Kiyana Allen
Kayly Ober
American University
April 2008
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Table of Contents
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….3
Desertification and its Effects on Forced Migration: The Sahel as a Case Study……6
Sahelian Migration……………………………………………………………………………………..10
The Fulani of Northern Burkina Faso…………………………………………………………...10
The Maradi Region of Niger
Sea-level Rise and its Effects on Forced Migration: China, Bangladesh, and Small
Island Nations as Case Study…………………………………………………………………………13
2
Introduction
Norman Myers defines environmental refugees as “people who can no longer gain a
secure livelihood in their erstwhile homelands because of drought, soil erosion, desertification,
and other environmental problems” (752). There is some debate over the difference between
economic and environmental refugees, but Norman argues that the two are intertwined because
the environmental problem leads to the economic hardship that causes involuntary
displacement. Diane Bates argues that “environmental refugee” is too broad a term, and
suggests three classifications: those displaced by disasters (either natural, such as a hurricane,
or anthropogenic, such as an oil spill), those displaced by the expropriation of their environment
(either through economic development, such as China’s Three Gorges Dam, or through warfare
that ravages the land), and those who are displaced due to the gradual, anthropogenic
degradation of the environment. This paper will focus on those migrants who fall into the third
category, or more specifically, those who have been displaced by unpreventable environmental
problems spurred by climate change; namely, desertification and sea-level rise. This paper sets
out to examine if forced migration due to climate change does, in fact, exist. And if it does, what
are its impacts and implications? We will look at recent examples and scientific forecasts to
render a prediction. We predict that environmental forced migration does exist, and the poorest
and least-developed nations take the brunt of ecological disasters.
The first half of our research will explore the relationship between desertification and
migration by approaching the Sahel region of Africa as a case study. It will examine how
residents of this region are coping with desertification, where they are migrating to, and the
effects of their migratory patterns on the rest of the region. We hypothesize that the data will
show an exodus of desertification refugees from rural dryland regions of the Sahel into primarily
heavily-populated urban areas of West African states.
The second half of our paper seeks to examine effect sea-level rise has on migration. We
understand that sea-level rise is a newly-investigated phenomena and inherently future-based.
However, comparing future predictions to occurrences in the last three decades allows us to see
the timeline at which sea-level rise affects, and will affect, various nations. We will use China,
3
Bangladesh, and several small island nations as case studies. We hypothesize that not only a
future tend should be expected, but that sea-level rise has forced migration in recent years.
Using these two examples of environmental problems spurred by climate change, we can
then determine if the term “environmental refugee” can be legitimized, and whether or not
measures should be taken to incorporate them into United Nations rhetoric.
4
they are naturally induced and unstoppable. The migrants produced by these phenomena have
no choice but to move. Below is a table outlining the difference between naturally and
economically induced disasters.
5
Desertification and its Effects on Forced Migration: The Sahel as a Case Study
Desertification is an environmental problem inextricably linked with environmental
refugees. The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Report regards 41% of the world’s area being
drylands, of which 10-20% are already desertified. There is much debate over whether
desertification describes a process in and of itself, or a final end result. And, because of its slow,
progressive nature (rather than a sudden environmental catastrophe such as an earthquake),
there is a great deal of controversy over whether victims of desertification can be classified as
environmental refugees. In order to understand how desertification is linked with
environmental refugees, we must first understand what desertification is, how it works, and in
what ways it has been defined.
The first use of the term “desertification” came from Andre Aubreville in 1949, where he
described the creation of deserts in tropical African forests by the removal of trees and excessive
cultivation, which caused the nutrient-weak soil to erode, thus leading to the creation of deserts
via soil desiccation. He noted that forest was transformed into savannah and savannah into
desert. A deadly, extended drought in the Sahel led to further attention to the concept in the
1977 United Nations Conference to Combat Desertification in Nairobi. In the conference’s
statement they placed responsibility for desertification firmly on anthropogenic causes, defining
it as:
“the diminution or destruction of the biological potential of the land, (which) can lead
ultimately to desert-like conditions. It is an aspect of the widespread deterioration of
ecosystems, and has diminished or destroyed the biological potential, i.e. plant and
animal production, for multiple use purposes at a time when increased productivity is
needed to support growing populations in quest of development. …In general, the quest
for ever greater productivity has intensified exploitation and has carried disturbance by
man into less productive and more fragile lands. Overexploitation gives rise to
degradation of vegetation, soil and water, the three elements which serve as the natural
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foundation for human existence. In exceptionally fragile ecosystems, such as those on
the desert margins, the loss of biological productivity through the degradation of plant,
animal, soil and water resources can easily become irreversible, and permanently reduce
their capacity to support human life. Desertification is a self-accelerating process,
feeding on itself, and as it advances, rehabilitation costs rise exponentially.”
The causes of desertification are varied and interlinked between many disciplines.
Hermann and Hutchinson note that the cause and effect relationships between desertification,
drought, and human activities are characterized by multiple linkages and feedback mechanisms,
making it difficult to tease out the true source, and pointing instead to a complex network of
interrelated causes. We do know that desertification occurs primarily in arid drylands, complex
and fragile ecosystems receiving little rainfall. One cause of desertification is drought, defined
as a period of below-average rainfall. They are short-term episodic phenomena that may occur
anywhere but tend to be more associated with drylands due to their more variable climate
conditions. Land degradation is also strongly linked with desertification, and generally comes
from human activities in the forms of overgrazing, overcultivation, and deforestation (Thomas
and Middleton). Climate change is also a hypothesis for explaining desertification. LeHouerou
notes that an increase in dryland temperature, coupled with no substantial change in terms of
rainfall and unchanged human-use pressure, leads to drier conditions and desiccation of the
soil. Desertification can also exacerbate global climate change through the release of carbon
dioxide from cleared vegetation and reduce the carbon sequestration potential of degraded
land.
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FIGURE 1
There is a great deal of debate amongst the scientific community about whether
desertification refers to a process of change or the end result of a process of change. Glantz and
Orlovsky, in a review of scientific desertification literature, describe the desertification-as-
process position as “a series of incremental (sometimes step-wise) changes in biological
productivity in arid, semi-arid, and subhumid ecosystems. It can encompass such changes as a
decline in yield of the same crop or, more drastically, the replacement of one vegetative species
by another maybe equally productive or equally useful, or even a decrease in the density of the
existing vegetative cover” (1). Desertification-as-an-event is generally defined as “the creation of
desert-like conditions (where perhaps none had existed in the recent past) as the end result of a
process of change. To many, it is difficult to accept incremental changes as a manifestation of
desertification” (1). This paper will utilize the definition put forth by the United Nations
Convention to Combat Desertification, which is “land degradation in arid, semi-arid and dry
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sub-humid areas resulting from various factors, including climatic variations and human
activities.”
Primary areas of the world that are affected by climate change include the Sahel region of
Africa, as well as the borders of the Kalahari Desert in southwestern Africa. The Gobi Desert in
China and the Taklimakan region of Central Asia are also affected, as well as parts of northern
Thailand and northern Brazil. Large regions of Mexico, specifically the Oaxaca province are also
undergoing severe desertification. Other regions such as the western United States, sections of
Chile, Bolivia, and Ecuador, as well as large swaths of the Middle East are at a high risk of
desertification. Essentially any area that can be classified as a dryland is threatened by
desertification. This section will focus on the case study of the Sahel region in central Africa as
an example of desertification and its effects on human migration flows.
Hulme estimates that from 1967 to 1992, annual rainfall was 20-40% less that from 1931
to 1960, signaling a long-term trend towards desiccation. The following graph of rainfall
estimates in Niamey, Niger illustrates this trend:
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FIGURE 2 Rainfall Data in Niamey, Niger
Sahelian Migration
Many Sahelian peoples are traditionally semi-nomadic, migrating in the dry season to
less harsh areas, but migration flows are demonstrating increasing patterns of permanent
migration away from the Sahel as conditions worsen. The severe drought in the 1980’s, widely
believed to have precipitated conditions for increased desertification, displaced millions of
people. About 20% of Mauritania’s population (400,000 people) left their homes, while 17% of
Niger’s population (1.5 million people) also fled. Overall about ten million people left home
during this period, with two million being in the countries of Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad, and
Burkina Faso. During this period many people migrated to towns, as the Sahel’s urban
population quadrupled from the mid-1960’s to the mid-1980’s. Burkina Faso’s urban
population increased by one million. Many also went to neighboring countries, with Côte
d’Ivoire taking in 1.4 million of these refugees (Myers for the Climate Institute).
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leaving rural areas in Burkina Faso for urban regions within the country as well as crossing
international borders. Much of this migration has followed a circular pattern, with remittances
being sent back to family in the Sahel in order to help them get by.
Research by Hampshire on the Fulani tribe of Northern Burkina Faso confirms this
trend. Her 1995 study of 40 villages and a total of 8834 Fulani individuals allows us great
insight into the migration trends of the Sahel. The Fulani work primarily in extensive
pastoralism, as well as agriculture, which is possible only in the rainy season from July to
September. The population is highly mobile, as they often travel with their herds, however,
since the 1970’s men have been traveling to large cities to earn money on a temporary basis, a
new phenomenon within the Fulani’s home region. At first, only a few young men migrated, but
many more began to make the trip after a second drought hit in 1984. This migration was
defined specifically by three factors: movement beyond the Sahel region of Burkina Faso,
migrating for a period of one month to two years, and migrating with the intention of earning
money. Nearly all those who undertake this journey are men between the ages of 18 and 64, and
36.6% of all men in the study had ever migrated for work, with a median length of five months.
The middle-aged cohort of men (aged 28-40) were most likely to travel, while the oldest cohort
(41-64) was least likely, with the youngest productive cohort (18-27) in the middle. They
generally leave directly following the harvest and are away for most of the dry season, returning
in time for the rainy season in order to cultivate the land. It is not considered socially acceptable
for women to leave in order to pursue economic activities, and the few who do travel to the cities
are accompanying their husbands rather than engaging in some sort of economically beneficial
activity themselves. The most popular destination is Abidjan in Côte d’Ivoire (79.5% of migrants
went there in 1994-1995). Only 5.5% traveled to Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso’s capital, while
another 5.8% went to Bobo Dioulassou, another Burkinabè city.
Migrants typically depend on social networks within their villages once they arrive at
their destination. Cousins, brothers, and fellow villagers from the same hometowns help one
another out. They are employed in a variety of jobs, such as wage labor, animal market work
(for example, transporting goods with a donkey cart), contract herding, begging, and animal
trading. It is also important to note that of the Fulani, only the most comparatively wealthy can
11
afford to make these journeys—the most destitute and affected cannot afford to make the trip.
Those who become “failed migrants”—those who do not find profitable work or make enough
money to make their travel worthwhile often end up trapped in Abidjan, both because they have
no money to return home and because the stigma of returning home empty-handed is so
shameful.
This process of migration was essentially unknown to the Fulani before the early 1970’s,
when a severe drought hit and the world started realizing the impact of desertification. As
desertification in the Sahel has increased, making pastoral and agricultural livelihoods more
difficult, circular migration of the productive male cohort has developed as a dynamic strategy
to maintain the Sahelian communities of northern Burkina Faso.
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result of food shortage. Here also, the great majority of circular migrants are men of the
productive cohort. However, unlike the Fulani in Côte d’Ivoire, there is a higher degree of
permanent migration to Maradi, although circular seasonal migration is still very prominent.
Hundreds of shantytowns, with small shacks built in traditional rural Hausa style surround the
edges of Maradi, and they swell considerably during the dry season. Even those who have
permanently migrated serve as social networks for circular migrants from their villages, which
allow these social linkages to continue. As desertification continues to encroach, both circular
and permanent migration increase accordingly in order for Sahelian communities to continue
their traditional way of life.
Sea-level Rise and its Effects on Forced Migration: China, Bangladesh, and Small
Island Nations as Case Study
The term “environmental refugee” has been investigated, ever since Essam El-Hinnawi
(quoted above) published a paper of the same name for the United Nations Environment
Program (UNEP) in 1985. Curiosity has solidified as the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) released figures of global warming-induced sea-level rise scenarios ranging from
22 centimeters to 34 centimeters between 1990 and 2080 (Nicholls 2004). With unexpected
collapses from the West Antarctic or Greenland ice shelf, the rise could be even higher. A sea-
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level rise of just 38 centimeters would increase the number of people displaced by flooding five-
fold (Nicholls et al 1999). However, all of these estimates remain just that, estimates.
Gordon McGranahan, Deborah Balk, and Bridget Anderson argue that low elevation
coastal populations are at particular risk from sea-level rise, stronger storms, and other seaward
hazards induced by climate change (McGranahan et al, 1). Indeed these low coastal zones, with
a coast equal to or lower than 10 meters above sea level, account for only 2 percent of the world’s
land mass, but up to 10 percent of the world’s population; and 13 percent of the world’s urban
population (McGranahan et al, 1). Any fluctuation in the ocean environment could trigger
massive migration, and even death. This is particularly worrying in China, the country with the
greatest number of residents living in coastal urban hubs (McGranahan et al, 16). China’s
problems are particularly pressing because of its trade-oriented growth strategy which favors
development along the coast, with migration to coastal megacities like Shanghai, Guangdong
and Guangzhou. More concerning is that the problem is only getting worse – the population in
China’s low-lying coastal region grew at three times the rate of the national population growth
rate between 1990 and 2000 (McGranahan et al, 16). This kind of rapid urbanization incites
coastal degradation, which in turn leaves an inadequate infrastructure open to flooding and
other weather-related disasters spurred by climate change. To gain a perspective, a one meter
sea-level rise would drown Shanghai and displace its 12.4 million residents alone (Myers 755).
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In general, many coastal city populations are at risk from flooding – particularly when
high tides combine with storm surges and/or high river flows. Between 1994 and 2004, about
one-third of the 1,562 disasters, half of the 120,000 people killed, and 98 percent of the 2
million people affected by flood disasters were in Asia, where there are large populations in the
flood plains of major rivers (McGranahan et al, 3). This is especially telling in China, where
floods are the number one cause of displaced people. Eight out of the top ten natural disasters
affecting the population in China’s recent history are floods (EM-DAT). After comparing data
spanning thirty years, we can see that the impact of flooding in the region is steadily increasing.
In 1989, flooding affected some 100,010,000 people; while in 2003, the number of those
affected rose to 150,146,000 (EM-DAT). 1
GRAPH 1
The figure above shows that while the number of people affected varies throughout the
years (even with a slight positive slope – or an increase of .1%), the rate at which flooding occurs
is becoming more frequent. We can thus conclude that with rising sea-levels as the newest
flood-causing factor, China will be facing higher numbers of affected people; and ultimately
greater numbers of forced migrants.
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Bangladesh is in a unique position – in that, almost half of its population lives in lower
coastal plains (McGranahan et al, 16). If displacements from flooding were to occur at a steady
rate, the first waves of migration would be between 200,000 and 300,000 persons annually
(Suhrke 11). Over the next 60 years, 13-15 percent of Bangladesh’s population could be
completely displaced, with few refuges to turn to (Suhrke 11). Just one meter in sea-level rise
would inundate all of Bangladesh’s rice land, forcing some 40 million to evacuate (Brown 2004).
These are striking potential outcomes, but we must remember that changes in sea-level and its
effects are not only limited to the future.
In 1993, due to flooding and river bank erosion, the Farakka people of the Khulna region
of Bangladesh found that their traditional jobs as agricultural farmers were no longer lucrative.
The poor, rural Farakka migrants chose to settle principally in urban areas, but once they found
opportunity lacking there they headed to India via the West Bengal border. A survey of the
Indian area later showed that 43 out of 52 Bangladeshi immigrants hailed from Farakka (Swain
195). Of the 43 immigrants, 41 cited environmental problems as their reason for leaving, 18 of
those specifically because of river bank erosion and flooding (Swain 196). Bangladeshi
immigrants have been consistently rising due to land degradation and flooding. Sea-level rise is
only set to exacerbate the situation, as seen in contemporary case studies.
The number of families and villages who lose their homes permanently to rivers every
year are perhaps one of the highest in Bangladesh. It has been reported that many of the slum
dwellers in the metropolitan areas are the victims of riverbank erosion. In the decade of 1982 –
1992, over 106 thousand hectares of land has been eroded in the three major rivers of
Bangladesh (the Ganges, the Brahmaputra and the Meghna) against an accretion of only 19
thousand hectares. About 350 thousand people were displaced due to riverbank erosion in that
decade, who suffered severe economic and social consequences (Climate Change Cell 9).
Substantial numbers are also being displaced from coastal islands, chars, and along the coastline
as their settlements are destroyed due to frequent and intense storm surge and tidal bores.
On Bangladesh's southern coast, erosion driven in part by accelerating glacier melt and
unusually intense rains already has scoured away half of Bhola Island, which once covered an
area nearly 20 times the size of Chicago (Goering 2007). Because of climate change, a sea level
16
rise of 0.5 meter over the last 100 years has already eroded 65 percent landmass of 250 square
kilometer Kutubdia, 227 square kilometers of the aforementioned Bhola and 180 square
kilometer of Sandwip islands. Over the past 100 years, the once 1,000 square kilometer island
into a small 21 square kilometer landmass (Climate Change Cell 5). In case of any further sea
level rise, islands like these and the entire coastal area would be hit hard resulting in billions of
dollars of losses in GDP, economic downturn, ecological damage and livelihood assets and
options. And land disputes, many driven by erosion, now account for 77 percent of Bangladesh's
legal suits, giving some banal insight into the whiplash of environmental degradation. The
extent of Bangladesh's coming problem is most evident in Antarpara, a village stuck between the
Jamuna and Bangali rivers five hours northwest of Dhaka, the capital. In this and other low-
lying villages nearby, more than half of the 3,300 families have lost their land to worsening river
erosion (Goering 2007). Some have moved their homes a dozen times and are running out of
places to relocate.
These case studies can be furthered bolstered by statistics, which reflect trends much like
China’s. In 1968, flooding affected 15,889,616 Bangladeshis, with the number rising to
36,000,000 in 2004 (EM-DAT). In fact, floods in 2004 were some of the severest seen in
decades, leaving 1,000 people dead and more than 30 million people homeless (Ward 2004).
GRAPH 2
As the graph above shows, those people affected by flooding have increased steadily by
close to two percent since 1968. It is true that flooding and erosion are part of life in
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Bangladesh, and are vital for the renewal of land. However, severe floods with devastating
effects on people’s livelihoods used to happen once every twenty years. But they are now
occurring every five to seven years, taking place in 1987, 1988, 1995, 1998 and 2004. Dr Atiq
Rahman of the Bangladesh Centre for Advanced Studies adds: “We simply do not know if
climate change is definitely increasing erosion…what we can say is that patterns of rainfall and
flooding have changed in the past few years. Severe floods used to come once every 20 years,
but now seem to occur around every five to seven years” (Christian Aid 2006). The most
disturbing reality: this increase in flooding is only poised to multiply as temperature rises and
sea-level follows.
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relocated to Bougainville, a larger island in the north, because Cateret is about to be engulfed by
rising sea-levels (Shears 2007). They are often called the first “climate change refugees” in the
news, but they are certainly not the only small island country under constraints. With small
populations on heavily concentrated low-lying islands, many pacific nations are becoming
alarmed at global warming. Those considered particularly vulnerable, are Vanuatu; the
Marshall Islands; Tuvalu and parts of Papua New Guinea, as well as Kiribati (Marks 2006).
Kiribati, an archipelago of 33 coral atolls barely 6 feet above sea-level, is vanishing as warming
temperatures spurs rising tides. Its president, Anote Tong, warned Australia and New Zealand -
the two developed countries in the region - to prepare for a mass exodus within the next decade.
FIGURE 3
Figure 3: Projected inundation of Bikenibeu Island Tarawa, Kiribati under Worst Case
Scenario (Sem 16). Top: Present status; Middle: Residual island under worst case scenario 2100;
Bottom: Residual island under worst case scenarios and storm surge, 2100.
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The beaches on Tarawa, an island nation which is pancake-flat and barely 500 yards
wide, are so eroded that sand has been imported from Australia (Marks 2006). Dozens of
families have been forced to move, dismantling their wooden huts piece by piece and
reassembling them further back from the water. Now the population is being squeezed into an
ever narrower strip of land between an inland lagoon and the Pacific. In Vanuatu, an entire
coastal village on the island of Tegua is being forced to move to higher ground, its huts flooded
by surging seas (Marks 2006). As the number of affected islands, and case studies of sea-level
rise forcing migration, continue to grow; the only question remaining is: how long will island
states survive?
This is not the only question we have to ask as we continue to wrestle with the idea of
climate change and the migrants it will invariably produce. We need to determine if those
migrants can be classified as genuine “environmental refugees” and whether or not they should
be included in the official United Nations definition upheld by many countries as the basis for
their asylum law.
Conclusions
The aforementioned case studies demonstrate the severe impact that environmental
issues have on human migration flows. Desertification affects 135 million people worldwide,
with another billion estimated to be at risk (UN Convention to Combat Desertification). Sea
level rise is projected to affect approximately 50 million people in a best-case scenario (IPCC).
In Bangladesh alone, the number of those potentially under pressure reaches 40 million. In the
Sahel, 67.5 million people are already living under the effects of desertification, causing them to
either be permanently displaced or to temporarily leave their homes for a period of time in order
to ensure the economic stability of their families.
Already existing cases of displaced persons make a strong call for the recognition of the
term environmental refugees. For, all have been forced to leave their places of origin, not
voluntarily, but out of necessity. While these refugees may be leaving for economic reasons,
they are not leaving for economic reasons alone, which puts them in a separate category from
20
solely economic refugees. Environmental refugees are forced to migrate because the destruction
of their environment is preventing them from being able to survive.
21
movement to other regions so that they do not remain internally displaced and a strain on an
already tattered developing country, or even failed state. Climate change is clearly shaping new
patterns in our world that will affect millions, and potentially billions, of people. In order to aid
those displaced due to environmental factors, we recommended that the United Nations add an
additional classification of those who are displaced by environmental factors to their definition
of refugee. Changing a definition is the only way to adapt in a rapidly changing world.
22
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