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Iran: Are We Out Of Options

Kurt Volker: [0:27] Welcome. Thank you for coming this evening to our debate on U.S. policy concerning Iran. Are we out of options? My name is Kurt Volker. I'm Executive Director of the McCain Institute for International Leadership, which is a part of Arizona State University. It is based here in Washington D.C. with a strong footprint in Tempe, Arizona, as well. [0:49] Our mission at the McCain Institute is to promote character driven leadership at home and around the world, to contribute to humanitarian action, and to contribute to better designs for better decision-making in national and international policy. [1:02] You can find us at www.mccaininstitute.org. [1:07] Tonight's debate is the next in a series of structured timed foreign policy debates around the most pressing foreign policy challenges facing our nation. Our goal was to help shape better decisions in foreign and national security policy. [1:22] Prior debates have focused on Syria and Afghanistan. Our next debate, in partnership with Intelligence Squared, will be about the U.S. defense budget. Will the cuts be seen as a gift to our enemies? That will take place on June 19th. [1:38] We intend to continue our debate series in the fall, as well. If you're enjoying these please sign up on our email list and we'll be sure to get you invitations as those are scheduled. [1:47] The purpose of these debates is to illuminate the issues and express different points of view, but to take out the partisanship and really get to the heart of the issues in question. We aim to have a scrupulous examination of America's national interests and America's role in the world. I think you'll see that reflected in the structure of tonight's debate. [2:08] Again, tonight's debate is focused on Iran. What if all of our diplomatic efforts and sanctions fail? Successive U.S. administrations, including President Obama's administration, have said that the use of military force remains an option if those other measures fail. As the clock winds down, are we now out of other options? [2:29] On the other hand, would military force succeed in stopping Iran and what would be the consequences of military force? [2:36] We have four distinguished panelists tonight to address different perspectives surrounding these questions. We hope that their debate helps illuminate these issues for you and illuminate the choices facing our nation. [2:47] It's a structured and timed debate. Each side will have six minutes to present an initial view, three minutes to respond each side. The moderator will then present questions. An equal amount of time for each side to respond.

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[2:58] There will be an opportunity for the audience to ask questions, as well, so be thinking about that. But please, if you do choose to ask a question, keep it brief, to the point, and do make it a question. [3:09] Tonight's event is open to the press. We are live streaming. We are also connected to Arizona University Television, going live there. [3:19] We have a number of guests who are from Iran or are connected to Iran, so thank you for coming. You are very welcome to this debate. [3:28] Please put your cellphones on silent. Don't turn them off because you're going to want to use them for tweeting. [laughs] The hashtag is #MIDebateIran. Please feel free to use that throughout the debate. If you post a question in the Twitter process, as well, we will try to pull something out of that. We'll also be getting students in Arizona an opportunity to ask a question during the course of the debate, as well. [3:54] Let me now introduce our moderator for the debate, the editor of Foreign Policy magazine, Miss Susan Glasser. Thank you. [applause] Susan Glasser: [4:09] Thank you so much to Kurt and thank you to all of you for coming out on a beautiful spring night. I see the promise of popcorn and a little foreign policy wonk-ery is alluring, even in Washington spring. Thank you for that and I'm looking forward to everyone's participation in this debate, as well. [4:27] As Kurt mentioned, this is a structured debate so we're going to try to stick very closely to the time frame. I think we'll see a real back and forth in a way that should be illuminating to everybody. We won't ask you to vote, but I certainly will be interested to hear if anyone comes out with their mind changed at the end of this conversation. [4:46] For now, I'd love to start off by introducing a very distinguished set of panelists. You have a full brochure, I think, that we're handing out with their long and distinguished resumes. I'll introduce the teams for you, so you'll have a sense of what our adversaries are up against each other. [5:03] Starting right here with Danielle Pletka who is the vice president of the American Enterprise Institute and her partner for the purposes of tonight's debate, former congressman Robert Wexler who is now the president of the Abraham Center for Middle East Peace. Thank you very much. They will be arguing on the side that now is the time when we need to look at the military option. [5:26] Up against them is a formidable pairing of, call them the ambassadors. We have two of them. They have served in just about every possible place and way and have teamed up. Just today, I believe, they have both signed a new report from a distinguished group arguing the case for negotiations and for letting diplomacy work with Iran.

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[5:48] First, we have Ambassador Jim Dobbins who is the Director of International Security and Defense Policy at Rand and his colleague, Ambassador Thomas Pickering who is now the vice chair of Hillson Company. [6:01] I want to join all of you in thanking our distinguished panelists today and our debaters and hoping that they will let her rip and not be nearly so polite as their distinguished titles would have us suggest. Thank you to all of you in advance, and may the best team win, as we say. [applause] Susan: [6:28] A quick recap on the rules. We are going to try to get to as many of your questions as possible. In order to do that, we're going to stick close to our time frame. Each team will have six minutes to begin in the order that they choose. [6:43] They can each take as much time out of their six minutes as they like. Then it will come back, and they will each have a three-minute rebuttal. Then we'll go to various rounds of questions. I must say just a couple of introductory words on behalf of not only myself but perhaps the audience as well. [7:00] I'm particularly looking forward to this conversation. I don't know about the rest of you, but I do feel that there is a certain Groundhog Day type quality to the Iran conversation. It's spring in Washington, so we must be having a discussion about whether it's finally time for us to take this debate to the next level and whether we've run out of other ways to do it and we need to strike now. [7:25] President Obama, as I'm sure everyone here is familiar with, has said that, in essence, we're one year away from that moment. Others believe the time frame is sooner. As Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu has said, the red lines are approaching ever closer. [7:47] The circularity of the debate, and, believe me, if you go back and do a search, you can find this very same conversation occurring down to the one year timeframe before all the events will play out every spring since at least 2004. [8:05] This might really be year, and if that's the case then this debate might really be the one that shapes all of our thinking on what should happen next and how the Washington policy conversation should go. So with no further ado, the lots have been drawn. The first team to kick off is the team of Pletka and Wexler. I will go right to them for their six minute opening. Thank you very much. Danielle Pletka: [8:33] Thank you, Susan. I'm not going to waste a lot of time with pleasantries, since I see that the timer hit instantaneously. You're exactly right. We have engaged in this discussion innumerable times in Washington. [8:47] Now is the right time to have a discussion not about the "Has time run out? Is there more time for negotiations? Is there more time that's available? Is now the time to end?" It's a question about what happens when/if those negotiations fail. We've been looking at this challenge of a nuclear...

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[break in tape] Danielle: [9:11] ...here in Washington, but of course the implications for the region are substantial. It's not just about Israel and the threat to Israel. It's also about the entire Gulf. It's about Iraq. It's about the Levant. It's about the influence that Iran will have if, indeed, they succeed in fashioning a nuclear weapon and having a nuclear capability. [9:32] We've been engaged in negotiations over the question of Iran's nuclear capacity for some time, most recently, a couple of weeks ago in Almaty, at which point the United States tabled yet another offer for the Iranians to persuade them to come and give up some of their capabilities, some information, in exchange for some concessions on sanctions and a variety of issues. [9:55] Those talks reportedly went nowhere. No future talks have been scheduled, though there are still technical conversations going on. It's not often that you see someone like me sitting here with someone like former Congressman Wexler, a pretty staunch Democrat...I suspect we probably voted differently in November...on the same side of an issue. [10:19] If you wanted to push Ambassadors Pickering and Dobbins aside, I'm betting we could probably engage in a pretty lively debate, just the two of us, about whether we've given too much time to negotiations, whether time is running out, whether the President is really willing to make a tough call. [10:38] But there's something that we agree about 100 percent. That is that once negotiations have run their course, the right choice, unfortunately the only choice, if Iran is not willing to give up its nuclear weapons program, is for the United States to strike Iran militarily. Now, no one who supports the military option believes it's going to be a panacea. [11:03] It's going to be a dangerous operation for whoever undertakes it and it's not going to be an end to the Iranian nuclear program. I don't think we are fooled about that at all. [11:14] On the other hand, a delay may be better than what comes next, which is an Iranian nuclear capability, intimidation of the region, possible use of the weapon, possible proliferation. None of us are technical experts, but I think that the details on Iran's progress are very telling. They give us a sense that this is a debate that's likely to come to an end reasonably soon. It's not going to go on for years. [11:39] As of the last IAEA Report, Iran had 5,500 kilograms of enriched uranium. They had 1,500 enriched to 20 percent. What's the President thinking about these things? Congressman Wexler has a really good idea about the President's thinking on these issues. Congressman Robert Wexler: [11:57] Thank you. I'm a Floridian. Like too many Floridians possibly, I've been at Disney World way too many times. One of the exhibits is the Hall of Presidents. At least the way it used to be, the thing you could buy there was a book. It had, in the book, two pages for each president. One page would be a big picture, a portrait and the other, in essence, would be the synopsis of the President's term in

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office. [12:23] Let's envision President Obama's page in the Hall of Presidents Disney World exhibit. I would suspect that about two-thirds of the page is going to deal with domestic policy. Either he's going to be FDR, if the economy goes right, or he'll be Hoover if it doesn't. It'll probably say he was the first African-American president and then, after that, it'll say he was the guy that ordered the action that caused the bringing of justice to Osama bin Laden. [12:51] Iraq most likely won't be on his page much. That'll be on President Bush's page. Even Afghanistan won't be on President Obama's page. It'll be mostly on President Bush's page. But what will be on the remainder of President Obama's page, I would argue and I would expect is on his watch Iran became a nuclear weapon holder or not. [13:13] The bottom line, on President Obama's policy, I think it's worth it to just read a quick quote that he said while he was visiting Israel recently. "We do not have a policy of containment, when it comes to a nuclear Iran. Our policy is to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear weapon holder. We'd prefer to resolve this diplomatically and there's still time to do so. All options are on the table. We will do what is necessary to prevent Iran the next world's nuclear power." [13:46] What are the means to prevent this? Of course, sanctions...We'll go into that no doubt. That have been relatively successful in terms of exacting economic pain. But it's a big question mark unfortunately so far in terms of if it has caused a change in Iranian policy. [14:03] What is at stake? Enormous security challenges, of course. Our own. Our allies. Particularly Israel's. Also economics. Let us not forget that a good percentage of the world's oil goes through the Strait of Hormuz, which, if Iran became a nuclear weapon holder, would hold the world's economics hostage and the complete, in essence, tearing out of the nonproliferation treaty -- if Iran were to become successful in obtaining a nuclear weapon. [14:33] US credibility, not just the President's. I'll stop with this. But, should Iran become a nuclear power after the President of the United States has adopted a concrete, clear policy of prevention, the American credibility, not just in Israel, not just in the Gulf, but worldwide, will be dramatically impaired in such a way that I would argue will profoundly affect our interests, not just in terms of security, but our interests all across the world, in every vein. Susan: [15:07] Congressman Wexler, thank you very much. That was excellent. I can see your training on the Hill led you to observe the timeline and we don't have anyone to yield time to you. Thank you very much for that opening. Congressman Wexler: [laughs] [15:17] Susan: [15:18] Ambassador Dobbins, that's a good point to pick up. Would the military option even be effective in stopping Iran? If that's the goal that everyone here agrees on, stopping Iran from obtaining the capability for nuclear weapons, why should we believe then the military option would actually yield that result? Isn't it possible that it would

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simply lead to a broader war or to putting back the timetable a year or two? Can a nuclear determined power be stopped? Ambassador James Dobbins: [15:47] I think, for anyone here to decide which side of this debate they come down on, they have to weigh the risks for the negotiations against the risk of war. The risk of an American attack on Iran is not that it would close the Straits of Hormuz, rocket Israel, unleash Hamas and Hezbollah, attack U.S. bases in the region and launch a worldwide terror campaign. Those are things we can deal with. [16:14] The risk of launching a war with Iran is that it would respond cautiously, that it would play the aggrieved party, that it would seek international sympathy, that it would unravel the large global coalition that's currently restraining its nuclear possibilities, that it would dismantle the sanctions regime, that it would withdraw from the NPT, that it would send the inspectors home and that it would accelerate its nuclear program at unknown sites, which we couldn't find and, therefore, couldn't destroy. [16:47] Those are things we can't prevent. Now, I think you have to ask yourself, when you try to consider what the consequences of a nuclear Iran are, what Iran's neighbors are afraid of. They're not afraid of Iranian aggression. They are afraid of Iranian subversion. [17:04] Nobody thinks that Iran is going to invade and occupy any of its neighbors. It doesn't have the capability of doing so. It wouldn't have the capability of doing so even if it had nuclear weapons. But it does have the capability of appealing to dissident populations throughout that region, to Shia, to Palestinians, and to others. [17:22] Its appeal to those populations would be intensified if it was the victim of an unprovoked attack. In fact, I think you can make a good case that Iran's ability to project influence in that region would be greater as the victim of an unprovoked American attack than an Iran with nuclear weapons. Susan: [17:41] Ambassador Pickering. Ambassador Thomas Pickering: [17:42] Jim has sketched out very importantly the problems of the use of force. I'd like to talk to you a little bit about negotiation. The background for negotiations is the following. The U.S. intelligence community agrees that there may have been an earlier Iran program, but there is none now in terms of a decision to make nuclear weapons. [18:01] Even more importantly, General Clapper recently testified that he believes it was a very good chance he would know if that were going to happen. Those are important. I also ask you to cast your eye over the American public. Are we ready yet for another third ground war in the Middle East? [18:18] The negotiating scenarios are very interesting. My own sense is that I believe we're probably closer to a solution through negotiation than we have been before, and I'll tell you why. I think that the effectiveness of sanctions, and indeed the pressure that has been put on Iran has led to two very interesting developments. [18:40] One has been that rather than having negotiations take place once a year for one day, we have seen over the last year, and continuing this year, a rather steady and significant series of negotiating activities.

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[18:56] The reports from those have been a combination of some enthusiasm and some misery. They're not yet clearly, as a sense of a negotiation, moving to some kind of effort that we could call essentially the end of the beginning. But we certainly have seen the beginning of the beginning in negotiations. [19:18] Substantively, I think it's important to note that rather than gosh, yet another proposal, there is a series of proposals from the P5-plus-1, mainly focused around dealing with 20 percent enriched material. Very important. [19:32] Danny said there were 1,500 kilos. The Israeli red line happens to be 225 kilos. The Iranians have scrupulously avoided making enough material in a form that could be re-enriched across that deadline, so I don't know where Danny got her information. Danielle: [19:48] The IAEA. Ambassador Pickering: [19:49] The what? Danielle: [19:50] The IAEA. Ambassador Pickering: [19:52] The IAEA is reporting less than 200 kilos, so you have a different IAEA than I have. In any event, we know in fact that... Danielle: [19:59] Yes, I think I have the right one. Ambassador Pickering: [20:00] We know in fact that Prime Minister Netanyahu has called that a red line, and apparently the Iranians have heard that. I think it is significant that the remaining outstanding, most significant difference is over the degree to which the Iranians, and the US and its friends and allies, can get together on the issue of sanctions relief. [20:23] This is not an easy issue to deal with. There are some proposals on the table. Jim suggested this morning in a group that, in fact, brought out the introduction of this particular book. I'll hold it right side up so you can see it. It is, in a sense, an important primer for any of you interested in negotiations. [20:44] Jim's suggestion was that in any sanctions effort, we should go the UN's Security Council and get a temporary suspension of sanctions as our hold card against any Iranian malfeasance in negotiations. This would mean that it would take our veto to continue the sanctions beyond a suspension period, and it's very important. [21:07] How can all of this end? Well, very clearly on the table, there are four principles that are important. One, the Iranians constrain their program to a purely civil, and indeed peaceful, nuclear program. Secondly, the IAEA has inspection mechanisms of its own devising to ensure, in fact, that we have the greatest possibility of knowing of any violations. [21:32] Thirdly, we gradually release sanctions as they gradually comply with the restraints they have to accept on their program. Fourthly, we agree that they can continue enrichment within the bounds of a peaceful program and within the limits of a peaceful program. To me, that makes sense. To me, that points the way for the future. To me, it is an important point to exhaust negotiations before jumping into war.

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[21:59] Interestingly enough, from everything I've heard here, all four of us seem to agree with that principle. Susan: [22:04] All right. The Ambassador's team also ends on time, so thank you very much for that. We're going to go to rebuttals, three minutes. I'd like to go back to Pletka and Wexler with this question. Ambassador Pickering had just said are you ready for a third ground war in the Middle East, and is that going to be the consequence of the military option that you're advocating? Congressman Wexler: [22:26] I voted at the time to give President Bush the authority to go to war in Iraq. That was the most difficult vote of my political career, and one that was politically, no doubt, the worst vote that I made. In many respects, I regret that vote. [22:44] I do not think that anyone, nor would I suggest that anyone would, lightly consider the extraordinary consequences of yet a third military action. However, the question must presuppose all of the things that didn't happen before then, meaning that all the things that Ambassadors Dobbins and Pickering talked about, didn't work. That's the key. [23:13] If all of the things they have proposed didn't work, and we were ultimately left with the question of do we prevent or do we contain, I argue we prevent. We have no option. If prevention requires military action, then I actually believe because of the way President Obama has quite modestly, in many respects, approached this, the American people, the vast majority, would be supportive. Danielle: [23:43] I think part of the question, of course, goes to whether any of us are military tacticians. I guess I can only speak for myself in saying I'm probably not one. [23:54] I don't know whether what would be required to strike the Iranian nuclear sites is in fact a ground war, given that none of us have suggested that the aim of any military option is in fact to invade, occupy the country of Iran and let's say depose the regime. I don't think that ground troops would be necessary, but perhaps I'm confused about what the imperative is here. [24:17] I think part of the challenge that we're facing up to, and I do want to come back to you on the numbers because I think they're important, but let's set that aside for a moment. The challenge that we're facing up to here is that we're on a timeline that is not one of our own choosing. If the aim of sanctions is indeed as one of our worthy opponents suggested to have more negotiations, then those sanctions are really pretty darn awesome, because we're having a lot of negotiations. [24:48] The aim of sanctions is not to get to negotiations. It's to persuade the Iranians of the wisdom of giving up their nuclear program, and by the way, giving up what may well be, according to Yukiya Amano, the Director of the IAEA, elements that are secret to us. In other words, progress that has been made about which we're not aware. [25:11] That is the challenge. It's not about should we keep talking. We can keep talking. That's always a good idea. The point is at a certain moment, Iran is going to have a nuclear capability. At that moment, the question before the President of the United States

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will be to act or not to act. He has said very clearly he believes he should act. We happen to agree. Susan: [25:34] Congressman Wexler framed this as an issue of whether you're really willing to embrace containment, ultimately. [25:42] You say that the goal is to stop Iran from obtaining the ability to have a nuclear weapon. But really, doesn't your argument suggest Ambassadors that rather than prevention ultimately containment is something that you're willing to live with if the alternative is war in the Middle East again? Ambassador Dobbins: [26:01] Well, I'd say first of all that the design of this debate is about whether we should now be giving negotiations a further chance or not. On the issue of containment or prevention, the U.S. government agrees that they cannot prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. They can only delay it. [26:21] It really is a question of do you deter Iran, or do you delay their development of a nuclear weapon? Thereby making it A, more likely that they ultimately get it, ensuring that they get it under conditions of extreme hostility and creating the other consequences which I've laid out. Tom, you want to add? Ambassador Pickering: [26:47] Containment is a code word for accepting an Iranian nuclear weapon and using deterrents to try to prevent them from exploiting it. I don't agree with that. My colleagues don't agree with that. [27:00] Secondly, it is very clear to everybody who has looked at the military piece, and again, I recommend the predecessor volume to this that looks at the cost and benefits of the use of military force. The best that one can estimate, and a number of generals including a former CENTCOM commander signed this document, is that you can get through aerial bombardment on a continued basis, maybe four years relief. [27:29] Everybody who looked at it believed that you have to invade and control Iran to stop its nuclear program with the use of military force, which is why we have said the military option only works if in fact you enter another ground war in the Middle East. I think it's important to keep that in mind. [27:49] Finally, I agree with Jim. I thought we came here to debate whether we should drop negotiations now and use military force. Iran has nuclear capabilities, no question. Those capabilities are being developed. They concern me. [28:02] The President has said when he believes they have gone to the decision to make a nuclear weapon, he will employ everything on the table to stop them. I don't disagree with that. I think that we all join in seeing the importance of stopping an Iranian nuclear weapon, but I don't believe, and I haven't heard Prime Minister Netanyahu say recently that he believes that we don't have time to continue with the negotiating process. Susan: [28:32] Thank you. We're now done with the opening statement and the rebuttals, and so I'm going to jump in with some questions to keep us going right on that theme. In fact, I'd like to start right with your question, Ambassador Pickering, which is should we continue to invest in negotiations, or have we run out of time? If so, how will we know? [28:54] Going right back to this Groundhog Day nature of this, we've had UN resolution after UN resolution. We've had tightening sanctions over and over again.

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We've had years, literally years, worth of P5-plus-1 negotiations over and over again. Nonetheless, every year, it's reported that Iran has continued to press forward with this nuclear program in some ways. [29:18] It begs the question at this point, how will we know? What is it that makes one team here see that there's more potential in negotiations and another team here say no? I'd like to ask, first of all, Congressman Wexler and Danny, what you think about how do you know that time is up? Danielle: [29:40] I think that, first of all, we've gotten into what you call this Groundhog Day discussion about negotiations, which is an entirely sterile debate. There is absolutely nothing wrong with negotiations. I think that we can continue talking to the Iranians for as long as we like. [30:00] The challenge before us, as I said, is not whether or not we should continue to negotiate. The challenge before is, "Are we something? Is it doing anything to get to the end result that we seek?" After all, the purpose of these "crippling sanctions" is for us to get the Iranians to give something up, not for us to simply get the Iranians to the table to play out the clock until they have a better hand. [30:29] I think that's the thing that we agree upon. Again, should we continue talking? I have no objection to talking. We can talk all we want, but we do need to achieve something. That's why the President has said on numerous occasions, "This is not an endless process. The window is not always going to be open. There is a wide recognition that Iran will reach this point." [30:52] Now I do have to disagree with our colleagues about the clarity that there will be. General Clapper has suggested that he will know. He will know exactly the same way we knew about 9/11 or we knew about the Iranian program or we knew about the Syrian program or we knew about the North Korean program. Our track record isn't exactly perfect. I'm sorry. I hogged too much time. Congressman? Susan: [31:15] That's OK. You get to respond as well. Congressman Wexler: [31:18] I think it's important to ask the question, and I, too, support extended negotiations. No one, no serious person in Washington, would suggest employing a military option without exhausting over and over and over again every other alternative. [31:37] Does anybody seriously believe that if President Obama had taken the military option off the table, that we'd be negotiating with the Iranians? Of course we wouldn't. Following that line of logic, it concerns me, this notion that the military option or that the credible element of a military option is just a side show to the negotiations. They're not. [32:08] I would argue that, unfortunately, a credible military option is one of, if not the most, important element of a serious set of negotiations that reach the conclusions that Ambassadors Pickering and Dobbins provide. [32:27] I think it's extremely important to also recognize there's one more point. If I took away one thing from all of the dozens of briefings that I received in Congress about Iran, was that as unified as the Iranian leadership may have been and still is with respect to the

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pursuit of a nuclear weapon, the one thing the clerical leadership values more than their nuclear program is their power. [32:56] I would argue that, while it's one strategy to attempt to alleviate a nuclear weapon program, it's also another strategy to challenge the power of those that currently rule Iran. I would argue that, at the end of the negotiations, should they fail, it's probably time to combine the policy of President Bush and President Obama and make it an "all hands on deck" policy. [33:28] Take the best of the regime change policy and marry it to the best of the negotiation policy with the military option still at hand. Maybe that's our last card. Susan: [33:41] Team Ambassadors, I've got to ask you this question. Ambassador Pickering, I'll go right to you. What is to stop us from having this process go on absolutely forever? How is it that we can't string this on forever? When are you willing to say that diplomacy has not succeeded? [33:58] We have a rule in my house that if you've been saying you're going to clean the attic for a year and you haven't done it, you're not doing it. We've been doing this for a lot longer than a year. How long is too long? Ambassador Pickering: [34:10] Susan, if you're not making progress, you know it. We are. It's not millennial, but it is there, and it's real. I made those points. Secondly, Danielle Pletka doesn't know what she wants. She wants something to drop from the tree like a ripe fruit as a result of the sanctions squeezed, but she's never to find it. [34:30] Certainly, having Iran give up entirely its full nuclear program is not on as a sanctions deal. What is on, I think, is a deal which can constrain them. I might ask Congressman Wexler to take his mind back to the Iraqi decision. [34:48] What you just recommended is Iraqi decision son of with respect to Iran. You need to think through what that means. Are we going to occupy Iran to achieve our objectives through the use of military force? And don't forget, we are not wonderful occupiers. We are not good at changing regimes. [35:10] We ought to learn a little bit from the last two episodes in which we worked that particular problem so badly, combat operations were very successful. After that, the whole thing went to hell in a hand basket. Think about it. Susan: [35:26] We can see who drew the bad cop straw in this team here. [laughter] Susan: [35:32] I'm going to let you both respond. Danielle? Ambassador Pickering: [35:35] I've got to give Jim a chance here. Danielle: [35:37] Do you want to, Jim? Go ahead. Ambassador Dobbins: [35:38] I just say that we're all operating without full knowledge of what's going on in these negotiations. My impression is that there is broad agreement about the end game in which the Iranians constrain their enrichment program but don't give it up all together, limit the amount of nuclear material that they have, and open up a much wider inspection regime including sites that they haven't. [36:09] The issue is

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largely one about sequencing, how quickly you lift sanctions for what kind of Iranian concessions with the Iranians wanting the sanctions lifted when they say they'll do these things, and our side saying, "No, you can have the sanctions lifted when you've actually done all these things." [36:28] I think we've gotten beyond broad principles to a real negotiation. Because none of us actually know, the sides have been rather circumspect and that may be a good sign, people tend to become more circumspect when they actually have secrets to protect, but my impression is we may be closer than we think. [36:55] Nevertheless, there are going to be controversial decisions that the American president would need to make, concessions that will be severely criticized and moves that will require understanding and support on the part of the Congress that may not be entirely popular. Susan: [37:12] All right. We're going to get a response around, and then we can go back another time. Danielle: [37:18] I just wanted to take a moment to admire Ambassador Dobbins beautiful character. His optimism is inspiring to me. [laughter] Ambassador Dobbins: [37:27] Thank you, Danielle. Danielle: [37:28] It really is. It reminds me a little bit about the conversation about the peace process. We all know what the nature of the agreement is going to be, but yet, darn it, those two folks, they just can't seem to get it together. Perhaps we'll be as successful in our negotiations with Iran. Let me turn to the question of the ripe fruit that Ambassador Pickering alluded to. Ambassador Pickering: [37:50] It was Karl Marx, I'm sorry, Danny. [laughs] Danielle: [37:53] That's OK, I expected no less from you. [laughter] Danielle: [37:59] I don't think any of us fool ourselves into thinking that the Iranians are going to have a road to Damascus like conversion and decide this is a really dreadful idea. What were we thinking? Because, after all, I think that what they're thinking is perfectly rational. [38:19] The truth is that, if they look at the region and they see what's happened, they can say to themselves, "Look at Libya. Kaddafi gave up his nuclear capability or his nuclear plans, and where is he now? Oh yeah, he's dead. Look at North Korea. They're still hopping along very nicely. It looks like the United States is thinking twice." [38:39] I think that's a perfectly rational calculation. They may also be looking at Pakistan and thinking to themselves, "They'll accept it when they have to." I think that the Iranians are, contrary to the suggestions of some, very rational actors. [38:52] The question is really, yes, what are they willing to give up? Here I think, again, our opponents' faith in humanity is so much more deep than mine. Their faith in the Iranians, the notion that Iran could have a limited enrichment program, a program, by the

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way, that is intended to be limited by their agreements under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and their safeguards agreements but has not been limited, a program about which there have been repeated revelations of violations of those agreements, but nonetheless that we could again trust them perhaps just with a few more observers. [39:31] After all, then they won't want to keep secrets from us, because what they're looking for, after all, isn't really regional domination. It isn't that trump card. What they're really looking for is just that feeling of security that they have. [39:47] Really? Is that what they're looking for? Perhaps, again, I think we just have different reads of the Iranian character. Congressman Wexler, you had something to answer as well on... Susan: [39:58] Son of Iraq, I believe. Congressman Wexler: [39:59] Yes. Ambassador Pickering asked, I think, both a valid and important and, for me, haunting question. That is, "Have we learned any lessons from Iraq? Does my position or others doom us to repeat some of those mistakes?" That's a fair question. [40:19] I would argue that in actuality the policy that President Obama has put in place from his first Inaugural Address, actually before that, from his debates from then Senator Clinton and Senator McCain, he adopted an entirely different approach, whether you think it's right or wrong, versus the approach that President Bush took with respect to Iraq. [40:49] In fact, I can't imagine almost a more diametrically opposed approach than the manner in which both President Obama and the United States have maneuvered and stated our policy relative to Iraq, too. So I do not think, respectfully, that the analogy ultimately works. [41:10] After all, it's not even the United States that is directly negotiating with Iran. We're doing it with our European allies. We're doing it with Russia. We're doing it, in theory, with China. These aren't a set of sanctions that are unilateral by the United States. If they were, they would be hardly effective. [41:29] They are a set of sanctions that have been adopted and approved by countless numbers of our allies. The Treasury Department, the State Department, have with great pain gone through with even those that are not our allies to work with us in applying pressures. [41:49] If all of these things do not work, and that's the big if, if they all do not work, then President Obama is in a far different set of circumstances than, unfortunately, we were in when President Bush went to war in Iraq. [42:08] Then, ultimately, in Iraq, we were found out to be wrong with respect to weapons of mass destruction. I suspect that if, God forbid, a military option was required and whatever it was we alleged in Iran, I would hope and suspect that this time we would be more accurate.

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Susan: [42:33] Ambassador Dobbins, I've got to ask you, Danielle Pletko says that you have a touching and even naive faith in the Iranian character and their ability to negotiate with us in good faith. Is that the case? Ambassador Dobbins: [42:48] I'd say a couple of things. I'd say first of all, there's no doubt that the reason we instinctively believe that the Iranians are going for a bomb is because it's exactly what we would do if we were in their position. [43:01] No American policymaker would choose any option other than gaining nuclear weapons if he were surrounded by the United States, Pakistan, Russia, India, and Israel. There's a natural instinct. Of course, they're going for a bomb. [43:19] I think there are a number of other factors, though, that constrain that decision and make it fairly costly for them to cross that threshold. They've been careful not to cross that threshold, although they keep inching up to it. [43:31] They could have had a bomb sooner than this if they had really wanted one badly enough and were prepared to pay the consequences. I don't think it's necessarily the threat to attack them, although that may be a factor. [43:42] They negotiated with us for five or six years before we threatened to attack them. I think the sanctions regime and the degree of opprobrium they get if they cross this threshold is one of the things that are holding them back. [43:54] In terms of whether you can negotiate with the Iranians, I negotiated with the Iranians over Afghanistan in 2001-2002. They were quite helpful in that regard, and they negotiated quite seriously and without great difficulty. The government there has changed, and Ahmadinejad was elected a year later and has been a much more difficult [inaudible 44: [44:10] 18] . Therefore, I've had less hope for similar relationship under his leadership. They're having another election in a couple of months. Iranian elections aren't free and fair, but they are completely unpredictable, and they do have consequences. [44:37] Iranian policies have changed significantly under different leaders. We've missed opportunities with other leaders when they made openings. I'm hoping that if those opportunities occur, and I think they might, that we'll seize them this time. Ambassador Pickering: [44:54] Might I add just two things, Susan? During that period that is before 2008, Iran accepted for two years to stop enrichment entirely. Iran at the same time agreed to accept the additional protocol to the IAEA which is a voluntary extensive, more extensive inspection system which allows the IAEA to say what sites it's to visit with the acceptance of the government in advance. [45:22] I don't think that the whole question of negotiation is an exercise in disutility. I think it's extremely important. I think that progress is slow, that part of the problem is that on the Iranian side the point that Congressman Wexler made, let's go for regime change, is certainly not helpful in bringing about an agreement on a particular set of issues constraining their nuclear program.

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[45:51] We will only know until we make the major effort to try. Jim and I have pointed out that the bridge to cross is a serious one and not an ephemeral or, indeed, not an unimportant one. But it is, nevertheless, a bridge that I believe is possible to cross. There are ways to cross it, as I explained, that continue to keep our powder to dry, so to speak, and keep us in the driver's seat. [46:22] That's the kind of approach we need. I couldn't agree more with Congressman Wexler who says that we should exhaust all of the opportunities, certainly within the time allowed us. That time is obviously not working on our side, but I think we have time now. [46:39] I think the debate is not whether ultimately should we use military force, which is what the other side is trying to turn it into. The debate I was invited to come here to make was, "Should we use military force now and forget all of this silliness that the diplomats are involved in, in negotiation?" [46:59] I can tell you, in fact, that it is that kind of attitude and that sort of approach, the substitution of military force for diplomacy on a premature basis, that got us into deep trouble for the last 10 years in the Middle East. Susan: [47:14] I'd like to let you respond. Then I want to probe a little bit more into this question of the military option that you're advocating. Up until now, Congressman Wexler, you have made the argument that having the viable military option is important as a tool in the diplomacy. [47:32] But I haven't heard a lot from either of you about why it is that you believe that, should negotiations fail, this is a viable option or that it is an effective one. Please, respond to Ambassador Pickering as well. Congressman Wexler: [47:48] First, I just want to be clear. I don't know exactly what explanation you received, but I personally completely support all of these efforts. They are legitimate. They are credible. It's exactly what the United States must do in order to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear weapon holder. [48:12] What I thought was a part of the debate, and certainly must be because it's the essential question ultimately and, more importantly, when the President of the United States announces his policy of prevention, he's a smart man. [48:29] He understands that by choosing prevention versus containment, he is saying that if at some point in time prevention is no longer possible by negotiation, then I must use other means. Those means might include military means. That, to me, is quite self-evident. [48:52] I would go back, if I could, using Ambassador Pickering's, I think, very worthy tactic of saying, "What have we learned from various experiences?" I would ask, it seems to me that maybe the only time in which Iran has, in fact, altered its behavior was in 2003. [49:13] If I understand the history correctly, the primary action that occurred in 2003 was the fact that there were 200,000 plus American troops in Iraq, and Iran correctly or incorrectly calculated that they might be next.

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[49:30] Now I'm not suggesting we put 200,000 plus American troops for this purpose, but what lesson should we draw from that? That a credible military threat is not relevant to the success of negotiations or that a military threat is just one factor? I don't think so. [49:49] The lesson that I draw is, rightfully or wrongfully so, a credible military threat may, in fact, be the most significant element that we have to achieve your negotiated success. Ambassador Pickering: [50:06] You may be right. I don't think it's a knowable proposition. Our experience is that coercive diplomacy, that is threatening somebody in order to secure their behavioral change, usually doesn't work, that it makes them more difficult to do what they're doing. [50:26] In 1999, or going back even earlier in 1991, we told Saddam if he didn't get out of Kuwait, we would throw him out. He didn't get out. We had to throw him out. In 1999, we told Milosevic if he didn't get out of Kosovo, we'd bomb him out. He didn't get out and we had to bomb him out. [50:51] In 2001, we told the Taliban that if they didn't hand over bin Laden, we'd invade and overthrow their government. They didn't give us bin Laden. We invaded and overthrew their government. [51:02] In 2003, we again told Saddam that if he couldn't convince us he didn't have WMD, we'd invade and overthrow his government. He didn't come clean that he didn't have WMD. He continued to pretend he did and we invaded and overthrew his government. In every single occasion, the threat didn't work. Congressman Wexler: [51:20] Respectfully, though, Libya is a different example. Susan: [51:22] I'd like to get Danielle in. Ambassador Pickering: [51:24] Libya's another good example, if you want another one. Danielle: [51:26] I'm not quite sure what you would have preferred that we did with... Ambassador Dobbins: [51:32] I'm on a limited argument, whether the threat is likely to bring about the desired impact. I'm saying I don't know, but our experience is that threats tend to get people's back up and usually the threat of war doesn't lead to peace, it leads to war. Ambassador Pickering: [51:49] Can I make just one small point here? Susan: [51:51] No, no, no. Danielle. Ambassador Pickering: [51:56] I thought it was our side's turn for the six minutes. Danielle: [52:01] Let me just address this. Ambassador Pickering: [52:03] So we don't get equal time.

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Danielle: [52:04] No, you... Susan: [52:05] You get more than equal time. We're not on the six minutes anymore. Ambassador Pickering: [52:10] Somebody should tell us that we're off the six minutes. Susan: [52:13] Go ahead. Ambassador Pickering: [52:14] All I wanted to make was a small point. I agree with Jim on threats. On the other hand, as an American diplomat, I would never want to negotiate without a first class military force in this country or without the world's best economy. I believe that in some ways that makes a considerable difference in our ability to negotiate successfully. Danielle: [52:38] I note the success of our negotiations with North Korea or perhaps not. The success of our negotiations with Iran, so far. [52:50] I would point out that sometimes there aren't really good answers but the notion, this construct, this straw man that you've created that somehow had we negotiated with Milosevic, let's say, without the prospect... Ambassador Pickering: [53:04] That's not my suggestion. Danielle: [53:05] Again, it sort of is because we're in the real world. There is an option. It either happens or it doesn't happen. Do you want to sit down and negotiate with him? At what point should we have stopped negotiating with him, because that's the place we're in. Ambassador Pickering: [53:23] I'm just arguing that in some cases neither negotiating or threatening work. There are cases where neither works. Danielle: [53:29] I think that what Ambassador Pickering said is actually apropos. We go a little further, and I think that's maybe one of the distinctions between us. It's not the question of having that military. It's the credible threat of using that military that gives your negotiations a little bit of urgency. That is the question before us. Ambassador Pickering: [53:50] has written...I wrote down the quote before I came because I thought it was important what he said. "A war with Iran would be madness and catastrophic for U.S. interests." I think that's a pretty clear statement that a war with Iran would be madness. [54:07] We don't believe that, and I think, again, the important thing here to underscore is that no one is excited about a military option with Iran. I'm sure, least of all, the Iranians, but frankly even...I think I can speak for you, Robert, here. I don't think we're very excited about this idea, either. [54:25] First of all, you're exactly right. If we end up in a situation where, God forbid, we end up having troops on the ground, we're not very good at that. But there's another element here that doesn't get discussed. That is that a military strike, if it buys us the four years that you estimate. I'll give you two. If it buys us the two years we estimate.

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[54:45] If we have a decent strategy to cope afterwards with an aftermath and to figure out what should be done and to help to mitigate any option for the Iranians to move back to a nuclear weapons program, we will be in a better place than if the Iranians, in fact, are the point of possession of nuclear weapons. Ambassador Pickering: [55:10] Triumphs of hope over reality don't produce a sound strategy. Danielle: [55:14] I'm sorry, I couldn't hear. Ambassador Pickering: [55:15] Triumphs of hope over reality don't produce a sound strategy. Danielle: [55:20] Bingo, that's the problem with the negotiations. Ambassador Pickering: [55:20] That's what you're arguing. Susan: [55:23] Just to return to our format so that everybody is clear, Ambassador Pickering. We're going to give...I'm going to give a question to all of you that goes back to this question about the military options and then we're going to turn to our audience for their questions. Ambassador Pickering: [55:35] I thought we were having a debate, but that's OK. I'm happy to oblige. Susan: [55:37] We're going to have two minutes each, absolutely. [55:40] What I'd like to know is your view of the military option and why it is that you're sure that it would be such a disaster. Does that mean that you don't believe that there is the need for a credible military threat as part of these negotiations? Ambassador Pickering: [55:57] I don't say that I don't believe that a credible military threat is not useful. I explained how and why I believe that. I think Jim has explained how active military threats, at times, have not produced the result that we would like, and I agree with that. [56:15] Secondly, I agree that we ought to exhaust diplomacy. That's up to the line where the General Clapper piece begins to fit in, where his confidence, which I was amazed by but I'm happy to accept, that he would know, in fact, if this was going to a nuclear weapon is very important to have on the table. It's something to consider. [56:37] It's not something that I would likely doubt, because I respect the man, and I think he's a careful and a conservative person. Jim and I have both described what we see as the down sides of military activity. They are simple. [56:52] One is we can achieve a small gain, but we don't know what we'll do after that except either more bombing or land occupation to stop the nuclear program in Iran if it turns to a weapon. Certainly, we are not yet ready to decide that some level of capability is the trigger for moving ahead. [57:15] I think we need to be careful about that. I think that the President's view on that, which has been expressed a number of times, which Congressman Wexler has expressed,

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is the right view. I wish I could tell you that we had some silver bullet, easy answer, to a very difficult problem. I don't think we do. [57:36] I think it's very hard. You've heard it from both sides, and I agree with that. But I do think, and I go back to the point, that I think we agree along here that the exhaustion of other remedies is extremely important before we turn to the military. Susan: [57:55] Ambassador Dobbins, do you want to add anything to that? Ambassador Dobbins: [58:05] I think that pretty much says it. I think we're all agreed that we should exhaust diplomacy. I think Danielle, at least, believes it's exhausted. Danielle: [58:14] Tired at least. Ambassador Dobbins: [58:15] We're arguing that it's not. What you do when diplomacy is exhausted is, in a sense, another debate. I think Congressman Wexler talked about the page in the Disneyland Book of Presidents, President Obama. Congressman Wexler: [58:34] Disneyworld. Ambassador Dobbins: [58:35] Disneyworld, sorry. [laughter] Susan: [58:38] They're very different. Ambassador Dobbins: [58:38] I'm an older guy. I visited Disneyland. Maybe if we went the military route and set that program back, what that page might say is that he pushed the Iranian nuclear capability into President Hillary Clinton's term. [laughter] Ambassador Dobbins: [59:02] One of the questions is, "Is there a realistic prevention option as opposed to a delay option? If it's a delay option, what are the risks and costs that you entail with such a delay?" I think in my opening presentation I suggested that. [59:18] In terms of where I think we'll be a year from now, I debated Danielle on this almost five years ago, and I think you can schedule it right. Danielle and I, Congressman Wexler and Tom, can come back next spring and debate as to whether diplomacy still has a chance. Susan: [59:33] I like, the annual McCain Institute Groundhog Day Iran Debate. [laughter] Ambassador Dobbins: [59:38] It's not a bad outcome. Danielle: [59:39] It will still be a year, don't worry. There's always another year. Susan: [59:42] Team Pletko and Wexler, I do want to return to this question of the military option. You've made your case for why it's an element, you believe, of coercive diplomacy that's necessary. But putting that aside, if it's an option that needs to be exercised, why do you believe that it would be effective?

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Danielle: [59:59] I don't think that either of us believes that it's a silver bullet. I think you'd find a lot of consensus. There's no one who can make a persuasive case, and you don't hear it in Israel, for example, where you first heard talk about military action, that any military action would be a silver bullet. Clearly, the United States has much greater capability on the military side than Israel would. [60:25] That being said, I think that there is broad agreement that it could cause a serious delay in the Iranian nuclear program. At a certain moment, you are forced into a little bit of what we've been talking about here today and what Ambassador Dobbins and Ambassador Pickering have been writing about, which is a bit of a cost benefit analysis. [60:46] I guess that there are those that believe that the cost of an Iranian nuclear weapons capability are lower than the costs of a military strike. I don't think that's our assessment. I don't want to speak for the Congressman. [61:04] I think there's a further point here, and that is that we can't talk about this in a vacuum, this notion that we all have tended to refer to in shorthand that somebody is going to "do it." Who is going to do it? Are we going to do it, or are the Israelis going to do it? This "doing it" is a great corruption of what needs to happen, which is that you do need to have a strategy for day two or week two. You do need to have an idea that, if we're going to delay the Iranian nuclear program by striking at their key sites, at [inaudible 61: [61:20] 40] and elsewhere, that we know what we want to do the next day. [61:45] I think our military capacity isn't one that's in any doubt probably in the room. The question is what are we going to do with that time that's afforded to us? We do need to have a policy in place. I am hopeful that the President, as he says his policy is prevention, is thinking about those very things today. I sure as hell hope he is. What do you think? Congressman Wexler: [62:07] I think it's a given that no responsible person underestimates the great consequences of any military action, let alone the potential for this one. I'm not a military planner, and I wouldn't begin to be so presumptuous as to suggest how the Pentagon either has or should go about planning for such a contingency. [62:31] However, President Obama did not reach a position of prevention cavalierly. He clearly laid the options. No doubt Ambassador Pickering understood every one of the downsides that you listed. He also understood the other part of this equation, which is "What are the downsides of Iran becoming a nuclear weapon holder?" [63:04] The President clearly came down on the side of the downsides of Iran becoming a nuclear weapon holder outweigh the downsides of a military action should it be required as a last resort. Unfortunately, I think that is the ultimate part of the equation. [63:26] The President could not reasonably have reached a prevention policy without having the confidence that the Pentagon would be able to implement such a policy, and that is not to underestimate the difficulty of doing so and the consequences of doing so.

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[63:48] I would offer maybe just one term here, though. I have so much respect for Ambassador Pickering that I will always question myself if I hear him saying what I'm saying is way off. You suggest that by reinstituting an element of regime change, that that would be completely counterproductive and would undermine the effectiveness of negotiations. [64:23] I accept that if the President were to go out now and do it, but if at the end of this negotiation process or at the 11th hour plus some and we still haven't succeeded, if we can agree that the one thing the Iranian leadership cares about more than the nuclear weapon program is their own power, if they were to perceive that the President of the United States with all its power was, once again, embracing the possibility of regime change, would it not yet be another bit of leverage that might possibly avoid the military confrontation that all of us would seek to avoid? [65:09] Why, when dealing with a regime such as Iran, the world's leading sponsor of terror, would we want, necessarily, to forsake what may be ultimately our biggest point of leverage? Ambassador Pickering: [65:23] Because you and I know we don't do regime change very well and regime change in Iran requires occupation. Regime change in Iran will come from Iranians. It will not come from outsiders. I think we have to live with that tough reality. [65:46] As attractive as it may seem, again, another triumph of hope over reality is not what I would call the right driver for the hard thinking that has to go on here. If an action that you take is going to make it difficult or harder to reach agreement on a nuclear program, then you ought to be very cautious about taking that action. You ought to be cautious about making the threats. [66:16] Jim gave you four examples where military threats had to lead to military use. Military use lead, in some of those cases, to useful change and in some of those cases, to deeper and more difficult problems. It is not a kind of slot machine issue in which we put the quarter in and pull the lever and out comes our preferred alternative. Congressman Wexler: [66:40] Why keep the military option on the table at all? Ambassador Pickering: [66:43] I'm not taking the military option off, and I told you that because I told you I agreed that as an American diplomat, I would not want to enter into negotiations with a situation in which I did not have the strongest of all possible backing. Susan: [67:01] Gentleman, a great spot to break for one second and bring in you, the audience, the very patient audience. I can see we've eaten all the popcorn, so it's time to have at the debaters. Ambassador Pickering: [laughs] [67:10] Susan: [67:12] Just to refresh on the rules. I'm going to ask you to state your name, who you're with, and to really make it a question for our debaters. Each team will get two

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minutes to respond so that we can hopefully get to as many questions as possible. Sir? You, you're the first guy. Mike Connell: [67:29] I have a question... Danielle: [67:31] Wait for the mike. Susan: [67:34] Sorry, we're doing the live streaming, so we want to make sure they can hear you. Mike: [67:37] Mike Connell, Center for Naval Analyses. I have a question. Both sides of the debate seem to downplay the issue of containment. They have sort of implied that it wouldn't work. I know we're not here to debate containment and Iran in a post nuclear phase, but I'd the commenters to speak more about containment. [67:55] Why wouldn't containment work? What are the downsides of containment? North Korea went nuclear, and the world didn't fall apart. Both sides have said that Iran is fairly rational actor. I'd like to hear more about that issue. Susan: [68:08] Thank you very much. I see Ambassador Pickering eager to start us off. We have two minutes, again, for each team. Ambassador Pickering: [68:13] The problem of containment is the problem with premature capitulation to proliferation. It adds to the incentive of other people in the region to move in that direction. The fundamental basis for our nonproliferation policy is the more people who have it, the greater the chances are for mistaken, accidental and mis-judgmental use. [68:39] I follow that logic and I respect those statistics. I think it's very important to do that. It is clearly evident that when the Iranian issue became hot, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and others, including Jordan, all began new peaceful nuclear energy power programs. So keep your eye on the ball. Ambassador Dobbins: [69:07] Could I add just one point? I think we're really using the wrong terminology. Containment has been the American policy toward Iran since 1979. It will be the American policy toward Iran as long as Iran tries to subvert and destabilize its neighbors. Containment would be the American policy toward Iran whether it has nuclear weapons or not. The issue is deterrence versus preemption. Ambassador Pickering: [69:35] Exactly. Ambassador Dobbins: [69:37] That's a better way of expressing this dilemma. Now, can Iran be deterred? The answer is it can almost certainly be deterred from using its nuclear weapons, particularly against other, stronger nuclear states. But if it possessed those weapons, it might embolden it to use other instruments which would bedevil particularly Israel and to some degree us. [70:01] And further expand its influence in the region and along with the proliferation risk, that's really what is of concern. To Israel, to its neighbors and to the U.S. government. Ambassador Pickering: [70:15] Yeah. Just to point out I said earlier that containment had become a special term of art, which meant deterring Iran after it gets a nuclear

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weapon. I think the President is right in saying he's not in favor of that policy. I don't agree with it. I don't agree with containment as the way to go. Danielle: [70:36] We are going to have a... Ambassador Pickering: [70:37] But I have to say I agree with Jim in every sense of the word, that we're going to keep up the pressure on Iran in terms of its intervention in other people's affairs. Danielle: [70:47] Mike, you asked about containment. I wrote something on this with my colleague Tom Donnelly about a year and a half ago. The sine qua non of containment is, as I think our colleagues have said very ably, a credible deterrent. The credible use of force in the event of the action that you've sought to deter, that you seek to contain. What exactly is credible in what we would be doing? [71:19] We would have gone through a process in which we for years on end said that it was unacceptable for Iran to have a nuclear weapon. Suddenly they would have one and we would have done nothing. Of course, we have gone through years on end of looking at Iran through its proxies and directly kill American soldiers. Kill American soldiers in Saudi Arabia, support terrorist groups. [71:41] Attack American citizens, murder American citizens. Capture and hold hostage American citizens. Without actually ever doing anything credible that would contain the regime. [71:55] How would we in fact be a credible force for containment all of a sudden? It's not a realistic option in terms of our own power projection and our own willingness. I think that's a big part of the challenge. Congressman Wexler: [72:11] I think there are in essence two parts to the gentleman's question. There's the generalized debate of, however you define it, containment versus prevention. I think both ambassadors answered that question very well. I think there's the second part of your question, which you didn't say, which is after adopting a policy of prevention, what are the risks of the prevention failing and moving to a policy of containment? [72:42] I would argue having adopted very publicly, concretely, clearly, for everyone to see over and over and over again the policy that we have adopted. To then in some manner take a step back, we would destroy the credibility of the United States in ways that we couldn't even begin to count. From strategic security issues. Danny mentioned the two state solution or at least the negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians. [73:16] Kiss a Palestinian state goodbye. It will never happen. I realize this is way beyond this debate, but you want to contain Iran? [73:26] Everyone in the region then goes and pursues, both our friends and our opponents, their own self interests with a degree of certainty and not looking back one minute to see what the United States thinks, cares about or may do. Because everyone will know we do nothing. I, for one, would never want this country to be in that position.

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Danielle: [73:50] Can I explore the Pickering prerogative for one sec? I just want to take issue with one thing that Jim Dobbins said because I think that it's important it not sit out there. I don't know why you're so persuaded that Iran would not be a first user of nuclear weapons. I think that there's no reason for us to be so certain of it. [74:10] We can doubt, but doubting isn't very reassuring when it comes to a country like Iran with nuclear weapons. Susan: [74:17] We're running out of time, so I'm going to try to squeeze in two questions if we can be brief in our questions. So this young gentleman here. Connor Gottard: [74:29] Thank you. The discussion this evening has been about a military option or... Susan: [74:34] Can you tell us who you are and where you're from? Connor: [74:35] Yes. My name is Connor Gottard. I'm a student at Northeastern University. The discussion has been about a military option or high-level diplomacy. I'd like to ask you about a third option, which would be supporting a democratic uprising in Iran. This option was articulated this morning in a "Wall Street Journal" op-ed. [74:53] I think this is a very important moment as Iran has elections coming up in June. In the 2009 elections, we saw that there is a genuine thirst for democracy in the country. What should the U.S. be doing to support democracy in Iran? Are our current tools there such as our virtual embassy or the Voice of America effective enough? [75:16] If we get a truly democratic Iran that is truly representative of the Iranian people, will that be an ally of the United States? Thank you. Susan: [75:24] Thank you very much. Danielle: [75:26] If I may, that would be so awesome. Yet, first of all our commitment to democracy is one that I question after watching what's going on in Syria. I question a lot of things after watching what's going on in Syria. But I think what we've proven over some years now is that we don't have a great commitment to supporting a democratic uprising in Iran. We don't have great capacity to support a democratic commitment. Perhaps that rests on the commitment. I'm not sure. [76:03] Of course, that would be the answer, but that is regime change, of course. That is getting rid of not just the people, but the system of the Islamic Republic. The problem for us is having gone so many years, the Iranian government has in place a system of repression which is extraordinarily sophisticated, extraordinarily brutal and one that it would be very tough to contend with, even if we were to put our back into this effort, which we haven't. Ambassador Dobbins: [76:40] I think it would be great if the Iranian regime were to change in fundamental ways and if democracy was to take hold in the country. I'm not sure it would solve our nuclear problem. The nuclear program started under the Shah. [76:58] We came close to an interim agreement with the Iranians two years ago. It was scuttled by opposition from the green movement, who complained that they were making big concessions to the Americans.

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[77:11] Polling shows that the nuclear program, conceived of as a civil program, because that's how the Iranian regime explains it to its own population, has strong support across the spectrum in Iran. We would have a government that would be less threatening, wouldn't be supporting terrorism, wouldn't be threatening to wipe Israel off the map. [77:33] Would be trying to integrate in the international community and those would all be good things and maybe we'd be a little less concerned about their nuclear program if they weren't otherwise threatening. [77:43] Maybe we could persuade them to abandon it. I'm not suggesting we wouldn't try. I'm just saying it's not necessarily a panacea. I agree with Danielle that we have very little capacity to influence whether this occurs in Iran. I think it will occur in some way at some point in the next generation almost certainly. But when and how, I think, is not going to be decided in Washington. Susan: [78:08] Did you want to add something, ambassador? Ambassador Pickering: [78:09] Just to add one more brief point. I said a while ago that regime change in Iran will come from Iran. I agree with Danielle that the system of repression is enormous. But we saw in the period after June 12, 2009 when there were great hopes, that both Mousavi, Qalibaf who led that movement said to us, "Please don't help. It's not going to mean a difference for us that is positive." [78:41] I think it's something that we have to keep in mind on this particular issue. I said earlier, we don't do regime change very well. I think that we have to be cautious about how and in what way we deal with it. But the lead ought to come from that direction. [78:57] If you want an example of where things went differently, it was in the period when Serbia changed hands. But then it was very much the Serbs themselves, but with people from the region. Who knew in fact, because they had involved themselves in changing the communist domination, how to do this and made that happen. [79:24] I don't see that kind of effort possible or available. I would like to keep my eye open for it, but I think again it's more in the area of pious hope at the moment than it is any reality. Ambassador Dobbins: [79:38] The Serbs did get a little help from us. Congressman Wexler: [79:41] I would respectfully differ just a bit. No doubt regime change must be homegrown. No doubt American opportunities are limited. But surely America has a role to play and again, back to your first sort of theory or question, Ambassador Pickering. What lessons have we learned? [80:10] If we could turn the clock back to the most recent Iranian election, I might be persuaded by your argument that we don't have many cards to play. If we were to inject ourselves, we are likely to undermine the very result we wish to seek. We did that and it didn't work. I'm not saying that from a critical point of view, but we now have that example. [80:36] I would hope that at a minimum as we approach the next Iranian election, none of us know precisely what will happen. That if another opportunity were to present itself,

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that we would learn from that illustration and come to the conclusion that by simply standing relatively silent, the likelihood of effecting a result that I think we would all hope, is highly unlikely. And that we would employ a different strategy next time that might equal a different result. Ambassador Dobbins: [81:09] Again, if you don't believe that it will come from inside and has to be supported from inside, if the insiders want our help and can use it, that's an entirely different position. Danielle: [81:23] But the insiders felt betrayed. I don't agree with you about what happened in 2009. I think the people of Iran felt a great sense of betrayal, that the United States was unwilling to stand with them against a brutal and repressive regime. Ambassador Pickering: [81:38] I think we've got all kinds of examples to learn from. Congressman Wexler: [81:42] We are all dreaming that if everything was simply splendid and we helped them out it would all change. Ambassador Pickering: [81:49] Nobody's suggested that. Congressman Wexler: [81:49] The two leaders of the movement made it very clear that they couldn't use our help. Danielle: [81:54] The same guys who criticized the regime for capitulating to us on the nuclear program, maybe they just weren't the right leaders. Ambassador Dobbins: [82:02] Maybe so, but we're going to, then, start making leaders out of people? Danielle: [82:09] I think we actually believe in people. Ambassador Dobbins: [82:12] I believe in people, too, but I believe in the fact that we don't make leaders very well. Susan: [82:19] One thing I can say, for sure...Sorry, please go ahead. Congressman Wexler: [82:22] My only quick point is at this point we have an example of what happened in the last Iranian election. Ambassador Pickering: [82:27] Let's try something different. Congressman Wexler: [82:28] We have Egypt as an example of a different American role. We have Bahrain as an example of a different American role. We've got Libya, we've got Tunisia. We've got now a half a dozen examples. [82:41] I would hope that... Ambassador Dobbins: [82:41] All of them moving splendidly except, perhaps, Yemen where we're OK. Congressman Wexler: [82:45] Yeah. I would hope we could extract some lessons from those.

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Susan: [82:50] I guess that we'll be having our panelists continue debating outside on Pennsylvania Avenue for anyone who misses the show. [82:57] I'm afraid to say that I'm told we're out of time. We are going to go right to our final round, which is really to go back to each of our debaters tonight and to ask them one final question, which is to say, "We didn't manage to come to any kind of consensus here about what is that date when we're going to run out of time?" [83:17] That clearly is the biggest X-factor, if you will. But let's just say we've reached that date, whatever day it is, whatever time it is and we are now sure in some sure way that I'm not sure how we'll be sure, but we're sure that Iran is finally on the cusp of a nuclear weapons capacity. [83:35] What should we do? What is your policy recommendation? We'll give everyone a final chance to go around. Danielle: [83:41] Can I start it, perhaps? Susan: [83:43] Ambassadors, it's yours to... Ambassador Pickering: [83:45] You mean we didn't get to go first before but now we get to go first with a really crappy question? Susan: [83:48] I think that's a fair point. [laughter] Susan: [83:53] I'm just following the moderator's [inaudible 83:55] . Ambassador Pickering: [83:54] That's OK. I'm happy to go first. Danielle: [83:56] I'll go first. Ambassador Pickering: [83:57] I know how we stand in this free debate thing. [84:00] I will tell you. Anybody who tells you that he will advise the President now, uncertain about the circumstances and what the possibilities are, that the President should move immediately to war has got to have his head examined. [84:19] My view is the President has said he's keeping everything on the table. I totally support that. I will support under the circumstances and at the time, what I believe the president should do, but if I don't know the circumstances and the time, how much time we will have left, what the type of evidence is on the decision, and how and in what way we judge our military effectiveness, and whether it's better to achieve a two- to four-year delay or continue with some other pressure tactic, I don't know. [84:51] But my view is nothing should come off the table. I think that the President has that onerous and difficult problem of looking at it under the circumstances. Susan: [85:01] One thing I can say is we should send Ambassador Pickering to negotiate with the Iranians because he's made a very important point here and in the interest of fairness, it is not right that you should start with the second word and end with the second

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word so we're going to alternate. [85:14] Someone from Team Pletka or Wexler can go next. Congressman Wexler: [85:17] I concur with Ambassador Pickering. I would say it requires one more statement in that the President, of course, has said that all options are on the table, but he's also said -- this was his exact language -- "We will do what is necessary to prevent Iran from getting the world's worst weapons." [85:39] That's the policy in a nutshell. If I could, without interrupting, Senator McCain has joined us. I think something we all agree upon and probably why we're all here is that it's a tremendous honor for us to be associated with anything under Senator McCain's banner. I may not have always been on Senator McCain's team, but I always respected and admired him, regardless. Susan: [86:09] Thanks very much, Senator. [applause] Senator John McCain: [86:17] Thank you, Susan. You've done a good job with another rather unruly group here. I thank my friends from many years, all four of you. [86:32] The debates that we've been having, I think, have been incredibly informative. But, also, I hope we can share this with the American people because when I go back home, people ask me, "What are we going to do about Iran?" Americans want to know. [86:49] The benefit of the knowledge and experience amongst the four of you is even older than me. I want to thank you for participating. It's a great honor to have people at the level of knowledge and experience and expertise that you have to join here in this debate. [87:13] I know that those who not only are present but also view it through various media outlets are better informed. That's what it's supposed to be all about. [87:25] I thank you all for being here. And Susan, thank you for the great job you did. Thank you. [applause] Kurt: [87:35] That's going to conclude our debate for this evening. I want to thank our debaters again. I want to thank Susan and thank you Senator McCain for coming here. He wasn't able to hear the entire debate, in part, because there were votes in the Senate this evening which I think, if you all now check your "Washington Post" or Twitter feeds you're going to see were quite interesting votes that took place. [87:57] I want to thank all of you and remind you that our next debate will be June 19th on the subject of the defense budget cuts. Are we giving our enemies a gift? [88:06] Do stay in touch with the McCain Institute by our website. Get on our email list. We will be continuing this series in the fall. [88:13] I also want to put in a plug. This evening, there will be on "National Geographic" a special called, "Locked Up Abroad," that features some of the history of Senator McCain's service to our nation.

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[88:25] I want to thank all of you again for coming, thank our debaters. Thank you. [applause] [88:28]

Transcription by CastingWords