of
DEN BIEIN Howard R. Simpson
PM)
Copyright 1992
T 2400ON 7 MAY 1954, tier 55 days of A study of Dien Bien Phu can be as impor-
continual combat, General Vo Nguyen tant today as it was more than 37 yearsago.
Giap’s red battle flag, bearing the gold–le~ered Certain aspects of the campaign have a direct
slogan, “Fight and Win,” flew from the captured application to contemporary limited–intensity
command post of the French mountain strong- conflict and provide a number of lessons for the
hold of Dien Bien Phu. The fall of Dien Bien Phu professional soldie~
signaled the end of French rule in Indochina, the ● The battle was a clear demonstration of
establishment of the North Vietnamese Army as the flexibility of a guerrilla foe and his ability
a recognized professional fighting force in Asia to change procedures to fit a specific tactical
and the opening of a new phase in the struggle situation.
for Vietnam-a struggle that would eventually ● The taint of colonial paternalism or too
lead to direct US military involvement. much Western influence can be fatal to a “na-
The battle of Dien Bien Phu also revealed a tional” army in the Third World, exerting nega-
number of important truths about revolutionary tive psychological pressures that weaken morale
warfare and counterinsurgency. Unfortunately and degrade battlefield petiormance.
for the West, particularly the United States, . Underestimation of a guerrilla enemy by
these lessons were largely ignored. Given the regular forces is a cardinal milita~ sin.
choice between studying defeats and victories, . An overdependence on air support and
most military professionals will ofien opt for the supply can lead to disaster during a guerrilla-
latter, unless the defeat in question was that of a type campaign in diflcult terrain or adverse
real or potential enemy. At the time of Dien weather conditions.
Bien Phu, there was a tendency in the Pentagon To better understand the battle of Dien Bien
to view the defeat as one more French military Phu, the issues and those involved, it is usefd to
disaster, another debacle linked in American review the situation in Indochina during the
minds with France’s collapse in World War II. early 1950s.
Tiue, the outcome of Dien Bien Phu stemmed General Henri Navarre, the newly appointed
from a host of errors in planning, intelligence commander of the French Expeditionary Corps
and tactics, but the whys and wherefores were had arrived in Saigon on 19 May 1953. A cold
generally forgotten following the French with- and effete man, the 55–year-old Navarre knew
drawal from Indochina. little of Asia or Indochina. He had come to Vlet-
nam with the outlines of a special “Navarre
Plan” designed to restore the confidence of his GeneraJ iVavarre [pkwned]. . .
troops and shifi the French war effort out of neu- to restore the conjiience of his troops
tral through offensive action. With US military and shift the French war effort out of
and economic aid supporting the bulk of the war neutral through offensive action. With
effort (to keep the French “fighting the good US milillzry and economic aid suppoti”ng
fight” in Asia while guaranteeing their contin- the bulk of the war effort (to keep the
ued membership in NATO), Navarre wm under French /Jighting] while guaranteeing
pressure to come up with some impressive suc- their continued membership in NATO),
cesses. Navarre was under pressure to come up
Shortly after his arrival, Navarre turned his at- with some impressive successes.
tention to the background material and recom-
mendations dr&ed by his predecessor, General
Raoul Salan, an old Indochina hand nicknamed strongpoint had been sitting in stagnant suspen-
“Le Chinois.” One of Salan’s recommendations sion since the heavy Vietminh attacks of De-
involved the occupation of Dien Bien Phu, a cember 1952. In reality, it was an empty symbol
small administrative hamlet in a strategic valley of power, ignored or bypassed by the enemy and
in Northwest Vietnam that had been aban- requiring constant resupply by airlift from Ha-
doned to the Vietminh in 1952. Salan had seen noi. To Navarre, who needed every combat unit
Dien Bien Phu, together with the already estab- and aircraft he could muster, the evacuation
lished position at nearby Na-san, about 60 miles made practical sense. But it removed a stan-
to the east, as mutually supporting strongpoints chion of Salan’s recommendation that projected
blocking further enemy moves on Laos, 1 Its lo- Na–san, Dien Bien Phu and Lai Chau as mutual-
cation would also bolster the tribal capital of Lai ly supporting bases.
Chau, not far fi-om the Chinese border, and pro- The valley of Dien Bien Phu, 16 kilometers
vide operational support to the Grou~ments de long and 9 kilometers wide at its broadest point
Commurukx Mixes A&o~ort& (GCMA), the and dominated by jungle mountains, was no
French–led, anti–Vietminh tribal guerrillas of stranger to the clash of arms. It had long been
the region, primarily the Black Thai and the a stopping point fhr invaders from the north
Meo. Dominance of the confluence of the Nam seeking access to the upper Mekong. In 1888, a
Yum and Nam Ou rivers at Dien Bien Phu would French column had camped at Dien Bien Phu
also deny a precious transport asset to the enemy. during operations against the Siamese. It later
As Navarre’s immediate staff secretly weighed became an administrative post manned by a
the advantages and disadvantages of seizing small detachment of troops under French com-
Dien Bien Phu, they were influenced by the re- mand. In 1939, a small emergency airstrip was
current, hopeful vision of a major, set–piece built to support the garison at Lai Chau. From
battle. Such a dream sequence had become part 1940 to 1945, the Japanese occupation forces
of the folklore of the French Expeditionary largely avoided Dien Bien Phu, and the French
Corps. This “best of all possible worlds” scenario used the strip occasionally for the clandestine
had Giap’s divisions pouring from the forested landings of agents and members of Force 136, an
hills onto the valley floor of Dien Bien Phu, anti-Japanese resistance unit. z
where they would be blocked by the French When Japanese forces reversed their live–
barbed wire, decimated by artillery and air and–let–live policy toward French authorities in
strikes, and mopped up by tanks. In&china in 1945 and attacked French gmri-
In August 1953, while the @ns for a French sons throughout Vietnam, Dien Bien Phu was
attack on Dien Bien F’hu were progressing, Na- used to evacuate French wounded to the relative
varre ordered the evacuation of Na–san. This safeq of China. A heavy fire fight during this pe-
4T
~‘ Ban Nhang Nhal
commando officers with long experience in In-
m Ban Kho Lal
N dochina were ignored by staff officers, whose
A prime experience had been limited to the cam-
Au~lllary AIrSIrIII
w
A
varre’s decision to name Colonel Christian
‘ &an Hong Cum II
Fre~bs Defenses Marie Ferdinand de la Croix de Castries as
{ II at DienBienPhu
Gilles’ successor at Dien Bien Phu once the
COMBAT CUISINE
7he cooks of the French Expeditionary Corps bottles, along with ammunition and medical sup-
were the unsung hems of the Indochina War. plies, to long–range patrols deep in the jungle. Vi-
France has always made an effort to see that its men– noge[, a horrendous concoction of concentrated
at–arms eat adequately, if not well, and French sol- wine packed in cans, was sometimes substituted
diers-much to the chagrin of field surgeons-have when the real thing was not a~’ailablc. Mixed with
long preferred to go into battle with a fill stomach. water, it produced an alcoholized grape juice of pur-
The Indochina campaign presented special problems ple hue that only a besieged garrison might savor.
to quartermasters and cooks alike. The racial and re- The chefs of the legion were noted for their
ligious diversity of the French Union Forces called adaptability and imagination. War correspondents
for special menus. This, in turn, called for special in the field soon learned that a hazardous jeep ride
procurement and delivety. to a nearby legion unit w= ofien “worth a detour.”
North African riflemen required lamb in abun- One shaven-headed legion cook conjured thinly
dance, harissa hot sauce for their COUS-COUS,dates sliced water buffalo, chopped Chinese mushrooms
and mint for their tea. Troops from French West and the remains of a bottle of port into a passable
Africa had a taste for yams, coconuts and hot pep- Iweuf @gordine. Bare chested Vietnamese “beps”
pers. The Vietnamese of the national army and could do wonders with a few scrawny chickens,
those serving with French units (more than 50 per- some green onions, rice noodles and coriander. An
cent of some parachute battalions) required pork, invitation to a Spahi (Algerian cavalry) unit’s me-
plentifil rice, noodles and now mum, the fermented choui feast following the end of the ?&dim Rama-
fish sauce. The French Legion was partial to Wn dam fast meant helping yourself with your fingers to
noir, a rich blood sausage, required for the yearly a whole, spitted lamb roasted over hot coals.
celebration of Camerone, a famous battle in Mexico But, once the battle began at Dien Bien Phu and
where a legion detachment fought to the death the airstrip became unuseable, the defenders had no
against overwhelming odds. time for culinary indulgence. They survived on air–
Wine, beer, pastis and brandy were plentifd in dropped combat rations and tightened their belts as
most French messes and a special effort was made the enemy inched closer. By the time the fortress
to see that no one went thirsty in the field. The fell, they had little weight to spare, a condition that
holiday period saw truck convoys risking ambushes would prove fatal to many prisoners attempting to
and mines to deliver Christmas cheer to isolated survive on the meager rice gruel and bits of fish
outposts. Transport aircraft parachuted cased bot- supplied by their Cap;ors.= ‘
NOTES
1 Dominique Wermer, Navarre CJULa Sohtude d’un Commandant en Chef 10 Ibid.
(Pans. Revue Hlstona, 1971), 11 Author’s discus.suon With mtelhgence offcer, Dlen Blen Phu, December
2. Roger Fallgot and Pascal Krop, La P/scirr+Les service secrets 1953
fran~als 1944-1984 (Pans. Edtons du .SeuIl, 1985). 12. Author’s discussion wrth Foreign LegIon ofhcer, Dlen Blen Phu, December
3 Jules Roy, La Bata///e de D/en Blerr Phu (Pans Julllard, 1963) 1953.
4. Jullen Lebel, D/en B/en Phu (Pans: Revue Hlstona, 1971) 13 Roy
5. Joo Keegan, D/en Bien Phu (New York Ballatrne Bock, 1974), 85 14. Author’s dscus.wn wth LTC Marcel Blgeard, Sagon. 1955
15 Lebel
7 Ibid 16 G~ap
8 Vo Nguyen Glap, Den B/en Phu (Hanoi: Edmons en Langues Etrangers, 17 Ibid
1964) 18 Ibid.
9. Ibtd.