the public domain and therefore outside the commerce of man. Consequently, it cannot be subject to registration by any private individual. Issue: Whether or not the declaration of the road as abandoned make it patrimonial property which may be the object of a common contract. Held: Since that portion of the city street subject of petitioner's application for registration of title was withdrawn from public use, it follows that such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial

property which can be the object of an ordinary contract. Article 422 of the Civil Code expressly provides that "Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State." Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed.

Laurel v. Garcia (G.R. No. 92013) Ojeda v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 92047) ROPPONGI PROPERTY

government sector and those for private parties in projects, the latter shall be made available only to Filipino citizens or to 100% Filipino-owned entities in national development projects.

FACTS:

These two (2) petitions for prohibition seek to enjoin respondents from proceeding with the bidding for the sale of the 3,179 square meters of land at 306 Roppongi, 5-Chrome Minato-ku Tokyo, Japan. The latter case also, prays for a writ of mandamus to fully disclose to the public the basis of their decision to push through with the sale of the Roppongi property.

The Roppongi property was acquired under the heading Government Sector for the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred to Nampeida due to the need for major repairs. However, the Roppongi property has remained underdeveloped since that time.

The Roppongi case is one of the four properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine government under the Reparation Agreement entered into with Japan. The other three (3) properties include Nampeidai Property (present site of the Philippine Embassy Chancery), Kobe Commercial Property (commercial lot being used as a warehouse and parking lot for consulate staff) and Kobe Residential Property (resident lot which is now vacant).

Although there was a proposal to lease the property with the provision to have buildings built at the expense of the lessee, the same was not acted favorably upon by the government. Instead, President Aquino issued EO No. 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of separations capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease or dispositions. Thereafter, amidst the oppositions by various sectors, the Executive branch of the government pushed for the sale of reparation properties, starting with the Roppongi lot. The property has twice been set for bidding at a minimum floor price of $225M. The first was a failure, while the second has been postponed and later restrained by the SC.

The Reparations Agreement provides that reparations valued at $550M would be payable in twenty (20) years in accordance with annual schedules of procurements to be fixed by the Philippine and Japanese governments. The procurements are to be divided into

Amongst the arguments of the respondents is that the subject property is not governed by our Civil Code, but rather by the laws of Japan where the property is located. They relied upon the rule of lex situs which is used in

determining the applicable law regarding the acquisition, transfer and devolution of the title to a property.

the Japan properties can be sold to end-users, when in fact it cannot. Neither does the CARP Law reclassify the properties into patrimonial properties, merely stating that sources of funds for its implementation be sourced from proceeds of the disposition of the Government in foreign countries, but not that the Roppongi property be withdrawn from being classified as a property of public dominion.

ISSUES:

1. Can the Roppongi property and others of its kind be alienated by the Philippine Government? NO. There can be no doubt that the property is of public dominion and the respondents have failed to show that it has become patrimonial. The property is correctly classified under Art 420 of the Civil Code as property belonging to the State and intended for some public service. The fact that it has not been used for actual Embassy service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Such conversion happens only if property is withdrawn from public use, through an abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi property for public service and to make it patrimonial property. Abandonment must be a certain and positive act based on correct legal premises. The EO does not declare that the properties lost their public character, merely intending the properties to be made available to foreigners and not to Filipinos alone, in case of sale, lease or other disposition. Furthermore, it is based on the wrong premise that

CONFLICT OF LAW Furthermore, the respondents argument that the Japanese law and not our Civil Code shall apply is incorrect. There is no conflict of law in this situation. A conflict of law arises only when: a. There is a dispute over the title or ownership of an immovable, such that the capacity to take and transfer immovables, the formalities of conveyance, the essential validity and effect of the transfer, or the interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be determined. b. A foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance is asserted to conflict with a domestic law on the same matters. Hence, the need to determine which law should apply. Both elements does not exist in the case. The issues are not concerned with the validity of ownership or title. There is no

question that the property belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the authority of the government officials to validly dispose of property belonging to the state and the validity of the procedures adopted to effect the sale, which should be governed by Philippine law The rule of lex situs does not apply.

2. Does the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority and jurisdiction, to sell the Roppongi property? NO. A law or a formal declaration to withdraw the Roppongi property from public domain to make it alienable and a need for legislative authority to allow the sale of the property is needed. None has been enacted for this purpose. 3. W/N EO No. 296 is constitutional? The SC did not anymore pass upon its constitutionality.

Province of Zamboanga del Norte vs Zamboanga City 22 SCRA 1334 Facts: Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality of Zamboanga used to be the provincial capital of the then Zamboanga Province. On October 12, 1936, Commonwealth Act 39 was approved converting the Municipality of Zamboanga into Zamboanga City. Sec. 50 of the Act also provided that Buildings and properties which the province shall abandon upon the transfer of the capital to another place will be acquired and paid for by the City of Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by the Auditor General. The properties and buildings referred to consisted of 50 lots and some buildings constructed thereon, located in the City of Zamboanga and covered individually by Torrens certificates of title in the name of Zamboanga Province. On June 6, 1952, Republic Act 711 was approved dividing the province of Zamboanga into two (2): Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur. Properties and the obligations of the province of Zamboanga shall be divided equitably between the Province of Zamboanga del Norte and the Province of Zamboanga del Sur by the President of the Philippines, upon the recommendation of the Auditor General.

and assets belonging to the former province of Zamboanga and located within the City of Zamboanga are hereby transferred, free of charge, in favor of the said City of Zamboanga. Issue: WON Zamboanga del Norte is deprived of its private properties without due process and just compensation.

Ruling: The fact that the 26 lots are registered strengthens the proposition that they are truly private in nature. On the other hand, that the 24 lots used for governmental purposes are also registered is of no significance since registration cannot convert public property to private. Applying Art. 424 of NCC, all the properties in question, except the two (2) lots used as High School playgrounds, could be considered as patrimonial properties of the former Zamboanga province. Even the capital site, the hospital and leprosarium sites, and the school sites will be considered patrimonial for they are not for public use. They would fall under the phrase "public works for public service"

However, on June 17, 1961, Republic Act 3039 was approved amending Sec. 50 of Commonwealth Act 39 by providing that All buildings, properties

Salas vs Jarencio 46 SCRA 734 Facts: Facts: On February 24, 1919, the 4th Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, acting as a land registration court, rendered judgment declaring the City of Manila the owner in fee simple of a parcel of land containing an area of 9,689.8 square meters, more or less. On various dates in 1924, the City of Manila sold portions of the aforementioned parcel of land in favor of Pura Villanueva. On September 21, 1960, the Municipal Board of Manila, presided by then ViceMayor Antono J. Villegas, adopted a resolution requesting His Excellency, the President of the Philippines to consider the feasibility of declaring the City property bounded by Florida, San Andres, and Nebraska Streets, containing a total area of 7,450 square meters as a patrimonial property of the City of Manila for the purpose of reselling these lots to the actual occupants thereof. There is therefore a precedent that this parcel of land could be subdivided and sold to bona fide occupants. The bill was passed by the Senate and approved by the President and became RA 4118. Issue: WON the property involved in RA 4118 is a private or patrimonial property of the City of Manila.

The conclusion of the respondent court that Republic Act No. 4118 converted a patrimonial property of the City of Manila into a parcel of disposable land of the State and took it away from the City without compensation is, therefore, unfounded. In the last analysis the land in question pertains to the State and the City of Manila merely acted as trustee for the benefit of the people therein for whom the State can legislate in the exercise of its legitimate powers. If it were its patrimonial property why should the City of Manila be requesting the President to make representation to the legislature to declare it as such so it can be disposed of in favor of the actual occupants? There could be no more blatant recognition of the fact that said land belongs to the State and was simply granted in usufruct to the City of Manila for municipal purposes.

Ruling:

Davao Saw Mill 61 Phil 709 Facts: The Davao Saw Mill Co., Inc., is the holder of a lumber concession from the Government of the Philippine Islands. It has operated a sawmill in the sitio of Maa, barrio of Tigatu, municipality of Davao, Province of Davao. However, the land upon which the business was conducted belonged to another person. On the land the sawmill company erected a building which housed the machinery used by it. In another action, wherein the Davao Light & Power Co., Inc., was the plaintiff and the Davao, Saw, Mill Co., Inc., was the defendant, a judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff in that action against the defendant in that action; a writ of execution issued thereon, and the properties now in question were levied upon as personalty by the sheriff. No third party claim was filed for such properties at the time of the sales thereof as is borne out by the record made by the plaintiff herein. Issue: Whether or not the machinery mounted on foundations of cement and installed by the lessee on a lease land be regarded as real property. Held: The machinery which is movable in its nature only becomes immobilized when placed in a plant by the owner of the property or plant but not when so placed by a tenant, a usufructuary, or any person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as agent of the owner.

Immobilization by destination or purpose cannot generally be made by a person whose possession of property is only TEPORARY, otherwise we will be forced to presume that he intended to give the property permanently away in favor of the owner of the premises.