6 18 13 0204 62337 Notice of Clerk of Court Peters and Asst Bar Counsel King's Pick and Roll Combo Stamped

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
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ZACH COUGHLIN;
Appellant.
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vs.
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) Supreme Court No: 62337
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SBN
Respondents
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NOTICE AND DECLARATION AS TO SBN CLERK OF COURT PETERS

AND ASSISTANT BAR COUNSEL KING'S PICK AND ROLL COMBO;
MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS IN THIS APPEAL AND ANY
PROCEEDINGS TO BE CONDUCTED IN THE TRIAL COURT; MOTION TO
REQUIRE KING TO BECOME AND EFILER SUFFICIENT TO AMELIORATE
CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE RPD AND CITY OF RENO
ATTORNEYS ARREST AND PROSECUTE COUGHLIN FOR EVEN
ALLEGEDLY SERVING FILING ON THE SBN (WHICH IS AN ARM OF THE
COURT UNDER WATERS, ANYWAYS)
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Petitioner, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN, representing himself files

this Notice for the de novo review, noting to the failure of NNDB Chairman
Susich, apparently, to follow SCR 110(3)-(4)'s requirement that he notify a District
Court judge of the contempt attendant to a variety of individuals and entities failing
to respond to Coughlin's SCR 110 subpoenas for the 11/14/12 formal disciplinary
hearing
And to give, uh, credit, where it is due, City of Reno Prosecutor Dan Wong,
Esq. is Glass Plus on the boards...currently subjecting Coughlin to two different
baseless prosecutions in the Reno Municipal Court, even where Wong "happily"
admits that he would prosecute Coughlin for alleged violation of the jurisdictional
prerequisites devoid Reno Justice Court Workplace Harassment TPO/EPO obtained
against Coughlin by the SBN on 12/20/12 in RCP2012-000607
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NOTICE AND DECLARATION

Docket 62337 Document 2013-21067
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE OPPOSITION TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61901,
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7 C.J.S. Attorney & Client

IV. Professional Conduct and Supervision Thereof
41. Generally
42. Canons of ethics and codes of professional responsibility
43. Standards of conduct
44. Aiding administration of justice
45. Solicitation of clients
46. Advertising, letterheads, and listings
47. Protection and representation of clients
48. Exercise of independent judgment; conflicting interests
49. Preserving funds and property of client
50. Preserving confidences and secrets
51. Zealous advocacy; assertion of frivolous claims
52. Making of extrajudicial statements
53. Dealings with opposing counsel, parties, witnesses, and jurors
54. Dealings with opposing counsel, parties, witnesses, and jurorsComm. with
repd party
55. Dealings with opposing counsel, parties, witnesses, and jurorsEmployees of
parties
56. Influencing official action; prior public employment
57. Fees, compensation, and sale of practice
58. Miscellaneous activities or conduct
59. Methods of enforcement; disqualification
60. Determination of grounds for disqualification
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V. Discipline, Suspension, and Disbarment

A. In General
61. Generally
62. Power of particular courts, committees, and agencies
63. Defenses
64. --Limitations and laches
65. --Personal problems or mental disabilities
66. --Settlement with, or absence of objection by, client
B. Grounds
1. In General
67. Generally
68. Moral turpitude, dishonesty, and corruption
69. Want or loss of moral character
70. Mental or physical illness, alcoholism, or drug addiction
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71. Fraud in procuring admission

72. Criminal offenses and conviction thereof
73. --Effect of pendency of criminal proceedings
74. --Effect of acquittal or pardon
75. --Effect of appeal and reversal; post-conviction relief
76. Misconduct in nonprofessional capacity
77. Misconduct as public officer or judge
2. Professional Misconduct
78. Generally
79. Misconduct in relation to client
80. --Disregard of client's interests; representation of conflicting interests
81. --Improper dealing with funds; misappropriation
82. Misconduct in relation to other attorneys
83. Misconduct in relation to court
84. Deception of court and obstruction of justice
85. Misuse, falsification, or alteration of records and papers
86. Misconduct in relation to disciplinary authorities
87. Solicitation of clients and advertising
88. Miscellaneous grounds
C. Proceedings, Disciplinary Order, and Punishment
1. In General
89. Generally
90. Nature, form, and purpose of proceedings
91. Functions and qualifications of persons conducting proceedings
92. Applicable forms and rules of procedure
93. Notice
94. Preliminary investigations and proceedings
95. Disclosure, discovery, and examination; confidentiality of proceedings
2. Parties and Pleadings
96. Persons entitled to prosecute; parties
97. Charges; issues, proof, and variance
98. Answer
3. Evidence and Burden of Proof
99. Generally
100. Presumptions and burden of proof
101. Admissibility of evidence
102. --Weight and sufficiency
103. Degree of proof
104. Evidence of particular misconduct
4. Trial or Hearing
a. In General
105. Generally
106. Questions of law and fact; dismissal
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107. Deliberations, scope of inquiry, and verdict or findings

b. Disciplinary Board Hearing and Judicial Review
108. Hearing and determination by referee, committee, or board
109. Review by court
110. --Scope of review
5. Disciplinary Order and New Trial
111. Decision and judgment or order
112. --On review of action of referee, commissioner, committee, or board
113. New trial and rehearing
6. Appellate Review
114. Review of judgment on appeal
115. Scope of review and determination of case
7. Punishment
116. Generally
117. Circumstances considered in fixing punishment
118. Particular offenses or misconduct
119. --Misconduct in relation to client
8. Costs and Effect of Judgment
120. Costs
121. Operation and effect of judgment or order
122. --Practice in other jurisdictions
D. Reinstatement After Disbarment or Suspension
1. In General
123. Generally
124. Discretion of court and scope of inquiry
125. --Controlling factors
126. Effect of pardon or reversal of conviction
2. Procedure
127. Application for reinstatement
128. --Evidence and burden of proof
129. --Findings, conclusions, and judgment
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How ironic it is that the allegation Merliss's counsel made in his 2/24/12
Answering Brief in the Appeal to the Dist. Ct. that Coughlin "failed to raise" the
issues of his being a commercial tenancy sufficient to prohibit, under NRS 40.254,
the use of the summary procedures in NRS 40.253 where a no cause eviction was
plead (and clearly, at no point did Merliss amend his pleadings or "unlawful
detainer affidavit" sufficient to make his action for possession one based on nonpayment of rent, and the trial court may not amend the landlord's pleadings for him,
especially where the landlord's attorney, fearful of the NRCP Rule 11 implications
attendant to making any such claims of rent owing and expressly indicating that he
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was pursuing a "no-cause eviction" under NRS 40.254 (with such statutory section
specifically cited in the very "unlawful detainer affidavit" admitted as one of the
landlord's exhibits during the 10/25/11 proceeding, in addition to in the landlord's
attorney's 10/19/11 Declaration (which expressly indicated it was being filed in an
attempt to satisfy the requirements of NRS 40.254(2)) and decidedly not alleging
any rent was owed, nor seeking an award of any rent. Dubiously (and a fine review
of this matter likely reveals an alarming degree of judicial misconduct), the RJC, in
addition to appearing to attempt to plead non-payment on behalf of the landlord
(incident to conducting a sua sponte interrogation of Coughlin at the initial
10/13/11 proceeding upon the problem of the landlord failing to show up and his
counsel not being an appropriate witness sufficient to permit Coughlin an
opportunity to "test the truthfulness and sufficiency" of some "unlawful detainer
affidavit" which had not even been filed (or, apparently, even provided to Coughlin
until, at the earliest, the day before the 10/25/11 proceeding), also seemed to
attempt to coax the landlord into seeking an award of past rent out of the "rent
escrow" deposit ordered pursuant to NRS 118A.355(5) (and Coughlin's pleading a
commercial tenancy clearly precluded any such application). Such brings up the
illegitimacy of requiring a tenant (particularly a commercial tenant) to make such a
rent escrow deposit (based upon a statutory section found in NRS 118A, the
"Residential Landlord Tenant Act") especially where the "unlawful detainer
affidavit" manifest from the record (not "you failed to raise it" bar where it is
manifest from the record that Coughlin did in fact raise such issues in the trial
court)...ironic considering that Merliss's attorney's are the one's against whom the
"you failed to raise it" or DCR 13(3) bar (which was applied, mistakenly to
Coughlin in the appeal in Flanagan's 6/25/12 award of attorney's fees, to which an
excusable neglect analysis is required (to whatever extent Coughlin's 1/14/12
"standing order going forward" Opposition to any attorney fee motion ever brought
by Hill or his associate is not recognized) considering the inequity attendant to the
summary 8 day incarceration by Judge Elliott in CR12-0376 starting the very day,
4/19/12 that the Motion for Attorney Fees/Sanctions in the appeal to the Dist Ct.
appealed herein was filed, not to mention the NRS 178.405 mandatory stay
violations committed by the WCPD, WCDA's Office, and, however coincidentally,
Judge Sferrazza where they attempted to hold a trial on the very day the deadline to
file an Opposition to that 4/19/12 Motion for Atty Fees/Sanctions feel due, 5/7/12
in the convictions now on appeal in CR12-2025 (that trial was within the criminal
prosecution of Coughlin for some half-baked "lost, mislaid, or abandoned property"
as not only petit larceny (but, ridiculously,considering a "thief cannot receive from
himself the fruits of his larceny", a "receiving stolen property" charge an
subsequent conviction for both charges as well, despite Judge Sferrazza being
provided both Shepp and Staab sufficient to undermine the receiving charge,
especially where there was zero allegation that the man allegedly finding the phone
on the ground had "stolen" it, much less any assertion that Coughlin "knew" such
man had "stolen" any such item Coughlin thereafter was said to have been freely
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given by said man) allegedly retrieved by Coughlin from one finding an iPhone on
the ground in downtown Reno, whom then loudly announced to all in the plaza in
front of City Hall that he would "throw it in the river" if someone did not
immediately claim the phone).
While Coughlin filed many documents which may appropriately be viewed as
functional equivalents thereof, any view that Coughlin failed to timely file, or
otherwise seek to address later an such failure to file, a Reply to the 2/24/12
Answering Brief in the appeal clearly must view any such failure as satisfying the
"good cause" or "excusable neglect" standard. This is particularly true where at the
time such Reply would have been due Coughlin was incarcerated, wrongfully,
incident to the summary contempt 5 day incarceration he was subjected to (even
where he pleaded with Judge Holmes (not to mention the prejudice to his case
brought by a similar refusal (consider NCJC Rule 2.15) by RMC Judge Howard to
grant a stay of any sort as to his own 3 day summary contempt incarceration of
Coughlin between 11/30/11 and 12/3/11) that a failure to accord a stay of any
length at all would not only prejudice him (especially where self representing as a
license attorney in a number of matters (and if In Re Schaeffer allows for applying
RPC's against attorneys where proceeding pro se, then the traditional rule
essentially requiring a stay of any summary contempt incarceration of an attorney
(to avoid prejudice to his clients/interference with the orderly administration of
justice in the other matters wherein the attorney is appearing) should have applied
to the summary incarceration of Coughlin on 2/27/12 not only in light of Coughlin
representing clients other than himself, but also in light of the matters wherein
Coughlin was self representing, as a licensed attorney whom subsequently had a
bevy of RPC's applied scattershot to his self representation therein. To hold
otherwise would be tantamount to the SBN and Bench seeking to have it both
ways. (During the relevant times involved herein, Coughlin was represneting
clients, including a single father living in Florida in UIFSA and custody matters, in
Jones v. Harris; foreclosure defense clients in Carpentier v. Aames; debtors in
adversary proceedings in the NVB before the same Judge Beesley (hard to cross
examine a "judge as witness" (wait, SBN/Panel, didn't the 11/2/12 Motion to Quash
Coughlin's subpoenas on judges and the 11/7/12 Ex Parte Order granting it rule one
couldn't "question judges as to their though processes"? Law of the case? How
then were Judge Beesley and Judge Holmes able to testify about their thought
process (but only to the extent doing so suited the agenda of the SBN/Panel) at that
hearing:
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 135:22 to 138:9) BY MR. KING: Q -- paragraph 3,
and this is partly for the purpose of laying a foundation, did you actually write it? It
says, "He has not practiced law in this case in a manner that demonstrates his
competence, professionalism, preparation, consideration for the court, the witnesses
or his opposing counsel. He has been very disrespectful to the court." Did you write
that? A Yes, I did write that. Q And then you made a list, you actually went so
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far as on Page 4 as to be very specific in listing the rules of professional conduct

that you were saying he violated? A Yes, I did. Q You listed 8.4, engaged in
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. Because I'm limited in time, I'm
not going to read them all, but I'm going to ask that Exhibit Number 5 be admitted.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Objection, Counsel? MR. COUGHLIN: Yeah. This looks
totally different than the one that's in the file. What's going on here? Why is this
one all blurry and illegible, and this one like pristine clean, Pat? MR.
ECHEVERRIA: What is the objection, Mr. Coughlin? MR. COUGHLIN: If this
wasn't propounded. MR. ECHEVERRIA: This wasn't what? MR. COUGHLIN:
This version wasn't propounded earlier. MR. ECHEVERRIA: It was attached
to the complaint. MR. COUGHLIN: This is clear. The problem is the one he's
always attached to the complaint is not clear. THE WITNESS (JUDGE HOLMES):
Mr. Echeverria, that was also provided to Mr. Coughlin. At the time that order
was entered, I had him served up in jail when he was being held for
contempt -- MR. COUGHLIN: No, you didn't. THE WITNESS: -- mailed to his
house as well. MR. COUGHLIN: No, she didn't. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Thanks,
Judge. I'm going to admit Exhibit 5. It was the order attached to the complaint. It
was provided as Bates numbers 1804 through 1809 to the documents copied and
produced for Mr. Coughlin. So Exhibit 5 is admitted. (Exhibit 5 admitted into
evidence.) BY MR. KING: Q Judge Holmes, was it your intention -- you made
these findings by clear and convincing evidence, which is the standard of proof
necessary for disciplinary proceedings. Was it your intention that this order be
accepted by the panel as proof of his -- as irrefutable proof of his violation of
these rules? A Yes, it was. And I'm not intending to substitute myself for the
panel. I understand, and did understand, that it was their job to conclude that. But I
did want to tell them that in my experience, and based on my judicial position, I
did find that established by that particular level of proof. And I do believe that it
has that, in my experience with him".
Regardless of the fact that it is not true, and the the Certificate of Service for
that 2/28/12 Order contains no indication that Coughlin was served any such Order
"at the jail", the SBN in no way notice-pled the idea or factual contention that the
RMC's failure to serve Coughlin the 2/28/12 Order (the RMC received as "return to
sender" the one version it mailed to Coughlin, which was mailed to an address that
the RMC knew was no longer good, and where the RMC thereafter failed to remail
such Order to the address which it had been informed by Coughlin was current)
would somehow be countered by Judge Nash Holmes, curiously, and conveniently,
all the sudden remembering that she had this one Order from nine months prior
served on Coughlin while he was in jail, over, above, and beyond having it "mailed
to his house as well" (glossing over the bit about having it mailed to an address
Judge Holmes knew was outdated, and the failure to attempt any alternate service
thereof upon receiving such wrongly address mailing back marked "no longer at
this address".
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Also, it is particularly rich that immediately after the SBN's King address
some undefined "finding" in the 3/12/12 Order by Judge Holmes that Couglin had
violated RPC 8.4 that King himself then immediately thereafter engages in just
such misconduct where he attempts to slip into the record a version of that Order
that excises all the notice/legibility issues inherent to his attaching to the 8/23/12
Complaint a far different version of that Order, one that represents a very off center
photocopying of such order replete with the last five lines or so of every page
completely illegible due to being incredibly faint and blurry (which is especially
problematic when considering those parts of that Order which were illegible in the
version attached the the Complaint by King (ironic this legibility issue pops up here
considering the wholesale dismissals of Coughlin's suit against witness Elcano's
own WLS, et al in 60302, and 60317) comprise a major percentage of those
excerpts from that Order relied upon by the Panel in its 12/14/12 FOFCOL or
testified to by Judge Holmes. Due process. Notice. Opportunity to be heard.
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Judge Beesley whom testified at Coughlin's 11/14/12 formal disciplinary

hearing (though Beesley could not remember much of anything in the way of
specifics to support his outrageously negligent contention that Coughlin resulting in
a ridiculous and shameful recommendation by the SBN and NNDB Panel to
permanently disbar Coughlin now appeal in 62337 (consider the inequity of the
events of March 2012 in Coughlin's life and practice in comparison to the actions
and testimony at his 11/14/12 formal disciplinary hearing of Judge Beesley and
RMC Judge Holmes (in addition to her 3/14/12 greivance letter against Coughlin to
the SBN.
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 10:6 to 11:7) BRUCE BEESLEY Having been first
duly sworn, testified as follows: DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. KING: Q
Judge Beesley, can you explain to the panel your knowledge in this relevant time
frame 2011-2012 regarding Mr. Coughlin and his conduct in your court? A Mr.
Coughlin appeared in my court a couple of times, at least two or three times. The
first time I recall him coming to my court he came in, he was wearing, I think, a Tshirt and a tie, and no jacket. And he indicated that he had been evicted from his
residence or his office, indicating it was not because of not paying the rent, and that
that was why he wasn't what I would consider appropriately dressed. I apologize. I
don't have my letter in front of me. But my recollection is that he had filed a
pleading on behalf of his client in regard to some aspect of a bankruptcy case, and
that the pleading was lengthy, didn't make any sense, and just sort of rambled
through a great deal of irrelevant stuff. I had him a couple other times in my court
and had the same experience, that -- he was dressed appropriately the other times I
had him there, and he was very polite and appeared to be a very intelligent man.
But his pleadings didn't make any sense. His arguments didn't make any sense."
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HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 24:14 to 24:19) Q You would be referring to the T-shirt
and tie incident? A Yes. Q With a suit jacket on though? A Yeah. And your
apology was satisfactory, although I thought your appearance was odd."
HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 15:10 to 15:20) BY MR. KING: Q Have you formed an
opinion, your Honor, as to whether or not Mr. Coughlin is competent to practice
law? A (Judge Beesley): Yes. Q And what is that opinion? A I don't believe he
is, unfortunately. MR. KING: Thank you very much. I have no further questions. I
really appreciate your time. The panel in these settings may ask you questions or
they may have questions for you, as well as, I suspect, Mr. Coughlin."
Note the SBN's complete and utter lack of effort to gather a single shred of
specific factual testimony or documentation to support the testimony it elicited
from Judge Beesley.
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HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 16:1 to 16:18) CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR.

COUGHLIN: Q Good morning, Judge Beesley, your Honor. A Morning. Q I'm
sorry to hear you feel that way about me, sir, but I would like to ask you a few
questions. A Certainly. Q I would bet that your statements are made out of
concern. A They are. Q So I appreciate that, sir. And I don't mean for my
reactions this morning to indicate anything other than a complete and utter... -- a
complete and utter respect for you, sir. A I don't take it any other way. Q Thank
you, sir. But it's out of a profound respect for the law and due process that I'm
acting the way I am."
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 22:10 to 23:18) ow that I did that. Q What review did
you undertake of my work product and filings in your court to come to your
opinions? A I looked through two or three pleadings that you had filed in, I think
you had one or perhaps two cases, and read them. And I observed you arguing in
court. Q When specifically? A I don't recall. Q Was your testimony earlier
today that the first time you recall being aware of me was when I appeared at the
March 15th hearing in Cado Company v. Keller at 2:30 P.M. shortly after being
evicted at gunpoint by the Washoe County Sheriffs -- A I actually think you had
appeared in front of me one time before that. But that was my first strong
recollection of you appearing in front of me. Q And it was that brief interaction
whereupon you formed your opinion that I wasn't fit to practice? A No. I thought
it was odd, but I do understand that people have adversity in their lives sometimes,
which happens -- Q You took it to be adversity rather than misconduct by the
sheriff? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, you interrupted the witness. MR.
COUGHLIN: Yes. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Go ahead, Judge. THE WITNESS: And
I believe that you had filed some pleading in that case. And I went to the pleadings,
and they frankly didn't make any sense. And I think you subsequently filed
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pleadings in other cases which also didn't make any sense, and I became
concerned."
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HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 22:10 to 23:18) ow that I did that. Q What review did
you undertake of my work product and filings in your court to come to your
opinions? A I looked through two or three pleadings that you had filed in, I think
you had one or perhaps two cases, and read them. And I observed you arguing in
court. Q When specifically? A I don't recall. Q Was your testimony earlier
today that the first time you recall being aware of me was when I appeared at the
March 15th hearing in Cado Company v. Keller at 2:30 P.M. shortly after being
evicted at gunpoint by the Washoe County Sheriffs -- A I actually think you had
appeared in front of me one time before that. But that was my first strong
recollection of you appearing in front of me. Q And it was that brief interaction
whereupon you formed your opinion that I wasn't fit to practice? A No. I thought
it was odd, but I do understand that people have adversity in their lives sometimes,
which happens -- Q You took it to be adversity rather than misconduct by the
sheriff? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, you interrupted the witness. MR.
COUGHLIN: Yes. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Go ahead, Judge. THE WITNESS: And
I believe that you had filed some pleading in that case. And I went to the pleadings,
and they frankly didn't make any sense. And I think you subsequently filed
pleadings in other cases which also didn't make any sense, and I became
concerned."
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HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 24:20 to 25:17) Q Do you recall a hearing prior to that
in that same Cado Company v. Keller wherein Cado sought to amend their
adversary proceeding charges, and there was maybe a five- to ten-minute hearing
on that incident to which I submitted about a 15-page motion addressing the salient
points of law in that setting? A I cannot place it in the context of that case. But I
do remember you submitting a motion describing some points of law on something,
and I didn't think that that was competent work, frankly. Q You're referring to
which motion? A I don't know. I don't have any motion in front of me. Q So you
have a fairly strong opinion on it, yet you don't recall any specifics. Would that be
an accurate assessment of your testimony? A What I recall is that your appearance
in court was odd, and your pleadings were not truly comprehensible, and that and
further inquires made me concerned that you were having some difficulties that
prevented you from serving your client appropriately. Q Did you find any of my
work competent? A I don't believe I did."
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 26:25 to 28:1) BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Your Honor,
I'd like to narrow down some of these assessments you've made vis-a-vis when they
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occurred. A Unless you can show me the document, I don't think I can help
you with that. (NOTE: that may have been an attempt at humor by Judge Beesley
considering he was testifying by phone, as did Judge Holmes...similarly, King
alluded to Judge Holmes "authenticating" an Order over the phone) Q But you've
testified pretty definitively here today. So wouldn't that indicate some negligence
on your behalf in that regard? MR. KING: Objection. Argumentative. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Sustained. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Your Honor, do you have
any specific points of law or issues with which you can elucidate why you question
my competency to practice in your court? MR. KING: Objection. Asked and
answered. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Sustained. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Do you
recall any of my work product in Cadle Company? A Not specifically, no. I
remember a fairly lengthy brief that you filed which, I think, was that case,
that I thought was rambling, addressing points of law which weren't relevant.
I think had some discussions of historical matters and some discussions of
perhaps constitutional law, but it wasn't really relevant to the matter that was in
front of me."
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 28:11 to 29:17) BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Your Honor,
on Cadle Company, wouldn't it indicate a fairly high level of skill, particularly
for one who hadn't been practicing in a bankruptcy setting for very long at all
for, one, to deduce that in that case Cadle had issues with respect to the fact
that they had not renewed a dormant foreign judgment in that under the Texas
statute at issue, given the fact that the judgment was over ten years old, and
within the two years under the statute within which they had to take some act
to revive a dormant judgment, they failed to do so. Wouldn't the fact that I
pointed that out in a brief, and specifically cited to relevant legal research with
respect to what particular acts would qualify as reviving a dormant
judgment in that respect, wouldn't that indicate some level of competency? A
(Judge Beesley): I did not ever say that I did not think you are highly intelligent. I
think you are. But intelligence and legal competence are not the same thing. I think
you have a significant lack of ability to focus on the issues at hand, but you're very
smart. Q If I pointed out, which I believe I did in that case, that Cadle Co., by
having a vice president file an affidavit seeking to register a foreign judgment,
that their doing so violated NRCP 11, in that a corporation such as Cadle Co.
is not entitled to appear pro se, to wit through a vice president who is not an
attorney, wouldn't that evince some level of capability as an attorney sufficient
to avoid having a federal judge respond to Mr. King's imploring him to badmouth
me at a hearing? MR. KING: Objection. Argumentative. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Sustained. MR. KING: Thank you."
HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 3:15 to 3:18) Formal Hearing Exhibits:... Ex. 2 (3/30/12
Order in appeal of summary eviction from former home law office involving Hill's
firm awarding $42,065 attorney fee award)...Ex.3 4/13/09 Order After Trial
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("received" as a greivance in the SBN on 3/15/12)... Ex. 6 - Letter dated February

14, 2012 to Mr. Coughlin from SBN's Mr. King pages 159 165... Ex.7 - Twopage letter dated March 9, 2012 from Mr. Coughlin to State Bar pages 165 169 8
- Two page letter dated March 14, 2012 from Judge Holmes to Mr. Clark (SBN)
pages 171 175..."
HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 49:11 to 49:16) MR. COUGHLIN: The rule says I'm to
have no less than 30 days from service of the notice of the hearing to inspect, up to
within three days of the hearing, these materials. Mr. King refused to let me see
these materials for months, going all the way back to March."
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HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 96:17 to 98:6) Q Which judge signed that order? A
Judge Linda Gardner, who is a family court judge in Washoe County, Nevada. Q
What is the date that she signed the order? MR. COUGHLIN: You say it's been
marked, Pat, you haven't entered it yet? MR. KING: That's correct. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: He hasn't offered it yet. MR. COUGHLIN: Just a -- BY MR.
KING: Q The date next to her signature? A April 10th, 2009. MR. KING: I'm
going to move that this order, a certified copy of which has been produced, be
admitted as Exhibit No. 3. MR. COUGHLIN: I'll object, sir. It just looks
substantially different than what I have seen of this order. Further, the received on
it is not certified, and that goes to a material issue here to the extent that this is
purportedly a ghost grievance. We don't know how this materialized at the State
Bar. We don't know if it involves some brother and sister judicial -- well, we
actually kind of do know that Judge Linda Gardner passed it to her brother, the
administrator of muni court who presided over the trespass conviction. And he
admits passing to Judge Nash Holmes -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: What's the
objection? MR. COUGHLIN: -- the day before March 15th on this filed her
grievance with the State Bar. MR. ECHEVERRIA: What is the objection? MR.
COUGHLIN: I want to know exactly where and how Mr. King got this order. Why
the 5 on this March 15th looks so odd and different than the previous versions
where -- it looks like somebody drew the 5 in a little darker, Pat. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: So your objection is what, sir? MR. COUGHLIN: He's talking
about it being certified, and all this and that. I would like some more information
about that. How is it certified?"
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 98:7 to 105:9) MR. KING: I asked the witness -- I was
going to ask the witness -- the witness identified this as a document he
recognized that was signed by the judge. The witness testified that he heard the
hearing. BY MR. KING: Q Why did this matter to you -- MR. COUGHLIN:
No, he said it's certified. .... MR. ECHEVERRIA: What's the objection? MR.
COUGHLIN: It's not certified,... MR. COUGHLIN: Well, he said it was
certified. So my objection is, let's see the proof. Did you get it from Joey or
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Gina Hastings or did you get it from the clerk of court of the muni court? MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin. I'm not going to entertain questions between and
among the lawyers. If you have a question, direct it to the panel or the witness. The
objection is this lacks foundation? MR. COUGHLIN: No. That this certification
hadn't been proved or even spoken to besides ... MR. COUGHLIN: -- certified.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: -- position that only legal documents can be admitted that
are certified? MR. COUGHLIN: Well, I didn't make a position on that. My
position is he said it was certified. So I'm contesting that. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Is this certified? MR. KING: Let me get the clerk to bring the certification
copies, unless she gave them to you already, which I understood she did. Did she
bring you copies? MR. ECHEVERRIA: This particular one is not certified. Do you
have one that's certified? MR. KING: I have already introduced -- the copies do
not show that it's certified. MR. COUGHLIN: Your Honor, if I can quickly
interject for the record, I mean that not disrespectful. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Are we
on the record? Are you getting this, Ms. Reporter? THE COURT REPORTER:
Yes. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Go ahead. MR. KING: Mr. Chairman, I'll lay -- I
understood, and since this has been filed with the courts that we have certified
copies. Since the copy I gave you is not certified, I'm going to lay a foundation a
different way and withdraw the representation that the copy I gave is a certified
copy. MR. COUGHLIN: Yeah. And that's just another basis for all -- the 13th time
on the clock. I'm going to say formally yes, I think a recusal is appropriate. And I
think, Pat, you need to consider whether that's fraud, to be saying it's certified,
backtracking once you get caught on it. But I'm just going to put that out for the
record. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Let's deal with this. Are you now making a motion
that I should recuse myself? MR. COUGHLIN: Do you think you should? MR.
ECHEVERRIA: No. Are you making that motion? MR. COUGHLIN: Yeah, I
think so. Probably. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Well, then articulate your position. I'd
like to hear it. MR. COUGHLIN: I think it's been set forth enough. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Set forth what? MR. COUGHLIN: You've admitted to being
childhood friends. There's a rather odd suggestion that you didn't know you both
went to Stanford in 1966 despite being childhood friends, and being in northern
Nevada practicing law or members of the legal community. And I would like to
know any other relevant nexus between the two of you. MR. ECHEVERRIA: So
your basis for moving that I should recuse myself is that I knew Mr. Elcano as a
childhood friend, and we were at the same school together? MR. COUGHLIN:
And the fact that Mr. King has worn every different hat he's wanted to wear here.
The fact he just said something was certified, then he backtracks and -- you asked
me for my basis. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, I'm asking you to focus on
your motion for recusal. Is it your position that legally any judicial officer must
recuse themselves if he happens to have -- MR. COUGHLIN: I'm not going to get
narrowed down into if you were childhood friends. I'm telling you my basis, and
that is that there is too much funny business going on here. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Overruled. MR. COUGHLIN: I'd like to set forth specifically. MR.
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ECHEVERRIA: I've asked you to three times, and you won't do it. MR.
COUGHLIN: You want to narrow it down just if you were childhood friends, and I
want to go with the totality of the circumstances. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Articulate
your case, sir. I've asked you to. THE WITNESS: SCR 105's been thrown out the
window. You've ruled on motions before I've even had a chance to oppose them or
file a reply to an opposition. You claim that NRCP is applicable here. Yet under
NRCP when I file a motion to bifurcate, and he filed an opposition, and I get three
days for mailing under 6-C, and he purports to file it on the 24th, and you rule on it
when? On the 30th? Don't I get five days, plus three for mailing to file my
opposition to preserve for appeal? MR. ECHEVERRIA: So should we disregard
the motions you filed without giving the State Bar the opportunity to respond
timely? I had two motions shoved under my door last night. Should those be
disregarded under your legal reasoning? Because you did not offer the State Bar
the opportunity to respond. MR. COUGHLIN: Well, that -- MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Yes or no, Mr. Coughlin? MR. COUGHLIN: It's not a yes or no. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Yes, it is. MR. COUGHLIN: That would entail figuring out
whether or not 30 days prior to the hearing -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: Let's focus on
the issues back. You've made a motion now to require me to recuse myself. MR.
COUGHLIN: Yeah. MR. ECHEVERRIA: You made it on the basis that, one, Mr.
Elcano and I knew each other as childhood friends. And two, that we attended the
same school together, apparently. And you say it's suspicious that I did not know
that. Anything else? MR. COUGHLIN: Every -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: Anything
else? MR. COUGHLIN: Every aspect of SCR 1052(c) has been violated by your
orders. And the way this thing has been run, you have thrown out every last
procedural due process substantive protection accorded me for my property right
under the 14th Amendment. You have insulted me by the way you have run this
panel. MR. KING: Mr. Chairman -- MR. COUGHLIN: And I find out you're
childhood friends with a guy I'm suing. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm childhood
friends with justice -- MR. COUGHLIN: And you went to Stanford together in '66,
and you didn't know that. And let me guess. Are you on the Basque board too for
UNR? And Paul tells us he's Basque every five minutes you talk to him. MR.
KING: Mr. Chairman. My experience with Mr. Coughlin is if this is allowed to
continue, he will be thrilled, and it will go on for eight hours. My witness has a
limited time. MR. COUGHLIN: And your office is a stone's throw from the State
Bar. MR. KING: I need to move forward, because the witness has limited time,
with your permission. MR. COUGHLIN: I like you personally. I think you're a
charming guy. I do, your Honor. Just like Mr. Elcano. But the clock chimed 13
times. And if I don't put into the record what is it going to say on appeal? They are
trying to merge me here. Let's be honest. So if it's a merging that's going on here,
I'm going to preserve everything for the record. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm going to
overrule your motion for recusal. The supreme court has already ruled that the fact
that a judge knows a witness or a lawyer is not, in and of itself, grounds for recusal.
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That's been decided and litigated in this state. So the motion for recusal is
overruled. Mr. King, proceed to lay the foundation for Exhibit 3."
SBN Asst Bar Counsel Patrick O. King, Esq. and his SBN "Clerk of Court"
Laura Peters run a heck of a pick and roll. Similar to the old bait and switch they
ran vis a vis Peters representing to Coughlin that he could file and serve the Clerk
of Court and SBN via faxing documents to the SBN (and Peters specifically
indicated that she would file stamp in such documents submitted for filing by
Coughlin via fax (9/11/12), only to have Peters subsequently, if not lie (she was
allowed to avoid answering any tough questions in that regard by virtue of the
11/7/12 Panel Chair Echeverria Order granting King's Ex Parte Emergency Motion
to Quash Coughlin's subpoenas on both King and Peters)
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HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 154:3 to 156:1) BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Did you or

anybody with your court, the Reno Municipal Court, transmit or otherwise deliver
Judge Linda Gardner's April 2009 order sanctioning me to the State Bar of Nevada?
A (Judge Holmes): I'm sorry. Deliver to whom? MR. ECHEVERRIA: The State
Bar, Judge. THE WITNESS: Oh. After -- let me explain quickly. My trial was my
first experience in exposure to Mr. Coughlin. After everything happened, and I
held him in contempt, then Judge Gardner told me that his sister, Judge
Gardner, has a life experience with Mr. Coughlin, and he provided me a copy
of her opinion from a couple years earlier. And that may have been in the
package I forwarded to the court. I forwarded everything I could possibly
include that would show Mr. Coughlin's ability to practice law. Including Mr.
Coughlin's 200-page motion that he faxed to the court. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Thank you, Judge. It's now 12:22, and we'll excuse you. And we appreciate you
taking the time -- MR. COUGHLIN: Can I ask one more question about the
pending -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin -- MR. COUGHLIN:
-- competency evaluation or -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin. MR.
COUGHLIN: -- with the trial? It's a good question. MR. ECHEVERRIA: It's an
interruptive question, and it's improper conduct. MR. COUGHLIN: You're not
going to let her answer that, huh? You are not going to make her answer that?
MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm sorry. I continue to talk while you're trying to interrupt.
Judge, thank you for your testimony. MR. COUGHLIN: She held a trial with a
pending competency evaluation in violation of law. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Quit
interrupting, Mr. Coughlin."
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(It was Judge Nash Holmes whose 5 day summary incarceration of Coughlin
between 2/27/12-3/2/12 prevented Coughlin from filing a Reply to the 2/24/12
Answering Brief hearing (to which Hill, in testifying at Coughlin's formal
disciplinary proceeding on 11/14/12 claimed Coughlin's "failure to oppose" matters
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alleged in his associates Answering Brief (which, as manifest from the record, are
completely untrue, like in 60302 vis a vis the service of process issue) (such as the
patently incorrect allegations therein that Coughlin "never raised" the issue of his
commercial tenancy prohibiting the use of summary eviction procedures where
such action was plead as a NRS 40.254 "no-cause summary eviction" (much less
the incredible attempts Judge Holmes and the SBN/NNDB Panel to find Coughlin
violated RPC 1.1 "the duty of competence within "Part 1 Lawyer-Client
Relationship" of the NRPC), and RPC 1.2 or 1.3 (speaking of competence, its hard
to tell which rule the SBN/Judge Holmes alleged Coughlin violated given the
mixing of the numeric identifier of RPC 1.3 with the title of RPC 1.2 (expediting
litigation versus Diligence) found in the SBN's 8/23/13 Complaint (see 62337)
(much less, in transmogrifying a "simple traffic citation" trial into some absurd
summary disciplinary hearing (see the 3/12/12 Order in RMC 11 TR 26800 and
62337... "Judges Gone Wild").
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As to judges refusing stays to practicing attorneys representing clients where the

seek to summarily incarcerate such attorney's (in a remarkably similar display of
the kind of negligence born only of a steady diet of absolute immunity (what's
next? Surgical immunity?), the overwhelmingly majority viewpoint in the law is
that such is highly disfavored. In her 3/14/12 grievance against Coughlin to the
SBN, Judge Holmes is completely blase as to whether or not Coughlin's indications
to her on the record on 2/27/12 that he was representing clients and had hearings
upcoming the would be prejudiced and disordered as a result of the denial of any
stay at all were true or not (and if you have ever been to the Washoe County Jail,
you known how completely unrealistic it is to think one will be able to conduct
business from there, 10 days for your stamps, paper, and calling cards to arrive in
the mail, one may not access their own credits card, in their possession at the time
of arrest and booking, to add money to their commissary "books". One may not
receive even a single sheet of paper from a Deputy. Coughlin was routinely place
directly into "Administrative Segregation" sufficient to sharply curtail his "tier
time", preventing his making any phone calls to arrange for the avoidance of
prejudice or disorder to the clients he was representing and in the case such
representation arose). Laughably, Judge Holmes feigns being "fearful" that if
Coughlin's representations to her that he was actively representing clients were true
(she glossed over Coughlin's indications that the denial of a stay of such summary
contempt incarceration would damage their interests and disorder the matters in
which such representation arose in) that Coughlin could "be doing real damage to
their liberty or property interests".
Probably not as much damage as denying a stay of a summary contempt
incarceration of an outrageous five days (we are not talking Houston being
handcuffed for an hour in the 8JDC Family Court) to an attorney actively
representing clients would cause, no? But then, as with the denial of any such stay
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under the exact same circumstances (summary contempt incarcerations or

unnoticed revocation of Couglin's bail (the one on 4/19/12 is not all that clear, as
asking a HIPAA question about seeking to know to just what extent the
"competency" evaluators at Lake's Crossing have a blank check into the entirety of
one's medical/mental health care records where simply performing a NRS 178.425
evaluations that really fails to necessitate the inordinately invasive/retaliatory
approach taken by Bill Davis, Ph.D. and Sally Farmer, Ph.D.) by RMC Judge
Howard between 11/30/11-12/3/11 and Judge Elliott between 4/19/12-4/26/12, and
RJC Judge Clifton between 2/12/13-2/16/13 (5 days in jail for allegedly being late
to court where Coughlin was, again, summarily incarcerated between 2/1/132/5/13 incident to a warrantless arrest after 7 pm in violation of NRS 171.136
premised upon a NRS 211A.125 allegation of having violated his probation by
failing to check in with DAS on 1/23/13 where DAS wrote Coughlin on 1/24/13
admitting that Coughlin had checked in, but that the RJC Bailiff's in their
overstepping application of an already completely specious 12/20/12
Administrative Order 2012-01 by, wait for it....Judge Sferrazza (whom, in that
order, remixed the State of Nevada's Constitution where that Order indicated Art.6
Sec. 6 imbued "Nevada courts" with the jurisdiction therein that is only accorded to
"District courts", which is a signficant distinction when considering that Order was
entered (not in a "case" per se, with an opposing party in the caption, or upon a
complaint and subsequent motion made by a "party") by a justice court judge...with
such jurisdictional largesse being apparent again in a 11/28/12 summary "Order" in
"ALL CASES ALL DEPARTMENTS" that purported to base its summary
revocation of Coughlin's right to submit filings by fascimile (a privilege,
apparently, the RJC accords unequally among litigants and ), had prevented
Coughlin from accessing the DAS Office).
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HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 99:21 to 100:21) MR. ECHEVERRIA: Is this certified?

MR. KING: Let me get the clerk to bring the certification copies, unless she gave
them to you already, which I understood she did. Did she bring you copies? MR.
ECHEVERRIA: This particular one is not certified. Do you have one that's
certified? MR. KING: I have already introduced -- the copies do not show that it's
certified. MR. COUGHLIN: Your Honor, if I can quickly interject for the record, I
mean that not disrespectful. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Are we on the record? Are you
getting this, Ms. Reporter? THE COURT REPORTER: Yes. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Go ahead. MR. KING: Mr. Chairman, I'll lay -- I understood, and since this has
been filed with the courts that we have certified copies. Since the copy I gave you is
not certified, I'm going to lay a foundation a different way and withdraw the
representation that the copy I gave is a certified copy. MR. COUGHLIN: Yeah.
And that's just another basis for all -- the 13th time on the clock. I'm going to say
formally yes, I think a recusal is appropriate. And I think, Pat, you need to consider
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whether that's fraud, to be saying it's certified, backtracking once you get caught on
it. But I'm just going to put that out for the record..."
While the 12/24/12 ROA places the 10/9/12 Affidavit of Laura Peters at
pages 38-39, the 2/13/13 version of the ROA places the same at pages 33-34, which
is especially odd considering that the file stamp on that Affidavit of Laura Peters on
at ROA 38 is earlier in time than the file stamp on the Notice of Formal Hearing
and DoWSoE on page 33. This is even more odd given that the original placement
in the ROA of 12/14 put such 10/9/12 Affidavit of Laura Peters in a position after a
later dated document (the Notice of Formal Hearing, that is, of 10/12/12 was place
after the 10/9/12 Affidavit of Laura Peters, which, was actually placed in the OBC's
11/7/12 production of documents in lieu of SCR 105(2)(c)'s jurisdictional
requirements being met. In that 11/7/12 production (which Coughlin sought to
introduce as evidence at the formal hearing, but was not even allowed to have
marked), that 10/9/12 Affidavit of Laura Peters was placed after the 10/24/12
Opposition to Respondent's Motion to Bifurcate Hearing/Motion to Dismiss, and
after the 10/30/12 Order Appointing Formal Hearing Panel and 10/31/12 Order,
indicating that, regardless of when it was filed stamped or notarized, it was not
placed in the formal pleadings file until, at the earliest, 10/31/12. This is
extremely prejudicial (especially where the SBN/Panel are now asserting a default
basis/admission of misconduct theory) when view in combination with the SBN's
refusal to allow Coughlin to take advantage of the right to inspect, up to 3 days
prior to the hearing (which, arguably meant up to and through November 9th,
2012), all that to which he was entitled to inspect under SCR 105(2)(c) (the waiver
of service of and Subpoenas on Elcano and Beesley would have been helpful to see,
Beesley's supposed letter to the OBC and dating thereof, etc., and all the suspect
redactions or privileged and withheld ommissions from what was actually
produced to Coughlin on 11/7/12 (which only included materials up to 10/31/12, as
such was sent to the printers the morning of 11/1/12, as admitted to verbally by
Peters and in writing by King). The second ROA persists with inserting at bates 32
some quasi-Affidavit of Attempted service that is neither signed (and was not,
given the lack of any Index to Exhibits or cover page for any exhibit) attached to
that 10/9/12 Notice of Intent to Take Default found immediately preceding it in the
ROA (Coughlin, of course, only first received any version of that 10/9/12 NOITTD
upon finding it bates stamped among some 3,200 other pages of documents in the
production of 11/7/12). As such, page 32 of the ROA should be stricken.
There is not even a name assigned to the various statements (unsworn, of
course) made therein for the various dates detailed. Especially with regard to the
lack of notice to Coughlin that such would be put forward as evidence (that found
on page 32 of the ROA makes another appearance within FHE 1 at page 1736...and
now it becomes clear why the Index on page 1699 to FHE 1 has been photocopied
in a manner to completely obscure what it details...that was done to obfuscate the
reality that the SBN held out to the Panel page 1736 as being included in that which
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was originally mailed to Coughlin (with insufficient postage placed thereon

resulting in the USPS refusing to release it to Coughlin, which Coughlin promptly
notified the SBN of and placed the SBN on a Litigation Hold Notice with respect to
the contents and envelope of that mailing, which was returned to sender with a
handwritten notation detailing the insufficiency of postage placed thereon, made by
USPS Downtown Postal Station longtime employee Tim (tall, fifties, glasses).
Coughlin is filing herewith a version of what the SBN did file with this Court on
12/24/12 (though, in an apparent attempt to coerce payment up front for the
Transcript and certified copy of the Formal Hearing Exhibits (including Exhibit 16,
that Coughlin was not provided the day of the hearing, and where none of the
Exhbits were marked as provided to Coughlin), and has affixed bates stamping
thereto, such that the 574 page Volume 3 of 12/14/12 is bates stamped to continue
where page 1098 of Volume 2 left off. As such, the Index to the FH1 Index of
Documents that is too blurry to read on the second ROA's page 1699 is much more
readable at what would have been bates stamp page 2001 in the first ROA filed.
And therein is revealed an attempt by the SBN to hold out that quasi-Affidavit of
Service found at page 32 of the second ROA, included again, as an Exhibit to the
10/9/12 Notice of Intent to Take Default. However, as detailed above, it is not at all
clear that such Reno/Carson Messenger Service receipt was actually included
therewith, (though, a review of pages 2001 from the first ROA and page 1736 of
the second ROA would give one that impression, despite the unlikelihood of that,
given the RCMS receipt is dated 10/6/12, adn does nto appear to have been faxed to
the SBN, and would, therefore, unlikely have made its way to the SBN in time to be
affixed to the 10/9/12 purported mailing of the 10/9/12 NOITTD.
And, it is important to recall, as admitted to on page 1098 of the first ROA
of 12/24/12, that SBN Clerk of Court Laura Peters only mailed the first 2 of 3
volumes of that ROA to Coughlin (and that ROA and the second ROA failed to
comply with the requirement in NRAP that the Clerk of Court certify the contents
of such ROA, and, regardless, the SBN's negligent, at best, preparation of the ROA
here is risable. And, really, in the 2/13/13 ROA, what would purportedly be Exhibit
1, starting at page 1699, is not marked in any way to indicate that it is Exhibit 1,
and as such, should be stricken in its entirely. It appears from reviewing the first
ROA filed (since stricken by the 2/7/13 Order) that the SBN excised an essentially
blank (though ink wasting dark red or black page) that had affixed to it an Exhibit
1 sticker from the ROA filed on 2/13/13. You can be entirely certain that the Panel
and SBN applied every single ticky tack little reason for striking something or
ruling as inadmissible something Coughlin sought to introduce into evidence, and
such an approach should be applied to the SBN's Exhibit 1 beginning on page 1699
in the 2/13/13 ROA, through 1750 (or if not stricken, at perhaps ruled as
inadmissible, particularly given the apparent Sierra Glass violation incident to
pages 1727 and 1736 as detailed above). The SBN failed to include a 60 page Index
in the Volume 3 that it never provided me incident to the 12/24/12 filing. Further,
many cd/dvd attachments to my filings in that matter, I am told, by Clerk Castillo,
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are not in the ROA. I believe the ROA is deficient in this matter, perhaps
fraudulently so. All of the SBN's histrionics and melodrama related to the Extended
Order of Protection obtained from an RJC that is entirely to conflicted here to be
making rulings limiting the means by which I am able to communicate with an
opposing party and or file documents or seek extensions or stipulations where time
is of the essence...and not just with an opposing party, but with a "Clerk of Court"
as the SBN's Laura Peters hold herself out to be, as does the SBN and OBC hold
her out. In an effort to avoid an ex parte communications accusations (though Bar
Counsel King readily admits to having those all the time with the Panel...and to
controlling the Clerk of Court Peters (coercing her into the 10/9/12 Affidavit of
Laura Peters, which, according to the bates stamps of the "file" provided by the
SBN on 11/8/12 was only placed into the "file" on 10/31/12, as the filings in the
interim between those dates have a bates stamping indicating that 10/9/12 Affidavit
of Laura Peters (which lacks a caption and is not attached to any filing by the SBN
or Panel). If the SBN and or Clerk of Court Peters is going to be eliminating a 60
page index from the Official Transcript, or dropping in page 216 on Volume 1
(which is hugely inappropriate considering the fact that page 216 of Volume 1 is a
USPS Track & Confirm printout the SBN printed just after Coughlin alerted it to
the fact that the downtwon Reno postal station at first failed to find, then refused to
provide Coughlin with the SBN's 10/9/12 mailing to Couglhin given the
insufficiency of the postage attached thereto, and the circumstances related to the
SBN placing insufficient postage on that 10/9/12 Notice of Intent to Take Default
and receiving it back from the USPS with a "insufficient postage"/return to send
handwritten note that Coughlin personally saw USPS downtown station counter
clerk "Tim" affix to that large manilla package (which brings up the fact that the
Reno Carson Messenger Service unsworn quasi-Affidavit of Attempted service was
not a part of that 10/9/12 NOITD, either, meaning that page 32 of Volume 1 (the
Reno Carson Messenger Service Receipt) of the 12/24/12 ROA is another instance
of the SBN/OBC/Clerk of Court Peters/NNDB/Panel (my point is...there is no point
of distinction between any of those entities...they all bleed together completely,
with the main characteristic they share being that Bar Counsel Pat King is permitted
to fraudulent and coerce them around into doing his bidding as an attack dog for the
rich and powerful....Peters signs the Certificates of Service for all involved....Chair
Echeverria's Office is in the SBN's back parking lot...Peter's grants Coughlin
permission to file by fax on 9/11/12 at 4:48 pm (and a review of all emails and fax
confirmations involved, and, uh...some other things makes clear that Peters 10/9/12
Affidavit of Laura Peters is an extremely troubled document, as is Bar Counsel's
holding out the 8/23/12 Complaint and Affidavit of Service therein by Peters as
something other than a fraudulent assertion of service violative of RPC 3.3, 3.4, and
many of the provisions in the Model Code of Conduct for Judicial Employees in the
State of Nevada: http://www.courtethics.org/Nevada%20Model%20Code%20of
%20Conduct.pdf In that Model Code the appearance of impropriety is referenced at
length.
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On that note, I reference the "Dispositional Order' entered by Clerk

Lindeman that Richard G. Hill, Esq. conveniently referenced in his testimony at the
formal disciplinary 11/07/2012 Order/Dispositional - Order Dismissing Appeal
Filed Order Dismissing Appeal. To date, appellant has not paid the filing feeor
otherwise responded to this court's notice. Accordingly, cause appearing, this
appeal is dimissed. 12-35194 Further, why is Coughlin's Motion for Order to Show
Cause on page 44 of Vol 1 not file stamped, even where the Panel Chair ruled on it
in his 10/31/12 Order? Is it permissible to issue a Briefing Schedule on 12/24/12
where Motion for New trial, NRCP 52, NRCP 59 tolling motions are pending?
Also, while the 2/13/13 version of the ROA indicates that from pages 797-1347 is
Coughlin's Motion for Mistrial (Notice that 10/9/12 Affidavit of Laura Peters is
Whopper Chocked, etc. (again, for some totally unexplained reason the SBN
merely indicates such filing was Not Filed in the entry for such in the
Alphabetical Index, despite such filing being properly submitted for filing on
12/3/12). So, so, the 2/13/13 ROA's version of that filing totals 550 pages, while
the 12/24/12 version extends from 613-1068, therefore totalling only 455
pages...the SBN fails to explain at all where from or why there is now an
additionaly 95 pages associated with such filing. Beyond all of that, the multitude
of Coughlin's filing have been rendered illegible due to the SBN's fraudulent
fiddling with the scanner and copier settings. NRAP 11 requires the output of such
to be equal to that of a laser printer, which requires at least 300 dpi, and clearly, the
SBN has gone beyond just scanning Coughlin's filings in at the lowest setting
possible (75dpi), but rather has taken to adjusting the resolution, sharpness,
contrast, shrinking and also settings available to those whom wish to obscure the
record to achieve an impermissible advantage. Beyond this, King has sought to
obviate the due process problems (lack of notice, insufficiency of service of
process, and of the process itself...see 60302) associated with his attaching to his
8/23/12 Complaint Orders wherein portions thereof are entirely illegible.
Also missing from both versions of the ROA filed by the OBC is Couglhin's
11/9/12 AFFIDAVIT OF ZACH COUGHLIN AND SUPPLMENTAL TO
DESIGNATION OFWITNESS AND SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE; MOTION
FOR RECUSAL OF PANEL CHAIR ECHEVERRIA; and EMERGENCY EX
PARTE MOTION TO DISMISS THE 11/14/12 HEARING OR OTHERWISE
RECOGNIZE THE LACK OF JURISDICTION TO HOLD IT GIVEN THE
NUMEROUS VIOLATIONS OF SCR 105 BY THE PANEL AND THE SBN (6
pages with Exhibit 1 attached as disc). Defendant Zachary Coughlin (hereinafter
"Defendant") is charged with Violation of a Temporary or Extended Order for
Protection Against Harassment in the Workplace, a violation of NRS 33.350 as
incorporated by Reno Municipal Code Section 1.04.015. See Amended Criminal
Complaint filed March 7, 2013. It is alleged, interalia, that: The Reno Justice Court
issued a Temporary Order for the Protection Against Harassment in the Workplace
on December 20, 2012, with an expiration date of January 4, 2013 (RJC RCP2012000607). The TPO Order prohibited the Defendant or an agent of the Defendant
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from Contacting (versus prohibiting Coughlin from "harassing") the State Bar of
Nevada's Northern Office only (going so far as to prevent Coughlin from even
mailing in the US mail harassing materials to the SBN, and, perhaps, any
materials), and failed to list the SBN's Northern Officer's fax number therein (and
the TPO Application upon which such Order issued failed to list the fax number for
the Northern Office as well). The Defendant was not served this Order on
December 26, 2012, contrary to the RCA's assertions in its Motion. For an RCA
seeking to take Coughlin to task over phenomenally suspect, and de minimis, at
best, alleged violations of this TPO/EPO, it sure is willing to overlook a number of
deficiencies in the performance of the RJC, the RJC Bailiffs, the SBN and its Clerk
of Corut, RPD Detective Ytrubidde, the arresting RPD officers, etc., etc. as they
relate to their respective roles in this matter and the void and voidable nature of the
two protection orders in question. Sort of a do what we say not as we do type
approach. A "we're above the law, ourselves, see" kind of attitude. Further, the
RCA failed to turn over the Brady material attendant to the missing Proof of
Service page for such 12/20/12 TPO in RCP12-607, in the RCA's initial purported
(yet still not technically served) discovery to Coughlin, wherein the 12/26/12 Proof
of Service by the RJC's Bailiff Anthony English was missing therefrom, in a tacit
admission by the RCA that it knows such purported service was woefully
insufficient (the order itself directed specific members of law enforcement (not
among them were the RJC Bailiff, whom by the way, as parties, also purported to
effect service of a TPO against Coughlin by "Washoe County", and really, the
Public Defenders Office is an independent contractor, as such, Washoe County has
no standing to move on its behalf or on behalf of any of the WCPD's employees for
a Workplace TPO), and therefore the RCA is violating RPC 3.8 and Brady in
maintaining both of these prosecutions in addition to being a willing accomplice to
the criminal misconduct being committed by the State Bar of Nevada's OBC Asst.
Bar Counsel King and "Clerk of Court"/Investigator/Paralegal, Laura Peters, whom
admit to throwing away or otherwise failing to fulfill her duties as "Clerk fo Court"
for the State Bar of Nevada in formal disciplinary proceedings (as both Peters and
King have held Peters out to be "Clerk of Court of the State Bar of Nevada).
Further, the TPO application was violative of the requirement that one's
employer file it on behalf of a specific employee (as Laura Peters filled it out
originally in her own handwriting then used white out over her signature...replacing
it with Pat King's, and regardless, the TPO/EPO sought to protect them both, and
authority to so file such an application necessarily needed to be issued by a member
of the SBN's Board of Directors (or possibly, even, Watters and SCR 99, the
Nevada Supreme Court, as the SBN is merely an "arm of the Court", not merely
upon Pat King, or even David Clark's permission), whom would then need to file
such application on behalf of such employees as King or Peters or whatever
unnamed employee the RCP12-607 application purports to, in all its unattributed
hearsay and vagueness, seek protection for (NNDB Panel Chair Echeverria's staff,
non-sensically, seems to be the party for whom the SBN is seeking protection, for
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which, clearly, its lacks standing to apply for one on behalf of Echeverria, his staff,
or anyone with the NNDB), beyond that the SBN's TPO application fails to comply
with the statutory requirement that it specifically name which employees it seeks to
protect and why, or provide an factual specifics as to why such an application is
justified). Further, the SBN's TPO Application failed to contain a verification and
or a sworn Declaration as to any facts whatsoever, much less of the level necessary
to satisfy NRS 33.250. Simply put, nothing in any of the Exhibits or the Exhibit 1
"Summary" attached to the SBN's TPO is incorporated by reference into the 8 page
TPO Application's verfication (neither the required incorporating language is
included, nor are the materials contained in the Exhibit 1 placed on the statutorily,
court mandated "Continuation" Page, not to mention that the Application and
Exhibit 1 contain absolutely no attribution as to whom purportedly wrote the
"Summary" in Exhibit 1 to the TPO Application (and curiously, especially where
the employee for whom the employer is purportedly seeking the protection
(apparently Laura Peters?) is precluded from applying for such protection on their
own behalf, the "Summary" in Exhibit 1 of the TPO Application refers to Pat King
in the third person, which is strange considering its is Kign signing the verification
on page 8 of the TPO Application and there is otherwise no attribution for the
writer of the "Summary" included in Exhibit 1 of the TPO applciation (which
consists almost of unattributed hearsay alluding to unnamed non SBN employees in
vague, unsupported terms). Further, by virtue of the admissions made by both the
SBN and its Clerk of Court Peters and RCA Chief Criminal Deputy City Attorney
Wong, a level of complicity and prosecutorial misconduct is evinced in Clerk of
Court Peters failure to include the two purported filings in question in the record on
appeal transmitted from NG12-0204,0434,0435 to the NSCT in 62337 (ie, those
purported filings of 1/3/13 and 1/17/13):
"III. Title, Tenure, Removal, or Suspension C. Removal or Suspension from
Office 1. Removal from Office 21. Grounds for removalParticular
applications , Clerks of Courts k8 Examples of sufficient grounds for removing a
clerk of court from office include: misappropriation of funds to the clerk's
personal use[FN1] a conviction of theft in office giving rise to a statutory
disqualification[FN2] the failure to maintain proper records and accounts[FN3]
making disparaging statements about a judge[FN4] an offense involving moral
turpitude[FN5] willful misconduct in office[FN6] failure to follow to the letter
and in the utmost good faith the direction of the judge[FN7] misfeasance in office
or neglect of official duty tantamount to fraud[FN8] [FN1] Lewis v. State ex rel.
Evans, 387 So. 2d 795 (Ala. 1980). [FN2] State ex rel. Corrigan v. Haberek, 35
Ohio St. 3d 150, 518 N.E.2d 1206 (1988). [FN3] In re Overstreet, 851 S.W.2d 458
(Ky. 1993). [FN4] Voigt v. Savell, 70 F.3d 1552 (9th Cir. 1995). [FN5] Lewis v.
State ex rel. Evans, 387 So. 2d 795 (Ala. 1980). [FN6] In re Antonelli, 429 Mass.
644, 711 N.E.2d 104 (1999). [FN7] State ex rel. Core v. Merrifield, 202 W. Va.
100, 502 S.E.2d 197 (1998). [FN8] Commonwealth ex rel. Attorney General v.
Furste, 288 Ky. 358, 156 S.W.2d 198 (1941).
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AMJUR CLERKSOFCT 21" 44. Breach of duty affecting rights of

litigants West's Key Number Digest West's Key Number Digest, Clerks of Courts
k64.1 A court clerk's breach of a duty to perform the ministerial functions of the
clerk's office will not prejudice the rights of those dealing with the court concerning
an action or matter then pending. This principle frequently applies where a party
seeks enforcement of,[FN1] or relief from a judgment affected by some mistake or
default of the clerk,[FN2] or where the clerk's failure affects compliance with filing
or recording deadlines critical to the party's matter.[FN3] In the absence of a duty,
[FN4] or when the negligence of another intervenes,[FN5] relief is denied, even
with reliance on the clerk's promises or statements,[FN6] particularly those
gratuitous in nature with no relation to the clerk's duties.[FN7] A clerk of court may
be liable personally and on an official bond,[FN8] subject to the constraints of
potential immunity.[FN9] [FN1] Gilliam v. Gilliam, 43 So. 3d 615 (Ala. Civ. App.
2010). [FN2] McGee v. Hicks, 303 Ga. App. 130, 693 S.E.2d 130 (2010), cert.
granted, (Sept. 20, 2010) and aff'd but criticized on other grounds, 11 Fulton
County D. Rep. 2069, 2011 WL 2610368 (Ga. 2011). [FN3] Williams v. T.D.C.J.I.D., 142 S.W.3d 308 (Tex. 2004). [FN4] Trala v. Melmar Industries, Inc., 254
A.2d 249 (Del. Super. Ct. 1969). [FN5] Maginn v. City of Glendale, 72 Cal. App.
4th 1102, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639 (2d Dist. 1999). [FN6] Libert v. Turzynski, 129 Ill.
App. 2d 146, 262 N.E.2d 741 (1st Dist. 1970). [FN7] Trala v. Melmar Industries,
Inc., 254 A.2d 249 (Del. Super. Ct. 1969). [FN8] 55, 61. [FN9] 58 to 60.
AMJUR CLERKSOFCT 44 2. Custody and Care of Records Topic Summary
Correlation Table References 50. Generally West's Key Number Digest West's
Key Number Digest, Clerks of Courts k69 Trial Strategy Locating Public Records,
2 Am. Jur. Trials 409 12 to 15 (records of county clerk) The clerk of court is the
custodian of court records,[FN1] with the duty or function to make and keep an
accurate record[FN2] and docket[FN3] of the proceedings in the court,[FN4] the
court's orders and judgments,[FN5] all documents submitted to the clerk,[FN6]
records used in appeals,[FN7] and all documents used by the court in its decisionmaking capacity.[FN8] A clerk of court does not have independent ownership of
court records,[FN9] and has a ministerial duty to permit the inspection and copying
of the court's records in civil cases.[FN10] [FN1] Lapeer County Clerk v. Lapeer
Circuit Court, 469 Mich. 146, 665 N.W.2d 452 (2003); State v. McCraine, 214 W.
Va. 188, 588 S.E.2d 177 (2003). [FN2] In re Strickhausen, 994 S.W.2d 936 (Tex.
App. Houston 1st Dist. 1999). Clerk is responsible for maintaining traffic files for
the judge or magistrate. Speight v. Presley, 2008 OK 99, 203 P.3d 173 (Okla.
2008). Clerk must maintain an accurate record of the date of filing. Laidlaw Energy
and Environmental, Inc. v. Town of Ellicottville, 60 A.D.3d 1284, 875 N.Y.S.2d
668 (4th Dep't 2009). [FN3] Stewart v. Kentucky Lottery Corp., 986 S.W.2d 918
(Ky. Ct. App. 1998) (electronic computerized "case history" or docket sheet).
[FN4] Copley Press, Inc. v. Superior Court, 6 Cal. App. 4th 106, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d
841 (4th Dist. 1992). [FN5] State ex rel. Core v. Merrifield, 202 W. Va. 100, 502
S.E.2d 197 (1998). [FN6] Sullivan v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court In and For County
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of Clark, 111 Nev. 1367, 904 P.2d 1039 (1995). [FN7] In re Strickhausen, 994
S.W.2d 936 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. 1999). [FN8] In re Search Warrant
#5077/91, 96 Ohio App. 3d 737, 645 N.E.2d 1304 (10th Dist. Franklin County
1994). [FN9] Lapeer County Clerk v. Lapeer Circuit Court, 469 Mich. 146, 665
N.W.2d 452 (2003). [FN10] Lapeer County Clerk v. Lapeer Circuit Court, 469
Mich. 146, 665 N.W.2d 452 (2003). Clerk acted in judicial capacity when making
court records available to the public. Rieger v. Montgomery Cty. Clerk of Courts,
2009-Ohio-426, 2009 WL 242668 (Ohio Ct. App. 2d Dist. Montgomery County
2009).
AMJUR CLERKSOFCT 50 49. Documents deficient in form, substance,
or timeliness West's Key Number Digest West's Key Number Digest, Clerks of
Courts k69 When a court clerk receives documents which are not in proper form,
the clerk must file and stamp those documents with the date on which they were
received.[FN1] A clerk of a court may not reject a pleading for form,[FN2] general
informality,[FN3] originality,[FN4] lack of statutory authorization for the filing,
[FN5] or on substantive grounds,[FN6] unless the clerk acts under specific rule or
statutory authority to reject pleadings that lack certain documents.[FN7] The lack
of a civil case cover sheet is not a sufficient omission to reject a filing.[FN8] A
filing, untimely on its face, is nonetheless a filing that requires action by the court
clerk, leaving to the court the ultimate question of timeliness or other merit.[FN9]
[FN1] Glauner v. State, 107 Nev. 482, 813 P.2d 1001 (1991). The clerk of court
properly assigned new case number to a claim where the complaint did not identify
itself as a renewal of a prior counterclaim. Meyer v. Minster Farmers Coop.
Exchange Co., Inc., 2009-Ohio-4933, 2009 WL 2986971 (Ohio Ct. App. 3d Dist.
Shelby County 2009). [FN2] Hooker v. Sivley, 187 F.3d 680 (5th Cir. 1999); Cave
v. Elliott, 190 Md. App. 65, 988 A.2d 1 (2010). [FN3] In re Smith, 270 S.W.3d 783
(Tex. App. Waco 2008). [FN4] Gehring v. Goodman, 25 Misc. 3d 802, 884
N.Y.S.2d 646 (Sup 2009) (copies of affidavits). [FN5] Estate of Johnson v.
Ciarpelli, 71 A.D.3d 1482, 896 N.Y.S.2d 752 (4th Dep't 2010) (filing within clerk's
authority without guidance by law). [FN6] Hooker v. Sivley, 187 F.3d 680 (5th Cir.
1999); McKeown v. Bailey, 731 A.2d 628 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999). [FN7] Blundon v.
Taylor, 364 Md. 1, 770 A.2d 658 (2001); Cable v. Hatfield, 202 W. Va. 638, 505
S.E.2d 701 (1998). [FN8] Maginn v. City of Glendale, 72 Cal. App. 4th 1102, 85
Cal. Rptr. 2d 639 (2d Dist. 1999). [FN9] In re Smith, 270 S.W.3d 783 (Tex. App.
Waco 2008). AMJUR CLERKSOFCT 49 V. Powers and Duties C. Particular
Powers and Duties 1. Filing and Recording of Papers Topic Summary Correlation
Table References 47. Generally West's Key Number Digest West's Key Number
Digest, Clerks of Courts k64 to 69 Forms Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d 58:4, 58:6 to
58:8 (Certificate of Clerk Recordation or Authentication of Document) Am. Jur.
Pleading and Practice Forms, Clerks of Court 7, 11 to 19 (Clerk's Certificate or
AffidavitFiling or Recording of Documents) It is the official duty of the clerk of
a court to record[FN1] or file all the papers in a cause presented by the parties, and
to indorse the correct date of the filing on them.[FN2] The duty is purely
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ministerial[FN3] and the clerk may not refuse to perform except on the order of the
court.[FN4] Caution: A clerk may refuse to accept a filing for nonpayment of filing
fees unless a credit or waiver is allowed,[FN5] or where certain necessary
documents are omitted from the filing,[FN6] and statutes or court rules may
expressly authorize the clerk to refuse to accept papers for filing where a complaint
is submitted by a person who has been found to be a "vexatious litigator."[FN7]
Observation: A policy adopted by a clerk of court, that papers submitted for filing
after regular hours would not be filed until the following day, complied with
statutory guidelines and was within the clerk's discretion.[FN8] [FN1] Nash v.
Campbell County Fiscal Court, 2011 WL 1620587 (Ky. 2011). [FN2] Estate of
Johnson v. Ciarpelli, 71 A.D.3d 1482, 896 N.Y.S.2d 752 (4th Dep't 2010); In re
Simmonds, 271 S.W.3d 874 (Tex. App. Waco 2008). [FN3] Benson v. District
Clerk, 331 S.W.3d 431 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (writ of habeas corpus). [FN4]
Cave v. Elliott, 190 Md. App. 65, 988 A.2d 1 (2010); In re Smith, 270 S.W.3d 783
(Tex. App. Waco 2008). [FN5] 37, 38. [FN6] 49. [FN7] In re Smith, 270
S.W.3d 783 (Tex. App. Waco 2008). [FN8] Hartford Citizens for Responsible
Government v. City of Hartford Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 313 Wis. 2d 431, 2008 WI
App 107, 756 N.W.2d 454 (Ct. App. 2008).. AMJUR CLERKSOFCT 47
It is important to note that the SBN's Laura Peters emailed Couglin a version
of the TPO Application that was materially different than the one it utlimately filed
in that on page 6 of 6 of Form B-3 (the 12/20/12 TPO Application), the version
Peters emailed Coughlin did not check the I FURTHER REQUEST that this Court
set a hearing date for an Extended Order as soon as possible. ?? Yes ?? No (NOTE:
neither box was checked on the copy of the application Laura Peters emailed to
Coughlin on 12/19/12, however, the version the SBN filed did check the Yes box
requesting a hearing date for an Extended Order as soon as possible). Further, the
SBN never actually filed the EPO Application that one is directed to (by the form)
and required to (under the statute) Further, King's DECLARATION on page 6
thereof fails to actually identify just whom it is that King is apparently the
AUTHORIZE AGENT of, ie, whether it be he is the SBN's authorized agent or,
perhaps, the authorized agent of some particular employee (even himself) for which
he seeks to file such application. Such lack of specificity fails to satisfy the
jurisdictional prerequisite presented in NRS 33.250(1) where such requires King
specify that he is the authorized agent of the employer. Perhaps the biggest
failure of King's TPO application resides where it completely fails to identify
anything sufficient to meet the requirements of NRS 33.250(2)(c), which requires
that such verified application must included, without limitation: (c) A detailed
description of the events that allegedly constituted harassment in the workplace and
the dates on which these events occurred. A few glaring problems with King's
application appear where he fails to list any other location for the SBN beyond its
Reno office. As such, would that not imply Coughlin is permitted to call, email,
fax, or venture to the Las Vegas main office of the SBN? Further, King lists the
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main phone number of the SBN under the fax number section, and completely
fails to list the Northern Office of the SBN's fax number at all, which could be
taken as an exclusion thereof from those numbers to which Coughlin was,
apparently not to contact the SBN by fax...However, given that Chair
Echeverria's own use of the term contact in his 11/16/12 Order would, to be legal,
necessarily need to at least allow for Coughlin to obtain a transcript of the 11/14/12
formal disciplinary hearing under the procedures set out in SCR 119, which require
Coughlin to SCR Rule 119. Additional rules of procedure. 1. Record. The record
of a hearing shall be made available to the attorney at the attorneys expense on
request made to bar counsel... 3. Other rules of procedure. Except as otherwise
provided in these rules, the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure and the Nevada Rules
of Appellate Procedure apply in disciplinary cases. Perhaps Clerk of
Court/Paralegal/Investigator Laura Peters is not aware of NRCP 52, or NRCP 59,
or NRCP 60, or DCR 13(7), etc., etc., or NRAP 10, and NRAP 11, or all the other
various reasons why opposing counsel and the filing office of the SBN would
necessarily continue to have business (which would, obviously, involve Coughlin
contacting the SBN, the Clerk of Court of the Northern Office of the SBN, and
the Office of Bar Counsel, in addition to the NNDB and Panel) to conduct even
after the 11/14/12 hearing, and even after the 12/14/12 entry of the Panel's
Findings of Fact; Conclusions of Law which lacks any indication in the title
thereof that it is a decision sufficient to invoke SCR 105(3)'s procedural
mechanisms. (It is ironic, that lack of congruity between the title of the 12/14/12
FOFCOL and the FOFCOL citing to Hill and Judge Holmes criticisms of
Coughlin's work to the effect that the titles of his filings, at times, bore little to no
relation to the content therein). Further, the transcript of the 11/14/12 formal
disciplinary hearing itself establishes that Chair Echeverria granted Coughlin his
request to file post-hearing briefs on various issues.
SCR 105...(3). Review by supreme court. (a) Time and manner of appeal. A
decision of a hearing panel shall be served on the attorney, and service shall be
deemed Notice of Entry of Decision for appeal purposes. Except as provided in
Rule 105(3)(b), a decision is final and effective 30 days from service, unless an
appeal is taken within that time. To the extent not inconsistent with these rules, an
appeal from a decision of a hearing panel shall be treated as would an appeal from a
civil judgment of a district court and is governed by the Nevada Rules of Appellate
Procedure. (b) De novo review of public discipline. ...a decision recommending...
disbarment shall be automatically reviewed by the supreme court. Review under
this paragraph shall be commenced by bar counsel forwarding the record of the
hearing panel proceedings to the court within 30 days of entry of the decision... The
attorney and bar counsel shall have 30 days from the date the supreme court
acknowledges receipt of the record within which to file an opening brief or
otherwise advise the court of any intent to contest the hearing panels findings and
recommendations. If an opening brief is filed, briefing shall thereafter proceed in
accordance with NRAP 31(a). Extensions of time to file briefs are disfavored and
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will only be granted upon a showing of good cause. The parties shall not be
required to prepare an appendix, but rather shall cite to the record of the
disciplinary proceedings... 4. Rules of procedure. The chairs, after consulting with
their respective disciplinary boards, may adopt rules of procedure, subject to
approval by the board of governors. SCR Rule 120. Costs; bar counsel conflict or
disqualification.... 2. If, for any reason, bar counsel is disqualified or has a conflict
of interest, the board of governors shall appoint an attorney, ad hoc, to act in the
place of bar counsel. Further, King clearly needs to be removed from 62337 and
607 in light of not only SCR Rule 120, but also in light of the dictates of RPC 3.7:
Rule 3.7. Lawyer as Witness. (a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in
which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness unless: (1) The testimony
relates to an uncontested issue;... King's testimony absolutely does relate to a
contested issue, many of them, as further detailed herein, including, but not limited
to, the insufficiency of postage the SBN affixed to the 10/9/12 Notice of Intent to
Take Default in the SCR 105 disciplinary matter wherein the SBN and NNDB so
egregiously overstepped to jurisdiction accorded it by SCR 111(8) and the Court's
6/7/12 Order in 60838. Thereafter, as is King's consistent practice, he fails to attach
an Index to Exhibits or any cover pages to his various exhibits. Further, while the
first page following the last page of the From B-3 12/20/12 TPO Application
bares a heading of Exhibit 1, it is not clear whether Exhibit 1 is a broad
heading encompassing the 39 pages therafter or some lesser portion thereof. There
is nothing to indicated any particular aspect of the exhibits following the
application is a Summary as referenced on page 2 of the application. The first
two pages of the 39 page Exhibit 1 consists of just over one page of an unsworn,
unattributed, recounting of mostly irrelevant (relating largely to non-SBN
employee's of the Washoe County Public Defender or of the Panel Chair assigned
to Coughlin's formal disciplinary hearing by the Northern Nevada Disciplinary
Board, which is not a part of the SBN) details largely consisting of unattributed
hearsay and double unattributed double hearsay, which refers to King in the third
person...leading one to wonder just whom wrote such statement. Further, while
King's application fails to satisfy NRS 33.250(2)(c)'s requirements, its failure to
come any where near to satisfy any reasonable burden of proof divined from a
reading of NRS 33.270(1) in a free and just society makes void both the TPO and
EPO issued herein. (NRS 33.270(1), which requires: The court may issue a
temporary order for protection against harassment in the workplace if it appears to
the satisfaction of the court from specific facts shown by a verified application filed
pursuant to NRS 33.250 that harassment in the workplace has occurred. Such a
showing that harassment in the workplace has occurred requires an application
and analysis of: NRS 33.240 Acts that constitute harassment in workplace.
Harassment in the workplace occurs when: 1. A person knowingly threatens to
cause or commits an act that causes: (a) Bodily injury to the person or another
person; (b) Damage to the property of another person; or (c) Substantial harm to the
physical or mental health or safety of a person; 2. The threat is made or the act is
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committed against an employer, an employee of the employer while the employee

performs the employees duties of employment or a person present at the workplace
of the employer; and 3. The threat would cause a reasonable person to fear that the
threat will be carried out or the act would cause a reasonable person to feel
terrorized, frightened, intimidated or harassed.
Even if a court were to view all of that which is contained in the 39 page
Exhibit 1 to King's 12/20/12 TPO application as verified (which, clearly, it is
not), nothing asserted therein suffices to constitute harassment in the workplace
under NRS 33.240 for a multitude of reasons. One, nothing contained therein
provides any support for the view that Coughlin knowingly did anything that
could be said to threaten to cause or or commit and act that causes any of the ills
detailed in NRS 33.240(a)-(b), and neither the 12/20/12 TPO Order or the 1/4/13
EPO Order specify in any way whatsoever just which, if any, of those subsections
the court found to have been dispositive as to. There has been absolutely no
assertion by anyone that Coughlin actually committed any act which cause any
bodily injury to anyone or damage to anyone's property. Only the most attenuated
hypchondriac, histrionic fit thrower would assert Coughlin committed any act
sufficient to have already caused substantial harm to the physical or mental health
or safety of a person. So, one must assume that the court's justification for issuing
both the TPO and EPO was based upon a finding that Couglin threatened to cause:
bodily injury to the person or another person, or, damage to the property of
another person; or, substantial harm to the physical or mental health or safety of a
person Neither TPOs nor EPOs may be granted on a default basis. Even if an
adverse party fails to oppose any such application or attend any such hearing, the
court is still required to evaluate whether the requirements of NRS 33.240, 33.250,
and 33.270 are met. So, just what, if anything in King's TPO application may
suffice to meet those standards? Again, nothing, as the 8 page application is
completely devoid of any factual assertions, much less any with any degree of
specificity, and nothing in any part of the 39 page Exhibit is verified sufficient to
satisfy NRS 33.250. Even had such Exhibit 1 in its entirety been sufficiently
verified, nothing therein satisfies those standards either. What possibly could?
King's 39 page Exhibit 1, including Exhibit 1A-1D follows: "Exhibit
1 On November 14, 2012, the Office of Bar Counsel held a disciplinary hearing at
its Reno office with two sheriff personnel in attendance as a measure of protection.
As a result of the hearing the panel unanimously agreed to permanently disbar Mr.
Coughlin from the practice of law. On Friday, December 14, 2012 the Panel's Order
was filed and copies were mailed to Mr. Coughlin both by regular and certified
mail. Mr. Coughlin continues to make repeated calls to the State Bar demanding
copies and information. He is getting increasingly antagonistic and will not listen to
our attempts to reason with him. This morning he announced that he "would be
there in 15 minutes" It is our fear that if he shows up we won't be able to get rid of
him - we are not able to satisfy his demands and that just seems to aggravate the
situation. He has shown up after hours presumably to file documents; eventually he
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has used the mail slot for the documents but has sat in his car in front of the office
flashing his lights to get attention. Employees have been afraid to leave and, on a
couple of occasions, the police have been called - we don't know if they have
shown up because once he leaves, we leave. On one particular occasion, a female
employee was in the office alone. Mr. Coughlin knocked on her window and
gestured to the front door so he could gain access to the building. Eventually the
employee was able to get him to leave and the police were called but did not arrive
before Mr. Coughlin left the premises. This past Monday Assistant Bar Counsel Pat
King did dispatch the police because Mr. Coughlin again announced that he was
coming to the office - two officers did show up and one was dispatched to the Panel
Chair's office (9432 Double R Blvd.) because Coughlin has also threatened and
intimidated John Echeverria's office staff. When Coughlin called the Echeverria
law firm that particular day he stated that he needed some "face time" with John.
Mr. King has received numerous e-mails detailing what Mr. Coughlin perceives to
be a miscarriage of justice in his discipline matter and has indicated that he will
"expose him as a liar and a fraud". In a letter dated November 7, 2012, prior to the
discipline hearing, the Office of Bar Counsel sent Mr. Coughlin a letter asking that
he refrain from coming to the State Bar offices without calling beforehand. On
November 17, 2012, after the discipline hearing, the Panel Chair issued an Order
instructing Mr. Coughlin to refrain from contacting any member of the Panel, the
Court Reporter (whom Mr. Coughlin had contacted by phone at her residence), any
of the Panel Chair's office staff, or either office of the State Bar of Nevada. On one
occasion, an e-mail was sent to several recipients, including four (4) employees of
the State Bar, which included a link to a violent scene from the movie "Cape Fear".
The State Bar feels that this is a direct suggestive threat to office staff and
Bar personnel. Therefore, the State Bar requests that a Protective Order be and that
Mr. Coughlin be prohibited from contacting the Bar's Reno and/or Las Vegas
Office by telephone, by e-mail or by fax. Because he is currently temporarily
suspended from the practice of law and his disciplinary hearing has concluded Mr.
Coughlin has no business on State Bar property (9456 Double R Blvd or 600 E.
Charleston Blvd., Las Vegas, NV). The record of his disciplinary matter will soon
be submitted to the Nevada Supreme Court for a de novo review at which time he
will receive a complete set of all of the pleadings, both filed and unfiled, in this
matter. It should be noted that the State Bar and its Reno staff find it very difficult
to work under these conditions. Mr. Coughlin continues to monopolize our time
and resources and is causing an unnecessary amount of stress." (NOTE: the above
Summary fails to indicate Coughlin is causing fear of that required by NRS
33.240, but rather that the State Bar and its renot staf find it very difficult to work
under these conditions (such as Coughlin requesting copies of documents, seeking
the copy of the record/transcript of the 11/14/12 proceeding that he is entitled to
under SCR 119, which requires that he contact Bar Counsel to obtain such, which
Coughlin attempted to do on numerous occasions immediately after the 11/14/12
disciplinary hearing both by telephone and in writing, which the Bar and King
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failed to respond to until 12/19/12, with Chair Echeverria's 11/17/12 Order

seemingly void in that it, depending on one's interpretation of contact or
contacting would have precluded Coughlin from so seeking a copy of the
transcript pursuant to SCR 119 where such 11/17/12 Order reads. Further, it
appears that Laura Peters herself from the Summary which would not only vitiate
any first hand knowledge requirement being met even assuming the illogical leap
to incorporate by reference that contained in Exhibit 1 is made, despite the failure
of King's Declaration on page 8 of his TPO Application to so incorporate or even
reference such materials, and the failure of King to check the box on page 2
(applicants are directed to do so if the wish to incorporate by reference that
contained in the mandatory Form B-4 Continuation Page, which itself
contains language specifically incorporating by reference that which is contained
therein on such Continuation Page into the Application itself sufficient to make
the contents of such Continuation Page verified in compliance with NRS
33.250. This is not a case of a pros se non-attorney filling out the application, or
presumably, even, the Summary included in in Exhibit 1 of King's application.
As such, King must be held to the technical requirements of the statutes, include
NRS 33.250 and NRS 15 Exhibit 1A consists of an 11/7/12 letter from King to
Coughlin, which reads:
Dear Mr. Coughlin: Yesterday you arrived at the State Bar office after 5:00
p.m. to file several documents. When you discovered that the front door was
locked, and although there is a mail slot in the door, you elected to walk around the
outside of the building until you found someone inside. You stood outside an
employee's window, got her attention and asked to he let in. This employee
unlocked the door and took receipt of your documents after which you continued to
ask further assistance. Your behavior is becoming increasingly disturbing and
harassing. Therefore, except for your formal hearing, which will take place on
November 14, 2012, beginning at 8:45 a.m., you are not to arrive at the Reno
Office of the State Bar unannounced. If you have papers or pleadings to present tor
filing, you are hereby instructed to either mail them or to call the office (329-4100)
prior to your arrival. Please be advised that if you appear at the State Bar in the
future, except for the November 14, 2012, hearing or in the case of your need to liIe
a document (fOf which you must call ahead), the police wilt be summoned
immediately. Sincerely, /s/ Patrick O. King, Esq. Asst Bar Counsel.
Exhibit 1B consists of NNDB Panel Chair John Echeverria's 11/16/12 Order
in Case No: NG12-0204, NG12-0434, and NG12-0435, which reads: It has
come to the attention of the Panel Chair that Zachary B. Coughlin ("Respondent")
has been contacting the Reno and Las Vegas Offices of Bar Counsel, the Panel
Chair's law office and the Court Reporter who recorded the disciplinary
proceedings at the State Bar office. Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: That
Respondent immediately cease and desist contacting anyone at the State , Bar
offices, the Panel Chair, the panel chair's staff, any of the Panel Members or their
staffs, or the Court Reporter including her employer, Sunshine Reporting while this
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matter IS pending decision Respondent is hereby reminded that the Panel will be
deliberating at a future date and may take this conduct into consideration. DATED
this 16th day of November, 2012. by John P. Echeverria, Esq., Chair, Formal
Hearing Panel. (The Certificate of Service attached thereto is signed by Laura
Peters, an employee of the State Bar of Nevada
Exhibit 1C consists of the twenty-four page 12/14/12 FOFCOL in Case
No: NG12-0204, NG12-0434, and NG12-0435. It does not contain a single
assertion of any threatening on Coughlin's part, so it is rather unclear why King felt
it appropriate to attach it to his 12/20/12 TPO Application in 607. Similarly, King
and Peters felt it appropriate to attach filings in 607 to their initial attempt at an
Record on Appeal in 62337 of 12/24/12, but apparently were either scolded for
doing so or thought better of it (likely the former) and refrained from including any
such materials in their second attempt to file a somewhat professional, competent,
and ethical ROA on 2/13/13. Exhibit 1D consists of a printout of a webpage at
www.harm.com (ie, not even the url linked to in the email King alleges Coughlin
sent to various individuals (including some, like Coughlin's then Washoe County
Public Defender, Jim Leslie, whom then forward that same email to individuals
listed amongst the recipients of the original email itself (ie, the SBN's King), in a
class Leslie-style bit of pointless, insipid melodrama, along the lines of his adorable
jibberish stylings such as the phrase hand-off transmittal, which he originally
fashioned in his resistance to being stuck with the digital accountability attendant to
email a client their discovery, versus, what Leslie and his junior associate WCPD
Biray Dogan, are wont to do, which is have Dogan he himself handed the client his
discovery several weeks prior, only to change his story a couple minutes later to say
he saw Leslie hand it to the client, only to have Leslie then idiotically email the
client and indicate that the client failed to ever pick it up, and identifying such as
discovery of a 7/27/12 date, while failing to explain why neither Leslie nor Dogan
released to there then former client Coughlin the 8/13/12 and 8/17/12 updated 911
call discovery discs propounded to them by WCDA Zach Young while Dogan and
Leslie were still representing Coughlin (ie, Leslie taking over Goodnight and
Dogan's cases, and in an attempt to get a raise, setting out to purposefully deliver
the cheapest, quickest, convictions of Coughlin in all three of the baseless,
retaliatory prosecutions brought by the WCDA's Office after Leslie had succeeded
in depriving Coughlin of his right to accept a plea bargain disposing of all three
matters then pending on 8/27/12, which would have resulted in no SCR 111(6)
convictions in any of those matters. Getting beyond the fact that the printout of a
page with an audio clip only (played over a still frame photo of actor Robert De
Niro in a placid stance) comes from a different url than the one included in the
12/12/12 email King largely basis his decision to seek a TPO and an EPO on, such
audio only file and the quotation transcribed beneath it contain the following bit of
dialogue from the 1991 remake by Martin Scorsese of the film Cape Fear: I ain't
no white trash piece of sh*t. I'm better than you all. I can out leam you. I can out
read you. I can outthink you, and I can out philosophize you. And I'm going to
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outlast you. You think a couple of whacks to my good old boy guts gonna get me
down? Ifs going to take a hell of a lot more than that, Counselor, to prove you're
better than me! Max looks around in an attempt to find where Sam is hiding. (the
web page is adorned with a number of links to other materials and advertisements
as well). Exhibit 1D continues on with a 12/13/12 email from Pat King to obc;
Kimberly Farmer; fflaherty@dlpfd.com; David Clark printed from Laura Peters
email account as, apparently, King's forwarding an email he received from
Couglin's then WCPD Jim Leslie (which itself forwards to King and email Leslie
alleges Coughlin sent to Leslie, which, as Leslie would necessarily be able to
discern from reading a list of the recipients such email purports to be addressed to,
was also addressed to Pat King, making Leslie forwarding such to King rather
redundant, apparently).
The email from King that Peters printed out via her Microsoft Outlook
utility reads: Subject: FW: The Three E's;wcpd failure to provide essential 91 call
cd discovery of 8/13/ and 8/17, 2012 to Coguhlin in rcr2012-065630 This attorney
feels that his law firm staff was threatened by Zach Coughlin. I am concerned for
our staff. Please advise. Patrick King Thereafter, King's email forwards or
contains what purports to be an email to King from Coughlin's then WCPD Jim
Leslie, of 12/12/12, addressed only to King, which reads: Mr. King: The below
email from Mr. Cogulhin contains a reference at the end of the first paragraph to a
website containing a video clip from the movie Cape Fear. Please advise whether
any action is required of our office or yours regarding this possible veiled or
indirect threat of violence against attorneys in this office by Mr. Coughlin. Thank
You, James B. Leslie, Esq., Chief Deputy Public Defender, Washoe County Public
Defenders Office King's petition, allegedly for the SBN, contains no proof that
King was given any authority by anyone possessing the authority to give it, to file
his TPO/EPO Applicaiton in 607. Further, while King attaches and email from
himself the the President of the State Bar, Francis Flaherty, Kimberly Farmer, and
Bar Counsel David Clark, he fails to attach any sort of response from any of those
figures. Further, it would seem the SBN Board of Governors would need to vote on
such a thing. Additionally, the Office of Bar Counsel (OBC) should be considered a
distinct, separate office or entity, apart from the SBN. Without more, King fails to
prove that he has any standing to file his petition, particularly where the evidence
strongly suggest that King filed it for his own benefit, which violates the
requirement that the employer file such application for the employee, a requirement
which precludes the employee, King, from filing it for himself under the guise of
doing so for his employer. Probably the most important fact of all here is that the
SBNs Clerk of Court (as both she and Asst. Bar Counsel King have referred to
her and held her out to Coughlin and the public as) had added Coughlin's email
address to her blocked senders list by the time of the alleged emailing b y
Coughlin of 12/12/12. Therefore, Peters did not received such email from
Coughlin, and Coughlin was well aware at that time (Peters had notified him and he
was receiving failure messages for emails he sent to Peters) that she could and
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would no longer receive any emails from him (this became a point of criticism by
Coughlin as it underscores the SBN's failure to investigate, and Peters and the SBN
also hold her out as an Investigator). Regardless, even if it is proven that such an
email was sent by Coughlin, there is simply no credible basis for finding that such
is a threat to the SBN, Peters, or King (the SBN's TPO/EPO application in 607 fails
to identify just which employee it seeks to protect, as such, the failure to meet such
jurisdicitonal prerequisite renders it void), and further, such purported
correspondence must be seen as constitutionally protected excercise of free
speech.
Coughlin has already been subject to severe consequences of the OBC's
abuse of process here, including being subject to $5,000 bondable bail upon his
custodial arrest of 2/8/13 (and concomitant damage to his ability to defend his 14th
Amendment protected property right, his law license, in the appeal of the NNDB
Panel's recommendation that he be permanently disbarred (now on appeal in
62337). Further, King really applied for the TPO/EPO for himself, and is merely
masquerading as the agent of the SBN sufficient to attempt to get around his lack
of standing to so file for himself (to make his job easier, to intimidate or obstruct
Coughlin out of exposing King's fraudulent approach as a bar counsel, etc.). The
application can only be filed by the employer or its agent, pursuant to NRS 33.250.
An employee has no standing to file this type of protection order. This application
will contain the facts the applicant wants the court to consider in determining
whether a protection order against harassment in the workplace shall be issued.
King's application contains nothing Pursuant to NRS 33.240, in order for the court
to grant an application against harassment in the workplace, some or all of the
following acts or threats to commit the Further, its troubling the RPD Detective
Ytrubide was referred this matter in his role in the misdemeanor investigations
department, yet manage to incorrectly and maliciously overcharge Coughlin with
both a gross misdemeanor and a felony, especially where the SBN failed to even
put up the $100 security bond required for its application in 607, another
jurisdictional prerequisite. The fax header on the SBN's 12/20/12 application in 607
reveal that the RJC itself faxed the SBN the application form for the TPO.
That is inappropriate, much like the 4/11/12 email from RJC Judicial
Secretary Lori Townsend to the SBN's King (especially where the RJC has
steadfastly refused to even comply with the requirement that it respond, by
affidavit, witihin 5 days to the various motions to disqualify various RJC Judges
incident to the four retaliatory prosecutions undertaken against Coughlin in the RJC
since August 2011. The employer may not seek a workplace harassment TPO/EPO
primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it was not designed such as prohibiting
free speech or other activities that are constitutionally protected or otherwise
protected by law. The TPO and EPO obtained by the OBC from the RJC is a big an
abuse of process as can be. Simply put, the OBCs Clerk of Court, Laura Peters,
and Asst. Bar Counsel Patrick King grew tired of Coughlin discovering and
pointing out the numerous egregious instances of misconduct and fraud on their
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part, and leveraged that protection order against workplace harassment at the first
moment they (under their completely unreasonable viewpoint) felt there was even a
scintilla of something to hang their hat on, nevermind that such consisted of a
protected written grievance to the SBN about Coughlin's WCPD's patent, per se
professional misconduct, or that the alleged implied threat in no way related to
the SBN (the SBN is not and never was Coughlin's public defender, and even if it
was, nothing in the email Coughlin is alleged to have sent the WCPD on 12/12/12
(copied to complaints@nvbar.org as a written grievance against Leslie) could
reasonably be interpreted to be a threat, much less something worthy of a yearlong
protection order. Further, the OBC and Clerk of Court Laura Peters wished to
avoid being placed on notice of the wrongdoing of Richard G. Hill, Esq., and others
by Coughlin's faxes and emails (many of which contained audio and video files
demonstrating that Hill has lied continuously in an attempt to have Coughlin
disbarred), in addition to shortening the time Coughlin would have to prepare and
file post-hearing Motions, and motiosn to alter, amend, vacate, or otherwise
challenge the 12/14/12 Findings of Fact; Conclusions of Law of the NNDB Panel
in the formal disciplinary matter held on 11/14/12, which the OBC and NNDB
allege was comprised of the dictate to decide Coughlin's nature and extent of
Coughlin's punishment for his conviction of petty larceny in RMC 11 CR 22176
(see 60838), along with three grievances (NG12-0204 by Richard G. Hill, Esq.;
NG12-0434 by RMC Judges (according to Judge Holmes, see Judge Dilworth's
disputing Judge Holmes' assertions in her 3/14/12 written grievance to the OBC as
to her acting on behalf of all of the RMC, including her fellow judges; and NG120435, the grievance, apparently, consisting of the 4/13/09 Order After Trial by
RMC Administrative Judge William Gardner's sister, 2JDC Judge Linda Gardner,
which sanctioned Coughlin $934 under NRS 7.085 incident to a motion for
sanctions made during closing argument by Springgate in a divorce case (ie, no
compliance by Springgate with NRCP's procedural requirement that a filing ready
sanctions motion be served on Coughlin 21 days prior to making such a motion for
an attorney's fee sanction...which was largely premised on the assertion that
Coughlin failed to follow procedural rules, even where it was Springgate whose
Trial Statement was filed late and Springgate whom failed to comply with the PreTrial Order in failing to have, where he sought the introduction of more than ten
exhibits, those exhibits indexed, bound, and tabbed, and failed to provide a copy of
such to opposing counsel at the time of trial, as required by Judge L. Gardner's
2/25/09 Pre-Trial Order.
The same failure to comply with the 21 day safe harbor jurisdicitonal
prerequisite by Richard G. Hill, Esq.'s associate, Baker, would render Judge
Flanagan's $42,065.00 sanction award of 6/25/12 (formal hearing exhibit 2 at the
11/14/12 disciplinary hearing) void as well, except for the fact that NRAP 38
actually applies, rather than NRS 7.085 (which invokes NRCP 11, ie, not applicable
to appeals, and NRAP 38 must be made on a court's own motion, and the
application of DCR 13(3) that Judge Flanagan admits to in his 6/25/12 Order in
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03628 (Judge Flanagan wrote: After reviewing Merliss's moving papers-including

the detailed and thorough summary of fees and his counsels' accompanying
Declarations-and after considering all of the parties' arguments, this Court
concludes Merliss's attorney's fees request is authorized by Nevada law. This Court
also has considered the factors set forth in Brunzell, supra. After analyzing those
factors, and given the unique features of this case, this Court concludes Merliss's
fee request is reasonable. P3:13.. Where Judge Flanagan specifically mentions
only the landlord's moving papers and where he previously notes (incorrectly) in
the order that Coughlin failed to file any opposition (In the absence of any
opposition from Appellant ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN ("Coughlin"),
Merliss submitted this matter for decision on May 9, 2012. However, on June 9,
2012, Coughlin filed a Supplement to Opposition to Motion for Attorney's Fees. In
response, Merliss filed a Reply to Supplement to Opposition to Motion for
Attorney's Fees on June 14, 2012, and submitted the matter-again-that same day.
Merliss requests this Court to award attorney's fees in the amount of $42,065.50
against Coughlin in the underlying summary eviction matter pursuant to NRS
69.050 and NRS 7.085 P1:5-16; but note, Coughlin's law license was suspended in
60838 pursuant to his conviction of petty larceny in the RMC of a candy bar and
some cough drops , a suspension now lasting nearly one year (11/30/11 conviction
by Judge Howard in 11 CR 22176, where a three day incarceration was also
ordered incident to an Order Punishing Summary Contempt incident to Coughlin's
being forced to self represent where denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel
by the RMC), (compare to Stephen R. Harris, Esq's misappropriating $755,000
from clients, admitting to using it on prostitutes and designer good receiving only a
three months actual suspension, no temporary suspension, etc., etc., and no criminal
prosecution incident thereto)
( Further, in his 8/28/12 Order in 03628, Judge Flanagan further drove home
the point that his 6/25/12 Order was not an attorney fees sanction, wherein Judge
Flanagan wrote: Again, as was the case in Coughlin's attempt to set aside Merliss's
award of costs Coughlin's Motions here attempt to re-litigate substantive issues this
Court has already decided, or frivolous claims this Court has previously ignored.
P2:6-10; further the OBC's King email Coughlin a copy of that 8/28/12 Order by
Judge Flanagan, providing conclusive proof that King was aware of it, and yet
persisted in his violating of RPC 3.1, and 3.3 in seeking to have Coughlin disbarred
incident to the fraudulent assertion he and Hill maintained at the 11/14/12 Hearing
that Judge Flanagan's attorney fee award of 6/25/12 was a sanction. Peters and
King are basically afraid of a few things they did wrong, and which are perhaps
fraudulent, causing consequences to their careers...and, accordingly, the began to
threaten to abuse the protection order process in early November 2012 (shortly after
Coughlin pointed out that the SBN put insufficient
Coughlin has a right to confront his accuser's an nothing in King's TPO application
specifies just which employees of the SBN such protection orders were designed to
protect, and further, King showed up as counsel so as to King, and as to the
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failure to appear of those the SBN failed to list as the parties to be protected, the
EPO is void. King's 12/20/12 TPO Application in 607 is less than truthful. One, at
page 4 of 6, it fails to identify a TPO Applciation by Richard G. Hill, Esq., against
Coughlin where King, Peters, and the SBN were made well aware of such by
Coughlin, and even provided both the Order in RCP 2012-000018 and Hill's lied
filled 1/12/12 TPO Application therein, where such information is required to be
included pursuant to question 1(b). The complicity between NNDB Member Hill
and King runs throughout Coughlin's formal disciplinary matter, and King's failure
to divulge this information, especially as it relates to Hill, is troubling. Additionally
(and this is ironic considering King has attempted to have Coughlin permanently
disbarred incident to his own fraudulent allegation that Coughlin filed IFP's in the
RMC without identifying himself as an attorney), at page 5 of 6 King fails to
truthfully and completely answer question 8 therein, which reads: 8. Have there
been any other Court actions or any other relationships between the employer and
the Adverse Party? King check the 'yes box. In the blank following If yes,
please describe: King wrote Discipline Hearing held 11/14/2012.
King completely fails to indicate that there is another action between the
parties in that the appeal of the 12/14/12 FOFCOL is now before the Nevada
Supreme Court in 62337 (which would necessarily, and obviously involve
communications between these two parties and their respective counsel, making
RJC Judge Pearson's TPO a distrubingly overbroad order that has very troubling
lack of regard for Coughlin's rights as a litigant in two different cases wherein the
SBN is the opposing party, both of which implicate an extremely valuable and
primary property right to Coughlin, his law license. Further, King's simply nating
Discipline hearing held 11/14/2012 competely fails to inform the court as to the
fact that there was an ongoing trial court case between these two parties, with the
SBN operating in at least a dual role as both the prosecutor and the situs of the
court, and the Clerk of Court's location. This goes to the heart of the problem
currently in Nevada where the SBN cannot be trusted to wear so many hats, where
King and Peters have blatantly abused the public's trust in that regard and sought to
take advantage of the current structure at every possible opportunity, something the
NNDB and Panel here have been entirely too permissive with regard to, which is
troubling
5/28/13 Order:
"This is an appeal from district court orders denying an emergency motion for a
temporary restraining order or injunction and awarding attorney fees in a landlordtenant matter. Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County; Patrick Flanagan,
Judge.
Appellant moved the district court for a temporary restraining order or injunction in
an appeal from a justice court order in a landlord tenant dispute. Following the
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denial of that motion, appellant appealed to this court. Subsequently, the district
court entered an order awarding attorney fees to respondent and appellant also
appealed from that order.
The district court has final appellate jurisdiction in all cases arising in justice
courts. Nev. Const. art. 6, 6; see also Waugh v. Casazza, 85 Nev. 520, 521, 458
P.2d 359, 360 (1969). Although NRAP 3A(b)(3) authorizes an appeal from an order
refusing to grant an injunction, and NRAP 3A(b)(8) authorizes an appeal from a
post-judgment order awarding attorney fees, see Winston Prods. Co., Inc. v.
DeBoer, 122 Nev. 517, 525, 134 P.3d 726, 731 (2006) (recognizing that an order
awarding attorney fees and costs is substantively appealable as a special order after
final judgment), because the orders challenged in this case arose from the district
court's exercise of appellate jurisdiction over an appeal from a justice court
decision, the district court's orders were ostensibly rendered final and are not
appealable to this court.For the same reasons, to the extent that appellant seeks to
appeal from any other order or determination arising from the district court's
appellate review of the justice court matter, this court likewise lacks jurisdiction to
consider any such appeals. Accordingly, as we lack jurisdiction over this appeal, we
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ORDER this appeal DISMISSED.l /s/ Gibbons, Douglas, Saitta (fn1 lRespondent's
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April 26, 2013, motion seeking to dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction on
other grounds and his April 26, 2013, motion to strike are denied as moot. To the
extent that respondent seeks attorney fees based on the motion to dismiss this
appeal, that request is denied. We further deny as moot any other requests for relief
pending in this matter.)"
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Footnote 1 in that 5/28/13 Order in 61383 reveals the extent to which Hill's Motion
to Dismiss failed to argue that the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal of
Coughlin's 12/30/11 Motion for TRO per NRCP 62/Motion for Stay pursuant to
NRS 40.385 (and the District Court and N. S. Ct. both seem to be overlooking the
extent to which that motion was premised upon, and cited to specifically, NRS
40.385, which at least according to 8JDC Judge Herndon's analysis in Venetian v
Two Roads (the transcript from the 8JDC motion to stay hearing is attached as an
exhibit to a filing in that NSCT case).
It seems there is a reason that Hill/Baker continually sought to characterize
Coughlin's 12/30/11 filing of a Motion for TRO/Motion for Stay Pursuant to NRS
40.385 as simply a Motion for TRO...something both Judge Flanagan and the
NSCT Panel have seemingly accepted as a proper and complete characterization
thereof. This incorrect view becomes important when considering the extent to
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which NRS 40.385 vests original jurisdiction in the District Court, not the Justice
Court, for hearing such Motions for Stay. This means that Nev. Const. Article 6
Sec. 6. does not vest "final appellate jurisdiction" in the District Court in such
instances, as the version of NRS 40.385 in effect during all relevant times herein
was that which became effective 10/1/11, which implicates NRAP 8 (as does NRS
40.400):
NRS40.385Stay of execution upon appeal; duty of tenant who retains
possession of premises to pay rent during stay.Upon an appeal from an order
entered pursuant to NRS 40.253:
1.Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, a stay of execution may be
obtained by filing with the trial court a bond in the amount of $250 to cover the
expected costs on appeal. A surety upon the bond submits to the jurisdiction of the
appellate court and irrevocably appoints the clerk of that court as the suretys agent
upon whom papers affecting the suretys liability upon the bond may be served.
Liability of a surety may be enforced, or the bond may be released, on motion in
the appellate court without independent action. A tenant of commercial property
may obtain a stay of execution only upon the issuance of a stay pursuant to
Rule 8 of the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure and the posting of a
supersedeas bond in the amount of 100 percent of the unpaid rent claim of the
landlord.
2.A tenant who retains possession of the premises that are the subject of the
appeal during the pendency of the appeal shall pay to the landlord rent in the
amount provided in the underlying contract between the tenant and the landlord as
it becomes due. If the tenant fails to pay such rent, the landlord may initiate new
proceedings for a summary eviction by serving the tenant with a new notice
pursuant to NRS 40.253.
(Added to NRS by 1997, 3510; A 2011, 1492)
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The funny thing about NRS 40.385 is that is provides further support for the
argument that the summary evictions procedures found in NRS 40.253 may not be
utilized against a commerical tenant such as Coughlin in a no cause eviction per
NRS 40.254. Coughlin did, in fact "raise in the trial court" such argument (despite
Hill and Baker repeatedly lying that Coughlin had not raised it, both in Baker's
2/24/12 Brief in the appeal to the District Court in CV11-03628, and in their
testimony at the 6/18/12 criminal trespass trial against Coughlin stemming from the
11/13/11 arrest at his former home law office.
Besides a multitude of instances where Coughlin identified the property in his
pleadings and the transcripts of the 10/13/11 and 10/25/11 hearings as his "office"
(Judge Sferrazza even said "I'm not going to let you use the office without paying
rent" during the 10/25/11 hearing/"Trial"), in Coughlin's 10/17/11 filign of an
"Emergency Motion to Stay, Set Aside, Vacate Eviction Hearing Order" as to the
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10/13/11 "Eviction Decision and Order" by Judge Sferrazza "setting the matter for
Trial on 10/25/11" should Coughlin deposit some $2,275 in "rent escrow" based
upon a ruling that Coughlin's NRS 118A.510 retaliation defense to the summary
eviction contained enough of a tertiary connection to alleged habitability claims to
justify invoking NRS 118A.355(5), despite the fact that Coughlin, one, wasn't
defending a non-pay summary eviction by alleging habitability as a defense, but,
rather, was defending against a no-cause summary eviction by alleging, in part,
retaliation. Further, Coughlin clearly disclaimed any application of NRS
118A.355(5), and rather, specifically indicated that any rent alleged owed to
Merliss (and Merliss never did allege Coughlin owed him any rent, Judge Sferrazza
seemingly alleged that for Merliss, or let Merliss's counsel make such unverified,
unattested allegations based upon hearing, even where counsel Baker lacked a
single witness, Merliss included, for the 10/13/11 summary eviction proceeding,
and where neither Merliss, nor Baker, ever filed and affidavit or Declaration
alleging Coughlin owed any rent, and where
"In most cases, the landlord can choose whether to file a summary or formal
eviction action. However, there are circumstances under which summary eviction
cannot be used. For instance, summary eviction is not available for: 2) Eviction
of commercial tenants for other than nonpayment of rent (See NRS 40.254)
Using location for a "commercial" law practice, you filed a no cause, ie, "for
other than nonpayment of rent, not based in law or fact, Rule 11, plus this escrow
thing gets put asunder. NRS 40.254 Unlawful detainer: Supplemental remedy of
summary eviction and exclusion of tenant from certain types of property. Lease
allows for use for commercial purposes. Void, void, void! NJCRCP 59, 60..."
NRS 40.310 Issue of fact to be tried by jury if proper demand made. Whenever an
issue of fact is presented by the pleadings, it shall be tried by a jury, if proper
demand is made pursuant to the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure or the Justice
Court Rules of Civil Procedure. Coughlin demands a jury trial.
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(see Coughlin's 10/17/11 Motion for Stay

As to the summary eviction from Coughlin's from home law office at 121
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River Rock on 11/1/11 and the appeal thereof (see 61383, and the SCR 111(4)
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Petition by the SBN incident to the criminal trespass convictino Coughlin sustained
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as a collateral consequence to Richard Hill, Esq., Casey D. Baker, Esq., and Dr.
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Matthew Joel Merliss's fraud in 61901), confusion surrounding the meaning of the
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phrase therein "test the truthfullness and sufficiency of the affidavits" and "no legal
defense". Previously I thought such language meant the NRCP 56(c) prong of
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"genuine issue of material fact" was NOT included in any analysis of whether there
is "no legal defense"...but upon reviewing Anvui some more, and some other
materials, is seems the "genuine issue of material fact" prong is included under an
analysis of whether there is "no legal defense" (which seems unfair to me in a
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summary eviction setting considering there is essentially zero opportunity for

discovery, and especially where Judge Sferrazza essentially allowed the landlord to
file the "unlawful detainer affidavit" required by NRS 40.254(2) and or NRS
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40.253(5), in open court, at the time of the "trial"/continuation of the summary

eviction proceeding from last week..
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Such approach prejudiced Coughlin's defense (beyond Coughlin essentially

being required to litigate the no cause summary eviction as a non-payment
summary eviction, replete with an extended review of my alleged "habitability
defense" (ie, my retaliation defense tangentially involved issues of habitability)) in
that the holdover proceeding/no cause basis/issue of whether the lease had been
terminated versus "expired" (Hill's associate and the landlord essentially committed
fraud by declaring the lease was "expired" when, in actuality, the language of the
lease indicated it was for "not less than 12 months", not a finite period of 12
months (sure, the landlord can argue such contradictions between his and his
counsel's testimony/statements in unlawful detainer affidavit by the landlord were
patent or obvious from a review of the 10/19/11 Declaration of Lanldord's Counsel
(which contains nothing more than a conclusory statement that the landlord's claim
is "authorized by law"), but given the three days for constructive service thereof
and the Proof of Service therein, Coughlin did not, and can only be viewed as
constructively served such 10/19/11 Declaration of Landlord's Attorney (which
sought to satisfy NRS 40.254(2)'s requirements) a mere one judicial day before the
10/25/11 proceeding. Such scant notice of the basis and specific factual
allegations underlying the landlord's action for possession severely prejudiced
Coughlin's defense. Despite that, Coughlin did manage to preserve in the record
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his contention that the lease was not "expired" sufficient to argue the the 8/22/11
Notice of Termination was insufficient.
The main purpose of pleadings in a summary proceeding is to apprise the
other party, by allegations of ultimate facts, what will be established at the trial.
[4] A tenant is entitled to a concise statement of the ultimate facts on which a
nonpayment summary proceeding is predicated so that the issues are properly
raised and can be met.[5] Thus, a complaint filed in a forcible entry and detainer
proceeding must sufficiently apprise the tenant of the nature of the action brought
against him or her.[6]...The complainant must set out the facts on which he or she
bases a right to recover,[10] and a statement of legal conclusions only is
insufficient.[11] Since the remedy is purely statutory, a plaintiff must allege such
facts as bring the case within the provisions of the particular statute relied on.[12] It
is essential that the complaint or affidavit show that the plaintiff has a right of
possession.[13] As to requirements for pleading a cause of action, generally, see
C.J.S., Pleading 115 to 157. . [FN4] N.Y.Smith v. Scott, 190 Misc. 600, 76
N.Y.S.2d 91 (City Ct. 1948). . [FN5] N.Y.Sapphire Hotel Corp. v. Netzick, 82
Misc. 2d 95, 368 N.Y.S.2d 113 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. . 1975). . [FN6] Me.Rubin v.
Josephson, 478 A.2d 665 (Me. 1984). Adequate notice of transaction and material
elements N.Y.Olean Urban Renewal Agency v. Herman, 50 A.D.2d 1081, 376
N.Y.S.2d 328 (4th Dep't 1975). Effect of inaccurate description of leased property
AlaskaLeisnoi, Inc. v. Stratman, 960 P.2d 14 (Alaska 1998). [FN10] N.J.
Weller v. Kelly, 136 N.J.L. 281, 55 A.2d 55 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1947). . N.Y.Stier v.
President Hotel, Inc., 28 A.D.2d 795, 281 N.Y.S.2d 140 (3d Dep't 1967). . [FN11]
N.J.Weller v. Kelly, 136 N.J.L. 281, 55 A.2d 55 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1947). . N.Y.
Stier v. President Hotel, Inc., 28 A.D.2d 795, 281 N.Y.S.2d 140 (3d Dep't 1967). .
[FN12] Ky.Jobe v. Witten, 305 Ky. 457, 204 S.W.2d 575 (1947). . N.Y.
Midville Estates v. Cobey, 187 Misc. 350, 64 N.Y.S.2d 177 (App. Term 1946). .
Jurisdictional nature of such allegations N.J.Community Realty Management,
Inc. for Wrightstown Arms Apartments v. Harris, 155 N.J. 212, 714 A.2d 282
(1998). N.Y.Stier v. President Hotel, Inc., 28 A.D.2d 795, 281 N.Y.S.2d 140 (3d
Dep't 1967). . Wis.Rupp v. Board of Directors of Assembly No. 58 of Equitable
Reserve Ass'n, 244 Wis. 244, 12 . N.W.2d 26 (1943). . [FN13] Conn.Macha v.
Eastern Conn. Training School for Firemen, Inc., 1 Conn. Cir. Ct. 469, 24 Conn. .
Supp. 151, 187 A.2d 638 (App. Div. 1962). . N.M.Kuykendall v. Ulibarri, 56
N.M. 43, 239 P.2d 731 (1952). . [FN14] Mo.Bess v. Griffin, 234 S.W.2d 978
(Mo. Ct. App. 1950). . N.Y.Granet Const. Corp. v. Longo, 42 Misc. 2d 798, 249
N.Y.S.2d 231 (Sup 1964).
Certainly, Coughlin's 10/6/11 Tenant's Answer and numerous filings thereafter
assisted the landlord greatly by noticing him as to the law and specific factual basis
for Coughlin's various defenses and counterclaims. An answer or other pleading of
the defendant is sufficient where it sets up in proper form any defense that, if
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established, will prevent a recovery of judgment by the plaintiff. Ill.Beach v.

Boettcher, 323 Ill. App. 79, 55 N.E.2d 104 (1st Dist. 1944). Prima facie defense
N.Y.Core Management Corp. v. Loeb, 118 N.Y.S.2d 657 (App. Term 1952).
Setoff or counterclaim. A setoff or counterclaim, when permitted to be interposed,
must be specially pleaded. Ala.Myles v. Strange, 226 Ala. 49, 145 So. 313
(1932). Right to file answer and counterclaim Ga.Leonard v. Donald, 134 Ga.
App. 482, 214 S.E.2d 731 (1975). . As to setoffs and counterclaims, generally, see
1549. . Such a pleading must allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action
on the part of the defendant against the plaintiff. N.Y.8008 Realty Corp. v.
Rubin, 85 N.Y.S.2d 163 (App. Term 1948). . Allegations sufficient Mont.
Hutchinson v. Burton, 126 Mont. 279, 247 P.2d 987 (1952).
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The 10/19/11 Declaration of Counsel by Hill's associate, which fails to satisfy

the verification requirement in NRS 40.300 (though that may only apply to plenary
trials) or the RPC 3.7 prohibition against an attorney acting as a witness or making
a declaration based upon what his client told him, allegedly, then claiming attorney
client privilege somehow protects against any cross examination of such, etc. (Hill's
associate, prior to the landlord's "unlawful detainer affidavit" being filed in open
court as an exhibit during the 10/25/11 "continuation of a summary eviction
proceeding" (which is how Sferrazza reclassified his earlier written order following
the initial 10/13/11 summary eviction proceeding (at which the landlord failed to
appear, Hill's associate appearing with no witness to authenticate or "substantiate"
the "unlawful detainer affidavit" (much less allow Coughlin to "test the truthfulness
and sufficiency of the ("unlawful detainer") affidavit (a la NRS 40.254(2))" by the
landlord per NRS 40.253(6)) that Hill's associate Baker failed to have marked or
admitted on 10/13/11.
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It does not appear Coughlin was even provided a copy of such "unlawful
detainer affidavit" by the landlord until halfway through the 10/25/11 "continuation
of the summary eviction proceeding" of 10/13/11), only to have such admitted as an
exhibit at the subsequent 10/25/11 ""Trial", wait, er, no, it's not a "Trial" like I ruled
last week, if you're going to be a stickler about the NJCRCP 109 "20 days to file an
answer once served with a Complaint" procedural rule for "trials"...", essentially,
said Judge Sferrazza, whereupon he recharacterized such 10/25/11 date as a
"continuation of the summary eviction proceeding" meant to provide Coughlin an
opportunity to "substantiate" the "legal defense" he asserted in his Tenant's
Affidavit and during the sua sponte cross examination by Sferrazza on 10/13/11
(not much else to do when the California landlord fails to show up for the
hearing...and despite the RJC's allowing property managers and Nevada Court
Services to commit the unauthorized practice of law in landlord tenant matters,
there is nothing in NRS 40.253 et seq that allows for a "landlord's agent" to do
anything beyond that allowed by NRS 40.253(1)'s "the landlord or the landlords
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agent, unless otherwise agreed in writing, may serve or have served a notice in
writing, requiring in the alternative the payment of the rent or the surrender of the
premises:" ... and NRS 40.253(5)'s: " 5. Upon noncompliance with the notice: (a)
The landlord or the landlords agent may apply by affidavit of complaint for
eviction to the justice court of the township in which the dwelling, apartment,
mobile home or commercial premises are located or to the district court of the
county in which the dwelling, apartment, mobile home or commercial premises are
located, whichever has jurisdiction over the matter. The court may thereupon
issue an order directing the sheriff or constable of the county to remove the
tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the order. The affidavit must state or
contain: (it would seem that NRS 40.254's incorporation of the procedure's in NRS
40.253 would replace the requirements for what such affidavit should contain in a
non-payment setting with those laid out in NRS 40.254(2) for an "unlawful detainer
affidavit" in a no-cause setting (they differ somewhat markedly)..."
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The landlord is a neurologist from Chico, and the property is actually titled
in the "Matthew Merliss Living Trust", as such, it's not entirely clear that Merliss
himself has standing, or that the District Court does not actually have exclusive
jurisdiction (NRS 40.253(5)'s "whichever has jurisdiction") to the extent issues of
title are involved.
Am Jur
843. Application to holdover tenant
848. Requisites; sufficiency of Notice of Termination and Unlawful Detainer
852. Form of petition or complaint
(4) Defenses, Setoff, and Counterclaims:
(a) In General: 865
(6) Appeal: 885. Mootness 886. Procedural issues 887. Standards of review
888.
Bond; continuing payment of rent
Coughlin's possession of the premises was based on his mixed used tenancy
(the lease expressly allowed for using the premises for residential, commercial, and
"any other purposes", and Gasser v. Jet Craft makes clear that the landlord's
argument that some alleged failure to have a current or paid up or active business
license as to the mattress business (or to have the address in question for that sole
proprietorship listed with the State of Nevada's Department of Taxation (though,
there is conflicting evidence in that regard, and regardless, Merliss failed to raise
such issue in the trial court) or home law office/law practice or other technical
deficiencies does not operate to make such commercial use of the premises "illegal"
or violative of any restricdtion against using the premises for any "unlawful
purpose".
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Jurisdictional determination: Possession not based

on residential tenancy, eviction not proper remedy and summary procedure not
available. Grimm v. Huckabee, 891 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).
The 10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE fails to specify whether Coughlin's tenancy was
residential, commercial, or both. Judicial estoppel does not operate to preclude
Coughlin from pleading and arguing that his was both a commercial and residential
tenancy ("home law office" is a phrase repeated continuously, particularly in the
introductory pleadings and transcripts of the proceedings). At best Merliss might
argue that as to the portion of Coughlin's tenancy that was residential, he is
permitted to utilize the procedures in NRS 40.253, however, such approach would
not entitle Merliss to utilize such procedures against to portion of Coughlin's
tenancy that was of a commercial, law office, nature. Perhaps judicial estoppel
applies to prevent Merliss from originally claiming to be evicting Coughlin for nonpayment of rent in 1492, then changing course and bringing the no-cause summary
eviction in 1708. Certainly, collateral estoppel from 1492, as such issue was
actually litigated therein (Merliss turning tale and "dismissing" his own nonpayment summary eviction hardly operates as a get out of jail pass as to the
application of collateral estoppel in 1708 vis a vis the application of NRS
118A.355(5) by Judge Sferrazza, especially where Merliss's attorney repeatedly
insisted he was not seeking rent and that possession of the property was all that was
sought, and where Coughlin never once admitted to owing or withholding any rent
from Merliss. Rather, Coughlin invoked NRS 118A.360, agreements between
landlord and tenant operating as rent deductions, and the payment of rent to Merliss
in asserting that most decidedly did not owe Merliss any rent, and was in no way
asserting a posture under NRS 118A.355(5) vis a vis "withholding" any rent.
The order requiring Coughlin to deposit into the RJC a "rent escrow" of
$2,275 (which Couglin filed an interlocutory appeal to on 10/17/11, and any
purported justification by the RJC that it's failure to transmit such appeal to the
District Court premised upon some notion that Coughlin had failed to "perfect" his
appeal (especially where such is based on any notion that Coughlin, whom was
granted in forma pauperis status by the RJC's 10/6/11 Order, needed to pay the
filing fee of either the RJC or 2JDC, or some "appeal bond" (especially where
NJCRCP 73-76 are clearly not applicable to summary evictions. See NRS 40.385
and the RJC's own "Appeal Information" handouts) "Although a landlord generally
is entitled to require a tenant in possession to deposit rents into the court registry
during the course of any landlord tenant dispute where the tenant interposes any
defense other than payment, the rule yields where title is in issue. This exception is
well illustrated by the recent Fourth District Court of Appeal case, Frey v. Livecchi,
852 So.2d 896 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). In Frey, Pamela Livecchi, the owner of a
Broward County home, entered into a one-year residential lease agreement with the
Freys. Id. at 897. The Freys alleged that at the end of the lease agreement they had
entered into an option to purchase the property. Id. Livecchi, on the other hand,
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denied the existence of any such option and asserted that at the end of the lease, the
Freys became month-to-month tenants. Id. At the end of the period, Livecchi sent
the Freys a notice to vacate the premises. Id. The Freys responded with a complaint
for specific performance based upon the purported option. Id. Without conducting
an evidentiary hearing on this dispute, the trial court ordered the Freys to put the
disputed past due rent in the registry of the court or face an order of eviction. Id.
The court of appeal reversed stating: Section 83.60(2), Florida Statutes, requires
payment of rent into the registry of the court in residential landlord tenant disputes
under Part II of Chapter 83. 83.60, Fla. Stat. (1999). However, section 83.60 does
not apply when the occupancy is under a contract for sale of a dwelling unit or the
property of which it is a part. 83.42(2), Fla. Stat. (1999). The Freys claim that this
provision is inapplicable because they were not tenants under the statute. Rather,
their claim is based on their rights under a contract for sale. The resolution of this
factual dispute would determine whether section 83.60 is applicable. Because such
a determination would be dispositive, we hold that the trial court was required to
conduct an evidentiary hearing before determining whether the Freys were required
to pay money into the court registry. Because the trial court failed to conduct such a
hearing, we find that the trial court erred in imposing such a requirement, erred in
entering the default judgment, and reverse the entry of the final default judgment.
Id. at 897-98; ?see also Grimm v. Huckabee, 891 So.2d 608 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).
Cf. Blanco v. Novoa, 854 So.2d 672, 673 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)(reversing a motion
to pay accrued rent into the registry of the court where the trial court construed
the agreement between Blanco and Novoa to be a [true] lease rather than a
mortgage); ?First Hanover v. Vazquez, 848 So.2d 1188 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)
(affirming the grant of a motion for default and non-payment of rent where tenant
ratified the conveyance of property by bringing action for damages for fraudulent
inducement apparently without placing title in issue). As in Frey, there is a factual
dispute in this case concerning who is the true owner of the property. Because the
trial court's order requiring payments by Minalla of monies into the registry was
made without conducting an evidentiary hearing concerning the nature of the
transaction and who is the true owner of the residence, the court erred in imposing
the payment requirement upon her." Minalla v. Equinamics Corp., 954. So. 2d
645 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007).
Tennessee Bar Ass'n v. Berke, 48 Tenn. App. 140, 344 S.W.2d 567 (1960).
Evidence bearing the earmarks of
private spite should be accepted with extreme caution and scrutinized most carefully.
Cal.Sampson v.
State Bar, 12 Cal. 3d 70, 115 Cal. Rptr. 43, 524 P.2d 139 (1974).
W.Va.Committee on Legal Ethics of West Virginia State Bar v. Pietranton, 143 W. Va. 11, 99 S.E.2d
15 (1957).
Determinations in prior proceedings. (See SCR 114 for analogy as to not

recognizing convictions where due process was so obviously lacking in the trial
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court) In some jurisdictions, a prior conviction of a criminal offense may

conclusively establish guilt of the offense charged in attorney disciplinary
proceedings.[17] Likewise, a foreign jurisdiction's adjudication of guilt may be
deemed conclusive proof of guilt of the attorney misconduct charged.[18] The
burden then falls upon the attorney to demonstrate why the foreign judgment is not
valid or why the state should not accept it and impose sanctions based thereon.[19]
While a judgment in a civil proceeding to which the respondent was a party
may be conclusive that he or she performed particular acts having particular
civil consequences,[20] the result in the civil action is not conclusive in a
disciplinary proceeding in establishing that the respondent's conduct was such,
under the circumstances, as justifies disciplinary action.[21] Moreover, the
issue of what discipline is appropriate is not concluded by a determination in a
prior proceeding, even when it is conclusive of misconduct on the part of the
attorney.[ 22].
[FN17] N.J.In re Boylan, 162 N.J. 289, 744 A.2d 158 (2000). Mass.
Matter of Concemi, 422 Mass. 326, 662 N.E.2d 1030 (1996). Consideration of
underlying conduct not precluded A conviction does not preclude consideration of
the actual conduct itself for the purpose of determining the appropriate discipline to
be accorded an attorney. Ill.In re Ciardelli, 118 Ill. 2d 233, 113 Ill. Dec. 94, 514
N.E.2d 1006 (1987). [FN18] Fla.The Florida Bar v. Mogil, 763 So. 2d 303 (Fla.
2000). Unsupported finding disregarded A finding by a board, in an out-of-state
disciplinary proceeding, that the respondent had charged an excessive fee would be
disregarded in a disciplinary proceeding within the state, where no basis for
supporting the finding could be found. Mo.In re Weiner, 530 S.W.2d 222, 81
A.L.R.3d 1272 (Mo. 1975), supplemented, 547 S.W.2d 459 (Mo. 1977). Burden of
showing infirmity of foreign proceeding The burden of showing that the respondent
was denied due process and that there was an infirmity of proof in the foreign
disbarment proceeding is on the accused attorney. Neb.State ex rel. Nebraska
State Bar Ass'n v. Dineen, 235 Neb. 363, 455 N.W.2d 178 (1990). [FN19] 100.
[FN20] Tenn.Berke v. Chattanooga Bar Ass'n, 58 Tenn. App. 636, 436 S.W.2d
296 (1968). [FN21] IowaCommittee on Professional Ethics v. Wright, 178
N.W.2d 749 (Iowa 1970). Tenn.Tennessee Bar Ass'n v. Berke, 48 Tenn. App.
140, 344 S.W.2d 567 (1960). [FN22] Tenn.Berke v. Chattanooga Bar Ass'n, 58
Tenn. App. 636, 436 S.W.2d 296 (1968).
Further, the 2/28/12 and 3/13/12 Orders by Judge Holmes (Formal Hearing
Exhibits 4 and 5) were in RCM 11 TR 26800, with the "TR" signfiying the fact that
the matter was a "traffic citation", ie, not a criminal matter. The alleged infraction
consisted of a 'boulevard stop', more commonly referred to as a "California Roll".
As such
It is particularly obvious from a review of the transcript of the criminal
trespass conviction as rendered that there was "no basis for supporting the finding"
therein and as such (even though the SCR 111(4) Petition admits such "conviction"
was not a "serious offense" (making all the more incongrous Pat King's
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recommending permanent disbarment (although, curiously, King seemed rather

eager to see Hill's client, Merliss, in particular, and to the exclusion of, say, CIS in
60302 or 60317 getting their attorney fee awards paid (even where Hill and King
know full well that Judge Flanagan's 8/28/12 Order in 03628 (see 61383) makes
even more clear than his 3/27/12, 3/30/12, and 6/25/12 Orders that Coughlin did
not commit any sanctionable conduct in that case (which was not even notice-pled
as being at issue in King's 8/23/12 Complaint, violating SCR 105(2)(c), and, of
course, King attempted to make Formal Hearing Exhibit 2 that 6/25/12 attorney's
fee award by Judge Flanagan...only problem is that such award was premised upon
(see adjudicatory boundaries being limited to that put before the court by the
parties) Hill's associate Baker's 4/19/12 post-"judgment" Motion for Atty Fee
Award sanctions...premised upon NRS 7.085 and NRS 69.050....only problem is
(you think the $60K they allege there client paid them to "win" the summary
eviction of attorney Coughlin from his former home law office located in a
dwelling not worth $90k in today's market) that NRS 40.400 makes real clear that
NRAP applies to that appeal from the justice to the district court, and NRAP 38
makes clear that costs (killing the 5/22/12 Order awarding some $2,500 in "costs"
under NRS 18.005(17) for "work" done by the contractor that had absolutely
nothing to do with the issues on appeal in 03628 (where Coughlin was precluded
from brining counterclaims in this "summary eviction proceeding", then certainly
Merliss should not be able to win some "judgment" for "costs", which are really
mere "damages" he alleges were incurred incident to a burglary of the property that
occurred on 12/12/11 during the six weeks when Hill in his 11/21/11 email, at the
very least, implied he was able to prevent Coughlin from obtaining a timely hearing
on his NRS 40.253(8) 11/16/12 Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien until
12/20/11. HIll succeeded in that, but Coughlin's personalty was subject to a
burglary of 12/11/11...how Merliss's is able to receive a "costs" award premised
upon NRS 18.005 (where such does not apply to appeals given the import of NRS
40.400 and NRAP 38, see Berosini, is really not clear, but a theme develops when
reviewing each of the orders by Judge Flanagan in that appeal of a summary
eviction....awards of fees, costs, and possession all premised upon statutes and rules
that only apply to plenary matters and appeals thereof (NRS 69.050 (Merliss's
counsel's citation to such it particularly troubling given the extent to which it was
forced to recognize in the trial court that NRS 69.030 does not apply to summary
eviction proceedings (indeed, the whole of NRS 69 applies to judgments only, not
orders), as such Merliss was forced to "join in vacating the attorney's fee award" in
the justice court of $1,500, which is ridiculously disproportionate to the $42,065
awarded by Judge Flanagan in his 6/25/12 DCR 13(3) application/attorney fee
award, ie not a sanction (8/28/12 Order speaks to "previously ignored" "frivolous"
something or other...one's either pregnant or they aren't...ridiculous to attempt to
assert a collateral bar for that which the district court judge admits he never found,
but that's Hill and King in a nutshell...Hill is on the NNDB Board, along with
Echeverria....no comment....), NJCRCP 72, 76 "must not be tried anew" fails to
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recognize Anvui's "de novo review", and while some authority might allow for
using the ROA from below to conduct such "de novo review" (its not a trial de
novo, after all), the application of Gibellini, and some "clearly erroneous" standard
and level of deference to the summary eviction order (ie, not a judgment) of the
justice court
While a judgment in a civil proceeding to which the respondent was a
party may be conclusive that he or she performed particular acts having
particular civil consequences,[20] the result in the civil action is not conclusive
in a disciplinary proceeding in establishing that the respondent's conduct was
such, under the circumstances, as justifies disciplinary action.[21] [FN20]
Tenn.Berke v. Chattanooga Bar Ass'n, 58 Tenn. App. 636, 436 S.W.2d 296
(1968). [FN21] IowaCommittee on Professional Ethics v. Wright, 178 N.W.2d
749 (Iowa 1970). Tenn.Tennessee Bar Ass'n v. Berke, 48 Tenn. App. 140, 344
S.W.2d 567 (1960). So FHE 4 and 5 from 26800 should have been excluded
(particularly where King won his own Motion to Quash Coughlin's subpoenas
insisting one could not question judges about their though processes, only to the
have King do that in question Judges Holmes and Beesley about there (the panel
denied Coughlin the right to call for direct examination Hill, Holmes, and Beesley,
and perhaps Elcano, in addition to failing to (well, SCR 110(3)(4) makes such the
provenance of the chairman of the board, not the panel chair) pursue contempt
proceedings (or report the need for such to a district court judge per SCR 110) upon
a mulittude of individuals and entities failing to comply with Coughlin's SCR 110
subpoenas (reno justice court, RMC defender Keith Loomis, Judges Elliott and
Flanagan and the Clerks and REcord sCustodians of the 2JDC, City of Reno
Marshals....apparently the law doesn't apply to those whom work for the courts in
Washoe County and Reno...and City of Reno Chief Criminal Deputy Dan Wong is
happy to cosign SBN "Clerk of Court" Laura Peters and Pat King's willfull
direlection of duties, including those to maintain filings and transport such along
with the ROA and Supplementals thereto in 62337. par for the reno city attorney's
office, either side of it:
http://www.rgj.com/article/20130701/NEWS/307010033/Reno-happily-defendpolice-sued-custody-death
this is the functional equialent of a motion for mistrial.
So, a traffic citation case is as much akin to the civil proceeding in Berke as
it is to a criminal matter.
Duty of attorney to present favorable evidence
An attorney was under a duty, in disciplinary proceedings, to present any evidence
he deemed favorable
to himself.
Cal.Coviello v. State Bar, 45 Cal. 2d 57, 286 P.2d 357 (1955). Hard to do with
NNDB Panel Chair Echeverria rules everything the respondent seeks to introduce
as evidence (for any variety of purposes, mitigation, impeachment, Claiborne style
demonstrations that the convictions (and "convictions", as NRS 22.030 and NRS
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22.100 "convictions" involve "civil" contempt statutes, and where NRS 199.360
speaks to "criminal contempt" and NRS 22 resides in the "Civil Practice" Title of
NRS, the implication is that such is not criminal in nature, and therefore SCR
111(5) "conviction is conclusive proof of guilt" should not apply (and certainly
should not apply to result in some finding of guilt as to any number of alleged
violatiosn of Rules of Professional Conduct (ie, th 11/30/11 or 2/27/12 summary
contempt orders do not allow for the Panel to abdicate its responsibilities as the
trier of fact, content to skip straight to the "determinin the nature and severity of the
punishment" phases, because, gosh, they are only following the 6/7/12 Order in
60838 and SCR 111(8), ever so closely, right?
Support by admissible evidence (1) That some evidence in a disciplinary
proceeding tried before a judge may have been improperly received would not
require reversal, where the remaining evidence supported a suspension. Ala.In re
McKay, 280 Ala. 174, 191 So. 2d 1 (1966). (2) Any evidence improperly admitted
by the trial court in a disbarment proceeding will be excluded from consideration
by the court of appeals on a trial de novo, and, therefore, any error by the trial court
in admitting and considering incompetent evidence is harmless if there is adequate,
competent evidence in the record upon which to base the trial judge's conclusions
and the concurrence of the court of appeals. Tenn.Berke v. Chattanooga Bar
Ass'n, 58 Tenn. App. 636, 436 S.W.2d 296 (1968).
Problem here is, formal hearing exhibit (FHE) 2 gets tossed because (also,
Exhibit 3, the 4/13/09 divorce case order after trial, which was subsumed by th
6/19/09 Final Decree therein anyways, which not only failed to find misconduct on
Coughlin's part, but the lack of any NCJC Rule 2.15 reporting by family court
judge gardner operates as a collateral bar to the OBC's contentions, however vague
an insufficiently pled, that such laches ridden order supports some finding that this
or that RPC was violated...., one, it was never notice-pled, and two, it fails to
contain a finding, even, of any misconduct on Coughlin's part (reciting the parties
arguments is hardly a "finding", duh, its, actually, beyond duh, its just flat out fraud
by Hill and King to come to the hearing and not only attempt to ambush Coughlin
in the inequity attendant to failing to notice pled the issue (King possess Flanagan's
3/27/12 ORder denyign the landlord (Hill and Baker's ) Second Motion for ORder
to Show cause, so anything in the complaitn vaguely alluding to some "interfering
with the contractor" in some unspecified, vaguely alluded to eviction (which one?
Coughlin was evicted nearly 10 times since August 2011 by a Reno Justice Court
that RPD Sargent Paul Sifre alluded to some level of complicity, apparently,
between the RJC and the RPD with respect to such mass wrongfull evictions of
Coughlin, somethign WCDA DDA Zachary Norman Young, Esq. committed Brady
violations with respect to in RCR12-065630 in failing to turn such over undtil just
day before the start of the 12/11/11 trial therein, to bookend his brady and RPC 3.8
violation sin rCR11-063341 where he made argument and put on testimony that
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was demonstrated to be lies respecting RPD OFficer Nicholas Duralde's

contentions as to what his wife and the other ECOMM dispatchers told him
sufficient to justify his terry stop analysis in rCR2011-063341 (only problems it he
was out of his car, on the scene, unable to read the only message sent by ECOMM
that mentioned any "possible fight" sufficient to buttress Duralde's specious terry
analysis....). Now DDA Amos Stege insists on carrying on a prosecution in
RCR2012-072675 incident to RJC Bailiff Reyes (whose wife file a TPO against
him alleging he is "off his medications" and controlling and violent throwing
Coughlin around in the courthouse on 5/23/13 shortly after Coughlin submitted
written requests for sensitive documents necessary to his work in 61383 and
62337) well outside the suspect "administrative order 2012-01" that the RJC has
now recharacterized as a "criminal complaint" case, which Stege and the WCDA's
Office have no problem, according to Stege, with such usurpation of their executive
functions by their former coworkers at the WCDA''s Office turned judges, incident
to Judge Sferrazza's original 12/20/12 "Administrative Order 2012-01" In Re
Coughlin that mischaracterized the jurisdictional mandate provided by NEv Const 6
Art 6 by remixing "District courts" therein to read "Nevada courts' to get around
that whole distinction between limited and general jurisdiction and justice and
district courts, with such limited jurisdiction justice courts possessing well less
inherent authority, though such Administrative Order did not speak to any such
inherent authority upon which it purported to be premised. WCDA DDA Stege
admitted to Coughlin that he had every intention of continuing to sanction such
actions by the RJC (see NCJC Rule 2.15), even where Bruce Lindsay keeps getting
quick checks (and Lindsay threatened to "rip each of (Coughlin's) limbs)
off....where the justice court admits to directdly appointing Lindsay, despite Canon
2 and those 2006 LA Times receiverships "administrative appointments"
appearances issues dicating that such directing appointing of appointed counsel
may well be per se prohibited...Further, STege admits to not viewing reading
Coughlin's filings as part of his RPC 3.8 duty, and immediately requests the justice
court to begin setting picks for him upon Lindsay showing up just long enough to
collect a check before being granted his withdrawal ("your honor, please limit Mr.
Coughlin's ability to even contact us at the WCDA's Office", no problem
continuing their scattershot style of prosecuting Coughlin, just a little hestitant to
have to deal with all those tireseom attempts at defending himself).
Support by admissible evidence (1) That some evidence in a disciplinary
proceeding tried before a judge may have been improperly received would not
require reversal, where the remaining evidence supported a suspension. Ala.In re
McKay, 280 Ala. 174, 191 So. 2d 1 (1966). (2) Any evidence improperly admitted
by the trial court in a disbarment proceeding will be excluded from consideration
by the court of appeals on a trial de novo, and, therefore, any error by the trial court
in admitting and considering incompetent evidence is harmless if there is adequate,
competent evidence in the record upon which to base the trial judge's conclusions
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and the concurrence of the court of appeals. Tenn.Berke v. Chattanooga Bar

Ass'n, 58 Tenn. App. 636, 436 S.W.2d 296 (1968).
Laches as to FHE 3 the 4/13/09 Order after trial (which resulted in the
WCDA's Office's partner in teh ECR program, WLS Paul Elcano firing Coughlin
(Elcano's daughter has recently been hired by the WCDA's Office as an attorney,
while the district court order in 60302, which found ever more creative ways of
dismissing Coughlin's lawsuit against Elcano (not to mention the fact that the sister
case in 60317 saw Judge Elliott preside over the matter, and fail to recuse himself
or even disclose the fact of his Presidency of CAAW's Executive Board where
CAAW was WLS's co-defendant in the matter...not to be outdone, his successor,
former WCDA's Office Judge Sattler failed to disclose or recuse himself from that
same matter upon taking it over, despite his sitting on WLS's Board...huh?)..
and the FHE 3 2jdc Judge Gardner Order after Trial is laches barred: The
defense of laches may not be available in a disciplinary proceeding,[3] particularly
where the attorney in question contributes to the delay.[4] While staleness in a
charge against an attorney may prevent its being considered,[5] a court will not
refuse to hear charges of unprofessional conduct against an attorney even if a long
period of time has elapsed since the conduct at issue occurred, unless prejudice is
shown.[6] The defense of laches may not be available in a disciplinary proceeding,
[3] particularly where the attorney in question contributes to the delay.[4] While
staleness in a charge against an attorney may prevent its being considered,[5] a
court will not refuse to hear charges of unprofessional conduct against an attorney
even if a long period of time has elapsed since the conduct at issue occurred, unless
prejudice is shown.[6] [FN5] Kan.In re Ratner, 194 Kan. 362, 399 P.2d 865
(1965). Tenn.Tennessee Bar Ass'n v. Berke, 48 Tenn. App. 140, 344 S.W.2d 567
(1960). [FN6] Cal.Yokozeki v. State Bar, 11 Cal. 3d 436, 113 Cal. Rptr. 602,
521 P.2d 858 (1974). Ill.In re Bossov, 60 Ill. 2d 439, 328 N.E.2d 309 (1975).
N.J.In re Sarbone, 63 N.J. 94, 304 A.2d 734 (1973). Pa.Office of Disciplinary
Counsel v. Davis, 532 Pa. 22, 614 A.2d 1116 (1992), reinstatement granted, 543
Pa. 318, 671 A.2d 222 (1996). Vt.In re Wright, 131 Vt. 473, 310 A.2d 1, 92
A.L.R.3d 639 (1973).
22
23
The assertions herein are made, pursuant to NRS 53.045 under penalty of perjry
24
25
and based upon my first hand knowledge of these matters, except to perhaps a very,
26
very few aspects of a a very few assertions which are made upon information and
27
belief.\
28
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Also, under Sexton in Nevada, the SBN's Complaint had to be "verified" by

a person, not an entity, like the SBN, and Asst. Bar Counsel King is unable to
provide such verification lackign first hand knowledge, and his failure to offer
anything into evidence to in any way indicate just what Hill's alleged written
grievance entailed must operate to completely fail to establish any sort of notice
pleading of anything relative to hill or the summary eviction or appeal thereof in
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03628 (see 61383), particularly where at the time of craftin his 8/23/12 Complaint,
King had obviously come to the decision that he needed to disenfect his prosecution
of Richard G. Hill, Esq's reputation and ways, only problem is, Coughlin had beat
12
13
down every last insipid accustation against him by the various peopel involved here
14
(and you they know who they are) that King was going to have to go to the dance
15
alone, so at the last minute he slummed it over to Hill's office, and lucked out in
16
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getting NVB Judge Beesley and WLS's Elcano to come down to the formal hearing
18
(well, Beesley phoned it in, which made it hard to cross examine him or
19
authenticate any documents, in addition to the fact that his testimony was only
20
constructively noticed the day prior to the hearing, somethign King pulled in the In
21
22
Re Boles case too, but at least Elcano's testimony completely contradicted his
23
statement in his various suspension/termination letters to Coughlin vis a vis
24
Coughlin's tenure with WLS, as a domestic violence attorney in 2007-2009. so
25
26
there's that, which is nice, but Elcano and WLS obstructionist tactics clearly
27
develop the prejudice in support of the laches defense, particularly with respect to
28
their preventing Coughlin from accessing excuplatory materials vis a vis his work
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with then client Joshi and the effect her own level of organization and approach to
the alimony/community property issues involved (see 53833 and 54844) had as to
3
4
the 3/12/09 and 3/17/09 trial in that matter (though WLS"s Breckenridges' ordering
the JAVS cd recording of Coughlin's 3/10/09 TPO hearing adovcacy on behalf of a
male victim of domestic violence and the aghast horror displayed by some the
2JDC CAAW run TPO Office advocate (whom was , apparently, advocating on
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11
behalf of the alleged abuser? well, perhaps dueling TPOs) whee Breckenridge had
such copy of the record, as revealed in the docket, picked up on 4/10/09...and the
$1,000 attorney fee NRS 7.085 award was entered 4/13/09, though, strangely, WLS
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just rode the prestige train of that short lived "sanction" (it appears the 6/19/09
14
Final Decree admits Coughlin was right in ultimately awarding Coughlin's client
15
some alimony, so...which is it, Coughlin was vexatious in arguing for alimony
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(even citing to an alr supporting his contention that a duty is accord greater
18
protection than a debt, especially third party unsecured credit card debt to which the
19
opposing spouse was sole signatory (its hardly fraud for Coughlin to recognize the
20
realites of securitization and "fail" to demand his client to assist John Springgate in
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resucing his client from the decision to maintain all that "power and control" over
his stash of credit cards during the marriage, no?).
The criminal trespass conviction the subject of 61901's SCR 111(4) Petition
26
is so facially invalid as to provide absolutely no proof of guilt, even. Really, it
27
provides a basis for any judge reading this to report RMC Judge Gardner under a
28
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variety of basis pursuant to NCJC Rule 2.15, in addition to Reno City Attorney
Hazlett-Stevens for the many instances of misconduct he engaged in as well.
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THE COURT (RMC Judge William Gardner, the brother of 2JDC Judge
Linda Gardner, co-grievants against Coughlin in NG12-0435, see also
Coughlin's Petition for Writ of Mandamus against 2JDC Judge L. Gardner
in 53833 and 54844, noting Judge W. Garnder's failure to divulge the
familial relation until Coughlin brought it up, even where Judge W.
Gardner subsequently admitted to having been passed by his sister, Judge
L. Garnder, her 4/13/09 Order After Trial (FHE 3), which he then passed
around to all the fellow RMC Judges, with Judge Nash Holmes including
such in her 3/14/12 "box of materials" that she had deliever to the SBN,
stamped received "3/14/12", but for which Pat King and Laura Peters
made a concious, willful decision to attempt to mislead in this process by
then affixing a date received stamping on the 4/13/09 Order of "3/15/09",
manipulating on several occasions with interlineations the "5" in the "15"
of "3/15/12", then attempting to cover up the multiple improprieties and
conflicts of interest that arisen incident thereto subsequently): No, we're
done. That's it. You know how it works. The prosecutor goes first, you go
second, they finish up. They have the burden of proof. That's it. No more
argument. That's very clear. Alright, let me just make a couple comments
here. Both parties have identified - there's numerous issues here. The big
issue is the warning. Under our statute, both 207.200, and RMC 810.0lD,
the party - it doesn't even talk about the vex or annoy, the party who goes
or remains, either one, Mr. Hazlett-Stevens pointed that out, into any
building after being warned by the owner or the occupant, and the owners
and occupants can be agents with ostensible, actual or implied authority,
and certainly Mr. Hill and Mr. Baker had that authority. That's clearly
established by the evidence. I f you go back onto that property after having
been warned, you are guilty of a trespass, and I guess the question is what
is a warning? And unlike many areas in the law, it's not defined under the
trespassing ordinance, or the trespassing statute. It's a notice requirement.
And the real issue in this case - there's a number of issues, but I do there's no question, Mr. Coughlin, that you were on property that belonged
to another at 1 2 1 River Rock on November 1 3th, and that's in the City of
Reno, and there's no question about that. The question is, what type of
warning did you have? You had so many types of warnings, it's hard to
figure out which one is the best. Page - 148- First of all, the first warning and by the way, when we talk about warning here, when you look at the
statute under state law or the Municipal Code, both the Legislature and the
City Council have given some guidance that indicate for some occupants
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they've got sufficient warning if the property is posted in a conspicuous

manner in intervals of not less than 700 feet. So, something as broad as
that is sufficient warning under our trespass statute. And the statute goes
on to say it's prima facia evidence of a trespass if the property is posted or
fenced on a property. That's prima facia. So, the question is did you have
notice? Did you have some sort of warning not to be on that property, and
here's what the Court has determined. You received some kind of mild
notice, and a warning when you were given a 5-day notice and a 30-day
notice. Probably in and of itself, probably not enough to support a
trespassing finding. But at two separate hearings in October of 20 1 1 , on
the 1 3th and the 25th, where you were present in Court, there can be no
question that the issue is whether or not the owner of that property wanted
you on that property more, or should you be on that property. Then, right
in open Court, Judge Sferrazza evicted you from the property. He
followed that up with a written Eviction Decision and Order clearly
indicating that you were evicted, and that the stay was denied. So, I don't
know what - that would be what I call super notice, or super warning,
coming from the Judge himself. Page -149- It's often the situation we
never get that kind of warning. So not only did you get a warning, you got
an Order fr om the Judge that you were evicted from the property. That
was then posted on the front door of a property that you had been in and
returned to on November pt, 2012 (sic) the day it was posted. There was a
copy left on a coffee table later at some point in time after Mr. Hill had
entered the property and realized that there had been someone in the
property. You were emailed. Whether or not you received that email, I
don't know, but there was at least another attempt to email you at an
address to which you had responded, and to an address, an email address,
to which you had responded that you would not accept emails on your - as
notice. Finally, you were mailed a Notice of Entry o f Judgment to 1 2 1
River Rock. I'm sure - I would guess you didn't get that, but the parties
here did everything possible to provide you notice, to provide you
warning, and you had actual notice, you had constructive notice, that you
shouldn't be on that property. The State of Nevada and the Supreme Court
decision which Mr. Hazlett-Stevens quoted this morning and I have in
front of me, State v. McNichols, \ 06 Nev. 6 5 1 , clearly, clearly, says that
after someone has been evicted, a subsequent reentry in the property is a
trespass. A trespass reentry is what the Supreme Court called it, did not
create an objective of that expectation of privacy. So, that's just the first
section. That's been proved beyond any doubt. There's no question that
portion of the statute has been proved. Page -1 50- And I would also
submit that Mr. Hazlett-Stevens is correct. And after going back on that
property numerous occasions, setting up a residence with your pet in the
basement, constitutes a separate basis independent from the notice
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requirement that you went on to that property with the intent to vex or
annoy the owner. So, under any theory set fo rth by the City, I find you
guilty of the charge of Trespassing. We can proceed to sentencing. Mr.
Hazlett-Stevens?..."
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Its instructive to compare the summary eviction order as rendered in that summary
eviction proceeding (see 61383) from which the above criminal trespass conviction
stemmed, in the Reno Justice Court such NRS 40.253 proceeding was, involving
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Richard G. Hill, Esq.'s law firm, with his then associate Casey D. Baker, Esq.
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appearing for the landlord Merliss for the 121 River Rock former home law office
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at which Coughlin was arrested for criminal trespass:
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Judge: me I the defendant has the rights to make an argument you have a right
to the argument stance tell you what I'm going to do until I hear the arguments
Plaintiff: well I think customarily it's the defendant gets to go plaintiff gets no
less
Judge: one actually is you are burdened so sure burdened so it's his burden on
the retaliatory part of it but it sure burdened on the eviction itself
Plaintiff: okay thank you Your Honor with respect to plaintiff's burden the
plaintiffs plaintiff has introduced evidence that the lease terminated by its terms
at the end of February 2011 thereafter Mr. Coughlin was a month-to-month
tenant pursuant to NRS 40.251 or Coughlin was properly served with a no
cause termination notice to vacate on August 22 as exhibit B exhibit C is the
five day notice of unlawful detainer based on Mr. Coughlin's failure to vacate
the premises after his tenancy was terminated the affidavits and testimony
presented here today and form conforms with the statute conformed with the
form promulgated by the Nevada Supreme Court and with the form provided
by this court plaintiff has met its burden to show that Mr. Coughlin was a
month to month tenant in August 2011 when the termination notice was
properly served the eviction notice was properly served Mr. Coughlin now
bears the burden Your Honor it shifts to him to present and substantiate a legal
defense now the legal standard for summary judgment in Nevada which is what
were doing dealing with here is that Mr. Coughlin must again transcend his
allegations of his pleadings and show by admissible evidence that there is a
disputed issue of fact that he has a legal defense as a matter of law he has not
done that Your Honor he has identified only a couple of things and despite
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great latitude by the courts to to present evidence and establishes legal defense
he has failed to do so NRS 118A.510 that is the retaliatory eviction statutes
now Mr. Coughlin chose to focus on subsection 1B a complaint that he
complained in good faith to the landlord or law enforcement agency for a
violation of this chapter or of a specific statute that imposes a criminal penalty
we talked about this at length today Mr. Coughlin identified one e-mail which
he admitted on a cross examination does not identify a specific statute that
imposes a criminal penalty and I think we need to be extremely clear. With this
statute the statute requires the tenant has complaint in good faith to the landlord
of a specific statute that imposes a criminal liability he did not do that he did
not identify a statute he alleged something about some landscapers damaged
the carpet he's read on the lawn that does not satisfy the statute Your Honor
moving down the statute to sub EEE the tenant has instituted or defended
against judicial or administrative proceeding or arbitration in which the tenant
raised an issue of compliance with the requirements of this chapter respecting
habitability of dwelling its. That cannot be. He notices the first no cause
termination notice to vacate exhibit B was served on August 22, 2011 Mr.
Coughlin did not institute or defendant any proceeding on any habitability
issues until after those notices were provided Dr. Merliss can't retaliate for
something that is going to happen in the future that has not happened yet Mr.
Coughlin cannot proceed under that statute to the extent Mr. Coughlin is
complaining about this small business first of all the may e-mail in Exhibit 8
does not qualify in or satisfied the statutes regarding notice to a landlord about
a habitability issues and Dr. Merliss drove this point home when he testified
that he didn't understand what Mr. Coughlin was asking for I mean if you look
through these e-mails what Mr. Coughlin does is he identifies something he
claims is some sort of problem and then he tries to bargain some money off of
the rent for he has not produced to mean he does not say in then they e-mail
this is my notice to you under NRS 118 A .355 I am going to withhold this rent
unless you fix this he just says we've got this issue he is later come for the court
and he has told it that he fixed it to the tune of $500 well he is not produced in
receipt is not produced a bit or invoice from contractor he hasn't produced
anything furthermore Your Honor under NRS 118 A355 so to the tenant may
not proceed under this section if the landlord's inability to adequately remedy
the failure or use his best efforts to remedy the failure within 14 days is due to
the tenant's refusal to allow lawful access to dwelling unit as required by the
rental agreement or this chapter Dr. Merliss testified that he tried to send Zach
Nash out there he tried to send Randy Fisher the handyman out there they
weren't allowed in nine Your Honor if the court is I have this gentleman ready
to testify sooner to that effect nevertheless Mr. Coughlin he cannot proceed
under the statute he has no defense if he doesn't let them in to fix. What is more
Your Honor Mr. Coughlin wants to focus on this 48 hour notice under the lease
if Mr. Coughlin is the one making a complaint the complaints about these
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alleged it dishes came all being one of them which we have no proof of that
there is more than the house but let's just say for arguments sake he makes the
complaint then he is waived the right to hide behind the notice provision of the
lease or at the very least should be a stop from asserting it it's his request that's
what were running into and that's what we see here on exhibits a through I
Your Honor here. He here he is Mr. Coughlin makes a complaint about mold
and insulation and here is Dr. Merliss immediately saying hey I'll get
somebody out there will get this fixed note lookup statutory notice NRS
inspection landlord tenant. Mr. Coughlin should be a stop from the from hiding
behind the notice provision in the lease with respect to Randy Fisher Your
Honor I was not able to put him on the stand today but Mr. Coughlin was
provided with substantial notice more than 48 hours for Mr. Fisher to go
inspect the window issue there was an electrical lied that's Mr. Coughlin
identified. Mr. Coughlin cannot proceed under the retaliatory under the habit to
excuse me under the habitability statutes if he doesn't allow lawful access to the
property in any event Your Honor nothing that Mr. Coughlin as not even made
an attempt much less a showing to to have any of the issues that he identified as
habitability type issues the Windows the stairs the weeds the mold he is not
made any attempt to have those fit under the habitability statute
Judge: well I tend to agree that under subsection see or EM sorry of 118A.510
one he he has to have instituted or defended against a judicial or administrative
proceeding based on habitability which that is different than complaining about
habitability which he can interests through a separate lawsuit
Plaintiff: yes
Judge: so I simply Simply complaining about habitability issues does not
satisfy the retaliatory conduct provision
Plaintiff: that is exactly right Your Honor and in any event Mr. Coughlin has
not shown as is his burden to do that any of his complaints were in good faith
under that statute or that Dr. Merliss acted in a retaliatory fashion Dr. Merliss
said I didn't evict you because of these things you didn't pay your rent we tried
to help you you would let us that's not retaliation Your Honor he's Mr.
Coughlin is attempting to make logical leaps between him threatening to sue
for retaliation and Dr. Merle is hiring our office that that is you know per se
retaliatory well what are you supposed to do when you're tenant threatens to
sue you you gotta get a lawyer it's just simply not relevant in the logical leave
is not their Sir. Your Honor the only issue before the court today his possession
of the property in the court notice this and we've gone over this Mr. Coughlin
has gone on and on and on about potential claims
Coughlin Your Honor it's been 5 min.
Judge: they have 5 min. are up so go ahead Mr. Coughlin
Coughlin thank you Your Honor just sit at the outset that I know I've been
critical of Mr. Plaintiff: at some point throughout this but I do think Dr. Merle
us is gotten his money's worth is gotten some pretty solid litigating in most
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respects Your Honor I feel pretty strongly about this case but I could see where
possibly some other people would see other people feels different ways I think
it has a lot to do with maybe what you want this date in the CD to be if you
wanted to be a one where the people who aren't that powerful don't have much
money but who demands that the law be followed or if you want to be a
scarcity like that I guess you would rule one way but if you're going to ruled
the other way it seems to me that you would have to make some torturous
twists and turning her to find that Dr. Merliss all the sudden doesn't get his rent
on August 11 he wakes up inspect the country August 11, 2011 notices his
mortgage check hasn't been coming in every day on August 11, 2011 an e-mail
saying hey what's up with this I want my money I don't want to hear about your
complaints I want my money you're not gonna give me your money will guess
what I'm sending to people down there right now one today and one tomorrow
oh you want your notice guess what single further communications to my
attorney see how you like that kick you out on your ass in a big you and that's
how it comes across to me and that's exactly what the legislature intended to
prevent with 118 A.510. It has been educational to me an interesting certainly
to try to present some of these arguments justice court ruled Las Vegas 44
certainly have good refer to your vast breadth of your experience and its
approach in your courtroom there are considering your longest tenured mayor
Reno's history
Judge: surgeon-escrow any points with so
Defendant: on about try to score points Your Honor am trying to validate to
myself that someone is bringing to bear to his decision on this ability to see the
whole field. What I'm worried about is what this does to we want to be Las
Vegas do we want to be rule 44 Las Vegas where is such a transient community
people are handing out prostitution pamphlets got all this super Las Vegas type
stuff going on and so they had to enact rule 44 to allow them to do certain
things to deal with the craziness Reno's not Las Vegas Reno is months the most
well read cities in the country I went to law school Las Vegas unfamiliar with
Las Vegas I'm from Reno unfamiliar with Reno investing in tenants rights and I
have a background legal services I work for Washoe legal services they have a
landlord tenant section there I didn't work and I worked as a domestic violence
attorney for a while but investing in tenants rights is an investment in the
community and that something that this community needs at this but thank you
Your Honor;
Judge: alright I am prepared to rule and I do first of all I do want to say I
acknowledge the defendant's argument with respect to rule 44 And Justice
Court in Las Vegas and I have been unable to find a similar rule with
respect to Reno justice court so my decision with respect to the escrow
money will be separate from this but I do find number one that the landlord
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met its burden of proof with respect to unlawful detainer that the exhibits and
the testimony submitted to the court specifically exhibit B the tenant was
notified of the no cause termination in a timely manner and with proper service
exhibit C the tenant was notified five day notice of unlawful detainer and
compliance with the statute and with proper service and therefore the defendant
was an unlawful detainer effective as of the date of the beginning of these
proceedings which was on artists I'm sorry well certainly by October 10
when the landlord's affidavit was filed but certainly today without question
further I have considered the tenant's arguments with respect to it retaliation
specifically under 118A.510 with respect to subsection "a" although the
tenant has complained about violations of building housing or health code
I do not find there is any evidence that he made said complaint to a
government agency charged with responsibility for enforcement of that
code.
Second, with respect to the subsection "b", although defendant did present
evidence today of destruction of carpet and alleged that it was a crime under
NRS 206.330 205.270 206.040 there is no evidence that said complaint cited a
specific statute to the landlord but rather a general complaint about the
structure of this carpet and therefore I find it that subsection of the statute
was not satisfied as will him and I further find that even if it was even if the
landlord knew what you're trying to say the landlord did not retaliate
against you for that the landlord eviction was based on nonpayment of
rent not your complaining of your destruction of carpet and I also at the
prior court proceeding I made findings with respect to the damages and
those damages in total were $2725 and that was the outside number and so I
found that you owed at least $2275 even giving you the benefit of all the
doubts and today there was evidence presented that the stairs were only $75 I
gave you $1250 for the stairs credit there was an e-mail presented today that
indicated that it's all you are asking for was $75.
Defendant: may I preserve my objection for settlement offers being admitted
Judge: will you can reserve your objection preservative I am making my
findings are not of
Judge: and then with respect to the noxious weeds first of all I find that that
is not a habitability issue second of all I find that under the lease you were
required to maintain the lawn and third this is under subsection "a", you didn't
make a complaint the governmental agency and there is no evidence that you
did with respect to the noxious weeds, as to the moldy insulation I do find that
that could be a habitability issue clearly could be. However, again under
118A.510 subsection to make it retaliatory it has to be have been presented
either in action suit. By you or defendant against you against by you and the
judicial administrative proceeding or arbitration in which the tenant raised
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the issue of compliance with the requirements of habitability and since you
didn't raise this issue until after the landlord had in fact filed the complaint I
find that that it did not violate the habitability statute did not violate the
retaliatory eviction statute for all those reasons I find that the defense of
retaliation does not meet the requirements of chapter 40 specifically one second
here specifically 40.253 subsections 6 The Court determines that there is not a
legal defense to the alleged unlawful detainer and therefore the court to this
grant the eviction with respect to the money in escrow the court finds that that
money is to the landlord however I am not going to order that today since the
defendant is made argument that the court does not have enough fact a proper
rule with respect to escrow as similar to Las Vegas justice court rule 44 and
therefore since the tenant still has the ability to appeal in this matter I will give
him 10 days to file a proper appeal which is the statutory time friend and if
he does so that money will be used to satisfy his appeal bond in this matter
if he does not do so then at that time a proper motion can be made by
plaintiff's counsel on this matter the eviction will be effective October 31 at 5
PM.
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Defendant: Your Honor is the IFP status bearing on the appeal or is that a
whole new IFP bond?
Judge: I denied your IFP on the appeal but I am not sure if I actually did it in
writing Sir
Defendant: but you granted to the instant case
Judge: I believe I don't recall
Plaintiff: but you denied it for the appeal?
Judge: well the thing is there is enough money deposited that you don't need
an IFP Sir
Plaintiff: it's all the money I have my name
Judge: while it may be but I am not releasing it to you but I am allowing you
to use it to satisfy the appeal bond in this case which would normally be three
months rent are I
Defendant: not double?
Judge: okay I will grant your IFP for this appeal if you go forward but the
appeal you filed was not a proper appeal Sir
Defendant: okay at that point I get the rent escrow back?
Judge: no you don't get rent that what happens is it's gonna satisfy the appeal
bond pending your appeal to the District Court
Defendant: so the the appeal bond toward the IFP doesn't apply to it
Judge: no. The of appeal bond a separate the IFP's for the filing fee that's all
it's good for
Defendant: sometimes it covers depositions and
Judge: well it's not been a cover in this case are of Artie told you
Defendant: and that's your ruling orders that
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Judge: dying embers because it would be in District Court?

Judge: well you can argue District Court but it will be my ruling that you
have to post appeal bond post an appeal bond and I will since there's some
question about the money and the escrow I am going to order that it satisfied
the appeal bond in this case
Defendant: on believe I filed an interlocutory appeal about the escrow
Judge: yeah I know you did but so far as I'm concerned that was not a valid
appeal
Defendant: okay
Judge: but you can go forward with that appeal that's up to you are not going
to advise you
Defendant: do we adress the motion to stay here today Your Honor?
Judge: the motion to what question mark
Defendant: the motion to stay Your Honor
Judge: the motion to dismiss is denied writing get a stay from the District
Court if you want
Defendant: okay maybe I don't want to address the motion the state today if
that's all the inquiry that's going to be too voted to it devoted to it
Judge: I have read during the recess your briefs and stuff but I'm denying a
motion to stay Richard Brisson stuff I'm denying a motion to stay so it's clear
Plaintiff: Your Honor I have two quick points with respect to an appeal bond
Dr. Merliss is entitled to an award of fees under NRS 40.254 sub three under
NRS 40.254 sub three
Judge: what you can prepare proper memorandum of costs and fees
Plaintiff: yes or we will
Defendant: a prevailing party or in some egregious circumstances you get
these?
Plaintiff: it's in the statute
Judge: it's in the statute under chapter 40 in fact they can get three times
the rent too
Defendant: for when the nerve because somebody just
Judge: they could you need to read the statute
Plaintiff: my point in bringing that up Your Honor is that we will be asking for
that those fees be considered part of the appeal bond in addition to the money
already with the court I mean Mr. you seen the briefs Dr. Merliss has incurred
substantial amount of fees
Judge: well I understand but I don't even have your memorandum of costs and
fees
Plaintiff: we will make the motion
Judge: you make the proper motion and I will decide it
Plaintiff: thank you Your Honor
Judge: it doesn't have to be decided today
Plaintiff: that's true Your Honor
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Judge: and in the meantime the money's not going anywhere nor do I believe
this defendant is going to come up with more money
Plaintiff: Your Honor we would like to ask the court for permission to inspect
the property prior to October 31 we've attempted to inspect in the past but we
are very concerned about the property being damaged between now and then
Judge: I have already told you that I would allow in order to inspect the
property allowing order to inspect the property and what is your position on
that as to a time when it could be accommodated Sir newly cough and you said
my position on the time to accommodate that and let
Judge: yeah
Defendant: this emergency need to inspect it because it's good to be emptied in
six days my position is that it shocks the conscience
Judge: will okay I will grant the order 48 hours from today
Plaintiff: 48 hours from today we can and specs are
Judge: yes
Defendant: and I just like to preserve for the appeal all the egregious conduct
by the process server and all these others other matters
Judge: what you can preserve everything you want Sir what you can preserve
everything you want Sir
Plaintiff: shall I present prepare an order court
Judge: you can prepare the order
Plaintiff: I mean for the entire thing
Judge: you can prepare findings of fact and conclusions of law and a
judgment if you wish
Defendant: can I Your Honor?
Judge: yes you get if you want to do it and he can look at it but I would
suggest that the plaintiff prepared and submitted to you for comments
Defendant: well he is the one who got one years rent to litigate this case so
Judge: one years rent?
Bait Coughlin
Plaintiff: and understand either Surrey
Defendant: yeah 900x12 months
Plaintiff: all prepare the order and submit it Coughlin for his review
Judge: okay what you need to get it done you can both prepare orders and all
picked the one I want to sign
Plaintiff: you'll have by tomorrow answer
Judge: when will years be in Mr. Coughlin when will yours be in Mr. Coughlin
Defendant: well I will have to look at what records on the Your Honor records
on that Your Honor
Judge: well if it's I'm going to give you today is Wednesday it will have to be
done by Thursday because I will be signing an order on Thursday no later
than noon on Thursday
Plaintiff: noon on Thursday yes or
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Judge: alright y'all have a good day

Plaintiff: thank you
Defendant: thank you sir."
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Its quite clear that the summary eviction order as rendered from the bench by
justice court Judge Sferrazza on 10/27/11 departs markedly from the prosed
Order that Hill's associate Baker was able to get Judge Sferrazza to sign, but
regardless, Judge Sferrazza's orders/rulings from rendered from the bench at the
conclusion of the 11/7/11 hearing in the justice court amended such 10/27/11
FOFCOLOSE, as well.
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Judge Sferrazza's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order for Summary
Eviction of 10/27/11, reads: "FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND ORDER FOR SUMMARY EVICTION
This matter having come on regularly for an evidentiary hearing
pursuant to NRS 40.254 and NRS 40.253(6) on October 13, 2011, and
continued on October 25, 2011, before the Honorable Peter J. Sferrazza, sitting
without a jury; the plaintiff/landlord, Matt Merliss; ("Merliss"), having been
present, and represented by counsel, Richard G. Hill, Chartered and Casey D.
Baker, Esq., and defendant/tenant, Zachary Barker Coughlin, Esq. ("Coughlin"),
having been present and having proceeded in proper person; the parties having
offered evidence, called witnesses and having offered argument; the matter having
been submitted to the Court for a decision; the Court being fully informed in the
premises and good cause appearing therefor; the Court herewith enters its findings
of fact, conclusions of law and order for summary eviction:
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Court finds the following facts:
1. Merliss is the owner of the real property located at 121 River Rock, Reno,
Nevada (the "Property").
2. The tenancy at issue commenced on March 1, 2010, and was for a term of 12
months.
3. The rental agreement terminated by its terms on February 28, 2011. Thereafter,
Coughlin became a month to month tenant pursuant to NRS 118A.470 and
paragraph 3 of the parties' rental agreement.
4. Coughlin became subject to the provisions of NRS 40.251 to 40.2516,
inclusive, at the end of the stated term of the rental agreement, whereupon he
became a monthto-month tenant, as noted above.
5. On August 22, 2011, Merliss properly and lawfully terminated Coughlin's
month-to-month tenancy pursuant to NRS 40.251, by serving the statutory NoCause Termination Notice to Vacate NRS 40.251(1) upon him, which notice was
admitted into evidence at the hearing. The court specifically finds that service of
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that notice was proper pursuant to, and for all purposes contemplated under, NRS
40.280.
6. Coughlin failed to vacate the Property within 30 calendar days of being served
with the notice to vacate, and was therefore in unlawful detainer of the Property as
of September 27, 2011, at the latest.
7. On September 27, 2011, Merliss properly served Coughlin with a Five-Day
Notice of Unlawful Detainer For Failure to Vacate Rental Unit -NRS 40.251
(No-Cause Termination) and Notice of Summary Eviction -NRS 40.254, which
notice was admitted into evidence at the hearing. The court specifically finds
that service of that notice was proper pursuant to, and for all purposes
contemplated under, NRS 40.280.
8. Merliss' claim for relief of possession of the premises was authorized by law.
9. Coughlin alleged, as a legal defense to the summary eviction, retaliatory conduct
by Merliss under various subsections of NRS 118A.510. Coughlin's alleged defense
was further based, in part, on what he identified as "habitability" issues, and his
alleged complaints regarding same. Coughlin further alleged that Merliss acted in a
discriminatory manner toward him based on Coughlin's race, national origin, and
sex.
10. The court finds that Coughlin failed to present any evidence that Merliss acted
in any prohibited, discriminatory, or retaliatory fashion as alleged by Coughlin, or
otherwise. Specifically, the court finds:
10.1. Coughlin failed to present any evidence that he "complained in good
faith of a violation of a building, housing or health code applicable to the premises
and affecting health or safety to a governmental agency charged with the
responsibility for the enforcement of that code" as required by NRS 118A.510(1)
(a).
10.2. Coughlin failed to present any evidence that he "complained in good faith
to the landlord or a law enforcement agency of a violation of [NRS Chapter
118A] or of a specific statute that imposes a criminal penalty" as required by
NRS 118A.510(1)(b)
10.3 Coughlin failed to present any evidence that prior to being served with
the referenced termination and eviction notices, Coughlin had "instituted or
defended against a judicial or administrative proceeding or arbitration in which [he]
raised an issue of compliance with the requirements of [NRS Chapter 118A]
respecting the habitability of dwelling units" as required by NRS 118A.510(1)(e).
10.4 Coughlin failed to present any evidence that he had "complained in
good faith to the landlord, a government agency, an attorney, a fair housing agency
or any other appropriate body of a violation of NRS 118.010 to 118.120, inclusive,
or the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq., or ha[d] otherwise
exercised rights which are guaranteed or protected under those laws" as required by
NRS 118A.510(1)(g).
11. Coughlin failed to present any evidence that the Property was at any time not
habitable, as that term is defined in NRS 118A.290, or otherwise, with respect to
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any of the alleged deficiencies identified by him. Those alleged, but unproven,
deficiencies included, but were not limited to, the front and back steps, any broken
window, any alleged mold, any falling insulation, the garbage disposal, and any
weeds on the Property.
11.1. With respect to any weeds on the Property, the court further
specifically finds that the maintenance of the surrounding grounds, including weed
control, was the sole responsibility of Coughlin under paragraph 22 of the parties'
rental agreement.
12. Coughlin failed to present any evidence that he complied, or that Merliss failed
to comply, with any requirement set forth in NRS 118A.355 and NRS 118A.360,
which statutes address the withholding of rent for alleged "habitability" issues.
12.1. As such, the court finds that Coughlin was not entitled to withhold
any rent based on any alleged "habitability" issue, or otherwise, and that all
sums heretofore deposited by Coughlin pursuant to the Court's order dated
October 13, 2011, rightfully belong to Merliss as and for past due rent.
13. If any finding of fact above is, in fact, a conclusion of law, it should be regarded
as such, and its validity should not be affected by where in this decision it is
located.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Court concludes the following as the controlling law in this case:
1. The Court has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this
case. Venue is appropriate in this court.
2. The ultimate issue before the court at the referenced hearing was the right
of the landlord, Merliss, to immediate possession of the Property. NRS 40.254.
NRS 40.253(6).
3. The purpose of the hearing was to "determine the truthfulness and
sufficiency of the tenant's and the landlord's affidavits," to determine whether
there is any "legal defense as to the alleged unlawful detainer," and whether
"the tenant is guilty of an unlawful detainer". NRS 40.253(6).
5. "[A]n order granting summary eviction under NRS 40.253(6) should be
reviewed on appeal based upon the standard for review of an order granting
summary judgment under NRCP 56 because these proceedings are analogous."
Anvui, LLC v. C.L. Dragon, LLC, 123 Nev. 212, 215, 163 P.3d 405 (2007).
6. "To successfully defend against a summary judgment motion, the
nonmoving party must transcend the pleadings and, by affidavit or other
admissible evidence, introduce specific facts that show a genuine issue of material
fact." Torrealba v. Kesmilis, 124 Nev. 95, 178 P.3d 716 (2008).
7. Coughlin failed to show that any genuine issue of material fact remains
for trial. As such, Coughlin failed to meet his burden of proof to establish any legal
defense to the summary eviction. Anvui. Torrealba.
8. As no issues of fact had yet been presented to the court to warrant a
trial, Coughlin was not entitled to have the summary eviction hearing heard by
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ajury. NJCRCP 38. NJCRCP 39. NRS 40.310. Any demand by Coughlin for a jury
was untimely, in any event. NJCRCP 38.
9. Pursuant to NRS 40.253(6), Merliss is entitled to immediate possession of
the property.
ORDER FOR SUMMARY EVICTION
Landlord, MATT MERLISS, having applied by Affidavit for an Order
seeking summary eviction of the above-named Tenant and it appearing from the
record on file herein that the statutory requirements have been met and that the
Tenant, after notice, unlawfully detains and withholds the rental unit, and the Court
being fully advised and finding good cause, therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS
FOLLOWS:
That the sheriff/constable of Reno Township, or one of their duly authorized
agents be, and hereby is, directed to remove each and every person found upon
the rental unit at 121 River Rock, Reno, Washoe County, Nevada, by no earlier
than October 31, 2011 at 5 pm. Landlord is hereby awarded the right of possession
of the premises.
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
AS FOLLOWS:
The sums currently on deposit with the Court, in the amount of $2,275.00,
are the property of the landlord, Matt Merliss, but shall not be immediately
released to him. Instead, those sums shall serve as Coughlin's security for costs on
appeal, pursuant to NJCRCP 73, in the event Coughlin timely and properly appeals
this order. In the event Coughlin fails to timely and properly appeal this order,
those sums shall be immediately released to Merliss or his counsel of record.
These sums shall not, in any event, operate to stay enforcement of this order and
the surrender of the right of Coughlin to possess the Property. Nothing in this
order shall prevent this court or an appellate court from releasing the deposited
funds to Merliss or his counsel prior to or after any appeal is perfected, or from
increasing the amount of any security to be posted by Coughlin for any reason, or
both, either upon its own motion or upon motion by Merliss.
IT IS SO ORDERED."
he landlord may not, in retaliation, terminate a tenancy, refuse to renew a
tenancy, increase rent or decrease essential items or services required by the
rental agreement or this chapter, or bring or threaten to bring an action for
possession if:
Dated this 7 2 13
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/s/ Zach Coughlin, signed
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electronically
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Appellant
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Proof of Service:
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On this date, I, Zach Coughlin electronically served a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document to all registered efilers, and to those whom are not I placed a
true and correct copy of the foregoing document in the usps mail on this date:
David Clark via Eflex
mailed to Pat King at Bar's Northern Office, EPO permitting
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DATED THIS: Dated thi 7 2 13
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/s/ Zach Coughlin

Zach Coughlin
Appellant
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INDEX TO EXHIBITS:
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1. Exhibit 1: various relevant materials.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

NOTICE AND DECLARATION AS TO SBN CLERK OF COURT PETERS

Petitioner, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN, representing himself files

NOTICE AND DECLARATION

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE OPPOSITION TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61901,

7 C.J.S. Attorney & Client

V. Discipline, Suspension, and Disbarment

NOTICE AND DECLARATION

71. Fraud in procuring admission

NOTICE AND DECLARATION

107. Deliberations, scope of inquiry, and verdict or findings

NOTICE AND DECLARATION

NOTICE AND DECLARATION

NOTICE AND DECLARATION

far as on Page 4 as to be very specific in listing the rules of professional conduct

NOTICE AND DECLARATION

Judge Beesley whom testified at Coughlin's 11/14/12 formal disciplinary

NOTICE AND DECLARATION

HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 16:1 to 16:18) CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR.

NOTICE AND DECLARATION

NOTICE AND DECLARATION

NOTICE AND DECLARATION

("received" as a greivance in the SBN on 3/15/12)... Ex. 6 - Letter dated February

NOTICE AND DECLARATION

NOTICE AND DECLARATION

NOTICE AND DECLARATION

HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 154:3 to 156:1) BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Did you or

NOTICE AND DECLARATION

As to judges refusing stays to practicing attorneys representing clients where the

NOTICE AND DECLARATION

under the exact same circumstances (summary contempt incarcerations or

HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 99:21 to 100:21) MR. ECHEVERRIA: Is this certified?

NOTICE AND DECLARATION

NOTICE AND DECLARATION

was originally mailed to Coughlin (with insufficient postage placed thereon

NOTICE AND DECLARATION

NOTICE AND DECLARATION

On that note, I reference the "Dispositional Order' entered by Clerk

NOTICE AND DECLARATION

NOTICE AND DECLARATION

NOTICE AND DECLARATION

AMJUR CLERKSOFCT 21" 44. Breach of duty affecting rights of

NOTICE AND DECLARATION

NOTICE AND DECLARATION

NOTICE AND DECLARATION

NOTICE AND DECLARATION

NOTICE AND DECLARATION

committed against an employer, an employee of the employer while the employee

NOTICE AND DECLARATION

NOTICE AND DECLARATION

failed to respond to until 12/19/12, with Chair Echeverria's 11/17/12 Order

NOTICE AND DECLARATION

NOTICE AND DECLARATION

NOTICE AND DECLARATION

NOTICE AND DECLARATION

NOTICE AND DECLARATION

03628 (Judge Flanagan wrote: After reviewing Merliss's moving papers-including

NOTICE AND DECLARATION

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NOTICE AND DECLARATION

NOTICE AND DECLARATION

(see Coughlin's 10/17/11 Motion for Stay

6 18 13 0204 62337 Notice of Clerk of Court Peters and Asst Bar Counsel King's Pick and Roll Combo Stamped

6 18 13 0204 62337 Notice of Clerk of Court Peters and Asst Bar Counsel King's Pick and Roll Combo Stamped