TAADA VS.

TUVERA FACTS: Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation and administrative orders. Respondents, through the Solicitor General would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that the petitioner are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question. Respondent further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of the law where the law themselves provides for their own effectivity dates. ISSUES: Whether the presidential decrees in question which contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity? RULING: Publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date, for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the 15th day following its publication, but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect. Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The publication of all presidential issuances of a public nature or of general applicability is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose burdens on the people, such as tax revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concern. The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect.

La Bugal

Petitioners argue that E.O. No. 279, the law in force when the WMC FTAA was executed, did not come into effect. E.O. No. 279 was signed into law by then President Aquino on July 25, 1987, two days before the opening of Congress on July 27, 1987. Section 8 of the E.O. states that the same shall take effect immediately. This provision, according to petitioners, runs counter to Section 1 of E.O. No. 200, which provides:
[214] [215]

SECTION 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided. [Emphasis supplied.]
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On that premise, petitioners contend that E.O. No. 279 could have only taken effect fifteen days after its publication at which time Congress had already convened and the Presidents power to legislate had ceased. Respondents, on the other hand, counter that the validity of E.O. No. 279 was settled in Miners Association of the Philippines v. Factoran, supra. This is of course incorrect for the issue in Miners Association was not the validity of E.O. No. 279 but that of DAO Nos. 57 and 82 which were issued pursuant thereto. Nevertheless, petitioners contentions have no merit. It bears noting that there is nothing in E.O. No. 200 that prevents a law from taking effect on a date other than even before the 15-day period after its publication. Where a law provides for its own date of effectivity, such date prevails over that prescribed by E.O. No. 200. Indeed, this is the very essence of the phrase unless it is otherwise provided in Section 1 thereof. Section 1, E.O. No. 200, therefore, applies only when a statute does not provide for its own date of effectivity. What is mandatory under E.O. No. 200, and what due process requires, as this Court held in Taada v. Tuvera, is the publication of the law for
[217]

without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignorantia legis n[eminem] excusat. It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

While the effectivity clause of E.O. No. 279 does not require its publication, it is not a ground for its invalidation since the Constitution, being the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, is deemed written in the law. Hence, the due process clause, which, so Taada held, mandates the publication of statutes, is read into Section 8 of E.O. No. 279. Additionally, Section 1 of E.O. No. 200 which provides for publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, finds suppletory application. It is significant to note that E.O. No. 279 was actually published in the Official Gazette on August 3, 1987.
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From a reading then of Section 8 of E.O. No. 279, Section 1 of E.O. No. 200, and Taada v. Tuvera, this Court holds that E.O. No. 279 became effective immediately upon its publication in the Official Gazette on August 3, 1987. That such effectivity took place after the convening of the first Congress is irrelevant. At the time President Aquino issued E.O. No. 279 on July 25, 1987, she was still validly exercising legislative powers under the Provisional Constitution. Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution explicitly states:
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SEC. 6. The incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until the first Congress is convened. The convening of the first Congress merely precluded the exercise of legislative powers by President Aquino; it did not prevent the effectivity of laws she had previously enacted. There can be no question, therefore, that E.O. No. 279 is an effective, and a validly enacted, statute.
Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. Penal Laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same. 5. Habitual delinquency shall have the following effects: (a) Upon a third conviction the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided by law for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods; (b) Upon a fourth conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods; and

(c) Upon a fifth or additional conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period.chanrobles virtual law library Notwithstanding the provisions of this article, the total of the two penalties to be imposed upon the offender, in conformity herewith, shall in no case exceed 30 years.chanrobles virtual law library For the purpose of this article, a person shall be deemed to be habitual delinquent, is within a period of ten years from the date of his release or last conviction of the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa or falsification, he is found guilty of any of said crimes a third time or oftener. Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc. v. Feliciano G.R. No. L-24022 (March 3, 1965) FACTS: Private respondent Feliciano, the Chairman and General Manager of the Rice and Corn Administration, wrote the President of the Philippines urging the immediate importation of rice, thru a government agency which the President may designate, pursuant to the recommendation of the National Economic Council as embodied in its Resolution No. 70, series of 1964. It was approved. The President designated the Rice and Corn Administration as the government agency authorized to undertake the importation pursuant to which Chairman Feliciano announced an invitation to bid for said importation and set the bidding date. Petitioners contend that the importation is contrary to RA 3452 which prohibits the government from importing rice and that there is no law appropriating funds to finance the same. ISSUE: W/N RA 2207 was repealed by RA 3452. HELD: The importation may be illegal on the ground that such importation belong exclusively to private parties, thereby prohibiting any government agency from doing so. RA 2207 provides that should there be an existing or imminent shortage in the local supply of rice of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency, and this is certified by the National Economic Council, the President may authorize such importation thru any government agency that he may designate. The two laws, although with a common objective, refer to different methods applicable to different circumstances. The two laws can therefore be construed as harmonious parts of the legislative expression of its policy to promote a rice and corn program. In order to effect a repeal by implication, the latter statute must be irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant to the prior existing law, hence there was no repeal. National marketing corporation V Tecson GR no. L-20131 27 August 1969 Facts:

December 21, 1965, National Marketing Corporation filed a complaint, docketed as civil case no. 63701 on the same court, as successor of the Price Stabilization Corporation, against the same defendant from 10 years ago. Defendant Miguel Tecson moved to dismiss the said complaint upon the ground lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of that and prescription of action. The court, then, issued an order of dismissal with regards the article 13 of the civil code. However, National Marketing Corporation appealed to the court of appeals from such order. Looking at the fact that 1960 and 1964 is a leap year, they insisted that a year means a calendar year and a leap year would still be counted as 1 year even if it consists of 366 days. The case reached its conclusion with the appellant's theory with regards to the article 13 of the civil code. Issues: Whether or not the term year as used in the article 13 of the civil code is limited to 365 days. Ruling: The term year as used in the article 13 of the civil code is limited to 365 days. However, it is said to be unrealistic and if public interest demands a reversion to the policy embodied in the revised administrative code, this may be done through legislative process and not by judicial decree CIR v. AICHI FORGING COMPANY OF ASIA, INC. G.R. No. 184823 October 6, 2010 Del Castillo, J. Doctrine: - The CIR has 120 days, from the date of the submission of the complete documents within which to grant or deny the claim for refund/credit of input vat. In case of full or partial denial by the CIR, the taxpayers recourse is to file an appeal before the CTA within 30 days from receipt of the decision of the CIR. However, if after the 120-day period the CIR fails to act on the application for tax refund/credit, the remedy of the taxpayer is to appeal the inaction of the CIR to CTA within 30 days. - A taxpayer is entitled to a refund either by authority of a statute expressly granting such right, privilege, or incentive in his favor, or under the principle of solutio indebiti requiring the return of taxes erroneously or illegally collected. In both cases, a taxpayer must prove not only his entitlement to a refund but also his compliance with the procedural due process. - As between the Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987, it is the latter that must prevail being the more recent law, following the legal maxim, Lex posteriori derogat priori. - The phrase within two (2) years x x x apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund under Subsection (A) of Section 112 of the NIRC refers to applications for refund/credit filed with the CIR and not to appeals made to the CTA. Facts:

Petitioner filed a claim of refund/credit of input vat in relation to its zero-rated sales from July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002. The CTA 2nd Division partially granted respondents claim for refund/credit. Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, insisting that the administrative and the judicial claims were filed beyond the two-year period to claim a tax refund/credit provided for under Sections 112(A) and 229 of the NIRC. He reasoned that since the year 2004 was a leap year, the filing of the claim for tax refund/credit on September 30, 2004 was beyond the twoyear period, which expired on September 29, 2004. He cited as basis Article 13 of the Civil Code, which provides that when the law speaks of a year, it is equivalent to 365 days. In addition, petitioner argued that the simultaneous filing of the administrative and the judicial claims contravenes Sections 112 and 229 of the NIRC. According to the petitioner, a prior filing of an administrative claim is a condition precedent before a judicial claim can be filed. The CTA denied the MPR thus the case was elevated to the CTA En Banc for review. The decision was affirmed. Thus the case was elevated to the Supreme Court. Respondent contends that the non-observance of the 120-day period given to the CIR to act on the claim for tax refund/credit in Section 112(D) is not fatal because what is important is that both claims are filed within the two-year prescriptive period. In support thereof, respondent cited Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Victorias Milling Co., Inc. [130 Phil 12 (1968)] where it was ruled that if the CIR takes time in deciding the claim, and the period of two years is about to end, the suit or proceeding must be started in the CTA before the end of the two-year period without awaiting the decision of the CIR. Issues: 1. Whether or not the claim for refund was filed within the prescribed period 2. Whether or not the simultaneous filing of the administrative and the judicial claims contravenes Section 229 of the NIRC, which requires the prior filing of an administrative claim, and violates the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies Held: 1. Yes. As ruled in the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mirant Pagbilao Corporation (G.R. No. 172129, September 12, 2008), the two-year period should be reckoned from the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made. In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown Property Group, Inc (G.R. No. 162155, August 28, 2007, 531 SCRA 436), we said that as between the Civil Code, which provides that a year is equivalent to 365 days, and the Administrative Code of 1987, which states that a year is composed of 12 calendar months, it is the latter that must prevail being the more recent law, following the legal maxim, Lex posteriori derogat priori. Thus, applying this to the present case, the two-year period to file a claim for tax refund/credit for the period July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002 expired on September 30, 2004. Hence, respondents administrative claim was timely filed. 2. Yes. We find the filing of the judicial claim with the CTA premature. Section 112(D) of the NIRC clearly provides that the CIR has 120 days, from the date of the submission of the complete documents in support of the application [for tax refund/credit], within which to grant or deny the claim. In case of full or partial denial by the CIR, the taxpayers

recourse is to file an appeal before the CTA within 30 days from receipt of the decision of the CIR. However, if after the 120-day period the CIR fails to act on the application for tax refund/credit, the remedy of the taxpayer is to appeal the inaction of the CIR to CTA within 30 days. Subsection (A) of Section 112 of the NIRC states that any VAT-registered person, whose sales are zero-rated or effectively zero-rated may, within two years after the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made, apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund of creditable input tax due or paid attributable to such sales. The phrase within two (2) years x x x apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund refers to applications for refund/credit filed with the CIR and not to appeals made to the CTA. The case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Victorias Milling, Co., Inc. is inapplicable as the tax provision involved in that case is Section 306, now Section 229 of the NIRC. Section 229 does not apply to refunds/credits of input VAT. The premature filing of respondents claim for refund/credit of input VAT before the CTA warrants a dismissal inasmuch as no jurisdiction was acquired by the CTA.