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McCain Debate and Decision Series: Should the United States Save Syria?

Kurt Volker: [0:01] ...Arizona State University. It's a unique and new policy and action institute based here in Washington and also in Tempe, Arizona. [0:08] Our mission is to advance character driven leadership at home and around the world, to promote humanitarian action, and to help make better designs for better decisions in national and international policy. You can find us at www.mccaininstitute.org. [0:26] Tonight's debate marks the launch of a series of structured debates on the most serious foreign policy challenges facing our nation. How can we, through a series of discussions such as this, help shape better policy designs and better policy decisions for our nation's foreign policy and national security? [0:46] We want to illuminate the issues surrounding these challenges and give fair and equal time to various points of view. We aim to scrupulously avoid partisanship in favor of hard consideration of America's national interests, its values, and its role in the world. I think you'll see that reflected in the structure of tonight's debate. [1:06] Tonight we focus on Syria. It's the beginning of a series. We will have a further debate on Afghanistan on February 28th and we will have a further one on Iran later in the spring. [1:17] Before introducing our moderator for the debate this evening, allow me to introduce the man whose life and whose family history of service to our nation has inspired the creation of this institute, Senator John McCain. [applause] Senator John McCain: [1:34] Thank you, Kurt. Thank you all for coming in. I especially want to thank our panel and our moderator. [1:41] I think it's very fitting that the first discussion in this institute be concerning the issue of Syria. I think that it's pretty obvious that there are very differing views on what action the United States of America and our allies should take. I don't think there's any disagreement that the situation is serious, that 60,000 or more people have been massacred, and that it threatens to spill over into surrounding nations. [2:17] There was a report this morning that the Israelis attacked some vehicles. It's pretty opaque as to exactly what happened. The refugees are flooding into surrounding countries. Senator Ayotte and I, along with a group of other senators, Republican and Democrat, just came from a visit to one of the refugee camps in Jordan, where conditions, of course, as you know, were appalling, as they are in refugee camps, despite the good efforts of the UNHCR. [2:58] I don't think that there's any doubt that a small country such as Jordan has great difficulty absorbing that many refugees, it's destabilizing to Lebanon, and, of course, the Turks find themselves in a quandary as to exactly how to address this critical situation.

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[3:21] I think this is a topic that is not going away any time soon, not to mention the state of our relations with Russia. All of these, I think, four of the foremost people, the smartest people I know are in this panel, with the exception of Leon. [laughter] Senator McCain: [3:44] I look forward very much to the discussion. I know, with all of our economic difficulties, the fiscal cliff, the sequester, and all absorbs the attention of the American people. But I think the situation in Syria could have significant and profound effects throughout the entire Middle East. That's why I welcome all of you here and I especially appreciate our panelists being here. [4:17] I welcome all of our friends and I see my revered...I'm the illegitimate son of Brent Scowcroft, who is here tonight as well, one of the most knowledgeable and fine public servant that I've had the privilege of knowing, who will be honored, by the way, this weekend at the annual gathering in Munich of the security conference. [4:44] Brent Scowcroft will be honored for his long and dedicated service to the nation and the world. [4:51] Thank you all for coming and thank you to our moderator who is here from CNN, and thank you ladies for being here. [applause] Kurt: [5:05] Thank you. Tonight's event is open to the press and we're being covered by CSPAN and we're also live streaming on our website mccaininstitute.org/live. [5:15] We're also live to Arizona State University where some students are watching, and we're also showing live on ASU TV. [5:22] For those of you who use Twitter, feel free to tweet liberally, and the hash tag is up here, #midebatesyria. After the opening stages of the debate, there will be an opportunity for questions from the audience. With that, let me introduce our moderator, Elise Labott, the state department correspondent for CNN, who together with together with Joe [indecipherable 0: [5:30] 05:42] , we really had a wonderful interview with Secretary Clinton yesterday. Thank you, and over to Elise. Elise Labott: [5:53] Thank you, Kurt. Thank you Senator McCain, Senator Ayotte. [5:56] We also have a lot of distinguished guests in the audience, Ambassador Maen Areikat, Palestinian ambassador, Carla Jazzar, the deputy chief of mission for the embassy of Lebanon, a lot of people who really care about Syria, and it looks like to be a lively discussion this evening. [6:15] In August 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to step down for the sake of the Syrian people. At that time, about 2,000 people were killed. [6:27] Today that number by U.N. estimate has risen to more than 60,000 Syrians dead. Hundreds of thousands of refugees have fled to neighboring Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan and Iraq, placing burdens on those countries. Close to two million more, more than half of them children, have been displaced inside Syria.

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[6:47] What started as a brave stand against a dictator has morphed into a sectarian civil war with opposition forces becoming more radicalized, some of them would say infiltrated by extremist forces with links to Al-Qaeda. [7:02] The conflict threatens to destabilize the entire region and become a battleground for a proxy war, some might say, of competing interests. [7:12] The international community is far from united about how to end the crisis and just today, U.N. Envoy Lockbar Brahimi warned Syria was breaking up before our eyes and said U.N. action, the U.N. security council can only improve this increasingly dire situation on the ground. But as the senator, with China and Russia opposed, that prospect, at least for now, seems very bleak. [7:35] Now the U.S. says it is committed to a Syria free of Bashar al-Assad. It has supported the efforts to unite the fractious opposition groups and, to date, the Obama administration has sent more than $200 million in aid to Syria since the uprising began in March 2011. [7:55] But that aid has been limited to humanitarian assistance and non-lethal aid to the opposition to provide services on the ground and plan for a post-Assad Syria that today seems far off. The U.S. has been left to arming the rebel, Syrian Free Army to allies in the gulf and has all but ruled out military action. [8:18] The Syrian people have called for U.S. help. The region is looking for more American leadership and in the United States, there is a robust debate on whether the U.S. can and should save Syria. [8:32] We have a stellar panel here today to address all these issues, all of whom have written extensively on Syria and who I rely on for thoughtful analysis on this complex issue. [8:44] Rober Kagan is a senior fellow in the Center on United States in Europe in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution. His most recent book, The World America Made, has been published and Dr. Kagan also serves as a member of Secretary of State Clinton's foreign policy, affairs policy board, soon to be Sen. Kerry's foreign policy board and he writes a monthly column on world affairs for the Washington Post and a contributing editor of both the Weekly Standard and The Republic. Joshua Landis: [9:15] is the director of the Center for Middle East Studies and an associate professor at the University of Oklahoma. He writes Syriacomment.com, a daily newsletter on Syrian policy that attracts some 200,000 page reads a month. It is really one of the most thoughtful blogs out today, which really dives into the crisis in Syria. Aaron David Miller: [9:38] is currently Vice President for New Initiatives and a Distinguished Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Institute International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC. His upcoming book is entitled, "Can America Have Another Great President?" [9:56] For nearly two decades, Aaron has served countless Secretaries of State and advisors in the Middle East bureau of the State Department negotiating Middle

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East peace, which we'll get to hopefully in another debate. Aaron is also one of the most thoughtful writers out there today, really writing daily on these foreign policy issues. Leon Wieseltier: [10:19] is literary editor for "The New Republic" since 1983 and the author of "Nuclear War, Nuclear Peace." Against identity and Kaddish, I might mention that tonight is the relaunch of "The New Republic." It's really a new era for "The New Republic," and everyone's really excited about that. We'll be leaving from here, all of us, to go to "The New Republic" party. Man 1: [10:46] You better call them up. Man 2: [10:48] Everybody. [laughter] Elise: [10:49] There's a van waiting outside. Man 2: [10:50] Just tell them she sent you. [crosstalk] Elise: [10:53] This is how it's going to go. We're going to start with 10 minutes from each team. Leon and Bob will begin with their argument about why the US should be doing more in Syria. We'll then hear from Josh and Aaron their argument on why the US is doing enough and should not go any further. Then Leon and Bob will rebut Josh and Aaron's argument firmly but respectfully for three minutes. Then Leon and Bob will rebut that rebuttal for three minutes. [11:21] Then I'm going to begin a discussion by grilling one or both of the teams on their arguments. The other side will have a chance to respond, and then we'll open it up to your questions. Each team will have three minutes to answer questions. [11:36] We're going to be fairly strict on the time. If you go over, you're not going to hear a "Wrap!" in your ear like I do sometimes when I go long, but we're at the Navy Memorial, so someone could come in uniform and maybe escort you out. Let's get to it with Bob Kagan and Leon Wieseltier on why the US should be doing more in Syria. Robert Kagan: [11:59] Thank you, Elise, and thank you to the McCain Institute and Senator John McCain, who is a national hero not only for his service, but for the work that he's been doing in the Senate all these years. We're grateful to him. I've just used up some of my time, but it's worth it. [12:16] First of all, Leon and I both stipulate that the United States cannot do everything, everywhere. We cannot involve ourselves, unfortunately. Even when there are humanitarian crises, we can't always involve ourselves. There are limitations on our capabilities, our resources and even our attention. [12:36] The question really is, does Syria rise to the level that does require our attention? Our assertion is that it is. If you think about America's role in the world traditionally, our involvement in various difficulties around the world. We usually become involved not necessarily just for humanitarian reasons, sometimes for strategic reasons, but very frequently when humanitarian issues and strategic interests converge. [13:09] Syria is unquestionably a place where humanitarian issues and strategic interests do converge. I don't have to repeat the humanitarian crisis that we are witnessing in Syria,

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because Elise has talked about it. Senator McCain talked about it. You read about it every day. It is an unusually horrendous humanitarian catastrophe. [13:32] The only thing I would add to what has already been said are the perhaps upward of a million displaced people inside Syria today, who are about to enter a winter period and are living in tents, at best, and may suffer potentially catastrophic consequences if something is not done. [13:53] Let me talk about the strategic interests. I don't have to repeat, despite the fact that we are supposed to be pivoting away from the Middle East, that the Middle East remains a cockpit of difficulty in the world and a vital strategic interest for both the United States and our allies. [14:09] The consequence to us, directly, of Syria becoming a failed state, with vast swatches in chaos, are, I think, more than we should be willing or able to tolerate. One thing we have learned -- and it's awfully inconvenient to have learned this at a time when many Americans would rather not be so involved around the world -- we have learned that when chaos and failed states emerge in the world, at time when terrorists are looking for opportunities to base themselves, to find bases from which to attack the United States, that it is extremely dangerous to us at home in the United States to allow these failed states to go un-dealt with. If we can prevent failed states in a place like Syria, where there are chemical weapons, we should certainly be doing so. [15:02] There is the added fact, as Elise has already point out, that the refugee flow is destabilizing the neighboring countries. Iran is involved. Israel can become involved. [15:15] I mentioned earlier that traditionally we do get involved and have gotten involved in these situations. With General Scowcroft sitting in the front row, I think it's appropriate to think back on one episode that I think is relevant. [15:29] April 1991. I don't know whether it's in your terrific book, "A World Transformed," or in another book, but there's an account of Jim Baker visiting the Kurdish region of Iraq and watching the tens of thousands of refugees streaming away from what was feared to be a possible attack by Saddam Hussein. Baker called back to Washington -- according to the account, his voice breaking -- and said, "We must do something." [15:58] What the Bush administration did in that case, in response to this refugee crisis, was send 20,000 troops and set up a no-fly zone to protect the Kurds. That administration sent 30,000 troops to Panama to restore democracy, it sent 20,000 troops to Somalia to deal with a potential humanitarian catastrophe there, and in all those cases saved thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of lives. [16:28] What we are proposing is not 20,000 troops or 30,000 troops. What we are proposing is that we provide the military and humanitarian aid that the opposition needs to turn the tide right now in the fight around Damascus. If necessary to provide a no-fly zone in the north of Syria, which probably can be done using anti-missile, anti-air assets

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that are already in place in Turkey. That, it seems to me, given the stakes in Syria, is not too high a price for the United States to pay. Elise: [17:03] Thanks, Bob. Leon? Leon Wieseltier: [17:05] I'm going to open it up just a little bit, because the debate about Syria is really not just a debate about Syria. It's also a debate about American foreign policy generally. The debate about Syria has become a kind of microcosm or [indecipherable 0:17:16] for a larger debate that's happening. [17:18] Everything that my comrade has said, I agree with. The fact is that everything that Obama said would happen if we intervened in Syria, has happened when we didn't intervene in Syria, and I would argue in part because we didn't intervene in Syria. [17:31] Obama and with the concurrence of a lot of Republicans, because there is no longer a foreign policy consensus in the Republican Party, is returning the United Sates to a particular concept, a strategic and historical concept of America's identity in the world, according to which America's role is a concept that is small, narrow, nativist, self-regarding, insular, uninvolved and non-internationalist or even actively, anti-internationalist, as opposed to the other concept of America's role in the world which various other Presidents from both parties have honored, which is of the United States not just as an internationalist enterprise but as a transformational country, really for the entire world. [18:17] One of the reasons you cannot talk about Syria, you cannot talk about interventionism or withdrawalism or isolationism or any of the words that are used these days, without immediately bumping a guy up against the idea that we can't afford to do it. No conversation about American foreign policy can last five minutes without becoming a conversation about the American economic situation. [18:38] The first thing I want to say is that there is no light that this economicist interpretation casts upon this question. The correlation that certain people make, both economists and certain strategist or foreign policy people make, between our economic prices and our strategic position in the world is not remotely as neat as they think it is. The evidence of this is everywhere. [19:00] Every time when the people in Iran take to the streets against the repulsive dictator or in Libya or in Tahrir Square, or when there's an earthquake in Haiti or when a reactor in Japan melts down, they don't at all look to Brazil or India. [19:14] They all come, they look to the United States, and for very good reason. And the economic crisis, which we are undergoing, in no way should inhibit us, from proceeding with a strategic debate that we have to have. History does not allow us, either zero sums or time outs, that is to say it is never a zero sum between domestic policy and foreign policy in the life of a great state. [19:40] We always have to proceed according to our values and interests, both in inside our realm, our borders, and outside. There are no zero sums and there are no time outs, especially for the United States, when we can kind of call the time out and tell the world

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to pause while we get our economic situation back in order, and when we've hit certain economic goals, we'll be back to help. That's not the way the world works and it's not the way the United States has traditionally worked. [20:08] And the sooner we understand that what we are debating is a moral, historical and strategic question and not an economic or budgetary question because after all, the budget can be cut a hundred different ways and the defense budget can be cut a hundred different ways, or not at all from the standpoint of the deficit. This whole element of the conversation I think has to be retired. [20:31] The second point I wanted to make is this, and it's a little bit inline with what Bob has just said. If you would make a course typology of the foreign policy challenges that the United States faces, it might go something like this -- there are crises that involve our values but not our interests. There are crises that involve our interests but not our values, and there are crises that involve both, with a sum overlap. [20:53] Obviously the ones that involve our interests but not our values, are the easy ones we pursue our interests, hopefully not to the point at which we arrive at some sort of moral crisis that we generate. [21:03] There are certain challenges, which do not seem to involve our interests very much but do bring our values into question. The classic example of that would have been Rwanda, and I'll get back to that in a moment. And then there is a vast majority of foreign policy challenges. [21:18] Syria, given both the magnitude of the humanitarian crisis there, the strategic importance of the country, there is no greater blow that could be dealt to Iran at this moment than the fall of the Assad regime. There is no greater blow that could be dealt to Hezbollah. There is no greater blow that could be dealt to Hamas than the fall of this regime. [21:40] I mean if one wants to be a cold-hearted realist and put aside all the poetic and lyrical moral consideration that people like me to develop, there is no question but that from a cold strategic standpoint, our interest require us to do whatever we can. [21:56] When I say "whatever we can," and here I go back to something that comrade Kagan said, nobody is talking about 200,000 troops and with all due respect, I know it didn't happen that long ago, the Iraq war is not all we need to know about every foreign policy decision that the United States ever has to make. [22:14] And so what I would say is that the final point, we will discover, and we have discovered before, that the pursuit of our moral values abroad turns out to have strategic benefits to the United States because the strongest position in the world the United States can have is when it has alliances not just with regimes but with people, and that's the point at which I would end. [applause] Elise: [22:41] Thank you Leon and Bob. I want to remind everybody that if you're tweeting out there, our hash tag is #midebatesyria. So let us know if you're watching

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online, if you're sitting in the audience, what you're thinking about our debate this evening. Joshua Landis: [22:58] , you want to take it up why the US is doing enough in Syria? Why we shouldn't do anymore? Joshua Landis: [23:05] I don't want to argue whether the United States is doing enough. I don't think it is doing enough. What I do want to argue is it should not be getting into the middle of an ethnic war. [23:16] President Obama just announced that he would spend an extra $165 million in Syria. This makes America the biggest donor at about a third of a billion dollars. That's $15.00 per Syrian. It's not enough. There, as we've heard, the humanitarian situation needs a lot more money. [23:39] The Syrian opposition has asked for $62 billion. I don't know where it will end up but clearly, the humanitarian issue needs a lot more money. The question here tonight is can America save Syria? [23:54] Only the Syrians can save Syria. American cannot nation-build in the Middle-East and should not get in the middle of a sectarian and ethnic war. We've tried to do that twice in the Middle-East and it's ended in tears. [24:08] We spent over a trillion dollars in Iraq and Afghanistan. We've tried to pick winners -- Allawi/Karzai. We haven't been happy with them. We don't know how to do it. We can't pick ethnic winners either. [24:26] In Iraq, we tried to cast down the Sunnis who had been ruling Iraq, the 20 percent Sunnis, and had been put there by the British, and through them to the bottom of society, and we raised up the 60 percent Shiites in the name of democracy. [24:40] Today, we have another tyrannical rule forming. The Sunnis are at the bottom of society and they are very unhappy. It's long and bloody 10 years now since we invaded and the Sunnis have become radicalized and they are blowing up car bombs everyday in the middle of Iraq because it's a zero sum game for the losing ethnic groups. [25:04] We entered into Lebanon in 1982 to try to put the Christians on top of the Moslems. It ended up miserably. We went in with the Israelis, 220 marines were blown up and Reagan fortunately drew us out. [25:19] Today, we are trying to manage Syria ethnically to put the Sunnis on top of the Alawites. Certainly the minorities, and most of the minorities are clinging to the Alawites. Twenty percent minorities against 70 percent Sunni Arabs and 10 percent Kurds who probably want to live on their own. [25:38] What will Syria look like tomorrow? None of us know. We don't know if it will break up into three countries -- a Kurdish country, an Alawite enclave on the coast, and Sunnis in the middle. Whether the Sunnis would predominate. [25:51] If we decapitate the Assad regime the way we did to Assad's regime, and the Sunnis take over and the Islamic Militia's net now are pushing in at the Alawite

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territories, the Alawites, 2.5 million of them, could run for their lives. It could be ethnic cleansing. They could all go to Lebanon, which I imagine they will. It's an hour away. [26:16] Like the Palestinians running in front of the Jews in 48. Like the Christians of Anatolia, where the Turks won. Eighteen percent Christians in Anatolia in 1914. By 1922 there was less than one percent. [26:32] We don't know what we're unleashing in Syria. A new ethnic balance is being worked out in the entire limit, in Lebanon, in Iraq, Palestine/Israel with between Jews and Palestinians, and it's happening and is going to happen in Syria. [26:50] Like the Eastern Europe in the first half of the 20th century, there is a major sorting out going on with ethnic groups moving around, some leaving, some staying, some being winners, and if America thinks they can get into the middle of this and adjudicate who is going to be the winner, we better be prepared to spend billions of dollars and get some troops on the ground, because if there is ethnic cleansing, because we decapitate a regime. [27:14] We need to be there to help people. I don't think that America can decide this equilibrium if we push our hand too far on one side of the scale, and then we leave, as we invariably do, as we did in Iraq when we tried to do the "sons of Iraq" and power up. It gave the Sunnis part of an ethnic sharing deal and as soon as we did and we had quieted the violence, we ran for the access. [27:44] And then what happened? We dumped the Shia, the Sunnis. The cities got expelled by the Shiites and that's what's happening today and that's why they're on the war path again, because we abandoned them, and we will do the same thing in Syria. [27:56] An equilibrium has to be worked about between Syrians. It's going to be very bloody. America should be there to pick up and help, encourage and save as many people as we can. At the University of Oklahoma, President Boren has accepted scholarships for Syrian. My inbox is inundated with hundreds of moving emails. [28:21] It's very difficult to solve this humanitarian problem but to think that we can save Syria, I think is a fool's errand. We've done it twice before. We've spent a trillion dollars and we've ended up with chaos in both situations. [28:36] Syria is going to be long and tough, but we cannot unradicalize Syria. The argument that if we had gone in first it wouldn't have become radical, is a false argument. We went into Iraq and in three weeks we decapitated the regime. [28:52] There was no radicalization for about two months and then boom -- Al Qaeda spread throughout Iraq. Why? Because the Sunnis were being cast down to the bottom and hey, they were losers. [29:04] Radicalism is spread amongst the Palestinians because they've been cast down and they are losers. America has spent hundreds of millions of dollars trying to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict. We have been unable to do it.

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[29:20] We are not good at this. I don't know what the time is here. Elise: [29:23] We're pretty much out of...have a closing comment. Joshua: [29:24] OK. But America should not launch into trying to solve and save this Syrian problem. [applause] Elise: [29:36] Thanks Josh. Aaron is the cynic of the group so he will round us out and get us ready for Q&A. Aaron David Miller: [29:42] I don't want to erode my time but I don't want also to want to be misinterpreted. I am not for doing nothing in Syria and I am not cynical. You'll hear about that in a minute. [29:51] First of all, Senator McCain, it's an honor to be here. We may not agree on this but I have to say that I respect your clarity and your honesty, which are two things frankly that are missing both in diplomacy and life in general. General Scowcroft it's really nice to see you too. [30:06] I'm going to make three or four points. Number one. My argument is both emotionally unsatisfying and annoyingly negative, I concede that. I spent 25 years at The State Department working for Democrats, democratic and republican Secretaries of State, I had a certain number of illusions during that period. [30:21] They were illusions with the best of intentions, but I cannot in all good conscience continue, now that I'm out of government service, to harbor illusions. It was Meinken who wrote, not far from here, "That in a democracy it's unfashionable to discuss the disease without even talking about the remedy." [30:39] My argument is, we must talk about the nature of the problem, so that we don't rush forward without thinking through clearly, the relationship between ends and means. So that we have a chance, if we can, to remedy the problem. [30:54] It's not a question of saving Syria. it's not a question of should we or could we? The truth is, even if we could, we shouldn't, because the expenditure of resources that we would need to put into this enterprise would far exceed, in my judgement, our capacity to actually succeed. [31:12] We don't want to own another Arab country. Bob and Leon are absolutely right. No one is talking about boots on the ground. The Iraq and Afghanistan parallel is important for two reasons. [31:23] Number one, to severely, and in a cruel and unforgiving manner, begin to think about the relationship between means at our disposal and our capacity to achieve our ends. Precisely how the application of those means, military assistance, no-fly zone, is likely to affect the end game? [31:43] Josh's point here is right. The end state in Syria right now is, in my judgment, far from clear. We do not understand and know, and Josh is going to forget more about Syria than anybody among the four of us is ever going to know. This is a very important point. The best analysis leads to the best policy.

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[32:07] Second. I take Leon's point, but I do not believe that this should constitute, the Syria debate should constitute, the broader issue of what's wrong with American foreign policy? It is not a fair test, in my judgement. It is not. [32:22] The reality is, those who oppose a proactive role in Syria, perhaps myself, I don't abandon American leadership. I'm not a declinist. I believe America is an exceptional country. [32:36] I mentioned this to Bob earlier, "The dividing line for American policy should not be between democrats and republicans, not between left and right, not between center and left, but between dumb on one hand and smart on the other." Which side of the line does America want to be on? [32:55] I would argue that we have more consensus in our foreign policy, Leon, today. Than at any point that I could remember. Which is one of the reasons that the republican party had such a hard time finding a vulnerability that resonated with the general public in the debates and in the campaign. [33:14] The fact is Barack Obama is two things. He is a republican realist, number one. He has morphed into a less ideological, less reckless, more disciplined version of George W Bush. [33:29] He has virtually monopolized the territory of the republican party's foreign policy. Which is one of the reasons I think the debate over Chuck Hagel has proved to be so contentious. It's not about Chuck Hagel at all. It's about republicans trying to struggle with the fact that they need to some how reset. [33:48] Back to Syria. The tragedy of Syria is this. So much blood has flowed that it is impossible to imagine a negotiated transition now. [34:00] Not enough, horrifically, and I say this not to trivialize 60,000 dead and hundreds of thousands with life crippling injuries, not enough has flowed to force a divided, self-centered and distracted international community to emerge with a unified policy. [34:19] This is not Barack Obama's. I voted for republicans and democrats. I've worked for republicans and democrats. I got serious problems with some of Obama's foreign policies, but the notion that some how he is responsible for this? Or that an early intervention would have prevented militarization, radicalization. [34:38] The fact is, decentralization is the subtext of the Arab Spring, Arab Winter, Islam-spring, whatever you want to call it. The Arab state is imploding. [34:50] If 70 to 2,000 was an area of consolidation under faux authoritarian leaders, faux republics, then what you're seeing now is decentralization, and it's everywhere. You're seeing the end of what never was a deep state. [35:07] Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Libya. This is the problem that we're going to have to deal with, finally. I do not suggest abandoning Syria. Buffer Jordan, and Lebanon, and Turkey. Run an operation, international tin cup.

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I was with Baker in April of '91 at [indecipherable 0: [35:26] 35:29] . I saw what he saw. What he did and what he recommended worked. It was focused, means related to ends. [35:38] Final point. We are emerging from the two longest wars in American history. Where In my judgement, victory was determined, never by when could we win, but by when could we leave? [35:53] An extrication is not the metric that you want to evaluate and judge the performance and behavior of the most consequential power on Earth. This guy Barack Obama is the great extricator. His role is to get Americans out of conflicts, not get them into new ones. [36:12] Cruel and unforgiving assessment, both on military assistance and a no-fly zone. I'm sorry. Elise: [36:17] Thank you, Aaron. Thank you. Aaron: [36:20] You dropped a nickel in me Elise, I had to spin on. [applause] Elsie: [36:23] We're going to take it from your rebuttal. Now we're going to have a three minute rebuttal by, Leon and Bob, I'll leave it to you, I think maybe one of you can do it and then we'll leave it to Josh to do that rebuttal. Aaron your... Aaron: [36:33] I'm done. Leon: [36:35] I'll say something's really quickly. First, with all due respect to Obama and the Presidency, it's not up to him or the President of The United States what history provides. [36:44] History presents challenges whether he wants to be the great extricator or the great implicator, it's not up to him. History is going to operate the way it does and we're going to have to assess the various challenges, challenge by challenge. [36:56] Secondly, I understand the problem of knowledge and ignorance in personal life, in political life, diplomatic life. We all operate with various levels of knowledge. [37:07] We will never have the kind of clarity that some people want us to have before we undertake historical action. We can argue about levels of clarity that would be necessary, and what we would have to know and what we wouldn't have to know. [37:21] The idea that, until we are confidant enough that we know everything, so that all the consequences will have been anticipated, and the mess of history, and the fog of war, and all that other stuff will some how evaporate before our transparent gaze, that will never be the case. [37:38] It certainly seems clear to me, that whatever happens in the outcome of Syria, as things stand now, the next government of Syria will not feel it owes The United States or the west anything. And will have absolutely no incentive what so ever to align itself with us, and out interests, and our values. In the fog of my darkness, that seems clear to me.

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[38:03] About nation building. Nobody is suggesting nation building out of whole cloth. We are not demi-ergers. We don't go around creating nations. We are talking about a nation in which there was already a democratic revolt. [38:17] We are talking, not about creating democracies, but about assisting indigenous democrats in legitimate rebellion against hideous dictators. [38:27] Nobody is suggesting that The United States go create a new Syria or create a new Iran, but there are people in all these countries who deserve our help and who in the long term, secularly, as the economists like to say, it would be in our strategic interest to help. [38:45] We learned this from Eastern Europe and The Soviet Union, nobody ever, except for some maniacs, no one ever suggested a military attack against any communist country. We didn't even have roll back. [38:57] When communism fell, it became perfectly clear that our support under various presidents, from Carter through Reagan, sustained the opposition, sustained the dissidents and sustained the people who then became the rulers of those states. I know they're enormous differences. They're enormous differences. [39:14] The idea, that A, we cannot effect the outcome in anyway but a negative one. B, that we will never be in possession of knowledge sufficient for us to act meaningfully to bring about an outcome that would be in our interest and conform with our values. These two assumptions seem completely false to me. Elise: [39:32] Thanks Leon. Josh? Joshua: [39:35] The notion that we are going to find the democrats in Syria and put them into power is a false notion. We have tried with the opposition, first to find the Syrian National Council, which is a bunch of liberals. Mostly, we would like them to be Harvard educated and glue them on top of what's becoming an increasingly very violent and Islamist uprising. [40:08] There are over a thousand militias fighting in Syria. The Syrian opposition today, which America helped put together, are a bunch of Harvard educated liberal people that we would like to rule Syria in the future. Because we hope we can glue them on top of the Islamist militias and quiet them down. [40:28] We said exactly the same thing about Iraq. We're going to go in there and we're going to build democracy. What do we have? We have a Shiite Dictatorship. You said the Shiite's were going to be secular. They weren't secular, they were religious. [40:40] The neocon has got everything wrong on what was going to happen to Iraq, and they're going to get it wrong in what's going to happen in Syria. Democracy is not happening in Syria anytime soon. [40:51] The only two social indicators that have any reliable connection to whether democratic experiments work, are median age and per capita income. Those at a median

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age of 30 and above, you stick democracy 50 percent of the time. Per capita income, about $10,000 per person. [41:15] Syria, the median age is 21 years old. Iraq it was 21, Tunisia it's 30. Maybe Tunisia has a chance of becoming a democracy. Syria has a per capita, or GDP, today of about $1,000. It had 3,500. It's collapsed. [41:33] Democracy is not going to be the outcome. We can see it by looking at the militias. The strongest, most able militias are the Islamic front. They're the ones that took Taftanaz. They're the ones that have taken all the military successes in the last few months. They want an Islamic caliphate. They do not want democracy. They're not going to be friends with America. Leon: [41:52] Well, of course they're not. Joshua: [41:52] Even if you gave them money. You're not going to beat them by putting a bunch of Harvard educated democrats, and giving them money, and trying to get them to buy love in Syria. [42:02] They do not have a grassroots military population in Syria that's following them. They want our money before they'll name a government. We just tried to get them to name a provisional government. [42:16] They said, "We won't do it unless you give us the money, because we'll fail. We don't have the grassroots organization. America said, "Well, we're not giving you the money until you start to succeed." [42:25] We got into this argument with them. They said, "We're not going to do it unless we get the money, because we won't succeed without the money." That's where Obama was left. Do you want to try and pick them as the winners? When they have no proof that they're going to be able to win. Elise: [42:43] Thanks Josh. I think what we're going to do, is we're going to continue our debate a little, before we open it up to discussions. Bob: [42:49] , why don't you take two minutes and just kind of respond to what Josh said. In terms of some of the problems that we have right now and identifying who we would even aid? Because the opposition, despite the best efforts of the international community, still really doesn't have it's act together. Bob: [43:07] No oppositions have their act together before they get support. If you look at any dissident movement or opposition force in any country, they're always a mess until somebody actually starts helping them. [43:17] It's absolutely true. We have a less chance of finding the kind of people we want and strengthening them, than we did six months ago. We had a better chance six months before that. We'll have less good chance six months from now. [43:29] As long as we keep debating, ultimately this will be a self-fulfilling prophesy. You mentioned Josh, we shouldn't topple Assad and destabilize Syria. The outcome eventually is going to be a toppled Assad and a destabilized Syria.

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[43:42] We are going to have, in the mean time, another 100,000 dead, another half million refugees, and then we get precisely the outcome that you don't want us to do anything to lead us to. What do we do then? What is the policy then? [43:57] What is the policy when Assad, who refuses to go down without fighting to the bitter end, uses the chemical weapons in his arsenal? What is our action then? Are we going to be drawn in then? Then we'll face all these same problems, that you're talking about. [44:11] By the way, I want to say one last thing. There is actually a history that precedes 2003 and 2001 in America. [44:20] There were some very dubious interventions that The United States got into in the 1990's, and if you want to talk about not getting into the middle of ethnic groups, how about not getting into the middle of the ethnic groups in Bosnia? [44:31] We could had this exact debate and the equivalent of you guys, including the greatest experts would have said, "You cannot possibly bring a better outcome in Bosnia, given the inter-racial war that's been going on for centuries in that country." [44:45] Yet, we did. We bombed to the point we were able to stop the war. We had the date and the accords. Are things better off today in the Balkans than they were then? Yes they are. [44:55] It's not only a record of unmitigated failure that we can look upon in The United States. We have a mixed record in foreign policy. We have success and we have failures. [45:05] As far, let me say finally, as Obama being the great extricator. He has a history too. Harding was a great extricator, Coolidge was a great extricator, Herbert Hoover was a great extricator, and for the first years of his presidency, FDR was a great extricator. Elise: [45:23] Thanks Bob for that impassioned rebuttal. Aaron why don't you respond to that. Specifically the point that, whatever the US said, both Bob and Leon talked about this, whatever the US has been afraid of happening in Syria, is happening right now. [45:43] Continued deaths, increased radicalization, jihadists with weapons, and the idea that the US acted in Libya to prevent hundreds of thousands of deaths. We're moving up to 100,000 deaths in Syria. [46:00] If the president said, as he did in his recent new republic argument, that the US is not intervening because of interests or limitations, what about the moral imperative that the president acted on in Libya? Aaron: [46:15] Libya-Syria provides fundamentally different examples. Look, Let's be clear Bob, that it's in the resume of the great power to behave, as it often does, in hypocritical, anomalous and contradictory fashion. [46:32] That's how great powers behave, because they have the luxury of being able to behave that way. In Libya, the president acted because it was at a different moment in the so-called Arab Spring. He acted because he had a UN security council mandate to act...

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Elisa: [46:50] Specifically. I just want you to talk about the specific moral imperative. Because he said, "We are doing this because this is what we do. This is who we are." Aaron: [46:58] Fine. We also have accommodated ourselves and watched the [indecipherable 0:47:03] in Bahrain repress Shia and Sunni reformers. What consistency is there? It is when we act consistently. When we create doctrines for ourselves, which are straight jackets, that we end up getting ourselves into incredible trouble. [47:22] Two additional points. I refuse any longer, and this has nothing to do with the Arab world or the Muslim world, but our determination to put Hollywood conceit and tropes on everyone else in the world is fundamentally mistaken. [47:35] We have non-predatory neighbors to our north and south and fish to our east and west, what one historian called our liquid assets. We are extraordinarily fortunate people. We do not understand what it's like to live on the knife's edge. We do not have a dark history, we do not live in a dangerous neighborhood. [47:52] As a consequence of this, we some how believe that we understand these ethnic conflicts and can some how fix them. I am not against buffering neighboring states, international tin cups to raise money, contingency plans on chemical weaponry. [48:10] The debate among us, between us, comes down to one narrow point. Do you believe that we can provide enough military assistance of sufficient quantity and character that would somehow change the arc of the crisis? [48:28] You might say to me, "But we have to try." I know. I remember Bill Clinton telling us at the second briefing before he went to Camp David, "Trying and failing" he said, "Is better than not trying at all." [48:41] I remember how inspired I was by that. That is an appropriate slogan for a college or high school football team. It is not a substitute for the most consequential power on earth. [48:53] We get ourselves into trouble, Bob and Leon, when we commit two sins for great powers. One, the sin of omnipotence, we somehow think we can do everything. The other is the transgression of omniscience. That somehow we believe that we know everything. [49:11] The debate between us has to do with the provision of military assistance and the construction of a new fly zone. That is the debate here. Let's not moralize this or turn it into a morality play. That's the question. [49:27] I would argue, that history, since you both invoked it, in the last decade it's on my side. You have to tell me, why you think, you really believe, that we can centrally do this with unlimited military aid? Elise: [49:39] OK. Let's pick up on that point. Thanks Aaron. Reminder, we're tweeting it all. We're tweeting about this very lively debate at #midebatesyria. [49:52] Are there any Syrian-Americans or any Syrian residents in the house? OK, thank you. We'd like to hear from you.

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Leon: [49:59] why don't you address this point. That if the US were to get involved. How do you avoid the so-called Pal Doctrine, the Pottery Barn rule, "You break it, you bought it." How do we avoid getting bogged down in a brewing civil war? [50:13] Do we get stuck policing a fight that A, isn't ours and B, that we've historically proven, in recent, yes, as Bob points out, there hasn't been decades long experience of US involvement, but our recent involvement in these crisis shows we're not very good at policing. Does that turn the conflict in Syria, dealing with the situation in Syria, to once again being about The Unites States and it's role in the region? Leon: [50:39] I'd say a few things. First, what happened in Syria, was that over almost two years now was that a democratic rebellion was transformed into an ethnic and sectarian civil war. That was Assad's strategy. His strategy was to see to it that a democratic rebellion would be translated, by force of circumstance, into an ethnic and sectarian civil war. Insofar as we and the West posed no serious impediments to that strategy, that was one of the factors that enabled that strategy to succeed. [51:14] Now, the fall of a dictator is obviously not the same thing as the birth of a democracy. Anyone who knows anything even about the birth of democracy in the West, which was also not a pretty and fast process, knows this. [51:29] Democratization is not an event. It is an era. It is an era. We have to understand that if you believe, and some people here may not believe this, that the furtherance of democracy is not only morally edifying to Americans and to the world but is actually in the strategic interests of the United States. [51:49] If you believe that, then you have to understand what sort of commitment you make. You do not make a commitment of 200,000 troops. You do not bring democracy at the end of a rifle. You do not force people to be democratic. You do not believe that you are omnipotent or omniscient because nobody is. We never were. [52:09] What you do is you begin to help those forces within those countries who are beginning a long struggle. A long struggle. It is entirely true that, right now, the jihadists in Syria seem to be gaining the upper hand. Why do you think that is? Is it because both sides were evenly armed, but they fire weapons more skillfully? Is it because the opposition had patrons, and the jihadists had patrons, but the one patron was wiser than the other? [52:39] There was an asymmetry of force, an imbalance of power in that, and Assad's strategy was permitted to work. Democratization is essentially an exercise in destabilization because you are exchanging one political culture with another political culture, and we have to keep our heads. We have to keep our heads. [53:02] If we believe that the emergence of democracies in the world is in our interest. If we believe that the fewer dictators there are, certainly the fewer ethnic, sectarian, or theocratic dictators there are is in our interest, then we have to develop long-term mature, coldly calculated, morally motivated commitments to helping oppositions slowly march towards that goal. [applause] Leon: [53:31] Thank you, whoever you are.

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Elise: [53:31] Josh, why don't you respond to that specifically, knowing how much you know. Specifically, we've often talked about the people with the guns are going to be the one running this at the end. How do you make...? Joshua: [53:43] Democracy is the wrong way. He is going to drug you with America's religion, which is democracy. Every American loves democracy. I grant that. I love democracy. Leon: [53:55] I plead guilty to taking that drug. [laughter] Joshua: [53:56] I'm right there with you, but this is not about... Elise: [53:59] I'll have some of the buffet later. Joshua: [54:02] There is much more going on here. Anybody who knows the Middle East understands that the borders were drawn around peoples who don't necessarily want to live together. We've seen this in Israel. Palestinians and Jews do not want to live together. [54:17] We could say, "Oh, let's have democracy and have a one-state solution." Jews do not want a one-state solution. Palestinians do not want a one-state solution. [54:24] It's not about democracy in Palestine-Israel. It isn't about democracy in Iraq. We said we're going to make democracy and we're going to cast the Sunnis down and the Shiites will be...They were not. The pushed the Sunnis out of every job in the military, in the government, in the education system. That's what's going to happen. [54:43] Anybody who thinks that when the Sunnis take over in Syria, that they are going to incorporate the national institutions into the next state, are fooling themselves. Those institutions have been jammed full of the minorities who've had their foot in the throats of the Sunnis for the last 50 years. [54:59] The Alawites, who dominate the military structure, the ministry of education, and tons of other minorities, and have filled them up with minorities and Sunnis who are sympathetic to them. All those people are going to be cleansed from every one of those institutions because they're disloyal. [55:18] The new revolutionaries are going to put their people, who are starving, who've been hurt for this revolution and who have paid an incredible price to get rid of this suppressive government. You're going to end up with a new set of dictators. That's the unfortunate truth. [55:33] America can get themselves into the middle of this, but I do not think that we have a strategic interest. Today, Sunnis and Shiites are fighting over control of the Middle East. America's trying to balance Iran versus Saudi Arabia to a certain degree. [55:49] Syria is in the middle of that struggle. Unfortunately, it's getting stomped under foot by these two big elephants, if you will.

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[55:58] We are doing a lot to hurt Iran, and you say it's America's national interests to hurt Iran as much as we can and help Israel. Now, we can hurt Iran. We've got them under the worst sanctions. Leon: [56:08] Let's assume, it's assumed, yeah. Joshua: [56:09] But we've got them under the worst sanctions that anybody has ever placed. We are impoverishing Iranians very quickly. They may turn into a failed state, too, which would be, I suppose, a happy outcome. We don't want them to be a failed state, we want them to be just above a failed state. [56:23] But we don't want them to lose to the Saudis, because we're frightened of the Saudis, as well, and Wahhabism. We're balancing, and we're going to balance in Syria at the end of the day. [56:35] Thinking that we're going to, in a sense, that's what America's going to end up doing, is making sure that neither side wins in Syria, and that's what we're doing today. Unfortunately, I hate to say that. But we are, that's the fact of the matter is, is that we're not helping the opposition to win because we're frightened they're Islamists, and we don't like Assad and we're not helping, and we're happy to see him hurt. But this is driving Syria into the dumps, and that is our national interest, unfortunately, today. Leon: [57:05] Sorry, I didn't understand what you said. But you're for this, right? Where American policy is now. Josh, is that right? You approve of our policy, such as it is right now. Joshua: [57:17] I don't think we can adjudicate people who get sucked into a situation that we cannot control. But what I'm saying is, the objective outcome is that we're frightened of the Islamists on the one hand which are clearly growing in power across the Middle East, and that's what the Arab Spring is about, to a certain degree, is bringing Islamists into the center of power. Leon: [57:37] Yes, but you shouldn't just fatalistically lament an outcome that you're encouraging us not to do anything to prevent. Joshua: [57:44] How are you going to prevent the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt? You can't prevent this. Leon: [57:48] They don't want us to continue rhetorically. Elise: [57:50] Bob, Let me bring Bob in here about this whole idea, is part of the problem here that the US really has no policy for addressing the Arab Spring. Talk a little bit about, is the US afraid of continuing its lack of popularity in the region? Is there a chance here to help reshape the region? Or is this a failed experiment that the US is going to continue to get bogged down in? Bob: [58:21] I don't know if I'm going to answer that question, because I'm more interested in, if I can, I mean, yes, we don't have a policy toward the Middle East that I think is coherent. I don't consider, by the way, the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood to mark the death knell of democracy in Egypt. It depends how the Muslim Brotherhood

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behaves. [58:40] Our policy, by the way, as it happens to, and I would say, in this respect, I agree with the administration, has been to treat Egypt and the elected government of Egypt as the elected government of Egypt. [58:51] Now, just let me say something about democracy, because I think we have to clear about who's suffering from the sin of omniscience here. You seem to know who is capable of democracy and who is not. We have been hearing about this for decades. [59:07] Tell it to the Indians what per capita income you have to have in order to be able to have a democracy. I have been hearing for decades that Asians, for a variety of reasons, were not capable of democracy, that Catholic countries were not capable of democracies. Apparently the last acceptable group of people who are not capable of democracies live in the Middle East. They're not capable. [59:30] I'm not prepared to make that judgment yet. I'm prepared to give it a shot. If you had looked at Germany as a result of its history going back 70 years, in 1945, you would not have said that Germany was an obvious choice to be a democracy. Yet we were able to do something that was constructive. [59:51] A lot of the things that we now take for granted that we did in the world, at the time, seemed impossible, impossible. We were told it was impossible. [60:02] Now, are we going to get a perfect outcome in Syria? Absolutely not, it'll be far from perfect. But the question that Leon and I keep asking you is, what is the outcome that we're going to get when we do nothing? Is that an outcome that we are going to be able to tolerate? [60:18] Yes, Aaron, the United States has been a very foolish country many times throughout its history. One way in which it fools itself consistently is we believe we can tolerate something, which at the end of the day, we find we can't tolerate. [60:33] We said, at one point in the Balkans, we don't have a dog in the fight. We don't care how many people get killed, it's just not an interest of ours, and guess what? You talk about how we don't always stay, we also don't stay out. In fact, we have a hard time staying out. I predict by the way, in my omniscience, that we will peruse the policy that you both recommend, and we will wind up being dragged into Syria in the worst possible circumstances. Elise: [61:00] What's the red line you think that draws the US in? Robert: [61:02] I think that the use of chemical weapons will be the area. If anybody believes, and I know that people in the government don't believe this...By the way, I wish that I could say that it's going to be 100,000, 200,000 deaths. But I believe, yes, this president will tolerate 100s of 1,000s of deaths in Syria. The use of chemical weapons will be the red line. I believe that anyone who thinks that Assad will go down without using every weapon in his arsenal, that seems to me to be a fool's errand.

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Elise: [61:32] Aaron, let me have a pointed question on this point. You've said that there's not enough that the international community could force. What is the red line here? Is there a number of deaths? Is it a Srebrenica? Or, is it a chemical weapon? [61:46] I have to say, there have been numerous attacks on homes and other areas, with something very short of chemical weapons. Is US inaction, or US willing to get more robustly involved, allowing Assad to walk as close up to the red line as he can, and put a toe over the red line, pretty confident that the US isn't going to do anything. Aaron: [62:08] Yeah, that may be true. If the President of the United States determined that as a matter of interest, that the overthrow of the Assad regime was what we needed to do, the President would sit down and draft a sensible, comprehensive, coherent military strategy to achieve that end. All right? He would calibrate his ends with his means. [62:32] Now, I would argue that is not a vital national interest, given the consequences and the implications of such a policy, which would mandate a degree of responsibility that I don't think we can afford right now. With all due respect Leon, I do think there is some correlation between military adventures abroad that don't turn out right, and the nature of our own broken house, which is fundamentally broken. [63:02] All I'm suggesting, and I don't know whether Josh intended it or not...I do not believe that the Arab and Muslim peoples are incapable of democracy. In fact, it took us 150 years to reconcile the promise of the Declaration of Independence with the validation of slavery contained in our own constitution. We're still not there yet. [63:26] But, on the issue of democracy, 22 countries since 1950 have maintained their democratic character continuously. The Turks and the Indians are not on the list. It is a very small club, and they are not borne on the back of somebody's tank or Patriot missile battery. Robert: [63:47] Of course not. Aaron: [63:48] All right? Robert: [63:49] Sometimes they have been. Aaron: [63:50] If democracy is what we should be doing, Leon, then you should argue for consistency across the board in our policy, not just in Syria, but in Bahrain and in Saudi Arabia. The bell may toll for the kings too, but I would argue that that is not a wise policy for us to do. We do not want an Arab Spring in Saudi Arabia. We don't, for many different reasons. [64:20] I return to the basic point. The argument is, should we supply a quality and character of military aid to "X" opposition group, in and effort to change, fundamentally...Otherwise, why do it? Why do a half measure, or a half-baked measure, if in fact A, it doesn't work. B, it just accentuates the problem of warlordism. C, you've got the wrong hands problem where some of these weapons would go. You want to do this, do it right and stop messing around with half measures. [65:00] You think democracy is so important in Syria? You think the overthrow of Assad is of vital internationals Interest? Then give me a strategy. Give me a strategy that actually allows the United States to succeed. Don't fool around with half measures.

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Maybe a no fly zone with the Turks, maybe we'll vet this group and provide this level of armament. [65:22] No. Give me an actual strategy and you haven't done that, and in two years of watching this debate, and participating in it, nobody has done it? How come? I want to know how come? If this is so important, give me a strategy, a real strategy. [applause] Aaron: [65:43] ...A strategy that Senator McCain might well propose to actually accomplish American objectives. The truth is I can't do it, and the reality is you can't do it. There are too many uncertainties, there are too many unknowns. Governing is about choosing. FDR said, "Lincoln died a sad man." You know why? Because he couldn't have everything. We are not going to overthrow the Assad regime, I don't think. If we can't do that, tell me what we should do. [crosstalk] Leon: [66:18] Aaron, you've just spent the last two minutes asking me to repeat what I've already said, which I'm happy to do. Elise: [66:24] I'm going to open it up to the audience now. We have a Syrian-American woman right here. You have the microphone. Please direct your question to one of the teams. Then what we'll do is each team will have three minutes to address this question. Thank you. Please identify yourself. Rafif Jouejati: [66:42] Rafif Jouejati of the Local Coordination Committees in Syria. I don't really have questions, I have comments. Starting with Joshua Landis, there you go again. I represent the largest network of activists in Syria. We are a secular, democratic organization. None of us are Harvard educated. I want to say that this struggle. Elise: [67:08] We're going to switch out mikes, ma'am. Ms. Jouejati: [67:13] Thank you. This revolution started for dignity, democracy and freedom, as you very well know. You in particular, Joshua, also know that peaceful protests continue to take place throughout the country every week. Not one of you has addressed the fact that Assad regime has been bombarding breadlines and targeting civilians. What hurts most is that Syrians inside Syria know that this is genocide. The specific targeting of children makes it a genocide. [67:45] To call it an ethnic or sectarian war when you rightly pointed out that this is was the Assad regime's strategy is really an insult to the more than 65,000 people who are dead. Let me correct the record. It's more than three million people internally displaced, and it's 16 million people on the verge of destitution. Thank you. Elise: [68:09] Thank you for your comments. Josh? Joshua: [68:13] Rafif, I admire the work you've done. This revolution started out with many people like you demanding a better life in Syria. It has moved into a sectarian war and we don't know how it's going to end. This is the problem. We've brought up the model of Yugoslavia. [68:38] The fact is America did nothing about Yugoslavia for about two years. While terrible, brutal ethnic fighting went on. It was only after the different

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populations of Yugoslavia had run to their own enclaves. Then America divided up the country. [68:52] I know that you would not want your country divided up between Kurdistan, the Alawites, perhaps the Druze, and the Sunnis in the middle. You want a government that is democratic. Where everybody gets along. Where there is equal representation. It's a beautiful dream. In a Syria today, are Sunnis and Alawites going to be able to live together? [69:17] Are the militias that conquer the Alawite territory when this regime falls going to be gentle with them? Or are the Alawites going to run? Which they probably will do. There may be ethnic cleansing. We don't know what the outcome is going to be. It's Syria's interest to have this done. It's not America's interest to get in the middle of this terrible sorting out which is going on. Elise: [69:48] Leon, why don't you respond to that. Is there an accommodation that can be made? Leon: [69:51] First of all, other powers are already in the middle. Putin is already in the middle. Iran is already in the middle. The idea that American support for the opposition would suddenly introduce outside intervention of some kind in a conflict that has been magically played on a level playing field, it's crazy. The bad guys, whether that's Assad or the jihadists, they have their supporters. They get their weapons. They're doing just fine. [70:23] All that's being asked is that in fact, A, that the fight be fair. B, that's it's recognized to be a legitimate fight. C, that this is not going to be a fight that's going to end immediately. D, that the outcome of this fight in this place Syria, which my ten year old son could tell you looking at the map of the region, that American interests are in some way affected by what happens in this place. [70:49] The idea that all of this isn't obvious makes no sense to me. Makes no sense to me. It doesn't describe the reality that I see. Not in a scholarly way. Not, I might add, in a Neo-Con way either. It doesn't describe what I see actually happening on the ground. There is a struggle taking place. That's what's happening. One side of the struggle needs our help. Deserves our help for moral and strategic reasons, and is not getting our help. [71:20] While the other side of the struggle, which contravenes everything we believe in and every interest we have in the region, is getting help from a whole variety of outside powers. Elise: [71:31] Rafif, what is the opinion of Syrians back home or that you speak to, in terms of the level of American support right now. Rafif: [71:42] The Syrians that I speak to on a daily basis will paint a very different picture from what Joshua is presenting here. They will paint a picture of a struggle, as you said, for democracy, for dignity, for freedom. What they're seeing is a US policy that says we're going to nothing until there is nothing left to do. [72:03] Syrians inside will say "We've asked you for defensive weapons. You have refused. We've asked you for a no-fly zone to ground those MiG fighter jets that bomb bakeries. You have refused. So

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we have no one to turn to but God." That is where the radicalization stems from. When you have nothing, you will turn to God. I can't blame them. If I were watching my children get sniped by regime snipers, I would turn to God as well. Elise: [72:33] What do you think of that Aaron? Aaron: [72:35] How can you argue against that. I mean it's a compelling... [crosstalk] Elise: [72:45] Turn to God, or turn to someone who is launching jihad in the name of God. Aaron: [72:49] Well we go ahead and we sanction the Nusra front. Which was greeted with great consequence here in Washington, but was viewed in Syria as a horrible thing. Nusra and the other Islamists in the attack on the airbase at Taftanaz. It's the Islamist fighters who prevailed, not the Syrian military. Was that a good... Elise: [73:13] Well is it because they're not getting help from the rest of the international community? Aaron: [73:18] Should we be backing the Nusra Front, which is credited with over 600 suicide bombings? I don't know the answer to that Elise. That's why it's hard for me. I'm not sitting in horrible judgement. Nor am I immune to the terrible traumas and suffering. I'm looking for a rational American strategy that can help. If we do in fact provide a consistent level of lethal support to opposition group "X". [73:50] The question is, is it enough to literally change the arc of the military struggle. Or will we have to do more, and more. This is the problem that I really have. It's about, in the end, ownership. The Pentagon and the planners have made their own case to the President. With the new resource problem we confront in Mali. [74:20] Look what it took to support to French forces against Al-Qaeda sub-contractors. If we can't do that, when in fact Americans are held hostage and killed, what kind of response do you really expect for American policy in Syria? Elise: [74:42] Is that a consequence of the US not getting involved in Mali earlier? Aaron: [74:47] Right. What is the implication from that Elise? That we in effect need to be involved, what, on the ground everywhere? Elise: [74:54] The US has been concerned about Mali for at least eight months, but only now there is discussion about whether the US should do more there? Aaron: [75:01] We have another discussion on Benghazi for the thousandth time. Bob: [75:04] In the age of the great extricator we are in no danger of intervening too much and too often. Aaron: [75:10] Sorry about that phrase by the way.

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Bob: [75:11] What is threatening our foreign policy is not manic interventionism right now. That's really not what we have to worry about here. Elise: [75:20] Let's move on. If you have a question raise your hand. I'm going to ask you to identify yourself. Keep your question short. Let's go to Almash Mooni, of Radio Sawa. Then we're going to go to this woman right here in the black. Go hand the microphone to her. Almash Mooni: [75:40] Hi, my name is Almash Mooni from Radio Sawa. Obviously, as Joshua said, that Syria is part of a broader Middle East thing. What would be the position of the US when the Lebanon, Jordan, maybe Israel, and the whole region would be unstable? Should the US then act, or be more active, when everything is out of hand? Robert: [76:13] I think the whole region is unstable. We're trying to reduce that. I think that's why we need to spend more money in helping Jordan, helping the Lebanese, trying to help with the refugees. All of these countries are sagging under the weight of expense of the refugees. The outside world has spent almost nothing on them. We've abandoned them in a sense to Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon. [76:43] We should do a lot more to help bolster those regimes so they don't collapse under the same kind of foment that is going on in Syria. How will Syria end up looking? I don't think we should be trying to judicate that. If we jumped in on the side of the opposition forces, we would end up having to fight all the Islamic militias that are doing most of the heavy lifting. Because we would be trying to help the seculars. [77:09] We would drive a Civil War within the opposition. The Syrians will find a way to get along. I think that even most of the seculars and light Islamists will be able to get along with these Al-Qaeda people. In the same way that the Muslim Brotherhood gets along with the Salafists in Egypt and other places. They can work it out. If America were in the middle of that fight. We would be seeing these long-bearded people. We would send drones to go shoot them all. Elise: [77:32] It's a good question though, in the sense of, are we going to get dragged into this at some point? The longer we wait, is the price just going to be that much higher? Robert: [77:42] I think they could sort it out amongst themselves. I don't think that America... [laughter] Robert: [77:45] ... could pick which are the better Islamists. That's what we'll do. That's what we're doing in Afghanistan. We're doing in... Leon: [77:52] You're the one who puts such a premium on knowledge. How do you know that? How do you know that they can sort it out among themselves. When for two years we've seen the most atrocious crimes being committed. Increasing radicalization. The place is a nightmare. You think they can sort... Joshua: [78:09] If they don't sort it out...

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Leon: [78:09] This is not the Upper-West... Joshua: [78:10] Would you divide it up like Yugoslavia. Make a Kurdish state, an Alawite state, and a Druze state, and Sunni State? Leon: [78:15] If we can prevent the jihadists from coming to power. Prevent Assad from using chemical weapons. Prevent the massacre of children in the middle of this long struggle. Those three objectives strike me as justifying supporting the opposition militarily. Joshua: [78:29] With no boots on the ground? Leon: [78:31] Yeah, with no boots on the ground. [applause] Aaron: [78:36] I don't understand this. Even by the Pentagon's standards you're talking about 70,000 American forces to secure 350 metric tons of chemicals. Probably decentralized in 50 or 60 different locations. What exactly do you mean? Look, I'll give you a concession. Six months. Try to supply. Fine, fine with me. Not that it matters. [79:04] Vet a number of opposition groups, and start a military assistance effort. Go ahead. Joshua: [79:11] That's what they're talking about, Aaron. That's what they're talking about. Elise: [79:12] I think that's what they're talking about Aaron. Aaron: [79:14] Fine. Go ahead and see in the end... Robert: [79:19] Aaron, if you were commanding us in the beginning of World War II you would have said let's quit right now, because I don't know how this is going to end. Aaron: [79:24] Come on, Bob! [crosstalk] Elise: [79:28] We're going to take one more question, right here. Aaron: [79:33] Even for you, Bob. Even for you that is way, way... [crosstalk] Elise: [79:35] Back in your corners guys. Back in your corners. Right here. Lee Tucker: [79:41] Thank you gentlemen. My name is Lee Tucker. I work with the Public International Law and Policy Group. My question is mostly directed to "Team Yes". Which is how I'm conceptualizing Bob and Leon, but I welcome comments from both sides. First of all, what you're proposing is military assistance from the United States. In the form of probably money and weaponry, but also a no-fly zone. [80:07] I'm wondering how exactly do you recommend the United States take the lead in doing that with a stalemate on the Security Council? Are you thinking Balkans model with NATO? Related to that question, none of you have discussed any alternative to the military option. Obviously nobody is saying boots on the ground. It's unclear, as Aaron says,

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whether that assistance program will be enough to change the tide in Syria. More might be required. [80:39] Is there any viable option that the United States could put more pressure onto a negotiated agreement. Right now the opposition is refusing to negotiate because their bottom line is Assad has to go. The reality is, if there were a negotiated transition, say elections in 2014. There's no way that Bashar would win. It's impossible. There's no way he's going to get amnesty for his crimes. [81:03] So really in the end, does it really matter? Is this a viable option to go forward, other than the military side of things? Elise: [81:10] This is how we're going to do it. We're going to ask Team Yes to make some comments. We're going to give either Josh or Aaron a quick response, and then I'm going to ask each one of you to give a closing remark on what you think, specifically, the US should be doing in Syria today. Bob: [81:26] About the UN, let me just say that I regard Obama's insistence upon remaining within the UN framework as the strategic alibi for inaction because Putin is doing his work for him. As long as he knows that Russia and China will not come aboard and as long as he there stays within the system, stasis is the policy. This is a way of rigging things. [81:50] If we believe, if we come to the determination, either the President or us here or anyone who cares about this...If you come to the determination that the three objectives that I listed before are worthy and necessary objectives so that you have justified ends, you discover that the UN is precisely the antithesis of any meaningful means to accomplish this. It's pretty clear to me that staying within the United Nations framework is a formula for doing nothing. [82:18] Putin has been given a veto over our foreign policy, and he's been given it gladly because it unburdens the administration of the challenge of having to face this problem directly. This has been going on for 22 months. Putin is not going to relent. We know about him. He believes in the heavy footprint, not the light footprint. [82:40] My view is that it was long ago time to go outside the UN, and the United States should find its allies. We will find such allies, and we should act to accomplish the objectives that I suggest. Elise: [82:52] Aaron or Josh, I'll leave it up to you to decide, are we hiding behind Putin's skirts to avoid US action in Syria? Joshua: [83:01] Putin would love that phrase, by the way. [laughter] Aaron: [83:08] I don't think so. I think the reality is that it is fear of, is the uncertainty with respect to the end state that has constrained administration, that has created a policy of risk aversion, which I would argue is cautious and deliberate rather than risk readiness, which is in effect, in this particular situation, a difficult thing to think through. [83:37] I come back to the proposition. It's not even a question of changing my view. I would argue that if you believe that you can significantly change the arc of the military struggle

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inside Syria, with what I would describe as limited military assistance in weaponry to the right groups. "Hey, give it a whirl. See if it actually works. You didn't change my mind on this." [84:11] I just do not believe that that kind of military assistance will have the kind of impact. I think on the risk-reward continuum I think it's not that we're going to be drawn into Syria on the ground. We won't be. We will not be. I do not believe Iraq and Afghanistan is the right precedent here. It's only a question of... Elise: [84:31] What is the right precedent? Aaron: [84:33] I'm not sure, given my own views about this region, where our conundrum is that we are stuck in a region that we are going to have an excruciatingly painful time trying to shape, and yet we cannot leave. [84:48] That is the conundrum of the greatest power on Earth. This is not Bosnia. It really isn't Bosnia. We have a billion four invested every year to the Egyptian military and hundreds more millions of dollars in excess defense articles. [85:03] Egypt today, Bob, and I know this was important to you when you rightly were one of the few who argued early on, you and Michelle, for a more proactive policy when it came to Democratic reform. Egypt today is in the hands of the two most anti-Democratic forces in the country. With all of our military assistance and a forty-year relationship with this country, we cannot significantly change the arc of what is happening to this country. [85:32] Yet, you two want to believe, and Egypt is the most powerful, most important, largest, and most influential Arab state. So as goes Egypt, they would argue, so goes the rest of the region. Egypt is the most hopeful manifestation of this phenomenon. [85:52] If we cannot do that in a country with which we were allied for 40 years. I just don't get it. I don't understand what you are suggesting. How are we then going to influence... Elise: [86:04] OK. OK. What we're going to do is, I'm going to ask each of our speakers. To, in five sentence or less give a... [laughter] Elise: [86:13] ...I will cut you off. I'll be counting. Closing remark. Specifically a prescription of what we should be doing in Syria. Leon. Leon: [86:25] I'm repeating myself. I think that in order to prevent the jihadists from taking power. In order to prevent Assad from using chemical weapons. In order to stop what is genocide that is taking place. Fourth, in order to assist the forces whom we can support. Who exist. We did not invent them. They're actual. They're real. [86:47] In order to accomplish these four objectives, I would arm the secular opposition. I would do everything we possibly can to make the Council more effective, more sophisticated. They've got to deliver something. Syria, I would arm them. I would help the Council. I would provide a safe haven.

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[87:10] I would continue to make the promotion of democracy, or secularization, or progress. Call it whatever you want. Whatever the long-term outcome that we desire, I would begin to advise a long-term historical strategy that allows us to stay with this struggle. Not doing it in this manic-depressive way that our interventions are always conducted. Elise: [87:33] Thanks Leon. Bob, you want to finish out the argument. Bob: [87:41] The fact is, Aaron and I are, at the end of this debate in complete agreement over what should be done over the next six months. We should provide some effective military assistance to the opposition group. We should, in my opinion, use our capacities in Turkey to put together a no-fly zone. For which we will have a lot of support from France and many NATO countries as well as Arab countries. [88:05] Yes, let's see what happens. That's the way things work. We don't have a way of knowing what happens if you press one button. We're going to see what happens. Let me just end by saying, let's not make an argument futility based on the record of past futility. Which is what you're essentially saying Aaron. We did not do what we should have done in Egypt. [88:27] Yes, some of us did press the administration to get Mubarak. To conduct reforms. Which might have in fact allowed a more smooth transition to democracy. They didn't do it. This is the outcome that we're getting. That is not an argument for never doing anything, because we never can do anything. It's an argument for doing what you can do in time. Elise: [88:50] Thanks Bob. Josh. Joshua: [88:52] I think America needs to do a lot more, but I don't think that we can solve or save Syria. The entire region is going through a tremendous revolution and change. America is finding itself on the sidelines. We are finding ourselves on the sidelines in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya. We cannot pick who is going to be the winner. [89:11] We can be there with help. We can be there with aid. I think we should be over there with much more. We should help with education and the things that America does best. But to say, and to try to treat the Middle East as if we can pick the winners and put them up at the top, I think is only going to be a disservice to America. [89:31] It's going to be a big sink of money. We'll end up not getting the people we want on top. That's what we're seeing today. Is that people that haven't been close to America are coming to the top. It's their time. They are going to find a way to build, hopefully, a better society for themselves. America can not choose George Washington for somebody else. [89:52] The Syrians are going to have to find their own George Washington. That's going to come out of this maelstrom of national revolution. They will find, hopefully, their leader. That will lead them towards a better future. Hopefully a democratic future in the long run. Elise: [90:07] Thanks Josh. Aaron. Five sentences.

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Aaron: [90:09] I'm not sure how to conclude. For the last 20 years, we've been not, I won't say failing. We've been not succeeding in warmaking or peacemaking in this region, in my judgement. Bob, the frame of reference is that frame of reference. I'm not going back in time. America has had consequential foreign policy moments. We've been quite effective. [90:31] In my judgment...General Scowcroft is sitting right here, and he won't disagree with me. The last effective foreign policy we had in this country, the -truly -- last effective foreign policy, with all its imperfections, was Bush 41 and Jim Baker. The relationship between the ends and means made sense. They didn't overreach. Principle was important, but they steered clear of straitjacketed ideologies. [90:55] I frankly, and I worked for the last three administrations, I do not have the level of confidence. I'm sorry. And have not had the level of confidence, and I've worked for half a dozen Secretaries of State. I don't know whether we're up to managing what it is you are suggesting. [91:15] I'll concede to you, buffer the neighboring states. Try to create a transitional government that we can actually recognize with a Syrian prime minister. Do much more on the humanitarian side. Plan for the chemical contingencies. And yes, reluctantly think about what we can do to see if we can't somehow, without getting ourselves immersed in Syria, test your proposition. Go ahead and test it. At the end of the day...Sorry, Elise, last comment. [91:47] This Arab Spring, or whatever it is, is authentic and legitimate because the Arabs, for the first time in the modern period, actually own, for better or for worse, their own politics. We are not a part of that, and neither are the Israelis. That to me, frankly, over time is hopeful, but it is going to take time. If we can facilitate it, fine. I just don't want to see the United States fail again. Thank you. Elise: [92:18] All right. I think we're going to have to leave it there. It was an excellent discussion. [applause] Elise: [92:23] Thank you to our panelists. Clearly, this debate is not over. Not only the question today was, "Should the US save Syria?" but, "Can the US save Syria?" I'm not really sure we answered that question, but we look forward to continuing the discussion. Thank you, Senator McCain and the McCain Institute. Thank you, Kurt. [applause] Kurt: [92:51] Thank you. Can I have just one quick word? First off, was this the best debate and open and frank discussion on Syria, that you have heard, in a long time. [applause] Kurt: [93:09] For those of you in the media, please make sure you say that tomorrow. McCain Institute, Arizona State. Though our debaters and also our moderator, Elise Labott, thank you very much. [applause] Kurt: [93:27] Thank you, Senator McCain. Thank you, Senator Ayotte. Ambassadors, General Scowcroft. Thank you all for coming. Our next debate will be February 28th, where we will tackle the topic of, "Should the US get out of Afghanistan or stay in Afghanistan?" Thank you very much. Please mark it on your calendars. [applause]

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Transcription by CastingWords