Cartels and Violence in Mexico: Part I
The Cradle of Traffickers
Nearly a million people live in Culiacán, capital of Sinaloa in northwest Mexico. It
was founded in 1531 and one of the oldest Spanish cities in the Americas but
remains relatively unknown outside of Mexico. In spite of the anonymity, it has
become an important focal point of NAFTA economic growth.
The North American Free Trade Agreement was a boon to the regional economy
since most pacific and western shipping routes transverse Sinaloa. Serving as
regional hub, Culiacán has extensive access to the United States through the border
port at Nogales, Arizona, and to other interstate highways moving from there
through Tucson and Phoenix, Arizona. Trucking lanes through Sinaloa feed into
many routes serving the American West, and to northern roads into Alberta. These
highways have always moved large volumes of traffic in the American West, and are
presently being upgraded to deal with congestion after the trade pact made them
even more important.
Sinaloa is an agricultural oasis bordering the Sonora desert and sitting west of the
Sierra Madre Oriental. It’s the site of many rivers, dams and mountain run‐offs that
feed into an impressive irrigation system that lubricates a stable economy based on
the export of produce within Mexico, and external shipments to the US and Canada.
Tomatoes are its most famous product, but other commodities such as white corn
for bio‐fuel, eggplant, broccoli, and even lychee1 have been added in an impressive
diversification for external sale.
The state is also geographically and culturally important to the Mexican diaspora
across the frontera2. Sinaloa occupies a relatively narrow terrain west of the Sierra
Madre Occidental, and its north‐south highways provide the simplest route for tens
of thousands of undocumented migrants entering and returning from the United
States. Sinaloa is homeland for megastar bands such as Banda Recodo and Los Tigres
del Norte — holders of numerous Latin Grammies and selling more CD’s than any
other recording artist in English or Spanish. The dominant brass tones of Sinaloense
bandas are ubiquitous in all US cities with Latino populations, and song lyrics
provide both emotional and informational connections to la patria. The increasing
importance of Sinaloa has seen bandas displace the traditional mariachi at the head
of Los Angeles Cinco de Mayo parades.
Sinaloa and Culiacan have risen in visibility thanks to NAFTA, but are important for
more sinister reasons. They are host to “la cuna de narcotrafico” — the cradle of
drug traffic —home turf and sentimental heartland for the most dangerous criminal
drug groups in Mexico. Almost all social, political and geographical connections1 to
drugs pass connect to here; Sinaloa’s economic and geographic climate allowed a
1 Maiz is obviously a Mexican staple, but the other products are grown almost exclusively for foreign markets.
2 Estimated to be 8 million or more
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drug economy to gain a foothold; powerful Sinaloan clans and families took
advantage of the opportunity and cemented their place at the heart of drug trade;
Sinaloa was home to a narco‐society where unwritten norms and codes guided
events, and old regional and territorial feuds still influence the quarrels and
disputes of today. This narcosociety defined Sinaloa and seeped outward in what
might be called a narcodiaspora. And for at least 4 decades, the Sinaloa nexus in
North‐American drug‐trade has remained invisible, except for the few times when
leader’s mistakes generated unwanted attention and dragged many clans into
bloody power struggles. Ever since a spectacular assassination on September 11,
2004, the drug barons in Sinaloa been involved in a massive wave of violence that
has steadily escalated and routinely includes barbarous acts unseen in Mexico since
the revolution a century ago.
Measured against any baseline of viciousness, Sinaloa has long been one of the most
violent places anywhere! In a normal year, this state of 3 million people experienced
700 violent murders; Culiacan alone contributed more than 60% to the “usual”
annual carnage. By the end of 2008, city and state will have shattered all existing
records for violent homicides during a calendar year: in fact, the previous record of
746 had been surpassed at the beginning of September, and a new mark for
homicides in one month— at least 127—had been established in June. The new
record didn’t stand long when 135 drug‐related deaths were recorded in July2.
Although known homicides dropped to ninety‐nine in August, that was 35% higher
than any previous August on record. By September, seventy‐eight ‘official’ victims
were police, army or federal agents; some murdered because of their disloyalty,
some for failure to complete assignments, but the number also included innocent
police who’d been targeted to sow panic through a brute demonstration of force.
In fact, the toll is higher is because unknown numbers of abducted —victims of
“levantones”— have disappeared without a trace. Some bodies are never recovered
even when assassins make little effort to hide the corpse. Commonly, victims are
dumped wherever convenient, but have increasingly been tossed in public spaces to
make emphatic statements that an account has been settled — un ajusticiamiento or
un ajuste. Over the past 15 years, gruesome murders have became so routine that
journalists use a short‐hand argot to contextualize them; encajuelado for bodies
found in car trunks, entambado when stuffed in petroleum or chemical barrels,
encobijado when wrapped in tarpaulins or blankets, ensabanado if wrapped in a
sheet, enteipado when victims hands are bound behind the back with masking
tape—frequently accompanied by incongruous details such as the colour of tape
used to bind them.
Alarmingly, the recent wave of gruesome killings regularly involves beheading3,
limb dismemberment, symbols and letters carved into bodies, and even
3 Beheadings are not unique to Sinaloa. On August 28, 12 decapitated corpses were discovered near Merida in the Yucatan. A video and narcomensaje was also
posted on YouTube
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disembowelment — and distinctive patterns of torture emerged as the signature
trademark of specific factions. And, as if to ensure the symbolism is not
misinterpreted or downplayed, it’s increasingly common to leave narcocarteles or
narcomensajes — posters or handwritten messages— specifying the “wrong” that’s
been “adjusted” or simply to leave specific warnings about future targets.
More and more of these executions reflect a sophisticated recognition that ajustes
can have a national and international impact; some crime scenes are perverse
scenarios akin to Foucaldian Spectacles of the Scaffold. DVD’s of torture terminating
with bullets to the head and gushing blood, or actual acts of garroting have been
delivered to news outlets in Mexico and the US, or have been posted directly to
YouTube and its Spanish equivalents (e.g. MiVid). The macabre disposal of
decapitated victims in public spaces4 and these elaborately staged crime scenes
have “costumed” cadavers5 and have generated widespread horror. A symbolic
routinization of violence are seen as guerrilla events that will foment terror and
weaken the resolve of competitors in addition to raising levels of fear in the
community. This increasing evidence of torture and mutilation followed by
execution is an indicator that army deserters and ex‐military trained in anti‐
terrorism are the new generation of paramilitary sicarios —hit men.
There is no doubt that these horrific incidents have significantly increased the level
of community fear, and have paralyzed institutional reaction to an ever‐expanding
wave of violence. Scores of police have resigned, refused assignments or run away.
Those who remain have demanded modern equipment to compete with the drug
traffickers’ sophisticated weaponry and communication networks, and they’ve
pleaded for improved training and preparation to carry out assignments.
Meanwhile, the public and the press grew increasingly cynical in response to the
unsupported claims of success offered by elected officials who have demonstrated a
remarkable incompetence and ineffectiveness in containing the violence. Ironically,
if displays of symbolic violence were originally intended to intimidate enemy
factions, they’ve been a failure — the targeted groups have responded in kind and
aggressively recruited their personal professional sicarios, and have unleashed new
displays of brutality in escalations of frightening and perverse proportions.
Although the current wave of executions is characterized by these extreme
expressions of brutality, drug violence is familiar to Sinaloenses. The new wave is
simply one more in the cyclical outbreaks violence and internecine readjustments
familiar to the northwest. And most of the earlier waves of violence were explained
as much by kinship, disintegrated political arrangements, simmering feuds, and
informal “rules of the game” as they were explained by market‐forces or temporary
imbalances in drug supply and demand. In many ways these waves of violence were
4 On September 12, 24 bodies were dumped in a public park, La Marquesa, in the State of Mexico. The men had disappeared from their small town in Guerrero
a week before.
5 In July, a murdered police was “outfitted” in a stereotypical Mexican cowboy “guise” and placed under a tree with a note indicating that he was a “singing
cowboy” who had given his killers the names of his friends.
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family quarrels that have gotten out of hand, and can never be fully understood by
outsiders — especially when those interlopers are soldiers.6 The new wave of
violence still retains many of those same characteristics, but NAFTA and its lucrative
cross border openings have escalated the violence to new levels and changed some
of the rules of the game.
There is a century long connection to opium and marijuana trade in Sinaloa: its
people were called gomeros— a reference to the many opium farmers and resinous
gum from poppies first introduced into the sierra regions by Chinese migrants.
Culiacan developed a reputation for drug involvement and violence while
simultaneously emerging as a refined and civilized city that included a respected
university and a taste for high culture. But drug signifiers dominated and became a
master status of everyone from here: in the 1950’s, non‐residents called Culiacan
“little Chicago” because so many hoodlums and drug‐runners lived nearby, and it
was popularly described as populated by gangsters in huaraches7. The region
achieved international notoriety by the 1960’s and 1970’s —to the point that
Sinaloa and Culiacan were specifically targeted in the war on drugs carried out by
President Nixon. Between 1975 and 1985, an unparalleled military intervention,
Operation Condor3, deployed Mexican Army and a number of DEA operatives to
eradicate crops in the eastern sierra above Culiacan.
Ultimately, the military intervention was unsuccessful, but did generate unintended
effects that expanded the scope of drug trafficking and crystallized a burgeoning
alliance among disparate bands of traffickers. The deployment of military,
questionable under Mexican constitutional law, also exposed military personnel to
the corruptive power of drug money, blinded politicians to the flawed organization
of state and municipal police, and undermined public confidence in the army as
soldiers routinely ignored legal and human rights of innocent Sinaloenses. But it was
another unintended consequence that would generate a much more disastrous and
long‐term result— Operation Condor forged a consolidationbynecessity among
potential rivals and imposed a unity on them. During the years 1975‐1985, skills
that drug‐lords had honed at a regional level were applied to different States, and
even at the national and international levels with incredible success. The new
“realignment” of drug barons generated immense profits for all of them when the
drug leaders discovered they could influence events on a scale never seen before in
Mexico.
When operation Condor started, the Sinaloa sierra and its small municipalities such
as Badiguarato dominated a regionally based Mexican drug business. The drug trade
developed within a perfect micro‐climate in an isolated setting within a Golden
Triangle stretching over the wild mountainous corner of the Sierra Madre where
Sinaloa, Durango and Chihuahua converged. To the east, only unpaved and
unmarked roads meandered through mountain passes toward Durango, and
6 These structures and dynamics have disintegrated, and there is a violent rearrangement of the cartels social order and traditions
7 The older market, >>, still has this reputation.
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Chihuahua. Interspersed among dense forests lay numerous patches of small fertile
fields, perfect for both marijuana and poppy crops. A dense canopy of trees provided
camouflage for workers, and hid crop‐processing centres. To the west and south sat
the financial and money laundering centre, Culiacan, where cash from a half century
in marijuana and heroin trade had been “stockpiled” and used to expand financial
growth and enrich many local families. Further west, long stretches of uninhabited
beaches were perfect for launching fast boats and loading deep‐sea fishing vessels
on the Sea of Cortez.
Geography doesn’t explain the enduring impact of Sinaloa on the modern drug
trade: the region was filled with creative entrepreneurs who exploited opportunities
and understood that the burgeoning narco culture made them invisible to the
outside world. Many men and women took advantage of the situation, and seized
their chance to become very rich. Their ultimate success can be attributed to a
tightly interwoven set of connections at the local level that allowed them to flourish
and remain largely invisible outside of that region. In contrast to common wisdom,
drug organizations are most successful when local connections and structures are
organically linked— or perhaps in what might be called a subterranean structure—
and this was certainly true of Sinaloa.
A popular corrido by Los Tucanes de Tijuana refers to three little animals — el gallo,
la chiva y el perico4—slang for marijuana, heroin and cocaine, and all were firmly
rooted in the subterranean culture by the 1970’s. Marijuana, opium and heroin were
regional commodities, but cocaine had been introduced as an import from the
Andes. Within these options, cocaine represented the most lucrative commodity and
offered the greatest opportunity for drug barons operating within the Golden
Triangle. In Sinaloa, each animalito had a master “wrangler”— Ernesto “Don Neto”
Fonseca Carillo in poppy and heroin production, Rafael Caro Quintero in producing
and distributing marijuana — especially sensimilla, and Miguel Angel Felix Gallardo,
who would rise to become the most powerful “Jefe de Jefes” or “El Padrino”, through
cocaine importation and distribution. Each crime boss oversaw an underground and
subterranean network rooted in violence, co‐optation and bribery that touched
most state institutions and local businesses. Miguel Angel Felix Gallardo was
especially skillful in narco bonding because of his personality and extensive contacts
from a former career as policeman and personal bodyguard to Governor Leopoldo
Sanchez Celis.
This trio of local men eventually forged an unholy, but uneasy alliance cemented by
their shared origins in and around Badiguarato, Sinaloa. Their subterranean
network became stronger and larger as it was extended by kinship through blood
and inter‐marriage, rituals of compadrazco, mutual connections with many public
officials, and their unique reliance on traffickers from Durango and Chihuahua to
transport their product. In particular, their alliance with a regional cacique, Pablo
Acosta of Ojinaga, Chihuahua, allowed them to sell their contraband directly in the
US market.
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Mexican journalist Julio Scherer Garcia would later describe their partnership and
later ones with the term narco society. It’s obvious that folkways and patterns
characterizing this “narco society” in an isolated area of Mexico had gradually
crystallized after emerging in the second decade of the twentieth century; it’s also
evident that this cohesive narco‐culture was in place at the time of Operation
Condor. This narco society remained invisible to outsiders and even to some people
who profited from its existence— subterranean as it were. The “invisibility” allowed
the three men to establish a powerful presence with little fear of formal
repercussion. And unless one was part of the network, it would be hard to imagine
that it existed. Consider how the niece of Miguel Angel Felix Gallardo described this
subterranean narco society during her jailhouse discussions with Julio Scherer 30
years after Operation Condor.
“In narco society, wealth flourishes everywhere– says Sandra Ávila — one day you’re poor
and the next a millionaire. Where the money comes from is only known to those who
generate it! You don’t ask for explanations nor question how it works, nor do you think
about the nature of your own involvement. But you’re aware that “brilliant and precious
rocks will be shining soon”, that you’ll meet other women who are high-flyers, that it’s
possible to buy houses that you can occupy or abandon on almost the same day, to own
buildings or hospitals, like those in Guadalajara, or hotels full of flowers like those in
Mazatlán. I don’t know how it’s arranged with authorities, but they do it! One day a
person has changed their life-style and they’re walking around boasting about it! You have
isolated encounters with them, they’re surrounded by mystery, and you know nothing
else. You continue without knowing what you actually know. And then one day you do
know. How is it so? I don’t know! But I do know that’s how it is!…
Narco society is hard, cruel, and in its own way a society unto itself. There’s no code that
determines penalties during power struggles. Neither are there laws to resolve disputes,
and I don’t see any authority capable of intervening in the chaos that comes and goes, is
always present and always on your mind”
In hindsight, it’s clear that Operation Condor wouldn’t be successful against this
invisible network cemented by informal bonds, nor did it stand the chance of
dismantling the social arrangements that provided the fundamental bonds of this
drug society. Soldiers and generals were outsiders undermined by local authorities
whom they had incorrectly assumed to be working with them. In fact, Operation
Condor cemented deeper bonds between the drug lords and checked them from
acting on internal disagreements about turf or product— “the enemy of my enemy is
my friend” goes the aphorism. The drug jefes also realized that local production and
distribution routes could remain functional even though Operation Condor forced
them to relocate to Guadalajara, Jalisco. In reality, the forced move presented them
new opportunities to access international markets, and this new opportunity
guaranteed that all three of these men would soon join the circle of richest men in
Mexico.5
The three amigos and others did grow to be enormously rich and powerful “during
their exile from Sinaloa” when they expanded their control over the marijuana,
opium and the cocaine markets within Mexico, and participated in what came to be
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called the Guadalajara Cartel. Operation Condor had driven them to larger urban
centres where they could expand their global vision and create stronger ties to the
transnational drug market. And while this happened, they never forgot their local
roots not forgot the important principles that brought them success — all routes
and production are local and the networks at a local level provide the strongest base
for success. Ironically, this may not have happened without Operation Condor — it’s
said that Don Neto had selected Guadalajara simply because his girlfriend came
from there and was related to the governor— but all three of the Jefes took
advantage of the opportunity presented without forgetting their original roots.
In Guadalajara, the Sinaloans established close links to the Rodriguez‐Orejuela Cali
crime group that had gone there to seek alternative routes to deliver cocaine into
the United States. The Cali syndicate was producing 80% of Colombian cocaine, but
had been thwarted by DEA counter‐drug activities in the Caribbean. The Sinaloans
arrival in Guadalajara was a opportunity made in heaven for everyone, and led to an
alliance that would create hell for anti‐drug forces over the next 15 years.
With a few exceptions, the foundations of drug organizations in modern Mexico
emerged from the departure from Sinaloa. Today, there are other groups competing
in the drug trade, but these new groups are still faced with the daunting task of to
challenging the hegemony of Sinaloa groups. It’s unclear whether a criminal
organization in the sense of a mafia emerged and there is an ongoing controversy
about what name best describes the northwest criminal alliance8. It’s been popular
to use the terms mafia and cartel to describe their structure— but these overstate
the level of institutional organization, the degree of hierarchical authority resting
within any single individual or group, and even the reach and scope of their
international criminal activity.
Does it really matter what name is used to describe the jefes of Mexican narcotraffic?
Luis Astorga, a pre‐eminent Mexican sociologist criticizes the inaccuracy of such
terms, and argues that organized crime policies have been largely ineffective
because they concentrate on the existence of an “alternative power” instead of
relying on strategies of general crime control. What difference?
This second generation of drug dealers Even though they had been “exiled” from
ancestral homelands and communities, some families such the Arrelano‐Felix clan
and the Carrillo‐Fuentes clans prospered when these new opportunities allowed
them expand and consolidate their power power. Literally, these families had
moved from a relatively small rural small time mom and pop business of drug
running into a world of globalization and international money laundering.
The Arrelano‐Felix brothers and sisters — some with advanced university degrees
in business management— relocated to Tijuana and even San Diego where they
controlled the lucrative narcotics routes entering Southern California. Not to be
8 and by default the best term to identify the second and third reincarnations of that initial partnership
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outdone by their rural neighbours, the Carrillo‐Fuentes prospered even more after
the clan had been dispersed by the army: in particular, Amado Carrillo Fuentes was
sent to Ciudad Juarez opposite El Paso to apprentice under a regional drug smuggler
named Pablo Acosta. He learned well, and later Amado Carrillo Fuentes relied on his
family and other contacts in Guadalajara to forge a direct link to the internationally
notorious Cali cocaine cartel in Colombia.
By the 1990’s, Amado Carrillo Fuentes had become the prime distributor of
Colombian cocaine using his fleet of special airplanes, and was so successful that he
acquired a famous nickname “El Señor de los cielos —Lord of the Skies” —and more
importantly, became principal purchaser, seller and overseer of almost all cocaine
moving through Mexico. His managerial and organizational skills were so natural
that he almost single‐handedly forged a powerful organization that came to control
2/3 of the country.
In spite of a continuing myth that Colombian cartels run the drug trade, the fact is
that Carrillo‐Fuente’s Juarez cartel and the Arellano‐Felix Tijuana cartels became
principle operatives in the narcotics trade, and Colombians eventually were reduced
to their suppliers. Although the Colombians produced the cocaine, the Mexicans
controlled the shipping routes into Mexico, and effectively delivered the product to
the consumer in the United States. And furthermore, the Mexicans were more
diversified and not limited to one product — they also controlled marijuana, opiates,
and any version of a synthetic drug that consumers demanded and built an
impressive infrastructure to deliver these products and to launder the profits on a
global scale.
The principle illegal drug market is the US and estimated to have a potential annual
value of more than $30 billion dollars. The Drug Enforcement Agency estimates that
90% of all cocaine entering the United States market springboards through Mexico,
and that a significant proportion of all imports of marijuana and opium pass through
a porous Mexican Border. And when drug war crackdowns on the US side focused
“synthetic drugs”, the cartels on the Mexican side developed new partnerships with
minor crime organizations in Mexico and worked with global suppliers, especially
the Chinese, to manufacture and feed as much as 85% of the American appetite for
Amphetamines, Ecstasy and other synthetics.
Amado Carrillo Fuente died in 1997— probably murdered during an attempt to
disguise his identity through plastic surgery— but the drug organization he
nurtured has continued in one form or another as the most powerful cartel in
Mexico. Its infrastructure was too strong and well‐established to collapse with the
death of one man— it had been developed along horizontal lines and not as a
hierarchical structure. And as happens in many transnational mega‐corporations,
the Arrellano‐Felix/Juarez Cartel organization has experienced several
transformations, internal quarrels, and even “brand identity” changes. Admittedly,
“corporate branding” is more likely the brainchild of extensive intelligence teams of
the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Homeland
Security and even the United States Congress Research Office and not necessarily by
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the cartels. But the structural changes and internal reorganizations that took place
after the death of the “Lord of the Skies” are real, and explain the level of violence in
Mexico today and more importantly, explain why its become almost impossible to
eradicate the drug trade in Mexico.
Amado Carrillo‐Fuente’s Juarez cartel morphed into a loose coalition of smaller but
powerful groups in Sinaloa, Sonora, Chihuahua and Durango. In many ways, the
organization was following a business model of diversification and generating
diverse brands or creating variations of the same products in different outlets. This
strategy was incredibly successful in terms of money laundering and reducing the
visibility of the directors. Drug wars of the United States have emphasized the
strategy of targeting the “guy at the top of the hierarchy” and have been logistically
designed to get to leader of a crime organization. But the Juarez organization had
formed a style of leadership that played havoc with this idea — just as with mythical
Medusa’s hair of snakes, when one head was removed another three or four sprung
up to replace the one that was removed.
After Amado Carrillo‐Fuente’s death — many believe that the motivation for his
killing was that he had become too visible— the Juarez organization was directed by
a varied crew of people such as Amado’s brother Vicente “El Viceroy”, a cousin Juan
Jose “El Azul” Esparragoza Moreno, the Arrellano‐Felix family, Hector Luis “El Guero”
Palma Salazar, Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada Garcia, Ignacio “El Nacho Coronel” Coronel
Villareal, and forty year old Badiguarato resident and acolyte of the drug lord Miguel
Angel Felix Gallardo named Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman Loera. It wasn’t long before
this loosely organized partnership fragmented due to quarrels and arguments about
turf. The Arrellano‐Felix family became the first to be pushed to the side even
though their uncle was the powerful Miguel Angel Felix Gallardo, one of the original
founders. They weren’t pushed shoved out into the cold since they retained control
of the lucrative Tijuana turf, but were cut out from sharing the profits from other
routes in the inland States of Sonora, Chihuahua and Durango.
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itself, but even more importantly the execution of an actual family member of a
traditional clan violated an unwritten rule that allowed competing groups to
cooperate even when disagreements about turf or profit existed.
Internal mechanisms for controlling disputes had been ignored, and El Chapo
Guzman was demonstrating a strong hand to change the hierarchy of the
organization rather than work‐things out internally as had been traditionally done.
In fact, reliable documentation indicates that the organization had peacefully
divided up the turf of Mexico at a meeting in Acapulco in 1989. This assassination
was well planned, not only in its logistics, but throwing in several twists to make it
look like the attack came from other enemies outside the organization — principally
the armed hitmen of the Gulf Cartel in the Northeast or as betrayal by the State
Police and Federal Justice Department who long tolerated and even supported the
activities of the Carrillo‐Fuente family for many years.
After this assassination, the US Drug Enforcement Agency reached the conclusion
that a new and more tightly organized “Federation” had emerged and was headed
by “El Mayo” Zambada from the Sinaloa Cartel, the nearly invisible but powerful “El
Azul” Esparragoza, and “El Chapo” Guzman who retained control of the remnants of
the original Juarez Cartel. Another mysterious figur, Ignacio “Nacho Coronel”
Coronel Villareal was believed to be principle banker and money‐launderer from his
base in Guadalajara. The Federation had established a powerful presence with a
near perfect hegemonic control over ¾ of the central plains of Mexico and its border
with the USA, had established a powerful dominance in Mexican coastal states
where cocaine arrived from Colombia, and had expanded to develop ties to synthetic
drug manufacturers such as the Valencia family in the States of Guadalajara and
Michoacan. In spite of the family quarrels and isolation of the Carrillo‐Fuentes, the
Federation continued to be functional through extended family ties, and respect for
the shared traditions, and cultural and economic traditions that had deep roots in
rural Sinaloa.
Although there are other organized crime groups in Mexico, the only serious
challenge to Federation hegemony comes from 2 groups located on either coast of in
the northern part of Mexico. The Arrellano‐Felix family, partly motivated by the
simmering simmering feud with other Sinaloans, retains control of Tijuana and the
far west through sheer force; and the Gulf Cartel dominates the northeast edge and
some land and sea routes by virtue of its ruthless brutality and eliminating other
groups to remain the “only game in town”.
Interestingly, the Cartel del Golfo is the product of a different history and pattern of
development than the cartels grounded in Sinaloa. There were no dominant families,
just powerful individuals who established control in the region of Mexico that
included border cities south of Brownsville and Laredo Texas, and some interior
cities that feed traffic into those border areas. A former car mechanic and petty thief
by the name of Osiel Cardenas Guillen brawled his way to the top of the Golf Cartel
relying on violence, betrayal and terror, and in fact one his many nicknames reflects
his ascendancy “El Mata de Amigos” — the Friend Killer.
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Things might have peacefully unfolded with a three‐way, but decidedly unbalanced
sharing of turf in the north. The Federation was larger and more powerful than the
Gulf and the Tijuana Cartels combined, but for a period it actually benefitted from
allowing the 2 smaller cartels to “do their own thing”. Firstly, the smaller Tijuana
and Gulf cartels were more likely to rely on violence, and in the crude comparative
mirror the Federation looked more reasonable and fit into a type of “good bandit”
mode. In a perverted way, the Federation came to look like “the good thieves” and in
fact played up this image by sharing some wealth with their home “towns” such as
providing generous donations for schools, roads, electricity and cultural events. The
continuing and visible existence of Gulf and Tijuana cartels also provided deflective
shield that insulated the Federation from aggressive prosecution by Mexican and
American Drug agencies; in short, the Tijuana cartels and the Gulf cartels served up
the “big name” sacrificial lambs that the American war on drugs demanded. Almost
all major drug arrests at the top level involved the Tijuana and Gulf cartels during
the late 1990’s and up to 2005. It also helped that both of the smaller cartels had
been linked to “devalued” politics in Mexico — the Gulf cartel was widely though to
to have been favoured by former president Carlos Salinas de Gortari and his “rogue”
brother Raul, and the Tijuana cartel and Arrellano‐Felix family were linked to the
extreme right wing forces of the PRI — los dinosaurios— which eventually ceded
power to Vicente Fox Quesada and his Partido Accion Nacional.
But the uneasy tolerance of the smaller parties wasn’t to meant to last. There are
many reasons explaining why the frictions eventually exploded into an all‐out war
between Federation forces and a forced coalition of the Tijuana and Gulf cartels. One
reason was simply the consequence of a hot‐headed and loose‐cannon leadership
within parts of the Tijuana cartel and this negated any possibility of sharing turf and
routes through Tijuana and San Diego. For instance, the most hot‐headed brother
was Ramon was shot dead by a policeman on the streets of the Sinaloa resort city of
Mazatlan in 2002 when he was traveling unaccompanied by body guards and on his
way to kill “El Mayo” Zambada over a slight or disputed turf. The Arrellano‐Felix
cartel, originally from Badiguarato Sinaloa, had become too violent to suit the tastes
of other cartel leaders who preferred the benefits of anonymity.
But another factor was more important, and brought the Federation into direct
competition and conflict with Osiel Cardenas Guillen and his Gulf Cartel —the
border crossing at Laredo, Texas and Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas had the busiest
exchange port among the 29 entry points into the US and Osiel Cardenas controlled
it. By 2005, 8,000 tractor‐trailers a day were passing through this port once the
trade “benefits” of NAFTA had been maximized. The border crossing at Laredo
Texas accommodates not only massive numbers of tractor trailers moving north and
south, but has three railroad lines transversing the Rio Grande/Rio Bravo river. All
of this represented 40% of all commercial border crossings, and provided direct
access to highways and routes that continued on to the northeast and 85% of the
American population.
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Laredo/Nuevo Laredo turf was simply too lucrative for a covetous Federation to
ignore and El Chapo Guzman designed a Federation initiative to squeeze out Osiel
Cardenas and the Gulf Cartel. The Federation made its move by targeting local
municipal and state police in Nuevo Laredo. These men were controlled by Osiel
Cardenas through a traditional strategy called “Plata o Plomo”— silver or lead… a
bribe or a bullet! El Chapo seems to have been the primary aggressor in this hostile
take‐over, and he unleased his American born violent lieutenant named Edgar “La
Barbie” Valdes Villareal. In spite of a nickname —based on Ken and Barbie dolls,
Valdes Villareal unleashed unholy havoc and disseminated chaos among the
operatives of Osiel Cardenas Guillen. Somehow, the Federation was helped in this
initiative when the Federal Procuraduria (Department of Justice) disarmed local
police and fired several chiefs of police. The situation became so bad that the United
States issued travel advisories, and stopped issuing visas out of its Laredo offices.
But Osiel Cardenas fought back with a brutal force that was unexpected by the
Federation. He recruited a private force of mercenaries to directly challenge the
hitmen of the Federation. Cardenas perversely brilliant move involved convincing
29 or 30 members of the elite “anti‐narcotics” wing of the Mexican army to desert
and join him. These members of a rapid strike force team known as the Grupo
Aeromovil Fuerzas Especiales (Gafes) had been trained in anti‐guerrilla tactics, rapid
strike team actions, deployment of powerful ordnance and weapons, and were
experienced participants in many rapid mobilizations. Much of their training had
been provided by the elite school of the Americas, and they came well armed with a
sophisticated arsenal of weapons, electronic equipment and were backed by a deep
pool of money capable of financing sophisticated operations. It wasn’t long before
this group came to be known as the Zetas — the last letter of the alphabet— and
leaders such as “Z3 or El Lazca”, Heriberto Lazcano became notorious for violence,
brutality audacious attacks against the Federation and any forces who challenged
them. One of the unusual, and highly effective strategies of the Zetas and Osiel
Cardenas was to attack the Federation elsewhere…not directly target them in
Laredo. Areas of Mexico under dispute or partial control by the Federation became
the battlegrounds — particularly the States of Michoacan, Vera Cruz and Guerrero
which were targeted Zetas who kidnapped their targets from the streets, their
homes and their cars —levantones. Not only did they torture and execute their
victims, they released videos and posted their work on YouTube to spread the
impact of their terror. This reign of violence was made possible by the endless flow
of weapons coming in from the north.
When the Federation realized the strength of this mercenary force, they relied upon
their own “deputies” — the Beltran Leyva brothers— to form another elite hit team
to counteract the Zetas. Arturo and Hector, with roots in the State of Sonora, also
controlled the flow of Federation drugs through Mexico City and the Federal District.
They created a team that would go mano a mano with the Zetas and notch up the
level of violence even more. Beheadings, dismembered and tortured bodies were the
signature signs that the Beltran‐Leyva team had struck back. Not to be outdone by
the Zetas, the Beltran‐Leyvas released a horrific DVD of the torture and killing of
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four captured Zetas and released this to the American Media and placed it on
YouTube.
To be continued………
1
2 Official statistics are notoriously incomplete. Newspapers routinely report the numbers, and for instance keep track of
them in a running “ejecutometro”. The names of each victim are also reported in summary reports.
3 Just for fun, try the DEA
This is obviously the same Operation Condor that bears on the Pinochet case. But there are two additional "Operation
Condors" that involve some degree of CIA complicity. These two are drug eradication programs. One was in Peru in
1985. It involved the DEA, CIA, and the Guardia Civil. This one is not suspicious; in fact, it appears that it was the
Colombians and Peruvians who dubbed it Operacion Condor.
The other Operation Condor is more curious. It was a drug eradication program in Mexico that began in 1975 and
continued until 1985. Mexico's DFS was completely corrupt, and its chief, Miguel Nazar Haro, was a crucial CIA asset.
Mexico contracted with Evergreen International Aviation, which had CIA connections too numerous to count, to fly the
planes for herbicidal spraying, and two CIA people put together the contract. The program was overseen by the
narcotics office at the U.S. State Department, but it was such a boondoggle that Mexico refused to let the U.S. fly over
the spray zones to verify eradication.
This is suspicious because the CIA was starting to disguise some of its counterinsurgency efforts with drug programs
during the 1970s. In 1971, there was talk of secret BNDD assassinations authorized and budgeted from Nixon's White
House (BNDD was the forerunner of DEA). A CIA legend, Lucien Conein, was helping E. Howard Hunt, another CIA
legend, with White House dirty tricks in 1971. After Watergate, Conein was shunted off to the BNDD. He hired a
number of former CIA officers and agents, and was widely reported to be organizing an assassination program. In
1974, Conein went shopping for assassination equipment with his old friend Mitchell Werbell III. Hunt recruited Cuban
exiles in 1972 to "waste" Omar Torrijos in Panama, ostensibly because he protected heroin traffickers, but really
because of his position on the Panama Canal.
In the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, Congress voted to abolish all Public Safety programs. The Office of Public
Safety, ostensibly under the Agency for International Development, had become notorious in Vietnam as a cover for
CIA operations. In Latin America, OPS was widely involved in assisting security services in their war against leftists.
But the 1974 Act did not affect overseas operations of the Drug Enforcement Administration, which by 1975 had 400
agents overseas -- about the same number that OPS had deployed. So the DEA's programs suddenly became attractive
for CIA operations that required the cover of "plausible deniability."
Could this have been the real reason for the "Operation Condor" program in Mexico? Are the identical names a
coincidence, or is it possible that one was intended as cover for the other?
One of the agents hired by Conein in 1975 was Hugo E. (Hugh) Murray, who worked for the CIA for 16 years. In 1967
he helped the CIA track down Che Guevara in Bolivia. By 1984 he was still a federal drug agent in Tucson, Arizona,
and was briefly in the newspapers when it looked like he'd be called to testify in a murder trial. Genaro Celaya was on
trial for shooting a Tucson narcotics agent, and his lawyers were playing the classic "get out of jail free" card by
emphasizing his intelligence connections. In a court document, they stated that after several years of working for U.S.
agents, Murray and others tried to persuade Celaya to take over command of Mexico's Operation Condor. This defense
document says that despite the official version of what this Mexican eradication program was all about, Condor was in
fact "the conduit" that U.S. intelligence agents used to funnel money, weapons and other support to Central American
groups friendly to the United States.
There might be no connection to the Operation Condor that operated farther south, even though the two operated at the
same time. But the DEA must have files about the Mexican Condor, and the involvement of the CIA. Relations
between DEA and CIA finally went to pieces after the murder of another agent, Enrique Camarena, in 1985.
We know the CIA had the best possible information on Mexico's Condor. And there are hints that the CIA was also
well-informed about the Operation Condor that was operating in South America. Manuel Contreras, the chief organizer
behind Condor, claims that he was always following Pinochet's orders. In 1974 he travelled to Argentina, Bolivia,
Paraguay, and Venezuela to promote intelligence cooperation. Then in August 1975, Contreras travelled to Langley,
Virginia under an assumed name and met with Vernon Walters, Deputy Director of the CIA. The following month he
wrote to Pinochet to request an increase of $600,000 in the intelligence service's budget. The money would be used,
among other things, "to neutralize the Government's principal adversaries abroad, especially in Mexico, Argentina,
Costa Rica, the United States, France and Italy."
It would be surprising, given the coincidence in timing, if the DEA never wondered if there was any connection -- via
the CIA -- between the two Operation Condors.
Spanish authorities won't get anything out of the CIA. And the State Department looks hopeless, with Madeleine
Albright (not to mention Kissinger) sympathetic with Pinochet. The Justice Department might ask the FBI what it
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knows, but the FBI probably can't help much. They were not a big player in 1970s Latin American politics; Scherrer's
role was mostly a stroke of good luck for Letelier's friends. However, Justice could produce Michael Townley for
questioning, assuming that he's not afraid to talk. Despite the left's admiration for Scherrer, Townley's story has yet to
be told.
Why not approach the DEA? They don't trust the CIA anyhow, and are always quick to insist that they don't provide
cover for them. Let them make the case, by releasing what they know, that Mexico's Operation Condor had nothing to
do with the Operation Condor organized by Chile. There appears to be a CIA finger in each Condor pie, and it wouldn't
hurt to try.
4 The rooster, the goat and the parrot. Los Tucanes de Tijuana “Vivo de tres animales que quiero como a mi vida con ellos
gano dinero y ni les compro comida son animales muy finos mi perico mi gallo y mi chiva En california y nevada en texas y en
arizona y tambien aya en chicago tengo unas cuantas personas que venden mis animales mas que hamburguezas en el
macdonalds Aprendi a vivir la vida hasta que tuve dinero y no niego que fui pobre tampoco que fui burrero ahora soy un gran
señor mis mascotas codician los weros Traigo cerquita la muerte pero no me se rajar se que me busca el gobierno hasta debajo del
mar pero para todo hay maña mi escondite no han podido hayar El dinero en abundancia tambien es muy peligroso por eso yo me
lo gasto con mis amigos gustoso y las mujeres la neta con dinero y nos ven mas hermosos Dicen que mis animales van acabar con la
gente pero no es obligacion que se les pongan enfrente mis animales son bravos si no saben torear pues no le entren”
5 Jefe de Jefes Miguel Angel “El Padrino” Felix Gallardo “surgió en el negoico de las drogas en Sinaloa en los años
sesenta y poco a poco su estatura de capo comenzó a hacer historia. Proclive al consenso, más que a la beligerencia,
logró llegar a la cúspide de poder pocos años después y con el apoyo de importantes politicos y empresarios escaló
posiciones que lo distinguieron com un fino director de empresas que se codeaba con la alta sociedad” (Ravelo,
79)Pedro Avilez PerezTwo disciples of a regional powerful drug lord Pedro Aviles Perez, Ernesto ‘Don Neto’ Fonseca
Carrillo and Rafael Caro Quintero, a fellow Badiguarato native named Juan José “El Azul” Esparragoza Moreno had
entered into a loose partnership Miguel Angel Felix Gallardo in his Culiacan base.
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