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, GUIDELINES FOR SEISMIC EVALUATION AND

I
DESIGN OF PETROCHEMICAL FACILmeS'
P"'paied by
, Task CommJttep on Seismic Evaluation IIIUl DesIp ofPet1ochem1l!lIrl'arIUtIes
-
Petrochemical EDergy OcUI!! n'Uee
These guidelines am jnnmdect to provide pmcticallL%' iiilmcndariOllS 011 several areas
which affect the safety of a petlix:he
m
ica1 facility during ami fonow:ing aD
i earthquake. . -
,
This dor"",em also provides backgrouDd.ir4ot
iiiat
iDJ1 ami ro o"IIIIendatiDJ1S in
several areas related to seismic sifetywIieze the civil engineer may '*.
with other disciplines ami with plaDt operatiODS. These areas bu:bjcfe seismic
haz8ids. c:ontingency pl !l!1J!ing. d p o s t ~ damage ess
M
wQ1!f ..
' .......
t--'
,,'
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'I'he !!!I!Ir!rjaI prcscntrd iJi. this: pub'fii:arionbas been, p1qIBred fa with
geue:rally recognized "'"gin .. Ililg }iliilciplm aDd practices, ami is for pueral
iDformarioncmly; _. This inimnprion should DOt be used first se'i"hl8
CChiqe'mit advice with r,o irs sujtabD4y for gcacral or specific appIicarion
'I'he c. Ii deurs of this: pn
b
1U:at!on am DOt intrm
dtd
to be aDd should DOt be COJISIrUCd
to be a sraMml of the ftf!ieriI'.!l!l.SocIety of CivD.lmgIn=zs (AS.P!) ami am DOt
intended for asa:t#;i@wiDputd:lase sprdfirations,COlIUadS. mgnIarions,
.'IIIes or mnQlt!mr-'-1:!.;' dO-i-iFF"" . . .... <
lCIJPIII., '1 "
-- ... ....... - .' " -';;r-'
Any opinions, findings, cxmdnsiCIDS, 1OC ...... rend
ati
ons exja ssed in this
publication am those of,the BilllUlIS aDd do niii ne Im'ily reflect the views of ASCE
or the authoxs' respcetivC organj:zatjons
No refexencc made in thii pnbHc:prion to lIllY specific publication, method, product,
"P"'cx:ess, ....... oc 01' sen:ice ruudi""es or impJics aD cndnrscure:nt JCC4hiiliicodadon, or
wiUlIiIty thereofby ASCE.
- ". " .. r.: ... -t ......
ASCE makes no iep1 !ilBIi .... orwauaaty of lIllY wbethe;r CiAp:i ssed or
implied. mnczming the PC' "'4. camp' I "', snjrabiJity or utility of lIlY
infmmation, apparatus. podrIct, or ptoc:ess dilll'ussort In this: publication, aDd agslll"M
no
UnJu'J_ +-db
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B
T

.
ASCE Petrochemical Energy CnmmlUee
'Ibis publication is one of five state-of-the-practice engineering xeports produced,
to date, by the ASCE Petrochemical Energy Committee. These engineering reports are
intended to be a snmmary of caneut engineering knowledge and design practice. and
pmsent guidelines far the design of pctroc:hemical facilities. 'Ibey mpreseIIt a
consensus opinion of task committee 'XXIenlbers active in their development. These five
ASCE engineering xcpaus arc:
. " :"
. -,'. r'
The ASCE PctmcJu:mjeal Encrgy Olllllllin= was Olg&illn;i;by;A...K. ,Gupta in
1991 and britiaIly c:baitcd by Curley Tumer. Un&:f tbcir '
mmlilillces we= JiIlWrd. Moll: n:c:ently. the QIiiIi!i;U= hlIs'bi=n' bylaSeph
A.BobjnskymdPnmkJ.Hsiu. " '
Prank J. Hsiu
cbajnmm
Joseph A. BobiDsky
W"illiam Bounds
Clay Flint
JolmGeigc1
Ajaya Ie. Gupta
Magdy H. Halma
Steven R. Hemler
Gayle S. Jobnson
JamcsMap1e
DongIas J. Nyman
NtnmlIIJ C. R ........ Us
Curley TOlDCI'
.. ;'.'
Hudson EuginW!,! Coqiorarlcm
, ,sea:etaty
Brown" Root, 1m:.
:Fluor DameI. 1m:.
Becbrel IDe. " ,
EuoD,OtcmicalOihqwuy .. -
North CaxoliDa State UDivexsity
Jacobs EDgin"", ilig Group
'Fastm!lJ! 0u:nric:aJ Co.
EQE
T"'fti 'imnnaJ IDe. ,
J. A. Maple "Associates
D. J. N,maD "hSixi8tes
BASF Coxpoxabon
:Fluor Thmicl, 1m:.
",:';, .
". " .. ,'." .:,.; ,
." . ".
. .
. ..
< .... '"'.!-: ,.
.-
, ", ...
..
. ..
, ! ::.
TBEAScE'l'ASK mMMluEE ONSElSMIC EVALUATION
... AND DESIGN OF PE'l1<OCBEMlCAL FACJLITIES
". .
This document was ptepaiiiil to p:covide gujd!l!!ce in the seismic design of new
pctrochenrical faC11itjes and the imsmic evaluation of existing facilities. Though the
maJcenp of the. the writing of this dncument are dhected at
petuocbel!ljCll facilities, tbese guidelines are applicable to simp. simarions in other
industries The intended apttience for this document jncb!!tes stl'UCtIll'Il design
"-. I -_"'1.'- for 1.1 hln .. -:
eugmc:em, ope:raung CO"q"") pers,,,u'C 6 ... J:A' ......... esta IS g smsm
'
c u.wa.lgD.
and ccmstrIlCticm snmdanfs, and local building authnziries.
, ... .. .. ';:'-c'--'
..... !O.i.:1fJ"" ..... . _ .... -.. ._
The 1aSk QiFiiliiinN_ .... , ... bJisl!ed because of a significant iDtaest in the
peucchenrical w!lI'SbY in addr"5sjng the wide va:dation of design and CODSI:rIICtion
pcacriees and snmdanis tbat me applied tbrOughout the coaatly with regards to the
peancbemica1 industry. A ... i1hm primary plllpoilC was to address the need for
consistent ew'fnat!nu mmImdo1Ogies and standards for existing fac
t1iti
es. Most
govemiDg building codes &ad design snmdmis address cmly new design, and it is
recognized tbat it would bifprobibitively expensive to umofit existing facilities to
meet CUDCIlt snmdanls. It ,is alsoncognj zed tbat snmdards for new design do not
address an of the condiriou
s
1iIat. may be fotmd in existing fa ... 1ffies.
These guidelines are, inteI!.cJecJ to provide practical J:CCi III" "endariODS on several areas
which affect the safety .. a peU ... ;bemjca1 facility during and following an
eardIquab.
.
In the area of new design, 'guidelines empbasize intelp1c
r
a
ri
ons of the iDteDt of
building codes as applied .. , fac
t1i
ties, and practical gnid!l!!ce on
design details and considrwaliuus Which Ire Dot iDc1uded in building codes
.....
For existing facilities. these BM.'!=!jnes provide evaluation methodologies which rely
heavily on clpaience from past earthquakes. coupled with focused 8DDlyses. The
guidelines emphasize .... ds to address seismic vuhJerabi1ities which are not
covmecl by bm1c!iDg codes, but which can be identified by experienced engineers.
.. ,
4" .
".-" '.,'r .... ,;.., ... . . - .... '-.--.-.;... .... __
iv
This document also provides background iDfwmation and recommendations in
ssveml areas related to seismic safety where the cMl engineer may be imeracting with
other disciplines and with plant operaticms. These areas include seismic hazards,
contingency p1amring, aDd post-eanhquake damage assessment
In helping to create a exmSfll!SUS set of guideJjnl'$, a number ofkey individuals
dedi;I,ed significant amounts of time to formulating, writiDg, ami reviewing in detail
specific sectiODS oftbis do"unent Those members are identified below.
The ASCE Task Committee Oil SeIsmk
aad Des.igD ofPetraehemical Fadlitits
Gayle S. Johnson
EQE Intematicmal, Inc.
Cbahman
Leo BragagnDlo
Sohrab Esfimdiari
Martin L. Eskijian
Orban Gurbuz
RonHaupt
PeteHults
Makis Manetps
BmMcCamm
Tom Miller
lWdyMulia
AbmedNisar
Douglas J. Nyman
Phil Richter
MuDd Samara
Tim Sheckler
Paul B. Sliitili'ftI"S
FnmkJ.Hsiu
Chevnm llesemch &: TecImology Co.
Va-ClIainmm
EQE lDtematicmal, Inc.
ENOVA EnIPDI"tl!i.ug Services
Califomia State I .ands Cmmnjssjon
Bec:b:tel Corporation
P.ressmePipillg Engineering
Cluw.ron Research &: TecIm.ology Co.
PMB Engi!!=iug
Amoco Worldwide Engineering aDd CoDSttUction'
UnocalCorporaticm .
Vecr:ra T....mmlogies
Dames &: Moore
D.l. Nyman &: Associates
Fluor Daniel. Inc.
Brown aDd Root, Inc.
Chevron 1hZ &: Tedmology Co.
Dames It, Moore
Fluor Dar!ieI" Inc.
Bechlel Corporation
v

Tha R"Uillillee would Dke to tbaDk the followiDg individuals for their reviews am:t
~ ccmtrilmtioDs.
Bob Bact ... ,,"
1= Bobjuslq
MjcbeeJ.Czaig , -,-
De1Farbes
:Khur.ram Gaba
: ,'-, Bevkwen ad Other Colltrilnltcm
lecobs Fnsmeerius
Arco E:qUoretion am:t Production Technology I
Gas Processors Association
Fluor Dame!, IDe.
" BrOWD am:t Root. IDe.
t1JIoc:al CoJporatiOD
E's.". Research and F.ngineeriDg
Esso Fnsineeriug, Europe
Vemcm Gregerson
T'1DlOthy Ie. Hasse!mpn
Marklt I..eg ,1 :, .:-"
E1 Peso Natmal Gas I Gas Processors Association
ACrAIDc.
ACrAIDc.
.AlWussler
... , .........
";" -
ElPaso Natural Gas I Gas Processors Association
...... ..
; .. '-
~ _ - ~ i' ..
CONTENTS
Cbapter 1: 1DtroductIon ........ ____ .... __ __ .... ____ _____ ...... _
1.1
1.2
1.3
ectiVe ._ ......... ..
Obj
.
.......... ___ ............. -. ............. _ .......... I ......... ..
Related Industry Codes, Standards, aDd SpecificarilJJlS -_ ........... ..
Organization oftb.e Dcv:nment .. ________ _ ............ _.
Chapter 2: Design and Evaluation PhDosopby _____ .................... .
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.S
2.6
2.7
2.8
2.9
lmroduction __ ..... __ ...... _______ ..... _ ... _ 10 ............ ".
ConsideratiDDS far New Design ... _ _____ . __ .............. _ . _ ... 0 .... _
Considerations for the Evaluation ofEmting Facllities "_"'"0P",_
JJ'I)jlalions
__ ........ ____ 00__ ____ ......... , .. _ ............ __ ..... __ ..
PcIfonnlQ!!'C Objectives and Usage Categories _ .. _ .. _ ......... _ .......... .
Design Approach for New F'cUitirs .. _ . _ .. __ ......... _ ... __ " .............. _
Co
-_'''';on 0 .... _ .. .:-- and '".--ron .... 0 __ _
........ ,.---_ -___ _ .... _ .............. __
Quali1)r AssuIaDce ___ __________ ............ _._ 0 ..
_ ..... ___________ ...... ,
AliiYJ,VW Ir p,_ II _____ _ ...... _.
Chapter 3: Sefsrnlc Razerds .... _. __ _____ ... ___ ......... _
3.1
3.2
3.3
IDtroduetion ... _____ __ , __________ .............................. ___ _
............. -.. --................ -.. , ... ......
.. ___ ...... _ ...... _ ................................................. r ....
3.4 Tsunami and Scirbe __ ___________ .. _______ 11 .......
Appendix 3.A Ground Sbalcjng ____ .............. _ .. ___ .. _ _ .. ___ ._., ... _. __
Appendix 3.B Earthquake RcJated Coastal Intmdarion
---_ ... -
Chapter 4: Sefsrnlc A.DaI]'sIs __ ___ . _ .......... ____ .. _, .... __ __
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
IDirocluction _______ __ . _--.. ---. _ . _._ ...........
Structural Systems in a Pe1unemica1 Pacility ..... _. __ . ___ _
SeJr:ction of ADalysjs Methods _________ ._ ........
Equivalent Static.ADalysis Pmc:edme
Dynamic Analysis Methods ____ . _ .. ______ . __ ._
4.6 Considerations for Existing FaC'1itirs __ .......... _ __ ...... _._
Appendix 4.A Typical Period (T) Computations
for NonbuiIc1ing Structures _ ................................. _____ ._ _
Appenrtix 4.B Guidelines for Detennjnmjon of Base Shear
for Combination Structbres ........ ___ ..... _ .. ___ .... __ _ ___ .. _
Appenctix 4.C De"""";narilJJl of Base Shear for Selected SlNCtWes __
Appendix 4.0 Stability Check Using Energy Balance Approach ... .......:. ....
w..
1-1
1-1
1-2
1-4
2-1
21
2-1
2-2
2-3
2-4
2-7
2-8
2-9
2-9
3-1
3-1
3-2
3-8
3-11
3.A-l
3.B-l
4-1
4-1
4-3
4-5
4-7
4-19
4-24
4.A-l
4.B-l
4.C-l
4.0.1
CONTENTS (Canto)
Appenctix 4.E Methodology far Detemrination of Sliding DisplaClOD!ellTS
Appendix 4.F Risk MaDagemmt and Prevention Program (RMPP)
Guidelines for Seismic Assessment of Facilities Containing
Acutely Bazardolts,.Mmerials ______ ........ ---......... .
ClIapter- 5: PrJmary strDcta:ralDesiga ___ ___ .... __ ................. .
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
5.5
5.6
T_ ........ ____ _
...... _. ___ ___ _____ _
Desi

gn U"OI8 _______ .... _ __ ___ nl ,. __ 0 __
Desip Consjddiatiws
-.. ---.. --.... .... --..... , ....... ................. .
Slruclinal1)etm1
s
---------.----.. ---- I ____ .. -
Physical Jmeraction ofStruetmes and Components
..... , ... _-_._.
CJeotedmicaIOmsjtlma';ans II I .. .. ......
...... -
. .... ....... ... ' ..
Cbapter 6: Walkdown i!8iIW!i ms ofExfstfng FadQffes ._ ..... _ .. _ .......... _ .. _ .. _
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
60S
6.6
...........
.. .....::.i::ctj:on___ __ ' -._ ... _.-_______ ,
,IIIU.\AIU___ .............. __ , ____ ..
Basis for Ped "-Ii ni;ngWaIkdowDs . 1",_,., _____ ._ __ .... ___
_____ ., ............... ___ . __ .. __ _
C
- sid .-- System __ ......... ___ a ...... ___ ... __
EvalrvrtiOD of a ".-gl", .. ___ .................. . ............ __ _
J ind'plions ........... __ _
ofTauks at Grade ....... _._ .... ___ _
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6"
7.7
.. --.. --......... -................................. -............. " ... ........... .
Past EanbJiuakc Pel fill !IIanee of Flat-bottomed Tauks
----_.
Walk:I:1Jmqh lasilleClfillfcnQlil _._ , ___ ___ , _ ..... _.
ADalyIical EvaJuadnn ___ ." ............... __ ......... _ II ..... ....... __ ... .. _ ........ 0,_._
MitipIiaD of Seismic Effects ___ ____ .......... .. __ ....... _ ..... __
Qmsjderarirms far FBIIite lDvestigafion ............... _______ ..... __ , .............
Design ofNowTaDks . ____________ .. _
Planning ..... ______ .. _ .......
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5 .:-
8.6
8.7
8.8
8.9
..............
lJitrcRUb,c:tiClil-.. _ ............... _ , ___ ...... , ... , ........... _ ... _ ....... _ ..... - ... ....
..... ',
..... _ .................... _-_ ....... _ ............. _ .. _ ..... _-_ .. _ .................. ..
__ ___ ....... ______ .,_
____ .. _, ____ ..... _ .. _ ....... __ ,_
Jncidr:nr .... - ... _ , . _ ................... --
C
o
,nt'i8Dd &. f.?"'!n
1
/MobUjzatjon System ___ 1 ____
Roles aa.dRes,ChasmDit;es ofTeamPersmmel II II "' ,101 _._
IiiSJItiC=1ion Mr.tbrxio1ogy _._._. __ ......... __ __ _ .
,AnembJin.g oflusl*' 'ion Data I Rqlorting Results ...... _ ... _
4.E-l
4.F-1
5-1
5-1
5-1

S-6
5-21
5-28
5-30
6-1
6-1
6-1
6-2
6-6
6-8
6-33
7-1
7-1
7-2
7-5
7-14
7-23
7-23
7-23
8-1
8-1
8-1
8-1
8-2
8-3
8-3
8-4
8-4
8-5
CONTENTS (Couto)
Chapter 9: Post-earthquake Damage A_SOlem ..... _ . _ . _ . _..... 9-1
9.1
9.2
9.3
9.4
9.5
9.6
9.7
9.8
lDt:rod.ncti.aD __ ._ _ ..... __ ____ ._._ ... _ .. _ ............ ., _
....... ., " .......... _8 .... iDYestigattaD. _______ __ _. __ __ ._0 .....
Perfnnning Fidd lnspedions on ....
Evaluation ofLoad-caaying SystemS
Jdentffication of Damaged SttucImcs
.. _ .. _._---_ ..... _--
"--- ti
____ ._ _._ .... ___ .............. __ ............. __
Team __ _ __ ._. ___ __ .... _. __ .................... .
Recommended Equipment _______ _e ............ _._ ... .
Chapter 10: Retrofit DesIgD .. __ ._ '"N._'N .. _ .. __ .... _._. __ ."' ... _ .. t .. ...... _'.' ........ .
10.1
10.2
10.3
10.4
10.5
lDtrod.uction. ____ " ....... _._._. _____ .................. .
Upgrade Simatjnus .0 __ " or I r._. __ .-............. .
Q:iteria for Voluntary Seismic Upgrading ._._._ _ .......... _
GJJide
1ines
I PrcM::ec1\treS __________ ._ _
Strengthening Criteria ... , __ _, _________ _._ _
Nomeuclature . _, . .... , . _, ""' .. N' __ ._., __ _. ___ .,_,_ _,_,_" ___ ___ __
Glossary _-_. __ _. .. ",_"._._--,-,._-,-".-.,
Ref'ereac:es ___ .,.,_, . _,_,.,_ .... __ ___ __________ _ _.
9-1
9-3
9-4
9-5
9-6
9-6
9-7
9-8
10-1
10-1
10-1
10-2
10-2
10-3
A-I
B-1

L1 OBJECTIVE
Chapter I
INTRODUCI10N
Many diffetent codes aud standards me used in the strUCtDral aud seismic design
aud aS5eSSiieDt ofpettochemical VIC'.1jties Many of these codes have been developed
I" h liB! i1y for use in the design of bnjJdings, aud generally offer insufficiently detajled
guideJjnes for compJete design ami evaJuarion of stnx:ml'eS commoDly found in
petmcheDii=1 fa"'1ffies The engjncer is o!t= fuxceci to rely on broad subjective
iDterpmation of the intent of these codes to develop detaned design criteria and
proc:edures as they apply to items fotmd in petrochemical faCl1ffies Consequently.
these fat:tTlties may be designed aud bWlt with inconsistent degxccs of conservatism
aud design margins.
'I'be:re me also DO widely accepted standards for the seiMi' evab!!!tiOD of existing
fiIciIiries As the public aud regulators become more aware of env.irt-mnental and
safety issues associated with such faCIlities, Iqulators. OWllm, aud engineers have aD
ewr iDcreasiDg need for a consistent approach ami a t""'JuricaIly SOUDd, practical basis
forperfcmning evaluaticms.
Recognizing the need for design aud evalwJtioD guideJjnes in sevexal technical
areas specifically appJicable to petrochemical faCl1jtir:s, the Am=ticaa Soc.iety of CMl
Engineers (ASCE) Euergy DMsioD set up the Petrochemical Em=rgy C.liiihillee to
UDdextake the effort to fj]J tbecxistiDg gap in establishing !:I ire. ia aud guidance for
practical application. The Seismic Task: Corwiijllee of the Petrochemical EDexgy
Committee was charged with developmeu.t oftbis doc
11m
mtt
This doc:ument bas been developed to provide practical gujdance to eng;nrns
involved in the seisnril;: design aud evabxatioD of petrochemical fac.Ttties It is
intended to sexve sevexal objeclives:
L to help practiciDg engineers better UDdexstami the intent behind cenain
provisioDS of sejsmjc design codes, so that the codes ami provisions CaD be
1-1
~ ploperly aDd UDifcmnly applied to structureS and systems typically
found in petrOCbemical faC'
1iti
es
.
b. to pmvide gnidance far seismic engineering ptactice beyond tbat covered in
the building codes.
C. to pmvide background iDfonnation on technical PIC8S tbat are related to the
seismic evaluation of pen:ocbemica1 facilities, but not always well undel:stood
by civil engineers
d. to pmvide guidance specific to the seismic evaluation of existing
petrricmical fact1jries
e. to provide practical analytical guidance specifically applicable to
pelmCbcmica1 fact1jtjes
f. to alert engin IS and opemtions pCISODDel to PIC8S other tban structural
whI::m earthqaaka might affect the safety of petri .. bemiC:P] faC'1i
ti
es, such as
. c:mnjngrmcy plpmring, post-eaJ:thquak damage inspection. PDd opetational
;seers
The topics ;Deluded in this cfocnment address seismic design PDd !elated
ccmstrucUan of DOW S1IIICtUI:I:S aDd components as well as evaluation and letxofit
design of aisring SUiitUlies PDd systems in petmcbemi
cal
facilities. The scope
generally emphasjzes work tbat. is commonly under the direction of an engineer.
Despiti: the atte"'l to make this a COD1plebensive doi:
mu
en1, it is n=cognized tbat.
tbcre wiDbe applicable topics not faJ1y covered. In all blstanCe5, it is IJltjmately the
responsi.bDhy of engineers involved in the design or evaluation plOCC:SS to usc their
pmfessional JIJdgment to ensure tbat. applicable safety objectives. criteria PDd other
perfW'i """ pals are met. ...
1.2 RETATJID INDUSIRY CODFS,STANDARDS AND SPECIFICATIONS
A number of available indus .. ), codes, standards and specifications are nOiillRlly
used for the design of stiUCtUIeS and components at petxocbemica1 facilities. These
may include, bot are not liuritrd to the following:
a. Unifoma Building Cod6 (UBC)
b. NatitmtJI Building Code (BOCA)
c. StnrvWd Building Cod6 (SBC)
d. API St.anilard 650, Welded Steel Tarzb jor OD Storage
e. AISC MtlIIIIGl of Steel Ctmnrut:tion, Allowtzble Stress Design
f. AISC MtlIIIIGl of Steel Ctmnrut:tion, LotuI Il1Ui Ruisttmce Fm:tor Design
g. AC131B. Building Cod6 Requirements/or Reinforced Concrete
1-2
h. ACl 530, Building Code Requirementsfor MtUonry StruCtUreS
L ASCE-7, Minimum Design Loads jor Bl'jl
d
mgs/l1ld Other Strut:lUre$
j. ASME Boiler /l1Id Pressure VIWel Code
k. ASME B31.3. Code for Chemit:IzI. Plant tznd Petroleum 1l8:jinery Piping
A matrix indicating typical use of tbese codes. standards azul specificarious for
diffctem structun:s azul c:ompcments of petrocbr:mjcal faC"1ities is presented in Table
1.1.
TABLE L1: Codes aad Standards CnmmODly Used for Petrorbemical Fadllties
!.SCE ACI ACI API ASME
USC BOCtl SBC
,(1)
AlSC 318 530 650 BPV
Sleel Design X X X X X
Concrete Design X X X X X
Masomy Desip X X X X X
TlIDks
X{1) X(2) X{2T X(2)
X
Pre 5 DC Vessels
;x(2)
X{2f
x(2) X(2)
X
&.PipiDg
(1) Prima. i1y used in pmdic:e for wind loads.
(2) Pdmariiy used cmly for cfcte lIli"ing seismic loads aDd suppmt design
W'lth .R:Spect to code provisions, tile gnideIiDes preserted throughout this
docum:nt mer often to tbe llnifonn Building Code (UBe). This was done becanse
most of the effort in seismic design code devclopmeDt in the last two decades bas
been related to the UBC. Furthc:more. the UBC is the most widely used design code
in highly seismic: regions of the United States.
h is r=ogzrized that other codes azul stl!T!diids, such as from BOot IIIId SBC,
may be in effect in a particular local=. Rather than attempt to thoroughly address all
applicable provisioDS in an govemmg codes, this committee has focused discussion of
specific: provisious and examples to those codes and standards which have been
demoDSttatcd to be the most commoDly used in CWleut practice However, it is
iDtcDded that sufficient hackgroUDd and fDtent be provided such that the guidelines
are appJicable over a wide nnge of desigD staDdards, and the use of this document
with standards other than the UBC should result in comparable designs
h is also recognized that ongoing efforts in code development and refiZIement
related to the UBC azul other codes may at one time or another make some of the
specific guidance provided in this docllne .. ! obsolete, especiaDy wh=re related to
particular lmihting code provisioDS. However, the iJIteut aDd philosophy of much of
the guidance provided herein is expected, for the most part, to remain ditectly
1-3
ASME
B31.3
X
app'W:a!;fe to pet",t:bcmic
al
appJjc:aIRras. Much of the design philosophy. analytical
techniques, 81lIIl,ytica1 tools. aDd specific guidance provided in tbis donunem is
appxoprlate across a wide rmge of cWign critetia.
It should also be DOted that the gnideJines provided herein are not intended to
take plC .......... = OWI'dID code of IeCOld wbelcver differeDces may occur. 'I1=y are,
however. intended to provide a rational basis for var,ing 1i'om specific provisions of
standams in estabJishfng spec jm: design rcquhcme
nts
for items particular to
petroChmr
P
'8
1
facfl!des Where dffferem:es exist between the guideJines of tbis
docLi1biiiit ami dID code of IeCOrd. the latter should always prevail, UDless a potential
deviation from the stmtdanJ code of practice is authorized by the goveming authority.
1.3 ORGANIZA'DON OFTBEDOCUMENT
The liI"juder of the dotijpiieiJ' bas beeD mgalljzcd in cbapters which address
spcnHic sejs"'ii: related aspects of pctIocbe
n
';' a1 facility design, evaluatiaD, or
opetalilllls A bJ:iaf SlIJIllillity of the ceMents of each chapter is pi scmed in the
foDowiDg paragJlqd.s
Ompter 2 prov.icles a cfiscnsskm of sejgmjc: design philosophy aDd the general
:-. of desi . '"-" .1 __ eli ""cd.
MIIIiiUt. &e!sm'C JIl pmv1SlDDS. tcqUAeii@i.tsarewauSC"
Ompter 3 provides hack!P'Ouud data !elated to seiSlhir: bazatds such as grotmd
sbalring, fault xuptwe, ami tSlmamis, aDd geotrdmical issues such as liquefaction.
Emphasis is p1ac:rd OIl providiDg iufi:nnlll'ion which wDlbelp the engineer UDdcrsta1Id
the dc:rivatioD ami sipi6c;a
n
ce of diffeteut de
6u
jli"llS of grotmd JDDtiOIl which may be
encol111tCled OIl a project.
C!aptcr. 4 addu N aualysis aDd load definition for petroe""micml fm1jties
Guidance is sivm for intetpretiDg buDding provisious for application to tbe
types of struc:lIm!S coUiiDOi1ly fcnmd in peuoc 1e
m
;. al mcffltles Practical aDa1ytical
tools are suggesred for several R""t'$sary tasks in f8ciIity stlucnual design aDd
evabJatinns. such as calcnJatimi of structaral periods for COi1IpCIJiiIidS I1'dique to
petrochemicml mr:i!ities, calc
n1ari
cm of sliding displacements, aDd stabHity clw:ks
These can be foundin die appmelices to Claptcr4.
C!aptcr 5 proWies guidance for the design of new c:omporilJlts in petrocbemica1
fpt:J1ities. This cbapter attempts to offer usefiJl guidance from experienced engjneers.
emphasiring iuretpxctadon of the iDtCDt of code provisions aDd speo ifk: items not
found in typical design codes aDd standards, such as special design deta"s aDd
CODfigmation contmJs.
Chapter (; is n:1ated .. ificaUy to the evaluation of Clrisring m",1iries Detailed
gJlidanez is provided OIl the perfonnauce of methodical "waJIalowD" SCJ'I"CTIing
. JeViews of stntc:tm:es aDd systeIiIS. I
1-4
Chaptl:r 7 covezs the evablation of flat-bottomed steel storage tanks. Different
design codes are cUscussed ami alternative nctbodologies. panicularly usefill for the
evaluation of existing tanks, are presented
Chaptl:r 8 addresses earthquake contingency planning for a facility. It does not
give specific guidance on how to author contingency plans; rather it outlines some
general points that should be addressed by in-place contingency plans.
Cbapter 9 provides gnidance with respect to post-earthquake damage assessment
of petluchemic:al facilities.
Cbapter 10 provides guidance to the engineer faced with a task of retrofitting
seismjcally deficient SU1ICtllreS in a petrochemical facility.
1-5

Chapter 2
DESIGN AND EVALUATION PHILOSOPHY
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The pmpose of this chapter is to articaIate tile broad design philosophy which is
iDhercmly inco!porated into the guidance plt seated in this doCIIIIClJ1 'I'he design
philosophy is deI:ived from cumat kDow1edge of seismic hazan:Is, observed and
recouled behavior of structures ami components dmjnl earthquakes, and
CODSidcration of C:CIII'eqnenccs of fiWure of these structuJ:es ami compommrs.
Avai1able doc""c"rs on recomrmmdtd "';smjc: design practices for conwmional as
well as special faC"1jtjes (SEAQC. 1990; RMPP. 1992; DOE 1020) have been used in
the overall develol!IIJent of design aDd cvaluatioD philosophies.
The overall philosophy of this guiillI1!ce dcc""en! is based on the premise that
pOpel "';smje design caD be acbieved by:
L delcuniwnl an applicable seismic hazards for a site.
b. defining pet!uJIi mace objectives for diffctcnl usage categories of structures
and components.
c. CSlabHsbing design bases that meet the prescribed seismic pe1fur
man
ce
objectives for these facilities, ami -
c1. cusming that the design and construction adhete to those bases.
2.2 CONSIDERATIONS FOR NEW DFSlGN
The design phD.osophy for new f'aciHties is peseated ass ... iil"I that the code of
record is one of the major buDding codes cmrcnt1y being used in the United States
(see Table 1.1). Use of these guidelines with other simlJar codes and standards that
may be in effect in a particular community should:result in ClIjllJdlrable designs.
The seismic design femes discussed in this docnment are based on the assumption
that dnctility is provided in new design ami that the occunencc of ljrrrited inelastic
2-1
behavior may be acceptable in stnlClUJ'eS and compcmcntS during strong ground
motions. As a result. m :many cases, the lateral design forces are significantly smaDer
than those that would be requiIed if the structures aDd components were designed to
r=ain elasdc
For sttuctwes in the ineJastic Jegime. structural bebavior is improved if the
inelastic detiiljilatiD1lS me well distributed throughout the ~ The seismic
force Jr:vels called for ill this cfocument arc based on this consideration. Higher elastic
force I1'ductioJl factors are thus provided for cases where a more UDifonn distribution
ofine]astic defi;J(marum can be developed ill the latm'al force resisting S)'Stem (e.g a
welJ..distrlbnt S)'Stem of """""",t-resisting frllll'JlS). Conversely. for cases where
inelastic defotmlltjon may C01lCeJ1tlate ill a few urmhers, the reductioD factors me
Jower (e.g.. e1evated tanks). In any case, it is the engineer's responsibility to develop
a design that wm COliespo.:u:l to the expc:ch'Id iDdastic response capabitity of the
lith h :"nat sysrem for die item tII1dcr c:ansidf\1'8tion.
Fw:tlleilihllc, the grdd!!!U:e provided in this dOC'lIIent gencraJlyprovides mjnjmum
design ei. jig! ia. It is die engin. t. 's obligation to intctpret and adopt these guidelines
to each item usiag 6XpI2'ieDce 8IId judgDie
JlL
In se1cc:ted cases. it may be
adVamapoU$ to adopt DIOle CODSeI'Y8live criteria which may have overaJlJong range
ecollOlllic WII. Be . hse oftbe peat variabi1ity and optioDs avaflable ill the design
process. and beranse of the comph:xity of st:l'IlCtiJreS 8IId compollCDtS, it is very
difficult to CO\W all possible varlatioDs ill seismic response and to provide optioIIal
defln1M c. iM ia Thus, tbe engineer bas both Jatitude 8IId responlll"bility to exercise
jwignmt m tbe dcMllopm:m of derailed design criteria and m the execution of the
design
2.3 CONSIDEB4T10NS FOR THE EVALUATION OF EXISTING
FACILlTIFS
The reassessment of ex;s'i"g tj",Ttties may involve diffeteat Icdmiques and
acccptaDte criteria tbatI used for DOW design, delpcndillg aD tbe intent of the
cvab"Won, the npJat01')' requheuems, aDd the wishes of the 0WDer. Several key
c:onsidemriODS are as follows:
a. Evabtatiou acceptance criteria (stress amJ/or deformation limits) may be more
or Jess e ..... u. vative tbatI those for an cquivalcDt Dew facDity depending on the
jJItmIt of the cva
1
!1!i!ion.
b. Adctitioual requhc".,nrs related to equipment functionality as well as systems
intmac:tion may be applopliate.
Co Loads OIl an ~ i s ' i i l g sr:ructure may have changed over time and the
assessment should cousider the aetna] loads.
2-2

d. Any cbanges in the operating basis (weight. operating conditions, etc.) may
affect the ass"'smem ami should be incmporated.
e. Remaining design life is a factor in the evaluations and should be 1:onSidered.
f. In evaluating elis!i .. , fjll:I1iries, actual material propexties (if AV8"
1
a
h
1e) should
be tabD into ace' fI.nt
g. lDformation from ava
D
a
h
lc field observatious, such as deterioration of the
structural eJemcn
ls
(e.g., cmrosion), should be addressed.
In ,.,iii iiliary, the "best estimate- of the strDCtIl1'e ami material properties should be
used to get the most accmate of the S1:rI1CtUI:e's ur system's periOrmance.
Anytblng that might affect system petto! "'!!!Ice should be considered, whether
stn1C1IIral OJ' fimclionaL
2.A LIMITATIONS
CoDfbm.iire to this gnidllJlCC doHmenl does not guarmtee that significant
damage w.m not occur during a major CIIl'thquake. The engineer must always caution
both the owners and regulators to understand that seismic risk can .never be
completely efuninated Although conservatism can be added to the design and/or
review criteria, ami a mote detajled and euensive investigation (at greater cost) may
yield man: accuracy and re.Uable mfotmation, some .level of seismic risk w.m always
exist. 'Ibis is true regardless of how much time and resowccs are spent in the design
OJ'rettDfit of a facility. Thu.s. the goal should always be to "",jnj"'i'" the risk" within
the available ,csowces.
In order to avoid conffir:!ing expectations between enginecrso owners, regulators,
OJ' other affected paules, the follow:ing points should be discussed opculy, and
possibly agreed to in writing, so as to avoid miRmderstandings at later dates:
L An parties must recognize the Jack of complete asswance CODiimted with
In ......;,.,.1 .... 1.. f .. &.. :t:.:_ B.....: .. -- the . .
50'S""': eVLIhODS. ,tna ............... 3 0 CXiStiDg JJ!CJuum;, ~ 1lDCCI't8lDt1eS
associmd with material ptopetties and sttuctural behavior (uncettainties that
are t)'pically hqer for existing fjlC'1jtjes than for new designs), there are large
uncettainties associated with the eatthquakc input motion in tmDS of
amplitude, frcquenc:y content, and dmation.
b. The engineer has an obligation to use the degxee of C8IC ami skill ordiDarily
exetcised at the time the evaluation is perfotmed, under sjrm
1a
r c:ircumstances.
by xeputable engineering professionals in the same OJ' simil..,.locaJity.
c. An patties must recognize that geologic, seismic, envirolllD!!!!tal, st1'UCtUr8l.
and geoteclmical conditions can Vary from those encountered when and where
the engineer obrainM the initial data used in the evabllmon, and that the
2-3
liwbed uatwe of the data ,...".,sarlly aUJscs some Jeve1 of um:ertaiDty with
lespect to its interpJ:etatioD notwithstanding the exercise of due professitmal
CIUL
do All parties JDDSt ncogDizc that the extent of the engineer's evaluations lW
alwa,s 'funired by the time-framc ami fauds available for the investigation. A
II:IIm detaDed and cxreusive investigation. at greater cost. might yield more
accurate and reliable Dn "ation that might afi'ect some of the engineer's
decisicm
s
aDdjudg,"ems
Co When evaJnating o'Is';", fac:i!iries, an parties must agree on reasonable limits
to d"",ip J'I!Sf" msDdJity and lia",1ity of the engin!'lC!t'!l with .... d to the
adequacy of tile ...;g;aa
l
design and CODStnlCtion. Nomudly, respon","'1ity for
. the original design and CODStrUCtion should not be a.
m
'l!l1f'd by the cvaJnaring
ettgineer> OWIlOIS and engin=rs should be made aware of extensive
'!UICet.ajnties that may mnain in the absence of sigrrifiCNlt iDvesrigariOJlS.
Also, this c1och!!.IId is inUmctei! to reflect cw.ent CO""'''tl practice and should
not de rmgin Ir from designs and retrofits "'''''isrear with em::rgiDg
knowledp.
z.s PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES AND USAGE CATEGORIES
2.5.1 Ped'Ol
mA
lice ObJedliiS
The c;iilcia in tIds docn'ie'" are based OD petfOl
l1
18
n
ce o ~ defined far
seJected usa.ge categories. The pcrformann!! objectives are iDtemIcd to provide
different levels of protection :Cram damage, consistent with the usage categOries. The
main elemenlS of these ped'uc !!lAnce objectives are as foDows:
a. stractmaJ Integrity. The design philosophy aJtien1ated in this docanent caDs
for maintahring structural intql i'y for an structures and components in a
ficiIity. TJds II'II'!8JIS that 5tIUCtUZes aad components should not col1apsc or
othei wise fafl UDder tile design basis ground motion specified for the site.
Fnnctionality may need to be mai"tainNi if speci&aDy designated by the
owner or jorisdiclionaJ 8IJthorides or if requin:d to piotecl pnblic beaJtb and
safety. (In general, maintaiJring stmctural integrity does DOt imply mpjntaining
Ii
1 ) M .. __ 1 --"
biiCtlf1D
8
Jty.8jotShh"l tM.lYW.U.RII iDtegiity xeqaues atteD.tiOD to o y ~ w . .
ducb1ity ancl defg'!!II'ian limits. Subsequent chapters provide guidance for
Stieugth, dm:tt1ity and defo'!! iI' h In limits. .Although the gnidan= pi: s !JIed in
this ckR,ljhM at is not intended to prevent damage, JIII.1Ch of the !njdancc is
inte"ded to limit damage that would adversely affect the public safety.
b. Comai""''': Stmctares. IY5ImB, and C01Dp01Klli1tS with haDnIous materials
should be cJesigned for cont
a
;" "e'" of such materials during and after a.major
eartbqaake. Ensuring Mntai""ffl1 requires attentioD to streDgtb. du=tfli!y,
2-4
ami deformation limits as well as structural dctaDs of elements with respect to
potential leak patbs. of release of significant qn8!!t
it
ics of
hazardous materjals into the environm:nt is essential to avoid endangering
facility persmmel ami to maintaiD public health aml safety in the event of a
major eartbquake.
c. Func:tinnality: All structures. systemS. and components that me needed after
an such as fire prevention or other emargs.:y systems. should be
designed to maintain functioDBlity (i.e.. continued operability during or after
tile design earthquake), Majntajning :fnIJcrioDlllity requir=s attention to
SbeDgtb, cJudDity aml defoImation limits as wen as to stress levels, structural
details, seismic interaction, aml protection. of essential systems aml
c:gr'qKlUCurs
2.5.2 Usage Categories
For pw:poso:s of seiSi I lie design and/or ewl"ation, stmdIIIeS aml components at a
petmc
h
e
m
ira
1
facility me divided into thR:e usage catcgorles: (a) gcncral, (b)
hazmdous, and (c) essential
The "geuaa1" category jnr:Iudes an stmdIIIeS and compojlents that me not in the
other two categories. This category may be farther subdivided into "nonnal" and
"spccJal" groups. The str11CI:DrI:S aml compoDCDtS in tile "DOxmaI" catcgoxy should be
dcsigD'"4 for the minjmuUl cartbquake fon:es as defined in tile applicable codes and in
this document. The stxuclUXes and compoDCDtS in the "special" category may be
If 'gn:d J.;..1._ " , , ' fo
M! to __ semmc rcqUDt'1 eDts m un .. ;:or to mote protcct!DD r an
owners iD\'e;s' i nent
The "hazardous" category jnc:hyies stnu:/mes and COJl4iO
n
ents which coDtaiD
hazardous materials. Structures aml COXUPOACDtS in this caregoxy should be designed
to assure coDtaj""eD
t
of tile hazardous material ami need not maintain their general
1imctioDBlity beyoud what is required for coittaj""'CDt. If these structures aud
CUIiOqOI01itli1 fall, they should fail in a "!I""e
r
that will preclude release of hazardous
material into the envixOllment
The "essential" category incbtdes Sb:UCtUrcs aml compo.aents that me nea=ssary
for emergency operations subsequcm to stxong grouml moticm. CoDSCqUCDtiy,
structures aml compoDCDtS in this caregoxy should be dt:sjgned to maintaiD their
fuDctioDBlity after the canhquake. Generally. this may be accomplished by using
design criteria that will limit stress and/or defoxmation 1e1'els UDder seismic loads to
values that me known to provide for coilljr"'ed function.
2.5.3 ReJatiClnsbtps Between PerfOl1ll8Jlt:e Objeetfves ami Usage Categories
.
Relationships between the performance objectives and usage categories me
shown in Table 2.1. Design for an usage categorles should proYide for struc:tura1
2-S
iDlegrit)'. In addjtirm, hazardous material handling fac:t1jtjes and COmpoucnts should
be designed to 8SSIDe (!IiII6'Mmenf of such hazardous material
Sjnnlarly. essen'ia1 fac:iljtk:s and certain structures and components in the
bazatdous tnat,.,.w banding fac:lljtjes should be designed to maintain selected
fimcrioDa!ity. PiuaIly. the quaIiWive seismic risk for each usage catcgoI)' should be
CMSisteJtt with the philosophy diOM1ssed in tbis section. as shown in the last column
ofTable:U.
TABLE 2.1: PerfoID'BDce Objed:ives for DUterent Usage Categories
QuaJi1ative
Usage CaI"iVl-
PerfOJ'!DU!CIl Objeed,es Sekmlo: Risk
Mala.am
Mldn'e'
n
ec""ai"'''eJd
StrudaraI ofBazardous
)fahdafn
'litegritJ Mat.eriaJs I'mu:tioDs
Normal Yes NJA No Low
Gem:zal Special Yes NlA
yes<l)
Very Low
Raze'1luus
Yes Yes
yes<2)
Very Low
&SS ulial Yes NlA
yeP)
Very Low
(I) OJIlythareircmswladaihaCllllhavea signfficenteccmtmDc inq'act. usually an
owm:r's chniee
(2) Mai ... ai
n
ODlythosefimr:tions which are required forc:n"raitu,u: ,,'
.(3) Mainlei'! 0Dly those fuucIioDs which ;a required for es'C'UiaI oper.stiODS.
2.5.4 BasIs for the Remlliiiwrded Performance Objectives
The UDde:rlyiDg basis for any seismic design I I i/erinn or procedure is the
I'pI"CfficariOD, eitb=r e'p1ir iOy or implicitly. of IIZl acceptable level of risk. This
docl1Ue4t was pIeparecl With the belief tbat, although not quanrifjed, the peaf01lll8
n
CC
objectives spedfi"" for the fac:t
1lties
should be consistent with public
"'inns of otI=r c:iW structures. In other words. the risk of not U)Cting
the peafo
lft
l81!cc objcctiwu should not exceed CODUllODly accepted r:isIrs associated
with co"'''c'claJIincb"mial fac:t
1it
jes whose failure may affect public health.and
safety.
FutJ:bellnore. seisilijl: Dsk should be consistent with the poteDtia1 consequences of
failure of saucam:s ami components; those items tbat arc likely to pose greater
hazard to life safety should haw a lower risk of DOt JEft'ting their petformance
objectives. This risk is based OD.CUllent knowledgc of seismic behavior IIZld is not
quantified.
2-6
2.6 DFSIGN APPROACBFOR NEW FACILITlES
""!inee" iilg teqDi1tJlC
D
ts aDd acceptam:c critcrla to be used to demonstrate
comptiance of each usage caleJOlY with the applicable pmfoxwa
nce
- requirements
should be based on approacb=s that are well established and consistent with CUItent
pmctic:es for seisnric design 'DIe major elements of tl=se c:riterja include:
L StreJlBth: The structural design should be such that risk of gross faiIme of the
structural systems and elencnts UDder the design loads is mjnjmized This is
acco" '1,
li
sbcd by demlfNlijlling that the strength, based on the acccptaDce
criteria, is equal to or grater than the demand resulting from the design loads.
In dere' miniug the design loads., the loading comhinario'lS should accomtt for
an
tn-. .... _... . . with
-3 GUUYitions, r:mmstent cwxent pmctiCeS
b. Ductility: Dacdlity may be reli=l upon in detm iiiining the capability of
structures ami CQiiilW:4"ilS to resist seiSii.ic loads.. The dncti1ity limits and the
accoDlpllllYiDg defu, ne'io. should not exceed the Hmjring values found
bereiD, ccmsistent with the usage categories described above. Ductility limits
may also be dem"'lStIiIlI!d through appxopIiate iDdependeDt testing.
c. Seismir Analysis and Design Methods .As di!lll!!Jsse:D in detail in Chapter 4,
the equivalent static load method of analysis is generally appropriate for
selSiiiir: ana1ysis and design However, specific systems may require dynamic
analysis in order to pxoYidc a better undetstandiDg of seismic structural
msponse. incbtding a JIlIn accurate distribution of seismic forces. The
engineer should use jmIgment in drriding whether a dynamic analysis is
De cd:d, except for the cases wbele the codes cxpJicitly require such dynamic
analysis (e.g.. h:reguJar structures). CoDSidcration. should be given to the fact
that the fommJarions in die equivalent static method are gemnlly ewp.irical
and are based i" i
lllHn
9' em bm1ding structares. At peuur
h
e
fll
ica1 faC'1jtjes, the
structures in many cases are dm'eJ:eut eyen if they qualify as "regular" and
they may involve me ... tDIJI witb piping systems of sjlni
S
, anI mass. In such
cases, a dyDamic ana1ysis may be a better choice
Both equivalent static and dynamic IIII8lyses should be perfonned using linear
elastic methods. Seismic loads should be praperly combined with the other
load efrects to obtain the "design forces" in accordance with the praject
criteria
d. Acc:eptam:e Criteria: Either allowable stras or ultimate streJJgtb design
methods may be used in estaNislring the acccptaDCe criteria.. In addition.
where apptoptiate, displacement Ijmjtations should be imposed to assure
acceptable bebaviorof and components.
e. Seisi"ir Review of Systems and CompoDents: Experience indicates that many
systems and types of eq"ipDJeI'!I are genemlly seismically rugged, ie.. they are
2-7
ordmar:iI.y CODStrUCted in such a way that they have iDber=m seismic capacity
to survive sttoDg motioDs without significant loss of fimctUm. The engineer
should make an assusneid of the systems and compoJlCllts. especially those
in the hazardous ami essential categories, to cIcte. w;tIC thejr JUggeduess.
Those systems and COmpoueDts tbat are deeDed to be susceptible to strong
groUDd slmldng should be rcsvmwed in IDOIC detail (sec SBAoc, 1990,
Appendix IG far guidance OD equ4)j11Mt qnaljfjcarian). Such a review may
be dewQrmratc:d by exp"'i data, aDalysis, testing, or any combination
tbmof.
f. Redrmdancy: Expe.tience indicates tbat retfundaDcy is a signfflram factor
,ff.,:ijU! the sanivabiIity of a stn1CtI1R or COllipDJlCllt dmiDg strong groUDd
mo1ioD. Many struetures and compoueats at pettOCllftmjc:a! faC'1jtjes lack
mi""dncy. ConsidenwOD should be given to providing retfuncfant .structmal
SJSleDIS to die IIIl*jm"m extmtt practicable AIdIough proWfing recfnndaney
may IeIIUlt in a small incmasc in the COliSUuctioD costs. it will also reduce the
sekmj.: risk by providing aJtemate load patbs and acfttirimm! euexgy dissipation
.. ..:-:... T_-=_. S .. . ..:&.-.... ,
.. .IIIIGla.w.u.la:,o,,'iilC mtcraCbOn. as nnpact or
displai#heu" may have adverse c1f'ects OD the petfOimancz of scmsirive
a,stews and QIh'l1i\lJi6i1tS. Tberefore, separation of such items to pmclnde
sci,m;., :iate:tacdcm with other ncaIby structmes and components is a basic
d
...... If .. . 'oL_ . .. . should
mil' pi mCipm SCparal10ll IS DOt practtClL. LUIaI &elSiiiiC iDtefaCt10D
be aNlb"Dred far in design through analysis.
The guidance provided in this doc .... ent is generally based OD the above o!eU.lIIts
TmpJementarion oftbesc design piblcipJes is A}"c.ted to result in a design that will
meet the. pmfo!hwnce objectives. In pallicalar. both stmIgth and dm:ti1ity
requ:itehcIII' should be Sp"" ifWI to Deet the iDtegtity. confineDcnt or
functionality criteria As the pet
m
issih1c ductility values listed in later
sections of tbIs doc ""eDt are relatively high and apply to the petfhlhWDce crit.eriOD of
maiDtenance of stllumral iutegrhy. Thay would necessarjly be .lower if a
pctfc .. mance critmion of fnncrionaUty is spe iBed
'J..1 CONSTRUcrION OBSERVATION AND INSPECTION
Consuuct:iOD of petrochemical facilities in accordance with the explicit or implicit
engineering intent is esscDt:ia
l
far acbi:ving a quality that will assure acceptable
behavior of struetures and compoueutS cJnring ground shaking Thmefore. spo jfje:
items for which construction observation, inspection. and/or testing is deenlllld
,=-_.. . . . of this doc Co .
necessaty are .......,.. m apptopnate sccttonsliiicill DStlUCtlon
observation (site visits) by the Engineer of Record is recol!ll'end
rd
to assess general
compliance with the c!esign These site visits arc not intended to consl itntc detailed
inspections or to supplant lIllY aspect of required testing and iDspec:don programs.
,
2-8
2.8 QUALITY ASSURANCE
h is recommended that petrochemical far:iljties be designed using an eng;",:eling
quality assurance plan. Such a plan should iIlchJde the definition of the earthquake
loading to be used ill the design and a description of the lateral force resisting system.
Any materials testing program, seismic review procedures. COJIStIUction observation
by the engineer of record, and. other inspection programs should be clearly defined
In evaluation and retrofit of existing fac:t
1
iries, the engineer who identified the
need for modification may not necessarily be the engiDMl' who provides the
morfificarinn design In such cases. it is recoil II llcoded that the owner jnclnde review
provisioDs to assure that the intent of the evalnating engineer is properly
implemented 1bese observations are also iJ!tended to assure that the subsequent
construction is c:a:aied out properly. Furthermore. deviations made ill the Deld should
be reviewed SO that the intent of the retrofit is not violated.
2.9 PEEk REVIEW
New design for .hazardous and essential fac:t1ities should inclnde an independent
peer review. Such indcpcDdeut reviews may be peduljlw! by qUljljfjed flllginMl'S
from the design orgahizaljon who are umeIated to the project. 1bese reviews should
incbJde the examillation of design philosophy. design aiteda, suuctmal system,
construction materials. and. other factors pertinent to the seismic capacity of the
facility. The review IIttd not provide a detailed chrck, as 1IClTIIUIIly perfoDDtd in the
design process. but as a millimum should provide an overview to help icfentiiy
potential oversights, mors, conceptual deficiencies, and. other potential problems that
might affect a facility's seismic pedOlm;mCt,
For new design and. also for the evaluation of exist iug faCIlities, the guidance
provided ill this document may be diife.renr than that in the CUI1'ent codes. In cenaiD
inSUIDce5, less str.ingeDt criteria are recomll elided in this doctnn:nt In such cases. an
independent peer review is also apptoprialc.
2-9

3.1 INTRODUCI10N
Chapter 3
SEISMIC HAZARDS
An important step in the seismic design of DeW firC!l1jtjes ami the evaluation of
cmsring faC'Trties is the definition- of seismic hazards atfhuing the site. Potential
earthquake related hazards jpc:!ude the followiJIs:
L Inertial related loads aDd displacements caused by ground sbaking
b. Grou:ad fitilure caused by rupture of a fault located within or immecfiately
adjacent to a facility.
Co Ground failure or settlement cansed by liquefitcrion and l!D!dslides.
d. Coastal immdatiou or loads due to large waves produced in nearby bodies
ofwater' caused bytsunmris (tidal waves) and MirM
Bugineers responsible for designing -eqnipment and struc:tares to resist these
bazards are usually not responsible for ,ssessing the probability of oc:cur:rence of
these hazards. The definition and qnallcj6caliou of these hazards is generally
perfonned by specialists in other difcipJines However, engineers are often raDed
upon by owne.ts and regnlatms to interpret those hazards ami assess the validity of
the hazard analysis. In adtfirion, engineers must incorpmatc the hazant 8D8lysis
results in a ccmsistent ami appzopziat.: II7BI!!!I!r iDto the design of DeW fioci1ffl'5 or the
evablation of existiug firC'lities
The intent oftbis chapter is to provide bac:kground iafwmatiou to fium1iarize civil
engineers ped'cnmiu& design or analysis tasks with the pzotess by which these hazards
are defined, ami to understaDd the m!!!U!jng and signific:auce of various methods for
perfmming these evaluatiom. espcciaIly with Jespect to ground sbaking Although
this chapter does not intend to instruct the engineer bow to perfonn analyses typiraDy
eleCUted by specialists in other disciplines, it is intended to act as a resource to
3-1
promote an UDderstanding of the purposes, methodologies, temDnologies. and
IjmjtariQ1lS of seismic hazard evaluatiODS. This UDderstanding is n!tjmately necessaty
for an appiopriate inter:tace between seismologists, geotechnical engineers. civil
engineers, 0WIIe1'S, and J'eSldators in the design and evaluation process.
This cbapter is structured to present a brief overview of typical issues flIced by
civil engineers with Jeg8lds to each of the seismic hazards listed above. More
detailed discnssjons of several specific topics arc given in appendices to this chapter.
3.2 GROUND SHAKING
The most widely used seismic input parameter for the seismic design of strUCtUres
is a IMaMe of the ground shaking, usuaDy given in terms of ground acceleration. It
is often the cmIy pwaliieter used for the specifi.carion of seismic design
The fM'bJafton of ground shakinS is often mj"mderstood, in its terminology,
inteqI1e'elion, and application of its results. This section is intended to provide
e:oqWmarion of ""iii! "OJ! JI'OID1d motion descriptions and their relevance to
.. Ii
I!!Ilgmte.mg app =mons
3.2.1 Earthquake Magnitude aDd InteDsity
Eu1fup'akes arc often described in tams of their mapinJdes and resulting
inteDsiries The magrritnde is a measure of the overall etJeIgy released by an
earthquake. The itJteDsity is a meslR of the e!'flot:ts cxparieaced at a particular
Incation during the earthquake.
SevcimI magaitlufe scales arc commcmly used to describe the eae.tgy released in an
earthquake. These include the lUc:bter or local magnttn4e (Mz.), sud8ce wave
magrrimde (Ms). body wave magrritnde (JIll,) and momeat magrritnd
e
(M ... ). More
detailed descaiptions of each of the CQiiIi"on scales arc located in Appendix 3.A
FJSIITe 3.1 shows a comparison of sevend magrritnde scales over a range of
CCiill
ii
km1y experieaced magrritndes. Although the term "Richter magnit;ude" is
c:ommcmly used by news reports to describe eattbquake mapufes of major evems.
the maprde values arc typicaDy provided by ageacies such as the U.S. Geological
Survey and arc not necessarily the true "Ricbter" magmtnde.
TnteDsity is a measure of the effects of an earthquake at a site, and is a fimction of
the earthquake magnitude, mstance from the eattbquake SOlliC:e,local soil
characteristics, and other parameters. The most common 11It!!!9JTe ofiJttensity in the
United States is the Modified MercaIJi Intensity (MMI) scale, which ranges from I to
XII, as deJcaibed in Table 3.1. A sinn1 .... scele from the Japan Meteorological Ageru:y
(lMA). ranging from 0 to 7, is used in Japan, while Eastern European countries often
use theMSK scale, where intensiri'=S arc sjnn1arto the MML
3-2


. - - ~ - - ~ ~ ~ ~ - - - - + - - - - i - - - - ~ - - ~ ~ - - '



I
10
.......M" ....
Figure 3.1: RelatiOD betweea Momeat Magnitnde aad other magnitude
seales. ML (local), AI. (SJU1ace wave), IIIJ. (short period body wave), DIe (lODg
period body wave), and M.u.u. (Japan Meteorological Agmcy). See SectiOD
3.A.3 for definitioD of difrerut magnitude scales.
3.%.2 Measura ofGnnmd Shpking for U. in Design and Evaluation
Earthquake DIlIgnitude -and intensity are of fnnjted sigaific:aucc in engineering
design. A much more rmnmon paiimeter for engineering evaluation ami design is
the level of ground motion expeaed at a given site, defined in terms of acceleration,
velocity, and displacement
Earthquake records can be pi ented as time histories or response spectra. Tune
histories are measured iDsttummtally and captUre the duration, 1i'equency conteat.
and amplitude of earthquake motion. A response spectrum is the calcn'aud lesponse
to a given earthquake time history for a series of single.dcgree-of,.fteeciom OSC'llators
of diife!mtt frequencies. The response is typically presented for a given damping
ratio, usually 5%. The response specIlum is usefjiJ, in that it defines the response of
the structure to a given time bistory.
3-3
r

TABLE 3 I' Modified MereaJIi IDteDsity Seale
,t
Notfeh. MmsizmlIlDllIDDg-paiod efI'a:Is ofllqe _tbqm'm
11. em 1lJIPC=I' or1iwmab1ypla=:l
m. Feltiadams. H"'I!IiaI objecIs swiJIg. V'iIImIiDIIDb passiIIg ofl/sll! tnII:ks. DamIicm c:sripgte!
M'ayJlDt be I I;t 18 lilell as an earthquake.
IV. Ha',', g objecIs swiJIg. Vibmicm like JIIIISiDB ofllarvyuucts; or eneri'lll of.jolt Db. ball
saiki:Dg!lle walls. Standing JIIDIOrCIIIS nx:k. WIZIdowlt, d.ishcs. doaIs JIIItIc. Glasses cIiDk.
c::mdIayc.lasbcs. In!lle IIpJIIrJllllP Df'IV WDDIIaI.....us IIDll iIaIIes c:n:ak.
V. Felt .... I is; !ItiL " ,.
,.
'1
SI""P"'" ukI:aecL LIquids disIadJcd. __ spilkd. Small
1'I!II!8hIe objecIs c!iJp1 .... A or lIpIeL Domsaariag, cIaR. apea. !Qnmers, piCIDIeS -. Pezrdnbw
cIadIs ItIIp, stan, chaage-=.
VI.
Felt by.n. May fi IBI"
efadftlDCl ,,'
,
Pcaaas walk 1:111 '
5ily. Wmdows, d.ishcs.
sJassware \ njdl b, boob, etc., cdr ibelwIs.. PiI:Imes cdrwalls. FlIIIIitUN IIIDft4 or
Oi,,1Iii4eIl Weak p1astIIr aacl masaw) D mreked Small beIlsr:illg (clI1In:h, acboo1). TDes, baIIes
IIIIIrm (visible, or IIaIIIl
VlL J)IfBcgIt to IIIIIIIIi. Noticed by drma of_ CIIIL Ha 8' B objt:cIs qui.wL FunriU4e bmkm.
T);tgpJpto
H
'yD. Including cna:b.. WeakcbDwwysbmbDat.-na.. Fallofplasu::r.Joose
bdI:b, stGItI:s, tiles, colid'*, (also mhpmf j 61* IS_a J he T
4urr,m
.... ). Same CIIII:b in
...., C. W_ em pIIIIIb; _1IIrIIid 1l'iShmvd. Small slides IIDll caliq in IIIcmtIIIIIIIl or
JrIIIWIIIBats. lAtae bells JiIIB. CcmcnIe ill' 811II1D ditdIcs dII gell
WI. S' 1'8 mIlLOlOt' CIIS am. *r!
Darmrseto
M
"'Y pnial coapse
Same clamptomasamy
_ to Mamay A Fall of _1IDll SQIIIe masamyWllls. Twia1iaB. fiI11 of c:biu:we)'s. tac=y
...... m"" "'1II'RI8, a!ewatod lBDks F_haases 1IIImdem fnmuIerinns it'JIIIt bo!ted dIIwa;
Joose JIIIIId .....us tbIvwa 01Jt, D yal piIiIIg bnWa oft Bid! 1te 'Intea iam trees. CJvtnr ill
flcllvor ,
I
H'We or spriDp IIDll wells, Caleb in _ paaad IIDll GIl stoep aPopa,
JX. GcIIaII1paiG. Mil nyB ... i"uIyd
B
I (GeaaaP clamp to
liN l'i .) r-1'Il_ .... , fee" Flllzal:sDCked. Sainas
daaaplO.CWvcJas. !h1 saouad pipes bmkaL C 'I' '1S c:amkI in JIIIiiIId. In aIhwiaI.cd
_1IIIIIl1lDllma4 artliquake filiin. ' 1,IIIiIIIlI:IIIIaS.
X. MastA65ULi) aclialeSUiLUiies 1 .,cd with tbcir fiRmdetims S-wen.:baih w c1cm
auuawesllDll bsidps d .. yed, SaiRs damIIp to clams, dibs, embmpngrpts Lsrp hrrMIs
lides
Water tbIvwa GIl hIIits to CIIIIIils. mas. !ab:s, ell:. SIIDllIlDllIIiiId IIIda.t 1 .. I 'aDy em beocPIes
ad fIal Jad, RIi!s bcmt a!igbtly.
XL Wsbcmtpeatly, 11DdctjjiOUlllipijl I' Hcwap!r!e!yaotof ....
XII. 1AzBe11lCk_ctisp
1
ered Liaa of sisbtad Ptm:I dIstaIlcd. 0bjecIs
tImlIJl iaID !lie air.
Toawaid "8' '0J.1bo IpIIIiIy of-r.1ri:k. ........ 1IIIUriaI ....... Ioylbo ftrII ius Io:a,.;q.,......
(l1!/I..... . wilblbo_ ' .......... Jl.ad C ')
M ) A. Gaad .. ' \_ .... tIooiso;. ' ,
___ -.;dooIpodto.-.....".1ima,
M .,B. Gaad- ' "L .... _ r a4 ... ""'delipdto_-' ....
T' .,c CladiaI1!iy_ '" .... _ ... __ ' IiUflllillato .... _ ... 1IOisbor
' r __ dooipaIto_Iu' IIima,
M ,D. .. IIIIcrIoo; ...... _1aw ' .. ". . "; .-k
h
By.
3-4
Most building codes use a response spedlllm as design iDput. For design and
evahlation purposes, that response specb um can be defined either from standard
shapes or:from site-specific 8DIIlyses. Standard shapes are typically used for a given
soil type, scaled to a value of peak ground acceleration (pGA). The PGA is the
rnaximum response which a rigid structure would be expected to experience. moving
the same as the ground itsel
Bw1d"mg codes generally present standard design response spectrum shapes.
JlOl'I1Ia
f
..,.n to a PGA of 1.0. A PGA value appropriate for the seismic zone in which
the site is located is used to scale such standard spectral shapes. Those standard
shapes represent a smoothed average ofnorma6zed response speet1a of actual ground
motion records grouped by subsur&ce soil conditjODS at the location of the recording
iII.fnme", S
It may be appropriate to consid. a damping level of other than SOlO. For
ew8"'I.le, a wood framed cooliDg tower would ex:perience highar damping tban liquid
sloshing in an iDSulated taDk.
The use of standard shapes may be inappropriate under certain conditions, such as
very near a fiwIt, and when soils are very soft. UDder those conditiODS a site-specific
8DIIysis would be rmnnmended, using one of the procedures described in the
following secUous.
3.2.2.1 DetermiDistic Seismic 'Hazards ADalyses
In d
approach, __ of' ed by consid .
a etermiDISUc eo ........ mottODS at a SIte are est""., enng
a siDgle event of a specified magnitude and distance :from the site. To perform a
detenniDistic analysis, the following infbtmation is needed'
a. Definition of an earthquake source (e.g. a known &uIt) and its location
relative to the site
b. Definition of a design earthquake magnitude that the soun:e is capable of
producing
c. A re1ationsbip which describes the attenuation, or decay with distance, of
grouad motion
A
. have ___ I known ........... A .
SIte may ""'v.,.... acttve ........... m itS pIOXIIIIity. mBX"'"J1D
magnitude is defined for each fiwlt, :from published sources or agencies such as the
U.S. Geological S\D'Vef. The maw"nm magnitude is a timction of the fault length
and knowledge of past earthquakes on that particular source. The
attenuation relationships are developed based on statistical analyses of ground motion
records from earthquakes occuning in simt1ar geologic and tectonic conditions.
3-5
rl.T that detel: . und . -1..0_" with spec.ifi
",ote".'i.,stir: gro mot1OD esnmares are DOt a s s o ~ a ~
=tUm period. such as 250 years or SOO years. although the particlllar earthquake
event used may have a return period associated with it. The retum period for the
"""jWIIIII event 011 a given fault may vary from several bImdred to several thousand
yeus., depending on the activity rate of the fault.
3 2 2 2 Probabflfstir Seismic Bazards ADalyses (PSBA)
In a probabj1jstic: approach. ground motions at a site arc c#jw"ed by considering
the probability of dieats of difl'meut sizes 011 all sources that affect a given site.
Ccnnbjna
ti
h!'5 of individual prolJabDiries from difi'cxeut fIODlce5 provide total annual
proba
bo
1jties of ex"",,,!!JICf' for a given level ofPGA or specual response The curve
of probability of exceedance versus ground motion is often .efencd to as a "bazard
curve." A DDifu,m hazard specllum provides a poand motion amplitude for different
frequency vahJes for a coustant probability of exreec\ance The probability of
exceed!!!!!? is tben related to the xetum pedod for that ground motion by using the
equation for a PoiSSOIrian disttibution:
T= -t
l1l(1-p)
where p is the probability of exceedam:e in t yeaxs and T is the etum period.
(3.1)
A common value used in building codes is the 10% probability of CD'ceeclance in
SO years. Using equation 3.1, this is a 47S-year etum period. 'Ibis is also commonly
.c:feued to as a SOD-year return period for simpucity.
Since a PSHA is a probability based approach. it is hupwtant that uncertainty be
accounted for in the definitjon of input parallr:ters. such as the magnitude m:uuence.
the attemmrion. or geographical boundaries or location of a sonrce zone. 'I'hese
\IIIcertainties arc modeled in the PSHA. Figure 3.2 sImws the diffeJ:eut eJemeDts of a
PSHA grapbically. These analyses arc typically daDe with special computer programs
spedfically developed for this purpose. T)'pical input pR1iI1DIIters include the
following:
a.. Definition of earthquake sources, either as faults or as ;a:ea sources of
diffused seismicity not dimctly anxibutable to a known fault
b. A probability distribution of earthquake magnitudes for each source
c. A definition of eaxthquake ground motion attenuari'JD. including uncertainty
DefIne EaItI\qIIIdIe 8oUI'IIII
8lllamlcIty_ 01 ameay
..
De1Ine ADenuatiOn CUrves fOr SpeaInd
AmpCUndes.Per\DCIs T.I - TN
, SI'IIImW.
, -
8
0
CT,I a
o
".1
Deve\op Selnilc HIIanI em-fOr Spectral Amplitudes. Eech PeriacI
and Oblaln CoIl \sid
-
--
-
-
Figure 3.%: Seismic: Hazard ADalysis Procedure
Note also that beca"se the ground motion values are c:aJ"dat'!:d probahilistic:ally
by combining the probabilities of ground motion from many SCIUI'CCS, the value
derived is not associated with a speci:lic fault or event. In fi.ct, while it may sound
ccmservative to use the ground motion from the JaIsest possible earthquake
occurringat the closest location on the nearest fiwlt, those values may be significantly
3-7
." ,
. . ,"
;
smaller than ground motion caI"dated probahiJistically. This is particularly true if the
largest eattbtp,b on the nearest fault is associated with a shorter return period than
beiDg considerecl probabiJisticaJ. or if the site is affi:cted by several fimlts, which
each ('.! Ii U. B'lIce to the ovezall probability of ex. II&' rfamwt
More dgtai!ed cfiscnssions ofvarious aspectS ofprobWnstic seismic hazards lIDIlyses
are presented in Appendix 3.A.
3.2.2.3 SIte RespODSe ADaIysis
Other JI1DIIaicaJ methods aach as site respcmse BDBlysis using linear or non-linear
models ofuaderiyiDg soil are also available to esrjmate site-specitic response spec:I1a.
Codes such as SHAXE {Sclmabe1 et aJ. 1972)amI2D aDd 3D FLAC (lf8sca. 1995)
are ..".,1abJe Numerical site response aualysis is Ri!iIiiI .... ded where very poor
subsu:d8ce ('.! ",dicinns (such -as NE1IRP soil type E' aDd UBC soil type 84) are
CIIlCOUIlteral.
32 2 4 EartIaquake Time Bistories
S
. of _t L!_--'_ for
om
eUm
... it JS applopuate to use a '* ._erauon time IWOWIlI:i
structum1 aualyses, especiaJly for ncWmear auaI.ysis or for IID8Iysis of structures of
special hapcilI:aIh':e. Whenever used, it is reo .... Iii .... rfed tbat multiple time histories be
used to reduce the possVN\1y of a structaraI period mjm;idjng with a ftequency of
low CDeIIY """eal for the particular time histoJy recold cfmsen Additional.
considendicms for the use of time bistozy mcon!s. such as scaling ami the use of
artificial1ime histories, are discussed in AppendiY 3.A.
3 2 2 5 Db E>!lionaJity CoDSideratioDS
Earthqnake response spectra are typically developed for application in orthogonal
hoiizonraJ directions Discnssions of how to combine design input fi"om diifetent
directions are pi t ,,!!led in Chapter 4. While wrticaJ reBJIOlISe spec:I1a can be
developed in a sinnlar mumer to horimntaJ spectta, in practice, vertical spectra are
usually oblaiued by sraUng the horizmuaI spectra. TypicaDy. a 18cIor of 213 is used.
This value may be inapplopliate for sites near 1iults. See also Section 3.A. 7.
3.3 GROUND FAILURE
Grouad fiiIures can be cansed by Iiql'efirc:riOJl, fault rupmres within a fiIcility. or
slope fii1ures QandsJjdes). Earthquake induced settlement also fiiIls iDto this
categoJy. Grouad fiilures are an imponant concern for pettoc:he:mical faCilities.
When dasigning for sround sbaking accelerations, COIIsiderations for the possibility of
higher tban BlQIf">eted accelerations are incmponIted into the design pl0ce5S by
inrJudiDg details to provide ductile behavior when loaded beyond the elastic range.
Howew.r. '!DeCllfA:ted groUDd failure often proves to be catastrophic in tenDs of
dsnnage and consequcmces. not 0DIy to the strUCtUre or equipment itseJt: but also to
secondmy systems, SIlCh as attached piping, tbat can not withstand the Wge
moveiilents associated with ground fiIiluns.
3.3.1 Liquefaction
Liquef8ction is a phenomenon COJDDIODIy associated with the repeated shaking or
c:yc:lic loading of saturated loose cohesiouless soils mad quick clays. The potential. for
liquefaction djmjnisbes as soil deasity increases. Ccmsolidated soils are not typically
w1nerable to liquefilction. while poorly sraded sands are more susceptible to
Jiqnefiction
The process of Jiqnefic:rion is assoc.iated with the tendeucy of loose soils to
densitY UDder shear loadiug Tbia process is replaced in sa1:UrII%ed sands by a build-up
of pore water pressures tbat reduces its shear strength. EvcmtnaUy the strength may
be reduced to the exte:nt tbat soDS may flow or produce water spoutS and sand boils.
These are the evems typically usocjatecI with Iiquefir.tion.. Structures may
experieuce fo'tmdation fiWures at levels ofloanmg or sbaking below those tbat would
produce Jiquefic:rion in be-fie1d conrfitions beC'nse the SU'CDgth of the soil may
degrade to a level jnsnfficiem to support the foundation loads imposed by a structure.
EElU (1994) bas noted tbat liqvefiction bas most often been observed in areas
where the ground water table is within 30 feet (10 m) of the ground sur.fiu:e. while
there are few observations of liquefiction where the ground water is deeper than 60
feet (2Om).
The evaluation ofliquefiction potential most often involves an auphical or semi-
empirical procedure. Seed et aI (1991) S!!!T!!7!IUjze a few of those procedures. The
evaluation of lique&crion at a panicuJar site involves a number of physical
determinations that carry with them conside:rabIe' variations and UDCeltainties.
Among the most importaDt are:
L physical soB cbarac:teristics (u . de:asity, grain size distribution, and filbric)
b. !!!IM:banical c:hatacteristic (u . deCoxmation piopeuies and shear stnmgth)
c. in situ stress conditions
d. site concfttions (Le depth of son strata, locations ofwater table, and ground
slope)
e. c:baracteristic of ground shaking (Le., duration, fi'equcncy content, mad
magnitude of accelerations)
3-9

Ledbetter (1985) has pJeseuted a "'""lIa,y of methods to mitigate damage
associated with liquefiable soils. MaDy of the methods are valid for Iimiring
settlemant-induced damage for city soils. The methods for improviug perfonnance
include:
a.. iDcreased "hliRiSolilem
b. densfficatinn
c. foundation drainage improvement
do soD .eiafi:uument
Excavation of sails with poor cbaracteristics IIllIi rep!aceullmt with select fill is a
simple altemative wheu ecoDiilliicaUy jnSlified. J)ensificarion of shallow sands may be
aC"" iinpfisbrd with v.ibratoJy ""'"1)'actOl5 at the SUIfiu:e IlMIl. Deeper layers may be
densffied by explosMIs, driving displacement piles or chopping weights fimn cranes
on the grouDd ""Tfiuz
A fimdamcatal sohttion to poteIltiaI liqnefilction or sett!ement hazards is to extend
the fmmdaVtm system to a deeper soD stJata having a lesser tendancy to or
ccmij'act Other eJemenlS offmmdatitm desigu, such u the use ofmat fbundations,
strap tboting, IIllIi pile cap ties to reduce diffbeatia1 foundation movements IIllIi
settleroe
iils
are effective in reducing damage to strucmres or equipment
As the resistance to liquefilction increases with collfiujllg suess. it may be
beneficial to add a SlUc:batge pressure to the origiDal sraund surliu:e by depositing
select material..
3.3.1 Fault Ruptw e
Fault rupture results in destructive shaking fi'om a massive release of crustal
euergy at a fi'adu.re in the eaJth's crust along wbich scpalated sections have moved or
displaced re1ative to each other. The displacement can VIII)' fi'om a purely hOlwmta
J
to a purely vertical direction IIllIi C8Il be u large u seve:ral:meters. A ground rupture
involving more than a few inches of movemeut can cause major cfamage to structures
sited on or i"'Iii .. fia'eJy adjacent to the f8ult. In gene:.:al, the precise locations of
fimlts are not known because they are typicaUy covered with alluvium. Fault
displacements produce forces aud mOVeliiejlls so sreat that the best method for
limiting d3mage to structures is to avoid building in IJeIIS close to ground traces of
active fimlt zones
3-10
3.3.3 Landslides
Individuallmdslides induced by seismic evems may enoompa
ss
mass voJumes and
areas much larger than those due to other causes (Seed et al, 1991; Krinitzsky et al,
1993). The largest :fiWures have iDvolved many square miles of material In addition,
landslides may occur in lID area much larger than that usually associated with
structural damage for a particular event. someJimes occurring more than 100 miles
from the epicenter.
Few Jpnds1jdes seem to be 1riggerec1 by seismic IM:ZItS ofless than magnitude S.
T .andslides may be associated with liquefaction of soillayers.1idIure ofweak or brittle
soils, or s!jcfmg along seams of weak soils. 'Because of the spatial extem of the
fiIilures involved and the variety of fiIilure modes that may trigger them, detailed
geoteo Jl!lical site iDvesrigatir.ms are neces' 'Y to evaluate these hazards.
Numerical methods of evahJatiUg Ipndslide potential im:)ude limit equilibrium and
finite e!em,, teclmiques. These methods are applicable to dJy, satwated. cohesive
or IlOJloCOhesive soils. FiDite cI ment tedmiques are ptefeued when evaluating
camp_ puneliies of combiDations of soil types, and also when calQJ)ations of
displaceml!!1tS are required. Limit equilibrium tec!miques have been extended to
dyDamic IIII81ysis, IIIld load duration ell'edS can be incorporated to calculate
disrIacemI!!1tS These dynamic calculations consider rigid body motions.
3A 'I'SDNAMIAND SEICHE
Tsrmamis IIIld seiches occur regularly throughout the world, but are usually only
considered in the design pnd evaluation offiC'1jtjes when maldng iuitial dec:isions on
the locatioD of the ficiIity. This section briefly describes these pbenomeaa,
a,....,....,eat methods, 8IIIl mitigation mesena. Additional dimmion is pnmded in
Appendix 3.B.
Tsrmmris, or tidal waves, are typicaJIy seueaated by large and sometimes di,stant
earthquakes and UDdersea fiuIt movemI!!1tS. TmveJiDg through the deep ocean. a
tSlm;mri is a broad ami sbaI1ow, but fist D1D\'iDg, wave that poses little danger to most
vessels. When it reaches the coastline, the wave form pushes upward from the ocean
bottom to make a swell ofwater that sometimes (but DOt always) breaks and washes
iDIand with great force.
A seiche occurs when resonant wave OSCt'Uatir.ms form in lID eaclosed or semi-
eaclosed body of water such as a Jake, bay, or fjord. Seiches may be 1riggerec1 by
moderate or larger local submarine earthquakes, and sometimes by large, distant
earthquakes.
A tSlm;mri or seiche may result in flooding of low-lying coastal areas. The
greatest hazard results from the inflow and outflow of water, where strong currents
3-11
mI forces can emde foundations and sweep away structures and equipment.
Petrocbemi<3 fj!!:.1iries are especially vulnerable to the ro.pture of storage tanks fi'om
debris impact aDd fmmdation erosion. possibly remJlting in explosion and fire. lbe
tsnnami at Seward. Alaska following the 1964 Alaska earthquake led to such
desuuction of the port fiu:.1jtjes. lbe succ:essim of waves spread the 1ire fi'om
ruptured oil tanks across and throughout the part area.
A third ]'IOtIiiiItial cause of coasta1 immdation is coastal subsidence caused by
tectoJIic: (figdting) or non-tectoDic (e.g. IntllDd'm.e landslide) effects. Permanent
MIIsta! subsidence ami Inbmb, gence may 0CCDr. It is difficnlt. if DOt impossible, to
predict when or if such tectonic snbgjdence wiJ1 occur in a sMa area, dJtbmtgb
historical earthquaIa data provide evidence of such occurrem:es.
3.4.1 Asnmneut arvuJaerabDity
-
Coastal sites m active tectoDic areas whem dip-sBp fjmffiag is common are most
susceptible to eardJquaJce-iaduced iDJmdarimJ E'H"Mj',,'iDD of the J'e!Pmml fault
dIaracterisdcs aDd earthqr.Iake histoty. with empbasjs on suJnDadne earthquakes and
passib1ehistorlcaJ '51
Jf
.",;s, prov.idesthe best me""'6 afaitew1DerabDity. J;stjmates
of ma,i",," tS"IW
n
.
i
lUIHIp may be based au either historical ocaweaces or
theoretical mode1iag. lbe Federal lDsuram:e AdmiDistraticm developed ;",mdatifJJ1
maps to assist in selliilS rates for the Nationat Plood 1Dswaac:e ProgL614 (FJood
lDsunmce Rate Maps - FIRM). Immdation levels on these maps geaerally consist of
the higher of eitherrlverine flood. masta! storm sarge, or tsunami jmmdation levels.
3.4.2 Mltigatfon M.suns
Throughout.JBpIIII, whem t:amami attack is ccmmum. sr:w:ral mi,igjilion measures
have been implem"ltoi. such as sea walls aDd barxiels to RSist tqmmnj immdation.
These structures are sometimes .msnccessfi!l. as large tsunamis may overtop the
barriers and flood the protected area, generatiDg stroDg wuents which erode the
barriers and other structures. lbe structures could ead up 8CIiDg as powerfi1l
battering rams apinst the very structures they were designed to protect. Coastal
pxotective stnicaues must be carefbIly designed to wjIJlS'Hhd exbtllD'e events.
In practic:e in the UDited States, tSlmamj ami seiche eRi->1;ts are nn:ly considered
in tisciIity desip, mdess considered in the origiDal siting of the fBciHty. For existing
fircilities. other ,nes9Ues are more like1yto be effective in mitiga,j,'g risk fiom coastal
inundation. Some afthese measures would inc:lude:
a. TS!mami W8i nih! and alert systems
b. EmClgtiiq or msaster response plans which consider the wInerabiIity of the
fiacility IIDIl possible effects oftmmamj attack
3-12
c. Identifiration of the most vulnerable components and development of
possible mitigation strategies
d. Public and personnel awareness oftbe possible effects and impact of
ts!mamis.
3-13
APPENDIX loA
GROUND SHAKING
, ~ .
3.A-l
3.A.l INTRODUCTION
APPENDIX 3.A
GROUND SHAKING
'I'll: most widely used seismic input paxallteter in the seismic design of struclUrcs
is a measure of the groumi shaking, usually given in temIS of ground accelermion. It
is often the ouly parameter used for spetificazion of seismic _gn.
Section 3.2 provides background infuMatjou on CODD1lU4 temlinDlogy aud
fimdamemta
ls
rcIldcd to the eva
bul1io
ll of groumi shaking ba2:ards. This Appendix
provides addjtjonal distm
ssio
ll on &pO iiie: areas that me often mjsnnderstood.,
jncbl!ljng temrinology, interpretation aDd the app1icadon of its results. This section is
jntcmded to provide explanation of COWII"U groUDd motion descriptions aDd their
~ to engin=iilg applicati9JIS.
3.A.2 EARTHQUAKE BASICS
Earthquakes are genc.1Illy caused by the sndd .... Rlease ofbuilt-up elastic strain in
the earth's crust aud originate as slip along geologic fauIrs. The total energy of an
earthquake is measect along the entire IeDgth of the mptured zone, propagating from
the source and traveling tbmugh the earth in the foml of seismic waves. The point in
the earth's crust where the xuptute is jnjtjaud is kaown as the focus or the
hypocenter of the earthquake. The point on the smfiIce of earth diIectly above the
h)Ipocenter is known as the epicenter of the ean:i1q1Jab.
The build up of elastic strain in the earth's crust can be exp!ajned by the theoxy of
plate tectonics. According to wbich, the outer 70-150 km of the earth's crust is made
up of approximately 12 major plates which are slowly XDIn'iDg reJadve to each other.
Most of the seismically active areas are located along the plate boundaries. The
relative motion between the plates results in eitber plates grinding past each other, or
a plate subducting beneath 3DOthcr or several plates c:onveq:iDg aud cmslring smaDer
plates. There are also divetgent plate boundaries. Monntajns and deep sea trenches
me fom= where plates converge aud mfxIlJa beneath one another. Mid-ocean
ridges are foxmed at divergent plate boundaries. :Earthquakes are usually jnjtjated at
sbaIlow depths at plate boUlldaries where plates sIidc past each other. Deep focus
earthquakes usually occur aloug subduction plates. :Earthquakes within a plate can
also result due to other reasons such as mcxeased couapxessioual stzess. Other" causes
of eanhquakes can be due to mre.lear explosions or due to large anfficial reservoixs
which change the local state ofsttess witbin the earth's crust. Also, volcanic activity
can cause earthquakes at both subducting and diverging plate boundaries.
3.A-2
3.A.3 MAGNlTUDEAND INTENSITY
The amount of energy released in an eartbquak.c. and its size, is cbaracterizcd as
the magnitude of the earthquake. Some of the most commonly used magnitude scales
are Richter or local magnitude (ML). surface wave magnitude (Ms). body wave
magnitude (JIIb) and moment magnimde (Mw).
Gutenberg and Richter (1956) showed that the amount of energy released in an
earthquake can be related to the magn;u1de by the following rela1ioDSbip:
Log E = lo5Ms + 11.8
(3.A.l)
where E is the e=gy in ergs. A magnitude increase by one unit releases 31.6 times
more energy.
Richter (1958) defiDcd the magnitude of a local earthquake (M0 as the
"logarithm to base ten of the ma ';IT!I!m seismic-wave ampJitude (in thouAD!hb of a
mt'1Jimeter) recorded on a standard seiqmgraph at a dis'8I!
c
:e of 100 kilometezs from
the earthquake epicenter. (Bolt. 1988). Seismograms from deep focus earthquakes
are significantly diffraent from those for shallow focus eattbquakes. even though the
total amount of energy rdeased may be the same. This results in differrmt magnitude
estimates for earthquakes whicb release the same amoWlt of cm::rgy. 'Ibis is a
limjlation ofMs-.
The magnitude of an earthquake is also den .. iiiined by the ampJitude of the
cOlllplessional or P-wave. 'I'I: P-wave's ampJitude is not aff=tecl by the focal depth
of an earthquake. The magnknde estill!8
t
ed by measuring the P-wave ampJituiie is
c:a11ed the P-wave or body wave magnjmde (JIIb).
Magnirude caIcuJated by urasnring the amplitude of long period smfacc waves
(periods near 20 seconds) is c:aJled the surface-wave magnitude CMs>. Surface wave
magnimde is calculated only for.shaDow focus earthquakes which give rise to surface
waves.
For sman or moderate size earthquala:s. the ampJitude of seiBII;C: waves measured
by typical or standard seisrmgrapbs increases as the size of the earthquake incn:ases.
This trend. however. does not continue for large or wry large earthquakes for which
the ampIimde of seismic waves, whose wave leIlgths are much smaDer than the
earthquake source. do not inczcase proportionaDy to the size of the earthquake. Tbe
magnimde estimated by the ampJitude of seismic waves. tbiitefore. does not continue
to increase at the same rate as the size of the earthquake. Beyond a certain limit the
magnitudes calculated in this way tend to remain constant for di1feteut size
earthquakes. In other words. the magnitude scale saturates. reslliting in no fUrther
increase in estimated magnirude with the increasing size of an earthquake. .
3.A-3
Due to the JjmjtatjollS jn the above defined magnitude scales, a magnitude scale
based upon the amount of energy released was introduced by Hanks am:\ Kanamori
(1979) and was tel lied as tI= 1DJlIIIUlt mapitude scale (Mw). Moment magnitude is
defu"d by the follow.ing m'Jatjonsbjy.
2
M. =-logM. -10.7
3
where:
M.=p.AD
(3.A.2)
(3.A.3)
The sei$lldc 1DJlIIIUlt Mo is defined as a product of modulus of rigidity of the rock
(1), area of IUPtwe (A) ami avmage fault displacement (D) in a seismic event.
Mw. theiefo:t", is dcpemIent upcm the size of IUptJJre UDtike other magnimde
scales which am dependemt DpOD the ampJitnde of tile seismic waves. Larger
eanbquakes. him la!gcr sei$lllic DIODaIt (product ofiUptwe area am:\ IlVCIIIF fault
disrlacenMat). The """, ... d mapritnde scale. tbeJ:efole. does not saturate with tI=
size of the earthquake. and also has the ability of di...rtngnjsbjng between a la!ge and a
great I:IIIthquake; For ex", q.m, the snrfioce wave magnitude far both 1906 San
Francisco earthquake am:\ 1960 Chile euthquakes was estimated as 8.3. although the
wptwc 8ICIIS of tile 1960 ~ was about 3S times greater than tbc 1906
eartIIquake. The Ii"nelll_magnitude for the two earthquakes has been c:omputed to
be appwximately 8.0 am:\ 9.5.ltspccdvely (Reiter. 1990).
AD approxjmate ICIatioD between the wrlous magnitude scaJes is shown jn Figure
3.1 jn Chapter 3. According to tbis figure. except for Ms. an other magnitude scaJes
lie sjmjlar to Mw up to the point they SIBIl to satmatc.
Another des 'iptor about tile size of an earthquake is the bttensity at a given site.
The intensity at any Jocation is desnjfxyl by a quafttarive scale that uses eyewitDess
ICCOWItS of fau1t motion 8Dd d!i1!!8p assessn....".s to describe: the amount of
DJDVeIXIeJIl felt at that IocatimL ODe coDiLllDilly used scale is the Modifi:d Mercalli
Intensity (MMI). As shown jn Table 3.1 jn CJapte:r 3. the MMI scale CODSists of 12
different intensity levels. Whereas i
Ul
Nl5ilY I 1D"8"' tile earthquake is practically not
felt. intensity XII bldicates aJmost total destruction. InteIISity XII is rarely achieved
except for very large fIIIItbquabs. IIItfIIISity X can be achieved jn morJente to la!ge
earthquakes, especially in areas close to tI= IUptJJre ZOIIe. Engiremd structures can
be damapi in 8ICIIS expericmciDg imensbies in about tbc vm to X range.
3.A-4
3.A.4 MEASURES OF GROUND SHAKING FOR USE IN DESIGN AND
EVALUATION
Earthquake magniT!1de is of limjted significance in engineering design A much
more important pamnercr for engin ... riDg evaluation and desjgn is the level of strong
motion expected at a given site. StrOng ground motion can be measured in tenDs of
ground accekration, velocity and cfispJacement GeneIally, ground acceleration is
n.cotdcc! for the duration ofdle eartbquake by instruments known as accelerometers.
Traces of acceleration versas time are known as accelerograms or acceleration time
idstories. Two orthogcmal hoIimntBJ and one vertical componem of ground
accek::ration are usuaD.y lecmdcc! in an earthquake. 'Ibe three components of
recotded motion provide a complete cbamct.....m.tion of translational ground shaking
to wbich any SUI1CtIJre is su'bjecled and provide usemI infon:nation. in temIS of levels
of ground acceleration, frequency conteDt and dwation of sn:ong shaking which can
be tltI1ized for engineering design pmposes.
St:ructatcs respoud cljfFetCi!!ly to dHrctent ac=mgrams. This is due to
diffenmces in :Ii'equcDcy colltilWt. 8!TIJ'
Htn
de and duration of each acceleration record.
No two recorded ac=lerograms from an earthquake are exactly the SBJIIe. This is
because the seismic waves gencmted from the ea:rthq1lakc SCl1JR:e are reflected,
refracted and absorbed as tbr:y traverse dHrctent IaycIs of rock and soil before they
are recorded by the rec:cmiDg station arrelerometem. Some of the important
parBlieters defirring an acccIc:rogmm are the peak value of the acceleration or peale
ground acc:eJcratioD (pGA), the frequency content. represented rougbiy by the
mwbe:r of zero crossjngs pe!l'second in the arremgram, and the duration of strong
motion. defined as the length of time between the first and the last peaks exceeding a
given threshold level. Other definitions for duration of strong shaking, based on
cneIBY content of motions am also used.
A more usefi:al measure of the intensity of a given motion can be obtained by
computing its response specIIUm. Response specitum of a particular ground motion
is defined as a plot of ma' hUliill response versus period of vibration of a single degree
offreedom damped oSCtl1atnrof a fixed damping zatio.
Peak ground acceleratitm, an important parameter describing the strength of
shaking, may not be the most representative of engineeting This is
because there may be isoJded peaks of high frequezzcy ground motion haYing little
significance for most enginc:oed structures. In ATe 3-06 (ATe. 1978), the concept
of e.ffec:tive peak arreJenum (EPA) and effi:ctive peak vcloc:ity (EPV) was
introduced as a means to define a parameter with the units of accelcIation that was
more descriptive of the potential damaging intensity of the ground motion. As
defined in ATe 3-06, "EPA and EPV are considered as nomudizing factors for
C01UtTIlClion of smoothed elasric TeSpmue spectrll for ground motions of normal
dImuion. The EPA is propDl'tionlll to spectnJl ordinatesfor periods in the range of
0.1 to 0.5 seconds, whereas the EPV is prtJpOrtiImal to spectrlll ordinates at tl period
3.A-S

t1/ about 1 set:tmd (McGuiTe, 1975). The constImt of proportiontllity (for a 5 percent
damping spectrum) is set III a 8IIIndDrd value t1/ 2.5 in both cases. It EPA is also
used in the USC as a basis far defuring the "Z' factor for different seismic.umes.
3.A.5 FACfORS AFFECrING GROUND MOTION
The size of the earthquake by the magnjtude is related to the amount
of eneJgy roJeased Larp:r magnitude earthquakes usually produce higher levels of
ground shaking at a pven Jnc:atiop However tbis trend is not always true. Levels of
ground motion at a parlicuJar site depend on several other faclors such as distance
from the source. type of fauJring, local soil conditions and other secondaJy effix:ts
which are not totally npderstood. Typically. ground. shaking intensity attenuates. or
decays, with diuanrc from die sowce. The source distance can gcJIClIlly be defined
as the closest djstanrc from the site to the sels""genic %ODe (or the %ODe of e=tgy
release). High JcveJs of acceleration. displacemellt and velocity pulses are usually
recorded in close ploximily to acIive sources. Such erects are termed as near-field
effects. Consid=ation to sm:h efDorts should be giwn for locations close to an active
seisnric soun:e.
The level of ground sbaking js also significantly afi'ected by local soD conditions at the
location where the gxwad motioDs are be.iag n:corded. Soft soD sites amplify ground
motion, esp"" ially in the loDg pmd rauge. Par eTampte. considerable amr1ification
of ground DlDtions due to Jocal soD conditions occuned during the 1985 Mexico City
and the 1989 lAma PrletaEarthquake.
3.A.6 DFSIGN RESPONSE SPECTRA
A response spect1um used far design and analysis of structures is known as a
design response spectNW. and can be classified in two main categories. The first
u,t1jZl'$ pIedetemziDed fixed specual shapes that can be scaled to appIopIiate levels
based on specified design criteria The second employs the use of site-spet:ffic
iDfoml81ian about the sejsmic:ity.of the region, local and regional geology. and soD
conditions.
3.A.6.1 Standard Respcmse Spednwa Shapes
Fixed response specuum sb"lCS are sometimes used in lieu of site specific
estimates of response specnum. Fixed response spectrum shapes are avaHable in
various pubJjshed soma:s. Some of these sources are the USC. A.TC-14 (ATe.
1987), NRC Regulatory GlIi.de 1.60 (U.s. Nuclear Regulatory Comiiiission, 1973).
and the EERI monograph (Newmark and Hall, 1982).
The response specuum shapes in the EERI DlDnograph were developed by
statkrical analysis of zecontcd ground motions. Since there js a large variation in
I
3.A-6
response specbum shapes from rCcorded ground motion, both median (50th
pczcentile) and one standard deviation (84th percentile) shapes me presented.
.
Normalized spectnil sbapcs are obtained by COD4lLiting effective values of
maximnm acccleration, velocity and displacement by scaHng the corresponding peak
ground acceleration, velocity and displacem:nts by specaal amplification factors.
Values of peak ground acccle:ration (a), velocity (v), qI displacements (d) can be
e.stbmtt"'" from established ratios between aJv and aDrr. These ratios tend to be
constaDt for sinn
1
u son c:oncflrions Response specbUDl for 84th perceP
h1
e value can
be obtained by either using median eslj ... ares of peak ground acceleration to scale the
84th percrmt11e spedXUm shape or by scaling median spectzal shape with 84th
percen1 De esrimates ofpeak giuuud accelcmtion. Use of 84th perce"tile estimates of
PGA to scale 84th perceutUe spectLal shape js not l'COiI!i"Cndcd as it leads to
excessive amount of COUSeJ wtisw. Median values of 1espoDSC spectxam from the
EERI monograph fomr. a basis for the spearum shap'$ provided inATC-14.
The response spectrum shape givmI. in the UBC was obtained as a smoothed
average of 11OT1!!!!ljy:d 5-PCXcem.d
alh
led response spectLa of actual ground motion
teCOIds grouped by snbwn rue son c:onditions at the location of the recording
instruments (SEAoc. 1990 and Seed and Idriss, 1982),
AD apploptiately selected response Spectxwn shape corresponding to the local son
c:muiitions can be scaled on the basis of PGA or EPA oMaiued through procedures
defined in this s=tiOD. Par sites in close proximity to an active fault., considerations
to possible JICIIr' field cff"'dS sJumld be giv&m.
Two ctisrinc:t approacbes are gene:rally used for si1e-specl1jc estjwares for
A_I __ .... fo cd . the d . --"-
,..... .. tdWlt'Aol5 wmnc nestgn ex liN. r CDgme:crr prDjCCtS:etcmttntSUC
and the prubaw1istic plbCC"".... Des liJ:ltiveli. the two procedures would at first
appear to be quite diff'e1eut with a detC!jjjhdslic approach ofl'eriDg the advantage of
appe:axing easiest to Plupedy applied. either p.rucedure can lead to
'-" .>
SattSJlctmy smsmtc gmgn
In areas oflow seismic hazard. the ar'lditiona
l
design 8IId. material costS that CDSUC
when unsure but consenative decisions are made may not be excessive. When the
seismic exposwe is high, the cost associated with aMitionai coDSCt'V81ism can
incJcase significantly. This increase needs to be balanced with the Ijkelilwod that the
damaging event may or may not occur. during the life of the stntctare. Large
damaging. earthquakes are iufiequent events that may simnhanenusly affect a large
number of structures. The cxrent of damage during an earthquake can be related to
the level of motions gem::ratold by the earthquake. The level of earthquake motion
against which design Or evaluation cdtei:ia should be developed requires subjective
judgment based on c1! .... j,.",,= and observatiolL P.robabt'Jistic methods were
3.A-7
developed as a result of a desiJ:e to quamify some of this judgment understanding and
to allow use in a n:pc!!!ab!e way by otherpmctitioners.
In the foD.owiDg 51!! rimlS. both the deterministic and probabilistic Seismic hazard
approaches ate djsf!1"sed
In a dele" uju\stic apptoacb" gRI1IDd motious at a site me eslima
ted
by c:onsideriDg
a smp eWIIlt of a ape' iIjrri magnimde SlId distance from die site. In order to
peIfmm a ME' mhdsri.: aaal)'sis. thefollowiDg data me xequited.:
L J)e6ujljon of aD ea""'J"an somce (e.g .. a known geologic fault) and its
location relatiw to the site
b. DefinitiOD of a design earthquake that the source is capable of pmdtteing
c. A mJatiODship wIIich des ,DQ the attcmnmion of die ,pouml motion
paahllctel of iDtmcst, e.g., peak ,po1Uid acce1cratioD or re8pODSe specual
onfinares for a SJi6 ifie IIIdmIl period or fl'equcnc:y of vibmticm.
All earthquake sowce ill III)St cases is a known active or potrmrially active
geologic fault. A site may havI: sevwal faults in close proximity to it. All of these
sources JDDSt be id ..... j6td. Based on the length and c:barac'eJislic!!i of die fault, a
madllll1m magnitude potcmial of each source is spcc:ified B.c!;'II8tjnD of maximum
magnmuf" potrmriaJ of geologic sowces can be obtajned from publisbed sources or
qualified pmfessiODllls The PM' jlliliM magJritnde potentW of a source is determined
from Chlj';I;':'" m1arionsbips bc:tw ...... magmtude and ruptwe leagth or through
hl.ctorica1 knowledge of past eartIIquakes on the particular source. GeDeraUy, the
earthquake conesponding to the maaihlhw magmtude is xefenec1 to as die MIu jmum
Cxec1ible :Earthquake (MCB). wIdch repi S hiS the ma';hllUn eartbqnake poteDtial of
a source. MCE is es1jhiatM 'by geologists based on die c:haractw:istic of the source
SlId Dctoxs such as blstnl leal activity aDd source din ,,"Sious. Sewml mIatioDships
exist dJat relate source CJj,,'lIIsjhDS to its rna ';lIillrn magJritnde patrmria1 This
iIIfoxmaliOD is thc1I used as iDput to aD aummation relationship. which mares die
ground motion paaametw ofiatuest to magirlmde and distance.
AUenn!l!im! of pound motion is kDown to vary significantly during 'auy
earthquake. While die 'ValialjMl is widely kDown, the qWMffication of the R!ISOUS for
the wrlation me not filIly m!lfeurood. Eumples of possible causes may be difi'eJCDt
rupture mechanismsjn the q,i#jihal an:&, dizcctionality of the mdiatjon pattern of the
motion and regional geological \i81 jatious. Research usiDg statistical aualysis of large
ground motioD data seiS have shown that the scatter of ground motion values about a
mean arumuatiOD relationsbip can be ieptescm-d by a log-normal distribution.
Attenuation re1atirmsbips me Mildl ica1 relationships deYeJ.oped by using regressjnn
3.A-8
amdysis tec!miques on ground ID3tion data recorded during earthquakes. Several
different attenuation relationships are available in pubHSbed sources, ami are a
function of earthquake magnitude, its distaricc. local geology a.nd tectonic
cnviroDlD:Dt (subduction zones of Pacific Northwest. Eastcm U.s. and Western
U.s.). Joyner and Boorc (198B) $Iliiillladza some of these rclatioDSbips. Some of
the other well known relaticmsbips are Boore et aL (1993), CampbeD and Bozorgnia
(1994), aud Crouse am1 McGuize (1994) (for Western U.s.), AtIdnson and Boore
(1995) and Boore and Joyner (1991) (for EaSTf!T'!1 U.s.), and Crouse (1991) (for
subduction zones). .
Siace attm.atjon relatioDsbips are cmpiIk:al relationships derived using statistical
IIDalysis tec!miques on rec:ozded data, they do not fit each &lid every data point
exactly. The actaal ICCOIikd data spreads around the median attem.won
relaticms!rip , This spread js de6""d by the standard deviation. The atreDuation
equation with no staDdaId deviation means that 50% of the recorded values are above
and 50% are below the ptedicled value. An pttemJatiml IC!ationship with one
standard deviation means that 84% of the recorded values are below the predicted
values, siIm1"Tly attrmnarion relaIioDShip with two standard deviatioDs imply that 98%
of the recmded data are below the predicted value.
The definition of CIIItbquab magnitude and source-to-site distan.,. sometimes
VBIy from ODe attrmnariou rel!!!ionship to aDOther. It js important that the magnitude
scale and sour=-to-site rJjsI,,@ used in til: 8IllII,sis should be ccm.nstcmt with the
ptoper definjtiou for the panicuJar attenuation relationship usccl. If the site has
seveml sources in close ptCl8il!!iry, an envelope of values of response spcctIa
developed for each sourc:e can be used.
ProbahDlstlc SeJsmic HazanlA.aaIysIs
Pmbabilistic seiSmic: hazard analyses (PSHA) require additional seismic criteria
beyond the selected magnimt!e, mjnjmum distance and the attenuation equations used
for til: dctcnninistic place .. !"". defined in til: previons sectioD. The prlmaty
additional requirements are til: cHmc:n.nons of each source region and the means to
interpret the probability of occuaence within each source.
Pmbabilistic seismic hazard analysis proccdurcs were fiIst developed and used by
Comell (1968) and <:omcD and V8IIiIIlII\':kc (1969) and tinthcI extended by Mcr.z and
CorneD (1973) and Der lOuregbian aud ADg (1977). This =thad involves care1W
consideration and iDtm:POlation of the geology, history, aud tectonics of the site
region into a seismotcc:tonic source model A probabilistic seismic hazard study
requires the acceptan= of sevaaI. assumptions regarding caIthquakes..
The fixst step in PSHA ~ that the seismic history and geology are
snfficiently well known to ptlwP. an cs.iuwte of the seismic activity of the region.
This js defined as til: seismicity of the region. This infO! matiml js then used to
3.A-9
develop a seimric: source model Potential sources can be defined as either point
sources. li= sources., or mea sources (Ocr Kiuregbian and Aug, 1977).
ConsidcratioDs may be DtecW1 to account for the raudom occmrence .of smaI1 or
moderale sized eartbquakes (backgnJlmd seismicity).
The probabffity distribution of earthquakes to obtain the relative OCCUllencc
bquency dJstribution between lmge and smaI1 eartbquakc:s is then obtained.
EsOili.'i"ll of lCCUUeuce rate is a key para''''ler in PSHA procedures. Two
app1'OIICb=s for est iiIW'iug the r=uneuce rate are geutrally used. ODe is based on the
historical seismicity rcconis, ami the other is a geologic slip rate model. The former
is based on the rec:cmL:d seismic: history of the region, whereas the latter uses
10
" . ".4:-.' 1" 1_",", .,,",-, data
po gJC 'hU,'i.ia"M to strammte 8CC'lI"ILptiml usmg
for a fault.
Recaweuce nteS can be expxesse.i in the form of the fmmljar Richter's Jaw of
maguitndes (Richter, 1958), expxessed as
logN=a-bM
(3.A.4)
wI=re N is the number of cvenrs of magnitude M or greater for the time period under
ccmsicl=:aticm, and aamlb are con!Sl!!ntS tbat depend on the seismicity of the region.
Other lecaneuce models. such as the characIerisdc earthquake model (YoUDgS
ami Coppcxsndtb, 1985). may also be used.
For PSBA, the lIIi"jrlllnn value of S.O is usually CODSidcred for M, siacc
earthquakes of sD:es less tban s.o are gcmerally not dllD!!!ging to cnginwed
structun:s: Due to the buegzativt: DlItIIm of PSHA, iucludiug earthquakes of
magnitude Jess tban S.O would lead to im:rease the ground molion hazard for the
peak ground accelera1ionl!Dd. short periods of the response spedlmn for small return
periods becanse of the reletiveiy high 1requency of occuaeuce of smaI1 earthquakes.
which azc DOt Me' 5 BP' ill' d8'1"8ging to the sttuc:tmes.
The PSHA procedures co.mbine the probability of OCCUlleuce of an earthquake,
the probability of it being a sp=c ific:: size, and the attcnnation of its motion to the site,
to obtain the probability of e' dm:e of a specitiro:! ground motion level.
Combinariou of these .iDdividual probabt1iries for the ctifibtent source zones at each
motion level of bttezat then proWdes the total annual probm1iries of exceedm:e.
Ground motions com:spoDding to a particular probability level can tben be obtaiDed
by interpolation. Figure 3.2 shows the ctifibtent elementS of a PSHA graphically.
There are several computer plogtllDS available for PSHA.
The choice of probability levels for ground motion usually depends upon the
design criteria for each iDdividual project. and is esrabushed based on seven}
. pl!f3iic:1m1 SIIC'h as level of risk and imporIm:e of the facility. Various probability
3.A-I0
. ~ , ....
levels commonly used are 50% probability of e,xceedanoo in 50 years. 10% probability
in 50 yeatS and 10% probability of eveerlanoo in 100 years. Assuming a Poissonian
cIistribution, these prohahility levels correspond to aD cquivaIeDt return period of 72.
475 and 950 year reblm periods, JCSpeCtively. or aDDua
l
excecriancc probahiliri
es
of
0.014. 0.002 and 0.001. Tl= relation between retum period, T and prohahility of
exceedance for a Poissonian distn"bution is given as:
T= -t
In(l-p)
(3.A.5)
where P is the probability of cxceedanoo in t years. In this equation. the
probability of exceedanoo. P. is expressed as a dtrima
l
(e.g., 0.10 stands for 10%).
A response specnwn developed from a PSHA is .efel1ed to as a UDifoJ:m hazard
spectrum. since each ordinate bas the same associated probability of exc:eedanoo (a
constant level of risk). Since the response specnwn from a PSHA analysis is
calculated by a S111D of individual probabilities of OC:C:OIi enoo of sevezal earthquakes of
cliffe:tCDt magnitudes and cfistances within the entire amL of stndy. it CaDDOt be related
to an earthquake of spec iAed magnitude and distance from til: source.
Tl= level of ground motion corresponding to a 109'D probability of excecdance in
50 yeatS is the basis of design for the UBC and is also "Ifcued to as the maximum
probable ground motion in the T'1tle 24. Pait 2. of the CaJifomia BujJding Code
(1991).
Uncertainty associared with the selection of input parameterS JDIlSt be incblded in
a PSHA. UDCCItainty could be in the defiuition of magmtnde-itiCUllCDce relationship.
or in the definitiou of slip rates, or the maximum magnitude poteutia
l
, or geographical
location of a source. Furthennore. there is also unceuamy in defining the ground
motions. The uncertaioty distribution on the attenuation model indicates that no
matter how accurately we know the magn;mde and dista
n
..,.. of a postUlated
earthquake, there wDl still be some uucenainty in predicting wbat the ground motion
wDl be (Reiter. 1990). The uncertainty associated with an attenDation rclationship
(standard deviation) is incOIporated in the seis ... ;': hazard during the integration
process for the calt:nJation of the probability of occuuence of a specified ground
motion level.
Sometimes there is a tendc:ncy to make conservatiw eS'illi8TM of input
p8l'lllDetCiS to be used as an input to a PSBA. This is not consistent with the
philosophy ofPSBA. Input pammeters should be selected on "best estimate" values.
3.A-ll
3.A.7 VERTICAL MOTIONS
Few auemtatiOD relatioDSbips are available for vertical groUDd motions whicb can
be used to c1eve1oped vatical gromu:l response spewa. In practice. vertical groUDd
motioDS are usually obtaim:d by 8ppIOptiately scaling the horizontal groUDd response
specuum. T)'ph:aDy. a factor of 213 is used as the ratio between vertical and
horizontal groUJld motions. Gmmu:l motiDDS recorded during earthquakes show that
for sites in the uear-1idd, this ratio may be DIIlCh higher than 213 in the high frequency
range and lower than 213 in the loDg period (low frequency) range (Egan et. al.. 1994,
Nisar and OoJesorkbj, 1994).
3.A.8 EARTHQUAKE TIME BISTORIFS
If Dr rded, it may SOli e
l
jmes by better to use a set of acceleration time histori=s
whose aw:msc elastic response speena is sjrnijar to the design spectrum. T'JJ:De
histories are usually used for mm-lim:ar analysis or for ;malysis of stmc:tures of spcc:ia1
impottaw:e. WheaeYeru.sed, the use of a single time bistmy is not reco
l
llil lenderL
,.
Acceb atioD time his1oria; to iepx nat site-spet Ific design ground motioDS are
usually deveJopecl by taJdng ItiC01ded aa:cJeratioD time histories during past
em:thquakes and 8pploptiate1y s .... t;ng to represent the design ground motions. In the
seledioD of time bWtmies for use in design. c:onsideration should be given to the
dmaticm, scnm:e-to-site djsran=. loc:al soil c:cmcfttious, and type of faulting
Sewral methods of seating the acceJention time histmies are used, such as
sca!ing on the basis of PGA or by obtaining a scale factor by a comparison of the
iCSpOnse time.bisloJywith the design iCSpODSC spectiwuin the period
range of interest. Site-spc.!fir: acceJeration time histories can be developed by sming
the time bisior)' in the 1i:I:quency cJomajn, whereby the Folllier a:mplitlJdes are s .... !M
such that the iespoDSC spec:tNii1 of the scaled,. time history JT!lI!cbes the design
icsponse spec:ttwn.
Artificial time histories usiDS involwd matbCTTllltica) models are SOJl'I!"fimes also
developed. It is generally rec:t'mmended to use recorded ground motioDS when
available The use of artificial tim: histories may sometiws become necessary when
DO data on recorded motions is avaDable If used, it is hupottaDt to ensw:e that these
time histories bave realistic ampljtude and phase rela!:icmsbips and that their response
speclXa is similar to the design response spec:rzum.
3.A-12
APPENDIX 3.B
EARTBQUAKERELATED COASTAL INUNDATION
3.B-I
APPENDIX 3.B
EARTHQUAKE RELATED COASTAL INUNDATION
3.B.l INTRODUCTION
Section 3.4 descrlhes briefly the phenomena associated with tstmamis and seiches.
This appendix cfu;cusses in more detail several issues associated with earthquake
induced coastal jmmdarion.
3.B.2 EARTHQUAKE INDUCED COASTAL INUNDATION HAZARDS
A given site in a coastal area may be affected by one or more of the foD.owing
earthquake mlated jnundation hazards:
a. CotISIIJ1 Subsfdmce c:an
sed
by tectonic (faulting) or non-tectonic (e.g.,
subcllarinc landslide) effects..
b. T.wmarnis from either .Iazge (Mw>6.5) local earthquakes or distant great
CMv/>7.7) earthquakes.
Co Seiches in semi-enclosed ~ estuaries, lakes or reservoirs canp:d by
mudeJate (Mw>S.O) local (submarine) earthquakes or regional large
earthquakes.
Each of these hazaIds is cJescr'bed in detail below.
3.B.2.1 CoastA] SnhsIdeace
In areas of dlp-sJip fanlting (nomml, tID:ust, or oblique-slip faulting) which involve a
vertical component of mo'Ve
ii
eur. co-se.ismic subsidence along coastal faults could
result in p::tiil8"C
D
' submergence of the coastal area. Based on worldwide
experiences such as the 1964 Alaska (Mw=8.4) and the 1992 Cape Mendocino,
California (Mw=:7.2) eartl!quabs. r=oDic subsidence of more than 6 feet (2 ueters)
could occur. FQrtt.eWHIJ:e, earthquaIrcs on blind faults. such as the 1994 Northridge
Califomia (Mw=6.7) earthquake, may create significant surface uplift or subsidence
without attendant smface fault ruplwe.
Permanent coastal subsidence may also occur as a result of earthquake-induced
seafloor slumping or landslides DmiDg the 1964 Alaska earthquake. the Seward pen
area, which included petrochcmiM'l factliries . progressively slid under the bay as
shaking continm:d This snhsjdenre was foD.owed by withdrawal. of the sea and
subsequent jrnmdaUon of the coast by a wa'Ye 30 feet high. In adcfitioll to this slide
induced wave, tsmmmi waves some 30-40 feet high. generated by the tectonic
defonnation. arrived 1ater and compounded the destruction of Seward. Similar
cffi:cts on a lesser scale were cxperimu:ed at Moss I anding on Monterey Bay during
3.B-2
the 1989 Loma Prieta, California (Mw=7.1) earthquake even though the epicenter
was located onshore in the SaDta Cmz Mountains, At Moss T anding, subsidence and
related liquefaction created large :fissures, generated a small tsunami in Monterey
Bay, and caused substantial damage to the Moss T aneting Marine FSCl
1iri
es, Thus,
sites located where landslides or ,mstab!e slopes are COl I" I wm. both on land and
oftSbme, should assume that SIJ1!!11lJI illc sIumpiDg and coastal jmmdation could occur
during large eanhquakes in the region.
For cfisaster planning and emergCJlC)' response purposes. signffiQlnt coastal
suhsjdeuce followed by tSlmamj nm-up should be considered likely to exceed run-up
predicted based on ptHUbsideuce topography aIoDe. Combined su},sideucc and
"II! Ill"'; effects _ cOllSidered the likely cause of the destruction to the city of Port
Royal on the Island of J!!J!l!!ma in 1692. and may occur in many seismically active
axaas 'of the world. TJms. maps of potential jmmdatjon should consider these
combined effects where coasml subsidcmce may be expected.
3.B.2.2 Tsgnami (Seismic Sea Wave)
Tsgnamjs _ long pmiocl (T from S to 60 minutes) surface gravity waves, with
wavelengths that may exceed 60 miles (IOO km). TSlmamjs _ typically gcueratecl by
large SIlIlIiIWI ille earthquakes that displace the seafloor owr large areas. The
cIestnlctNe efh:ts of tgunamj waves may be loc:aHzeod, occzm:ing along the coasts
sitnatcd close to the tsunami origin, or the waves may travel with little attenuation
across entire oceans and affect coasts tht>uS!Uuk of miles away.
Earthquake induced seafloor displaC1'''''''' may occur with or without seafloor fault
xuptuxt (as on a blind fault). and could geuet<W a porentiaDy desttuctivc tsunami
Bven stxike-sJip faults, although less Jikely to geDCiilltl: significant vertical seafloor
displaCemml than dip-slip faults, may cause S1dmamiaJ seafloor uplift or subsidence
in pJa=s where these fauhs bend and curve. Fuxtbermore. Jaxge earthquakes centered
on faults near tbe coast but on land (e.g., tbi 1992 Cape Mendocino, Califomia
eaxthquake), may also cause local tarnamjs because of the broad regional tectonic
uplift (or subsideuce) they c:rcatc.
In addiriM to plhlllIly tectoDic clefonnation associated with the eaxthquake. large-
scale $hmqdug or Jandsljdes UDder the ocean or other laxge water bodies may
generate signffiQlnt local tsumunjs A laxge rock slide in lltuya Bay, Alaska,
txiggeled by an earthquake in 1957 geJiClated a tmnamj that surged 1700 meters up
the side of the fjord. VolcaDic cxplosiollS, such as that of Krakatoa in 1883, may also
gcuctate destructive tS1mamjs that jnnmtatc suxroUllding coasts Coastal areas in
activc tectoDic regions are more likely to be susc:eptible to tS1mamj attack. Howewr,
laxge tsunamis may travel across entiIe ocean basins and affect axaas with Jittle or no
loc:al tectoDic: activity.
3.B-3

AroUlld the Pacific Ocean basiD, often tefmcd to as the "Ring-of-Fite", most of the
world's gmat eartbqwtkes. volcaDic eraptions, ami destructive tsunamis occur.
Eanbquakes in this reJion bave large dip-slip (vertical) movenenrs whic.h dJsplace the
seafloor mpidly, inillal iug tile sea smface disturbance that becomes a tSUl!8Dlj Places
such as JapaD, AJaska, Hawaii, and wCSUlIn South America me particuIar1y wluerable
to these tsunamis, both became they have many large earthquakes (ami volcanoes)
locally sjn'ataI, ami because the.ir geographic position ami coastal COlIiiguration
expose them to distantly generated tSlllla"'is In the contiguous U.s., recent evidence
unc:over=cl aloag tile coasts of Washington, Oregon, ami notthcm Califomia show
that large local tSIII!8iujs have been geuerated by great earthquakes .in tile Cascadia
snbdnctioD ZOIIC. The AtJantfe coast bas also suffeacd destructive tslJDamis such as
tile one gwe.cated by the great I isbon eatthquake in 1755, but such eveJItS me rare
and geue:mJly Jess sevme on tile U.s. side of the Atlantic Ocean. Wheleas the Gulf of
Mexico bas heeD relatively ti:= of desauctive Is""allli&, in the Caribbean, active
tmonics aloag the Puerto Rico bench and Antilles an:: have generated notable
tSl1!18!!!js Acdve totmrism with la:rge eartbquakes. volcanoes, ami tsunamis, also
occm:s around the Imijan Ocean.
Propagatima oflS"Mmis oftauesults in dispetsiOD. of the hdtia1 tsunami wave fomlSo
that several sia"lIt aiU WavtlS nay strike the coast. The first wave to anive may be
smaRt" than SldJsettueat waves, and pe.rsuDS in affected areas must realize that a
drawdown foDowiDg ODe wave may be soon followed by larger, mote destructive.
wave mivaJs. The run-up speed of such waves (10-20 miser or 20-40 miles per
hour), would outrnn even the futrst lllliiil'" nmners. In bays or other panially
enclosed basins, ISll!Ia"'!s may also set up a seiche (sec below) which can amplify
wave bI:ighl ami prolcmg the tstlild"'i duration. For example. following the 1964
Alaska (Ms=8.4) earthquake. tile tsunami recorded at SaDta MoDica, Califomia,
JD'8SDrII:d up to 2 meters (6.5 feet) Idgh and oscjl1arions ofbalfthis amoU11t were still
0 ...... ;"1 17-19 hours after tile aaiva1 of tile first wave. Consequently, cIesbuctive
waves from ,Sli"am! nay p::zsisl for a Jong time. and vulnerable areas should remain
evacuaIed mun an "All Clear" """S8F bas been broadcast by autbmiries.
3B%3 Sefche
A seiche OCt ina when resonant WIl1I: osciDatilJDS fimn in an enclosed or semi-
enclosed body of water such as a Jab. hay, or fjord. Seiches may be triggered by
JDDdcrate or larger local snJn"8';Ue C8ltbIptakes, and sometbra by large, distlnc,
earthquakes. TectoDic deformatiml of Hebp Lake daring the 1959 earthquake
iJririatcri seiche ".".,1Iatjous of up to 8 feet ovm- the new lake level (which chaDged as
a zesuJt of the defonuation). Such oscmarions have also been triggered by
JD'rteorOlogical distmhavces For C*8
ii1
I'Je, the passage of a storm front across Lake
Mic:bjgau tends to pjIe water on tile eastern shOIe as tile 1i:oDt advances AfJ.er the
fi:oDt passes, tile water flows back wescward, setting up tile seiche. The inidal storm
wave seII1p is sinP1ar to storm surges observed aloag coasts affected by hu:rlcanes
and other tropical stcmns, but tile seiche results :from the monant OSC'l1!1t;n';" of the
3.B-4
wave due to the enclosed character of the water bocly. Seiche oscmations may persist
for several hams.
3JL3 ASSFSSJNG SITE VULNERABlLITY
Coastal sites in active tectoDic areas \\"hm dip-slip faulting is COADWn are most
susceptible to earthquake-jnduced iDiliii1arion Examination of tbe regioDal fault
cbaracterisrics and earthquake lIistory. wJrh emphasis OD submarine earthquakes and
possible bistorical tsunamis, provides the best mcaSJve of site wlnerability. Estimates
of Tnaljiil"m tsunami nm-up may be based OD either historical occummces or
theoretical modeling The Federal Imutance AdministraiioD developed ftmndatioD
maps to assist in setting rates for the National Flood Insurance Program (Flood
Insw:auce Rate Maps-PIRM). TmmdatjrmlewJs OD these maps gcmezally consist of
tbe higher of eitber xivedxw tlood, coastal stDmI. surge. or tsunami jmmdation levels.
The FIRM maps show coastal nm-up eIevatiODs for 100 and 500 year events based
UPOD theoretical tsunami modeling for the Pacific Coast of the U.s. (HoustOD and
Garc3a. 1974). Some cities, pattic
n
1arly in Hawaii where tSJmam;s are zelatively
icqueDt. have prepared local tsunami jmmdati0D maps. Th=se should be available
from gOVCliiliGd ageucies Eastem U.s. cities (AtJantic and Gulf coasts) are II10le
likely affected by hut:ricam: stDmI. surge jmmdarinu whereas Pacific Coast cities are
affected by tsunmni Inland cities wouJd be afl'ccted by riverine tJooding. ahhough
cities ad"J8CCDl to mgor Jakes. such as Oicago. would also be susceptible to seiche
If a site lies below the ftmndatiOD eleya1i"DS, then it may be vuIaerabJ= to tJooding and
related effects Lower elevations are also more vuJncrahle because dccpcr water
lewis cauy pater hydrodynamic forces for impact and erosion of structID'eS and
foundations. Table 3.B.l ontUnes tbe steps involved in 2'SC'Sing the potential for
coastal innndation.
3.B.4 mECl'S OF COASTAL lNDNDA110N
A1ly of the three C!lDSCS ofcoasta! i"""jIa'ilill (coastal subsidence, tS'mjrnj, or seiche)
results in essentially the sa:m: effect: low-lying coastal areas wm be covered with
water. The greatest bazatd from coastal jmmdatioD results from the inflow and
outflow of the sea during the jmmdatiou event. The strong cuneuts from this flow
may erode folmdations of SU1lCtlm:s and sweep away sma11er ~ or
equipment. Debris caz:ried by the warer will act as batte:riDg rams to pound other
DIOlC solidly anchotcd structDres. People unsafeJy located in the low-lying areas may
be swept out-to-sea and drow.ned, or koocked unconscious by the debris and
drowned. Normal wave acticm wiD also be su}c!li"1:HJSCd OD the IS'''I8'";. adding
dynamic forces capable of poundiog and destroying m:il strong structUlCS.
Petrochemical fac:t'Jities would be espeda11y valnerable to rapbllC of storage tanks
from debris impact and foundation erosion. possibly lCSUIting in Cltplosion and 1itc.
The tsunami at Seward. Alaska foD.owiDg the 1964 catthquakc led to such destructiOD
of the port fac:t1ities The succession ofwavcs sptcad the fitc fromraptDIcd oD tanks
across and throughout the port area.
3.B-S

- .... ............
.
Outline for ADalysis of Coasra1 Innnrlafton Potamial
1) Bvaluale tSllllami ami earthquake history
2) Immcfatiml maps ptcpwedby SOW'iiliiMt agencies (e.g.. ARM maps. Houston ami
Garcia)
3) SeiSIIEld84 "I.dc smdy.C:11111 lei offaulting, location offaillringw.r.t. si1e

4) Site tIJjXIgUiphy ami adjacr:Dt ."., ..... 1 bathymetry. harbor or embaymeDt COJIfigIIIation
(leallill :es)
(S) HyckadyDamicllllllyses,lODgpmiDd wave respcmse, tidallJ81Blllelels
TSllIIlllllISeic}te THliii"Mfftft Bva,ll'lAticm Procedure
A. Is 'SimE,ujlseicJJelimmdatjnn ponib1e (histoxy, seisl'K'tec'c"'ic smdy)
1) J bf'dhite Review
2) mlU .lieBl Res-.I:h
3) Sdsa
eim
& h'hi'; AaalysIs
4) Otnms ttphtdPala eissu;c S1udy
S)
CkIIUi. Imit:aJ S1Udy (I .JII..m.HMs. Slumps, Possible Grm ... al iug M-lIaui'''IlI)
B.
What is ".Ji"""" c:zedible am-up c1:vad.an for rezicm
1) Tsnnanii itnmtfation maps 8VJI'ab1e'1'
2)
flood Tn""."", Rare Maps
3)
Historical ADalysIs
4) TheoJelic"ll AIIIIlysis
C. Is site II- lied witbin 1ow-1yiag cnastal mea (below maKiIlUU" possible nm-up elevation)
D.
Rn' a.ua1JSis eel evaluate ilseiche mot; IeIItial
glDecllll, teqIbI- to lall1I8m:. UlUII_OD per--
I!. Bngim t eiug 8D8Iysis iLiijUhed to idmdfy wIDeJable facility ce,nrt_.nC*i.'S
P. Engine", in, BDllysinequhed to idtwtifylr=CIhi!id,d specJfic: mirigarions for'l'lJb=able
faci1i1r coq* en"
s
1) SeawaJls or Barriers
2) Facility Layout to Locare VIIiII=mb1e Cc.mpODUItS Above Il11III
elati
on Zone
3) CicwN I'llical Studies to Id=D1ify Pmemial T'
. .
Hazards
that might place facility at risk (Seward, Alaska ptQb1ems)
4) FaciBty CoDsIJuc:IiOD with Rebd'wctd PouDdations 8IId WaDs Below ImmdatilJJl
t.eIs to Resist Tail"".; Dan WI'
S)
Response PIcms-Tsnnanri WamiDg System; BvacuaDon to High Grtnmd; Safe
Shurdown; Antm ill';': fite.PighriDg Bqai)'mrJlt? Life Saving (Flotation) Devices
G. GovemIll='1t smr.Iies IvaiJablelJleeded for =sion?
3.B-6
Tmmami combjnM with seiche could result in an oSt:tllating water level causing
several cycles of coastal jrnmiIatimL Periods of tmmdation could last for several
hours. Wlth tectoDic subsidence of the coast (or from. a large submArine landslide),
the jmmdarion may be pea "!!!'ent Major subsidence, ground defonoation, or seve:e
erosion could "Me, ",ine bridge piers and fo1mdatjous, disrupting Jffi:Hnes such as
highways, railroads, pipelines, and clectrical power ami CO .... !iiI'"i lines. Sucb
damage could jsolate the an:a from. emergcm:y equipmeJ:It, supplies, and rescue.
3.B.5 MlTIGATlON
3.B.5.1 Shoreline Stnactares
Throughout Japan, along tile coast wbc:re tJl
mamj
attack is common, sea waDs and
otbe.r bauicls bave been CODStrUcted to Iesist tsunamj immih!!jou. These structures
are somed"cs lJIISD("cessfhl, as large tsunamis often overtop the baniers and flood the
pIOtccted area. geumatiug strong CWleuts which erode the baniers and other
stmc:n:aes. In SOl1C iDsrpees, large wave dissipation structures bave been cauied
lnmdrcds of metas inland by maJor ts
n
"a mis These structures could act as powerful
battering rams against the very structures they were designed to pIOteCt. Even large
stmm smf foN,-j,," thi:ows large boulders and rlp-rap inland C8"!sing damage to
stmc:n:aes. Thmef01e, coastal pIOtective stmctllreS must be c:azefully cfesigncd to
witbstand exlI ....... events.
3.B.5.2 Tsmunni WandDg
Tsunamis t1aVd&ClOSS the oceans at bighsp::ds ofmare than 60 miles per hour (100
kmIhr), but generally requite several haars bet'ore reaciring dietent coasts. 'I'he1efore,
tS11Jlami Warnings are possible and bavc been established tbiough the Pacific tS'mamj
. ork. It' . . ."-' . .*'-* .t....__ . . .. elu-f'allo.-
wannng netw JS liDpClatlYC UIAIo e"'2erS IAAG &..UI:2IiC warnmgs senOWiU,r-MU&W4W
to heed the wamings by goibg to the beach to watch the jnc:cunjng waves may result
in needless Joss..of-Jife. In southcm Califomia, -th:ie seems to be a serious lack of
appleciatiIJn for the gxeat hazanI tbat tsnllamis pose. This pc,baps results from the
absence of sign;"r:aD' tsjlji, .. "is striking the south=m CaJifomia coast in the recent
past (ODe or two gemaathms). Southern Califonda beacbes, such as Santa Monica,
are most wlDexable to distant tS'mamis atriviDg from the south or north. Such
tsunamis would be gener.u= by large or great earthquakes along the South American
or .Alaska and AJemUm coasts Other coastal areas would be wInerable to tsnnam;s
flom sources located along direct patbs &ClOSS the ocean. For large, appromnarely
linear, tsunami sources sucb as oceanic treacb. areas, direc:tional cff=s teDd to focus
the tS'mamj energy along aD axis perpendicular to the linear source region. Sites in
Hawaii are vuIn:rable to attack f10m tS11Jlamjs in many directions because of its
centrallocatiOD in the Pacific Ocean.
A
.. f abo ""30' .. _.:-.I' .,
Dilliiihurn 0 at mmnt
cs
tI:IDe IS to 1SSUC a tsunamI wammg
tbiough the Pacific tsunami warning network. Locally generated tS'ma
mis
would
3.B-7
arrive too quicIdy. m less than 10-1S minutes. for adequate warning by officials.
AIlhongh th= trdmolngy eDts to develop more rapid. regional tg
manri
wamiug
networks, th= Ie1advely 1'III'e occ:utre1ICC of damaging local tgmamis ~ economic
CODStraiDts have pm:lnded instaDerinD of such a system in most areas (such as the
soutMm Ca1!tin "ia ana). In tbe absence of ofiicW waming systemS, persODS m low-
lyiDg coastal mas wJnerable to tgilla",; immdarioD should seek shelter OD higber
grouud imiiwfiately upon e'leciencing a strong earthquake m their Ina. Such
jaunNijate re5pODSe bas been conditioned into the minds of 1apanese people wbetc
tsll!!anl; OCCWlcwces arc relatively frequent. If DO tgnunnj wc= generated in the fiM
hour foDowiDg the ew:at, 8IId no tswa
m
; waming were jssucd based upon otber
earthquake data, it sbonJd be safe to retam to the low-lyiDg area. If. however. a
tsnnamj is geueliited. the fimt waw may mive 8IId withdraw cansjng little or DO
datmp. 0DJy to be followed by Jarpr. posmty destructive waves. For areas tba1
tend to have 1_ osc:iDaljm IS, significant wave activ.ity may petSist for several
hours, or eveJllIIDSt of a day. People m these areas should wait for an an clear signal
fromofficia111'1iF CsbefOrerehiii';ng
3.B 53 Laall-Use PIaz .. dug ami IlIJIJ!datiOD Map
Tbeoretical and Jahoratmy models have been used to es'irna'e likely jmmdatfnn lcveJs
for 100 8Dd sao year :retDm periods along U.s. coasts affected by tSl
mmri
(FIRM
Maps). The 100 aml sao year time iDtervals lep1eseut an es'iwatc:d average
recuncnce :iuret tal; DB DIIJSt n:aJim that so-c:alled 100 year eVCDts may occur in
shoItez time spaIIS. For c,.u'P'c both the 1960 Cbile IIIIIi 1964 Alaska eartbquab:s
gcnerlltl:c1 tsuMmi waves equivaJ=t to a 100 year event along the soutbem Ca1ifomia
coast. Til: nmup beight CS'!U@Ied in tbesc maps rcfezs to the land elcvadon (or
ccmtour) tbat the iDaJid'ag tS'iUa'''; will n:acb. This tDDDp height includes the effects
of the nDmIaI tidal zanp. but exclndes the possible sinmJtaneolJS oc:c::uuence of the
tgmami with JUgb smf ADd stoIm wave setup. Amplification of nm-up by coastal
topOgraphy may also occur, e5}'C' ially in D8DOW. V.sbaped, canyons.
Sites located m wJacrable mas should plepa1'e for the possjbt1ity of tqmarnj
jmmdatima, aml iwpoxtant stm:lIIreS should be designed to resist possible inundation
cfi'eets. :Fac>1ities sfKmld be evalnated to identify wJDcrable components, and poSSIble
mitigation stIII!efP=s ide
ll
'ifie4 Emergency or disaster Rspcmse plans should be
plcpanid cohsjde' illg the vubrcrabiIity of the facility IIIIIi the possible efleets of
tsunami attart Also, an lIttempt should be made to anticipate otherwise u .... xpected
conscqucmces that may arise from the complex interaction between direct earthquake
effects and subsequeDt fSUDami innndatjOD.
3.B-8
3.B.5.4 Public Awareness
McCulloch (l98S) lists the fol1ow.iIJg individual actions which can help to save lives in
the evem of a lSlrnamj
L If you are OD low ground near the coast and a large earthquake occurs in
your sea. move to bigh ground. There may be no time to either issue or
receive an official waming.
b. If you recopize a drawdown of the sea, move to high ground.
Co The first tsuDami wave may not be the highest In major tsunamis, later
waves c:ommonly have the highest rwmp heights.
d. Periods between successive major waves may be shmlar, Thus.. yoU may
have time betwecn waves to move to higher groUDd or to assist in rescue
efforts.
eo Do not assume that becanse the incoming tsunami wave is not breaking it
will DOt be destructive. Till: foIccs ct'Majnr:d in this high-vclocity, often
debrls-laden tormDt are extremely destructive during rwmp and runoff.
f. Do not assn"," that areas behind beaches gencrally shielded from storm
waves will be i"""'lIie from high I11DUp. Tsunami nmup heights have
historically been higher in some such 8IC8.S along the Califomia coast.
g. Do not go to the beach to watch a tS!rna
mi
comiDg in. Not ouly might
you hamper rescue efforts, but you may also have taken your last
sightseeing trip.
3.B-9
4.1 IN'I'KODUcnON
Cbapter4
SEISMIC ANALYSIS
This c:haptcr desThes the overall methodology for petti,"";'" seismic analysis of
peJrDChemj.:a] faci!ities in order to obtain seismiraDy induced loads. This is applicable
to stnu:tmal systems or subsystems to be used either m DeW design or m evahlation of
existing :lBr:jJitjes This chapter is organimJ m a i!ifili!jer such that the main contents
are WIitten pliwarily for desjg" of new :fBct1ffi:s CcmsidctatioDs for the evahlation of
. :lBW ed S . 46-
exlSttDgCJJtiesares'"'U'i'Ii'Zm ecaon .
The ovmall approach ontlined m this chapter is coDSiste1lt with cc.1JDWll practice
in the petrocbemica1 jndl1stry at the time ofwritiDg of this doCIlJI!!"'t The committee
surveyed the design sranc!ards of seven operators and an:bitect-enginecring firms and
found that an of those standards speriflcaBy reference the 1994 UBC. As such, many
spo jfic: equatioDS and nletenccs m this chapter are from the version of the UBC
CWient at the time of wri1ing of this documcmt.
The intent of this chapter is not to blstruct an enpeer on how to use the UBC or
any other c:mnmoJlIy used buDding code. Rather,. it is to give guidance as to
apploprlate application of typical b1
IDdin
g code provisioDS to the types of structures
anc! equipment COJWWiIly found m petrochevri
caJ
:lBc:r1jtjes The reader should be
aware that b
m1
djng code provisioDS are consrantly being revised and that major
clnrages are cmrent1y being mcorporated mto many codes, such as changing from
working stress to strength-based design sad changing the formulatjon of the basic
base shear equations.
Users of codes other tInm the UBC are encouraged to still read those sections of
this Chapter that plimadly use UBC equations as a reference. such as the discussion
on the base shear equation in Section 4.4.2. Much of the intent behind the guidance
for application to petrochemical structures. such as iDtcrpretatioDS of appropriate
response modification factors (R., in the UBC) will stiD be applicable to other codes.
4-1
Also. it should be noted that Spr&i1ic gtddance given in many cases differs
signifit:antly from the CWieut UBC provisions. such as in the following areas:
a. Response Mocfjficaticm FactoIS (R..) (Sections 4.4.2 and 4.6)
b. Millh .... ", CJR.. zeqaheiileDtS (Secticm 4.4.2)
c. Use of a site 5pC',j
fi
c value of the Seismic Zone Factor, Z. and response
specna (Section 4.4.2)
d. Accid .... tal tomion for mmbuilding stt'UCDln:S (Section 4.4.6)
e. Rajuirene
iliS
for seating of resWts when pctfom:dug a dyuamic 8D8lysis
(Section 4.5.6)
AIlseimlc Jmilding codes CC>WIIH.nly used today emphasize building structures.
and were developed with a PlbiWIY focus on methods ami earthquake expcrimIce
from ImRer"" pctfoih."ce TlUs cbapter empbasizes applicatiOD to nt'nlmiWng-like
stnlCtIlics, ami gives guid!!J!ce as to djstinc:riODS that are appxopdare when ushJg
codes developed pxiwadly for bm
1
dings. Tbe appendices also give eDtrq:lJes of
appIicatiOD to typical petroclml I ';"al instaJlatirrns. suc:b as vessels, elevated equipment,
process c:oInmm;, p;pewa,s. etc. Mw:b of the gtridance in the appendkes. such as
calculation of structural periods in Appendix 4.A is dm:c:tly applicable to users of any
lwrilding code.
In addiriOD, in Section 4.6 and several appcndkes. tbis cbapter discusses
coDSidcratians for a.csessing ea JSI iug structures. (All bm1djng codes are pxhuatily
focused OD design of DeW facw'JitiN). Appendices 4.0 ami 4.E provide allemate
methods foi the evahwioD of the O\imtwaing poteDtial ami the potentia! for sliding
commensurate with the ovmall pbRosophy for ~ evaluaticm of exisriDg structures.
Appendix 4.F pxcseuts a gtridaDce doi:''''ent prepared by otbms, being used in many
Ioca caHfi '. in It ., no i1" for' f
noDS morma .0 assiSt ew latmg eDs"ngMJ!!es requne" elitS 0 a
state-TlI!!T!dated regulatory progiam. TlUs dMumnt is j4tsented in its emhety in
Appendix 4.F bec!!J!se it is in use 1mt is not published ami is not readily avaflab)e to
immesttd engineem.
Some of the material ptts-
illM
in tbis chapter. includjng appendices. was takeD
from various companies (an:hilect-engineer. CODSUltant ami owner) cwxemly active in
the penuche"'i. aI b .. IuSby. Apptopliale refexeDCCS are provided to guide the reader
to the backgrouDd of the presented materiaL
4-2
4.2 STRUCTURAL SYSTEMS IN A PEtROCHEMICAL FACILITY
4.2.1 General
structures foumi in petiocimmjc:al. fac:t1ities fall into two main categories: buDding
st:nlCtUres (Section 4.2.2) and nonbnUding structures (Section 4.2..3). Within
nonbnjlding structures, two ate defined depending on strUctural
cbaracteristics These arc building-like structures (SectioD 4.2..3.1) and nonbnUding-
like structures (Sccdon 4.2.3.2). Combitmion structures arc also addressed in
Section 4.2..3.2. In addition, certain equi}1I.en
t
and anchorage design requirements in
a petrochemical facility faDs under the category of ftsubsystemft rather than structures.
Subsystems ate discussed in Section 4.2.4. A brief d"'" 'iption of various strUctures
typically foumi in petroche ... jc:al faclJities can be foUDd in Esfandjari and S" ...... e"
(1994).
4.2.2 BuDding Stnl.ctwes
BuUrfmg structures typically found in peaoeh
e
"'i1:81 fac;ljties include
admini.stradcm ImUdings, CODtiol 1:miJdings, substmous, warehouses. firehouses,
maintenance bnt'Jdings. and compressor sbelten or buildings. They arc typically
single story 1:mi1
d
ings, but may bave as many as two or thIee stories. Lateral force
xcsisting systems (LFRSs) used include shear walls. bzaced .fnums. rigid frames, and
mmbinmrms. The provisioDs of the code of record would apply in their entirety to
design of these buDdings Certain buUdings in petrocbemical faCJ1jtjes may also be
requhed to be designed for blast loading, which often couaols the design.
4.2.3 NODbuDdiug Structures
Otbcr than actnallmt1dings in a pelTOChemical facility, an structures arc typically
classified as nonbnDding stmctnres. However, their strnctnral systems may resemble
those of buildings, for example traDsverse momcm iiam:s for pipeways. Therefore.
these structures arc classified as building-like strneturcs. Other structures, whose
structural systems do not :resemble those of bnUdings. arc classified as nonbuilding-
like structures. An e."ample is a taDk or a vessel Each of these sub-catcgories is
defined in dclail below.
4.2.:U BuDding-LIke Structures
These arc structures such as pipcways. equipmeDt support frames and box-type
heaters which bave LPRSs sinn
1
ar to those of building systems. such as braced
frames, moment resisting frames or shear wan systemS. A flexible structure is
typically defined as baving a natUral period of vibration (T) of 0.06 seconds or more,
which is equivalent to a frequency of about 17 Hz or less. E"amp\es ofbnUding-like
sttnctures found in petmcbemical facilities include:
4-3
a. Moment resisting frames (steel or concrete) or bnIced fr:amc:s (cross-braced or
chevron-braced) supponing exchangers and horizontal vessels. Such
stnlCt1I1'es can be up to fcmr or five levels high.
b. Pipeways with LFRSs that are moment resisting frames (usually in the
traDSVerSe direction to povide access beneath the pipcway) or braced frames
(usually in the longitnrtina
J
din:ction).
c. Rectangular furnaces
4.2.3.2 NOIIIndIdbag-LIke Stnu:twes
This category covers mBDJ structures and self supporting equipment items found
in a typical petrochemicAl facility, such as vertical vessels. horizontal vessels and
exchangers. stacks and towms. NODbuilding-Jike struetures t)'pically found in a
petmc:hemical facili1y typically &ll into one offour categoIies desmlxd below:
a. Rigid structures, i.e.. those whose f1mda
n
g
lll
al stmctmal period is Jess tban
. 0.06 sec:cmds, such as a luil;4 >ntal vessel or exchanger, supported on short,
stiff pic:Is.
b. FJat-bottom taDks suppurte4 at or below grade. Such structures respond very
diffeumtly (CC"'II,BRd til mplar structures) during an earthquake. Special
issues for unanchored IDDks, such as the effects of fluid slosbing and tank:
uplift must also be coDSideted. TaDks are desCI:ibcd in more detail in Chapter
7.
c. Other nonbuijding_Jike IIrUClUJ'eS. EnmpJes of this category of structures
inclnde skirt-supponed iCltical vessels, sphcn:s on braced legs. horizontal
vessels or exchangm on long piers. guye4 struc:tun:s., and cooling towers.
d. Combination str'IlCtDrI:s. In petloc:bewical mr:t1iries, such structures generally
support flrw"le JIOlJI;hjrr Imill eJements whose comhihilld weight exceeds
allow: 25tH, of the weight of the structure. A typical example is a tall vertical
vesse', fw:Dacc or tank supported above grade on a braced or moment
resisting frame. The 8II8lysis method depends on whether the DODSttUctura1
element is flexible or Dgid. and whether its weight exre-t1s or is Jess tban
allow: 25tH, of the weight of the SUppoIting stracture. Refer to Appendix 4.B
for a descdprion of rheseBDalysis methodologies.
4.2.4 Subsysl .. ms
In addition to various stlLu:biics described in the pit ceding sections. various
equipment and components that are supported wirbiu a sttuctUre can be considered
subsystems. The weight of subsystemS should only be a sman portion of the total
weight of the supporting strueture (ie less than about 25%). Example of
subsystems typically found in a petrocbemical facility include:
a. Horizontal vessels and exchangers supported on a strueture. weighing less
than about 25% of the weight of the supporting structure
b. ElecIr:ical and mechanical equipment supported within a structure
Co Cable tray. conduit, ductwork. and/or piping supported on a pipeway or within
abuilding
4.3 SEI.ECTlON OF ANALYSIS METHODS
4.3.1 General
When performing seismic ama1ysis of structures in petrocJwnical faC"1jties. two
options me COl "monly used:
a. Equivalent Static Analysis
b. Dynamic Analysis
For the great majority of cases, the equivaleIIt static analysis method is
apptopxiate to lateral forces and their cfisttibution. However. unusual
structures which haw signific:ant im:gaJarities in shape, mass or stiffness or me
affected by interaction with other strI1Cblr'es may leqDi:te dynamic analysis. Further
descriptions on types of i1:regnlarjrjt:s me given in Section 4.3.2 below, various
buDding codes, and SEAOC (1990). If a dynamic aualysis is perfomd. but
1d
ing
codes typically require that earthquake forces should also be calmtJatNl, or checked,
by the equivalent static method. Section 4.s.6 provides pme discussion on the
background and the ueed to perfonn static analysis in additiouto dynamic aualysis,
when one chooses the dynamic ama1ysis option. Other options avaDable inch.de a
. nonlinear static (pushover) analysis. This method is described inATC-33.03.
4.3.2 EquivaleDt Static ADalysis
This amIlysis option allows the 8D8lyst to deteuiline the seismic loads using static
methods. BnjIding codes typically contain MStrictioDs on the use of equivaIcnt static
8D8lyses for bt
n1
ding-JiIce SImCtU1eS, in particular when the structure bas a highly
i1:regular shape, non-UDifonn mass, abmpt changes in Jatc:aI Fffihess, or exceeds
c:ettain heights, Dynamic ama1ysis is usually required for dete .... iiling the distribution
of lateral force for these situations. Ideally. mass distribution is uniform over the
eDtire beigbt of a Sb'11Ctme. and the ceutloQs of mass and rigidity coincide at every
level. This ideal condjriou rmely OCCDIS in petrochemical structures, but the
distributions ue in general close enough so that the simpJffied code dismbtttion of
4-S
forces is justified 'IlIe engineer should investigate the issue carefully before
CODclmiing that the equivalem Slatic method is apptopxiate.
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 define structural irregularities t)'pica1 of petrochemical faC11itje!l
along the structural height and in plan view, respectively.
4.3.3 Dyuamic AaaIysis
This analysis proccdDre may be used for an petrochemical facility structmes;
however, it should be used spmffic:ally for irregular structures and for structures,
regular or irregular, Jocatc:d on soft soil profiles, such as type 54 in the UBC, which
have a period. greater thaD about 0.7 seconds. Various analysis optiOXlS, such as the
xespouse specnlJm method, 1D'tb0d using modal supetposition or direct
integration teehniques.. either lincBr or nonJinear, are avauable to the analyst. Section
4.s describes the dynamic analysis option in D10IC derail.
TABLE 4.1: Vertical Struc:tura1lrreguJarities
(fmm UBCTable 16-L)
A. Stiffiless lneguIarity - Soft Segment

lass than about 70 pelwat m that m the segment il!!! II...tiare1y above.
B. Wcigbt (mass) JneguJamy
Mass iDegalaJity should be mnsjdered to exist where effective mass of any
"'Fen' mtbD StlUCtUlti is _ than about 150 perceDl t:fft:ctive mass m
acljacmtt SOS"E"ts.
C. VenicaJ GeaIDllfl:fc 1mIgaJazily
Venical !\I'",p1elric im:saJariry should be considen:d to exist where h ... i ... lltal
cfuaeasian IaIeml fon:e resisting systtiIIl in any one seg ent m :.1liidWe is
more than about 130 pen=pt mthat in an adja,....,t segmcmt
D. lD-PlaDcDfscn.uju .. ;ry in Vea:icaJ I atem1 Fmce Resisting FJemc:nt
An iD-p1aDe ofi'setmtbelatmalload lesisrjugeleaeh's glC:aterthan tbD k:agth mthose
ele 'c"'S
E. DiS! mnjlQrity in Capacity - Walt Segn .. m
A weak segmtmt is one in wfrich strength of one segmeat SIr\1CtIIre is lass
thaD abom 80 peIwat mthatoftbD segmeaJ above. The segmeat:.1leDgth is total
mall seismic resisting elmnenrs sharing the segment shear direclian
IIJIder ccmsidezation.
TABLE 4.2: Plan Strac:tural Irregularities
(from UBCTable 16-M)
Irregularity 'I)pe and Defiullfon
A. TorsioDa1 J n e ~
TOJSicma1 iuegularity should be CODSiden!d to exist when the maximnm segment drift.
at one mtd of the stntctun: aansverse to an axis is more than about 1.2 times the
average of the segment dtifts of the two ends of the suucmrc.
B. Rtenuant Comm
Plan c:cmfigmations of a stIUI:IDre and its lateral force resisting system contain
leentlant c:omers. wlulre both pxojCdions of the SIrUCt11m beyond a n:entlant comer
a= gx== than about fifteen JICICCIlt of the plan cfimension of the stnlCtIDe in the
given di=:tioD.
C. Diapbxagm Discomiuaity
~ with abrupt dill> II "iQlriries or variaIions in :oriffi!"5S. including those
bavmg catam or opeD amas parer than about fifty peiCCllt of tile glOSS enclosed a=a
of tile diapbragm, or clxangcs in effective diaphragm 5
1
;
ml
ess of more than about fifty
percent from one segment 10 tile next.
D. OUt-of-PIane Offsets
Discontinuities in a lateral fDICe padi. such as out.of-plaJle otfsets of tile verdcal
e]emCJlIS
E. NonpnaDeI Sysrans
The veni.cal lateral load resisting eleu !CIIIS a= IIOt pm1Ie1 to nor S.1iwllCtdc about the
major onhogonaIaxcs of the Iatcxal force MSisting system.
4.4 EQllIV ALENT SI'A'11C ANALYSIS PROCEDURE
4A.l GeIleraJ
The concept of the cquivalcnt static aualysis proc:edure is to calculate the effec:tive
earthquake loads in tetms of a base sbI::ar which is depcDdcnt on the mass of the
structure, the imposed ground acceIeratioD, the dynawh: c:baracterlstic of the
structure. the iDherem dUCtIlity of the structure, and the importance of the struc:ture.
The base .shear is then applied to the structure as an equivalcDt lateral load. This
chapter also discusses how this lateral load should be disl I BJUted in plan and vertically
along the height of the strucll1re. Om:e this load is determined and distributed at
various clevatioDs of the structures. conventional static analysis techniques may be
used to determine the seismic load in each sttuctura1 member and at CODjlcetions.
4-7
4A.2 Determination of Base Shear
The toW horizontal base shear (V) for a regular flexible blinding-like structure in
any of the two orthogcmal JmjmntaJ di:rcctinDS can be determined from a fornntlation
similar to Equation 4.1 bdow. which is Equation (28-1) in the UBC.
where:
v = 7J.CWI&"
v = Base shear
Z = Seismic zone f8clor gMu in UBCTable 16-1
1 =-lmpoImn.:e factor given in Table 4.3
(4.1)
R.. = Resp .. nsc: factor given in UBC Table 16-N for lmildings
ami Table 4..4 of this dOc11U="t for petmchenrical facility nonbuiJding
stluttwes
W =Totalseismicweight
C = N111I1Mjc:al cneffieient detemrinrA from tbc followiDg fnmmla
C =1.2SSfr2'll
(4.2)
s = Site caefiicicnt for soil characrer.istics given in UBCTable 16-J
T = Fuudan*"hII period of vibmtion. in seconds, of the strUCtUre for the
direction um1e:r cousideration
The value of C JIeed not eyc=d 2..7S ami this value may be used for lIllY structure
without rcgmd for soB tne or stnJCtUre period. The minimum value of the ratio
CIRw should be O.07S.
In Equatjon (4.1). each pam""'er lepiesents a cenain aspect of tbc earthquake
loading as d"SCt'Ded beJow:
Z leprescats the lew:I of seismic groUDd motinn "rt= at the site ami is
thetefote sire dependent For cases where site sper:ific data exist. it is appxopxiate to
use the site-specifir: Z vaJae or site-sper:ific specttUUl in lieu of those given by the
code oflCCOXd. subject to tile appxoval oftbe local bUndiDg oflieia
l
.-
1 is a measure of the aeIevaat importance of the stmctwe. For mme important
stxuetu:res. bigher seismic: fim:es In Ph! ribed The importaDCc factor. 1. provides a
meaDS of increasing the design force levels for far:t1jties which may Jme aD mmsaal
hazard, have a potential for Jdcasing hazardous materials. or which are important for
eumgem:y response. 'IlIB I value for individual petroch .. "nical faC11itjM should be
reviewed with the owner BDtJIor the building official for those cases whc:ze items do
not fan UDder the code defi .. jrjoQ,S. Suggested values of 1 for pctroebcmica1 fa ... 1.
are given in Table 4.3. Note that an entire facility need not use the same value of I.
See Chapter 2 for further discussion on this topic.
TABLE 4.3: Importance Factor (I) for Different Usage Categories
SeJsm1c: f!eknric:
Importance Factor Importance Factor
ForStuu:mn:s, for Subsystems
Usage Categories
(IFac:tor) (Ip Factor)
Gem:ral Normal 1.0 1.0
Spec:ial 2:1 (Sec Note 1) 2:1 (Sec Note 1)
Hazan:lous 1.25 1.50
1:551'1 "iill 1.25 1.50
Note 1: QnHI"ifi"atjnn of JWpOIlIliil:e Fac:tars for "Spec:ialw usage c:aregory is
an uwm:r drr:jsjun, sim:e iUactUitS in this c:ategwy are Iila:ly to be
cIesjgn' for higher seimric fcm:es to plO1CiS an OWIIds invaiIMt
C reprcscmts poteDlial amplification of seismic fcm:es allowing for reJatiw
frequcm:y conteDt of the ground motion and amsidcr.ing the uatura1 period of
SUI1CtU1'e under consideration.
TB pmdm:t ZC lep1esents the spedlal acrderllion com:sponding to the period
of the stNCtute. For cases where a sitHper;jftc spectxWD exists, the spectzal ordizutte
concspom:ling to the period of the SI:J:UCtIJre may be used in lieu of the ZC value,
subject to approval of lmiIding officials Caze should be taken to allow for higher
mode: effeCts if the fun
d
!!D1!'!!!t
aJ
II8tUra1 period of the stzuct.uzc is larger than the
period com:sponding to the spedlal peak. One way to allow for this is to increase
the ZC factor by a factor of 1.s to allow for bigher mode: effects.
Appendix 4.A plesents COW1ie c:almt!arions of the fundaUCldal period of
vibration. T. for several typical st:tuctures c:o, 1 ji 1 mlly found in petrocbemical faco"liries
If using the UBC. it is J'CCO""lenried that tb= period be cietcmlj"M from UBC
Equation (28-5). Section 1628..2.2. couesponding to Metbod "Bw only. This fommla
is based on Rayleigh's metbDci and uses the sttuctmal pt0p5ties and dc:fozmatiunal
characteristics of the stzuct.uzc as de:leumued by a static IIIIIIlysis. For buDding-like
sttuctUltS only. Method a A W of the UBC may also be used in c!etepmjn;ng structUral
period. AltelIiatively. the fiwdanjlli"lal period of the stzIJCtDre may be es' ;"*''''4i by a
frequcucy (modal) analysis. TB engineer sbould use judgmeut as to wbicb mctbod is
znost desirable for applicalion at band.
Seismic weight.. W. inclncles the weight of the structIlre, attached equipment,
I;qUipnent aDd vessel coDlClltS (operating loads) and code-speclfiecI portions of live
and snow load.
R.. is a measure of emqy absorbing capability or ductility iDberent in a panieular
type of structural system or structmc. It represents an cquiwlent reduction in seismic
forces by allowing energy diSSipation once the structure begins to respond in the
jnelastic xange. For a mme detailed definition of this tenD, refer to SEAOC
When earthquake forces are calr:nJated using Equation (4.1), it is recommended
that R. factors be applied as shown in Table 4.4. That table compares suggested
values with those that. W01Ild Jikely be 1lSCd if applying descriptions provided in
typical lmiJding codes. which geucra11y are intended to descdbe bniJding systems
Note that the R. valDes 1i:tr 1lODhuilding structures in pr:troc:bemical fjac:tTIties, as
JeCOIiii!eodcd in Table 4.4, are generaDy smaller than those for b1Jfldings 'Ibis is
""='IJse lnn
1
dings tr:IId. to lam structural redundancy due to multiple bays aDd frame
lines.. Also, bm1ctinp "i'a'ai
n
DDDStrIlCtIIr8l elenae,.,s wbich effectively give the
bqilding gJeatr::r damping &lid streDgth riming strong ground DXJUon ltSpouse. The
should. evaluate die Ii' Filic _pouse cbarac:terildics of the spo ifO: structure
to detr:iwine if a more COJl5eI vative or liberal R. value than given in Table 4.4 is
apJiloprlate for cfesIp Note also tbat using higher R.. values in design tend to result
in a flcxih1e sl:nJCbJIe which will tend to increase calcn
1
atr:d displace! Ofi"'S.
For buflctinp and bm1tfiq-Jike st:ructures, codes typically specify a '!lilli!)I"I"
CIL value Farmnbm'cting-like structures, this ".ieej ".") mtio is specified
as 0.4 in the UBC. For peZmdemica! type structures which ran in the 1IDJllH,.,1cfjng-
Jib c:atr:gozy. it is suggesred by this committee that a lower "';ni"'u", CIRw value of
0.25 is apptoprlarc.
The lec:o"'i;endrd IC';"i"""" CIL value of 0.25 is based on a COqjl.j9)D by the
co!liilii!lee of theoretical base s'Jears cak:gJatM with DO limits on CJR... wrstIS the
COlfe..!jmjrcd base sIzears caJmIatr:d apply.ing the "'iuillllm
i
CIL values wbme
appIopxiate. 'I'JIe propouiuual im:rease of code-1jmitcd base shear aver tbewetical
base shear is Jmger for ntm
bm
1dirJg-Jilre sttactun:s than for \miIdings ami bm
1
cting-Jib
SUuctwes, evea with the "'ilth."",. CIL wlue of D.2S rather thaD 0.4. Funbm 8SM "e,
that increase in base shear also 0" ' 'lIS over a grearr::r period J'8DP for urmbm
1
ding-
Jib strIlCtIlJriS (typically 0.7S SOl MiS or greau:r for DDlIbm1tfiq stn1CImeS wrstIS 3.0
seconds or greater for lnl'1dings). 'I'JIe reason for tbis is because the R.,. values for
!lOI1bui1ding-Jib StIl1CtUies as suggesred in Table 4.4 me Jjmi'ed to S. aDd are usually
less than 6. as couapated to those for hnflctings, wbiclJ can nmge as lDgh as 12.
4-10
TABLE 4A: ll" Factors for NonbuiJding Struc:tures for
DesigD of New Petrochemical Fac:Uities
A. BUILDING-LIXE STRUcrtJRES SUPPORTING
Rw
EQUlPMENT (see DOte (a) at tmd of table)
This covezs SIrIICIUreS whose primaIy pmpo5e is to suppa"
equipme:m:, such as air coolels, hoxizontal vessels. cu:bmgm, Suggested
heaters. venical vessels and JI!8Ct()tS, etc.
L Steel struc:tures
Special momea:1I msisting frame 8
0rdiDaIy moment msisting frame 6
Braced frame
L Ec:cemrically braced flame
8 ~
b. Concentrically braced frame 6
Invmted pcndgJum type SIlUCtIlrC (camilcver column) 3
2. Ccmcrete stnrdm'es
Special JJ!QDICII! resisting frame 8
lDteti1erfwe 1'IlDII1MT nesisring frame 6 (c)
0rdiDaIy mrnnen:t frame Sed) ,
SlIearwaD
6"
Inverted pen
dnh
..... type SlrW:UiIC (camilcverpierlcolunm)
3'
B. EQUIPMENTBEHA VING AS STRllC'X'ORES Ru,
WllH INTEGRAL SUPPORTS Suggested
1. Vertic:al vesselslheatets, 1aDks, or spheres suppoi lEd by:
/
SteelskizU 4 (e)
Steel braced legs /4(1)
Steel or concrete unbmced legs - 3/
2. BoDen
Light sr=J framed waD with shear pazzels
6
Steel braced frame where Imu:ing cmries gmvity load
6
Steel cnclinaty tJ:ItlmN'l frame
6
3. CIIhn'*15 or 5CBCks
Steel guyed
4'
Steel CIDlIilevcr
4
CmlCleu: 4,
4-1l
Code
VaIue(b)
12 -
6
10 -
8-
3
12
8 (c)
Sed)
6/
3 '
Code
Value(b)
.-
4 (e)
3/
3 ,
6
6
6
4
4,
4
TABLE 4.4: RwFac:tors for NonbuUding Structures for
Design of New Petrochemical Fac:iIlties (ConL)
C. PIPEWAYS Rw
St.ggCSflXl CocIe
Value(b)
L bu.ll
SpeciallDOJIlellt resisting frame 8 (g)
Ozdinaly .. !nuDe
nlc,mem resmng 6 (g)
Braced frame 6 (g)
CantIlever column 4 (g)
2- Cmn:rete
Speciallilom"lll msisring frame 8 (g)
Lila" 'Mmte mO!1'!m! zesjsrjng !nuDe 6 (c) (g)
Ordinary mnmeD" resi
5l
j"gframe
5 (d) (g)
Cml' j
1
ever col'" ""
4 (g)
Do COOLING TOWERS
Rw
Snges''''
Code
Value(b)
L WoacIframe 8
(h)
2- Ccmcrete S 5
Eo ANCHOR BOLl'S
Rw
L
2-
Suggested
Code
.
Value(b)
AIIchorbolt)'ield or cdIIerchq:dJefallutemftl'pnk"M
Allor Allor
GiDtluJ SIlUCQde SUIiGtLlte
Concrete failure or IIIlChor bolt slippage wntrols, or (i) NlA
there is a llOJMlIIc:IiIe fanoe traasfer m ...... anism bet"tal
stn .. ." n: ami fOJDldatiuD
FOOTNOTES:
(a) for stnIdIJnIS suppcatiug equip""" whose WBight exc=fs about 2S .. of die
supponiug strw:ta:res, die IOWIlr R. COllesp mrling to die eqaipu&:Dt or
SIrUCtUle shoukl be used lor design of die entire stnzemre, IIIIiess jnsrifierl on a
c:ase-by-casc basis.
4-U
FOOT.NO'IES (Cont.):
(b) These vaIue:s are iDtetpm
18
,jnns of UBC Table 16-N as applied to
pettoebemical facilities
(c) Use Rw = 4 for modaate and high seismic zones for SII\lCtorCS less than SO ft
(15 m) in height. If SIn1CUlre is taller than SO ft (15 m) in height. C01iCtert
IMRF is typically not pcunitred by codes.
(d) Typically not peunitlcd by codes except in low seismje %OJJeS,.
(e) Usc Rw :: 3 whea DIt of tile skirt is gn:ateI'than 0.441 *ElFy. where E and Fy
are tile Y cnmg's Duxiuhw ami yield SInISS of tile skirt.lespe:ctivc1y
(f) The RJggI""'CId Rw is higher than tile wlue fOUDd in bnUdiDg codes. Although
codes typk:ally do not recogui7.e tile difference between biaced and unbraccd
suppan S1:iUCtURIS, this C) iiliiiljnee believes there is gIeaII:f emcrgy absorbing
capabiJity for biaced strUClUICS.
(g) Codes typic:aIly do not sr'" jfj Dy Jlll!ll!ion Rw for pipeways.
(h) The typical cocfe.spa:ified Rw factor for timber mdiuary braa:d fiamed
st:ruc:tmes is 8. However. cooPg tDWtI'S are also Jefeued to in Table 16-P of
tile UBC for Jlonbujlding SDUL.1IilCS with 8D Rw "" S.
(i) Shaald 0Dly oc:c:ar with sprcial jI's'i
li
:ptiau provided by mgin=r on a case-by-
ease basis .
Codes t)'picaD.y provide straightforward equations to calculate lateral forces for
non
bn
j1ding structllJ'CS which are rigid (T < 0.06 sec.), such as a short, stiff support
pier for a horizontal vesse1. For example. see UBC Section 1632.3. Equation (32-1).
Appcndircs 4.B and 4.C provide c""'l,les of detell!linarion of base shear for
typical petlu::bcnJica1 strJlCtUreS.
4.4.3 CnniblDation Stnu:twts
Combinations of stn1CbJral systemS are often lncozporated into the same
suuc:ture. Structures which inclnde IDCIle _ om: suw:tural system IeqUire special
attention.
NODbuiIding-like SI:rUCtDreS which support flcxUl1e nonsttuetural elermnts whose
combined weight ext ' ~ about 25'11 of the weight of the stntc:ture. should be
designed consjdering tbe dynamic: interaction effects between the structme ami the
mpported eh:rnrmrs If the weight of tbe nonstruc:tural eWleld is Jess than about
25'11 of the weight of the structure. or if the noDStr\JCtUral eleru .... t is rigid, inleIaction
e1fects m:ed not be considered. For structu:res suppmting equipmeDt whose weight
exceeds 25% of the supporting structures. the ST!'!l!u .... R., value, conesponding to the
either equipment or st:nlCtJJR:, should be used for design of the eDtire stmctuIe.
Appendix 4.B contains guideljnes for detel!llhJing base shear for noDblv1ding
structures which are a combination of more than one structural system (e.g., finfims
supported on pipeways). Specific guidance is provided for combinations of rigid ami
4-13

IlOJl-.rigid suuctUrCS., and Supported equipment weighing greater than and less than
25% of the weigbt of the SbiiCtIitC. Appendix 4.C also comams examples showing
calculatious ofbase shearforc:ombjnarilJll structllreS (e.g. c'lIamples 1.2 and 3.2b).
4AA Vertfcal DfstributioD of Forces
Lateral force distributioD in the vertical direction is a method for resolving the
base shear into static force equivaJcDts applied laterally to the SUUCtUl'e. When the
mass of the st:J:1JCtIUe is unif'umIly distIibutcd over the height of the structure (such as
bw
1d
ings), tbis fon:e distrihiilD'" is amnno.d to be JiDcar ("mverted triImguIar). For
multilevel bnihtings.aDd snuctures. the base shear, V, is distributed to diffmeut levels
ass"ming a tJ:iaDguJar ctistrlJmrinn offorces. This is a close repm:eDrarion of the first
mode shape of the strUCtI1t'eS. It also is iepxesentativc of the average of the shear
defl=tion and DKJmeat "eON I jna CIIiW for the {rmd!lD!!'!!\ta1 Jl'des An C
18m
l'1e of a
methodology to dis"Q'Dle JatmaI forces in such a way is found in the USc, Section
1628.4.
When the st:J:1JCtIUe 1D1Ckr mnsfdeJation is bfgbly im:guJar in sbape amlIor has
nan-unifmm mass disnibution vatically, the concept of lalemlload distiibDtion as
defined above is no longer valid. In such cases a pl0pe:r IIDIIlysis should be
c:ondncred to detePh,j"o 181m] load distn.1mticm.
4.4.5 &rizuJdal DJstributimi of'Forces
Om:e hc .. w!I!I1I1 forces for each elevation are de1e""i"M these forces are

distributed to each of the Ii ... jmmaJ load CII1't)'iDg elen'liIfs in the mtio of their
horizontal S!lIhsses Such 811 approach asS!!!P" that diaphragms are rigid. For
struc:tures with flexible diaphragms. the horizontal Sliffi; 'ss of the diaphragm should
be incoIporated wbea djShihlllj,'I horizontal forces into various load canyiDg
ele".,m
s
Attmmively. the Jateml forces should be psrigred based on tributaty
spans. In petrochemical fimr1jties lIqe .aDd rigid horizontal vessels suppottcd on a
st:J:1JCtIUe may be eonsjdcred to act as a diapbragm. An C?9"'t'le netbndology for
hwiwnraJ disnibntion offoD:as cau be fotmd in UBC Section 1628.5.
4A.6 TorshmpJ Eft'ects
-
Ben i.nnlal tOlsioldll "''''Mts occur in struc:tme:s with rigid diapbragms as a
resuh of ecccnllicides betWieii the ceute:r of mass ami a:ater of riPiitY at each
elevation. Other faClOiS also ldll ft.1Ite to horizomal to!sion. These an::
spatial
., 1 _11M ion
L yananaa gstrDCDm:s
b. the efiects of nan-straclUr.Il elements
c. 'IiUCiCl!ajntjes in c!efining the stJ1Jc:b:n'S sriffness cbaIaclffl isrics
4-14
Where torsioJlal irregularities exist, the effect of horizontal torsion can be
computed at each floor level and inch'ded in the at!alysis in accordance with
requhements ofbuildiDg codes, suclI as Sections 1628.5 and 1628.6 of the UBC.
Where the mass ]ocation for most petrt'cbenric:aJ facility structures can be
determined with reasonable accuracy, no consideration of accidental torsion is
necessary. Additionally, to a large extent structures in petrochemical fa ... 1jries
typically do not have rigid diaphragms. Therefore, for these types of struc:turcs, the
tmsional effects are mini!!lal However, if the mass distribution in a horizontal plane
cannot be deletminec:l with accuracy and the structure has a rigid diaphragm. an
allowance should be made for accidental torsion. .
Accidental torsion is typically accounted for by assnming the center of mass is
shifted in each horizoJttal direction from its calr.nlated value by a distance equal to 5%
of the structure dimenSion perpemiicuJar to the direction being considered. An
example of such methodology is provided in Sections 1628.5 and 1628.6 of the UBC.
4.4.7 0vertIlrniDg Potential
Bvmy structure should be designed and eva
h
'8led against potenrlal overcwniDg
effects ""'!Sed by cartbquale forces. The o ... ettwning moment to be ttSsted at each
level should be deteJ;mi"M using the seismic fo:n::es which act on levels above the
level UDder coDSideratioD. on evwy elc!TlP.Jll should be canied
down to the foundations.
Cbaptex 5 discusses safety factors to be used to check for potentjaJ against
foundation overturning for DeW fa ... 1ities In addition, Section 4.6 presents special
provisions that may be used to evaluate for foundation stabWty agaiDst OVett", "iag
for existing facilities
4.4.8 Sliding potentia.
Building codes typically do not requite any checks for stahiHty against sUeUng,
beca!lse bnj!cfjng-like strud1IrI:S are reqlJhed to be PIOperly secwed at the foundation.
Likewise for the design of DeW petrocltem;' '8] fa ... 'jties, almost an structures (with the
possible exception of large diametet' fiat bottom storage taDIrs) should be anchored to
their fOlllldatious.
Chapter 5 discusses safety factors to be used to check for potential against sfiding. if
needed, for new fa ... 1iries Section 4.6 Ql1!
lin
es require
ll
ft1t
s
for clwiking stam'ity
against sliding for stI1JCtUR!S in existing fa",1ities which are not anchon:d to their
foundations.
4-15
4.4.9 DIrectIODS ofEarthqaake Forces
For btn'ding-Jike 1>1lUCtWes. various bt,j1ding codes generally imply that
independent design for each of the principal horizontal axes will provide adequate
rcsist;lDce for forces apptir:d in any cIirccticm, and therefore. the design seismic forces
may be wum:d to act .uom:om:uneutly with certain cxcepticms; such as cohmms that
arc part of the lateral force resist i hg systemS in both horizontal directions.
For nonbuildiDg SI:rDCtDnIS in petrochemical fac:t1fties, the ICqUilem:ut that
earthquake forces are to be COJISidm:d to c:om= from any dh:1ICtion should be
carc1Wly ewh'pted 'I1Ie rcquiIem:ut that orthogonal efiPccs be cousidered may be
satisfied by designing such eJemenrs using one of the following methods:
a. Consjder lClO'J& of tbC nember forces due to loads applied in one horizontal
dittdion and 301J6 of the meill}..... forces due to loads applied in the
orthogonal horizontal dittdion. This is mostly done in hand coalcn
1a
tjons. and
it bas the advantage of majtring signs when perfotmiug various ('4IT!bjnarions
of earthquake loads.
b. Akematfvely. the elfts . of the two orthogonal dim:tious may be com.bined
on a square tOOl of the sum of the squares (SRSS) basis. This is usually
imp1""e
i1
ted in computer analyses. B..".nse the SRSS method loses the sips
of the tcmIS. use of the nsults require great care since knowledge about
member equilibrium bas been suppressed.
4A.lO VerticalMatiODS
Response ef'F:ts due to vertical CODipODCDlS of gromul motion are DOl usually
calcnlarec! They are cftDsjd. J i I ~ d to be allowed for by the followmg special provisions:
a. Combined vertical gmvity loads ana borizontal seisillic forces must be
cousidered In deSigHting \mjJdjng compouems. Uplift effects due to seiSi'Iir;
forces must also be considered. For materials designed usiIIg weilling stress
pzocedwes. dead loads are mukiplied by 0.85 wbr:n used to c:heck agamsr
uplift.
b. The following apply in high seismic zones:
- Ho.i7OI'1al CIID!iIIM:r compouents should be designed for a net upward
force of o.szw" wl!e:n: W, is the weight of the c:owponeDt.
- HoIiZM.aJ pl51lessed components should be designed usiDg DOl more
than 509& of the dead load for the gravity load, alone or in combimWon
with the Jatmal fcm:c effects
4-16
It should be noted that for fat:.Utjes which are located in areas of known
high seismicity and close to active faults, close attention must be given to
near field effects. Near field terminology is used when the epicenter of the
earthquake is close to a site of interest (see Chapter 3). Since
compxession waves attemtate much faster than horizontal shear waves, the
vertical component of the earthquake tends to be dominant only in the
near field. For these special cases, the designerlanalyst should give
apptopriate consideration to the effects of vertical accclenltions on design.
c. If vertical earthquake forces IIft\ to be considered explicitly in design or
analysis. they caD be obtained by scating correspondiag grolUld horizontal
acc:eleratioDS by a factor of 2J3 (higher factors may be required in the near-
field; see Section 3.A. 7). Ahcrnate factors may be used if substantiated by
site specific data. Once the vertical ground motion is defined. appropriate
CODSideration should be given to the d}'1WDic response of the structure in the
vertical direction. Member forces and m ",,,nrs cine to the vertical
component of the earthquake should be obtainrri and combined with the
forces and IDOments res
n
1ting from the horlzontal compoQeDt of the
earthquake in accordance with the procedure of Section 4A.9. RefI:r to
Chapter 3 for JDOJ:C guidance on the definition of vertical earthquake motion.
4.4.11 Subsystems
Subsystems refer to any nan-structaral elemmts. equipment and components
which IIft\ supponed by the structure IIJldcr consideration. Examples IIft\ horizontal
vessels supponed on a structure. It should be noted that tbe procedutes described
here for subsystems IIft\ SOD:ljli"'S confosed and mjsnsed with those for actual
structures. As a general guide, a subsystem is am: which is attached to a pxiwary
stxucture and weighing less than about 25% of the total weight of the suppoxtiDg
stxucture. Any component or stI1lCtUJ'e follJlded dixectly on soil/grolUld is not
considered a subsystem.
An equation sjnp1ar to UBC equation (30-1) caD be used to dete1liiili# the lateral
load for subsystems. In that equation, a texm C, is iDt:roduced as a JDeIISlJIe of
Bmplfficariou of groIIJld n:spo.DSe through the structure into the subsystem. based 011
the ass!I!"ltion that the subsystem is categorized as rigid. AzJy subsystem whose
period is less than 0.06 seconds is considered rigid. Subsystem periods greater than
0.06 seconds IIft\ c:onsidexed flexible. Refer to Table 4.5 for r=onmmd
ed
C,
coefficients.
4-17
TABLE 4.5: Horizontal Force Factor, <;,
Value
'R.1.ow.euts ofStruclures ami NODStrIJctI:InI Components ami EquipmeDt orc
p
L Equipment 0.75
1. Taaks ami vessels (meJm!e C07!I!!ms). including suppon sysrmns and
lIIChomge 0.75
2. EIecIric:a1. """JumjraJ ami pbunbing. distributed systems including
conduit, ductwork aDd pjpjDg 0.75
3. Marhinery ami c:qaiJ",cIII such as boilers, c:billm, heat excbangms,
JIIIIIIPS, air-bamfUng 1IDits, COIIInIl panels, motats. switch gear.
InmSfi IIII II!IS ami lJfe-safety eqWpllll'at
D. NcmstructaraI Camp'"''''
1. Chimneys, sw:ts. tl'l....,.t towers. rdadvely light elflated air cooims aDd 2.00
taDks on legs:
a. Sappolled on or JI1"QItCIiug as 8111111braced. cantIIever above me roOf 2.00
1DOIe tbaa ODe half 1bcirtllllll height
b. All others. iru:hufing thDse suppotttd below the roof with unbmcecf
pzujeclion above the roofless tbaa one balfits beigbt, or ImIced or 0.7S
to the suuc:tand frame at or above their ceutcrs of mass 2.00
2. l!xtmior and ime:rior oma
m
w
ua1
i01lS and appendages 0.7S
3. Signs ami bIIlboaPU 0.7S
4. &orap racks (mc:Jude amPMI'S)
S. Aach01age for peiil@n.,nt fIaor-Siippo.ted cabiaets aad book Slacks JDOJe 0.75
tbaa5 feet in height (mcl",t'C;clIIlMrs) 0.7S
6. Ancborage forSllSpmcltd czffings ami light fi:Clwes
7. Acc-n tloorSYS! 115
As aD alteili';VC to die DYfhDd pro\ided in the usc. other Olga'+jza'ioDS are
wod::iag on rules sad ploYiiio1lS for d ..... SDd evaluation of subsystems. Ouce such
akemative can be found in NEHRP (1994). 'Ibo NEHRP proviskms 0.
hapio.eilcnts over the USC pzucedwes in the sease that tbay allow for tile
foIlowiDg:
a. Subsystem mass ctistribmion, jncbuling dynamic pxopea'des.
b. Seismic response wbichiDcludes site cffcc:t5
Co Location of the subsysIma witbin the sttIlCtIIm.
d. Subsystl:m ancbarage cfncttlity and liCigy ahsoxption capability.
For tlcxible subsystems. the lateral force on the subsystem must be detezwjned
giving consideration to the dyDamic characteristics of both the primary structure and
the ~ These caIcn1atinns aze performed usiDg period calculatjons for both
4-18
the prinwy suuc:nue ami the subsystem to determine the extent of structuml
amplification. The resulting C
p
factor should not be less than those specified in Table
4.5. In the absence of such calculations. the value of C
p
should be taken as twice that
given in Table 4.5. but need nOl exceed 2.0.
If a subsystem is located at or below ground elevatiou. So may be taken as 213 of
that in Table 4.5.
The total base shear determi!led using the above procedure should be distributed
in pxopoxtiou to tile mass disttibution of the subsystem.
4.5 DYNAMIC ANALYSIS MEtHODS
4.5.1 General
Dyuamic auaJyses of structures are typicaD.y conducted using strnctura1 computer
programs. DyDamic 8D8lysis can be pedinm:d for lID)' type of str1JCtI1'm at the
engineer's discretion. However. it DDlSl be petfunned for cases where strnctnral
iDcgnIarides exist.
In m:ent yca:rs with the advances of the computer mUSIl' resnJting in availabllity
of high petfOJTDllnce computers at low prices. as well as availability of various
strnctnral BDalysis software packages. the option of dyDamic analysis seems more and
more attractive to engineers and is thus encouraged. In general, dy.aamic analyses are
believed to result in more accurate detenninario'l of the dynamic PXopelUes of a
structure and. hmu:e its response to a seismjc eveDt. They better capture local effects
in addition to global response. often leading to a more economical design of a new
facility. and avoiding 'll!!!etT:S!!ary conservatism in the evaluation of lID existing
facility.
In choosing the dyuamic atJalysis option. the analyst should have a good
UlIderstanding of the expected global behavior ami should review the dynamic
analysis results cazefillly. to enswe RiSpODse is as expected This is 0_ achieved by
COillparing the base shear with that obtained using the equivaleDt static approach.
4.5.% GI'OIIIId MotIon
The ground motion to be used in a dynamic analysis is defined in ter.ms of either a
ground response spectiwu (most COiiUim) or a time bistory. Gc:m:raJly. the grouud
response spec:ttwn is first definecL Cbapter 3 deS! 'j1 es the logic of the choice of the
ground motion and its development. The response specnwn shape is either a
standard shape scaled to an appxop:date peak ground acr+ration, or is a site-sper if'ic
shape. The spectnd shape for new design t)'pically COlTeSJlOuds to a ~ probability
of exceedance in SO yeatS and is generally defined for a number of damping ratios.
For petrochemical type structures, analysis is usually performed using the S% damped
4-19
specnal shape; therefore as a min
Unnm
, the ground respoDSC speena should be
defined for S% damping.
If a time history aaalysis methodology is chosen. tile ground motion ID1lSt be
defined in terms of time history of response (usually acceleration. sometimes velocity
or displacenxmt). Either actUal earthquake time histories or time histoIi=s generated
artificially to represent a specttal shape are suitable for use. However. in both cases.
the response spectLwn associated with the chosen time history s h o ~ matt:b tile site
specific response specttwn at the frequencies of interest. Cbapter 3 discusses the
devcIopmcnt of the ground (free..field) time-history for use in dynamic aualysis.
4.5.3 Mathematical Model
A finite eJemcut or Jumped mass model of the SU\JCtDIC is a mathematical
lepxesentation of the st:l'UCtIlre which ploperly aDows for the distribution of mass and
sljRj !l'SS of the sttucture to aD extent which is adequate for tb,e calcn1ation of the
significant featwes of its dyDamic 1CSpJDSC
A three dili ifi"sional snuc:tural model should be used for die dyuamic aaalysis of
structures with bigbly il1egular plan configuration such as those baviag a plan
iDcgu]arity defined in Table 4.2 ami having a rigid diapbragm. For mgular StLuctwes.
use of a two dimeusicmal model is 1lSWIIly adequate. GeDeIally. two 2-D mocfeIs,
each lepies",lfing aD ortbogcmal pI iiicipal axis of the sttuctwe. are dcveIoped and
used in the aaalysis.
Structures whose dyDamic response CaD be cbarar:rft'ize:d by eida' a shear type
response or bending type response. CaD be reascmably DKJdeled usiDg beam ';le
a
rn
rs

Three dirnensiODal finite eJement models nrir'7ing pJateIsbdl or 3-D solid eJements
may be used for more complex StlUCWies. .
4.5.4 RespoDse Sped! am AIIalysis
A response spectluw aaalysis is aD elastic dyDamic IIIIIIlysIs of a struc:tme ntifmng
the peak dynamic respouse of '!gniID ant modes wJ:dcb tUn" jhUltl to total SI:lIICtDral
respoDSe. Peak. modal lespouses are calm1ate:d using the Ofllln"es of the input
spect1um which COl1espond to modal periods. Msci"'''''' modal respanscs are then
combined to obtain tile peak. S1NCWiallespoase.
The foDowing coDsideIaticms should be giYCD wilen petihliili .. g a response
SpedlWD IIJUIlysis:
a. Number of Modes. AD signifi.:aat modes wbich capture at least 90% of the
panicipating mass of the stnJCture in each diRw:lion sbonld be incI!!ded in
d I e ~ ~
4-20
b. Camhi"i"g Modes. In a response spectzum aualysis option. the maxUmID!
response of the structure dming each mode is first computed. These modal
respoDSCS must be COjlihined in order to obtain the peak response of the
structure. Modal responses arc generally combined by the SRSS method.
However. the SRSS method may be UJlCOJISCrV8tiv for struc:tures with
closely spaced modes. Other more accurate methods of modal combjnation
arc also avaDable in ce.ttain structural programs. An example is the
complete quadratic combination (CQC) metbnd
Co DirectionalEffec:rs. The IeSpODSC of the sttuautc subject to two or tbrcc (if
requin:d) dircctioDlll componentS of the input motion should also be
combined in order to an Oill'l for dhectional effects when designing comer
clements Dim:tioml ef!'f$ arc usually accounted for by either an SRSS
or a l00%-309D-3O'JJ mcdmd of combiDadon.
4.5.5 Time History AaaIysfs
A tim= histozy aaalysis is gewally a .1DDIe complex and eqcnsive method of
pczfozmiug a dyuawie IDalysis. bat is c:cmsidercd to giYc a IIIDIC reaftStie estimate of
structural xespcmse to a gMa CIilthquakc than a respt'''''' SpecttWD aua1ysis. In a
tim= histoJy approach, the input is defined in tenDs of a time history of ground
motioD. Modal and direc:rioDlll ~ .... d';l!8tjons arc pcrti .... ed in the time or
domains, accounting for dnnni
nn
, ficqueucy CODteDt ami plils;ng for a particular
eanb.quab time histmy.
GeneraJly, two options me available for pcrfOlmiag time history aualyses: the
modal supeiJl"'WnU and tile diR:ct integratioA vJlenrs A JD"dat supctpusition
appzoach is sjnrlar in cone. to tile teSpODSC SpecnWD approach, with tile exception
tbat individual modal respnnRS arc obtained as a time history, and, as such, can be
combined with other VKJdal lespclDSCS in an algebraic 5eDSC ill the time domain..
Hcncc, the phasing betweca mndes is Iet';nmi. 1'11= diRct integration scheiD:
detr!lmiitf$ tile total IeSpODSfI of till: SUuctwe at each timcIstep by soMDg till:
equations of motion using dimcl iDregradun.
The above djsrnssion Phi! ems linear dyoamic time history BD8lysis. In raIe
occ:asious. one might IIH6d to pczfonn nonfincar dyDawii:: malysis. AIlbough, tIds
option is rarely used in pxacsice far petuwemical faCJ
T
1!fes. special chi .'IIiS'"mes
might wmaut a DonJincar aDIIlysis. Ouly tile direct iuJeg&atiDD """"'- can be used in
nc:mrmear cI.yDamk: aDIIlysis. In peti
n
liijn, UODJinear IIDIIIJsis, spec:ial consideration
should be given to actual sttuamalllODliaearity in eoutt8!tt to the dnctt1ity values (R..
fiu:toIs) which arc used as urans of Cilttgy djssipatioD capabtlity of a stmctmc or
structural system.
Sjmalar to the IHSpOJJSe specuwn aua1ysis, in a time history modal SupelpOsitioD
aualysjs. enough modes must be consideIGd to captwc at least 909& of tile total mass
4-21
patlk,q.aring In a dired httegtatiun scheme. by definjrjon, lfJOlJD of the mass is
. considered in the solution at each timr: step.
4.5.6 Sealing of Results
When a d)'DlIDIic amUysis is pemjll,*,d. various bw'ldjng codes p.umally require
that tb= base shear (after dividing by R..) be compaxed to that of an equivalent static
analysis. If tb= dyDamic base shear is less than tb= equivaJeDt static base shear. the
mn1ring espouse patant'ClS me scaled such that the dynamic base shear equals the
foDowiDg values:
a. 909b of the static base shear for megular buiJ.ding-Jike structures
b. 80% of the static base shear for regular bm1tf'q-like stmc:tures or
nODbuilding-like suueturcs
The ratiouale for tbis scaHng of the nsults lies with tb= fact that the eatthquake
force lewis dett:r:miued using the equivalent static method ieflect tb= infInenre of
period, dru:ttTtty BDd d'Fi'l'iug for V8Iious straCbJll'l .)steiliE Ilecense it is
djfIjcnlt to reflect these influ""'CS on a mnsistent basis for d)llllUlic analysis design,
the code requites the abow m:atioDed scaHng This is also tial to tb= fact that tb=
Fat DII90rlty ofbm1tting stnJctDres desig,uod using modem equivalmIt static ....rhods
8IId dnctiIe derm1ing requite"- uts ha.Ye, in general. peafi"""'" wen c1
w
in' past
earthquakes. In addition. scaHng is iDtroduced as a safeguaid against unmatistically
low fon:es obtained through irIapproprlaie mocWing ISS'''' q"jons
Be c lise stnJctDres in petiOCOO"; al tjy:01itjr:s lypJca1ly bIne simple and
straig
J
"
ti
uw81d strucmral canfigULadtms with weD. defined mass aDd SliFBI'SS
cbararte';stics. il is felt that tbis cade iequitCiDiiUt is not appxoprlato for typical .
peaoc )ellde al &cility st:ructareL However. Ie B"se it is -ape i&:aDy zequhed in
bw1ding codes, it is rec:oilii'C"ded that an indepIindcut peauevie:w be used to tIlSUl'e
that tb= seknric iaput and resuIIs PI' & .. ." by tb= dyuawic 8IIIIlJsis 8i1: adequate aud
rasoDllble to be used directly in design Special C8i1: should be tabD wJ:a the static
_)'Sis base shears IIIC much higher tban those predicted by d,yJwwic analyses.
If dynamic aua1ysis resaIrs judicare a base shear gzeaie. dIaD tb= equivaleDt static base
sbear, the dyDamic ana1ysis results can be ried down to llJOlJ& of tb= static value.
Howe,,,,, C8i1: must be CJLiilcised in doing so; there may be special chi iil!lStances
wbich Jesuit in increased dynamic rc SpiiN. such as togionaI e ,,, icky.
Son-Stmcture Interaction (Sst) Iefers to dynamic iateraction ...... s belween a
stnzc:ture and tb= underlyiDg son dming a seismic eWIIL SSI effila.'ts 8i1: pmut'unced
for heaYy embedded struclUres fD1mded on soft or nzdimn soil. and in geaeraI can be
4-22
ignored for light and surface founded suactures or smx:tureS founded on competent
marcrial (stiff or rcc:k).
For structures founded on rock or very stiff soDs. the foundation motion is
essentially that which would exist in tile soil at tile level of the foundation in the
absence of the structure ami any exca:wation; this motion is denoted the free-field
ground motion. For soft soDs. the w",,'a'ion motion differs from tbat in the free
field due to the coupling of the soil IIIIl structure durirJg the earthquake. This
interaction results from the scattering ofwavcs from the foundatjon IUld the radiation
of energy from the stII1CtD1'CI due to suuaural vibnItioDs. Beca
nse
of these effects.
the state of defolmaUon (panicJe displac. "' DU. ami accelerations) in the
suppmting soil is difieIcnt than tbat in tile iRe field. In tum. the dynamic response of
a structure supponed on soft soil may diffi:r sultstanriaUy in ""i'Htnde and frequency
content 1i:mn the response of an identical structure supported on a very stiff soil or
rock.
SSI efli:cts usually result in potenria
1
amplification or de-ampJification of the
structmal rcspcmse depending on the sir: SJiC" is,, mnditinns and the COhlbjmd soil
ami structure dyDamic cbaJw:t.,. is' Ics Generally. tbem reads to be. a sIdft in the
combined soi1-sttucturc DatWal period wIIm to tile period of the strucmre
only. Where profound, this shift tends to inczease the system period.
Methodologies for ccmsidering SSI cfIi:ds am available in the 1itetatme (Wolt
1985 aud NEHRP. 1994). These efrects can be simply allowed for. if the underlyiDg
soil bappe1iS to be. a WIiform Jlmjn" aud as sach, can be lepl '-!1
M
by an
equivalent sprmg aud a danqcr. If the underlying soil is layered, to properly aDow
for the cfIi:ds of Sst one must msort to mare ccrmplicated tecbnitpJes such as finite
element !III!Ilysis. or other alternate methods
a. The system period maeases
b. 'I'heon: is an 0ve:raJl reducrinn in sttuctura1 response tm1ess the structure
aDd the underlying soil happen to be in 1CSOnam:e ( ...... Mexico City.
mid-rlse mn1dings)
Co Subsystems wbich am mare ffcyjb1e may have .iDcreased response ami

d. The rocki1lg efti::ds are more profouad resnlting in higber sttw::tma1
displwemN."
4-23

4.6 CONSIDERATIONS FOR EXISTING FACII.1TJF.S
4.6.1 Geueral
The plucedmes 01uJined above apply primarily to the design of IICW fa",1jtjes
This section S!iliIl!II!hC; 5pe'
m
e gnidance for the evab>atiou of existing fa",1ities
Diffe.te.ut plWosopbies and methodologies arc apptoprlate for existing fact1jtjes for
sevetal lC8SODS. including the following:
a. Older faC'1jties were probably designed to earlier codes and ,.,...,dards
that were not as lelltlictive or apptoprlatc as CWle.ut sta:adards with
JlSpec:t to seismic design.
b. While the objective is to enhance the seismic safety of the aris'ing facility
UDder consideration, it would be vety cfifljt:glt to upgrade it to meet all
the tequhecuents of CUl:eDt sranciards.
c:. At the time of IICW design, the desil''''I can afliml to be IIIDIe
coaserWitive cx.mpazcd to the time of lctndit. wheae optioDs an: IIIDIe
r
....:.-.s in . . of d
'I1IIUaI mo ("Ig a pveD set SC'S"UC npgPLft c:r;rena
FanIki
F
'I' ne., it is also recognized tbat structarcs fmmd m fact1jties teDd
to be older, ami therefwe. were designed to lower 8MIIs of seismjc demand with far
fewer of the cJttct.ile detailing prov.isioDs fotllld in today's codes, thus iDcteasing the
Deed for accurate assesS!!!CDt of these SUuctDteS with apptoptiatc levels of dnctJlity.
4.6.2 Methods for Evaluation
1'helI: an: no widely accepted ami used med'U for ewtnating exisling .
_ fact1jties It is reeG"liie'lrlm tbat ID apPIOptiale ewb'ptjon
methodology incorporate on-site IIMews of the elislin. &1Iuctmes aDd
systems. as desc:ribcod in detaiJ. in Chapter 6, in COJUPnc:tion with app.toprlate aDalydcal
mriews.
0JIc metbod. which is CWlQl1ly bemg used in sevaal1llllilic qaljries in CaJifomia.
was developed to satisfy tile tequhelle
nts
of tbe stare-mandated Risk MaDa.gemr:nt
aDd Prcvcmdon Program (RMPP). for facilides with lhremJd quantities of cadain
Acutely Hazardous Materials (ARMs). Becau," tile RMPP criteria an: not readily
obtainable by pzacricing engin.ms, _ bave heeD im:Imfed in tb:i:r eatirety as
Appendix 4.F. Those criteria differ from a typical bmlding code approach in dID
following areas:
a. The metbod is based on uJrimate streDgth radIer than wOlking stress.
with the R.. factors for ex;,,;n, fa",
1it4
es adjusted to retIect dID cIiffaeace.
4-24
These new factors me tefeued to as Q factors and me generally lower
tban Rw factors.
b. The input motion used for new faC"1jtjcs, by definitiou, colTCSpOnds to a
ground motion with a "tD=m plus one standard deviation" msponse
specuum, i.e.. there is 84CJJ c:bance tbat tlIis motion wBl not be exceeded
at the site, given the seismicity of the region. In contrast., for existing
faC'1jtjes, the ground motion is defined as a rnr:djan re5pODSe spectrum.
This COllesponds to a ground 1IIDtion tbat has SOC1D chance of
exceedance. 'I'herefom, the ground. motion definition for evahwion of
existing faC'1jrics is less CODSeIVative tban a COlIesponcting motion to be
used for design of a new facili1;y.
c. The.importam:c (I) fiIctor to be used in Eqnarion 4.1 is always set to
unity (1.0) for cvaJnatiop of eaist ins fm1ities 1lDl=ss it exe c ds 1.0 for
"special'" stmc:mres at tile OWIitii'S request. In cuntlast, for design of
new faC'ljties, apPlopriate T factor. depending on importance of the
SUucttue and functioual reqaireliK "'S, may be higher tban 1.0 (as JIIIJCh
as 1.5) as spo iSeci in Table 4.3.
d. For evaluation of ellisHng facr1jtjes, site-spe> ifir. Z values and site SJlI" iSc
tespoDSC specaa may be used widIout the coment of the buDding official.
For new faC'Ties, if a si!e-spe# i5c Z wIDe or RSpODSC specuwn is
s}leri5rd which ctiff'ets Dam code 5p'"* ified values, the mnsem of a
lmt
10
mg official umst be ohraiued
For meting building-like sttuctIlIes, some guidance is also oifeIed inATC33.03.
4.6.3 Overturaiag Poteatial
In evalnariml of exi."ling stIIlCtUI:es. it is lccolllllcnded tbat the safety factor
against OyettutlJiD& be rmrited to 1.0; however. the dead load n..b'Ction of 0.90
should be allowed for. Altematively, more tefiued 0'fllilllcn1h, cbecks, SDCh as the
"Energy Balance
n
approach, may be used. The euetgy baJance approach checks tbat
the potential euetgy to OVettmD the muctwe is not exceeded by the imposed kinerie
energy cansed by the earthquake. Strain eutilgy eH=s in tile str:uctun: and. more
importantly, in the soil can be incbuled.
Appendix 4.0 provides futthcr des' 'i.ptilm of the energy balance approach for
c:bt&king against overtuming.
4-25
4.6.4 SIIdiIIg Potential
For structures in existing petrochemical titC1
1iti
r;,;, a factor of safety of 1.5 against
sJjcfing is recoliii i ended for fRIe-standing strUCtUreS that are not bolted or otherwise
anchored to their t'cnmdaIicms aud that caDDot otherwise tolerate movement.
For free..stamting stnJctID'es resting directly on soil, a factor of safety against
sJitUng of 1.0 at the foun
d
atio'3lsoB interface is CODSidered appxopJatc. as it is
obserVed tha: %IIO"YeIDCDt of follJldati'lJ)S resdng on son does not usually occur.
In the eWllt stiding di,uacea oent5 arC requirecl (for ex
81
i'l,te for evabladon of
tole.tance lequiremeulS, pipe displacements, etc.), the methodology prescribed in
Appcudix 4.E can be used. 'I'be methodology "!SIders the vertical upward
accele.tations pxeseut clming eanhquala:s that can redw:e the efli=ctiye :fi:iction force
l:IetWeeD stntcturc am! support smface. The ma,;n) " sfiding displacene
nr
can be
related to the velocity h:upa:rted into the sttuctme dming the earthquake.
T'm: history !ItItdiJ=s of d.yDamic srat..1ity show Ibat die CaIcWated maiilinU!
inertia forces act for _lu short ~ ~ of'-- .. direc:Don"""'" times . -3 _ ~ __ MW4m -J
during an earthquake. Considering these maw iii!"!11 forces as staDe forces for
pmposes of staJro1ity and sfiding IIlI8lysis is very ems i .ative. In fact. tile factor of
safety against sJicting and o'Wtatwuiag has been sbowu to drop below 1DIity for short
periods of time during the 9'imric evr:.at without fid!m& ThIs isb""m!!,,, any rigid
body iIlOVCIDent is arrested when dyamnic forccs decicase ormvase dhections.
4-26

APPENDIX 4.A
TYPICAL PERIOD (T) COMPUTATIONS
FOR
NONBUILDJNG STRUCTURES
NOTE: EquatiODS in tbIs Appendfx are preseated In Engllsb UDlts ouly,
as coefficients are developed for EngHsb IIIIits oDly
4.A-l
..... .. '.'" .. " ...... .. ... -.
A.
A. Natural Period ofVlbratioD - One Mass, Bending Type structure
w
*
3
T ..
E1g
Where: W .. Weight of Mass
H
I
H = Height of Caadle\Ia'
B = Mgdnlps ofEasric!ty
I = MOIIICIIt ofJarcia
B. Natural Period ofVlbratiOD - One Mass, RIgid Frame Type Struc:tore
Ta LB14 iC:::
ILl: i J. w
'Lie
h-
I,,-
For CoImnns IDDged at Base
B
2K+l
a=
K
For CoImnns FIxed at Base
B
3K+2
a-
6K+l

4.A-2
C. Natural Period ofVlbration - Two Mass Structure
where: c.. = DefICCIion at A Due to Unit LaImaI Load at A
Cw. = Defla:!ion at B Due to Unit LaImaI Load atB
c... = Defla:!ion at B Due to Unit LaImaI Load at A
WA:via = Smnmarion ofVi:nicalLoads atLeve\ AorB
See Example 1 for Application

D. Natural Period oCVihratfon - BendiDg Type Structure, Uniform Weight
DIstribution and Constant Cross Sec:tlcm
H
4.A-3
E. Natural Period ofVibratiOD - UDif'orm Vertical. CyllDdrical Steel Vessel.
,r
w
-
n

t

'0///0,
H
TaE!!(!!)2l2WD
10
6
D t
wbere: . T .. (sec)
W = We:islat (IbIft)
H .. Height (ft)
D = Dlammer (ft)
t .. Sholl ThicJmess (iach)
F. Natural Period ofVlbratiOD - Non-uafform VerdcaJ. CyUndrical Vessel
._."
To pcziod (sec)
I

!.E.03 .t.Ay
B .. cmntI1 heigbt (ft) .
w .. c!!striImtM weight (Ibsfft) of em:b sccIicm
H W .. We:isbt(lb)ofem:bCna uaadMass
D adlanetel (ft) of em:b sec:sioD
t.. shell tlddmess (iDdI) of em:b Ie ,iall
Ee mnc!p!ps of eludrity (miDjggs ofpsi)
II, II. ad Tille' .... melc!!lS far a giwDleveI
d F qll.'I on b,/Ihalio of tile be:islat of the
level above gmde to tile ovaaIl Jmi&ht. 4a
IIIId ATIIIe the dI:ffea ........ in thII VIIha:s of CIt
IIIId T. fram thII top to thII WIIIM. of ear:h
sec:sioD of .... ilihiil weight. diBm"'"' IIIId
tldclmr:ss Ills "'" ,i"rd ad far em:b
con' e"",,"" mass. Values of II, II. ad T
_ rainIIa!ed on tile followUIB 1abJe. .
4.A-4
Coemcients for DeIermiJdng Period of VIbration ofFree-StandiDg Cyllndrlcal
Shells with NOD-Uniform Cross Sec:tion ami Mass Dlstributlon
0.79
0.'18
0.77
D.804
0.762
0.722
4.261 D.999309
4.102 o.9!l9133
3.946 II.!J98923
T
4.A-S
G. Period ofVlbration - Generalized One-Mass Structure
y.. sattic deflec:rioD of mass raultiDg
from a 1araalload applied at the
IIIIISS equallIJ Us OWII weiJht.
See F .... mple 4 for appJil:aIima.
4.A-6
Example 1-TwooStory Concrete Vessel Support Stru&:ture
...
(
"
w.
~
1 ....
~ " .&.
II'
+
f.
-
... t Ir4
.,. ..
111'
w.
1
r ..

./.
.&.
_r.
Irt
...t
tr
trSQ trSQ
ao ..
UIMIII_I
roll'

R'Y'i'lPtt
---
.--
Two-Story Concrete Vessel Support Structure
Period ofVlbratioo:
Earthquake Pon:es (Trausverse Gircction - Loads on one bent)
W = 2D kips (includes stnlCt1:Ire weight)
Deflections from 1 kip at A ami B (calculations not shown):
c.. = 0.0384 in.. c.. = 0.0180 in.. Cw. = 0.0157 in.
Nams:
1. ~ 1 s
1I0II0I,,,,
Ioodiqill
_'UII
IIl=Iiaa
0IIiJ.
:z. Weiala
iIoo:Iud8
o.s
12(0.0384) + 8(0.0157) + [[12(0.0384) - 8(0.0157)]2 +4(12)(8)(0.0180)2 f.s
T = 2(3.14) 2(386)
= 0.234 sec
4.A-7
-,

EYJlmpie 2- UJdform Cylimlrical Column
"In most columns of COJIStaDt dlamerer. the entire mass can be assumed WIifOImly
distr.ibuted over the height. Where there are large concenttations of mass or
variations in c:ross-secrion, the amdysis should be made as shown in Enmple 3.
~ ~ ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - +
,
,
,
W.4IIIO UIIPr
-
-+'-511"
I
,
!
',. !p
....... _ .. -' t IW h
_I-
I
//
UJlifOlW Cy1imfrical Col!!mn
Period ofVlbratioa:
7.78 (100)2 (1.2.t6IIIb6)0.5
T .. '6 - .. 0.B98sa:
10 6 0.25
4.A-8
Example 3 - Column wllb Variable Cross Sec:tlon and Mass Distribution
w(lb.ll)

Au wAu
or
II
P
or
T AT ""0' .. ,,,.,
W (\hi)
WIIIII
r-
.......
.. III 2.103 1.Il0l
8'6" ~
25.5
'D.25
, 1,s1D \.1143 2,861 0.0122
"
.
1t-1/16
-to
.
3.5 I
0.622 '- 0.2111
0.9818
26.0'
1,5311 0.2835
--7',- ~
434 0.2l51 1,369
'D.15
....
1/16
, ...
'''IIO,IDO 0.260 0.1IOS222' 0.D9564"
... II ...
'0.1321
L
.'
" ~
3.5'
2.51D 0.D0325 8.4 0.0169 465
1' ... _
D.211 - o.mI7 0.6452
15.25
-t:
it-1/16 '1 1,250 0.001911 2.5 0.6452 3.494
/////////
W.393 1)=5,413
Example 4 - SphereOD Braced Columns
The common bracing sysrcw for spheres consists of x-bnlcing connecting adjacent
pairs of columns as ilIasttated below_ The bmcing for IaJ:Je sphenls subject to
earthquake loads should be effective both in tension and "illiquession to better resist
the lateral forces.
- - 4 ~ - Diam. =40'
1be shear in each paud ami tbD max
nmjmnm paud sbear could be found by
the foIIowing fommJa-
v
"
PLAN
Period ofVibratim:
vp =(2VhI) cos II
v_=%Vh1
v p .. JIII1II=l shear
v ..... = ii.diiiilinpmelshear
V .. IaIInl fcm:e
= 89'n I a afplaDls
II III qIe betw_ plane of
JIIIIClIIId dInicIIoD of
IaIInl fan:e.
The period of vibratiau. is found using the gcaeral fomuda for cme-mass SII:'IICtUIe
J=Viously. The sta'IiI: deflection, y, is found by de" .. ",jili"g the c:baJlge in length of
the bracing resulting fmm a total Jateralload equal 10 the weisht of the sphem.
Deformation of the oofumns ami balcony gilder are usually aegJected for cme-stmy.
NEVADON
30'
1
BllIdng
P a Ye.;"""" fcm:eiD IDace
= (lI2) (211 'l"'V6) (36.0J20.0) ..
450 kips
A .. ,."". in JeIIgIh of Ince
= PJ.JEA .. (450) (36.0) (12)Y
((29.000 (8.0)] .. 0.838 in.
Y - 4faine-(O.B38) (36.0120)- l.51 in.
Paiad ofVDnlioD, T _ 2s (y/g] CU
T .. 2s (l.511{32.2)(12)] CU = 0.393
- Crass-Se:niDMI
Area .. 8.0 sq.in.
_ T cngtb = 36'
4.A-10

APPENDIX 4.B
GUIDELINES FOR DETERMINATION OF
BASE SHEAR FOR COMBINATION STRUCTURES
4.B-l
A. MEIHODOLOGY
NON-BUILDING STRUCTURES SUPPORTED ABOVE GRADE
(WuO.2SW
s
)
{
{
Ws
WE less tbaD Q.2S Ws
TEless tbaD 0.06 sec_
(Rigid)
Sum!oJ:t SIIUcam:
V .. .!!E!.with Rw forSllUClllft: from Table 4.4
Rw
(Lump mass of l.=n with mass of SIIUCIIIre)
NOll BuilcJing Item and AI!cho!ase
Use larger of V .. O.5ZlpWE
or V= ZC, IpWE withCp fmIIITable4.5
(Note: use 2.0 x <; If support SUUCl1iie is
f1aible aad 2.0 x <; need IIOt exceed twO)
CASE I
Ws
(F1cIible)
Spppmt Sttucam:
V .. w i t h R w farsaw:asrefrom Table4.4
.Rw
(Lump mass ofl.=n with maSs of SU_o)
Non BuiI!!imr 11m! mel t\ndmrm;
DCW
Use Jarscr of V.. E
It"
wilhR (far Ciqllil' 'l)fmlllTable4A
..
c.:V .. Z(2.0 x Cp)l, Wa withC, ftam Table 4.5
(Nore: 2.0 X <;-.ueed I10t acealtwv)
CASE 2
4.B-2
NON-BUILDING STRUCTURES SUPPOR'IED ABOVE GRADE
(WE>O.2SWs)
Non-BuiIltiDg WE
Irem {
- -VI
Support
S\nICtIIre
{
Ws
WI! gn:arer1ban 0.25 Ws
Ts less \han D.06 sec.
Note: Case 4 may always be usal"
Suppmt SaW Iii .. !
with It. equal to the SIIIIIIJl:rof
tile values for tile cquipmeul
or saiiCWie from Table 4A
<=-.==2.75
C based on gmibincd system T
(Lump mass of item with mass of suiiCWie)
NOD-Building lIE!!! and A
n
5hemeE
Use laJpr of v" = 0.5 ZI, WE
or v" = ZC,l,W
E
wi%hC,fromTable4.5
(HOle: usc 2.0 x C; if SUPpuit SUiiCWic is
tbible and 2.0 x C; IIIIed DOt exceed two)
CASE 3
4.B-3
WE
Ws
WI! gearer\han 0.25 Ws
T E graDIZ' \han 0.06 sec.
(Rexiblo)
with It. equal to the smaller of
the vaIaes far 1he erp.ipii iC'!ftt
orauuawe from Table 4A
<=-.=2.75
C based on mmbined SysIaD T
CASE 4
B. EXAMPT ,F.C!
Example: Table Top Rl:hd'mced CouwClii SlnICUIle Supponing lteacIor Vessels
30'
16'
I t I I I
I I t I
J
Itt 1t2 Its
3V,a"-
I:!


3*-
1
.
1"1'
1
1"1'
1,.-
1
JD ID JD
f--
\.1 'Z,!I
" "
,
/
,
y

y.
,rr -X-6"sq
I-L...,..
4- l...!-
i It'
Jt
11' 11'
,
fRONTE EVA'llON
,

.... - .. - -.. - .... - ... - .... - .. ".-
. . . . . .

13.5'
1 1 I II


I
. . .. .
j- - - - - t i -- --- i -j- -. - - -1-
I

PESIGNPATA:
-WEIGHT:
3P.........,
StIIel P1atfmm
Support SU'III:lln
a fIXI'
.. 10"

TOTAL W .. 845"
'5,. I
-coNCREmDATA:
rc: .. 4_ Py .. 60ksi
I I I I J
I I I
, I
, I
Y
'T 11' T
sure E EV ATION
.-_OCI'AGON
OPBNING (TYP)
CKilEklA:
Z. .. G.4(ZaDe4)
I .. 1.0
S .. 1.5
R.. .. 4.0 (SeeNoie 1)
DETERMINE STRUCTURAL PERIOD. T :
By iDspcction, each of the reactors is rigid and thus the ftmdarnental period of the
combined structure will be determined based on the stiffness of the supponing
structure. If the reactor vessels are not rigid (i.e. T > .06 seconds), then the
structure may be considered as a two lumped mass system whose period may be
detcnnincd using other methods.
1) 'IRANSVERSE DlREClION
..
(
1 ) .. W .. (30)(30)' .. 67,500 in.
4
C gTtJ18 12 12
Assume (Ie) eff .. 50% x IJtIISS" 33,750 ill.
4
Be = S7J.4000 = 360S ksi
Assume the table top slab is a Rigid
diaphragm. (See NOli: 2)
Support stiffness per Bent :
For simplicity, assume as a lDomem wi1h
iDfuIite1y rigid girder.

H3
12x3605z33750z2
..
(14.67z12)3
=535 kips/ill. (pc:rbent)
D{ .. 4zS35 .. 2140k / fa.
FmvIamenta
J
Period :
Too2ft.J:!
wIIere: M .. toIIllDISS of vessel
+suppcA1
Ie. = suppmts'iFfne
ss
=D.20Sec.
NO'IE 1: The suppcnliug SInICIUnI is a COlII:Zefe special momem-reslsring ti'aD!e. theu.Io,,:, UIIIIer
mdiJwy QrnunS!l!!!rljS iIs R. equa1s 8.0. Howm:r. !w;cause the v.oeight of the vessel
dmninares that of the SUIICtiIle, WIll c:IIoosc DOt to use Case 3 (as pr ,led ill the
methodology section). Inqead WIll consider the combined sullCUile to be leptwe,da';ve of
Case 4. wi1h the sysrmn R. rakea to be that of the vessel suppcnled by a steel skirt, i.e.. R. ..
4.0.
NO'IE 2 : If diaphragm is DOt rigid, then the period calculatiOD should be pmonm:d based on the
Irihutary JDasS per bent.
4.B-S
v
--
DETERMINE BASE SHEAR:
Similarly like in Ihc tmrISvase
diJectiOD, Ihc suuc:tum1 period of
Ihc Suppon can be deLhi lIIined as
foIlows :
Fumfamenta! Period:
T=
2Jr
i M
:IX


.. =G.2Sec
214W86.4
Since Ihc pclriod and R.m boIb Ihc same in both directioDs. SO toll will be Ihc base shear.
V ..
R",
R", =4.0
L2SS l.25zLS
C ... -=
r 13 (o:JJJy.1 3
C 2.7S
-=-=o.6!l>G.2S
R,. 4.0
V = o.uLO.lO.69zW
=0.276%845
... 233 kips
4.&-6
LATERAL FORCE DISTRlBUTION :
Since the subject table top sauctUrC has a rigid diaphragm. the lateral force is
distributed to each bent per its relative stiffness. Since the stiffness of each bent is the
same. the lateral fcm:e to each bent is essentially identi.caI.
TRANSVERSE DJlU!ClION :
F._-
.,..

I

I

2/3x3Oo4O' !
I

+
F._
&=30'
IL= 16'
LONGInlDlNALDIRECIION:
Wt.of SIIf11HJTl.
(V-Ft)wzh
F. co %
% I W I ~
Whcm F.., = Force at level x
F
t
= Force at top level
SiDceT <0.7. Ft=O
(610)(36) x
&= (610)(36)+(235)(16) 233=I99kips
Same as far lrailSia ... dncrion calm1eted above.
4.B-7
APPENDIX 4.C
DETERMINATION OF BASE SHEAR FOR
SELEC1'ED STRUCTURES
4.C-l
Base Shear Remarks
Fp=ZlpC,Wp V=O.5ZlpW
1.1 on !hIck skirt
Ancborage 4.0 0.69ZlW

Q
1'1
1.2 Suppotted 011 sbUcture
a) For Wv S 25,'Jo WI Vessel&: Zl.,x2x.15W. Rigid or flexible
Wv
anchorage equipment supported on
flexible structure
Special Support structure 8.0 0.34Z1W
Moment Resisting
Frame (SMRP)
steel OrdiIlll1l' Moment-
6.0 0.46Z1W Non buildIng structure
Resisting Frame (OMRP)
wltb structure system
&: conc. Intermediate
similar to building
Moment-Resisting

Frame (lMRP)
Ws b) ForWv > 25'Jo Wa
Vessel &:anchorage . 4.0 0.69ZlW
steel &: cone. SMRF.
and support sJtucIure
steel OMRP. and cone
.. '
-

EqulpmenUStruclure Types Componenls
a. Base Shear Equation Remarks
2.0 Horizontal vesselslExchangers
V=zg
~
Fp"'ZlpCp W. V=O.5ZlpW
2.1 On shortIdgld piers
~
-Ji)
Forbotb Vessel and anchorage
ZIp" 213"
-1
,-
longhudlnal and
transverse dlrecllona
.75W.
rr < 0.06 sec) Support struclUre
o_.sZlpW Non building structures
2.2 On IIeltlbte plersllees
(
r-
)
r
=:t
For both Vessel and ancborage ZlplI2.o.myJ
O.sZl.W Use larger of two
longitudinal and
.-

. transverse directions
T>D.06sec Support structure 3.0 0.92ZIW Considered as Inverted
... _.
-
pendulum structure
EqulpmentlSlructure Types Components R. Base Shear EqnaUon Remarks
3.0 Alrmoled exchangers (On rans)
V=ZiCW F,=ZI,C,W, V=II.5ZI,W
R..
3.1 Mounted at grade
a) Longitudinal bent Braced frame 6.0 o.46ZJW Non building Sb'UCture
concentric steel brace frame with a structural system
similar \0 buildings
b) Transverse bent 81_ OMRF Moment frame 6.0 O,46ZlW Same as above
3.2 Mounted on top of plpeway (less
Ihan 25" of structure weight)
a) Transverse bent
SteeJOMRF Flnfen design 6.0 0,46ZIW Zl.l2xW. Use larger of two
I'
"-
Sa
....
I I
:-' Steel &; conc. Plpeway design SEB ITBMNO Include reaction from lin
~ & e
SMRFor 4.0 fan
OMRF
b) Longltudloal Bent
A
Steel concentric Fin fan design 6.0 0.46ZIW Zl,.x2xW. Use larger of two
X
braced frame
lX lX
(COP)
,
Steel collcenttic Plpeway design SBB ITBMNO. Include reaction from lin
braced frame 4.0 fan
(COP)
"
CoDCJete SMRF or Plpeway design 8BB rmMNO. Same as above
OMRF
4.0
.
,
"

'. '"


-
EqulpmentiStructure Types Components
R. Remarks
4.0 Plpen"
V=ZHa! F,=ZlpC.W, v=o.szlpW
R ..
/'
I !c{ \ Ii'" V' Traasverse
"'V \' I' .,
l IF: IF l I
l IF
4.1 Steelframe main plpeway SMRF B.O O.34ZIW Non building structure
a) Traasverse benl OMRF 6.0 0.46Z1W ---
with structuml system
similar to building
b) longitudinal benl EBF B.O 0.34Z1W-
COF 6.0 O.46Z1W
4.2 Concrete I'rarne main plpeway
B) Traasverse bent SMRF B.O 0.34Z1W
Non building structure
IMRF 6.0 0.46Z1W
with structuml system
OMRF S.O O.s$Z1W similar 10 building
--
b) longitudinal bent SMRF B.O 0.34Z1W
1MRP 6.0 o.46Z1W
OMRF S.O O.SSZlW
Steel Bracing 6.0 0.46Z1W
4.3 SleeUconcrete candlever stanchion Candlever Column 4.0 D.69ZlW Nole difference between

plpeway and Inverted
pendulum
I
.1

'W"
.... ,
EqulpmentlStrudure Tft1!8 Componmts
It.
Base Shear Equation Remarks
5.0 Horizontal box healerlfumaee
V=ZI!a! r,..ZI,c.w, V=O.!IZI,W
a;;-
S.I LongltudlnallJraced frame and/or shear
panel
rSn
CDP or shear panel 6.0 o.46ZIW Non building structure
deslsn (usually with structural system
redundant system) similar to building
X X
-
S.2 Transverse momml frame
A
~ I
OMRF 6.0 0.46ZIW Non building slrueture
with structural system
// similar to building
~ ~
S.3 Tall concrete p1erlpedestal pier/pedestal 3.0 O.92ZIW Inverted pendulum type
system
EqulpmentlStnu:lure Types Components
R.
Base Shear !quaUon Remarks
6.0 Vessel on bracedlnnbraeed legs V .. ZICW
F,=ZI.C.W,
V..o.sZlpW

6.1 Sphere (wllhoul top girder or
stiffening ring)
Sphere and bnu:ed 4.0 0.69ZIW Noo building structure
frame design
Use same base shear for

design of anchorage and
support structure

6.2 Stack/cylindrical furnace.
vertical vessel. or hopper on
cantilever or braced legs (wIthout top
girder or stiffening ring)
r"o
Steel bnu:ed legs 4.0 o.69ZIW
Steel cantilever legs 3.0 O.92ZlW
- --
- Concrete cantilever 3.0 o.92ZlW
l;..
.
EqulpmenUStructure Types Components
R.
Base Shear Equation Remarks
7.0 BoDers
V = ~
F.=ZlpC;Wp V=O.5ZlpW
R,.
~
'(Jf
0

Light steell'tamed 6.0 0.4fiZ1W Non building structure
wall with structural system
lransmse or similar to building
Steel braced frame
where bracing csrrles
II
gravity
II"
or
SteelOMRP
,,&LJil
J ' ~
b!!ngltu!!ll!!!!

Equlpment/Struclure T7Jles Components
R.. Base Shear Equadon Remarks
B.O CooJlng Tower V ..
B;
Fp=ZI.C.
W

VaO.5ZI,W
~ L r l L U 1
""'
Tnmnme Wooden braced B.O 0.34ZI\V Non building slructure
frame willi SInIclural syslem
similar 10 building
I I I I I I
I L___________________ I
LonBll!!!llnal
APPENDIX 4.D
STABILITYCHECK USING
ENERGY BALANCE APPROACH
(ExistfDg FaclUties Only)
4.0.1
.- -, . , .. ..
4.D.1 INTRODUCTION
The factor of safety against ovenuming under static loading is defined as the ratio of
the resisting forces to 1lIe Ol'eJlIllDing forces. However, this classical approach may be
overly conservative when used for earthquake loadings since it does not recognize the
dynamic cbaracter of 1lIe loading. The methodology described in this Appendix is adapted
from material presented by lhcbte1 (1980) and presents an approach based on energy
balance. In this JlM"l1Iud, the factor of safety against overturning during earthquake
loading is defined as tbe ratio of potential energy (Pee) required to cause overturning
about one edge of the SUilCtUie to the maximnm kinetic energy (Ke.) in the structure due
to the earthquake. This factor of safety should be at least 1.5. Presented below is an
overview of the methodology.
4.D.2 CALCULATION OFFACI'OR OF SAFEl'f AGAINST OVERTURNING
The structure is ronsjdered unstable in the overturning mode when the amplitude of
rocking motion caJlses tbe c::cmter of strw:tura1 mass to reach a position over any edge of
the base (fig. 4.0.1). 'lh: hO'hanis", of rocldng motion is that of an .inverted. pendulum
with a vety long natmaJ p:dDd co"'pared with that of the linear, elastic sttuctura1
response. Hence. so iiIr as Oieilw iii", evaluation is c:ont:eIned, the structure can be
treated as a rigid body.
The factor of safety api'iSlI overtuming (FS) is given by:
IJ1urr.
; ~ .. !!.
KE
PE = PoteD1ial-zy m GiaimO tbe suucuue
="" All
1( = rmeric eDaIY of Cllllhquake input to tbe SIrUCUIte
= ~ m y 2
2
m = tmal massofdleitliLllUe
g = ecceImatinn ciaem pPity
V = I"'$QlI!!!!t II1II1 of tile SII1ICQD6
All = height to wIIiI:b __ of _ of tile SIrUCUIte must be lifted
to reach 0'",'" IIhcpwizion for a block as shown in FigAD.l, All is given by:
All =(1i
2
+f) 112_1'
1i co heightof_of_
L 12 = half widIh of lllana'aide of suucuue
4.D-2

The factor of safety, ps, is then given by:
FS= mg/lh
lI2mvl
The velocity. V, is calculated as follows:
Total venIcal velocity, Vv = (Vvg
2
+ VvS2)1I2
Total x _ direclion velocity, Vz = (VZg2 + VZS
2
)1I2
Totaly-direclionvelac:lty, Vy = (Vyg2 + VyS2)1I2
where:
Vvg, VXg. Vyg me the peak JlOU"'d velocities in the vertical, X and Y db:ectiODS
Vvs, Vxs. Vys me the sttuctQre velocities in the vertical, :It and y directions
Using the coJl\POilCll1 factor method to obtain total struc:tum response from separate
lateral and vertica1 analyses. there me three diffCImlt load combinatiODS to consider:
CombinatiOD I: 100% Venica1 + 30% Horizontal :It + 30%BorlzODtal y
v = [Vv
2
+ (D.3Vz)2 + (D.3Vy)2j
= [Vvi + Vvs
2
+O.o!l(VZS
2
+ V.a:r
2
+ Vyg2 + Vy.f2)j
Combination 2: 3O'JD Vertical + 100% Horizontal :It + 3QIH, Horlzcmtal Y
v = [O.o9(VPg2 + Vvs
2
)+ Vzs2 + V.a:r
2
+ D.09(Vyg2 + 'Vy.f2)j
CombinatiOD 3: 30% Vertical + 3Q1J& Horizontal:lt + lOOCJfJ Borlzcmtal Y
v = [o.09(VPg2 + Vvs
2
+ Vzs2 + V.a:r
2
) + Vyg2 + 'Vy.f2j
For cases where the spet:ified :It and Y horizontal grou:ad motiolls and structma1
responses are the same fI.e.. conservatiYc use of the peak of the velocity respoDSe
spectia). CombjnariODs :2 and 3 me irfenricaI and htmcc 0Dly two load combjnatimls need
to be considered.
Note that in the above computation of total vertical and horizontal. velocides., the true
relative velocity is IIK)Je appropdate to use than the peak groUDd velocity. However, for
long period osc:t1!ators, this value approaches the groUDd velocity. wbi:teas the commouly
used pseudo-spectral velocity tcDds to zero. Therefore. to guard agaiDst tbe use of
velocities that are below the groUDd velocity. the peak pound velocity bas been acfded to
the estimates of the peak structural velocity. No peualty is aV<Jciated with this
conservative approach since the factor of safety is ordiDarily a very large D I I " ~ c r , despite
4.D-3
" " , ..
the usc of conservative peak velocities. The peak horizontal ground velocity can be
obtained from any 6:pproptiate source. It is recommended that, lacking other informatiOn,
a value of 4 fUsee. for 19 n.h;"",," ground acceleration can be used for competent soils
(Newmark ami Hall. 1982.). For the vertical ground motion, the peak ground velocity
shall 'be 2/3 of this value. Structure velocities can be obtained knowing the structural
periods ami the applOpr_ acc:eleration response spectla in all three diIec:tions.
4.D.3 OtHER EFFEC'lS
The above analysis 'su"'es rigid body rotation about one edge of the structure that is
not free to work. Othm' efFrrts such as soil flev"ht1ity, embedment ami buoyancy can
signific:antly iIIfluence the CUnqhiled factor of safety depending upon local conditions.
4.D.4 EFJiECl' OF SOn. J'lEXJBB.JTY
Considering son flexibt1ity bas two significant effects. First it changes the axis about
which "effective .. rotation '" itS The axis of rotation moves inboard from the edge of
the struc:t1m:., as shown in Fig. 4.D.2., towards the ccmtcr, thereby making it easier to
rotate the structure towm:ds instaJriJ/ty. SecoDd, the son can DOW absorb energy (since it
has :fIcxibiIity). The anw ..
ml
ofaueJgy absorbed can be significant ami this effect adds to
the "Icsistance" to overnld!ing The iDstabiIity equaIion now bee. ,mcs
ICE = PE+SE
where:
SE = sttain eneq:y of the soil block
A &.ctor of safety of 1.5 is DOW required on the angle cansing ovextuming versus the
angle at which the above eqhH'inu holds true (Le., 9ovl8 1.5). A chec:k of the computed
maximum son pressme apinst tbe allowable bearing capacity should also be pcrfoIIneci.
4.D.5 EFFECI' OF EMBEDMENT
Embedment gives rise to additional teSistance agaiDst overtuming due to the side
passive soil piasswe COl.;')' led as follows.
Let"d"be the depthofendwlncnt sad "d'" be the mne.ged depth wbere the poUDd
water table is above the c:kovatiun of the base. The i1rUCture is asslll!tf!d to rotate about
the toe edge for the OiCilhiiliiu, evahtation. To simplify the aua1ysis for practical
pUIp05CS, only the passive son pie5SUie developed on the toe-side is CODSidered, and the
wan friction and action ofdle soil on the opposite side of the structure IR neglected. 'Ibe
passive pressure diagram is mndHjed to be c:t'nsisteJtt with the ass"mption that the
structm'I:: rotates about ODe edge. Fi" draining son conditions are also as!!1mgcf Figures
4.D.3(a) tbrough (c) &bow die J'P!sn1tant idcaU.".d passive pxessurc diagram (Pol for
different c1evations of the pIIIIld water table when it is above the base (i.e.. d' 0).
4.D-4
As was the case when consicleriag soil flexibility at the base of the strIlCtU1'e, the effect
of embedment is to include some strain energy absorbed by the soil in the instability
equation KE = PE + SE. Calculation of the strain energy can be performed through
integration of the pressure and strain diStlibution over the volume of soil affected.
4.D.6 ElF'ECT OF BUOYANCY
When the ground water table is above the base (d' > 0), the buoyant force has the
effect of increasing the OlO!\X.tUming potential of the struc:ture. The buoyant force B acts at
the centroid of the volume uf water displaced by the subme:tged ponien of the st.-IlCtUre,
and its magoitude varies during the Ove.ttllOling process. At. any position before
overtuming takes place, t'Je centroid of the displaced volume of water is located at height
z above the elevation of the edge R and the corresponding buoyant forc.c is Bz
(Fig. 4.0.4). The work done Ly the buoyant force is:
where Za and Zt. are the heights of the centNld ofbuoyaDt force above the edge for the
. equilibrium and tipping positions. respectively.
In the instability equation, the work done by the buoyant force is additive to the kinetic
energy imposed by the earthquake, i.e..
KE+WB = PE+SE
In addjrinn to buoyaucy effects, if the block is sitting on saturated ground, suction is
created when the block tries to lift off. It should be noted that the positive effect of this
suction in resisting overturning is difiicuIt to quantify, but may be much larger than any
effects of buoyancy, especially wben the water is vmy shallow.
4.D-S
,....... POSmON (B)
POsmON (A) , ........
.... ....
" ........ ,
...
"
, ,
, ,
I ,
, .... J' .. ----- .......,t /
.,.,......... f.M I .Ma,
H ...... .. II. I fI--r-
.......... ! i l -
.. ,.. ;; II
...... "
.... 1/
.. _Ft;:, ,,7.,,", *'" , ,"", ..
1
Vertical
Excitation
LI2
Figure 4.D.1: Position or the structure when 0vertumiDg About One Edge
4.1)..6
Ayl
,
,
I
)t
Mass
M
.... -
I e
I
B
I.
I
I
I
LI2
I
I
I
,
I
I.
I
I'
I
,
I
,

KE .. .!.mv2
2
PE=mg(LI2-B)(I
SE .. 5uainEm:qy of SoiIBloclt
.. 1/2cr AV (EAV) (VobameofSoilBloclt)
CI AV .. Avc:rapsuess in soil bloclt
E
AV
.. Avc:rapSllllininlOllbloclt
KE .. PE+SE
!!!! > LS (faclor of safety of 1.5 against OV&WiaiDg)
(I
CI_
tfllAJl < a.w. (c:brd; pnsSiUe lesstbalUlllowablc baring c:apacity)
FIgure 4.D.l: Effect of SoD FlexiblJlty
4J)..7

T
z
1
d=d'
(A)d'=d
~
p;
. r'
...JZ.... _.-
-
\
f7
d'
~
(B) dfl <d' <Ii
d'
(C) O<d'<dfl
FIgure 4..3: Idealized PassIve SoD PressW'l! for (hC1turDiug About Edge R
4.0-8

tJ

m


0

t9
i=t:

1:1
..J
e.g.,
.j
I>
/1
J
ri
J

e
I

c
a-
S

I
1
z
0
-
to
t:

i
!
:E



...
=
d
tJ
:J

-
f
g
J
f;J;j
.-.
..J <

....,

4.0-9
APPENDIX 4.E

OF SLIDING DISPLACEMENTS
(Existing Facilities Only)
4.E-l
E.! INTRODUCI'ION
The occunence of sliding of the structure as a rigid body due to earthquake loads does
not necessarily lead to a failure mode as long as sliding is within tolerable limits. A
J]J'!a",rre of the factor of safety then is the ratio of the calculated to allowable
displacements. The methodology describecl in this appendix is adapted from material
presented by Bechtel (1980) that fOnows and procedure originally developed by Newmark
in which an acceleration. ng
t
is defined that would just cause a rigid block to slide.
E.2 ME1HODOLOGY
A.sstmring asiDgle acceleration pulse, ofmagnitude tlbg and of duration II. is applied to
the rigid block (Fjgure 4.E.l-b). a velocity plot. as shown in Figure 4.E. loe. can be
coJlStrUCted. Given the ma!juNhI horizontal ground velocity. Vilma.. time 1/ is then
estimated from: .
The velocity due to the UlSjding acceleration is given by ngt. At. time 12. the two
velocities are equal and the rigid block comes to rest relative to the ground. From Figure
4.E.1-c, time t2 is given by:
~
t .. H_
2. lIB
The maximum displace"e"t of the rigid block relative to the ground is obtained by
integrating the velocity curves up to time 12 and subtracting the n:su1ts. This is equivalent
to COmputing the area of the shaded lriangle. The maximum is then given by:
A, = Me ,h,,,,,," sUdiDJ .'1;'" e "e",
V .. M"jhhiili IDIIl wlacllyof1hcS1lUClllnin 1hcbwiUlillaJ diMclion
H_
I '" Acm1enllian - to JIIl'VitY
I1.h .. MaJimmn total hi +iMp"'" acce.\aation in g' 5
n" FIacIicm of gIlh" .a' acce.\enIIion tbat would cause the SIrIICIIIre to slide
.. "U-I1.y)
Jl" Coeftlr:lau of fiietiuo between S1IUCIIIn lUid ground
11. .. MaJimmn vcaicalllX:elaation
11
4.E-2
Using the component Iactor InetDOQ, "n-............ -- ______ _
Combination 1: 100% Venical + 30% Horizontal x + 30% Horizontal y
112
V
H
_ = [0.09 (v.%i + If.D2 + Vyg2 + 1IyI2)]
all = [ 0 . 0 9 ( ~ +,,;)]112
1I=1I(1-a.)
Combination 2: 30% Vertical + 100% Horizontal x + 30% Horizontal y
V
s
_ = [(V;rg2 + V%l
2
+O.09(Vy,2 + Vy.l'2 )J1I2
all = [a%2 +O.09a
y
2f
II = II (1- D.3av)
Combination 3: 30% Vertical + 30% Horizontal x + 100% Horizontal y
V
s
_ = [v.n
2
+ 1IyI2 +D.09 (v%i + V%l2)]112
all =[Ill +o.09a% 2f
II = II (1- D.3a,,)
In the above equations; Vxg, Vyg. Vvg are the peak ground ve1oc:ities in the X, y and
vcnical directions; Vxs. V:ys. Vw are the structure velocities in the X, Y sud vertical
directions; a... a,. a. are the peak amplified struc:tmal acc:cIerations in the x, y 8Ild vertical
directions. Vertical ground xesponse parameteIS can be taken as 2/3 of horlz .. atal values
aDd values of peak ground velocity can be estimated from emrical equadODS.
It is to be DOted from the equation for As that when the applied acceleradon coe:fficlent
lib is less than or equal to the les;s' ;ag acc:elcration coefficient Do As is equal to ZI:l'O. This
result is compa",,\e with the definition of the c:oefficieat Do Relative displacement would
occur only when lib is greater than Do SettiDJ DIa., in the equation equal to ZI:l'O will
provide an upper bound esljuwte of As: howewr. it must be mcogaked that this
simpijfication leads to finite dispJaccmems for aD. cases.
Note that in order to calcuJate total dispJacement, the sliding dispJaC'ement needs to be
added to the in-structme deformadon, a5mrming the structure does not move at its base.
4.E-3
W.=W (l-a.)

F,
(A) SLIDING MODEL
III - - ~ - - - - -
tl
(8) RECTANGl.Il.AR ACCELERATOR PtlLSE
I



~ S'IRUC'I'UREMO'IION







I


I
I

(C) MAXIMUM VELOCI'IY VS. 'l1ME
Figure 4.E.l: Sllding due to Earthquake
4.E-4
TIME
APPENDIX 4.F
RISK MANAGEMENT AND PREVENTION PROGRAM (RMPP)
GUIDELINES FOR SEISMIC ASSESSMENT OF FACILITIES
CONTAINING ACUTELY HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
Committee Note: This appendix contaiDs a document prepared by others for use In
evaJuating existing faclJities. It Is reprinted In its entirety because It Is Wllently
beiDg used by regulators throughout CaDfortda for facilities containing Ac:u.tely
Hazardous Materials, but it Is not pubUshed and Is not easily obtainable by
practicing engineers.
4.F-i

PROPOSED GtlIDANCE
FOR
RMPP SEISMIC ASSESSMENTS
Prepared for the
RMPP StJB.COMMIttEE of the
SOUl'BERN CALIFORNIA FIRE :BII<:!4'S ASSOCIATION
Prepared by the
RMPP SEISMIC GUIDANCE COMMIttEE
June 1992
4.F-i
RMPP SEISMIC GUIDANCE COMMITTEE
Teclmical Authors
Roben Bachman, Chair
LceBenuska
Sohrab Esfandiari
Orban Gurbuz
OordonHau
J.ucien Hersh
MikeKnarr
Alfredo Lopez
JobnMasek
Allan Porush
Mayasanclra Ravinclra
Philip Richter
Kenneth Saunders
Ian Stubbs
Paul Summers
WenTong
Lmy WesseJink
Joe Young
Other Contributors
Catherine Caraway
JIDl Goodfellow
Fred Lercarl
Tony Markham
Edward Mueblbacher
David Myers
Jeanne Perkins
Barllara Yu
Fluor Daniel, Inc.
Lindvall Richter Benuska Associates
ABB Impell Corporation
Becb.td Cmporation
ABB Impell Corporation
Bechtel Coxporation
Southem Califomia Edison Company
Bechtel Cmporation
Dames Ie. Mom:c
Dames Ie. Mom:c
EQEJntemadonal
FluOr Daniel, Inc.
Hopper Ie. Associates
E8tL Engineering, Inc.
WGP Engineering, Inc.
EQE International
Chevron Research Ie. Technology Company
East Bay Municipal Utility District
Califomia Office of Emergency Services
can,,, "i, Seismic Safety Commission
Cafifumia Office of Emergency Services
Los ADgcles aty Fite Department
South Coast Air Quality Management District
Los Angeles Cty Fite Departtmmt
Associatiml of Bay A%ea Go'Yefiiiilents
Los AngeJes County Fite Depauwent
4.F-ii
CONTENTS
DESCRIPTION
PAGE
Title Page
4F-ii
Auth.m's
4F-iii , .
Contents
4F-iv
1.0 Introduction
4F-l
2.0 Seho;;;.; f.; ~ : ~ a z u d Evaluation CDteria for Existing FacjUties
-4F-2
3.0 Walkthrough Considerations
4F-3
4.0 Analytical Evaluation Methodology for Existing Structures
and Systems 4F-3
5.0 Assessment ofEquipmmlt and Non-structural Elements 4F-S
6.0 Ac:ccptmxce Prac:edme for Above Ground Piping Systems 4F-S
7.0 New Fat:t
1
jries 4F-ll
8.0 Strengtbcaiug Criteria
4F-12
9.0 RefeIcnces 4F-12
Table 1 Ductility-based Reduction FacImS (Q) for Existing
Structures and Systems 4F-16
4.F-iv
~ ..
PROPOSED GUIDANCE FOR RMPP SEISMIC ASSESSMENTS
1.0 INTRODUcnON
The objective of Risk Mauagement and PreveDIion Program (RMPP) seismic
assessments is to provide reasonable assurance that a release of Acutely Hazardous
Materials (ADM) having offsite consequences would not occur as the result of a
major earthquake, The purpose of this doc'''''C!JIt is to provide guidance regarding
acceptable criteria to be used in such assessmM'S The guidance provided is
applicable to structural systems and compoDents whose failure would result in the
~ of sufficient quantities of AHM to be of concern. .
The gnidance given in this docnme
mr
provides fiIr a cfeterministic evaluation of
structural systems and components. This evaluation is generally performed
considering an earthquake level which bas a law probability of occunence. The
seismic capacity of stmctures and C" ,nq"""rmtl! tD withstand this level of earthquake is
calculated using realistic criteria and ass qrticms. An alternate approach is to
..-. babilistic' , ":-'- ...c .... ___ .f_' and' 'ghts the
_.arm a pro ~ assesSl!lent w ....... r-........... estnnates JDS1 on
relative risks and vuJnembilities of diffeleut SYSJr:mS and components.
ConfOl1l!aDce to this docnment does not guaIIII1ee or assure that an AHM release
will not occur in the event of strong earthquaJre ground motions, Rather, the
guidance provided is intended to minill'ljp: the risk of release of AHM by reducing
uncertainties and increasing resistance to earthqnake ground motions.
It is assnmed that the owner, administering agazcy, and consultant petfU! ming the
hazard and operability study will identify the systems and components of concem to
the RMPP seismic consnltant It is exyrted that three classes of items will be
evaluated. These an::
1) Systems which C:C""ain snfficieut qna!lli'ies of AHM to be of concem,
2) Adjacent fac:tUries whose sttuctw:al far"hmo. or displacement could result in the
:failme of systems which c:ontain AHM.
3) Utility systems which would be requited to operate following an earthquake
for emeJgem:y reaction or to maintain the facility in a safe condition, e.g.,
firewater or emergency power StSlems
At this time, CaIifomia state law requires tbataU new facJljties buih after Janwuy I,
1990, be designed in accordance with the 1981 edition of the Unifonn Building Code
(UBC), It is the conseasus of the Srismic GnjdaDre Committee that AHM systems
aDd components designed in accordance with the 1988 UBC (or later) provisions
provide reasonable assurance of withstmufing eanhquake effects without either
4.F-l
. -.'
I',
structural failure or a ldease of AHM having offsite CODSequence5. Two situations
exist for which the Committee feels it is applOpJiate to exceed the minjmum
requirements of the aBC. The fim case is when the facility is situated near an active
fault.' The earthquake ground motions in the near field zone of a major earthquake
may be gteater than those specified in the UBC. The second case is when the facility
is situated on a soft soil site identified as UBC Soil Profile S4. Here, the site
t5pODSC amplification effect may ueed to be increased beyond the amplificarioo
factors currently provided by the UBC. It is the judgment of the Committee that
guidance provided in abc Reco"""""ded Lateral Force Requimnents and
Commentary of the Sttvetaml Engineer; Asscv:iation of Califomia may be utilized to
assess the extent of possible bigher ground motions in these two cases.
2.0 SEISM:!!C BAZARDEVALUATION
FACILITIF.S
A site specific seismic Iiazaxd assessment shrmld address and. where apPIOjlliate.
quantify the following emdIquake effects::
1) Gmumi sbaking. inclmting local site amrJjfic:ption effects
2)' Liquefaction
3) Fanlhuptwe
4) Seismic settle iF. ill
5) T mufsJide
6) TSlllla
m
ilseicbD
It is the consensus of the Seismjc GlIidance Committee !bat the earthqUake hazard
which sbouId be used as the basis for evaluation is that which has only a 109&
probabllily ofbeiDg el! wed in SO}'elllS. ie.. one with a mean =um period of 475
years. 'Ibis probabffity of 1/ ismic hazard is the same as !bat used for establishing the
design earthquake gromui motion for IICW fac:jlities as ip'Cified in the 1991 UBC.
Three Pl(ICC 'hies am .,..,jlalt1e to chamc'e' im ground motions associated with the
above retu:m period.
1) Utilize the UBC static base shear equation or UBC standard specual sbapes
anchored to the effective peak ground acceleration (POA).
2) Utilize ATC-14 spectaal shapes anchmed to the effective PGA.
3) Develop site specific criteria for ground shaking in teJ:ms of clastic IeSpODSC
spect1a at 51J1 of c:riticaI damping.
The pbilosopby of the Committee is to use mean es'i11lates of ground sbakjng for
assessment. of existing fa",1itieL 1'h=forc. IeSpODSC specua.liquefaction potential,
and seismic settlement bazaxd esfunate values should be based on mean estimates of
4.F-2
oceutrenCe. The Qmmrittee recognizes that combining the UBC base shear equation
or specttal shapes with a site specific meaD effective PGA represents a mean plus one
standard deviation groUDd motion estimate, which is conservative.
Any procedure used to cbaracrer:ize groUDd motions should be adjusted for soil
conditions and near field fault zone effects. Effective ground motion parameters may
also be utilized.
3.0 WALKTHROUGH CONSIDERATIONS
The evaluation program should be geared to finding, evalW\tiDg and, if necessary,
strcngtbeniDg governing e
1
e
n
'*i!IS in the 6)stem. Thus, a systematic walkthrough
should be an integral part of the serismic evabmtion program. Walkthroughs should
concentrate on governing elements and potelltial areas of wcmknesses due to design
or construction deficiencies, mnctifieatioDs. or detmioratioD. These areas of wWmess
may not be apparent in design drawings or calcnJllfjons. The walkthroughs should be
conducted by experienced engineers fmrit1illT'with seismic design and the effects of
earthquakes so that they can zadily identify the areas of weakness and prioritize the
cfetaUed evaluations that may be needed
4.0 ANALYTICAL EVALUATION METHODOLOGY FOR EXISTING
STRUCTURES AND SYSTEMS
4.1 Define ground motion for evaluation in terms of elastic response spec:tta with
S% critical damping adjusted if neoessary for Dear' field and soft soil effects.
These spectta may be based on meaD estimates of OCCUiXence.
4.2 Acc:eptancc for existing str.uctures, systems, and their fonndllfjons may be
am ""Z,lished by ODe of the followiDg pI'recllues:
4.2.1 perroxm elastic modal analysis or cquivaleDt stIIfjc analysis.
The evaluation COIl$ists of demonsttuiJlg that capacity exceeds
demand for idtmrified systems. Acx:eptam:e is prcs""rM if the
following equation is satisfied:
DEMAND
~ D = Dead load
r
I
I
i
I
I
l
4..F-3
CAPAcrtXBASEP ON
1.6 x Working Stress Allowable
(without 1I3%diDcr=se)
or
L = LiveloperatiDg load
E = 'Elastic 10% probability in SO year earthquake load at
5% damping
III = Capacity reduction factOr (per ACl) or resistance factor
(per AISC)
Q = Ductility based Rduction factor per the attaChed Table 1
R,,= Nominal capacity per AISC Load &. Resistance Factor
Design (LRFD)
U = Nominal capacity per ACI
1) For syStems whose iimd!lTl'!f:Dt!J period (T) is less than the
period at which the peak spectral acceleration occurs (Tpeak),
one of the following approaches should lie used to deter.mine
the applopri4te level of seismic acceleration for the
v'iidanM"al andhigbermodes
a. The p=ak spec:ttal amierati.on should be used for the
6mMmeilW mode of the struc:tIJre. When considering
higher modes, citherthe p=ak or actual spectral.
acreJemtions values may be used.
b. For stmctures whose fundamental period 8IC less than
D..67xTpeak. the mnimllm spec:ttal accelemtion in the
mage of O.sxT to 1.5xT may be used in lieu of the peak
.. ba] acccleIation. When ronsidering higher modes,
either the peak or acbIalspecuaJ accelerations values may
be used.
2) Formbmdant stl'UCtIUal systems, e.g... multiple bents. in which
seismic loads in individual membcJ:s may be rcdistrlbuted
without Wlmc. the d!lD!a
nd
(from the previous equation) on
inIfi.vidual mem'heJs may exceed capacity by up to 50 percent.
3) ReIadve displa'"eli b'llts sball be ctJl!Sicfered and sball include
tuIsiaual and nansJarioua] deformations. Structural
displpMmplts that are dete! i j"N! from. an elastic analysis that
was based on seismic loading mdnced by Q sball be muJti.plied
by O.5Q [but not less than 1.0 (onc)1 to determine
disp'. emf'''S to be used in an evaluation.
GenmDy. the drift (relative borjmntaJ displacement) shall be
Jess dian D.Ola whmc H is the height between levels of
" This drift limit" be d :d if" be
am'''+'a1JOD. may excee ~ it can
d!lD!!InSbilll=d that greater drift can be tolerated by structural
and mmstruc:tural dements or the equipment itself.
4.F-4
To obtain relative displacements between different support
points. absolute flmm1
ati
on of the individual displacements can
conservatively be used. Alternatively, the square root of the
sum of squares (SRSS) method for combining displacements
may be used where apPloPliate.
4) When evaluating ovcxtuming, a 15 percent reduction in dead
load should be assnm
ed
to account for vertical acceleration
effects.
5) The capacity of m:hor bolts embedded ill t:Oncrete may be
evaluated in accordmce with the stxeIlgtF! ,ll",sign provisions of
Section 2624 of the 1991 UBC.
6) Structures that do DOt pass these evaluation criteria can be re-
ass-.ed using a DlCI& rigorous appxoach to determine if
suuctural retrofit is actually requited.
4.2.2 Structures that are judged to meet the intexlt of the 1988 (or later)
UBC, and for which a 'Visual field iDspection mveals well-pxopoxtioned
and complete latexal force misting systexns. may be deemed to meet
the intent of these requhenwmls withODt further evaluation.
4.2.3 Altemative procedures using xaticmal analyses based on well
esrab1isbed principles of DID banics may be used in lieu of those
pxeS! ribed in these reo II nnwmdarious. Methods such as non-linear
time history BDBlyses would be acceptable. The resulring inelastic
deformations must be witbin appxopxiate levcJs to provide Ieasonable
assurance of SlJ'Ucrnral in'es' i'l.
5.0 ASSESSMENT OF EOUIPMENT AND NON-sTRUClUKAL
ELEMENTS
The anchorage of equipmeDt and JlDD-SUUCtU1'al elements sappoxred within or
by structuxes may be evalnated in accoxdance with Section 2336 of the 1991
UBC.
6.0 ACCEPTANCE PROCEDURE FOR ABOVE GROUND PIPING
sySTEMS
6.1 Evaluation of piping systems are primarily IIC':h"Q
lli
sbed by field
walkthroughs. Such qualitative evaluations of piping systems are best done
by an engineer cxpexiexu:ed in this mea, v.isually inspecting the pipiDg system
UDder conCClD. This is pIef'emd because some piping is field routed and, in
4.F-S
some instances. piping and supports have been modified from that shown on
design dmwings.
This guidance is prlmarlly intendoo for ductile steel pipe constructed to a
national standard such as ASME B31.3. Evaluation of other piping material
is discussed in Section 6.6.
6.2 The pJOcedme for eyab.ating above ground piping systelIIS will generally be
as follows:
1) Identify piping systemS to be evab1ated.
. . , ~ De .. t of' --"- basis _.. . ... f -_'CU'
.IO} tel iIilllfl angmaemgn ......... iWU ~ l j j ; ' "'m u co........ on.
3) Assess exteat of conosi.onlerosion.
4) Assess =-of significant cyclic opemtiODalloading conditions
wbich IDafAdiidal!!iaJly mIuce system fatigue life.
.. S) Ped'unu a waIktbrougb oflbc piping systems for seismic capability.
Dtx:nwent the waIktbmugh and identify areas for derailed evaluation.
6) Complete tile detajJed evaluation of any identified areas and
n:c::cuiilleml re1liMjaJ actioDs.
6.3 CompU!I1!!:e with dIese pUl""'fnres does Dot assure compliance with CUllent
constxuction codes and standuds. It must be emphasized that damage to or
failure of pipe suppwrs should Dot be construed as a piping failure .m1es
s
it
ditectly contributes to a pessute bmmdmy failure. The intention hexc is to
pItiStii ve the ess-nrial pIe5Sme cnldaiDing integrity of the piping system but
DOt lIflCCSsmily leak tigl" hC'S Thercfme, this procedlJI'e does not preclude
the possibility of small leaks at bolted flanged joints.
6.4 Ducdle piping sySII:IDS have. in gwmal. performed adequately in past
earIhquakes. Whete damage bas occuned, it has been mlated to the following
aspects ofpiping l)s'eiliS:
1) Brc:essive sc:jmric: ancborm.ovemmn.
2) IDteJaction with other elements.
3) &tensiYe amosion cfiws
Seismic anchor monmeilts conJd MSUlt in relative displaceDIfl1)tS between.
points of suppmt/atta! "m .... t of the piping systems. Such movements include
relative disp1arc
n
'dUs between vessels. pipe supports, or main headers for
bJanch lines. 'Jntcmcrion is the FeiS! Ideally induc:ed impact of piping systems
4.F-6

with adjacent structures. systemS. or components. including the effects of the
falling hazards. Corrosion could result in a weakened pipe cross section that
could fail during an earthquake.
Additional aspects of piping systems which should also be reviewed during
the walkthrough for seismic capability are:
1) Large pipe dispJacemeDtS from inertial effects.
2) Brittle eJemenu.
3) Threaded connections, flange joints, and special fittings
4) lDadequate supports.
Special features or conditions to illustrate the above cancel us include:
1) Iuadequate anchorage of attached equipment.
2) Shortlrigid spans that cannot arcmmnodate the relative displarement
of the supports. e.g.. piping spanning between two structural systems.
3) Damaged supports including corrosioD.
4) Long vertical nms subject to inter level drift.
S) Large unsupported masses (e.g.. valves) auached to the pipe.
6) Flanged and threaded connecrinns in high stress locations.
7) Existing Jeakap locations (flanges. threads, valves. welds).
8) Extemal corrosion.
9) Inadequate vertical supports and/or insnfficient lateral :restraints.
10) Welded attachments to thin wall pipe (,Lf:., pipe less than Schedule
40).
11) Excessive seismic dispJ.amnertts of expansion joints.
12) Brittle elements. such as cast iron pipes.
13) Sensitive equipment impact (e.g control valves).
4:F-7
14) Fatigue of short to medium length rod hangers.
65. After the walkthrough is perfonned and an analysis is deemed necessary. the
following general rules should be followed:
1) Frlcticm Iesistance should not be considered for seismic restnUnt.
except for the following condition: for long sttaight piping runs with
numerous supports. :li:iction in the axial direction may be considered.
2) Spring supports (constant or variable) should not be considered as
seismic supports.
3) Slwrt rod hangers can be c:onsidered as effective lateral supports if
justified
4) Approprlare stress intensification factor ("i" factms) should be used.
S) ADowable piping stresses should be teduced to account for fatigue
effiocts due to significant c:yc1ic OpeJdtion
al
loading conditions. In this
case tho allowables pi sented in Section 6.5.1 may need to be
red"'.
6.5.1 Pmced'''es for seismic anchor mov"""mf evaJuation of piping are as
follows:
1) Use tho telative seismic anchor displacements as detemIined in
tho Section 4.2.1.
2) Piping stress due to seismic anchor i s p ~ t should meet
the following aitetia
iM_ S3.0S
Z A
i = stress intensification factorfromASMEB31.3 or
other apPlopDate tefetenee
M.- = mOD!Mt amplitude due to seismic anchor
movement using nomina) pipe wall thickness
z = elastic section modulus of pipe = 2t t
4.P-8
Sh = basic material allowable stress at pipe operating
temperatu:Ie from ASME B31.3 or other
appiOpriate reference
r = mean cross sectional radius
t = design nomjnaJ wan thicJmess minus design
COJrOS.iODiemsion aJlowances or actual wall
thic:kness minus future anticipated
cmrosiODiemsion
3) Flange cCJlml'dioDS should be checked to ensure that moments
due to seismic 8J!cbormovement do not result in significant
leakage. Factors to be considered are flange type and material;
gasket design; bolt m!!tf:ria', nttmbc:,:, and preload; rated
pressure and upelating pressure. If the rated pressure is
greater thaD the o}flB'i'lg pzessure. the moment capacity of
the flange body may be significant, and an equivalcDt ptesswe
approach may be used. Bolt loads should also be assessed.
Bolt stresses above preload may result in inteImittent leakap.
Bolt stresses above yield are potential concerns.
6.5.2 Pmcedmes for inteJaclion evaluation of piping are as follows:
1) ABM piping sball be visually iDspected to identify
potmtial interactions with adjacent structures, systems,
or c:omponNlIs Those interactions which could cause
bl
.
unw (epUt e Gamap to plpJDg. p1p1ng C' hiij+oD.Cllts
(e.g.. c:ontnIl valves), or adjacent critir;al items should
be nritigated
Note that res'tic:rjng piping seismic movement to
pteclnde intmcrion may lead to excessive restraint of
tbr:rma
J
expansion or inbibit other nDCessery

2) The waIktbrough should also identify the potential for
interaction bctwee.u adjacent structures. systems or
co:wpcmelilS. and the AHM piping being investigated.
Those interacIions wbich could cause unacceptable
damage to ABM piping should be mitigated. Note that
falling hazards should be considered in this evaluation.
6.5.3 PIoc:ohlies for CODOsion evaluation of piping are as follows:
4.F-9
1) During walkthrough identify conditions conducive to
external ccmosion.
2) Wall tbickness should be evaluated for potential
reduction due to erosion or corrosion.
3) Extent of intemal COIIOSionlc:rosion can be evaluated
by any of the follow.ing methods:
a. Review of existing COII'Osion inspection program
for AHM piping systems.
b. .Review of successful opeutting experience.
Co Wall tbicJmess measillemcnts.
4) C
. . . . andA...-
~ " ' i p " e exiSting COl1OSlOIl expenence ~ .........
IIDtjrjpated cuaosion to original design cuaosion
a1lowam:e.
S) This seismic eva1uation guidance is not applicable if
excessive COIJ'Osion is evident.
6.5.4 Procedures for seismic inertia evaluation of piping are as
follows:
1) Large DDSUppcnted spans of piping should be checked
for iacrIia loads. The inertial moments should not
exceaI1hose allowed in Section 6.5.1. It is not
I'D ary to combine moments from seismic mchor
movement and inertialloacUng. Inertial loading shall be
based on the 8pPlopxiate pipe support motions and the
chI .. ," jsrics of the piping c:cmfigmation. Seismic
inatial
l
oading usually can be evabllltf'i! by simpHfiM
calcnJatimis.
2) If tile intent of ASME B31.3 or other 8pPlOPliate
mab"''''' can be demonstrated to have been met for
seismic effcas. then the piping system is deemed
acczptable.
3) Flange CC)!!1!f'l:rions shall be checked to ensure that
moments due to seismic inertia loading do not result in
significant flange leakage. Refer to Section 6.5.1(3).
4.F-IO
6.6 Procedures for detennination of allowable stress levels for piping materials
other than ductile steel accepted by ASME B31.3 are as follows:
Piping made from materials other than ductile steel accepted by ASME B31.3
may be required to withstand seismic loading. The criteria ourJines above for
ductile steel piping should be followed for piping made from other materials
with the followiJlg allowable str=ss values:
1) When ductile material piping is designed. and constructed to a national
standard with basic allowable stresses given, then those values should
be used.
2) When piping mpterials meet a natiOO& standard with.a minimmn
specified tensile strength, a., then the basic allowable suess at
operating tenlJwatule should be:
Ductile Materials: Sb = ! a. at temperature
3
Brittle Materials: Sb = 1- a. at temperature
40'
3) When piping materials cannot be jcfentified with a national standard
with a mjnimum specified tensile strength. then one should be
estimated from published literature or a testing program. The basic
allowable stress at tempeIatuIe should be cletenninc:d usiDg the
apjJJopdate equation in (2) above, unless a higher allowable can be
justified by seismic testjng
4) If a strength cannot be detenDined with a mssooable level of
confidence, then the piping material should be replaced with one
having known ptopenie.s.
7.0 NEW FAClLI'I1ES after adoption of these rules)
Desi f facili
t AHM satisfy the . f the
gn 0 new ties con alft'"g must 5elS1QJC prDVlSlODS 0
1991 UBC. An I-factor of 1.25 and Ip-factor of 1.5 (for pans and elements of
structures) should be uri1iud These factors are defined in the UBC.
4.F-ll
The fonowing two UBC c:riteda modifications should be included in new designs:
7.1 . Modify site peak grouad acce1er.ttion for fault near field effects. Use the
larger of the seismic zane factor (Z) per the 1991 UBC or the site specific
effective peak gI'OlDId acce
1
er.ttion corresponding to a 10% probability of
being exceeded in SO yeam.
7.2 Make a rational determination of the effects of soft soil amplification of
bedtock. motion if the site is der.ennincd to have a UBC Sell Profile S4.
8.0 STRENG'I'BENING CRITERIA
In the event a struCtIlre. syst:m, or C'lIiilonent is deemed Imactptab1e based on the
guidance provided in this doi,"'rent, astn:DgtheDiDg program should be initiated
Appropriate strengthening ethel ia must be developed to provide reasonable assurance
that retrofitted items will pel f(jj ill adequately when subjected to strong ground
shaking
It should always be kept in mimi that 1hc intent of retrofittiDg these structDIeS,
systems, or compommts is DOt "to bring them up to cadent code." In many instances
this may not be practical. Til: rettofit design criteria should be consjstemt with this
proposed guidance. It is always advisable to meet code requiIements to the extent
practical
An imponaDt point to c:cmsjdr:r when mtrofitling is that over strengthening areas of
the stnJCtUre that ani cundy deficiem in strength can force the weak liDk(s) to
occur in other elements that are perhaps more brittle. This can have a negative
impact on overall strIlCtIJml pe:di'llllance dnring a major earthquake. In other words.
a structure that is present1y weak, butdncrile, should not be strengthened to the point
that its failure mode becm
Des
brittle with a lower energy absozbing capacity.
9.0 REFERENCFS
ACI 318-89 Bullcling Code aDd c.!lm .. :uwy - Building Code R.equinmtmtsfor
Reinforced Ctmcrete, Amer;, an Conctac Institute, November 1989.
AISI, Steel Tanks for LIquid Storage. in Steel Plate Engineering Data. Volume 1,
1976 Edition.
ANSlIAWWA DlDO-84,AWWA Stmldardjor Welded Steel Tanksfor Water
Storage, American Water Works Association.
ANSlIASME B31.3, ASME Codefor Pressure Piping Chemical Plant and
Petrokum Refinery Piping, 1986 Edition.
4.F-12
ANSI/ASME B31G-1984, MDnIIIllfor Determining the Rnnaining Strength of
Convded Pipelina, a Supplement to ANSVASME B3I Code for Pressure Piping.
API Standard 650, Welded Steel TanJcs for OU Storage, 8th Edition, November 1988.
ASCE 7-88, Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures, American
Society of Civil Engineers, 1988.
ASCE 1987, 'The Effects of Earthquakes on Power and 1nd1Istrial FaciJjties and
Implications for Nuclear Power Pltmt Design, " Working Group on Past Behavior,
Sub-Committce on Dynamic Analysis, Committee on Nuclear Structures and
Materials, Sttuctm'IIl Division, AImaican Society of Civil Engineers, New York,
1987.
ASME Boiler am:! Pressure Vessel Code Section vm. 1989 Division 2. Appendix m.
Rules for Bolted Flange Connections.
ATC-14, Evaluating the Seismic ResIstance of Existing Buildings, Prepared by
Applied Teclmology Cmmcil. 1987.
BaclunslI, R.E., April 1992, "Proposed Gu.idancefor Preparation ofRMPP Seismic
Assessments" in Pfoceedings ofHAZMACON '92. Session on "New Developments in
Earthquake Caused Ha.zardo1l3 MateriDls Releares, "Long Beach, CA.
Baughman, Paul D., Mani L. Aggarwal, Steven P. Harris, and Robert D. Campbell,
"Seismic Evaluation of Piping Using bperience Data, II S=cmd Symposium on
Cmrent Issues Related to Nuclear Power Plant StruclUIeS, Equipment, and Piping
with Emphasis on Resolution of Seismic Issues in Low Seismicity RegiODS. EPRI
NP-6437-D. PJepared by B1ecttic Power Resean:h Institute. Palo Alto, Califomia,
Bechtel Power CoIporation, Bechtel Topical Report BC-TOP-4, Revision 4,
"Seismic Analyses of Structures and EquqliUtllIt for Nuclear Power PlaIus", 1980.
Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Report NP-S617, "RecrnnmDuIed Piping
Seismic-luJequacy Criteria Based on PeifoTl7UJ1lCe During and After Eart/rqutJkes, "
Volumes I and 2. PMpared by EQE l:acmporated, January 1983.
Gurbuz, 0., Lopez. A., Smllwm. P., AprllI992, "lmplmlentation of the Proposed
RMPP Seismic Assessment GuiIJJmce to Perform a SITUl:IllTIll Seismic Evaluation of
Ezisting Facilities" in Proc eedings ofHAZMACON '92, Session on "New
Developments in Earthquake Cm.ued Ha.zardous Materitlls Releases, "
LoDg Beach, CA.
Manual of Steel Construction, N'mth Edition. American IDstjmte of Steel
Construction, 1989.
4.F-13
NEBRP Handbook for the Seismic EvalulJtion of Uisting Buildings, Developed by
the Seismic Safety Council for the Federal Emergency Management Agency
Based on a PreljmjDlIIY Version PJepared by the Applied Tecbnology Council, 1992.
Newma1k:, N.M. "Effects ofEanhquakes on Dams and EmbankmentS",
Geothechnique, Vol. IS, No. 2, Janllary 1965, pp 139-160.
Newmark, N.M. and Hall, W:1 .. "Earthquake Spectra and Design, EERI
Monograph", 1982.
NFPA-13. Sttmdllrdfor the butD11tJtitm ofSpri:nkler Systems. 1988 Edition, National
FIre Protection Association.
Perkins, J.B., Wyatt, G.E., Sc:bmidt, J.H., and Selvadm:ay, G .. November 1990.
Htgqrdous Materials Problems in Earthgugkes: A Guide to 2jleir Cause ond
Mitigation: Association of Bay AIea Governments, OalcJand, CA, 72 pages.
Perkins, J.B., Wyatt, G.E., Schmidt, J.H., and Sc1vaduray, G .. November 1990.
Hrrrpus Materials Problems in Ean!uiu.akes: Background Materials:
Association of Bay Area Gow. ",,+",S Oakland CA, 281 pages.

Perkins, J.B .. Wyatt, G.B., No .. e:mhet 1991. Tozic Gas Releases in EartIvptalter.
Existing Programs. Sources ondJ4itigatitm Strategies: Assrv:iation of Bay Area
Governments, Oakland, CA, 306pages.
Perkins, J.B .. Wyatt, G.E., andSelvadaray, G .. April 1992. "Mitigating Tozic Gas
Releosu in EII.rtIt.qu.aku" in PI' rib", ofHAZMACON '92. Session on "New
DevelDpmtmts in EtuthquiJks Cmrm'I1tIz.artlma Materials Releases. "Long Beach,
CA: Association of Bay Area GohG iIiI+nlS, OalcJand, CA, pp 562-573.
RMPP Pnblication No. 101. RMPP "DnelDpment Guidelbw, "published by Los
Angeles City A= DeparlmeDt, Hazardous Materials Section, Risk Managelllent &:
Ptevcntion Programs UDit, Sc:p'""lei 1990.
RaviDdra, M.K., -Seismic A..uessment ofChemiclll Facilities lhulu Ctdifomia Risk
Management ond Prevention P'DlIWII, "lntemational Conference on Hazard
Identification and Risk.ADalysis, s.."iQi' Factors and Human Rc1iabili1;y in Process
Safety, Jaamary IS-17, 1992, QrIandn. Florlda.
SEAOC - RectJ71l1l'le1Ule LatertzlForce Requirements ond Commmtory, Seismo]ogy
Committee Sttuctural Enginecxs Association of Califomia, 1990.
Stevenson. J.D. and Lapay, WoS., -Amplification Factors to be Used in Simplified
Seismic Dynmni& Amdysis of Piping SystI!1IiS, .. ASME Paper No. 74-NE-9.
4.F-14
State of CalijomiD. Guidance for the PreptJnJtion of II Risk Mll1IIlgement tmd
Prevention Program. Prepared by California Office of Emergency Services
Hazardous Material Division. November 1989. .
Uniform Building Code, 1988 Edition. Jntematioual Confenmcc of Building Offi.cials.
Uniform Building Code, 1991 Edition.lntemational Conference of Building Officials.
1992 Supplement to the Uniform Building Code. Intemational Conference of
Building Officials
4.F-lS
A.
TABLE 1: Ductility-Based Reduction Factors (Q)
for ExistIDg Strw:tures and Systems
STRUCTURES SUPPORTING EQUIPMENT
This covers SUuctU1es whose primary poupose is to support equipment,
such as air coolers, sph=s. horizon"" vessels, c:xcbangers, h=ters.
vettical vessels and reactors. etc.
L Steel stnu:tuns
Dadilemoment frame
Use Q=6 if theze is a signiR"!I! departure from the intent of
-the 1988 (or Iatcr) UBC for special moment-resisting f'rames.
0ntiuaJ:y1llOJlll!llt frame
The follow:iDg structural i IM'" Mimics me usually indicative
of a Q=2 value (also see NCIIe 6):
a.1ben: is a signifiamr SllaJg1b discontinui1:y in any of the
vertica1lateral force resicling elements, i.e.. a weak story.
b.1ben: me partial per.tibiililil. wr:ldcd splices in the
cohunn
s
of the momentresiS'ing frames.
-
c.The SUUClUie exhibits suong girder-weak cobmm"
bebavior. i.e.. under c:ombined lateral and venica11nading,
hinges occor in a signifit:an
t
IDIIJIber of columas before
occaaing in the ..........
The following stnlctural clMm I jslics me usually indicative
of a Q=4 value (also sec NCIIe 6):
cLADy oftbe moment fnaII=eJt:menrs is not compact.
c.ADy oftbe beaJn..cohmm coiliienions in the Iatmal force
msiSling IDI I" .. n! frames does DOt have both: (1) full
fiC'I.etillion flange welds;1IIIIl (2) a bolted or welded web
, h"'dJiOD.
f. 1ben: me bolrcd splices ill the mbnnns of the moment
msiSling tiawcs tba1dollDtam
ua
:t both flanges and the
web.
Braced frame
The following structural c
ha
n":If1i
id
il's me usually indicative
of a Q=2 value (also see Note 6):
a.1ben: is a sigaificaut sumgtb disconrimrity in any of the
venicallatmal force .esMog clements. i.e.. a weak story
b.The bmcing system inc:btdcs "K" braced bays. Note: "K"
bmcing is peiimued forframes of two stories or less by
using Q=2.. For frames of DIllIe tban two stories, "K"
bracing must be justified on a case-by-case basis.
c.Brace WI" ections am IlDl able to develop the capacity of
the diagonals.
cLColumn SDlicc details CiIIIIot clevelOll the column
4.F-16
Q
6or8
2.4. orS
2.4, orS
TABLE 1: Dw:tDity.Based Reduction Factors (Q)
for Existing Structures and Systems (Continued)
A. STRUCTVRES SUPPORTING EQUIPMENT (Ch"UIIUed)
Brac:ed frame (Cont.)
The following structmaJ chamcteristics me usually indicative
of a Q=4 wJ.ue (also see Note 6):
e.D.iagcmal e1e
meills
designed to cany COIllpIeSSion have
(k1Ir) glearet dum 120.
f. The bracing system inclnc!es cbevnm ("V" or inverwi
"V") hnv:jng that was designed to cany gravity load.
QmtiIever column
The following structmaI cbamcrerisrics me usually indicative
of a Q=1.5 value (also see Note 6):
a.Column splice dmiIs CIIIIJlOt develop the cohnn capacity.
b.Axialload demand lepIesents more thalI2O'1b of the axial
load capacity.
%. Ccmc:rete struClllres
Ductile moment frame
Use Q=6 if then: is a significant depaiaue from the inu:nt of
the 1988 (or Ia!er) UBC for special moment-mistjng frames.
luteuliediatemcrment frame
Ordinary 1IUIJ!Imt frame
The following stniCIWIIl chamcreri!lrics me usually jndjcative
of a Q=1.5 value (also see Note 6):
a. 'lbete is a significant SInIDgtb disl
e
hIIinuity in any of the
venicaI lateral force resistjng e1e
v
ours, i.e., a weak stmy.
b. The SIIiIdIIIc exhibits "1IrmIg giJdc:r-weak column"
behavint. i.e., under combined Iaretalllllli venical Joading,
hinges occur in a significant dumber of columns before
Cle hi iug in the beams.
e. 'lbete is visible deleriD1'll1ivn of c:oncn:re or reinforcing
steel in any of the flame eleums,lIIIIi this damage may
lead to a briule IiI11um mode.
d.Shear f'lIiItne OCCIIIS befcm= fJextna) faih= in a significant
JPUIIber of the columns.
The following stniCIWIIl cbaJacImistics me usually indicative
of a Q=2.S value (also see Note 6):
e. The lateral resisting frames incbule pn;stlessed
(preteDsioned or post-tensioned e1emculS)
4.F-17
Q
1.5 or 2.5
60rB
4
1.5.2.5 or
3.5

TABLE 1: DuctDity"Based Reduction Factors (Q)
for Existing Structures and Systems (Continued) .
A. STRUCTllRFS SUPPORTING EQtllPMENT (Continued)
0rdiDary moment frame (Ccmt.)
f. The beam stirrups and colmnn ties are not IIIIChorr:d into
the member cams with hooks of
135" or IIlOle.
g.Colnnms have ties spaced at greater than dl4tbroughoUt
their Jength. Beam stimJps are spaced at grealiu than d/2.
b. ADy colnnm bar lap splice is less than 35db long. Any
column bar lap splice is not c:aclosed by ties spaced 8db or
less.
i. " 1agth for Jcmgimdjna1lms is less than
24db-
j. Shear failure oa:ms befoJe ftmmtl failun: in a significant
" .. ,,'bet ofdte hemns
Shear wall
The followiDg sttuctma1 cllamc!=istics are usua1ly iIIcticativo
of a Q=1.5 wlue (also see Note 6):
L'Ibem is visible dererioJaIicm of COIJCII'te or reiDfcm:ing
steel in any of the frame eMIroil's, and Ibis damage may
lead to a brlUle failure IIlOle.
b. 'Ibem is a significant stI1mgIb didiscsc:oJlUlllilrinm'Dty ill any of the
venicalJataal fcm:e _sting d!!lQeiils, i.e.. a weak stoJy.
c.ADy wan is DOt cujiljMOUS to the HI Ja'jon.
The followiug said IUI.l charaM'a'.iPies am usuaDy imJjratiye
of a Q::a wlue (also see Note 6):
cL TIle &ehifuxc:htg steel for COIiCiele walls is DOt gteattit than
O.oo:zs times the gross area of the wan aloDg botb the
JongimdiDal and tmnsver.se axes. TIle spacing of
leiufUJc:htg steel along eitheraxis ezn"Cds 18 iIIc:b=s.
e.For shear walls willi HID gmarerthan 2.0. the boundaiy
d.,"'riUS are not mnfinr4 with citbc:r: (1) spirals; or (2)
lies at spac:htg of less than 8db.
f. forconplai shear wall b't
n
1dings, muups in any conp1ing
beam are spaced at gaeatcrtban 8db or are DOt anchon:d
into the c:me with hooks of 13S" or iDOIe.
4.F-18
Q
1.5.3 orS
TABLE 1: Ductility-Based Reduction Factors (Q)
for Existing StrDcbnts and Systems (Continued)
A. STRUCTURES SOPPORTING EQUIPMENT (Cootinued)
Cantilever pierlmJmnn
The following SDUCtunl c:baracteristic am indicative of a
Q=1.5 value (also see Note 6).
L TIIcrc is visible deterioration of c:om:rete or reinforcing
steel in any of the el",",' IllS, IIDd this damage may lII8d to a
britde failure JDDCIe.
b. Axial load d!!l!!8lll! lepteseu1S IIlOlI: tban2OCJI, of the load
capacity.
The following SDUCtunl c:baracteristic are usually indicalive
of a Q=2.5 value (also see Note 6).
c. The ties am DOt anc:hon:d inIo the memher cmcs with
hooks of 13S" or IIIDJe.
d. Cohmms have ties spaced at gxeatel' than dl4 tbroughout
their IeDgIh. Piers bave ties spa=! at gxeatcr tban dI2
tbmughout their ltmgth.
Co Any pierlcohmm bar lap splice is less than 3Sdb long.
Any pierlcohmm bar lap splice is DOt enclosed by ties
spaced IIdb or less.
f. Development lcDgth for longjtnOtnpl bars is less than
24cfb.
B. EQUIPMENTBEBA VlNG AS STRUCTURES Wlfii
INTEGRAL SUPPORTS
L Vertical V"""EJsIheate&S or spheres supported by:
Steel skirts
The following sullCtlilal cbamc:ta:istics are usually indicative
of a Q=2 value (also see Note 6):
L The diliiWet (D) divided by the tbjclcness (t) of the s1drt
is gxeatcrtbaD O.441*ElP,.
where E IIDd F, am the Y OUDg's Jl!CICbdus IIDd yield $UtsS
of the skirt, respectively.
Steel brac:ed legs without top girder or sdlfener riIIg
The following stnICl1IJal c:haracIerisIic am usually indicative
of a Q=1.5 value (also see Note 6):
a. The bracing system includes "K" braced bays.
4.F-19
Q
1.5. 2.S or
3.5
Q
2or4
1.5.30r4
TABLE 1: DuctIlity-Based Reduction Factors (Q)
for Existing Structures and Systems (Continued)
B. EQUIPMENTBEBA VING AS STRUCTURES WIlli
INTEGRAL SUPPORTS (rAndoUell)
Steel Juaced legs without top girder or stiIl'ener riDg (Cont.)
b.Bracc c:o.nutrtions an: not able to develop the capacity of
the diagonals.
c.Cobmm splice deraDs cannot develop the cobmm capacity.
'I'hc following SIn1camIl charactcrisIics an: USLlll!lY im!irative
of a Q=3 vaIuc (also see Note 6):
d.DlagonaJ elcnMlils designed to cany compression bave
(IdIr) gRI8ler tban 120.
Co The bmcing system inc!udc:s cbeflW C'V" or bMrted
"V") blacing that was designed to
c:my gravity load.
Steel urduaced legs without top girder or slilfeuer ring
-
'I'hc following SIn1camIl charactcrisIics an: usually indjcative
ofaQ=l.5 value
(also see Note 6):
LCobmm splice deraDs cannot develop the column aqmcity.
b.Aldalload demand representS I1IOm tban 2lJ'I, of the axial
load capacity.
1. CJdmneys or slacks
Steelpyal
Steell'!RldiJewr
Omrr'*
C. PIPEw'AYS
Ncne: This b* )"des pipeways SUPpolliug equipneDt that does not weight
I1IOm 1ban 259& of the other dead loads. Forpipcways suppotting
equiJlDltiU1 that weighs more tban 259& of the other dead loads, see
Seaion A. STRUCTURES SUPPORmmEQUIPMENT
1.
S"
Dw:tIIelilViiidltfnme
OnIiDaaylliCiillDt frame
Bxated frame
"'a
nlD
lea wI.1II1II
4.F-20
Q
1.5 or2.S
4
4
4
Q
8
6
6
5
TABLE 1: DudilityBased Reduction Factors (Q)
for Existing Structures and Systems (Continued)
C. PIPEWAYS (".I!ialled)
2. Coacrete
Ductile moment frame
Ordinuy mament frame
CaDtilever .......... a
- =
D. FLATBOlTOMEDTANKS (See Note 4)
1. AIlchored
2. Uuaadmred
.
Eo FOUNDATIONS (See Note 5)
L Piled
2. Spread faotlllgs
F. ANCBORBOLTS (See Note 6)
1. ADchor bolt yield amtrvJs
2. CoDcrete faIlme or am:har bohsJippage c:ontroIs, or there Is a IlOJI-
dudDe force tnmsferma '"",ISID betwusa stractw:e aDd foundation
(also see Note 7)
NOTES:
Q
8
5
4
Q
4
3
Q
6
6
Q
As for
structure
1.5
1. The usc of the higbest Q-facIors in each category requites that the elemems of the
primaly load path of the lateral fon:e misting sysrcmhave been propoItioned to 8SSIIIC
ductile rather tban briUle system behavior. 'Ibis caD be cfemonsrrared by showing that
each CUllDCClion in the prima1y load path has an u!rhuate SUCDgth of at least equal to
150% of the load capacity (governed by either yielding or SUIbility) of the e1emem to
whieh the load is tnmsfened. A1temaJively. Q-factms should be n:dm:ed consistent
with the limited dm:tiHty of the governing COjhl"'Ction andIorthe govemiDg wmltCli.on
should be moDified as requin:d.
4.F-21
NOTES (Cont.):
2. . A Q-factor differeDt from the tabulated values (higher or lower) may be justified on a
case-by-case basis.
3. If mon: tban ODe of the conditions specified in the IBble applies. the lowest Q-factor
associated with those conditions should be used.
4. Other approved national standards for the seismic assessment of talIks may be used in
lieu of these gniAli!Jes.
S. These values ofQ apply to oveJlwning r:Jt!T:
ks
, soil bearing, and pile capacities
6. Ifbolt yidtfinJ COJIIrOls the evalua1ion of the ancIIf.lr t. (as opposed to concrcre
failme or anchor bolt slippage). and there is a ducIile force traDSfer unbanism betweeJI
the SIrUcIIIIe and fnuncJation (such as the use of properly propOIuoneci anchor bolt
chairs between skins or 1IInk sbeJIs and the fol!!!dptjon), then the Q-factDr to be used for
both the evaJmnion of the anchor bolts and the est of the SIrUCUJnIl system wuesponds
to thatforthesrruchllal systcmitself.
If COIlCRiIe f'aiJIue or anchor bolt slippage controls the evallllttion of anchor bolts (as
opposed to bolt yielding). or there is a non-ductile force transfer mcc:Ivurism between
the SIrUcIIIIe and foundatinD, then a Q-factDr of 1.5 should be used for the mrbJ8fion of
the anchor bolts aud the teSt of the stnrcturaJ. sysr.em.. Also see Note 7.
7. AItema!ively, for SU'UCtDl'es that may contain loc:atjndfsingle features with limited
clucIiIity, such as Hnriting CODJiecrums or spIic:es. noncompact sreel members, high (kJIr)
members and mndncriIe anchor bolts. that do DOt occur at a sil2rificant number of
loc;atimm the load '*j"'ciry of the specific: "miring featare(s) may be mWated and/or
iuquoved in lieu of using system-wide lower Q-t'actms that tend to generically penalize
all e1elMiiJs of1lle SUUdUlal system. 'l1IcmWmrion for these Inc:alind feimDes may
be perfU1illed using a Q-factDr equal to OA tima the Q-facroi ncmmlly lee. h Ibl. 3!cfed
fLO., waul" ed) for the S)'SIeIII. 'l1Ic evaJuarion for the fflJlw;ade of the system may
then be pe:tfouDcd using 1IIe Q-factor nmmally itOJJlJIi\lndcd withaut consjdt:nmun of
the IocaJjmI fea1me wiIh Iimjted clucIiIity.
4.F-22
ChapterS
PRIMARY STRUCTURAL DESIGN
5.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides guidance for the seisnlic structural design of petrochcmical
faet1ifies Once the design forces me csrabHsbed using IIIIIIlysis techniques as
discussed in Cbapter4. the design may-proceed as omJined in this c:ba.pter. The
methods described me applicable to structures and components, including supports
and am:horages of clectrical and mechanical systems. Seismjc design of electrical and
mecbanjc:al components (e.g. t:raDsf'omIcrs, pwups. CCiUlple5S0rs, vessels. etc.) is
outside the scope of these guidelines. Both new design. retrofit and modificatilJn of
existing facilities me addtessed.
The gnirIeJines proWled herein me based mainly on CUl1ent pracIice. For this
pmpose, c:ritcria and specificatioDS from several petrochemical companies and
architectural and engineeIiug firms were collected. rmd reviewed. The criteria and
practices most commonly used were geDCIlI11y pJefemd and WCftI therefore adopted.
Criteria related to spcciaJ cases may not be UDivmaJly applicable and therefoIe were
not incbuJecL As a resuJt, this c:ba.pter incbtdes design I'CC''''''' e' .dations for which a
genetaI consMsus exists
Where spec:i6c building code tequiJeneiils me .=e",,=II, this c:ba.pter ptimarlly
uses the 1994 UBC, as that is the most CCilWWDly used code for lieismic design in
petrot:bemic:aJ facfflties (see discussion in Chapter 4). Some material is based on
ASCE 7, when the material is not addJessed in the UBC. Use of these guidelines with
other codes and standards (e.g., $BC rmd BOCA. which me based on the NEHRP
(1994) provisious) is expected to result in compatable designs
5.2 DESIGN CRITERIA
S.2J.lntroductiOD
Section S.2 addresses the loading C(\mbinations to be used in design and the
acceptance criteria to be met. The loading COm])jmujDllS me derived mainly from the
5-1
UBC and ASCE 7 and are deHneated to provide specific guidance for common
structures and components at petroCMmjr.a] facilities. The loading combinations
CUllently in use by the uugar petroleum firms have also been considered. The
accCptance criteria are defined by reference to accepted indnstry codes and standards.
At petrochemical faC""Hties, more types of loads affect the design of members than
those ge.ue.1IlJy jm:hJded in mdes Thus the engineer should carefully review an
applicable loads and design the structures components for their effect$,
. including:
D = Dead Load is the total weight of materials fOllDing the pt'llllal'ent part of
a struc:tIn. jm:1udiug struc:tm3l :framjng, pJatfmlllS. waDs, fixed equipment,
vessels, piping, insnJation and fiaepro diug.
DV = Vessel 0peIaI:ing Load inclncfes the weight of any liquids or solids
. within the .. : se], arramed cquipJDCid, and piping durlng nonnal opctatioD.
DP = Piplng Opctating Load inc1ucfes weight of any liquids or solids wilhin
'. and ,1-... """';"n 1
prpmg on ...... equqliiCDI ..... _ DQr11IlL operattOD. "
L = IJ1e Load is the weight of all movable loads such as pciSODDel, tools,
stored IlW'erjal. :mowbJc panitions. Cl8!lCS and hoists, maintenance loads, snow
and icc loads. jnq@i I. surge "9ibmtion, and longitnctinal and transverse
hodz(Jnt
al
fcm::es.from IIIOWlg c.qnit"'e
ll
' The design live loads should be the
ma.
bmll
" Joads likely to ICSUlt iiomde intended use and should not be Jess than
those given in appJicable bnilding codes.
E = Earthquala: Loads incbJde de inedia effects due to a design earthquake.
Far detem:dnation of eat
l
' "l"aIce Joads, Jeter to Chapter 4.
W = Wmd Loads are tbose stipuJared in applicable mdcs
s = Snow I Gads are those stipulated in applicable mdcs Roof live load
should be zep
1
aced by the snow load when the snow load is greater.
n. = lnngitndjnaJ Pipe TbemJilIGad
s
, include pipe anchor forces. if any. In
lieu of d,.",,1ed caJcnJatimJS. the thermal sliding force can be appro:dmated as.
10% of the vmical operating pipe load plus pipe weight being supported. When
there are tbree or feIft:r pipes use 30'.1& of the vmical operating pipe load plus
pipe weight of the heaviest pipe.
5-2

T = Thmmal Loads are the loads caused by a change in temperature and may
resuh from both operating and enviromnental condhions. Such forces should
include those caused by vessel, piping. and structure expansion and contraction.
TE = Test Loads, incbJde the weight of equipment and of test fluid related to
the test condition.
H = Soil Loads inchJde the effects due to weight and lateral pressure of soil
and water in soil.
5.2.2.2 ComhiDatlous of Loads General
Structures IIIld foundations should be designed for the most critieaJeffects
resulting from the combination of an applicable loads which may reasonably occur
simnJtaneously.
The load combinations for aDowable stress and streDJth design methods are given
below. It should be noted that codes differ in the treahitmt of load combinations.
These diffen:Dces often exist between aDowable stress design and strength design
The local building ju:risdiction for a particular project is the fiDal authority. The
combinations shown in subsections S.2.2.3 and 5.2.2.4 should be c:onsidered as
Jcpxesentative of common practice and are JeCViiliilended for use .in the industry.
In the appJica.tion of the load combinations, the following caveats should be
adhered to:
a. Loads other than those specifically jdentifu:d in the loading combiDarions,
such as lateral son pressmes (11). sett1eJJtmt effects, vibJ:ation loads, impact
effects, mlative IIIIChor me",.," eilts, bundle loads, occasjonal extreme
operating loads, fluid pressures, min loads, test loads, blast effects, and
vehicle loads that could occor simnltaneously, should also be consideIed, as
apptop,iate.
Any of the above concwltmt loads PJesent in aDowable stress design should
be included in the loading combination with factor ofuaity
Any of the above collCUJIelll loads plesent in factomdload design should be
added to the loading combination with a factor greater than unity. The load
factor should be deteu"hlfti consic!ering the accuracy of esriuwte and
probability of occurrence and should range between 1.2 (low probability of
oCC1,llrellCC of full value) to 1.6 (high probability of oc:curJeIICe with high
uncenainty of magnitude).
b. When the effects of design loads counteract oue another, special care should
be exercised to ensure adequate safety against maximnm load effects. e.g.,
5-3
tempeilltlue effects should not be permitted to reduce the strength require-
ments.
When the effect of the dead load is to reduce the design requitemeDts, a load factor
of 0.9 is used for the dead load. This factor is somewhat greater than the UBC value
of 0.85. This is justified sizu:e the dead loads at petrochemical fac1
1iti
es are more
precisely defined (i.e., absence of nonstructuraI elements common in
However, in the case of vessels, the engineer is cautioned to consider the sitnatious
when part of the dead load is removed, e.g., dead load inside a vessel For example,
in the loading comhinatioDS that inclnde wind or seisiric loads, a reduction in full
design live load is in order sizu:e it is amlikely that load wID exist at the time of
maxirnnm design wind load or design earthquake. A va.l!.le of 0.5 for allowable stress
design and 1.7 x 0.5 for strength design :.: tbD document.
5 2.2 3 Loading CombiDatfoDs and Load Factors - Allowable Stress DesJgu
In the allowable stress design method, the combinM loading effects, with load
factors of tmity, are compared with the allowable values (stress, strain, or displace-
ments) in the applicable code. For some co .. drinatio-as of loads, the allowable values
may be increased by the allowable stress muItiplim' as showD.
The fonowing combinatious of loads are recomm:ud
M
for use in COJ\i1mction
with the allowable method of design.
l.D
Load
Combination
2. D+L
3. D+L+T
4. D+O.5L+ (EorW}+T
S. 0.9D - (E or W)
Vessel Support Design
A11owab1e
Stress
Multiplicr
1.00
1.00
1.33
1.33
1.33
A11owab1e
Load Stress
Combination Multiplier
1. D+DV 1.00
2. D+DV+(EorW}+T 1.33
3. D+TE+O.2SW 1.33
4. 0.9D - (E or W) 1.33
)
Pipeway and Pipe and Equipment Support Design
Allowable
Stress Load
Combination Multiplier
1. D+DP+TI.
2. D+DP+(EorW)+T
3. 0.9(D) - (E or W)
1.00
1.33
1.33
5.2.2.4 Loading Combinations and Load Factors - StreDgth Design
In the equations below. U designates the required design strength.
General
1. U= l.4D
2. U = l.4D + 1.7L
3. U = l.4D + 1.7L + 1.4T
4. U=0.75( 1.4D+0.8SL+(1.9Eor 1.7W)+ 1.4T)
5. U = 0.9D - (1.4E or 1.3W)
Vessel Support Desigu
1. U = 1.4(D + DV)
2. U = 0.75(1.4D + 1.4DV + (1.9E or 1.7W) + 1.4T)
3. U = 0.75(1.40 + l.4TE + 0.4W)
4. U = 0.90 - (1.4E or 1.3W)
PJpeway and Pipe and Equipment Support Design
1. 1.4(D + DP + TI..)
2. 0.75(1.4D + 1.4DP + (1.9E or 1.7W) + lAT)
3. 0.9D - (UE or 1.3W)
5.2.3 Acceptance Criteria
5.2.3.1 General Requirements
Design of petrocb"p'jea] faCIlities should comply with the project criteria which
should be developed based OD the owner's spec jfh "tiODS, design criteria and
appJicable standards. some of which are listed in Sections 5.2.3.2 through 5.2.3.5
below.
S-5

All projects should coliform to the safety requirements of OSHA. Local building
oftici.als should be consulted to deteimine codes applicable to the project. The
edition date. and any addenda and/or supplements should be detczmiDed. When more
thari one code may be applicable, the mcm: stringent provisions should be used.
5.2.3.2 Steel Acceptance Criteria
The design, fabrication and erection of steel struetures should be in accordance
with the requirements of the following applicable references: AISC (1989),
AlSC (1993), AISI (1986). ASCE B. sn (1990) or AISI (1973).
J'caign and ccmstnJction of steel fuuuing systemS it! UBC' Seismic :l:Dnes 1
through 4 should also coDform to the requitcments of applicable sections of the UBC.
In case of conflict, the more SIriDgcm requirement should apply.
5.2.3.3 Concrete Acceptance Criteria
Design and CODStJUCtion of xeiufi>.ced concrete sttuctures should coDform to the
requirements of ACI 31B.
In UBC Seismic Zones 2 through 4, dedgn and constxuction of reiDforced
concrete structures should coDform to the requirpmcnts of applicable sections of the
UBC. In case of conflict, the mere stringent n:quixement should apply.
The design, COJIStnlCtion, and quality assurance of masonry components that
resist serismic forces should conform to the require
n
cnt5 of ACI 530 and ACI 530.1
except as modified by the provisions of the UBC.
5.2.3.5 Wood
The design, constxuction, and quality assur.mce of membexs and their fastenings
in wood systems that resist seismic forces should confoxm to the of the
UBC.
5.3 DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
5.3.1 Iatroduction
This section describes typical structures and components found in petn,v:bemica!
facilities and provides special design NCOiilliiCndations forthem.
5.3.2 Buildings
The buildings typically found in petrOchemical faC'lTtties are administration build-
ings, control buildings, sobswicms. warehouses. fire houses, maintenance buildings,
and compressor shellers or bniIdings. They are most oiteD single stOIY buUdings, but
can be multi-story. Typical construction materials are masomy, concrete and
strUCtural steeL Lateral load resisting systems used are shear walls, braced frames,
rigid frames or comblnations. Unlike nonbuilding structures, these buDdings can be
designeD with direct application of the UBC or other model bllDding codes. For the
purpose of differentiating these buDding types fi:om nonb1n'ding structures. it is noted
that they are 1:
l1J
Dding shells which generally do not supp>rt opeIating pettOcbemical
equipment and piping systems In some petrochemical fiu:
t1iri
es. control buildings or
substations are designed additicmaUy to resist blast eff'a:rs from a postn1ated explo-
sion within the facility.
5.3.3 NonbuUdJug Strw:tures
5.3.3.1 Geaeral
As noted in Chapter4, nonbtto
1d
ing structures lepl !If the bulk of items in a
petrochemical plant. T.Izy can be classified as nonbtn1cting structures with structural
systems similar to buildiDgs. or orher nonlmilding st:nJCtImIS.
5.3.3.2 Drift aDd P-DeJta meets
It is important to note that for nonlmDding sttuctures it is not necessary to meet
drift criteria specified for other litIUctlJles in the UBC. However, p-DeIta effects
should be consideted when dIit limits, which would otherwise apply, are exceeded.
An acceptable p-Delta II118lysis pzocedwc is pM Ilfof in the Co"liiCnrary to
Sect. lE.9 of SEAOC (1990). For this aualysis. ddft detam;ned using code design
forces should be multipfied by 3(RwIS). Code design bees have been reduced by
llRw. Multiplying the msulring deflect;cms by 3CRwJ8) Jives a better appzoxVnatiou
of real seismic dcflectioDs . This IeqUircmcnt is not clearly stated in SEAOC (1990).
.. The SEAOC (1990) CoiilliCiltazy equation (el-I), should be modjfird to MlJ1tip1y
P X A by 3(Rw18). Section S.s bmem should be tefeaed to for other pzccautions
relative to stlUCtU1'e drift. Note that SEAOC (1990) also uses the quantity 3(Rw/8)
as a force amplification factor forthc design of critical +"'eills
The SEAOe (1990) CoiilllCillary contains several cautions rc1ativc to use of the
3(Rw18) factor to es
r
jnm
te
inelastic ddlections. The factor is a direct canyover of
the 3.OJK factor from pzcv.ious editions and is therefOlc based more on tradition than
on hard facts. The Col ," I cmary states that the force ampJjfication of 3(RwI8) is
genemIly on the high side while the defotmation factor of 3(RwI8) is on the low side,
and could be as high as Rw. When Rw is less than 6, the 3(RwI8) factor may become
sma
Der
than the Engineer wanrs to use in design. The value should never be less than
5-7
1. Where there is reason for concern, the value should probably not be less than z.
ASJ. example of such a situation would be when inelastic deformation would cause
damage to a component containing hazardous or flammable material The
Collillitmtary also states that P-Delta effecrs are potentially much more significant in
lower seismic zones than in higher seismic zones. because the relative stiffness of
1ateralload resisting systems in higher seismic zones is required to be greater than
those in lower seismic zones.
5.3.3.3 BaildJDgLike Struc:tun:s
Pipeways aDd equipment support st:ructures are the two main categories of
building-like structures found in petrochemical faCt1iries. Materials are concrete or
structural steel Lateral load resisting systems used are braced ftames and moment-
resisting frames.
Pipeways and equipment suppon structnres. are buDding-like because of the
lateral load resisting systems commonly used. Howewr, they differ from bm1dings in
that they are most often open stnlCtUres. They lack the non-struetura1 compommts
found in \t11i1dings, such as wall panels, which increase damping and enexgy
absorption during a seismic event. Also, they se"'''''Uy have less redund!l!!C)' than
\tnDdings, They inch1de complex piping systems which may or may not pax'jc :;llte in
seismic shaking. It is conuwnly thought that dead load participa1ion of piping
systems in structure inertia forces is ovmes,hna"'" in most designs.
Pipeways
Main pipeways are usuaRy frames 20 to 25 fI:et (6 to 8 m) wide, spaced at 20 to
25 fI:et (6 to 8 m) longitudinally. They generally are longitudinally stNtted and
braced at every third to fifth bay. They often c:my ODe to tbree levels of ptocess and
utility piping, conduit and cable trays. Many times air coolers are placed at the top of
main pipeways. Strucwral steel is most often used for these structures due to the
ease of em :Iion. When pipeways need to be = resistant, structural steel is encased
in concrete or the pipeway is coDStrUcted of COJiClete. Ccmcxete pipeways can be
precast, if a sufficient quantity is requhed to justify establishing a jobsite casting yard.
There should also be adequate mobile crane capacity for erection. .',
Secondary pipeways in process UDits, or ofrsite pipeways are usuaRy single level
unstnltted frames. These frames are 10 to 15 feet (3 to 5 m) wide, spaced at 15 to 20
feet (5 to 6 m) IongitndinaUy. The material is almost always steel and often not
fireplOofed.
Rw values for both main and secondary pipcways are included in Clmpter 4.
Chevron bracing or cross bracing systems should be used in braced bays and
designed in accord!!!!ce with the UBC, but K-bracing should not be used. The
SEAOC (1990) Commentary to Sect. 4O.3.b. states, "1'he K-bracing configuration is
undesirable for seismic resistance. Deformations of the bracing system due to tensile
yield and/or bm:kljng may cause lateral deformations of the connected column
sufficient to cause column buckling and subsequent collapse. a
Knee-bracing can be used as an alternate method of creating a beam-to-column
moment coJlIlection. However, the column or beam length used for calculating KJ/r
ratios should ignore the presence of the knee brace unless the combined bnc:!cling
behavior of the column and knee brace is evaluated. The presence of the knee brace
should not be used to reduce the beam or column design moment.
Equipment Support Structures
Equipment suppon structures are usually open frame structures supponing
elevated vessels (horizontal and vertical). heat exchangers, other mjsceDaneous
mechanical and electrical equipment, and piping. For OpeiaUon and maintenance rea-
SOns, these structures also include significant platform areas, stairways and ladders.
Equipment is elevated eitber for process reasons, lack of plot space or a combination
of both. Materials used are usually fizeploofed stnu:mIal steel.
Steel structures usually utilize moment-rmsting frames in one direction and
braced frames in the other direction. -The cost effec:tiveuess of braced frames
suggests tbat whenever possible, braced frames in both directiuus should be used.
However, access quite often lead to the use of IlICIJI1CI1f-resisting frames.
Rw values for JIIOment-resisting frames and braced frames, ami the issues related to
bracing systems, are distmssed in Chapter 4. Rigid equipmeDt is generally treated as
lumped masses for analysis purposes.
EqtLip",ent anchorage loads should be cal I itd to the main Jateralload system by
horizontal bracing. C'becker plate pla1:fi Ii mi"S can be treated as a diaphragm to also
carry equipmmt loads to the main Jateralload system. Often. certain cJu:cker plate
areas are detailed to allow removal of the plate duriDg maintenance opetatjons In
such cases the diaphragm may not be ptesent during a sei
smS
event OCO:Wling in an
extended maintenance Opeiation and horizontal bracing should be pIOVided.
Another category of equipment stzucture supports rotating equipmcnt such as
compressors orgener ... ..,...,rators, or equipiilent with intcnni.ttear signfficant vibrations such
as coke structures. Materials used are usually concrete, to provide sufficient mass
and Frlifuess to limit vibrations to a permissible leveL
Concrete structures which suppon large rotating equipment or other equipment
which generate sustained impactive loads are usually quite massive. Three feet
square columns and three to four feet thick concrete decks are common. These
snuctu:res can be designed with little concem for ductility. ami therefore with low Rw
5-9
values. Such a structure can be designed on the basis of Rw = 1. in which case
ductile detailing specified in the UBC can be relaxed.
5.3.3.4 NonbuiIdfng-Like Structures
There are a number of nonbuilding-Jike structures iD common use which have
special cbaJacteristics The following gnjdeJjnes address some of the issues to be
taken under consideration when designing these sttm:hdts. Other stJ:uctm5 are
essentiaDy defined in UBCTable 16-P.
a. Tanks can be supported at grade. on pedestals or on braced or unbraced legs.
Chapter 7 addresses the design and evaluation oftlmks at grade. This SCdion
addresses tanks on pedestals or on braced or tmlnamd legs.
All taDks should be anchored to the foundation or IIIIIin structure. Tl1Dk: legs
and the tank-ta-leg c:ormcct:ion should be diN lett!! for stress and 1mckling
effeclS.
b. Vessels, both hmizhnt,J and vertical. are designed to satisfy ASMB code
requitemmts (ASME, 1992). The design of the 18 me portion of the vessel
is geumaJIy not &ovezned by seismic effects The 8 ....
lo
,*,"s to fonndations
and structures, are the e1emems directly affio.d .... by seismic loads. These
elements are osuaJly skirts or legs for vatical vessels and saddles for
horizontal vessels For seismic load resist!l!!tZl, """Dtion should be given to
weldiag and bolting, and bracing or plate buckling d'eets Most often vessels
are designed by TTlr!C:banical engineers. Occasionally struc:tmal enginem are
asked
. . "--' cal I . .. loads.
to gave g w ~ m en aung apptopl1ate SrI liilC
Co Bins ami silos are SIrUctU%es used for storing soHds. e.g. powder and g""ml
ar
J!Il!teriaIs Silos are by definition tall bins. In biDs ami silos the lateral fuzees
are mitigated by frlcIion in the material stored in the bin.. Research has shown
that equivalent viscous damping may be as moch as 20 pacem. Also, the
center of gmvity can be considezed at the ceulCi of mass rather than at the
cenuoid of the mom fam,TtlIr triangular ctistdbutiolL Good guidance exists for
bin and silo designinAC1313.
d. StcmIJC m:ks are typically mass pzoduced elements wbich are assembled on
site. The geometty and strength requitellcnts are quite varied, and standard
componems are mixed appzopxiabely to proWfe the requited performance.
Mally m:ks are made of relatively slender or cold formed elc>ments, which
requite special evaluation prm:edures. Good goid8!!!!'!: exists for storage rack
design from the Rack Manufactmezs Institute (RMl. 1990).
e. Skid-mounted equipnent systems are usually very rugged. since layout and
design criteria should take into consideration forces imposed by crane lifting.
5-10
and uuck, rail or ship transportation. The skid is usually a base frame
consuucted of structural steel shapes and the equipment includes pumps.
compressors. small vessels and exchangers. and piping. The skid should be
anchored to the foundation to resist horizontal seismic forces.
5.3A EJements of Structures, NonstructuraI Components and Equipment
5.3.4.1 General
UBC Section 1630 and Chapter 4 herein specify the lateral force to be used for
design of parts and portions of stractures and their attaclnneuts, permanent
noDS1IUcturaI components and their attachments. and the auac:lunent, for permanent
equipment supported by a str'UCtUre. In general, these hems are most often found in
buildings and not in the typical re1inety structure. The SEAOC (1990) CommentaIy
to Section 10 provides definitions to better distinguish the various categories of
item; which are covered by this section. A review of these definitions will show that
"attachments for permanent equiplilent supported by a structure." are the item; most
often found in petrochemical plants. It should be noted that UBC Section 1630
applies only (in the words of the C011lT!1!!!!tary). "to elements, components. and equip-
ment attached to bnUttings whose dyuamic behavior does not substantiaD.y alter the
1:n
1
ilding's response." This implies that the c1emauts. components and equipment are
relatively small in relation to the supporting structure. w=e this is not true., design
is governed by UBC Section 1632 (Nonbuilding Structures). Also. some large
grade-mounted equipment such as boilers and turbines may be CODS1IUcted within a
structure. In such cases the equipment should be considered as a nonbnjJdjng
structure.
Another approach is given in the NE1IRP (1994) prov.isioDs which provide a more
comprehensive treatment of this subject tbaD the UBC. A number of additional
factors which affect the respDDSe of equipment are addR:ssed in NEHRP (1994).
NEHRP (1994) also has a simp1ffied approach sbm'", to the UBC. Additional
guidance is also given in Section 5.s hmcin, which discusses physical interaction.
"Parts and portions of structures" and "pet i i iAilMt I1OIIstIUCtU1'a components" in
the UBC are bllDding elellaents rarely found in refineries. Parts and portions of
structures refer to miscellaneous assemblies or portions of structures haWIg a
structural :fimction reJated to the structure and include exterior waDs. interior bearing
waDs. penthouses (except wbere framed by an extension of the main buDding frame).
and prefabricated suuctural c-lemcnts other than waDs ami. diaphragms. Pcnnanent
nonstructural components are pet11181 ..... t assemblies not having a st:nlCtUral fi.mction
and include parapets. nonbearing waDs and partitions. masonry and concrete fences
over 6 feet high, exterior and interior ornamentation and appendages, signs and
billboards. cabinets, book shelves. and storage racks, inclucijng contents, over 5 feet
high, 8"=15 floor systems. suspended cetlings and light fixrwcs.
5-11
5.3.4.2 Typic:al Supported Equipment
.The common per!iianent equipment supported by struetures in petrochemical
plants include the following groups of items.
Cantilever suuctures include chimneys, stacks and towers. Design concerns for
these items in petrochemical plants, are generaD.y no different than supponed items in
blU
1
dings, For these cantilever struCtUreS, it is especially imponant to recognize tbat
in many cases., the suppon lewl is a flexible structUral floor system. If horizontal
detlectiOl!S ncar the top of the c:antilever item is a concem, it -fllY be necessary to
increase the rigidity of the suppom lewl to achieve the desired performance. Once
the loads ba've been detb wiilc.d and support t1exibllity issues have been addressed,
design pi ...... I ... es for a .:I';ii111ey, stack, tower or any other Um;]n csnt11ever
str1lCtme are the same as if they were supported at grade.
Vessels 8IId Taaks
Vessels and taDks incbJde boilers, heat exchangers, fired and UDfired pressure
vessels, and mjsce
D
8J!N)US tanks. Design concerns for these items in petrochemic:al
plants, are gcumaJly no dltfe.tent than supported items in buUdings. Since these items
should be Jdatively small to be included in this section, suppon flexibolity is xelatively
UDimportant. unless the item is quite long. If the item is long, relative vertical suppon
movement may aeed to be addressed. Design aspects of vessels and taDks are
discussed in Section 5.3.3.4.
Mechanical EqulJ"'*'III1
MecbanirW equipuent include twbines. chiIIers, pumps. motorS" and air-handling
units. Design concerns for these items in petrochemical p1attts, are generally no
different than supported items in bm1dings These items are usually vety rigid
compared to the support leveL Since these items generally have a low profile. seismic
loads rarely, if evar, cause tension forces in the anchorage. Howevar. it bas been
observed that the conUte,! ing structure between the component and the supporting
strI1CtUIe is S'iiierines designed without due CODSideratiOD for seismic loads. The
engin"tlf should &eview the adequacy of any COnON! iug struc:ttrres provided by
component vendors to assure that adequate Iatcralload capacity exists. ADchorage
aa:eptabiIity is evaluated by compaxing seismic forces to boh shear and tension
capacity, without frictional resistance from dead load of the item.
Vibration DoJators are often uti1ized with rotating equipment to minimize
vibration in the equipn:eut and its supporting struc:tme. The isolators. while solving a
difficuk vibration problem, may create problems during an earthquake ums care is
5-12
exercised to restrict horizontal and vertical movement at the isolators. This is often
accomplished with snubbers, guides or stops.
In some cases, mechani<:a.l equipment needs to be reviewed. Although specific
guidance is Dot provided herein, seismic design of mechanical equipment should be
performed by qnaIjfje.d structuralImechanicaJ engineers. The desjgn should take into
consideration inelastic behavior as well as potential .interaction with the supporting
structure. These and other factors are consideJcd inNEHRP (1994). Chapter 3.
For additional guidance., refer to the SEAOC (1990) Commentary to
Section 1G.1.
Elec:tric:al Equipment aDd Control Systems
Blectrical equipment and control systemS include traDSfom=rs, switch-gear.
control panels, standby power equipment. and computer equipment. Design concerns
for these items in petiur:hemical plants, are genetally no diffetent tban supported
items in bnj1dinp. These items are sjrnt1ar to cantDever structUreS, mechanical
equipment. or something in between. Depending OD the size and shape of the item,
follow the apptopdate gukhmc:e in the paragraphs above on c:antiIever stl'UCtlJm and
mechnical equipment
Distributive Systems
Distributive systems include piping. ducts, coodoits. c:able trays and conveyors.
Design concerns for these items in petrochemical plants. are generally 110 different
th!!D supported items in bm1dings. except that the pipe sizes in pipjDg systems are
usually larger in petrochemical plants. The major design COJICCtD for the item itself is
the effect of relative movement between points of anchorage.
Leakage at equipment and piping flanges is often due to underdesign of the
flange. ie designing the flange for only Ope1ating pn:ssure-tcu'leratme conditions.
By increasing the flange class, the seismic moments may be accommodated without
leakage.
NEHRP (1994) has developed specific gllideJiDes for the seismic design of
distributive systems, such as those noted above. These guidelines ;"cb1de refcIences
to codes and SU!7I!'lards. ~ c to given types of systems. h is RCllDID'IMded that
these guidelines be used for the design of distributive systems in petrochemical
faCJ1jties
5-13
5.3.5 FoundatiODS
5.3.5.1 General
Except for cettaiu types of equipment (horizontal vessels, heat exchangers and
vertical vessels), foundations in petrochemical facilities are similar to foundations in
most other iDdustries. Tberefore, the desip of foundations should satisfy the
requirements of appxopxiate building code provisinns.
Foundaticms should be designed for seismic loads calrntlarcd for the overall
structural system. The loads generated by individual elements, e.g. braces designed
for 150% ofbrace load, should be considered for anchor boh design but should not
be used for fouadarion design.
5.3.5.2 ADdJor Bolts
Two design apptoacMs for anchor bolts sbould be used for petrocbeJnica
l
facilities. Usiag UBC terminology, the first appJllaeh, Service Load Design, follows
the requixenhdS of the UBC. This should apply to grade moUDted equipment such as
be8t exchangeu and horizontal vessels, vertical w.ssels, pots and drums with a height
to diameter ratio Jess than 3, pumps, colDpJessors, generators, transformers, and
other skid-u .... "'",., eqliqw*,'" Here the lequiteme4t is to prevent the supported
items from sljdjgg during a seismic event. 'Ibe second approach, Str=gth Design,
should follow the requitcments of ACI349. App. B, with the exception that the
concrete pull-oat capacity should develop the bah's yield snength (not its n1tjma
t
e
teD",1e strcngtb) umltip1ied by 1.25. This slmnld apply to vertical ,'eSSI'Is with a
height to diander ntio gRater than 3, and bniltJing-Jike structures, where ductility is
figured into tile Rw "fBlues.
5.3.5.3 OfCClutuiDg
The UBC does not requhe a check for foundation overtuming. If resistance to
overturning is drckrd, a factor of safety of 1.0 should be used, considcIiDg only 0.9
times the dead load for tesistance. The 0.9 Detar for vertical loads accounts for
uncertainty of the dead load and upward vettical acceleration.
AC1318 n:quitcs that die reiDforced com:zete of footings be poportioned to
resist factored loads. This mquiI:es appIyjng load factors to die loads and calculating
a fictitious soD pi "e. The reiDforced CODCIete is then proportioned to resist this
fictitious son ptessute. Wben the factor of safety against ovenuming approaches 1.0.
it may DOt be posst"ble to calculate a fictitious soil pressure because the er:ccntricity is
outside the footing. In this c:ase, it is recoTT!T!!:!!ded that a point load at the edge of
the footing be ca!r:nlarcd to replace the fiQjtinus soil pressure. by dividing the
factored ovellwning moment by one-half the footing width in the direction of the
tnoment (see Figure 5.1).
5-14
p
1.06P
I
~ . 4 M
D/2
When S.R. = 1.0
Then MIP = e = DI2
For Service Loads
1.4M> R
I.OSP :2
R-fictitious = .!&M
DI2
R-fictiUous
For FactoIed Loads.
Figure 5.1: Concrete Foundation Design When StabWty Ratio Approaches 1.0
5.3.5.4 SDding
The UBC does not require a check for foundation sliding. If resistance to sliding
is checked, a factor of safety of 1.0 should be used, considering ouly 0.9 tim:s the
dead load for resistance. Lateral loads on spread footings and mats are resisted by
friction between the footing and soil. and passive pressure on the footing.
5-1S
5.3.5.5 POe FOIIDdatiODS
Lateral loads on pile foundations are resisted by passive pressure on the piles and
pile cap.
The lateral load capacity of a pile or pile group is essentially based on permissible
horizontal deflections. GeoteJ:bnical COD$n)tants will often set lateral load capacity
based on a pile deflcction at ground level wuy.ing between 114 to 1 inch. The
structural engineer should determine from the geoteclmical consultant, whether lateral
pile load capacity is based on deflection or son strength. If de:flection is the
governing Clitexion, the engineer should then evaluate whether a larger horizontal
deflection is acceptable for the particular facility being desipd, to avoid mnecessary
conservatism.
Most petrochemical facffitics operating UDits are paved with 4 to 6 inches (10 to
15 ClD) of COJICl8te. rciDforccd with welded wire fabric to minimize shrinkage
cracking. ConsideIation should be given to taking credit for the presence of the
concrete paving in resj", ing Jatera1 seismic loads to reduce the mtmber of piles
requjred for iadividual foundations. While this may increase the paving thickness to
create the nee :nary mass, this may be a cost effective solution. Care should be
exercised when CQJIIbirring lateral pile resistance, passive pressure on the pRe cap and
frictional resistanc:e of paving. It may not be apPIOpIiate to take the maxjrmtm value
of each mode.of resjS'HIIIT: when used as a comJij"arjon. This subject should be
discussed with a gee'" lmjl:HJ consnltant Asphalt paving should not be considered as
performing in the IlII1D: ,,*""er as concrete paving. Asphalt paving is uureinforced
and has low shear stlaIJth. and therefore is unable to contribute to resistance.
The UBC requires tha1 pile caps of every struCtDle subjected to seismic forces be
interconnected by ties (e.g. grade beams), which are capable of resisting a mi"hmtm
horizontal force equal to 10 percent of the larger column vertical load. Other
approved methods may be used wb:re it can be demonstrated that equivalent restraint
can be provided. In pen .. ::llflmjca
J
plants. it is desirable to minimize the use of grade
beams to avoid Wei fdlem:es with UIIderground piping systems and underground
electrical duct systems. Adequate lateral restraint can. in many cases, be provided by
passive son resistance agab.
et
the sides of the piles and pile caps. Adequate lateral
resistance is also provided when the structure being supponed can acceptably tolerate
the latcraI d .. n.:..'tiOJlS and rotations at the structureIpRe cap interface. The
determination of acccp1abiIity can be investigated for critical stnlClUreS by including
the lateral and rotatinDal sriffness of the pile and pile cap in the sttUctural analysis
mode!
5-16
5.3.5.6 Pier and Tee Support Foundations
Pier and tee suppOtt foundations are typically used to suppon grade-mounted
horizontal vessels and beat e.ycbangers. These foundations are treated as "invened
pendulums". The vessel or exchanger is anchored at one pier and allowed to slide at
the opposite pier to Ieliewe thermal expansion forces. The anchor pier is designed to
resist alllongittutina! . mic forces. For simplicity. both the anchor pier and sliding
pier are designed the same. When this approach creates excessively large pier
fOlmdations. two a!temarives should be considered. For vessels with low design
teaipCl:atures. less than about lSDOf' (6S0C). the vessel can be anchored at both ends.
Here each pier would be designed for one-half the vessel expansion and one-half the
seismic load. When tbmnal Cltp"nsiQD cannot be accommodated without allowing
the vessel to slide, the piers can be tied together with strUCtUral steel strUtS. so that
again. each pier foundation resists one-balf the seismjc load.
Longitt1dinal seismjc: loads OD som: analytical models have been stUdied (Richter.
unpublished) which iUi'irate that a significant amount of enetgy is absorbed at the
sHrUng end pier. ~ n d i n g on the frictioD coefficient This effectively reduces the
load applied to the fixed end pier. In the study. a series of calculations were
performed to investigate the seismic force distribution to pier fonndations including
nonlinear time history analyses on a two-dimensional model of a typical pier
foundation. Table 5.1 gives tentative recommendations for load distribution to the
fixed and sliding ends, as a 1iaction of the total horizontal seismic load. Additional
savings may be achie\'I:d by designing each pier separately. for the horizontal load
disuibution sbown in the table.
TABLE 5.1: RecommendatioDS for Load DIstrIbution
Transverse seismic loads are usually catried by both pddles and the loads are
transmitted in shear to the anchor bolts. When it is not possible to determine the
exact mass distribution at each saddle. some engineen apply 60'1& of the traDSVerse
seismje load to each sadrDe
5.3.5.7 Vertical Vessel Foundations
Historically. the foundatiOD anchor bolts for tall vertical vessels and stacks have
tended to stretch beyond yield when subjected to strong ground motion. Yielding of
anchor bolts probably prevented collapse of these vessels. Based OD this experience.
some engineers design to develop the run UDCOIrOded tensile capacity of the anchor
5-17
bolts. However. this is a conservative design practice (See Section 5.3.5.2). Special
care should be taken to not ovasi:ze the anchor bolts. Excessively oversized anchor
bolts could remain elastic during a seismic event, creating overturning moments in the
fQlmtlarion beyond tbat used in die design.
Wben the anchor bolts exteDd 0JIly into the pedestal. the pedestal dowels should
aansfer the OvellPi "jng mommt into the footing. The dowels should be able to
develop an ove.ttUIDiDg mommt equivalent to the overtuming moment based on
anchor boh strength (J.e. 1.25 time boh yield strength; see Section 5.3.5.2). If the
anchor bolts extend into the footing, which is often the case for very taD vessels,
pedestal dowels do not tranSfer overtmDing moment to the footing. In this case, it is
only necessary to pIOVide a nominal JWJDber of dowels to mjnjmize concrete cracking.
Tnere are at least tIu:= known calculation methods used by engineers to deal with
the transfer of horimnta
l
seismic fon:es from the vessel to the concrete pedestal.
a. The USC pmlnbits the use of friction due to dead load to resist horizontal
seismic forces. 'I'JIe code does petmit the use of fiiction caused by the
downward foIce from die seislilic overtuming moment. Some engineers
approximate the dowuwatd force (see Figure 5.2) as the ove.tturDiDg moment
. divided by two-thirds the boh circle diameter. If the downwmd fon:c times a
friction cocffi itut of 0.55 evo:ds the hotttontal seismic fon::e, it is assumed
tbat there is no horizontal force on the bolts. If the horizontal seismic force
exceeds the iik:tion foIce, the total friction force is applied to the bolts. To
n 'i";' "he the Deed for ea, ssive boh edge O'5tance or shear n:iuforaIJlent, the
bolts on a 9O-degn:e an: in the direction of the horizontal force are ignored.
The horizontal force is then canied only by the bolts on the remaining
27O-degrec arc (i.e. tlm:e-fomtbs the totallUJTDber of bolts).
b. The shear-fridiuu ccnwept ofAC1318 is used by some engineers. The total
size and !!!III"e. of bolts tequixed to resist ovettuming is first determined and
then the nmllle, of bolls not in tension (i.e.1Ill11I1ler of bolts that can function
as normal R>infu.tcc@1'/J in a shear-friction design) is determined eNe). In this
method, the bolt area Jejij e jled by Nc (i.e. Nc x All) must be greater than
Avf in the ACl318 shear-friction equations. In the shear-friction equation,
q,:,o.SS and Jl=O.6 (for r:oncrete cast against steel, or in this case, steel placed
on conc:rete) is used.
5-18
D
M = Overtuming Moment
=Hxh
M =P=T
213D
J.I. =0055
IfF = O.55P>H
IfF = Oo5SP<H
Bolts do not
cauyshear
Bolts cm:ry all
shear
Figure 5.2: A Method to DetermiDe Tnm* af'Bo.riJwltal SeismIc Force for
Vertic:al Vessel Fonndptjons .
c. The third method is based on the same principles as the &st medmd cited.
The comp.tessive fcm:c due to ovemmring moment is ass,,"rd to produce
sufficient fi:il::tioJIal resistanc=, such that the bolts do DOt need to be designed
to resist tile sejsmic shear if the vessc1's height is :mote than tbn:e times the
diaDieter ofils boh circle CLe. when HlBC>3.0). IfHIBC<3.0, tile bohs are
designed to resist tile eIltire seisnric shear. For tile special case wbI:n
HlBC<3.0, in Seismic Zones Nos. 1 and 2. friction is caJculated as the
downward fcm:c from the OVeltUluiug J1iOIb:IIt plus 6S peteent of tile dead
load times a 0.3 coefDcitmt offriction. If this friction force is greater than the
seismic shear, tile bohs do DOt need to be designed to resist horizontal loads.
If tile friction fcm:c is less than the sc
is
... : shear, the bohs are designed to
resist the entire seisDlic shear. Fiaally, for a vessel with HlBC less than 3.0 in
Seismic Zones Nos. 3 ami 4, supponed on legs rather than a C(\nrinnous base
ring, llllcimr bohs are designed to resist the entire seismic shear.
5-19
5.3.5.8 Earth 'Qetaining Structures
" " The most commonly used pmcedure for the design of gravity retaining waDs is
that proposed by Mononobe and Okabe, referenced in Seed and Whitman (1970).
Mononobe ami Matsuo (1929) and Okabe (1926) modified Coulomb's classical
solution to account for inertia forces comsponding to horizontal and vertical
acceleJ3Uu"s, acting at an poiats of an assumed failure wedge. They expressed
backfi1I thrust against a wall as fi.mction of the" UDit weight of the bac:kfiU, the height
of the wan. and active stress rneflicient The suess coefficient is a 1imction of the
friction angIc of the baclcfilt the friction angle between the bat:kfil! and the wall., and
of the acceleration coefficienrL Seed and Whitman (1970) provide a simplified
version of the original equation. wbich is commonly used. A detailed description of
the Monnll.,.be-QIg ..... nu:rbo(\ can also be fonnd in. Dowrick (1987).
The Mononolz-Okabe eqm!tinn is based on a mrmber of a!ISlII!'IItioDS. The bac:kfiU
must be defonDahle enough to mobBize mn shear resistance along the failure plane in
the active sease. and that the accelerations must be constant tbroughout the failing
wedge. Concerrdng the use of the Coulomb equation for static passive tbrust apply
to the dynamic case as well. This equation may OVClIestimate the passive resistance in
"case wall .......... on 15' 1W U&WI r- nt
Most earth I'd_me theories ""s""e a constant horizontal acceleration over the
height of die wan. with the lDDvewent of the wall controDecl in some manner. In
reality, "eirhe:r condition may be satisfied Depending upon die frequency of
excitation and height of the waD. accelerations may increase signfficantly upward
through die backflD Furrh", "Hue. die non-Jincar bebmor of die backfill bas a
significant infIwmc:e Uafufh
m8r
ely, thm: aR few weJl-docw:Dente case studies
from die fi='Id, with ftCt!!p! Dl "'iients of dynamic earth pressures. Several stndjcs
such as Lai (1979), ZIuJabj (1973), Nadim (1980), Nadim anc1 Wbjtman (1983 anc1
1984), and Anderson et a1 (1917) show the influence of various ef'ftds on dynamic
lateral pltsSUle5, e5p"CjaDy die tole of residual pressure remaining after shaking.
These smdies bave been Sh""""hoi in Whitman (1990).
Many concepts dewloped for gravity retaining walls may be exrczutci! to other types
ofJ'eflrining strnctures. WhjliilHii (1990) concIrutes that for design ofn:latively simple
waDs with heights of 30 feet or less, Mononobe-Okabe equation can provide
reasonable zesulIS. For Irigher waDs. and those restrained against outWBId movement.
JDOJ1: carefiil aaalysis should be musidered.
5-20
~ "", '."-, "." , 'T' _ , .,' , ._,.,
5.4 STRUCTURAL DETAILS
5.4.1 Introduction
Typical stnJClUrCS found in petrocbcmic:aJ plants arc discussed in Section 5.3. In
generaI. specific seiMic details used in the building industry arc also applicable to
petrochemical plants Most of the bttilding industry practice can be found in Nachn,
SEAOC (1990) and the UBC. This section discusses special scjsmjc derailing
requilc"lentS unique to peu.,.",.,emica
l
plants.
5.4.2 Steel
5.4.2.l General
The general sejsmjc lequhenents for steel structw:es can be found in Naeim,
SEAOC (1990), UBC, AISC ASD aud AISC LRFD. Special details that arc not
",!II illinnly encoantered in the b
m1
ding indnstry will. be diSCllssed here.
Figure 5.3 shows a COlDiWil conn""tjon detail which has been used in the btJjJding
industry. In the aftermath of the Janwuy, 1994 Northridge, CaJifomja earthquake,
over 100 1nriIdings were found where cracks occuned in connections based on this
detail. The cause of these cracks is still under investigation. A """'mr of causes
have been posm1ated, such as poor welding and welding ploce hnes. inadequate
:i:asp=tkm. inadequately addressed thmnaJ ccmsiderations, and the potr:nria
1
need to
JIID\'e the plastic hinF fonnarion in the beam, away from the ke of tb: cohmm. At
the time of writiag of this doc.", eli', the cause(s) arc SliD. under investigation, aud
UDti!. the inrfnsny has fomrnJated a solurion, it is prudmn to avoid the connectiDn. It
is, in fact, cunently prohibited in soae p",ther dismgjon of this,
jncllJding some suggested deraHs and mrofit details. is provided in SAC (1995).
The stee1 used in latcra1 fon:e esisting systems should be Ijmjted to the foD.owing
AS'IM Spo ifiratious: A36, A441, ASoo, ASOI, AS12 (Grades 42 aud 50), aud
ASSS. Structural steel to ASTM A283 (Grade D) may be used for base
plares aud anchnT' bolts.
In exnemcly cold regions. fiDe gmiaed st=ls should be CODSidered to reduce the
JikeJjborx! ofbrlttle faUme under dynamic loads.
5.4.2.2 Requirements for Braced Frames
In the petrochemical indnsny, braced frames rely on diagonal members to resist
horizontal fon:es aud to provide stafrt1ity. These cma memhers have a tendency to
xesuict acc:ess Therefon:. it is good praclice to keep the mtmbc:r of braces to a
minimum. aud to ploperly locate those that arc used.. Gencmlly, chevron or diagonal
5-21
'FUll ?EJII
Flao WELDS
_,,[THOR
,:wtOEtllS
...... -. ':. . .!'
..... :-
~ .... ~ . ' ... . . ~ : , " ..... * :=: .. :... -'.*' *
;:;=.:;:::;::;::==#1-., ~ . . . "
" ' - ~ ~ .. -: .. :-
:-'flII..L . P.;EN _: ' .. ,: " . "
....... .41 'waDS:'
. ,
".:'" ''',: . -. : ..... : ... , ....... :.!,:.
Figure 5.3: Former shntdml dprtDe moment CODDection detaIL As a result of
the Nortbridge Earthqaake, this CODDection was shown to have major problems
, and Is CWiently probJblted In many jurJsdIctlons.
braciDg is used in pn:fexeuce to X-bracing. Tees an: plefened over double angles for
ease of i'lAiU'E,B"ce
Quite aftm. it is neccsse" that the lower wmkpoint of the bracing to grade be
kept ahem head room uquiIMdI'S to avoid b10cJcing paths of cgress in case of
ewer! .... , ies Bracing should be located so as to avoid interferences with piping.
ducts, cle "ic aI trays ami co".ln i'5. and accesswa)'S. Also. diagonal bracing should
be arranged &0 that it wm not dBect lateral load to only a few fO'mdarion
s
5A.2.3 Pipe"_'"
To aJlow P 55 UDder _ .... way. pipeways an: generally designed as moDlCDt-
rrsisriag ti&iles in the aausvase direction, and me braced in the k-ngit1Jdina
J
merillO. Longitudinal bracing aBDSfCls scismi,: and other k-ngitndjnaJ forces to the
fo.mdations NOIm8Ily. a long pipeway would require expansion joints (slotted strUt
CO""c:ctiDns) to aJlow for tbemm
l
movCneuts and thus the longit1Jdin
aJ
bracing is
designed for the tributaIy segne
n
between expansion joints (typically. 100 to 200
feet (30 to (j() m). but this dqrnds on plant ami site conditions).
5A.2.4 AIr Coolers (Fln14ns)
1)picaIly air coolers me supported on pipeways. The air cooler is generally
composed ofa large box cCII,tab,h" the fans ami motors, supported on four or more
legs. 'Ibis geaetally creates a condition where a relatively rigid mass is supported on
5-22
flexible legs on top of a peway. Whenever possible, the suppon legs should be
braced in both directions. This however. may not always be practical due to the need
for working platfomlS tmd access under the air coolers. Xuee brac.ing audlor chevron
bracing can be used as long as bcadroom is not comptomivd Figure S.4 illustrates a
typical air cooler ammgement
Though not a seismic design issue, care should be exercised to prevent possible
resOIlllJlCe effects due to the operating frequency of the air cooler motors being too
close to the natUral frequency of the suppon structure.
5.4.3 eoDCrete aud FouadatioDS
5.4.3.1 Framed Concrete Structures
It has been observed that the conn"Clions of ductile moment-resisting frame
concrete structureS, when ctenn1ed tmd coJJSttUCted pxoperly. sufl'e1ed little or no
i'ailme during a large seisiliil: event. In petroc:bemica1 fac:t1ities. this includes
structures such as table top sttuc:tutes IUld concrete structures SIlPPOIting equipment
or other steel stnJctwes,
However. it is clear that some of these items should be dmgned so that the
coDDCCted elem!!J!ts can peafunn piopedy. This n:quires that the joints be
pIoponioned tmd detailed to allow the ele"llIs ftamiDg into them to develop tmd
maintain their saength as we1I as sHRiness while lDIdergoing large indastic
deformation.
5.4.3.2 Equipment Fouudatlons
In general, most equip" e
nt
foundations are designed with the equipment consid-
ered as rigid. TheIefUJe. for seismu: conditions, the andIorage should be designed for
the code specified shear. Addhional ties are usuaJ1y required around the anchorage
by the UBC. Special considemion should be given to vessels tmd excbangers as
outlined below.
5.4.3.3 Horizontal Vessels and Exchangers
Horizontal vessels IUld exebangers are UOlmally supported on two pedestals
supportiDg saddles confunning to the vessel curvatmc. One saddle is fixed to the
pedestallUld the other is allowed to slide for ther.mal expansjlJlL
For stacked vessels aud excbangers where the anchor bo.h capacity may not be
adcqua1e to carry the loads. the fixed foot plate can be welded to the bearing plate. or
shear keys can be used. Shear keys aud nrdumical stops may be used on the sliding
foot for traIISVeiSe load resistaDce; however. this should be placed in such a way as
not to impede the sliding of the foot, Figure 5.5. Note that shear capacity. either in
5-23
/""
--
........
--

L...J
'"
:Ii
:Ii
IICTIIIN .....
FIgaIe 5A: Typical AIr Coolers Supported OD a Pipeway
the traDSVerSe or longitnctin
a
! direction, may be govemed by the concrete capacity.
Special ties and dr:tpDs for seismic zones are shown in Figure 5.6.
For additional g"blance. mfer also to Section 5.3.5.6.
5-24

TYP ICAL
LlECHANICAL
STOP
Figure 5.5: Transverse shear resf.stiag elements. Where anchor bolts are not
adequate to resist shear or are not appropriate, mechanical stops may be added
5A.3.4 Vertical Vessels and Stacks
Figure 5.7 illustrates some special details, particularly relating to the number and
~ of ties for vertic:al vessel foundations.
5.4.3.5 Foundations on Piles
Sometimes the pile cap/pile connection is designed to be fixed. A pile cmlledment
of one pile cfjunetr:r is rec:t'nmrnded, but not less tban 12 inches (S em). In geueral,
the cmIJrdment need not exceed 2 feet (9 cm). The pile reiDfol' ne
ill
should be
anchored in the cap the appIOpIiate emlwfment length. Whenever the pile cap!pile
c:onamction is cfcsigJWI as a pin. the pile CjDleilment into the pile cap should be 3 to 6
inches (1 to 2 em). Rebar development should be provided in the pile cap.
S-2S

;
.$II ... .sucr;
",
" -..
P'" ST.aca.$
...... ..
/.' ;:-,
-.
" ... . : ..
..
I :
':.'-, " .....
-'.,
:',',f'o!. r,..'.i
AIGft .;;.. .:- 1
-r 0 .......... ..... f!'JIX . -.......... ..
. --_tEo .ft ...... 'SHHU .
. . ...,.. ..
FIgure 5.6: Typical horizoDtal vessel and exrbanger flJllDdatiOD details. Note
spedaI seismic ties. ReiDfon:emeat Is typical for IIotb pedestals
5.4A MasoDrY
ReiDforc:ed masomy structun!S arc often an iDlegral part of tbe landscape
tbroughout a peuochemical plant. Masomy SUUCtlII1:S arc Jjmjted to items such as
rcraining waDs and barriers. opetator shekers, au.v1iary hw
1d
ings and in some cases
control bnMings 0fte:D. masomy is used for tIamal linings in furnaces, beatms and
other high te'"lcxatwe eqWpliltillt. In an active seismic ZOJle, COJ1IH'f.tion derails for
the above items should comply with the UBC and related codes. However, care
should be taken to ensure thermal growth compatibility of any ties with that of the
masomy.
5-26
...... -9IIU STACKS
AS IIEO' D
SOL TS
lEO SPACED
PLAN
P10 REINF
180T)
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
& STRADDLE
SREC IAL TIES
FOR SEISMIC
ZONES
,..... .... REIHF
lTOP)
OF FDN
FIgure 5.7: Typical Vertical Vessel FCJ!!Ddatfon DetaDs
(Note special tie requirements)
S-Z7
5A.5 TImber
In the petrochemical jndUstry. most struCtUrCS are buiIt with materials other than
timber. such as steel and concrete. However. when timber is used for the con-
struction of buildings or supporting systems. CO!!JltOC';tOIS sjrnt
1a
r to colilllleidaJly
available se.ismi.c ties or with good seismic resistance, are reco!TlT!1f'!llded. In a high
seismic zone these special connectors will provide evnJ!ent uplift and lateral load
resistance to the strucmre.
5.5 PHYSICAL INTEllACI10N OF STRUCIURES AND COMPONENTS
5.5.1 Introduction
This section deals with physical interaction between structmes and components.
and the precautions that should be taken to mmjrnig the negative effects.
5.5.2 General
The physical interaction between structures and compoJlCl1tS of a petrochemical
plant during a seismic event is sjtmlar to those in til: general COJlilDaclal
euv.iromrent. The configuration of structures or coh4,,",ellts largely deteuniues the
ways in which seismic forces are distr.ibIned, ami also influences the relative
magnitude of forces and displan=mcnts. 4
The objective of a good petrochemical facility c:oufiga:ration is high opellding
efficiency and low capital cost. Process, ""W"banjt:al and piping design xequixeJl ents
and til: desire to minimize plot space encouxagc placing COIDpOJlCI1tS close togetlu:r.
This inevitably creates til: potential for damaging ixItenction of structures and
components duxing an earthquake. It is incumbent upon til: structural engineer to
raise concerns about strIiCtIlrc and component intexaction.
a. Tall vertical vessels with pJatfoxms or pipe jn close proximity to each other.
b. Venical or hoxizontal vessels with shared worldng platf'oxms.
c. Iaterconnecting pipeways.
d. Mobile equipment such as davits, c:nmes. etc.
e. Distributive systems wbich c:cnmect compc:iilt5dS suppoxtecl on piles with
components not supported on piles.
5-28

Some of the general concepts that arc practiced to avoid or minimize physical
interaction arc as follows:
a. LayOUt all stmcIIJreS as regular strUCtUreS whenever possible.
b. Provide adequat= space between componems.
c. Check the "Ph iii!! II n displ8'"11 ",II' Make sure there is enough room between
the structare and componeDt to match the displacement c:alcuJated.
d. Provide an apptoprlate support and restraint coufiguration for pipes to
nrinimTm tranSfer of load across flanges and couplingS.
e. Make piping syatems more flexible to mitigate the coupling effects of large
pipes. Include loops in the pipes wherever needed
It is the general pxacdce to layout an structu:res and compolltlltc to IIIjlljllljze any
physical
..r...w.w 'lUL- pJatfo --_.- _._--
mterac:aon UoI&UII6 a sersliliC eveDt. ft'UlaliWS or y ~ are m
proximity to each 0_. the disp1aceIllMtc and/or periods should be cJtrdced to
iDsure that the spacing between such stJ:tIctUl'eS exceeds the sum of the absolute
values of the dispJa"'", "'S 'l1= dispJa. fum'S (deft .. willed with code mandated
forces) for this evaluatiDn, should be increased by 3<RwJ8) to account for inelastic
behavior. Also refer to Secdon 5.3.3.2 herein, for fi:&rther iufolll.,t;on on dealing with
inelastic behavior.
Often, piping in sttuawes is routed ve:rticaIly from a higher elevation to a lower
elevation into flanges ami coupHngs at tile nonJes of turbines, PWIqiS, ussels. etc.
Large displac:ements of these pipes may cause leaks at the intetface. thus cansing fires
and in some cases leadjng to exp.IosioDS. All effort should be made to provide
adeqnate system tlex;hjJjlY in the pipes to minjnVn: load tl1iIISfet across flanges and
couplingS due to se;smjI; loads.. This may be achieved by several methods. the III)st
pxacticaI being pIaper suppo:rt of the piping. ami by Hnriting the displarellenl ofpipes
as specified below.
Where large pipe cfispJaillient5 cansed by defJerrion of the suppotting structure
are UDaCCCptlIbJe. 1iwiting hozw)IIlBI str1JCtw'e displacemenl OD the order of HI24O,
where B is the height of the suppo:rt point above the flange, may provide an
acceptable solution.
5.5.4 PJpeways
Often, pipeways inteIsect each other, thus care should be taken DOt to transfer
longitudinal seismic c!isplare!l'CDI and forces from one pipeway into traDsYerse loads
5-29
on another. Adequate IcmgitndinaJ bracing or physical. separation of pipeways can
protect agaiDst such eff'er!s Layout of piping and cable nay systems should be done
. in a numner to mjnimize such effects
5Ji GEOTECBNICALCONSlDERATlONS
Foundations for stnIiClUies designed with the aid of modem buvding codes and
seismic analysis tec!mjqves have generally perfomm well during major eartbqualce
events. This satisfac:tOI)' state of eVCDtS is due to a combjnarign of a good
understanding of seismic balls, good construction ami design procedures. and large
sati:ty factou used for static loads. Seed et al (1991) ami Krintzsky et al (1993)
provide some ~ I l e m Ip'*ground materlaIs on seimric mIated. folmdarion issues.
The following sections pmvidr: additional discnssion on sclected geotechnical issnes.
5.6.1 Piled FOUDdaticms
The ASCE Geota Ile at EngineeJing Division xeceudy published a Dumler of
papers reviewing the 1'1 m understanding of djliiWlic piI= respouse (Prakash,
1992). Among those papcas was one by Hadjian et al (1992) that miewcd the state-
of-the-practice as it IdaIes to both code provisioDS ami cilgiamil" practice The
foDowing is largely milia ted from that paper and fmmKJinitzsky et al (1993).
Little effort is typically expended on P'''c soil-shlh ""e intemctiDn UIIIess difficult
soU conditions exists, or tile capital exp=sc or 4Dpw1aiite of the SI:I:IlCtUm is gRISt.
However. a great ulma ... of procedures have beca pmposcd ami me in use for
iadependent piles. piI= groups. and linear and nonHnear soU response (e.g.. PPkasb,
1992; Gazetas, 1991; Ncip"'i et all991. 1992).
Piles inserted into a.piag groUDds, or adjaceal to slumping marerials, may
experience lateral Joadimg clue to the tnuISVeI:se JWiCiiEii1 of soU during ground .
faih=. Such conditions am difJictJlt to desigu against
Friction piles placed in loose sands, 5C(!sjrive cIaJS or high water ccdent clays
may exp:rieDce loss of ' Bpd! it)' or settlement dnring sigrrifisant seine events..
Battered piles offer a stiffer coDDguration to latcIalloads than vmically oriented
piI=s ami tbmefore teDd to iDaease seismic loads. Stnu:t1UCS DOt approp,iately
designed or CODStrUCted for dds rcspcmse can exp:,Rhiag setae damage. There me
proposals to ciliminate futare c:onsttuction with battc:al piles in seismic areas b,.C'msc
of poor performance
The seismic petfur .... m:e of piles can be improved by extending them to deeper.
more conqetent soils. addiag beUed bases to imptove tension and end-bearing
capacity. or by adding a SUTface surc:ha.rge to inarasc tile t.mOuillg stICSS and
5-30
strength at depth. Driving fUll displacement piIcs densifies the surrourufing son.
thereby improving peziuIlIWlice
5.6.2 SoD Strength CcmsideratiODS
Several codes allow the use of increased soil strengths under the action of seismic
ground sbaking. The iDcreasc is typically on the order of 1/3 or greater. The .large
factors of safety used in folmdarjou engineering for static loads result in significant
excess capacity that may be considered for the less fn:qucntly OCCW1ing transient
loads due to seismic ground shaking. The general satisfac:tOIy peIfonnance of
buildings ami fmmdations designed under modem seismic codes would seem to
validate this procedure. However, significant care must be exercised to insm:c that the
foundation response under'dyna:mic cyclic loading bas been considered in an analysis
attempting to c:baractcrizc it with simple static load metbods typically used in designs
5.6.3 Geoteclmic:al SltelmestigatioDS
Site investigations ate teqohed to acquire basic foundation design data. Zones of
potential seismic .activity JeqUire some additional CODSidcrations that arc necessary to
quantify local site response cbaracteristics ami seismic hazards. The following is a
partial list of data required for conventional fonndath"l analyses ami seismic response
ami hazard analyses:
L Depth to bcchoc:k
b. Ground water rabJc location
d. Soil physical chamcre! isdcs (grain size distribution. index properties. organic
content, density, YOidratio, water content)
eo Soil mechanical characteristics (elastic ptopeztics. consolidation ploperties.,
shear strength)
t: SmSlmc parallle!e!S
g. Unique conditions (sloping bedrock. sutDce grade. ami proximity to faults,
cliff ateaS, :river fronts or coastal ateaS, m:ctic condjtjons)
b. Site investigation iepoUS should incblde descriptions of drilling, sampling ami
in-situ testing mc.thods. as this infollnation in usefi.ll in aiding the compaiison
of results from different investigations.
5-31
Chapter'
WAIJrnOWNEVALUA'IlONS OF EXISTING FACILITIES
6.1 INTRODUCTION
A "walkthrough" or "walkdown" evaluatiou is the term genetalIy applied to an on-
site. mostly visual. sate";"g review where as-instaDed components are methodically
"walked down" and evaluated for potential sejsmic vulnerabilities Using this method,
it is possible to rapidly and cost-eft'ectively identify the highest risk ireas and prioritize
further, more detailed evalnatiOIlS which might be apptoptiate. This section is jntended
to give pmctica1 guidance to engineers who will pedoJm such evab,,!!ions
6.2 BASIS FOR PERFORMING WAI.Jal()WNS
PetrochemieaJ. fac:olitjes are increasingly being forced to demoDStrate safety against
toxic releases and poDution by mandates such as the CaliforJIia Risk Management
Prevention Program (RMPP) req1ilie
n
e
n
ts, the OSHA law (29 CPR 1910.119), and
the proposed EPA law (40 CPR Part 68). There is cuuent1y no widely used and
accepted standard for evah!llting existing faciHries for seismic loads. While some
bigbly regulated .industries, such as mui/ear power plants, require coDform!l!!ce to new
codes each time design st!IJ!dards change, when owners of pettt>c:bcmical plants
evaluate facjljties, it is gCiitliaB.y done voh"!I'ariIy. Upgrade and acceptance decisions
rely on cost-benefit CC'nsjdCJ3fious, with criteria set by the owners in agIee'uM with
local authorities as necessary.
Walkdown tecluriques along with Ijmjted amdytical evaluations have been used
extensively in Califomia petrochemical fa",
1iti
es rather than a nuc1car-type
methodology to satisfy RMPP requhements since the early 1990&. This approach has
been implemented beeR""'
a. Very few existing famTtties would be able to demoDStnlte CODfonmmce with
current seismic codes Seismic design codes change constantly in order to
incorporate lessons learned from past earthquakes and ongoing research, and
have usually become more restrictive and more conservative.
6-1
b. The walkdown D!Zthod takes advantage of the lessons Ieamed from the
earthquake pedOtIll/lUlCC of imiUSlrlal faciljties, namely that most instalIations
perform well, even when not designed speci1icaIly for seismic loads. The
occum:nce of damage can usually be traced to known Nlnscs which could
have been mitigated by the evaluations descdbed in this section.
Co The walkdown merhod is cost-effective. It is intended that all components of
interest are looked at during the walkdown. but more costly detajIeA analyses
an: efuninated for all but the higbM risk itc:ms. Obvious problems can be
quickly jdentified and mitigated, as well as those areas where low-cost
modifications or rmVttenance can significantly improve the scismic integrity of
the equipmentlst!!I!Jctnte (e.g. mjssing hatdw31C).
d. 'I'he method is lCi!,Iical and defensible to zeguJatms and owners. It considers
the actual condjlihls of the plant; it .relies OD deJmnstrated performance in
past earthquakes. backed up by pcdo"'M"':e obserwtioJJs and data; and it
.iDcOlporates the ift'lerjp"cc. judgment. ami CO""'''DD s=se of the engineers
perfonniDg the RlView. Several Califomia ICgD1atoxs have accepted and
n:c:c pi. ilm:nded this approach for RMPPs. .
e. 'I'he JlII:thod is a;pps:opria1e for regions of high and low se
is
deity. 'I'he level
of seismic baz;m!! can be accounted for in the waJkdowns.
In snmmary, the waJrdowu methodology allows the owner to identify high risk
items and assess potentiia
l
safety, POllution. and CCODOmic exposure due to seismic
eventS.
6.3 GENERALMEJBU.OLOGY
Walkdowns an: ge!!4af1y perform:d by an engl! r or team of engineers in a
~ systeM!.';I; " """. to assure coDSisteDcyaml comp1-te=" The overall
methodology may inclwfle SC'Vtilal or all of the folIowiug ekments:
a. Meetings with owners, ope.tators. rcgu1atms, pmcess safety cnginecu, or
other appropria patties to discuss objectives of the evalnarinn and to
estabHsh pellt" iiI'M"':e nquia:mcnts of facility.
b. Idemificatiou of "f"4!!!CiU, structures and piping of blterest. If the review is
being performcc!as pan of a process hazards aualysis or process relatcd safi:ty
review, the waJkdown engin ......... should review the ass"hq.tions used in the
bazaxd analysis a:gatd'ing the expc!:ted post-earthquake avajlability of critical
systems If the Rl9iew is voluntary, for pmposes such as evaluating insurance
m:eds or 0Vtil3Il Jist quantification, the engineer may be asked to review an
major equqjiilcmand stnu:tun:s in a facility.
c. EstabUsbment of damage categories. Walkdown eft'ons an: often required to
be coordinated with a process safety team to establish requireJnents for use in
the consequence aDalyses. For example, the process safety team may need an
indication of whether. in a given eanhquake, a vcssc1 might
- be IIndamaged
- suffer minor damage and leak
- fail catastrophically.
d. Collection of site data. Data of interest incblde seismic hazard data, fault
locations, available soil borings, plot plans to locate items, and seismic design
basis data applicable to the unit being evaluated.
e. Walkdown eva
Juaricm
of components. This is done systematically, using
cbccldists for each component, to docnmeJ'lt the evaluation and to serve as a
mninder of the scw4li
ll
g criteria. An example evaluation sheet is shown in
Figme6.1.
f. Review of drawings as necessary. This may be done to check adequacy of
reinforced concrete strucbl1'eS, to verify anchorage detaDs, or to icfentify
configumtions which CIDDOt be visually reviewed due to obstructions,
fiIeplCJOting, insulation. etc.
g. Idemifit:ation of items for IIIlIlytical review. Th=se may incblde "worst-case"
items or any items that appear to be seismically vulnerable. This is based on
the potential for damage that would cause toxic release, pollution, or other
unacceptable pe1fu!lii8!lce charactedstics, such as damage that would cause
Of! ... o. 0
S!gJU can' u'tsmess lD.tW:"j'l 'em
b. Documemaricm of "poor" or "questionable" items for 0Wi1iUS or regulators.
Sufficient expbmptjou DI11St be provided such that conective actions,
maintenance, 1in1her evaluation, etc., will in fact address the engineer's
concerns. The engineer DI11St recognize that others may perform additional
risk mitigation without futther consultation with the engineer who performed
thereviewo
i Recommendation of structural or m,.ctumU:pJ fixes or other eft'ons which
would mitigate risk from items listed above. The engineer may be required to
interact with pi0ces5 safety engineers and 0WDeIS to evaluate the economic
and technical feasibility of structural and pioc:ess mocfjfjc:ptjous
6-3

FIELD DATA SHEE'l' FOR EQllIPMENT
EQUIPMENTID:
DESCRIPTION:
LOCATION:
,
.
' .
. .. ':: 'SCREENING EV ALlJATION:.
,...,. .;':"1"',
..
..
;:::":. .
-
. .: ..... : ...
,
..
Summary of Evaluation:
_ Adequate
_ Not Adequate
_ Further Evaluation Required
Recommendatious:
. __ :A.T.:nJ'

..
Noted Anc:horage Concems:
lDstallation Adequacy Weld Quality
Missing or Loose Bolts Coxrosion
Concrete Quality Other Concerns
SpaciDgIBdge Distance
Comments:
,: c- ;., .
:
:

Noted Load Path CoDcems:
Collllections to C. "Ilpatlf4
i
!S Missilll or Loose Hardware
Support MembeIs 0I:IIIIr Concerns
Coifiiilents:
Figure 6.1: 'ibis eump!e waJkdoWD sheet shows how a simple cbecJdlst C8Jl
remind the engineer of what to evaluate for a giveD piece of equipment. .


FIELD DATA SHEE'l FOREQUlPMENT (Cout.)
"
......
.. >
Noted Struc:tnral IntegritylEquipment Specific Concems:
__ Maintenance Functionality
__ Brittle Material Ground Failure
Corrosion I..atezal Load
Other Concerns
Comments:
Noted Interactfon Ccmcems:
__ Failure and Falling
__ Proximity and bnpIct
Comments:
,."'.'
Name:
Name:
6-S
__ Differential Displaa:rJlCllt
SpmyJAoodlFire
Date: ____ -+
Date: ____ -+
.n
,:t .'
.. , .
r"::'!
. '.:."
<
j. Identification of cnuscquenres due to faDure of each of these items and the
prioritization of any recommended risk mitigation actions according to the
consequences of failure and the existing level of risk.
A rating system may be appropriate. identifying:
- major seismicwlncrabilities which shonld be fixed jrnmMjately
- serious wlDembilities which might require fixes. depending on economics
- relatively simple fixes which might be performed in conjunction with
routine maintenance or during the next turnaround.
6.4 SYSTEM CONSIDERATIONS
In most practical lpJifir:ati"us. walkdowns are performed on a cowpoJ1eJ1t basis.
T_ .. :...: ..... 1 I i:li. r __ 1Iu
....... n........ nems. e.g. c'l"'1"'em ttems, vesses, speed: PJPC"'es, are "'--I
idtmrifjed as hnportant 1M> euse of bazardous materials. me potential, potential
interaction with other CODip'",milS, etc. and eva!n:ated by the seiSii!ir: waIkdown team.
Often, these evaluations are perionued completely iadependeat of any process
hazards analyses (e.g. "What-m", HAZOPS, etc.) wbich may bave initiar' the
seismic evaluations to be pedm:med. In those sitnatlons, it is hnportaDt that the
walkdown team interact with teams performiDg process hazards 1UIalyses. A
constructive iDfonnation intert:hange greatly enhances the efficiency and potential
benefits from the review.
The seismic review team should be able to describe to owners and to. process
safety enginPATS some of the general etfects that can be expected in a scenario
eanhquake. For example
a. The entire facllitywill be shaken simnltalleously without prior warning.
b. The sha!dng may last 10 seconds or longer. Very large magnitnde
carrbquakea (gmata than magnimde 8) have cans' shaking !asring on the
orde.r of 60 secmrds
Co Off-site power will Jibly be lost.
d. Several systems may be lost at the same time, such as phones, water, etc. and
for long periods oflime..
f. Certain wlnerable equiprren
t
items and piping systems may be damaged and
unable to function.
,
1
,

I
I
t
I
l
g. Offsite emergency services may not be available dne to infrastructure
problems (bridge or highway damage) or due to their required use in the
general comm
u
ni1;y.
h. Concems about pe:sonal or family safety may be the priority of operator
personnel, and ope:arm action may not be a viable method of mitigating
damage.
If the review is pan of a hazard analysis. an of these issues may affect the hazard
analysis results. and should be mnsidered, by the process safety team. The waIkdown
engineer should c:rirically nMew what ass"" 'lWDS have been made in the process
hazards analyses which might be inappropriate regarding post-earthquake capabt1jtie
s
of facilities and equipmem.
The waIkdown engineer should interact with operators. owners, process safety
engineers. and other avaiJab1e specialists regarding consequences of damage. For
example, a civiIIseismic engineer might assume that the highest c:ousequences of
failed process piping am assnc:jated with pipes c:arryjng the most toxic materiaL In
reality, other considenilums. such as whether the system will contin!)e to feed
material through the Jim:. or whether the pressure drop will shut clown production of
the JJl8b:rial. may be IJ1QIC signfficamfactors in the priali1izarion of the hazards.
This point is made to alert waIkdown teams to be c:onsjsumt in cwluarlons,
caJibratiDg judgmmt based on UDdctstanding of the systeim, not on UDfounded
IISSUDIptioDs. It is also made to emphasize to the ci.viJlseiS!nic enginftlr that not an
potential damage needs to be mitigated. The waIkdown engineer will likely jdentjfy
several concems which lie detetwined to not have sigrrificam safety or economic
implications, a d=isiuD that will be made by othe%s with iDput from the walkdown
team. Al that point. drrisi01lS regarding upgrades should be made by the owner on a
cost-benefit basis.
6.4.1 Emergency Syidaus
During a damaging earthquake, it is very likely that off-site Ut11jtjes will be
disrupted and potentially lost for long periods of time. If the scope of the review has
bee
, cd . _......... .. 1.--'-- _ . . . . : . . I ~ the ...... ." . .
n Jrntt_ to cqu4 ..... ul ...... plplIlg w..... UiWOiIl""UII ......... _ ... v .... scrsrmc
engineers should question the process safety engineers to deteulline their aSSlJJlIptious
on the avaUabiIity of o1kite ntt1ities following an earthquake. It may be pmdent to
inchlde items such as backup power supplies and water storage taDks in the seismic
evaluaDon.
The waJkdown team shonJd also question wbetb=r other em:rgen.:y systems ue
being counted OD to functirm dudng a large earthquake to mitigate damage. In
particular, it should be deteullined whether the fixe protedion system,
6-7
telecommunications systems. and containment systemS are required to perform active
functions after the eanbquake.
6.5 EVALUATION OF COMPONENTS
The following paragraphs are intended to give guidance for performing
walkdowus of typical CODl,. lIIents in a petrochemical facility. Note that this guidanCt:
is not intended to be an ineh'sive; it would be impossible to list an of the possible
situalioDS that an engineer might encounter. Rather, the issues discnssed below
represent those that have been identified in the investigatioDS of equipment
performance in earthquakes throughout the world over the last two decades. In
additiml, it incOIpoIates the in-plaDt experien.:c of engineers who have performed
seismic waIkdowus of petrnchemical fac,1ities, pIinwily in CaJifomja. In an cases.,
the walkdown engineer must use his or her counwn sense and fundamental principles
of enginem ing mechanics, as necessary, in the jdcmtjfjcation of potential seismic
vulnembili.ties
6.5.1 Major Comideratlnns
Several major c:onside,ations should influence the focal points of the waIkdown
investigation and the reIaDve effm:t spcut on various aspects B: ... mples inc:1ut!e'
a. Level of Ground Shaking Hazaxd: In amas of lower seismicity. major
struc:I:URS and vessels may be designed for sufficient 1ateral load capacity
1'C"'IJting from design for other criteria, such as wiDd. However.
displaali i iNll-indn"'" damage can occur at low levels of shaking.
b. Severity of Other Hazards (fillllring, soil faiJuze, and landslides): Known
fauJts in tbe Yiciui1y of the site should ale:lt the waIkdown team to be on the
lookout for situations where imposed disp. e ..... at could cause damage. such
as buried piping. or equipment supported. OD diffetern suucturaI systems.
Where known faults ran through the site, a walkdown cwluatjou may need to
be supplem:nted wiIh acfdjtjogal geotechnical or other investigations. son
failure such as liquelacrion cou1d also gteatly impact the severity of dam
a
!,,-
c. VJDtage of the faciJiI:y and applicable cades at tbe time of COJIStl'IJCtion
Applicable codes ami scismi design m=thDds may have clIa.aged c:cmsiderably
siIIce a tmit was cfcsigIted.. In paujMdar, .eiDfmced COJIQete design codes
dJaDged. in the early 1970s. adding d"""Ung IcqUhe" ... nts wIdch wou1d ensure
ductile bebavior in 3D overload condition. "I'hen: should be more emphasis aD
cwh1ating overall sttactmal capacity in older 1lDits tban in newer units. In
addition. engineers cwhl8ting older fam
1
jtjr:s should be more alert for existing
damage. such as dears in stracwral hIMi"cIs, damaged concrete, ccnrosion,
etc.
d. 0veraII quality of maintenance: Where overall maintenance appears to be
poor or inconsistent. walkdown teams should be alert for missing nuts and
bolts. unrepaired damage. fieldmocUfications., etc., especially in the primary
load path aDd coDDeClions.
e. Priorities based on puJceSS safety considerations. pollution. regulatory needs,
etc.: The process safety engineers and owners should identify to the
walkdown team which components may wammt a more thorough initial
review due to safety. pollution. or economic CODscquences of damage.
6.5.2 Generic Issues
The foDowing issues are common to several types of electrical and mechanical
equipment. Additional guidmce is provided for several of these issues, as
apptopxiate. in the discllssion of 5p'" jfic equipment items.
6.5.2.J. A n c h o ~
DispJa.:emem resulting !ram iDadequate or mjssing anchorage has probably been
the most common source of damage to equipment in past earthquakes. Among the
specific details noted to have C3nsed problems are the following:
L Vibration Isolators: Rotating equipment .is often isolated from its supporting
strw:tme by the use of elastomaric pads or springs which do DOt transmit the
vibrational loads from the equqmeul to tbe SIl'DCtDrI:. Those.isolatoIs. which
may appear on a quick visual Je'Viow to be designed for Jateralloads, often
lack tbe stt=Igtb and dnc:fflity to msist seismic: loads without finling (Pigure
6.2). One potcnljaJ cause of fiIilure is wbeD tbe isolatots are made of non-
ductile material. sucb as cast-iron. which may fracture rub:r than d.eioIDl
unde:r eartbquab loading ADotbcr poteadal cause of cfamagc .is a lack of
venical uplift: resuaints. 'l'be eq"qliiCilf may bollllCe out of the support and
thereby lose its eflIoo:r:ive Jatmd suppwt. A good detail on a vib:ation isolator
COUiIWnly hu:!wf,.. 'HIiiiY:iS" in the Jar""l direction (Figme 6.3). or stops
which will not pehU modon. but will limit the displa-:e!llC!J1f to tolerable
lewls. A good detail also im:Jud,.. uplift n:sttaiuts. In ge=ral. it is
Jeco'"'ended that 8DJ i'Du'lion isolated cq'1:'DeD
r
be carefiJJly evaluated
lcoJatms tbemselves should be evah1ated. as well as tbe ccillseq"ences of Jargc
dispJaremeats which may occur should tbat isolator faiL
b. Welds: Non-ductile 1iIiIure may 0CCItt in sitnarioDs wb= welds are
OVeIstxessed. Sihtations of com:em tbat might be idemifiM during a
walkdown evaluation include;
- corroded welds, a concmn which should be cvahlated whmever standing
water acc1!!DulatN or welds are constantly exposed to water;
-. .
- potentiaUy lmdmj71'lll welds:
- situations where good quality welds may be difficult to install, such as a
weld to checker plate which may not be of high quality (Figure 6.4);
- welds where they shouldn't be (e.g. anchor bolts welded to their rtseats"
on tanks); and
- welds over shim plates (Figure 6.5), an especia1ly difiicalt detail to detect
in a field mricw, and on1ikcly to show in drawings.
c. Bolted anchorages: Cast-in-pJacc, groutcd-in-place, and expansion anchor
bolts may fail not 0Dly due to lack of strength, but due to cfetajls such as
inadequate edge djstancc or cracks in the concrete (Figure 6.6). Factors such
as spacing of the bolts may reduce the capacity of bolted anchorages due to
overlapping shear cones. Spacing and edge ctistancc may cause a reduction in
capacity if <tistar'C
cs
betwccu bolts or bolts and edges me Jess than 10 times
the bolt diaJncter. Special anenrlou should be given to .hJsj;o:tjon (e.g.. bolt
dgh"'ess checks) of pouted-in-place and expansion IIIIC11OIs, as their
capacities me very ...... sffive to plopet hlmllation
Figure,6.2: ThIs Is an enmple of a faDed. 'Vibration Isolator. In this case, the
spriDg broke. Other times, the mounting may be made ofbdttle material, such
as cast troD, and may rxw:twe.
6-10
. ,- ~ . -, ."' -,' -' -.-.
FIgure 6.3: Bumpers should be iJpdnded to &mit the movement of vibration
Isolated equipmeut. Uplift restraints should also be prorided.
6.5.2.2 Load Path
a. The load path of the major equipue
or
masses down to the foUDdation should
always be visually ICVicwed.
b. The engineer should be aware of lmnsnal cutouts or modificatiOJlS. Where
those cutouts are obviously field modificatioDs, the mgineer should assess
whether lateral capacity is sigoific:arttJy reduced Cutouts are common in
sappan saddles, espo:iaUy for horizomal vessels and beat cxchangeIs where
the anchor bolts OD the pieIs are DOt cor:r=tly aHped with the pre-drilled
. holes in t1ie steel saddles They may also be found in vessel support skirts,
when piping does not align with prefabricated ope"ings
Co Load cells within the load path (Figure 6.7) may DOt be capable of resisting
lateralloads. These are typically used for vessels
6-11
(" .
,-
: ..
Figure 6.4: Example of a pm' quaIlty1Nld, In thfs case a tank baR plate to
checker plate d .... klng. Where welds may be dlfticnJt., the walkdown team
should evaluate the quality closely


. .
,
, ,
Figure 6.5: Sbim plates are often used for leveling vessels. Welds over these
sbJms may have severely reduced C3pa' ity. This poor detaD is diDicult to spot
in drawings or In the site investigatioD. In tbfs c:ase, the walkdown team should
notice the apparent tbkkDess of the base plate.
6-12




d. A common problem is missing nuts and bolts on connections. This situation is
especially prevaIeni where strUCtUral m''''den must be removed to provide
access for regular maintenance of equipment.
e. Attenrinu must be given to cases where large .... centri.cities exist. This often
occurs as a msult of field mortifications which have DO eng;"'! i!tg basis. such
as a sbifting ofbraces to allow for cIeuance for piping, or other eqnq""ent.
Eccenttfcities, if signfficant, can induce significant ...... ding on stmctura1
UlCIDbeIs. such as m1umn
s
, for which these JIIImIbcn; ate DOt designed
Figure 6.6: Large c:raeks within IIJ.bolt diameters could reduce the teDsiOD
capacity of an anchor bolt. Cnu:ks such as these through the anchor bolts could
significantly reduce their tensile and shear capacity
6-13
Ie'
~ .

FJgare 6.7: Load ails are commoDly used Ia the suppwt for 'L I Is These may
lack capabDlty of.elsling lateral loads aad should be c:aaefuDy eIH""ued.
6.5.2.3 Malnte,.,
DuriDg wa1IcdowDs of fac:t
1
iries, eagin =rs routiDely' obsave mmfitious which
CODiplowise the Mis"ir: SIliiCl1WaI iDtegdty of eqc,ildiC'iI. ;. could be easily taken
care of through louti'lie majntenance This occurs 0VIIIl in othe.t wise weJ1..maintained
filc:t1jtjc:g. As dip ,ssed above. this is pi iiIQdly a load patbIam:boJ:agc issue related ("
to npssing or dam,&, d baidwue.
6.5.2 4 Cutlusioa .
The waIkdown ream should always be on the lookout for areas where corrosion
may occur. The OlE' n is not smface nJsting, but a loss of structural strength which
may be indicated by ,hi",'; .. " pittjag. or flaking. Areas espccially w1DerabIe would
be where espeMaUy corrosive materials such as acid are pI em, ami where water
may accumulate
Another area wI=e corrosion may be a problem is where C O D C t ~ cover is
spalled and the t"j,,6.c:e
m
c
nt
is exposed. This is gc iiicrally a me"e. of majntenance
6-14

1
I
Because COIJ'Osion is often a high priority general concern to a facility, the plant
may have a corrosiOD group that can assist in idem;fying potential problem m:as.
6.5..2.5 CoDStl'actionllDstaOation Quality
During walkdowus, engineers may also observe consistently poor inJtaDat;on
practices. This may be evident in welds. or in expansion anchor boltiIJsta1lations.
For expaIISion anchors may not be able to attain their tensUe design capacity
if embedment is inadequate. This could result from the use of shim plates or large
grout pads. It may be evident by long stUds protruding above the concrete surface,
or exposure of pan of a shell insert. Other of iDsta
l1ar
ion concerns would
such as pins. not installed pl0pedy or fasteners missing
posttlVC locking deYices for vibrating cqu'lwlCl1t.
6.5.2.6 Seismic Interaction
Seismic interaction refers to damage to a system or piece of equipment due to
impact with or movcmcut of another piece of equipm:mt, system. structure., storage
Qbinets, farnitute, de. This is a particular aspect where the wa1kdown evaluation is
the best way to identify potential interactions.
For the purposes of this doc
1I
ment, seismic interactions ate divided into four
primary categories:
a. Proximity aad. Impact: This 0CCU1S when there is not adequate cleatance
between two items to prevent impact. This may occur from stiding of
tmancbored eqWp"CDC; swinging of rod-hung piping, ducts. or cable trays; or
cantilevered defIec:riou of eIecttiral cabinets causing pounding with adjacent
cabinets. waDs, or structural 1re,.dlCl5. Another example would be the hazard
of walkway phd Ii lid with shaxp ended beam supports. if the walkways ate
capable of DlJvemeut reJativc to the taDk such that the taDk waIl can be
punctured.
b. Structnra1 FaiIme and Falling: This usually occuxs whim iDadequately
ained fall fro abo' . the' .
restt c''''q+onents m ve, unpacung eqt''I'i.e:nt m questtolL
This can also occur when a large item neazby structmally faDs and impacts
with the eqnipmcnt being evaIna
tM
by the walkdown engineer.
Co D.ifferential Displw:emeDt: This is a particular CODcem for the waDaiown
team wherever items ate supported by diffe:tent structural systems. The
engineer should be awme of potential simmons where the diffiaexn systems
can displace, such that COJIIU!l:ting piping, ducts, conduit, mbjng, etc. do not
bave adequate tlexibility to survive the motion. Flexibility is the key feature
to resist damage. This is also a spccilic concern when dift"erent foundations
6-15
act as suppons for one piece of equipment. or where equipment is
tmanc:bmed.
d. WatezSplay and Floodiug: This may be of CODCem .iDSide buildings. where
damage to sprinIdcr systemS could affect the opcrabiIity of electrical.
equipment. Of particular concem should be sprinIde.r heads on fire piping
which might impart hard structural memben and open. sptaying water on
electrical eququ, 'em below.
Process changes may :result in operating conditiollS which have been changed
from the design ccm1litU",s without consideration of the effect on seismic
vuluerabiIity. The walkdown team should make appIopliate pzocess engineers and
oper:ators aware of this possibility and investigate wbere such c:banges may have
occ:uued.
6.5.2.8 lDadverteDt Relay Actuation I Functlcmallty
Functionality of equipueut may be affmed by die action of electrozm:cbanjcal
relays during an earthquake. This cannot be evalnated dming a walkdown and
requires a system evaIuatioD. Walkdown engineers should be aware of the potmttial
for relays chatteriug, It ipl'ing, or changing state due to earthquake ""'Iring and that
certain types of relays, such as switches rimg UEleuxy fiJIed vacmrm tubes, have
bccu demonstrated to be Wmuion sensitive. Walkdown enginectS should notify
process engim=s and operators of this possfut1ity and iIm:stigatc 1iJrther when this
condjtjon is a concan.
6.5 2 9 Ground Failure
Ground faiIme bas led to Be\'eRI damage and coDapse of many otherwise well-
designed SI1'UCtDICS lIJId eqAit" i ..... t in earthquakes.
a. Walkdown r:UgiiitliS should always teYiew soil lepwts to identify the
potential for fimlting. liquefaction and sett1e" Alt. Special caution should be
exercised whcuel'CI' one or more oftbese Stnatirms is encounteted, since even
we11-engi"ecml SINCtUles and .ip"ICm can be sevexeIy damaged.
Walkdown evaJmWoos generally must be supplemcuted with additjomll
studies whenevertbesc types of ground failme ate poss1'ble.
b. Steep slopes with potential stability problems should be identified, and if
questionab1e .slope-stability studies should be me> II I iii !floded,
6-16
6.5.2.l0 Design Interface
In general. the walkdatrn team should always be alert when investigating areas of
design interface. where amnecting structural elements may have been designed by
different engineering gIODpS. E."amples inclnde vessels on supports. where the vessel
and saddle design may be by the vendor, wbl1e the attachment to the support and the
support may be by others; or finfan units, where the p;peways may be designed by
one group and the finfaD. sad support framing by the vendor.
In these situations, the walkdown team should be alert for inconsistent design
practices. an indication tbat one or more eJem.w.s may not have been properly
designed for seismic loads.
6.5.3 Evaluatiou of SperiDo:: Components
The following sec:Qoas list c:onsideratiollS in the evaJuatioD of several specific
types of equipment and 51I'11CtDreS found in petrochemical fa!:11itjes, Again, it should
be empbasized that the following grridance is not all incb.sive and cannot possibly
address all sit'IJatimu; that might be encountered. It simply indicates observed causes
of damage and obsctted wIn=abilities from past walkdowns.
6.5.3.1 Meeb .... ical Eqaipmeut
Many types of eqliipile
iil
coDSist of complex assemblies of JII"cl!arrieal and
electdcal parts tbat typica1ly arc mamtfactured in an jndustrial pIOCCSS tbat produces
sVm
1a
r or even identical items. Such equipment may inch'de mp""Nrtwer's catalog
items and arc often designed by empitical (trial and error) methods for functional and
traDspottation loads. ODe c:bamcteristic of this equip" .... t is tbat it may be inhetet1tly
capable of survi'ving strung motion earthquakes without sigrrificarrt loss of function.
Equipment tbat may fit into this category inchrde most air Jumdlers. COmp1essors.
pumps. motors, engiDes, generators, valves. prn:nmarie, hychaulic and motor
operators. fans, chUJers, evapmatws. and condensers.
The engineer pedi"'"'ihg tbe waJkdowus should nmcw each of these items
looking for possible fragile pans of the compoJleDts and for specific CODfiguratioIlS
and details that have been shown to be potential probIetns. such as the following:
a. Am:horagc of the mDt. In particular, vibration isolators may be found on air
handlers, comptes .. us, and smaI1 pumps.
b. ComplCSSOrs, gem:mors. and pumps may have engines and motors located on
separate skids or foundatiollS. In those cases. the units should be investigated
for potential damage due to diffete.ntiaJ. dispJac1:
n
elll, such as biDding of a
shaft. This is a fimctioDality issue. and may not be an issue for toxic material,
flammable marerlal, or product m1
ea
ses
6-17
Co Attached piping must be fIcxib1e enough to withstaDd differential motion
between its two anchor points. This may be particularly important when it is
anacl=:l to .mancbored equipment or tanks.
d. Valves are generally wry rugged seismically. However, there have been cases
when: they have been damaged due to impact of the operator with a structural
~ . This is a spe:dal concem when the valve yoke is collSlruCted of cast
iron. The walkdown team should also investigate those sitnations where a
valve and its operator are independently supported on djfft:iC
nt
structural
systemS.
e. Additional investigation win also be appropriate where in-liDe components are
large relative to the size of the piping.
f. Non-ductile materja1s. such as PVC or cast iron.
Similar to mecbanical cquipuei!l. much eJec:ttical equiIOJI"nt is designed and
manufactured for functional and trausportation loads and has cbarac:teri1!tics of ample
construction that make it iDher=tly able to survive stroDg earthqmdres Well
anchored e1ecttical equipmeut has typically performed well in past earthquakes. This
incbldes motor conttol CCidms (MCCs), low and nrd
imn
voltage switcbgcar, I
tmnsiomas with auchored iutmnal coils. invcrt=s, ba1ty cbatgers, batteries. and
disttibution panels.
When electrlcal equipl1iCi4 is required to Amcrinn during or after an earthquake,
the waIkdown eng;',,. should lftiew each of these eq"q"'lw items. looking for
potentia! w1ncrabi1ities. &amples of concems for electticat equipment items incbtde
the following:
a. Verify auchorage of cl: h iN!) equipment. The am:borage may be bolts to .
conc:rete, fiI1et welds to cmhedded steel, or plug welds to ewleddrd steeL Of
particuJar concem are plug wcIds, which wm not have the SIDDI: capacity in
tcDsion as they will in shear. Iftb=e is a poteJltial for oyettut1liu&. the plug
welds should be cbecIred with a reduced capacity. To chect weld capacity.
USC 25% of the capacity of an equivalent fiUct weld around the pcriwetcr of
the hole.
b. Cabinets that are not bolted together may pound agaiDst each ather. This is a
padirnJar concem if tbe cabinets need to timction after aD earthquake, and
there are trip s,",sjlivc devices. such as switches and zeIays iIIside the cabinet.
6-18

!
I
,
,
J
C. f'abinets which am adj;K:cDt to sttw:tural columns or waDs may expexience a
c:antiJever defIecticm, cansjng an impact. EXcept for exnemely flexible
cabiurts. this should not be an issue where there is more than approximatcly 1
inch (2S mm) clear space. Again. this is a concern where nip s-skive
devices are pi scDt. This is not an issue if the cabinet is stiff due to top
braciDg. oniP.Ry suppoxttai COJIdnit coming ftom the top of the cabiDet.
II. The fiont to back shear panels should not bave unusnally large cutouts in the
side, ncar tbc bouom, which may COUiplomisc the stnu:tma1 integrity of the
cabiuct. This does not refer to mannfactwer's instaUr,c! and rciufurccd
cutouts. or CIltoIltS and doors in the front and back pancls
; ....
e. Intema1 dmccs should be seemed to'tm, cabinet stlIlCtD1e or internal flawing.
For fX\I''''lde. bolts t:nnr!N:ting transformer coils to tbs cabinet am sometimes
removed after Ilanspoxting the UDit to a site and instaJUngthl: eqai.];u .... Dt.
6.5.3.3 Battery Ra
rks
Emergency battery racks are identffied sePaiitteJ:y becanse they bave fidled several
times in earthquakes. often lemg to a lack of CJD:01geDCY power. Walkdown
euginmn should evaluate thI: following:
_ ..... 1 .. ~ ; ; ..
a. The battcty rack should be stnlCtW'ally sound, capable of resisting transverse
... ,'and Jongitnctinalloads. '" '" " ' , , ,
.. :'; .'0 _ ._" . ._
Ii.' The bariimes thcmsclves should be restrained fiom faD"mg offtbc rack. This is
, typicaJly done bY instaW'"g WIap-amund braciag amund thI: barrcries (Figwe
6.8).
c. Where batteries bave gaps between them. some f'oml of spacer should be
~ to prevent sliding ofthl: and i:"pact or damage to bus bars.
II. FaDing of overhead eqnip"Mint should be avoided to prevent POSSl'ble. "j.:aI
shott drcuits or d'""'lp to tbs batteries. Of particnJar concem would be
fJnoresi-ent tubes in lights. which have been observed to mn ftom fiiclures and
drop to the floor if then: is not safety grating. An CJD:01geu..oy lights. hams.
speakm, etc. in the W:iDity of Iralleries should be loobel at to ensure that
they will not slide. fall. or otherwise move Such that they can hit the batteries.
c; Ifthl:.;ng;.w,. is rcvicwiug ,tIHi batterlcs to eiusun: their 6ng:
1
iljualil:y after an
earthquake. related clectrical CqUiPiient should also be incJnded in the xcview
and given special attention (e.g. invcners. contrOl paacls. etc.).
, '
~ . . '. ..
" ,
6-19
. .
Figure 6.8: Batteries mast he kept from SUding oil'the racks 'Dds is commoDly
done with wrapannmd bra ....... as Illustrated here.
6.5.3.4 CoDtrol aDd IDStrnmpntation Equipmeat
Control panels should be vmwm with the SIIIII:I CO! "" efectrical Cabjll!"S
Of particular concem wm be the presence of tDp-seilsjlive dmces. such as mays.
WJ= JeJa,s are pmseut.. the walkdown enpmen shoukl question process safety
pe:r5OJIIICI1 or opetatms as to whether those Rlays are xeqaired to ftmctiou dmjng or
after an earthquake.
lDs!n'meuts on racks geuemIlypecfonn well. provided that they are secwed to the
rack ami the zack is anchored. J'Dsnliiicmgtjon such as de"''''Cl:luples and gauges
are not an issue except where tbey can be damaged by impar:t or ezcessive JlXltion
pulIiDg out cabIN
A.few other issues that are piiljc,.w to comDl aDd htstIUi'cnratjon equip"e,t
.
L Control panels ofteD collblin componcuts on rolb:s or slides. TIiese dmwers
may not have stops, ami have been observed to mJ1 out ami faR to the floor
during an earthquake. The walkdown cngir ... as shoukl cbet:k for stops or
other lest1:aiDts on COl I q aOMES on slides or ml1ms.
Cb:cuit cards ofteD slide in and out of panels with no resttaiDiDg devk:es.
These cin:uit canis have been observed to slide DDt ami faR to tile floor during
earthquakes. Tbe engineer should look for resnailliug dcM=s. Some cards
6-20
an: restrained by tight friction and win not have latches. Retrofits may be
impracdcaL
c. Control panels often have doors !eft open or unlatched. The swinging of
doors and resulting impact DIID' be a c:onceru if trip sensWve devices an:
pzcscnt.
6.5.3.5 Ptessure Vessels
Vettic:al plesswe vessels an: often mounted on steel skirts and am:hored to a
concrete {tlMdatioD. The vessels tht.mscJves ~ e usually designed for high pressure
and pcduIm wml in ecthquakes. Tan vesscIs and columns an: also often design""
for wind loads andllave sign; ru :anI lateral alpacity. Of special COllom! for vertical
vessols an: the followiDg issues:
a. Umehd'meed cutouts in skirts. Of special c:onrem should be cutouts that
appear to be field CODStn1Cled.
b. Flexib;1ity of attached pi.;''! lUgid. sepantely SIlpported piping can
expe:dence damaged uozz!es or failed pipes as a MSUJl of differential
displw :eIDe"!
..
.. "

Co Strength and ductility of the am:hmage., such as anchor bolts with no chain.
Rorizo'ltal p;;esswe vessels are typically supported on steel cradJtos which an:
anchored to c:omaete picts. Whae tbeuna
l
ftr,}'ansion can occur, one end will be
fixed, with the other end using slotted holes to allow for aial tbeunal growth. As
with vertical vessels, the vessels tfmmsckoes IR designed for p;;esswe loads and
would be eJqI'"rt"" to perfwm well in ecthquakes. The following concems have
been noted for b", j wEllal pzessurc v sIs
a. Pm which IR UDUsnaUy tan may not be capable of JJP!Sjstjng traDSverse or
kmgitncfina1loads.
..
b:. Namrw pim:s may haw c:ast-in-place """"'or bolts with edge distance
pmblems
Co Walkdown teams should be paItic:olarly IlW8le of field modifications in the
SUPPOdS, such as cutouts to modify alignlllent of the bolts and bolt holes.
c: For stacked horizPntaJ heat exchangezs. the walkdown team should cbeck
COPld tion bolts between the exchangers. It is common that the nuts or bolts
IR not IepJaced after mainllmllDce or a t\l:rJIaIOUI1d.
f. Actual condition of a ftsIidingft suppott. While the suppoltS may be designed
such that the nfi:xedft end is intended to take all of tile longitudinal load, actual
such as a corroded and fused slide may cause the sJiding support
to resist half of the IoDgitudinal load, even though it may not be designed for
that load.
Prtssutized spheres are typically supported on several legs eveDly spaced around
the clrcumfercnce of the sphere. The legs may or may not be braced. typically with
X-braciag between adjacent legs. Pailums that hPc been obsened in past
earthquakes have been c
a1l
sed by failure of the support SJSWIL In the 1952 Kern
County Earthquake, faDu:re of the support legs led. to breaking of attached piping.
The butane that escaped the spherical taDk CVCDmaUy igrritM, causing explosions and
fires.. The strw:tural adequacy of the legs and bracing should be the primary focus in
evabu!fjng spherical taDks. Drawings should be mviewed to ensure that legs are tied
togetherwitb grade beams
Small tanks and pressnre vessels on legs me found throughout petrochemical
faC"1jtjes The taDks and vessels themselves have not been obset ved to be sigrrificant
problems in earthquakes. The following areas should be emphasized
L The strw:tural adequacy of the support legs to msist OVClIiii IIj"g must be
cxmsidered. These have failed. in DIlDY inctances in earthquakes.
b. Flexibility of attached piping should be clw:ked 'l1Iis is especiaUy true if the
piping is connected to unanc:hoIed eqniljl"e.Dt or vessels that can move.
6.5.3.6 Fmfans
FiDfans are air cooleIs which are typically mounted em top of pipeways. The
following cODsiderations should be given to the seismic evaluation of these units:
a. The structural adequacy of the support flaming IIIIIi the attac:bmant to the
pipeway should be evah'ated Further investigadon is wammted if the
lialll;ng shows signs of distress, such as 1mckfms or bowing of members.
lJIIder operating conditions. Attadliients should be investigated whete they
are eccentric. or do not frame into primary stntctnml nv=mbers.
b. CoD buDdies are removed at iDtervaIs for mpjntemmce purposes.
These units may be positively attached to the suppcm frame at one location or
on one end only. Reinstallation of the coDs may l:e iuwDililete, with missing
bolts, mjsaligumeuts of struetural flaming, etc. The waIkdown team should
iDYesrigate those iDtetfaces.
6-22

6.5.3.7 Heaten
Boiler aDd heater sttuctures are generally thick walled steel vessels. supported on
scverallow concrete piers. They may also be cylindrical, supported on skirts siro
i1a
r
to other horizontal pressure vessels. Horizcmtal heaters are almost always fixed at
one pier with slotted bolt holes at other piers to allow for tbenn
a
! expansion.
The main focus on a boiler structure will be the support system. Reinforced concrete
piers should be cbrdced for adequate strength and stiffuess, so that they do not create
a soft story" effect
The walkdowu team should be aware of the possible presMCC of refractory brick
inside a heater or boiler structure. ThIs will add weight to the equipment ami may be
an additicmal SOIIlCe of intemal damage to the cquipmMt
6.5.3.8 Support Frames and Pedestals
Many cquqilie
nt
items will be located above grade, supported on reiDforced
concrete or steel frmes. These frames may be ineguJar aDd are typically opeD at one
end to allow forjnsraJJarion ami xeqwval of the """""'S
The faihues offreeway structmes in the 1989 Loma Prieta ami 1994 Nonhridge
Earthquakes DIDsnale tile potential for c:alMliophic coDapsc of older .einfo.ced
concrete struc:tIIIes without adequate shear reinfotrelltm' ami confinement. A
Common configumtion in mlj"cries is to iDstaIllarge vessels, emvated high above the
ground on pedestal SUPPOdS (FipR 6.9). ThD support s,stem typically bas no
redundancy. Reinforced CODClcte fia"..,. ami pedestals should be care1iJIly evabJatcd,
especially if C01ISt1UCtcd prior to the mid 197Os, wI:eD cbaDges in btrilding codes
added ductile detpt1jng uquinme
iil
' ThD walkdown team should review available
structural drawiDgs to verify adequacy of COlLlete strUdUies. In many cases, some
form of 'Qh'CjC::aJ eva1uatioD may be De essary to cfete""i"e adequacy of the
reinforced com:mta stnzclUleS. "
The waIkdoWD team shonk' also be em. tim lookout for damaged ami c:.mcked
concrete, espo:iaDy whm:e reiufau elle
nl
is CIpOrd StD:lxeinforCZ!lieil' in cracked
concrete could be susceptible to lD"jstnre ami coausioJ1, with subsequent loss of
strength.
6.5.3.9 Steel Frames
Steel fiames have traditionaDy pedihiint well ciminI earthquakes. However,
thme have bc:en a number of swptises noted in the 1994 Nortbtidge Earthquake
(EERI, 1996). Over 100 stcel1i:lllm builK. were damapd as a result of that
eanhquakc. The damage has been on moment resisting fraw:s ami has been, for the
most pan, ccmi!Clliliatcd in beam to cohmm CO""tc:tions (cracks have been found in
6-23

welded beam flanges to the coJun:m) and in some cases. in fracture of coJun:m base
plates.
Tbis is ofparticular conc:eotn to the strUCtUral COIiIliIiIii;ry bec:anse these types of
structures have been thought of to be the most dm:,,1c 8IIIl becanse of the potential
implications to the vast T1!!!1!l!er of existing steel frame stllU:nUCS. It inust be noted
however, that DOne of the damaged structures coDapsed and most remained
functional.
At the tim: of this writing. there are a DUmber of studies and investigations under
way on this issue and JIIOIC information will be known in the future. For now, the
walkdown engineer is aJated to pay additional artmtion to the connections in steel
frame structmes, in light of recent experience.
..; .
V
Figure 6.9: VertkaI ftSSels are often sapported OD each ead by a single
reiDfon:ed amcrete pedata
t
These ftSSels may be 30 feet (9 meters) above the
ground or mare, creating a large moment on the peel""'" Drawings may aeed
to be re'riewed for this type of crmfigqratfcm. Special anffon should be gi1'eD to
supports cfeslg
lled
priorto bgUdlng code cbange In tile mid 19'7Os.
6-24
The waIkdown team should be aware of sign of distress due to dead load
conditions or corrosion. Particular attention should be given to cases where drawing
mortifications (brace relocation/removal) may have taken place subsequent to the
original design of the structure. Tbese modifications may be related to piping
clearances. ere.. and may have taken place without the CODSultation of a structural
engineer. Brace relocation and removal can result in load paths being different than
originally designed and potential struc:tuml inadcqIw:y.
Most oftcu. the weakest links. where failmcs can be c'tJ'CCrcd. 8J:C in the
colDlCCtions. The counecrions should be looked at for sips of insufficient stiffening.
imtirect load path. potential prying action. etc.
Finally, in cases where non-structural cJements 8J:C attached to stmctura1 frames
(platfozms. gaard rails. etc.), tbc walkdown engjnrer should c:hec:k: that tbesc do not
act to signiR. aurly alter the dynamic RSpotISC of the st .... hne in an earthquake. or to
change the p,imary load path.
6.5.3.10 BgfIdings
This c:1oc:
n
uent will not detail the evab1arion of Cljdjng bm1dings. That topic is
covered in peat derail elsewhere.
The engineer should be cognizant of the typeS ofbm1rfing construction whk:h may
bave a higher potential for complete or partial S'tXUI::tiltiIl collapse. While minor
damage or even collapse of some buildings may be acc:eptable, suspect buDdiDgs
should be identified to the process safety group. 'J.'be following items 8J:C not
unc:nmm
OTl
in pea .... hcrnjca1 facilities and should be eva1nated by the walkdown team:
a. Umeiaforced masonry bJn1dings IIIC SUII tp'ihk to partial or complete
collapse.
b. Masonry iDfiD. in waDs 8J:C susceptible to coDapse
Co Tilt-up lmildinp IIIC susceptible to partial coBapse if they IIIC poorly tied
togedlcr.
d. Stnn:uues haviDg vertical or plan kregn!8!j
'
i may pedoan poorly in an
canhquake.
e. ReiPfon:ed concrete fi:amc bnildhlgs which lack ductiIc cJetv1s may be
suscc:p1ibIe to failure.
Attcntkm should be given to the level of fi",,:rioDaJity required of specific
buDdings following an earthquake. For example, wIICI1 evabJating a firehouse. tbe
6-25
",."
~ .
,
..
walkdown t'Jgincer should make an cva1l1
atio
n to ensw:e that the operability of the
. facility remains intact, such as the ability to open doms forme engines to exit.
6.5.3.11 Stacks
Although umeiuibtced concrete stacks and Ch;ililieys have faD.ed in earthquakes
and tall steel stacks have buckled. stacks generally pmfonn ade.quately in
earthquakes The walkdown engineer should be aware of signffic:mt changes in
b
u
i1ding codes over the years relative to tall, fIexibIe strudIJreS, such as stacks. For
example. the 1991 UBC would require a !IIinimum lateml force of O.20g in ZcnIe 4.
However. the same structure may have been designed. to 113 that load in the early
1960s. This discrepancy may be a special concem in evalnating a spread footing for
overtImIing. as the footing may appear to be UIlderdesigncd. However, because of
the cycJic uatute of dynamic loading, foundations have nut been observed to suffer
gross overloading such that a stack could tip over in an cartfIquake. This should not
be a concem unless soils are liquefiable or very weak.
It should be noted that past experience has shown that other structures IIftat:bed
to fumace stacks may be overstressed, such as tmsses supporting ducts feeding to
cfrimneys high above the ground. The waIkdown team shtmld be alerted to look for
situations where 1le:xible. or sliding type conn .... :d .... s are not peseut, as tbese
coDllCCtions would tend to preclude significant interaction between stacks and other
structares.
6.5.3.12 Gas Cylinders
Chemical releases have oc:cmred in earthquakes due to gas cylinders toppling and
rolling. Toppling of cyIindcr.; also has the potential to creme a missile bazard. The
following gaidance applies to gas storage cyliDdcrs:
a. Gas c:yIiDders are often chained to prevent falling duriDg nmmal opctations.
Single c:bajns do not lid essarily pOYen! faJftng CJnrins suppottiug both the
upper and lower portion of the cylinder are lid as "1 to pICVCnt the cylinders
from falling and sliding or rolling.
b. The er.gi"Cers should ensure that cyJillders tbat appear to be secure are. in
fact. seemed to strucmral members. This is particuIady true inside buildings.
where straps may be tied to non-structural eJmliMS
c. HOliz .. "ta) cyBnders should be secwed so tbat they cannot ron and fall of! of
suppoxts. An example of a good detaB is show in Figure 6.10, where
lewovable hold down bohs are used to secme chlorine cyIiaders. Where
hold-down devices are present. but appear to be ignoxcd or incoxrectly used.
the waIkdown engineers should question operators regilding typical
poc:edmes for restraining cylinders.
6-26
6.5.3.13 Chemical Storage Areas
CbenricPls have fallen from shelves, reacted with other spilled chemicals. and
cansed fires in past earthquakes. as wen as concem for explosions (Reference 4).
The following concerns should be investigated by walkdown enginem:
a. The engi"eers should deter.mine whether cabinets arc seemed to prevent
faDing
b. Engineas should determine w'llether resttaiDts prevent contents from being
spilledoff of shelves.
c. When: a potential for cbemjt:aJ spill is icJrm1ified, the engineer should question
the opetatolS as to the poteDtial cODSeqnences of spills. Note that seveIal
mitigation methods may be available, such as physical resaaints or separation
of me. iW}taUole c:bemjc:aJs
Figure 6.l0: CylInders that are removed when empty often sit 1JII1"eStraine on
vertical saddle sbaped supports. In this photo, a simple hold-dOWD bolt
prevents moIion whfIe the eylinder Is in use. The pres 1:'1 of a ...... hanlsm like
this C8D be judged to reasonably prevent ota twub&g or sliding of the cylinder.
6.5.3.14 PipiDg
Process piping nms throughout pettOchemjt:aJ fact
1iti
es, rmming directly between
pieces of equip"""', or often supported on overiJead pipcways. In many situations.,
6-27
the piping of httercst will be panicular lines CMTaining specified quantities of
,hazardous materia!, There are several difficulties in evaluating individual piping runs:
a. With severalliues on congested overilead racks it becomes extxem:ly difficult
to initially locate and then to follow 5pC" mc piping nms.
b. Piping may be difficult to locate, even with P&:IDs or flow diagrams. These
drawings do nat adeqwttely repzese.nt physieallocations or distances of piping
runs. Layout drawings are usually not available.
Co It may be dff!iCllit for the walkdown engineer to jdentify the boundaries of
coneem. especially considering bypass IiDcs. iujec:tioD liDcs. valves, etc.
Given these difficulties, it is often DIORl pmctieal ami efficient to evaluate an
piping in a given area. That method does RqUhe acfdjtjonaJ iDteraetion with the
process safety engineers to determine the consequcuces of postulated damav_
In evab1ating process piping, stresses due to iDertialloads are 'not the p'imary
c;onsideration. except in cettain circumstanees. Rather, dID ibcus is 'on wh!erable
details. fi:agile anac:brrent
s
, and connections which may expexicnce severe
displacc:lI'ents. The following observations should be CODSidt:red when performing
the evaluation:
a. Welded steel pipiug geueraUy performs weIlln eadbquakes ami is typicaDy not
sasmplibJtl to damage from inertial loading. I=rdaIloads may be a concem
for DOIHhu:tiIe materials such as east iIon or PVc. Note that materials such ,
as east iIon are probably used because oftbdr I1OJloCOD'Osive pIopelties. ami
changing the male' jaJ on the pipe'futc is not a r ,"able optioD. In these
eases sass IIIIaI,sis may be aec"" Pry. "
b. Lack oflateral sappads will not necess"iIy lead to iIi11:n of the pipe. Piping
often spIIDS very long did,n "S without lateral suppwts with no damaF or
failure. Ratl=r, the emphasis should be on CUM ing that the pjping system.
will DOt Jose wam:aI suppolt. For C""'l'1e, the walkdown engineers should
look for sjtuatjons whae the pipe'futc is near tbD edge of the support and
could slide off (Figure 6.11).
Co Where there is a leck of Jatmal snppon. melciug the pipe very flexible. the
waIkdown teem should aJso be aware of si,na';' ons wbme the pipeHn,e may be
efJ"Pi lively ... cluned .. by a rigid connection of a lmmcb Jiae (Figure 6.12). If
the branch Hn,e is significantly smeller than the header (less than one half the
dipmetn). the pipe could be overstressed at the c:mmec:don.
6-28

FIgure 6.11: PJpes that are near the edge of a support without lateral stops may
sUde oft'. Loss of vertical support is the primary concern in these sltnations, not
the length of span without lateral support.
Seismic
Anchor
Motion
Vulnerable
Joints
FIgure 6.12: RIgid or restndned branch lines may be vulnerable to
Ulll'eStralned motion of the header.
~ 2 9
,
d. The walkdowu team should look for sitaations where vulnerable
appurtt"'8/i! CiS or ponioDs of a pipeline could be impacted and damaged due
to motion of tile pipeline or the .impacting object. Examples would include
drain taps or sampling lines that could be jmpactcd by valve diaphragms on
adjacent Jines. Of special concern arc sprinkler heads on fire lines that might
impact bard sharp structural members (Figure 6.13). This has oc:curred
several times in past earthquakes.
FIgure 6.13: Fusible spriDkler heads are StlIIsltlve to impact.
c. Mecbanical conpIiDgs could fail due to cxccssive dJsp]accmcmt or impact.
Rod bung systeIm, particularly fire protection s)'Stl:i.Uii within Imiklings, caD .
faD. ami fan when supported by short rud haugers CODfigDred such that
mom:mts caD be dcvelopcd at the top (XInn" IiOD This is a low cycle fatigue
failme.
g. Burled piping could fail whem grouad failUIC caD occur.
b. Piping attacJmd to .mnchored taDks or equi,( ..... "f can faD. if there is
inadequate tle1ibiIity in the pipe to wjtbstand large dispJa.a:ments (Figure
6.14).
i In many inIot!!J!Ces. a relatively short span of large diameter (8" or more) pipe
CO'II!Cc:ts e1evmd vessels supported by iadepcadcDt StrUCtUXal systems such as
",
COJICI'Cte fraaaes. 'l'bI: stiff pipe may afl'ect tile intc:raction of tb: two
6-30
.... -' . ., ~
structures and can result in OVGlSuess at the fJanges or elbow areas.
particularly when stress concentrations ~ bIkeD into account. The
walkdown engineer should take this into consideration. and if in doubt,
ft'C01'!'TT1end a proper coupled analysis of the entire system.
Figure 6.14: P1piDg damap Is O"II"'OD where It Is rigidly restrained at
1IIIIIIlchored tauks.
6.5.3.15 Cable Trays ami CoDdult
Cable trays and conduit am generally wry rugged s '* :aUy. It is :il:qiorwn to
note that damage to the trays and conduit themselves do not aec:essarily imply
damage to the cables cc:m'aiDlorl within th=D. The mostjq>o.n:ant COJJSideration for-
cable trays and CODdait is to ensure that w:rtk:al suppmt capacity wm be DlHinlainN
during a seismic eveat.
6.5.3.16 Ductwork
DucI:iDg is o!tcD used in petrochemical faenities to ttaDspOrt hazardous gasses.
and may be identified by the process safety enginem as tequiriag review. Duct
coustruction caD nmge from tbin gage sheet metal to steel pipe sectious. Sheet metal
ducring has faDed daring past earthquakes in certain c:b;qlllelp
n
""41 Failure of sheet
meW dncring generally is caused by c:m:rosion, poor connrt:rio1lS., loss of structural
suppon, or differential displaremel conccms. Large djanx:ter. thick ducting. such as
plate steel coDStrUCtion. should follow the geuexal cousiderations presented earlier on
6-31
pjpiug, especially coucentratiDg on overall support systems and adequate flexibility to
.ac:commodare dift'enmtial motions.
6.5.3.17 Air Tubing
Tubing is very :rod is umaIly .insta!Jed with substantial flext
1n1
ity.
However, tubing can ber
1
!;,j<uged by large dispJaa:rn:nt or impact. and the
c:onseqnences of loss of ajr to b:Istnunents should be CODSideR:d.
6.5.3.18 SubsfatfODS
s .. hstatiOJl cqllqililtiil' '-'l especially susceptible to damage in
Ceramic insu11lf0JS often faiL TJ'lIIISfom:Iers which are nnancbORd, or lightly
anchom! with fdctioD clips. may slide and damage cmmccrims
6.5.3.19 CooJfng Towers
Wood coof,"S towczs have gene.:aIly p46:1i1lll"d wen in eaithquabs. The
fPllowinS have been the primary causes of d ... rap:
a. The p
d
i!!8
I
Y cause of damage to wood cooliDg toWGiS in earthquakes bas
beeu a dderlwated c:onditiOJl prior to the earthquake.
b. Cooling tOWGlS have also been damaged due to poor structural configuratious
at connections. For cumple, Figures US and 6.16 show an ecc.,,,, ric joint
which 1iIiIed during an earthquake. This figure is added to emphasize that the
engineer should focus OD details first. rather than .strength, when peIMming
waikdown evaluations.
6.5.3.20 Platforms IWaIkways
An extensive number of elevated platfOldiS and waIkwa,s can be found in a
xcfineJy. In DIIUlY jnstam:es these pJatfozms sm:round tall.. IS'Ts IIIId are supported
OD a structural system that may DOt be directly c:onnrtted with the vessels In cases
like these, differential displao '""'Dt is the pi htwry com:em. with the potential for
damage in the following ways:
a. Pounding between the wssel and catwalks, po'adjaUy resulting in eidlcr
lUptun:: of the vessel wall or sufficimrt damage to the pJatNIDlS themselw:s
such that they may be macc:emb1e in an emctgency foIlowing the earthquake.
The waikdown engineers would look for DOt 0Dly the pxoxiwity of the
platfozms to the vessels, but also for slimp ends of supporting beams that
could increase the pote!lrja
l
for damage..
6-32

' ..
b. Walkways spanning diffe.tent snactuxes without adapJate tIexibiIity, such that
differcmial motion could cause collapse ami faUjng ufthe walkways.
6.6 LIMITA'nONS
Because the waIkdown reiiew is intended to be SCZ'M"i"g process, it is
important that an conc:emcd patties uadcrstaml that it is impossible to identify an
sources of scisn:ric risk in such a mostly visual review. lreIm identjfic:d as potential
hazards in a walkdown may survive 3D eartbqu.alcc; liJccwisc..items which appear to be
adequate could fail for reasons not apparent during a visual or analytical review.
The engioeeI must always cantinn both owners ami ..,..mrms to understand that
seismic risk can never be completely e1jmjnared BYcn witIlamore thorough review,
some level of seismic risk will always exist. no .mller how much time. effort. and
money arc spent evaluating and upgradmg a ficiIi1y. Tha risk can be better
1lIIderstood and reduced, but there me never any guam!!
Figure 6.15: Eccentric:aDy loaded COIIIlectlon In a wood c:ooIIDg tower. The
cross member above is a retrofit.
6-33

,-
FIgure 6.16: Idenffcal joint In the same WGOIi ..... ttng tower as shan In FIgure
6.15
6-34
-
.'- ..
Chapter 7
DESIGN AND EVALUATION OF TANKS AT GRADE
7.1 INTRODUCIION
.. ,. -..
,::.
The purpose of this section is to provide the user with gaidermes for designing
new taDks and ewh.ating existing taDks for seismic loads. Emphasis is given.
however. to evaluation of e.Jdsring taDks. -r= iDfoxmation containM I=rdn is mostly
applicable to nnanchuxed flat-bottomed storage taDks at grade ill zones of higher
. .. with be .. - -_ .. for'- .. S ...
SNS!!'I!ctty, xequae'i.nts to UG-liIIGU. .wwca: SCiSM."C zones OJDB gttLance
is also .-...IAaA for ancbOIed ct_ ..... _'- ;'c ,- r '"", '" '
--ew IoGII.IWlk .. >. ,_, ..... _._ , _
-.',.'- --.';-',':,' --
. on storage taDks are tnncany designed accordiIlg, to ,the jmfnstry stmufard API
650 (API, 1993). Seismic design ptovisionJocatecliaApp=rUx E of API 650 first
appeared ill the 3rd revision of the 6th ecIitioDo dated . AIthough the general
theory was developed earlier. few taDks were designed for e8Itbqaakes befoxe the
code provisions came into effioct Sim:c tIleD, them have- been several expel h iiiital
programs and DWJD:OIlS field observatioDa1 data. that sagcstthat API 650 Appendix
E is consenrative ill most cases. TJm COJhSC vadsm may be 8ppiOptiate for design of
new taDks but not necessarUy for ISsessmentof ezistingtaDks..
.-, - -. -. '/ .. -
Brcanse 0Dly recently c:cmstI:IlCted to resist earthquakes,
there may be several potentiaDy damageable taDks ill any giYen: tauk popuJation. To
limit a flIcility's exposwe to earthquake damage; J:IOteDda1ly damarb1r; taDks should
be identified, emnatpd and, ifuquhed, 1i:trilfiued . .. ,' '
,_. -. 1
SiIlcc seiS' i 1m design provisions were 0Dly intmctaI:ed into the API code ill the JaIe
1970's (Wozniak ami M'1fCbeII, 1978), taDks that am- older dIID tbis may be
considered wIm:rable to damage by large eattbquakes. HOWQItIl', f1 should be noted
that DIIIDY liquid. storage taDks built before these piovisions Were inttodnced have
been able to withstand strong ground shaking with mi"iuw
l
or minor damage ami
able
, fi . .
were to COiiliiiuemc:ticmmg.
The steps iIlvolYed in undertaking a Si 111m hazatd mjtiption program for
existing umks are discnssrd ill this section and fnc:Jpdec
a. Qnanrificaticm of the site-spe* i fie seismic hazard.
7-1
b-.
.
-
b. Walkthrough inspection to assess piping. stairway and walkway anaclrme!!!s,
and other potential hazards.
c. Analytical assessment of tanks to evaluate the potential for Ovenuming and
shell bnc:lcJing
d.
U;"I_': f" .. - - ~ ..... - 1 _ .. ",----.s
.... on 0 selSilliC 1.IA<.Alu. "'" most COW"" ~ WIQO ....-." ITI1tjganon
measures ineb'de addition of flexibility to rigid anac:Jliicllrs, rednc"Jion of safe
opetatillg height and. as a last resort. anchorage of the taDk.
7:1. PAST EARTHQUAKE PERFORMANCE OF PLATBOTl'OMED
TANKS
The foRowing discussjon on earthquake lespoDSC of taDks is ge:uwally extracted
from material tm=S"Dte.d in ASCE (1984) and Dowling andS
1IIIIm
t!!S (1993).
FJat-bo.ttom vertical liquid storage tanks have _'imes 1lUled with loss of
contents during strong eanhquake shaking In some instances, the 1iIi1ure of sto18ge
tanks bas brought about disastrous consequeneesSome cuml'. incIndtr fires
C8nsing extensive damage to oil refiDeries in the 1964 Nfipta, JapaD earthquake and
the 1991 Costa Rica earthquake; pollutecl water\VaJS in the 1978 Sendai. Japan
eattbquake; :fires and 1iIi1ure of numerous oil5t018ge tanks in the 1964 Prince WiIBam
. Sound earthquake in. .Alaska; and failure of I!IIUC' uus liquid storage tanks, both above
and below ground. in the 1971 San Pel handu, the 1980 Li.YeuDule. the 1985 QiJcan,
the 1991 Costa Rica and the 1992lan
d
m CII1tbquakes. ..
The lesponse of unanebnred tanks, in pattic'llJar, cfm:ing earthquakes is highly
nonHnear, and much more complex than implied in.awfJable design stmuf8ftJs. The
erect of seiSli'ic gromad s1mking is to geawzate 8D ONlcu',""! tom: on the taDk.
This. in tum. causes a portion of the IaDk bascpJ"'C to lift up fi:um tie ti:mndlltiou.
The weight of the fluid. resting un the uplifted poitiun of the "asqWtte, together with
the weight of the taalt shcJl ami roof, praWta the res" ab;jM 'I '" n" ilil Rpinst 1brther
uplift. While upJii, in and of itSeI( may nut c:ause seciDus damage, it can be
accolllJianieti by large def ... "",tlons and DJI!jor chant in tie taIIk waD. messes This
is especially appallmt when the seImric loading iCRiSCIS and tie (lbwoly) uplifted
saP"'t JIM)VfIS down i" '1'3' I Ing the grouml 8IId iDuu'nGiag bIgh CiOliIplession
stresses into tile taIIk sheil TBlIk uplift during eanbqnekos has been obse:t vt:d many
tiI1es, but tile amoUDt ofupJift bas rm:cI;y been RiC01ded. A 100 it (30.5 m) d1auerc
r
,
30 it (9.1 m) high taIIk upJifted 14 inches (3S0 mm) dming tie 1971 San Fernando
earthquake." Duling the 1989 I.oma Prieta c:artbquaJa=, two 42 it (12.8 m) dim:!er,
28 it (8.5 m) high tanks uplifted 6 to 8 incbes (ISO to 200 mm); 81IIi a taDk uptifted
18 inches (4S0 mm) in tile 1964 Alaska earthquake (EElU... 1971; BElU, 1990; and
NlItional Reseii1ch Council. 1973). WbiIc taDk uplifHs wa:y CO
li
"'bJ1l, sJiding oftaDks
is ran: and genc.1Illy need not be c:onsjdered a cndIde failure mode for storage taDks
atgmde.
72
I
In gcncral. taDks. especially '1T!l!Dcbored taDks. are particularly susceptible to
damage durl:ag carthqDakes.. This is because an of the mass contributes to the
O\iettw:uing JIIODleIlt. bat only a small ponion of the mass coutn'bntes to the
overturning resistance (the reason for this is that the contained fluid and the relatively
flexible tank shell and bottom plate C8DJlot traDsfcr the latetal shear iDduccd by the
earthquake to the foundation), Some eumples of taDk damage that has occuned in
past earthquakes include:
a. Buckling of the taDk wan. known as "elephant foot" lmckling FSscntiaDy,
this occms lw:ause the Vettical coDlpiessive stzesses in the portion of the tank
wall remaining in coDtact with the gmumi (i.e.. ctiametricaIly opposite the
uplifted portion) are gready inclessed when uplift occms. Mote precisely.
that portion of the tank sheJl is sabjected to a biaxjaJ state of stress., consisting
ofhoop tension and axial CODIpies:sioJL In addiriOD, the baseplate plevents the
radial def'o.:mation wbich would !JIll ~ l a D y occur 1D1der jntema
J
pressure. A$ a
result, bending stzesses are intzoduccd into the sh=Il wan. fbrthcr iDcRasing
the ttmdeney to bru:kle 'IbD photograph in Figure 7.1 (talam. after the 1992
T amfers earthquake in SouthetD CalifoxDia) shows a cJassiMl example of
elephant foot buc:lding aDd ao iiillJi8i1)'iug failuM of CMiiCOJlstzBiaed pipjng.
TbIs buckBug mode is mil 'I...rty associated with larger cfiamrtter tanks having
height to diameter (HID) ratios of about 1 to 105.

~ .. ,
. '" ..-'
i


I"

' .

. w.
-"
' .

-.
. "
''',
.....
" .

-.. -...
......
FIgure 7.1: Elephant Foot Budding 8Ild FaBure of RIgId PIpIng
County of San Beraardbm, Water Storage Tank, landers, CA.
landers Earthquake, RIchter Magnttnde 7.4, June 28, U92
7-3
Another common buckling mode. nor.mally assocWed with taller tanks having
BID ratios about 2. is "cJiamgnd sIIape" buekting. In contrast to elephant foot
buckling. which is assocWed with an eJastopJastic state of stress, diamond
shape Imckling is a pmely elastic 1mck
U
ng
A feature of taDk.s which cxperi...,ce either ele:pba
m
foot or diamond shape
Mclding is that the buckled taak often does not tuptuxe ami COllI inlles to
fuJfiJl its tilnction of comaining 1IDid. However, all buc*led sectioDS of the
taDk should be teplaced.
b. Paring tank uplift, the baseplate may not be able to ccndbmI to the displaced
shape of tbe taDk ami the weld between the baseplate and the taDk wall may
not be able to accommodate the tension Stl snes that c1eve1op as a JeSUIt of the
tluid hoJd-down fcm:es which me moJp1jzed to resist uplift. In this case,
fracture at tbe jnncricm betwam the baseplate ami tile shcU wall may result.
ThIs was observed, in patticnfar, in the Cbt1gan earthquake of 1985, where
some taDks experienced ~ of the baseplate or of tile weld between the
wall ami tbe baseplate (EQE, 1986a). Good welding practices may pmclnde
sach mDures, which can lad to rapid n:Jcase oftbe taDk contents; fiu:thet, the
differential pxessiiles created widIin the taDk by tile rapidly ewcnating fluid
may also lead to damage to the upper shell comses and zoo
Co Seismic sbaking c:anses the SUi lib of tile tank 1Iaid to Slosh. If insufficient
freeboard is provided to &CCO"'1Ih odate this s1oshfng, damage to the taDk's
floating Z'04f or fixed roof. followed by spr11age of fluid over the taDk waDs,
may result. This type of damar is usually amsfifered cm1y minor but may be
impwtant for some stoMd pmdns
'"
d. Support cobunns for fixed rooftmks have 'nu*Jr:d in past eartbquakes from
the impact of slosbiDg fluid and their OWD iDenial force in combination with
the vertica1loads tboy support. Co11apse of sewal coTmnns, while oileD not a
catasuopbic faiJme, can be a significmtt ,1'""'9' item. ,.
e. Breakage of piping coo""or,ted to the imk as a nsaIt of m1ative ~
between the taDk and the "",'esC pipe suppcut. 'ibis is ODe of the most
prevalent canses of loss of coUleillS fi:om stonge tIIIIks during eartbqna!ces
FaDures of this type ate typically due to jnarfequate flexibility in the pjphlg
~ (tenDed "overconsttaiDed piping") between the nozzle Jocatinn at tbe
tank shellllDd the adjacent pipe suppott. Paihues have also occum::d due to
teIativc movement between two diffe.teut tmks a "mm,;ted by z:isid piping
f. Tearing of tank wall or tank bottom due to OVetWDSIlaim>d stairways
am:bored at the foundation ami taDk sheD.
g. Tearing oftaDlc wall due to oven:oDSl:lained walkways COIIIIMihg two tanks
. . ~ - . : - ,
expe' '=CMg WDtiiWilAl JDO\'f4.cr.L
74
b. Andwled taDks. with DOD-duc:tiIc conllceticm cfet .. 1s have pedOlllled poorly in
past eanbquakes. Non-cluctile C:"""edion dp;t;nls can lead to teng of the
taDk's shell aud release of its contents. DetaiJs that do not allow for 1Ul1
devdopmem of anchor bolts have led to IIDChor boh pullout aud failure of the
taDk.
i. TlIDk. failmes have been fouml to occur as a resuh of severe distortion of the
tank bottom at or uear the tank side wall due to a soil failure.. This failure
may be associated with soil liqaefac:tioa, slope in.ctabDity, cxc:essive
diffctCDtial settle" ..,11', bearing faiIum or washout due to pipe failure. A
failure oftbis type oc:c:uued during the Miyasi Eutbquab of 1978.
j. TCDSiIe hoop suesses due to shalcing-inclnc:ed pressures between the fluid and
the t8Dk. waDs canbectu:le large aud can lead to splitting aud leakage. This
bas been obsened dmiug cartbquakes. but appeus to be a pmblem ouly fol
boJted or riveted taDks. For welded taDka, 'I'I1l!tnja1 cJucttlity appea."S to
ace-U.h.IMate these high hoop &11eSSeS. .
Figwes 7.2 through 7.5 pleswt some exa"q'les of tank failures in recent
eanhquakes iuc:JmUng OVCilil!uing ofataDk daring the 1991 Costa Rica earthquake.
7.3 WALKTBROUGBINSPECllON
A walkthrough is lID on-sile visual SClf#ululs whereby "as-iustaUed" components
can be evaluated for sejsmic wh;Ierahifities Walkthrougbs in general8le discussed in
more detail in CIapter 6 of this dMmcar TlIe p1UpOS8 of the walkthrough is to
idImtJfy a variety of seis"li':aUy wlnemb
1e
detpjls In this sectioD, walkthrough
evaluadon gnidauce is smn spec jfjcaDy fortaDks.
The Pljl'. featme which dis'jr.pishes till .'"FIji; RSpODSe of UDanc:bored
rauks from that of IIIChoIed taDks is the large uplift commouly
observed arouml the edge ofnaanebmd taDks. As desl ,jlvi earlier, this uplift may
induce large tensinll or COliIpPsskm fcm:es ami """"'hJB II ..... 'r
s
in the tank wall,
baseplate, aud at the We' s ction of the two. Such foR:es may lead to severe damage
or failure of the taaIc. Fui"'hmH'Ie, die advas eflbcts of eyrd,ive tank uplift can he
greatly ex" mhated by a vaziety of co'''', .... ly eacuuatwed tank detaDs Walkthrough
inspection of hIdividual rauks or tank fauas sbould focus on tile fd."'ri
6
.,!jon of such
details In many cases. whfIe the tank itseIfmay be 1inmd to be StIacaaally adequate,
retrofit of a !!""der of these seismiceDy w&aabl= detgt1s may be deC"'M u=esslly.
The following matcriaJ, whJch cfescriies die wa1kIhtoush Pw IS, is taken from
Dowling and Summers (1993) and SIII",mos amiBults (1994).
7-S
"
".
-
":-'
'- 7-6
Jigare7.2: EJephantFoot
Budding, Failure oflUgld PipIag
aadTaIIk wan Failure at Mnho!e
Amn
Bfghom Desert VIew Water
Apacy, WaterStorageTuk,
T.pm1enr, CA
.
' ........ EartIupI8ke, JlIdder
Mag"lb". 7A, JUlIe 21, 199Z
'Co' ' .... -..... , '
, .;. _. .; ...... '-..
. ' : \. "
.'
FIgure 7.3: Above: Tank WaD FaDure at Taak MaDhoIe Access BJghom
Desert View w"".1I<l!:' AgeDcy, Water StonIge Taak, landers, CA
Below: Overall Vlf\W of FaDed Water Storage Taak, l.!ll!ders, CAt County of
San Beraardiuo, Water Storage Taak, l.anders, CA'
Landers Richter Magnitude 7.4, JU118 28, 1m
7-7
FIgure 7A: Above: O,ertwned 00 Storage TaDk, DCOPE on Refinery,
CostaBlca
Below: SpDled 00 aud Ruptured PipiDg, DCOPE 00 Refinery, Costa Blca
Costa Blca Earthquake, Richter Magnitgde 7A, AprfI22, 1991
7-8

I
7-9
FIgure 7.5: Above: Damaged
Roof, Seals, and SJoshlng of on
over Tank WaDs, RECOPE on
Refinery, Casta RIca
Left: Severe Elepbaut Foot
Buckling, Trmsmezquim Tank
Far:m, Casta Rica
Costa Rica Earthquake, Richter
Magnitude 7 April 22, 1991

Poor Details Retrofit RecommeudatioDS
(a) Add fIcxibiljty to pipe
..
(e)
(d)
Add flexibility to pipe
Add f1em'ity to pipe
Reroute piping to ceutet oftaDk or
mend hmcrwall of COl1tlete basin
beyond pipeftaDk. Oii.,''''Qon
FIgure 7.6: Poor DetaDs at Uaanc:bored Tailks and RetrofIt R ......... mendatious
7-10

Poor Details Retrofit Recommendations
(e)
Im:rease flexibility by providing
-
hor:izcmtal or vertical bends


V=-.
.'JP!
-
--
(f)
Anchorpipe at roof instead of along
1=
shell wall

VPlPlID
l CU.Ciliili
DITCH
.,.
-
:-

IDc:tcasc walkway flexibility to
acccnnmodpte relative displacements .
-
.--
"""'" . .. . .
"':"""
\
r-'
.Z=t""
.

'-.. -
1. ..
I
(h) -
Support stahwat exclusively on tank
shell
::;
=l.-"'"
:;
1TlU_
.....
;:::
; na..-
-
F1IUIIIIITIIli
...:.1
.
(i)
Jm:rea.se piping flexibility. attaCh
V-SIEU.
walkway exc1usivcly to tank shell. or
provide :more piping cleanmce
r=-YF
.
1.;.
......
Figure 7.6 (Continued)
7-11
The most frequently encoUDtered bazardous details are listed below, together with
applOptiate rettofit J'eCOTl!D'Iendarions. and iI1ustrated in Figures 7.6 and 7.7.
a. A comuwn failure mode in taDks has been breakage of piping connected to a
taDk: as a result of relative movemcm between the tank and the nearest pipe
support. Altematively. if the piping is stronger than the tank wall or baseplate
to which it is connected, tearing of the wan or baseplate may result. Piplng
should not pass directly, with little or no flexibtlity, from the tank shell or taDk:
bottom to the ground or to rigid concrete waDs, basins, pumps rigidly fixed to
the ground, etc. Failures of the type described above are typically caused by
the dera
Ds
shown in Figures 7.6(a) through 7.6(d). In the first tbree cases,
addjtjonaJ piping fltrrlbtlity should be provided by adding horizontal or vertical.
bends. or by instaDing a lc:ogtb of flexible piping. In the fourth case, piping
should be rerouted to the cemer of the tank or, if the piping is flexible enough.
the COlICiete basin may be extcDded beyond the pipeltank ccnmec:tion.
b. Sjnn"'" failures have also OCCUIXed due to rclative movement between two
taDks co"nected by a rigid pipe. as shown in Figu= 7.6(e). Again, additional
piping flev'bUity should be pmvided as desm"bed above.
. c. Partia110ss of contents may result from the type of detail shown in Figure
7.6(f). wbexe a vertical pipe is rigidly connected to the ground or fmmdation
aDd also supported rigidly along the wan of the tank. A detail offering a
lesser level of risk, but plcseut in many cases, is a taDk: wan support that
consists of a large U-boh which might appear to be capable of sliding up and
down the pipe as the tank lifts and faDs. However, it is possible that the U-
boh wiD. "bind." with the pipe, thereby also foxming an essentially rigid
COD"&:! DId, and ]eading to tearing of the tank waD. Any connection along the
taDk: sl=ll judged to be rigid should be replaced by a connection near the
sbeDImof intetsccticm, coupled with sliding connections or "guides" along the
sheD. wall. In many cases, simply loosening the U-bolts will suffice.
d. Roof access is frequently faC'ljtated by waIkwa.ys sp''''';ag between the tanks.
Typical walkway axraugeueQlS are shown in Figure 7.6(g). In both cases,
xelative movement between taDks may lead to rupture or tearing of the tank
wall or roof. Howeiel9 whereas the lower walkway IItXlIDgClDCltt shown in
Fipre 7.6(g) may lead to partial loss of tank contents, the upper walkway
aa,a'QIi'"elll w:m. at worst, lead to damage to the walkway itselfand/or to the
roof; """,, no loss of conteuts wiD. result. The distinction between the two
ammgeuellts is iwpoltant since the lower walkway xCplcsents a concern that
could ICSUlt in release of product, whereas :failure of the upper walkway win
Jikely only ]ead to a Mlease of fumes and a JXIIICh lower level of economic loss.
In eiJ:her case. the xequhed retrofit would take the fom of increased walkway
flCJibi6ty.
7-12
Elevated walkways also U;pesent :falling hazards for tanks located in plants
with significant adjacent pedestrian traffic or sensitive equipment. Where
necessary. walkways should be attached to the tanks by cables as a secondary
mmlS of support to pxevcnt them from falling.
e. Stairways should DOt be smacbed to both the tank shell and the fotmdation;
see Figure 7.6(h). However. only in thin-shelled tanks is such a detaillik:ely
to lead to failure of the tank wan and to loss of contenlS Again, therefore. a
distinction should be drawn between this case and the case of a thick-shelled
taDk, where such a detail would only resuh in damage to the stairway itself.
In either case, the bawd may be eJjmjnatoo by attaching the stairway to the
tank shell or by climiliHling the COmu:ctiOD which prevents the stairway from
displacing vertically.
f. TaDk piping is usually concattrated in one area, often with an IlCC"'$S walkway
1iII;ug over the pipjag. as shown in FJgUIe 7.6(1). If the walkway is rigidly
attacbed to the grouad and if in,cu!jcicnt clearance is provided between the
piping and walkway. then tank uplift may lead to impact between the piping
and the walkway. resuTring in damage to one or the other. However. only
\Irith small diameter pipes ortbin sbew tanks is loss of tank contents likely to
occur. Othmwise, damage is likely to be confined to the waIkway itself. In
both cases, the bazatd may be mitigated by mereesi
n
! the piping tlexibility.
attacfring the walkway exclusively to the tank sheD. or pzov.idiDg more piping
clearance. Another potentiaDy seismiraDy 'V1lh:=able detail is the case of a
walkway attached to both the tank shell and foundation, as in Item (e) above
for stairways.
g. TIIDks anehored with anc:bnr bolts baving poor col!!kCtion dot,"ls may tear the
bottom plate or taDk shell resulting in a loss of product. Poor rfeta11s (see
Egure 7.7) incJmfe mv:ho.rs which are clipped to the bottom plate. cbaiI:s
which are unusually short so as not to pem:dt adeqaate t:ransfm' of fotces in
the bolt to the taDk sbeJl, or any detail which will resnlt in the tearing of the
tank shell before the anc:hnr bolt yidds. This hazard can be mitigated by
:placing the C" ""!fA lion with one that wID exhibit more dUl:tility.
When petCorming walktbrough inspcctiollS, experiencrd enginr=s fawliar with
seiswj" design and the eff'ccrs of earthquakes should be ntt1jml in order to answer the
questions as to "how :mnch flex1"bi1jty is suf6cIcnt... The assumed value of tank uplift
is critical to answering this question. Values oC6 to 8 im:bas (ISO to 200 mm) have
commonly or.crl!! eel in the past. Using a value of OIl the order of 6 to 12 inches (ISO
to 300 mm) of venical dispJacenat, and OIl the order of 4 to 8 i n r t ~ s (100 to 200
mm) of horiwutal dispJacerre
nl
(at least in zones of highest sefsmicity) would be
considered prudent and conservative. .Actual ex:pected values are a function of tank
size. fill height, aspect ratio, and local seismicity and soil type. AdditioDaI discnssion
of uplift is given in Section 7.4.5.
7-13
."
ANCHOR CLIPI"EJ) TO
101 fOM PLATE
]
'CHAIR' HEIGHT
I I UNUSUAU. Y SHORT
~ ~ ~ I h
.... '. ... 1.1 .- .
<4 1 ~
Figure 7.7: Poor Anchorage DetaDs
7A ANALYTICAL EVALUATION
'-4-1 Methods for AaalysJs ofUlIIIDcbored TaDks
'I'lIem is eveasi'Ye literat:ure on the seimric aualysis of flat-bottomed tanks. The
Jitenttwe inclndes a Dumler of mctbods avaUable for amlyziag UDaru:bored tanks.
Some of these analysis methods am:
a. API650 Appendix E (API. 1993) - This m:thod is the standard for design of
new tanks for the penoc:hemil:al industry. h is simple to USC and its
plovisioDs gcnmaIly match those of tile UDifonn Blinding Code (lCBO,
1994).
b. AWWA DIOO (AWWA, 1985) - This JD'!dmd is vezy sjmr1ar to the AP1650
metbocI, and is used primarily for design of water stoJ:age tanks.
Co :Earthquake TaDk-Wall StabiI1ty of Unanchored Tanks (Manos. 1986) -
Geotge Manos bas developed an attC\1 !larive method of assessing tanks which
is sipificamly diffe1ent to the previous two methods. and is based on
observed perf", Ilia,,"" of tanks during past eatthquala:s.
d. Serismic Design of Storage Tanks (P:riestley, et a1, 1986) - This method was
plaposcd as the tank design code for New Zealand Presently, it bas not been
adopted. Of an the methods listed, it is the most .involved and has the most
deraiL
MoI:c discussion of the above asscsS'D"'tt methodologies is given in subsequent
sections.
7-14
7A.2 Methods for ADalysis of Am:hored Tanks
Past performance of anchored tanks during eatthquakes bas jndicared tbat such
taDks gene:rally experience very few problems. This is partially because very few
taDks wen: anchored before the seismic provisions of API 650 were introduced in the
)are 1970's (Wozniak ami MitcbeD. 1978). ami those that were subsequently anchored
were designed to those very same provisiODS.
Anchored tanks should be considered as adequate UDl=ss anchorage details are
judged to be capable of tearing the taDk shell or bottom plate. c:ausing loss of
contents ADchorage details should be assessed during walkthrough inspection to
ensure that there is an adequate load path for the hold-down forces developed in the
lIDChor bolts to be transferred from the taDk shell to the foundation.
If an ancbnred taDk needs to be evaJpated ana1ytically. the methods in API (1993).
ASCE (1984). or BollSDel' ami Haroun (1980) may be used.
7.4.3 StablDty
API EvaJnatbm Methodology
Tbe sejsI liic design methodology for welded steel storage taDks presentrrl in API
650 Appendix E (API. 1993) is basc:d on the simplified ptocednl'O developed by
Baumer (1977). Details of the deveIotumDt of the API methodology are described
in Womiak: ami MitcbcD (1978). Tbe procedure CODSiders the ovettmDiDg moment
on the taDk to be the sum of:
a. Tbe uvettillning lDD1iI:nt due to the taDk sbeJ1 ami root together with a
POltiua of the """en" wbicb. moves in UDison with the shell, acted on by a
]u" izc"'!,] acceJeraticm. The value of the a ~ r a t i O D is u.suaIly takeD as the
peak of the 2% dHnqed sire respDDSe spectrum, divided by a factor that
8CCOUJItS for the duc:hlity ami reserve capacity of the taIIk. A1tt:madvely. the
code aDows a value of O.24g to be used for the bigbest seiSiliic ZODe. 'Ibis is
tenzzcd the impulsive CODipOliiIi11:.
b. The o,etwuh:ig moment due to that portiOD of the taDk contents which
moves in the 1irst sIosbiDg JJJDde ("J.e., iDdepeDdm1t1y of the taDk she11). acted
on by a hoIiwntal acceleration equal to the 0.s1Jl dMi" Spedlal
acceleration corresponding to the period of that mode, again divided by a
ductility/capacity factor. A1temative1y, the code provides simpIificd formulas
to delelJlIine the accelcratioD to be used. 'Ibis is tetmcd the coJl'VeCtive
CC"iq.mmt
ResIstance to the overtuming DI01J!!'lt1t is provided by the weight of tile taDk sbeJl
ami roof ami by the weight of a portiua of the tank contents adjacent to the sheIL
The stlUCtImIl adequacy of the taDk Is deu I iiiilled by a "stability ratio." which is a
7-1S
measure of the ratio of the overturning moment to the resisting moment. The
stability ratio is defined as the quantity M![Dl(w
t
+ wJ,)l where M is the overtunUng
moment at the bottom of the tank shell (ft - lbs); D is the nominal tankl'Jiameter (ft);
wi. is the mad",n", weight of tank contents that may be used to resist sbell
OVCltm nhag (lhs per ft of chi lill!fmencc); and Wt is the weight of the taDk sbell and
the portiml of tile fixed roof supported by the shell (lbs per ft of chcawfaten.:e). The
value of the stamuty ratio must not exceed 1.57 (no mcttic equivalent is provided).
Further. API 6SO provides a methodology for caIcuJating the compressive stress at
the bottom of the tank shell together with the maximum aDowable value of shell
C01Dpxes
s
jnD; tile latter coxresponds to appxoxiaately oa-thixd to oa-half of the
theoretical bmting stxess of a uniformly complesseci perfect cylinder. If the stability
ratio e . ~ 1.57 or the C011ip13 ive stress exceeds the aDowable value. retrofit of
the tank. orrecfnction of the liquid height is necessmy.
Exteasive e'le+j'iif!liI81 studies ami obserYatioDs cfrning past earthquakes bave
demor.sh8
l
nJ tbat tile radialleDgth of uplifted bottom plate. and hcuce. the actual
liquid "<Ii pt lesist81!!!C which is mobilizcd during an earthquake is substantially
undcres1i""'M by tile API upDft model The teasuUil for tbis are that the API model
does not accolJllt eitber for the in-plane stress in the bottom plate. or for the dYJWDic
natnxe of the tank tesl"''''se The model also c:alculates an uareaf.ujcally narrow
ccmij; .. essiwt ZODiC at the toe of the tank. thus leading to large compxessivc ~ in
the tank. sIJell formlalively low overtuming [llDme"ts FiDalIy. the API approach does
not 8CCOlJIIt far the mrect of foundation fteUbjliry on the tank. wall axial membrane
sttess diS!ft1mtjrm
Ahhongh the API methodology is kDown to be somewhat conservative and
CC'ndemning tiljs'i .. , taaks for faDing to meet the API c:ritcria may not be deemod
mapmpx
m
olt11pnate,m Ib!. the crjlh. are the basis of the CWlCiilt seismic design practice and serve
as a goodtfu"J",w,' Large acT danee ofsperi6" pmv.isioDs should be taken as an
iDdicaticm dlatn:uufi1s may be necess.'y.
UnIb the &:Ilnid developed by Geoxge Manos. plese!!!"" next. the API 650
criterion is teJatively jm;ensjrive to the tank's waD. thirlmess 'l'Ids is because tanks
usually fail by ft. ediDg the "'stabw'ity ratio" and not by exc:e.edjng th= shell's
&Dowable Sti API6S0 then becomes DIDIe of an ovetnnning check rather tban a
sttess cbrck Thus. wbiIe API 6SO is conservative for tan tanks. it may be
lINOPSi i vatiw for broad taIIks with very tbin sbeIIs due to the use of high strerIgth
S1Cels. Cme sbnnJd be 1IibD when esse'sing these tanks.
AIteraative Me"gdoloey
"I'IlI= are Sb'Ietai aIlematives to the API methodology described above; one that
might be coDSidered for use in evaluation of ex is! iilg tanks is a modified version
(DowliDg ami S""."ers, 1993) of a zn:tbod deve10ped by Gecnge Manos (Manos.
1986) pttlle
n
= he.D:in. Manos' method is based on experi"":m.
J
stUdies. as well as
7-16
on observed behavior of unanchored tanks during past earthquakes. Instead of trying
to model the complex uplifting plate behavior. Manos ass"" es a stress distribution at
which the sbell wiIl1mck1e and solves for the resisting moment produced by the sum
of the sttesses. This resisting 1l1ODIeIIt can then be ccllnpau:d to the overtuming
moment and the resisting acceleration solved for.
TIle ,ss"ned cawptessive stress is muC;"""fI at the toe (opposite the point of
maxillll"" uplift). ami dccrease.s to zero at an cwpidcally determined distslDce from
the toe. The umai"""" eowpressive stress is funited to 7S9O of the c:ririca1 buckling
stress of a uniformly c""q"essed perfeet cytiDder. The model ignores the effect of
hoop stress on fmckliog stress. but correlation of the method with actual test results
validates the results obtai"ed. Integration of the ass""rd uia1 stress yields a
resultant cc.mptessive force which 11iIlSt be bala,nced by an equal tensile force due to
the weight of tile fluid n:sting on the uplifted portion of the bottOm plate. Using an
ewpidcal fommIa for tile lever ann between these two 1brces. an expression for the
rcsistiog moment apinst uplift of tile tank is developed. AdditioDal resistance
provided by tile weight of the tank sbell, the bending 1iiO"ent distribution in the tank
wall. and other sowteS a= ignored. .
The ovmbU "illg IIICIment on the tank is caJmlated in a nil ""er sfnn1ar to that used
in the API methodology. except that the convective component of the oVettUmiDg
mo11iClll is neglected. in the htterests of simplicity. This is felt to be apptopdate since,
becanse of pbase diffetem.:es between the ;wp"Isjve and convcctive components, the
convective portion is not believed to contribute :much to the peak tank wan stress
response. esprciaDy for very tall tanks. This a
raissg
'b is balanced somewhat by
ignoring some portion of the oVetturDing resjstmce, as dee ,j! cd above. and by the
use of an expzession for the height of the CCDtet of mass of the fluid which is slightly
conservative.
The tank is d .... na' to be stable if the reaM;',! J1iOJWiit, Mus. is greater than the
ovenuming JIlDJJISt jndnced by the earthquake. Mar. &pressed a1temately. the
tank is stable if the funit impDlsive acc:eletation. Ceq. Cl1mlated by equating MoT with
Mus. is greater than the earthquake-jndnced peak specual acceleration at 290 of
c:rilieal damping
The m=thod for evaluation of uMnc:bored stonge tanks included het'ein is based
on that of Manos. but inclndes some important w,iar;cms. The most notable of these
are:
a. TaDk anchorage is recornrnrmded in zones of high seismicity whenever the
ratio of safe operating height to tank d;!!!'!!etft1 exceeds two (Dowling and
S!jjj"'Ci5, 1993). Based on the data presented in Manos (1986). and the
higher level of risk for taller tanks. this is believed to be tile upper limit of
appJicabiJity of the Manos method.
7-17
b. The allowable CODip1essive stress in the taJIk shell should not exceed 75% of
the tbec"tlicaJ 1mc
k
ling stress, as prcsem
ed
in Manos (1986), nor should it
exceed tile DIIItmial ~ strength. This last requirement is signffiratt for
thicker-walled taIIks. Note that under certain circumstances an increase in the
allowable compressive stress beyond 75.., of the theoretical buckling stress
may be jusrified (Dowling and SlIiII" ea, 1993). Rumination of the
cxpm jiiWilaJ ami observational data Pi "led by Manos indicates that an
increase may be jlls!j6ed for the types of taDks encountered at petrochemicaJ
fal:l'Htjes In any event. the compxessive stress should never exceed the
material JiDld strcDgtb.
c. The COUipltssive force in the tank shell should not exceed the total weight of
the bid MllkM, (Dowling and SlIlI",*,1'5, 1993). This has the effect of
jm}It)SI"1 an upper boUDd on the resisting moment
A filial note of caution: The critical fommJa for tean Ceq (the limit impulsive
accoleration). as Pi lied by Manos in Equation (9) ofbis paper (not shown below),
should include tile tam (m,Im.) not (m.fmr), as ClriginaUy pn:scrtt'"d, where m. is the
liquid impuJsive mass and DIt is the total liquid mass. Correction to this formula was
.made in the fmm of an eaab4D to the original paper (Manos. 1986).
The expxessiun for ovmtwuiug DlDm::nt, Mar. from Manos (1986) in F-nglisb
1IDits is gMm bJ:
Pw = mass deusil:y ofW8ter (=62.4/g)
G = sp'" j6c: gravity of c:onttrined liquid
H = taDIt JiqIIid beish'
R = taDk mdiDs
Ceq = Jimitirnpnlsiw accelcmtion fm g's)
(7.1)
and a cmve for tile raUo (m.fmr) is given in API 650. Appendix E for the ratio
(W.IW
T
), wlIme W. is the impulsive liquid weight and W
T
is the total liquid we.ight.
The expmssioD farJesisting mlment. MRES, is given by:
(
1,,)0.1 (R)D.CI.I5
MRES = OA8SERti t; 'i
(7.2a)
ls = sheIl,Jic 1 "ess
7-18

it = bottom plate tbickness
n = 0.1 + 0.2 (HIR) S 0.25
E = Young's modulus
S = FOlmdation defoImability coefficient
However. from Item (b) above, an upper bound on the resislj"g moment
assuming the cump.tessive stress in the ta1Ik sheD just equals its yield stress, F)'t is
given by:
(7.2b)
Also, from Item (e) above, an upper bound on the resisting moment when the
compressive fora: in the ta1Ik shell ~ equals the weight of the fluid contents
(assuming a lever Ball of 1.25 R(HIR)Q.1S, as expressed in Manos (1986, is given
by:
MRES = "rBgpwGx 1.2SR (:)0.15
\I.2c)
As can be seen from the above, the resisting moment. MRES, should be taken as
the smalJe.st. of the expnwions given in Equations \I.2a), \I.2b) and \I.2c).
An h:uportant feature of the modified Manos methodology is the use of a
fonndation dar". mability c:oe:fficicmt (8). This should be taken as 1.0 for ta1Iks
founded on DIOIe dgid materials, such as concrete, asphah rings or pads, and 1.2 for
materials founded on JDOJ:C pJiabJe matcrials. such as c:rusbed rock. sand, wood planks
or soB. 'I'he effi:ct of this is tbat the size of the compxessive suess zone is larger for a
soft fonndarion than for a dgid folmdation. This enables the deve10pmcmt of a larger
limit resis! ing wone'" (subject to the tirnil8tion .imposed by the total wejght of the
fluid, as descrijxo.d above) and. ccmsequcmtly. enables the ta1Ik to witlurtand a larger
seismic acceleratioD. This contrasts with the API methodology, whete the soB type
has no inftnence on the resis!jn&, momextt. but wbe.rc a softer son leads to a larger
ccmvective ecce1e:ratiDD and hence an increased. ovalol "i"1 1DJ,.nent
A co"'i'i';51m of the results of an ewbvttiOD of a 3S ft (10.7 m)di!lT!J'lfe!', 30 ft
(9.1 m) high tank, 1iIIed to a beigbt of 26 ft 4 in (8.0 m), using the moc:IiIicd Manos
and API xmtbodologics. is given in Table 7.1. As caD be seeD, the API approach
would requhe eider a rcduc'tion in fill height by about 4M> to 16 ft 6 in (S.O m) or
ta1Ik anchorage. whereas the modified Manos JJJ:thod indicates tbat the seismic safe
opcuating height can bemcrea.sed to 20 ft 1 in (6.1 m). Hence tho reqaired n:ducrion
in fill height is rerJnred from 9 ft 10 in (3.0 m) to 6 ft 3 in (1.9 m).
7-19
TABLE 7.1: Comparison of API and Modified Manos Results
(fmmDowling and Summers. 1993)
Tvuical Tan!!;
Diameter 3S' Product:
Vmyl Acetate
Height
30' Fill Height: 26'4"
RoofWeigbt: 14.2 kips
Sbe!J PtuJS1ies: An comses - 0.18" thick
BIlttOm l ~ 0,22" thick
Snecific Gra.vitti 0.93
Site Ahlhtifl. ..... igg
1.5
factor:
Site-Smpific API Approach
Instphility Ra1io:
2.79
Modified Manos Approach
r' .. A _t.-.:_.
m m n g ~ ~
Earthquake-Tndg"'"
AcceImaticm::
The:tefoxc.um;table.
0.741
1.29g
Seismic Safe Opea j .. , Height 16' 6- Seismic Safe OIetating Height 20' 1-
Note: MeEric UDirs .. pi ntd, since bath API (1993) and Manos (1986) DDly present
mmJrs far &gJish 1IIIiIs.
It is possible that a sitgllfinD may be encountered wbc:re loss of colltClUS of a
single c:ritfca! taDk (or a D1iiia,. of wca! taDks) is of COD! em In this case. the
structural integrity of the ucarby taDks.. ccmtabring relatively harmless matedals, may
cmly be of conccm jn SO far as their failu:re could adversely impact tile adjacent more
criticaJ. taDk(s). WbDe aD e'lqlbam foot bnckoog type of failure of ODe of tbe
surI'Onndblg taDks would DOt pose a threat to the integrity of tile critical tank. a gross
failw:c. such as ovetliiilii .. g, could lead to aD irnp1JCt with the critical taDIt, possibly
leading to xaptwe of the taDk wall and xeIcasc of its contcmts. In such cases. the
SUlXOllllcfistg taDks need to be evabJatrd to ensure that tbey have an adequate :margin
of safety agaIDst ovmtwnjnB or collapse (but not necessarilyagajDsl buck'Jiug). For
such a sjrnatiOJl, the D'l)djfied Manos criteria could be relaxed still further (Dowling
and SUI!iiIC!s, 1993), RU"'ination of the data on which the Manos methodology is
7-20

- .,,'.
based (Manos, 1986) suggests that failmeIcollapsc may be less likely in cases where
the ratio of ovettwuing mometit to restoring moment is less than two. Further, since
local buckling of the tank wall is Jess a com:em, it may be appropriate to incIease the
allowable compressive stresS in the tank sbeIl by 33% from that presented earlier, ie.,
up to the theoretical bllCkting stress, with the caveat to remain that the compressive
stress should not exceed the material yield stretJgth. Again, however, the compressive
weight in the taDk sbell should not exceed the total weight of the fluid contents.
These recollliiendariolJS are based on ijmired data and should be used with care
(Dowling and 5""11
1
""15, 1993) but are supported (in principle) by research presented
by Peek. and El-Bkaily (1990), whicb suggests that the rjltimare seismic overtmning
moment which was resisted by a subject 100 ft (30.s m) diameter by 40 ft (122 m)
high taDk was 31% higher than the overalTDing IIIODImIt at which elephant's foot
buckling began.
7.4.4 Freeboard Jtequheme:nts
Tanks with insnffic:jent freeboard may have their fixed or floating roofs damaged
by slosbing fluid. In fixed roof tanks, the sloshing fIDid can impact and damage
raftets. as well as buckle the tank sheD. Floating roofs can tilt with the slosbing wave
and, if insnffic:jent 1iecboard emu, the roofs seal can be damaged or the roof may
impact the access platform. In order to prevent thls damage. sufficient freeboard may
be provided to accommodate fluid sloshing. The height of the sloshing wave can be
calrnuated using methods described by Wozniak 8IId Mitc
beD
(1978) and Beusner
and Haroun (1980).
7 A.5 Uplift CalmiaffnDS
When assessing the whlerabiJity of a taDk's piping. walkway ami staitway
attacbUY:llts (as sbown in figw:e 7.6>, one should consider that the tank may be
subject to uplift. Using a value on the order of 6 to 12 inches (lS0 to 300 mm) of
uplift in the zones of bighest seismicity can be coDSidercd pmdent ami conservative.
Actual expected values are a 1imction of tank size, aspect xatio. fill height, and local
seismicity and son type. In lieu of.fusti1Ying other wIues. a value of 12 inches (300
mm) is proposed in the lalest NEHRP provisioDs for eettaia taDk:s. If explicit
calculation of tank. uplift is required, the only aualytical method known to this
committee is foundinPrlestley, et al (1986).
It should be pointed out tbat AWWA Dl00-84 (AWWA, 1985) indicates that
uplift does not occurwben the + wIll is less or equal to 0.785. This
coIIQllinee feels that tbis criterion should not be used for assessing piping ami other
attacbmetrts. One of the rca50ns for tbis, aside from. the ever-present risk that an
unanchored tank will uplift. is that the term wLt which is the rcsistiIIg liquid
component, 0IIly occurs when there is uplift and, thelefure, should not be used to
detemUne whether uplift occurs.
7-21
The method in Priestley. et al (1986) was proposed by a study group for the
. cJesign of storage taDks. 'I'he group did an extensive review of the available literature
at the time to come up with thejr proposed methodology. It includes provisions for
rectangular and concrete tanks. Some diff'erences between tbis and other methods
iru:.lude:
L The hDpuJsive ami ccmvective components are comhinM by the SRSS method
jnstead of algMraicaUy.
b. The taDk bottom uplift is based on a model tbat incorporates both the bending
and the m.phme fo.rces in the bottom plate.
c. The method is itetarive. equating the o"eJtwning moment with the resjstjng
mcn'eu'
d. The analysis is based upon ultimate loads rather than wo.ddDg loads.
As nenl;IWiW earlier. this method is more involved than either API6S0 or the
method developed by Mmms As stated in Priestley et al (1986). the calculated
displs hl'e,"s bema'll: Jess accwate as the displacemcius iacrc:ase. Good engineering
jUdgrmmt sbonJd be used in I:hese cases.
7.4.6 lUveteil aad Bolted Taaks
Riveted and bolted taDks have the additional failure mode of tank sheJl splitting,
which does not occur in welded tanks. TIIDk shell splitting is believed to occur from
eJ'Ce!lllive hoop tellsiou ami poorly proportioned joints. A quick asseSSjiC'm of this
failure mode would be to co"'l'&!': the cross-sectioDal strexJgth of the bolts or rivets
to the steel plate. If the bolts or rivets are stronger than the surrounding plate. the
shell sbould bebaYe with cJncrility. If addiriml8l analysis is requhed. the boltedlriveted
sectionstreagthcanbemiiiced to the hoop tension pmiicrtd by AWWA (1987) or
Priestley, et al (1986). Capacjtjes ofriveted sections are provided inAP1653 (API,
1991).
7:.4.7 FIber ReiDforad Plastic (FIberglass) Taaks
FihergIass does not have the dw:tt
1
ity typically associaIed with tile steel.
Fibexghiss ptoperties are aIlIo anisotmpic, tbat is, the strength in a direc:tion parallel to
the grain is diffczeut to tbat i'G}OCndicular to it. Presently, there is no standa1"J. for
d
. -"""- __ t- for . . loadin .... --:.:a
'Milgnmg or assessmg DDCl...- IoCIIIIII..Ii SC'SlliII: gs. Ull'Uance OD noD-SCIS""t:
design is fowul in ASME (1992) and ASTM (1988). Many variables are involved in
derc",,;'';''g the sneugrh ami clm:r,1ity of the fiberglass composite material, incbtding
the pxopenies of the a:siD watdx ami the angle of winding of the fibezs. Seismic
loads should be dele' milled from API 650 (API, 1993). with due considexation given
to expet:led taDk petfi .... wi!Ce and ductility, and allowables obtained from
manufactuftD
1
reo Ij""pe"datjons or test results.
7-22
7.5 MlTIGATION OF SEISMIC EFFECTS .
Mitigating a wsnd!: hazard can be quite involved or relatively simple. For
overcollSnaiued piping. addidolllll bends or a fIexibIc section of piping may be added.
Stairs and waIk:ways can be solely supponed by the tank shell TBDk waD stabi1ity can
be more difficu1t to COllect. No one method will work all the time and ope1ating as
well as c:onstn1ction economics should be considered.
Where the tank is found to be structurally inadequate (as determined by
excecdance of the modified Manos criteria or gross exceedance of the API criteria).
any of the follow.ing reuofits may be implemented
a. Reduction of tile fill height; this is tile and most commonly
rect'T!'ITIW1ded lebofit, and should also be considered in cases Wheze the
awn'able :fnleboard is foUJlll to be inadequate. Note tbat reduction of fill
beight can have a significant effect on the economics of tank stm:age.
b. Im:rease the sbell thickness and/or the bottom p1ate or !!J!J!l1lar ring tbicknc
ss

Co Anchor the tankm accordance with the provisions specified mAPI650.
d. In lieu of ancbcnage, pzevent uplift of the tank by 51 ifJ'''''ing the tank base
tblOugh the instaDarioD of a concrete slab within the tank sbdl, or by other
methods. This method is relatively 111m ied bnt may have the same effect as
anchorlng the tank.
7.6 CONSJDERA'IIONS FOR FOTURE INVFSI'lGATION
'Ibis CCi!iiwi'tco did not review all aspects of sei5
m
;! tank pmfwmance, 1'bzee
II1C8S which would wauaat fmtbcr evalmttion jnch1dc
a.. Investigation as to appJica"'"Hty of New ZeaJpnd code (Priestley. et a1, 1986)
for usc m the U.s.
b. Develop""",t of amctbod to pIcdi.ct tank uplift.
Co DcvclopJmmt of seismic design and evaIuaI:ion procedmes for fibczgIass tanks.
DESIGN OF NEW TANKS
Seisnric design of new tanks is covered in API 650 Appendix E (API, 1993)
wbicb, usuaI1y being conservative, is a good candidate for design. As discussed in
Section 7.4.3. API 650 may be unconservtive for very broad tanks with thin sheDs
when using high stmJgth steel and/or thickened annular rings. 1'be following
modifications or additions am proposed to address other sboncomings.
7-23
. Eartbquakes cause the upper portion of the contajned fluid to slosh. The height
of the sloshing fluid can be by an equation found in Wozniak and MrtcbeD
(1978). This beig:bt should be used for fIeeboard requirements if the owner is
CODa" ""') with floating roof damage or with spillage of product in floating roof or
open roof tanks. The sloshing fIIIid. can also impact and damage rafters and
supportiDg columns of fixed roofs. Wozniak and Mitchell (1978) also shows how to
calcnIate this wave force.
Overtundng Moment on the F01JI!da
ti
oD
The hJdrodyuawic forces which c=ate the o\'ettDDling moment on the tank: waDs
also act on the taDk bottom and, bence, also on the fo11!!
d
a
ri
on. ThIs additional
ovell'" "ing nallle
nl
(ASCE, 1984) should be inchvied wbml designing the structural
pmtion of the foundation and piles.
TBDk Mo, .... a"
. Tank upBft dnring earthquakes can damage attac:hM p!plDg and other
appUfle"a
il
CIS The same provisions cfivnssed in Section 7.4.s may be used in
cfesign Additionally, ancb.orcd taDk appw'enances may be c!esfgned for SOlD: level of
ancbnr bolt saetch. A value of 2 inches (SO mm) is proposed in tile laI:est NEHRP
(1994) pmvisions.
API6S0 states that piping attached to tile taDk bottom that is not free to move
'YC%tically sban be plared a radial cfistance from the shelJJbouom col"'liI In of 12
inches (300 mm) greater thaD. the upDft length predicted by the API 650 uplift model
The API 650 uplift trode!, however. may underpredict the amount of mdial uplift
(Manos. 1986; Dowling and Shil"'e'&' 1993). It may be prudent to consider
c:banging this JeqUireucm to that predicted by Priestley et al (1986), twice the API
650 model, or an interaction of allowable vertical movement with the c:fistam: placed
radially from the shell.
Walkways between. tanks should be designed to 8CCODIIDOdate relative JDI:IVCDJC!Dt
of the tanks. 'l'1=:e js no rcfeteuce known to this committee which calculates the
pteJicred JDD'Ye"eM In lieu of a more rigorous analysis, a walkway should be
designed to 8CCOhl
iiloo
are a total of 12 to 18 inches (300 to 4SO mm) of JIID\'M'C
nI
,
'--' ..... f high . .. ThIs based t:-:._" . data
at ......... m "'" zones a $C1Sliii
cil
y. JS upon WIIU ..... expcnem:c
from past eatthquakes and is thought to be conservative for tanks with small height-
to-dianreter ratios. Par anchored tanks. this movement should be redm:ed further.
7-24
Anc:hored Taaks
API 650 or other methods may be used for design Attached rlngwaDs should be
desjgned appropriately. Auc:horing a tank to a small ringwall and not developing the
forces into the soil by the weight of the rlngwall or with piles should be viewed with
caution. Anchor bolts need to be designed such that they behave in a ductile manner,
both in terms of the force transfer to the shell and pullout from the concrete
folmdarion.
7-25
ChapterS
EARTHQUAKE CONTINGENCY PLANNING
8.1 INTRODUC'l10N
Although not explicitly a part of petrochemical faci1IIy design, a section on
contingency plamring was iucluded due to the importance of the topic. This section
does not give JpeCific gnmute on how to author contingency plaus, rather it merely
outlines some geuIIDIl points that should be addft:sscd by in-place cont;ingeDcy plaDs.
8.2 PURPOSE
. .
h is expected that every flIci1ity in a seismic mgion should have its own
contingency plan in place. It is iwpe.'Btivc that an patties involved in the response to
a seismic evcDt be mnmar with the response plan in order to utilize it to its fullest
potential This section mmely offers suggestions that such a plan should inclnde.
The primaxy pmposc for assemb'fing an earthquake emetgenc;y contingency pJan is
to have a rapid, rati0Jl81 and stntctured response to a seismic event. A contingeuc:y
plan will allow the following do be done in an efficient and safe manner:
a. Emergcucy rtiSpODSe to majntain public. pers ...... aJ. and plant safety
b. Organized iuspe':tion of m1iries for eartbquake sttucnual damage and
of
-'... . . . r.._o 0
conveya.nce to managemeat so as to """",,,", LH"'ness iDtellDpllon
Co Focnsing of critical resources for teCOVerY effort
8.3 SCOPE OF RESPONSE PLAN
This gnmeJine is iatetlded to cover the wg8lli
zat
ion of personnel and resources
for pe1fOlwing suuctural damage assessment ami damage control after a seismic
event. An effec:tive respouse plan shonld cover ell of the foDowiDg elements:
8-1
.',
b. Event RecogniriDD
C. Qmunand &. Comrol System I MobillzatiDD of InspectiDD Team
cL Roles &. ResplllSjbtljries of Team Persmmel
Co Tnspt"C'ion Methodology
f. Assetnb1ing lDspectiDD Dalal Reponing Results
This section wID toDcen"ate maiIIly on Items a-d., with e and f covered in more
detail in Qaaptcr,9 oftbis doc:l!liMnl
SA PBE-EARTHQUAKE PREPARATION
The key to MSpottSe to any disaster situation is organization and
plaaning befo.te tile e\'IIIlt ac:tnaDy occurs. As likely scenarios could entail loss of
water. loss of colliliii!!liretiov.s. Joss of firefighting ability. bmb11ity to reach site,
of bazardous liw'er iaIs, h is .impetative to take a proactive role in
; .. ::nning for any ewe&gew:.y.,_ of tile most cdricaJ III:C8S to address would be:
. ..... 'lC:b!t; '.
L e
A key CGmpouent in planning response to an eartllquab eu:els=cY is
baviDg insight into what type of damage may be A}et:!ed ami where h may
occur. Pedbnuing a, ni' eswsmeut of a &ciIity is an ideal way to assess
b ,iDheraIt fIicmty. Another beneOI of pedi""'i"g a sejsmic:
assHSuwmt is that.h allJ!'!S suuctm:es to be pxioxirized accoufiug to risk. This
Dsk hiet8lcby can be impJemcrttra4 Jnto tlm lespouse plan and allow tlm
hjgbest Dsk stl'UCUIreS to be iIISpected first. This Dsk himatc:hy Jist needs to
be a &liv.iDg' dwhiiN" IIIIlmusthaw an ownc:rto maintain it.
", '''!Io ..,. "- .:"
:10", ':\lr.'1""a! a'ot ""
b. _,.:
-, Another by_ COlli-'" of efIQ live lespouse to a disaster is a written
Iesptmse pJ.m wIdch 0
,
,6'4'5
:";1" "to \0{. ,....
. eo: Orgainzm.m +cd"Tii'IlC'tiOD Teams
CC' ...... and Stnidme of Teams
e I Isdng of Key fm"BdS ...
RiskPrlJdUbedTistbrgofSImdUreS
The RISpODSe plan must cffectively outline the team's O1ganization,
CO',,,,.,'" Sbiidliie, aDJI.mJe m the aSWSi'e
nt
process in order to be useful
Its conumts must be cffa:tively COJI!D!!wicated to and 111Idets!ood by
perscmnel who wID be Dmdved in tlm assessment effon. Drills are an exceDcut
!!UItbocI to help impI.........,the intents of the dm""cnt.
B-2
It is often usefill to set up sranding agreen .. "ts with support resources
sac:h as local eng;"eedug firms, local eJIICigency re5pODSe agcncie!;, and
professional organizations such as ASCE. HaviDg sranding assistance
agreements in place can help streamline the rcspouse process.
Co Pre-Earthquake TnUning
In order for iDspection personnel to perform effectively, they IlIIlSt be
trained in post-earthquake d""",p ISselS'" ""' h is suggested that all
inspection personnel undergo ATC-20 or similar training for lu
n1
ding
well
... eazed ---" f :.. .. _--'-,
assess". lit as as S1DJ1Jar bammg I towuu. mspecIlPD 0 .lLwwU.UG.l
stlUctares.
For quick ftISPOnse. inspection mptt:rjaJs (i.e.. paper, pen""'s, clipboards,
film. etc.) as well as sttucta:ra1 prlorlty iDfonnatinn 8IId posting materials
should be kept in a secwe 101 a.jclD that is to be IICCr""'"" ODly.in the event of
aD eattbquake. The post-ewmt 51 e "rio is inb=ntly coll1hsing without
bav.ing the problems of finding inspecticm !I1!Itr:rials h may be desirable to
iDcln
de
search and rescue eq"q ... .,." Water and food. supplies should be kept
in the seemed locaEion additionally, as shelter in place conditions may occur.
8.S INCIDENT RECOGNI'OON
Befmc any lCSpoDSe or aues jim efIbrt can begin, thenI must be some formal
recognition of the eveut that has oo:JW1ed. Recognition of the cmmt will allow
rtspODSe plaD:s to be put into efli:ct h Js advisable to set up a 11181 i il or classfficarioD.
S)steD1 to deswibe the extent of the cmmt (Le..low, moderate, setae). This manix:
could be based on the extent of the 0_ Wid damage. By doiDg this, each level of
a1ert can then be paired with BIl apptopxiale J4vel of respuuse. The obvious hinc.fjt is
that the apptopriate IIDIDUDt of respoDSe Js employed for tile size of CWIIt that bas
occmrccL For additional iDfonnatjOJl, please refer to a,,'Iu 9.
U COMMAND" CONTROL/MOBRTZt\T10NSts1'BM
In order to effecti\'ely laspoDd to aD cwe:rgcmqt, a clear coliimand aDd COIiUol
structure must be lnainrainrd Key CODtaCtS and e'isjon l'IIkm must be c:learly
ic!entified, and a hielaxchy of authority must be clearly UDdcrstood. The ftISPOn&e
plan should specifically designate key c:ontacts 8IId d ... jsjun makCis, as well as
backups in case the pziwaty CODtacts are unavailable. It should also describe how and
to where inspection results should be comrmmirated to the decision makm. Finally,
the emagency openuions center (EOC) should be located in a safe area. pxefetably
on the perimeter of the site.
8-3

... ,
After an earthquake, tbr:rc will be a short tr:tm (rapid assesgxnent) and a longer-
term (cfetai!cd auebnult) JCS{-!Dse "Cf 'II ary. 'lmmedjately following an event, rapid
'UesII ..... ' teams will n=d to be SCIIl out to identify obvious or hili I edjate problems.
These problems: migbt include failures. eI1'Yironrncnra
l
releases, fires, etc.
Concurrent:ly, the iDc:jdem ,uhillAnder will need to start mobilizing structural
expertise to: a) advise plant persoJlllCl OD die comse of action to st..m1izr: jmmedjate
failmes or c.rlses; aDd b) begin peden wing a detailed inspection.
Once the rapid ass '5
11
tllll teams have reported to the incident co
lll
lll8
n
der aDd
die seDn
min
e8S of die iDcidem lias been detelllljued, the appIopriate level of response
must be IIIOm1fzed 'I'I= im:idcDt C'lhhillander must have trained persmmcl available to
III8b decjsjo,. ldplding short-_ stairiliza! it tU of failures or crises. Exa'mples may
b de _... ---':"-':-- of Iti,, ,tfl._.
mcu .... VlSlDg on temp-lUll, ... __ ....... _ """................ DItL 1SC1p_.1
problems, advising on plant shutdowu, ell:.
Tllemsponsc planimJst Chlllaih iDsa:uctiuus for the team lI!Idea cmce the level
of !'PSI- h'Sf! needed has been cfete ,0; .. 01 These iDstnzcticms must fnryhJde where and
whtm to lepWtt' AddjtjrmaUf. dt"'. iusttucdug tile teamm:mhcl!'S who to zepoit to
cmce they baW rea' hod tile &ciIity ueed to be mcJuded Some comiugencies =cd to
, be add! 5 t' II IIIX:oUDt, for tile inahBity of team JDmI""," to s to the site. difficulty
in comllllmjcatiOns, ere. or.aD.y IGi - I nble cfjfficuIrics that may be encondlmcd.
:.;, . '.
. ,'- ::;r"' . -", -. -.
&7 ROLFS AND RESPONSIBII J tiES OF 'l"EAM PERSONNEL
After the mspCction team bas been a_bled, it is hDpeiative that they know
what is -e'l"*cted of tbrm,81Id. what mspons;hiJity each of thmn wm be held
accountable fot.. A DmdeJ.team SIIIICt1Be should be Jafd out witbiD the respcmse plan
to shoW whitmle each will play. 'I'I= desiR:d quam ali .. lIs for each role in the
iDslectiml efIbzt ahouIdbe O'III1"M in die msponse plan, with the maHzatioD that
.... .- allow II' ... ad":"_J..I-
enc''"'''''' es may DOt a p#i<e' mptc:bjng of skills to posmons It JS ,YDiI&IBi
to ba've an op..athig lept "!alive as part ofdle iDSJldioD team. 'I1Ie plan should
also clearlY oudiDe Jiaes of cc"i",,,,,.k:a'i')u and ambnrity witbiD the team strucatre as
well See a.Rprer 9 fOr adcfiLi ;"fi h" ,,' jnn,
&8 lNSi'ECi'JONMEl'BODOIDGY
Ids Iiesirab1e'that tbe leaphM plan address tile methodology to be employed for
sbcJnld be spec jRed include:
. ..:?!1':-'Jap :w,.:.:. . . .
L iDiipi: c:iicm oiiima to Use (ATC-20 I Other)
b. Posdrig c.it..ria for Bm1ctings I StlUCtUtes
Au.'uuily
do Dealing With AftersJurInt .. .
e. Repair Authority
This item is addressed in more detail in Q!apter 9.
U ASSEMBLING OF INSPECTION DATAl REPORTING:RESULTS
After pezfo.t:lllins the field inspections. posting buildings. and making
structural evainatiollS, data and results must be assembled in order to report it to the
incident COTT!T!'ll!!!der. h is desirable to bave pre-designcd forms to help standardize
the data collected and make it easier to assemble after the mspectioDS. These forms
should be stored in a secared c:abinet. such as the ODe discnsser.l in Secdon 8.4. h
also allows d""IIicntation of damage to be kept for filture review 8!IdIor aoalysis.
Using the mmdard forJm makes the task. of awmbling and transliljlfjug the
iDfoImation to the apptopJate decision maker much more cfijcient. Also. these forms
should int:lnde some method of int:orporatiDg secondary iDspccti.oDS after the
incvilable laIgc aftersbncks Additional infotmation is ccmrajned in Chapter 9.
s-s
Chapter 9
POSTEARmQUAKE DAMAGEASSFSSMENT
U INTRODUCl'ION
This section provides gnidance with lCS} = to post-eanhqua1cc damage
assess" If!Jrt of those fm1iries considered to be m ueed of sttuctural investigation after
the oa:mrence of an earthquake. After every signifhalf seimic event. an i""'- djare
ami CMIplete walkdown of the petmebemieal facility m question would be the
0p'i
rnilTD
respouse. However, although such action is stnmgly advised, it is also
rcaJimi that this is imp1'actical due to cost ami manpower CODsttaints. For these
reasons, two factors ueed to be considered with regmds to the scope of, &lid =cessity
for, post-eartl1quae damage assesi!ieuts: (1) prlD,jljza!jOll of items to be assessed
after an ca:rthquake; ami (2) detemdilatbm as to what RsizeR of an event wammts an
assessmeD1-
9.1.1 AsSesSld"llt Priorities
The major safety/operatioD81 concerns of operators of pettorbmrica
t
DC't1itjes :fall
UDder the following three priorities: .
Fnst Priority: H .... lth &lid tmma
n
safety.
Second Prlorlt.y: Damage to the envhOiillient.
Third Prlorlt.y: Other items with signjfjcant economic bnpact.
Under the first priority item, the major risks to health and bmmn safety associateD
with eatthquakes (in no pmticolat otdet) an: the following:
a.. FimI.
b. Explosions.
c. CoJlapsed and damaged slnU:tilteS.
d. Release of hazardous materials
9-1
UDder the seccmd priwity item, the major risk to the environment associated with
earthquakes is the release of environ" !e!!tally sensitive products. Such releases are
mJared to the following OCUiUCUces:
a. Storage tank: failme.
h. Pip:line luptUte or failmc..
Note that 1iIiIare in the above djsMlssjon also rd'ers to sjgrrifica
rrt
leakage of
tanks. pipelines, and v Is, sad is DOt limited to comp1cte coDapse
UDdCT the tbirdpdOiit) iteiD; the mqor add
iti
DJl81 cause of significant economic
;
i1i
I'act to a 1BciIity ope.atOr 15 it Joss of production capamT1Jy. 0cClmcnces that
COllI! ihutC to lOss of pUcmcticiJi apebility (m additinu to those listed in the first two
priority itemsl!R the "
-., t! .... - ". .
. Jj,'{S"'of-."''',.,,.....J!O ,,-- '':'. . ..
a. ..
-.;' -"":.. ... .on;', .. .J.;o ... t .. _ .... t -
b. LaSS ofCOl'iiiFiittfcafinas --',.
Co' SImt-dcnrn pt' ceol
m
e5 activated by earthqnake.
-...... Ii"'" &3 U .
a. UtilitY. systeIDS.tbat would be teqaited to operate following an eanhquake to
maintain the fiu:iliijrma sam condition, e.g., :tirew .. and 6J1ii1geacy power
S,SlHiI'S
b. Adjacent s)s'ews, 'sUGCtUtes, or components whose stt'IlCtUrlIl milure or
displaceheur couUnesull m the milure of systems that pose a risk to beaJth
. ,,"".t',,-,," ....... '
ami b;'".'" Safety, CXJid';" hazatdaus materials or CDliUO",,",rally sensitive
PJducts. or !I!" patliaJ)arJy valuable from an opemtions point of view
UJ.it: ... .... J !If;o!-l ....
. - . ' .
" . , .. J '., " \ " ..
Co ADy sttuctures, systems, or components that, from an opexator
i'equbed to mwai" functicmal during and after a major earthquake.
9.1.2 Ass I wept Triggen
No absolnte IJhamha1jve masnre of eartbquake severity can be given as a
gui
d
e1jne as to when a post-earthquake d!!1!18p assc '1It"'1 should be perfumed.
Much depends on whether there bas been any n:ported significam damage at the
faciJity. and wbetbcr the eartbquake event was serious or damaging. Ideally. a post-
earthquake cfamage 8 "!1IC\!!l sbould be UIIClenaken after a seismic eWDt of any
signffiamt magnitude. The following examp1.es (either occnrring at the tiIciIity or in
the jniiiedjate viciDity of the facility) should trigger the DCCd for a post-cartbquakc
response:
a. Injuly to pcrsozmcl
b. Stnu:tural coDapsc
c. Release ofhazardous materials or cnwOIIDlenraJly sensitive products
eLm
Co RxpJosion
f. Automa1ic system slmt-down
Loss f
if

g. a power. utUtles, or CIlIIiIllllDtcattons.
Any of the abcm oc:cuneuces may jndlcate more serious problems, aDd a post-
earthquake damage assesment should be injripted jiiiiiediately. In addition to the
stmcturaI. investigation, medl!nrical ami systems assessments may also be rcquin:d.
9.2 PRE-INVFSTlGATlON ACl'IVl11ES
The perfbrllwnce of a post-earthquab d"""'P 8S
S
ess
ll
nil should be pxeceded by
the foD.owiDg safety-related actions, which should take place jmuMiately after a
sipffieant seismic event:
a. Accounting for the safety aDd weIfiu:e of an pe:rsons on the site (employees.,
contractors. ami visitors)
b. Control of an jlhmediate dangers, such as fizes. mJ1apsed S1:r&JCtUR:s, etc.
c. DetczmiDation of safety for JICIII-CIXIcrpD ICSpODSe trai=i pmsoJUlCl,ic.,
the engM"Cl'S petfuxmiug the post<arthquake d!lJ!'!!lP asses5'l eut , to enter the
facility.
Pre-plllDlring of IDspecdon activities is esfMllial, ami should jm:Iude a nretjng with
plaDt peISOJUlOl figm1iar with the faC''ljtjes UDder ,e,je",. To help eJISIII1' that an
perrinent topics IR addressc:d, a Jist of questions should be pxepau:d before this
1m ,dn, o.ue individual should be appointed to WIite DOleS for a recotd of
conversation. or instead, it is petmjlled, a tape recotder may be used. Topics to be
discussed with plant pmsonnel include the foDow:iDg:
a. Plant operating history befme and after the earthquab.
b. COllective acdon taken by the opemt01'S during or after the eartbquake.
c. Maintcmance orrepai:m that may have been made before the iDSpection.
eL AsJy problems experienced with operability aDd fnnc:rionaljty.
Co Any equipment failmes during or after the eartbquake.
f. Bquq'l .... nt accessWlity.
g.; Hazardous areas.
9-3
h. SafetypmcautiOJlL
L Existence of any iDstnll"corarion on site that recorded the eartbquake motion.
PailiCiilar anmrinn should be given to correc:tive actious. JDlrintenance. and other
repairs made at the facility due to seismic acti.v:ity. T'he adequacy of such repairs
should be c:bec:!r"', and the location of these comct:ive activit:ies may jndicate
additional areas of concem .. :: C::"
. -
During pre-investiptinn actMties, the inspection team should also diC!Mlss and
dete.tmine what areas of the p1ant, eqDipment, or componcIItS will be inspected and in
what order. PJam m::nmgement dmwings should be obtaiaed and markcd with the
location of spe' i'i" c:c '" 'l"'mmts v!tw:tcd for evalnation. If more than one inspectiDn
team is mYolved, __ of lOlwmsDdJity should be divided as Deeded
..... , .. ;c", _ op .
,-' t,:.. . ...
A pradeDt mzn!nder for an those invoJ:vcd with. the :inspection is that the plant has
cxperie.uzd a eeis.,.j,: e'VeDt. Before begi''''i'. iDspccdoDs, pJam pcrscqmel should
visually .iuspect the plant for any_mds'ing hazaxdous ccmdition (for example, areas
cmtta .. ;j;wteril by c
be
neira1 spills). If any hazauioUs condition is foDlld, this area
should be- noied team a ... oh"'ll advised accmdingly. ..lDSPeCtiOn of
these-8ieaS Sbnn'd be pei
6
1iiie.cL only if precantions to protect the safety of the
in.'IpCCtiaD team members can be and have been taken. . . - __
Oneal __ . iinpoltaAt fjlllctijlDS of the pre-i:avcstiprion phase is to
thorougb1Jqaestion ope.taMis as to the CXlCDt of the damage. UsuaDy. the Ope18W1S
will have akaaiy pe1Conuac1 a quick :inspecticni of the facility and will be able to
pmv.ide eiiIct .:plj",1S ofkaown damage. Such areas should be the:6mt priority of
the imP" 'inn team. If a sei.mic haza:rd. mitigation program has already been
undettakm at thefacili1y the stluctwes known to be seisildraDy wlnerab1e, and
their week Iirdc:s, should be the StCODd priwhy of mspel I;'m. If 110 such program has
been pxeviuusly UDdertaken, thm the wlneJ:able structwes will not be known a prlori,
and the ElSS' team should sweep tI= emin: facility in a systematic 'IAi'U,
wbile'w,';"'iaiting em dID ass=''''N'' pric .. jrirs as discmsm' pieviously in SectioD.
9.1.1. AAM'ftin should be given to types ofitems that have pexfw"'''d poorly duriDg
past earthqmm: Such as older structures. In any eve:at, p1aDt 0pe1atcm1 will be the
key to I"jcnj1izingthe _Sihd'"
... ...
.. .. I!_ . ... ,;..s \lglC.l ,
, ... . " . .
9.3 PEltFORMING FIELD JNSPECI10NS .
Inspc ti
OT
,;", of tile faciBty should be-- doc"neated widl 1iekl notes and
acCc;mpimyiDg photr.gtaphs. .. Oecklist-styJe fomIs may be used; see Chapter 6 for
exampleS' AItbough j"SJIfii 1m team.OIC"mers may prefer taking DOtes to fil1ing out
usiDg tbese fm:ms c:aD. provide a greater mep'I'te of cc,,'s;stency
.
M.s'''e""e-''ts shauld be made with a tape measure as much as is pla:rj
c
:e1 For
coDlpOllmltl tbet axe ineceessfWc, a visual estimate of dimensions slmuld be made
I
When visual ctimensious are used. the doCIIii entation provided should reflect this fact.
For some items. an as-found sketch may be needed to identify all of the parameters
invesdgate:d. Complete iDformation, as required, should be provided on the sketch
regardiDg dimensions, sizes. component types. etc:. Atlcast one photograph of each
sttuc:ture or C01OpODCiIt investigated should be taken. A labcJing system should be
.implemented to match the photographs to the .inspection notes. If peu"jssihle. a
video c:amem am be used. The video camera will gcneraDyprovide a better visual aid
for bistorical data, and the voice recording unit of"the c:amera am be used to nar.rate
condition and type of equipment being inspected
Above aD. any damage which resulred 1i:om the seismic evem should be described
in detail. Damage should be.,.. ssd jliiliediately at each indMduallocation, and
some engineedug basis to explain tile failure should be provided and noted, if
possible. The inspdion team should tty to c:om= to a consenms as to any remedial
mea""niS that may be IequiIed.
9.4 EVALUATION OFLOAD-CAllRYlNG SYSTEMS

Of paxamoGllt importance wI= perIinmins a post-earthquake damage
a"SC'suent is tile ability to detei:miue wbat exactly COIIstiliiles a given struc:ture's
gravity and lateral force resisting S}'SteDIS. A strw:tme whose gravity system has been
dllD'lllgcd. and its ability to conUnne to c:any veuica1 (dead) loads is in question, is a
wry hazaDlous condition since coDapse may be i"" .. j"e
llt
This becomes even more
critical when tile likelihood of aftershocks is inchJdcd, Such a structure should be
ihiiiMiately flagged. and suitable Dasmes taken, such as banicadcs, evacuation,
'ni, .. eiljare Sl2NHzariOD, drmmJitfma. ere.
StructIUtS tbrit ba'We intact g&avity sj'SlelOS. but ha'Ve substantial damage to their
lateral force resisling system, e.g.. buddr4 or clamagecl braces. sbould also be
regarded as potential hazirds. due to the possDWtty offiJture aftershocks. Although
such stntctures are gencraDy not as signfficmtt a hazatd as those with damaged
grav.ity systems. jliiuediate steps sbould be tabn to testate the integrity of the
oxiginalla1c:ral force resisting systmU.
lD cfeciding whether a structure bas a damaged .... Ii!!lll 8DdIor Jatera1 force
resisting s)'ii1tCim. tile questicm as to the ahi1ir.y of the stl\icbae to withc;taud aD
aftmbodc of equal or greater magnitude is often 's1rcd If an eXlMrieaced damage
esscsSjje
ut
team does not bc:Jil:ve the sttuctme is capeN .. of surviving such an event.
rI - ...... uld ....... At._......... . the rI
"""" 'ate steps ZUlU uw WIA.Iii.I&, iIIIU eatermg structure or itS ii""#rlate VlCiDt1Y
should only be done OD a 1jmjted as-needed basis. OmtiJrncd opetation should be
justifieD on a case--by-case basis. Soa items of particuJar c:cmcem im:lnde the
following:
L Loss of ilaltglity of vmtica1 and/or lateral force resisting systems
9-5
.'
b. Steel stu" faits - yielding, Mnging (top and bottom of columus), web
1mekling aDd crippHng. mace l\1Jckling, weld cracks, etc.
..
c. Concrete stluctwes - cracking, spaIliDg, exposed rebar, d'""",ged
rebar, hinging, CI1'Sbjng. etc.
d. Anc:bor; 8DII fimndatic"'s - am:bms and/or bohs pulled out of footings, large
depx ssims annmd cobnnn bases, etc.
e. EquqmC!!I - visible PIIJIClWes, leaks, cracks. toppled items, loose fittings and
valves;. cmdeJllS UDder high pressure. weld cracks, cm:loscd amas where
buDd-up of exp1nsm pscs may occur (confined spaces), etc.
f. .... " .r"-
.-..., t..iU.Ic:L... r . -!-.
". . ......
f. RoadwayS":- clear oflarp debris, dowud power lines, "CODtiuuous SllTfiICC"
(no fanIting), etc.
g. EvidmcO Of 1Ici
iimi
tiOia, fimlt rupture, signffic:ant scttJement, hmdsHdes, and
tsnnamj/seicb=
"-;:.--!lK'!f. It .. ... '
,..,... .
U mENTlFlCA.TlON OF DAMAGED STKUCTDRES
,.' . .' ... ' .. A: . ,_
. It is RC:Oliii
tietprlfd
diat'a fadIicy-spo:iBc "ragging" S)stem be CODSidmed in order
to idenrify' s;;.u.u.; stuaCcw .... or cowpolleJltS judged as being by the
DISpcc:tion t=l Ks)itian ifevdoped for post-eartbquako ewlnptiou oflmilctings and
usee! RlatiYelf 518 ': fiwJly folIowhlg -=t major earthquakes is desl 'i1 oJ in ATe-
20. That s,stem en II;alIy hwolves placing green (safe). ,mIow (eJItC:r with c:amion
for restricted use). aDd:=l (do not enter) tags on iDspeeted bnildings Such a system
, r..... - far' . 1 #oo_"tlh. .1- ......
may JeqUZte "".wc:s'"n use m a pouor-benDca ......... 3 setting, WIIOOi to ua;
congestiOJf8m1 (cdieDtimes) imlistinpisba1l11ity of diffcrezn st:ructmes., and it should
be UDderstood diii mnlrip1e tap or tape may be requhed to rope off those sections
d=Uied unsare bJ. the !"'ellt team.
. - . ' Oi $d L.
9.6 DOCCMENrATlON,
'I'hD objeCtive Of tbe insprl 'jCJn team's effort at each facility should be to coll=t an
iufin".j'iCni "Dlcdd-to dOO"'w equillllftI! 8Dd stn1ClDr8l pcufolii"nce dnring dID
can&qQakii. . epm 9.1 shows, in the form of a ltCO"'''cn!led tabla of c:cnttents, the
O1ga
n
jzaljriD'ami conleJd of a leport that can be produced for each facility visited
(EQB, 1986b). Note that tbe CODlezns of this IqIOrt can be sepamred between those
sectionS that sbmiJd be substantially completed dllTing the 1i=ld imlec&ioD and those
that c:an be c.!iiq' tCd Iatcr.;: ';:'
The fiDal RpOlt should .efi:zcuce pnhlisbNl Infol"w'ion on the earthquake
severity m m.msh'iiS oltbe grouDd mDUoD at each facility, &1''''''w.jm iufo.llaari"D
of the _pc cted equq""ent ami structures at each facility, djsc:uss generally the
,

performam" of each type of iDspected equip" e
ot
, and desCl"ib': in detail any damage
that was noted during the inspections, along with any required or recommended
retrofits.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. lNTRODucnoN AND PURPOSE. Gmaic: descriptioD of purpose of report,
wbich is to d,OliWnl post-eartIIquab iDspeclioD of facility after c:anhquak:II
evan. ThIs secrion c:aD be completed after iDspecIiDD.
2. FAClUI'Y DESCRIPTION. A brief overview of facility. iIIcIudiDg faDcdon.
DescriptiDD of major strUClImS, age, exac:t harlem, opaaring bistory. ere.
Duriag the plaDt visit. c:oIlect infot 'lM'iDD nec:essuy to incInd: ill this .nDD
pJam IiterilUle, dmwings, tape na:o.tdiugs of interview with pei'Sw
lll
e1. ere.
3. GROUND MOTION AT FAClLlTY. UJIIas records during the pJam visit c:aD
be oblaiDed, expect to write this .ee lian JaIer usiDg pnh1isb..t tepOIlS of n:cords
throughout the mea (e.g., those pubHshed by USGS).
4. OPBRA'IIONAL 1MPAc:r OF EAR'IHQUAKB ON FACLrl'Y. Jmehiews
with pIaDt peiSDDDCl will form the basis for this srcriDD If possible, ob!aiD
copies of opaatm logs during the plant visit.
S. EARTHQUAKE PERFORMANCE. This sectiDD will form the maiD body of
the report, and should be completed during the fie!d inspec::rion This secriDD
should im="ufeRQiI.ii'rivlatjrnur forJtIHwliatjQD, ifrequhecL Resp.msjbifity for
originating various mbscctioDs sbouId be dividec:I up IIJDDDS waIkdown team
6. CONCLUSJONSlRECOMMENDA'IlONS. Briefly sQwD.lim the primwy
findjngs of the team. jm:!ndjng lO"hiiiliu dec! PeriODS. This srt:tiDD may be
wriuea larcr.
7. APPENDIX A. Tho IIJIpeiIdix sbouId mnraill photograpbs, pllms, drawings, ere..
which IIJC .eii:teucc:d within the body of the sepmt.
FIgure 9.1: Example Report Table of Contentc
'.7 INSPECl'ION TEAM
Bach iDspection gmDp should c:onsist of a "'illi""'''' or two (2) individuals with
the following qualifications:
9-7

b. Expel! ien'l: in seismic: derign and 8Dalysis of equipment, systems. and
SII:1lClmeS mmUn peI1lC;herrrical facilities.
Inspection team 'ID!!I1!bers should have undergone training in post-earthquakc
damage &"'"0,1 and in the procedures to document such assessiilents at the
facility in qnesmm , -- -'. .
The strucumil portion of a post-earthquake damage assessment should be
con"",=,, by 6Kp!lienred qin=rs fatmlj!!J' with seismic derign and the cff'ects of
eatthquak:es. 'I'het should be able to readily identify areas ofwerlmess, and priotitize
remedial ",,"'es to awect sevCle damage and to euswe ccmtjnned safe operation
of the facility. .
-': . ... 1f'
...... .... ; ...
,.. RECOMMENDED;EQUIPMENT
. - --' ..... _ . __ ,;... JS... -
ass
," .. , .. -..:..... . -' . -.. ..
. ... ....... ,,-
The folIowiDg items' aie DCOmhendcd while pezfQ1ming post-earthquake damage
c. 0",'1 '5S
f. Safety gJ S
'.::: C. .... '

b. Safety mask (partWil1arly afier a JIllIjor seismic event 8IIdIor in areas ofknoWll
bazardo1Js ".'el jal or -",cilhiiffiwly sensitive pmduct release)
. \!''''. : , ...
L Cousb:UCIiuD boots
_'' __ '.'V_
k. Photo C8!!lera (Polaroid or 3Smm)
n. Hand-held video camera (optional)
o. Tape recorder (optional)
Note: Cbrdc camet&, flash, video, and tape recorder use with facility operators
prior to their use at the facilhy. This should be done not only for confidentiality
purposes, but also becanse some camera equq"'ent is considered an ignition source
in certain hazardous areas or could trigger certain fire detection systemS.
Chapter 10
BETROFITDmGN
lo.J INTRODUC'110N
The gnirfeJbn pest ,'ed in this sectinD are intendNJ to assist an engj'ftI in
pedilt. ___ J....-J.. -- of .,
mwg M"'I"': .... iIIIU J"N'M8!IDD CD'''''e stmctu:res.
'I'hese guit!eljneo; me nat intendeD to p:rfim:n as a code cioe1
m
e
nl
: mthI:r. they me
jntended ODlyto give gnidmc:e to the cngin=r fiIccd with a task cciM'';' ally
defi. rid strucaDes.

1It.2 UPGRADESII'UA'110NS
Geat:rally. SUilL1UteS m:cd sr:jswil: upgradiqg ami JJ!C'I!6fU alinu for OIIC or IIIOIC of the
1bJIowiDg rcasous: ... .
L ExiS\1ing structures may be jde:lllj!lHl to be potentiaUy hazardous to public sa1Cty
after a waIktbmugh ami an iDitial suee:uing evaJnation pxoc:ess (see Ompter 6)
........ :..:.:.., __ 1.--:- .to' of ., .. ..
IIIILIAl gYAllMll.l.UII pil- "Are IS a WlSOiy J:e\"&\V exmmg 95
iil
C ib'S' "'I
hming S1lUUUitS, S)'!4eWi. ami ecpdlhl<!'d. to dett"'';'e if*,>, me c:ategorlzed
to be "sa1i:", "uasafe" or "D=cl fiIrther study". For sttuctun:s and s,stems that are
c1assifieil as "sa1i:". no fiu:ther action-is mquiI:cd. However. for those that me
classified as "uusa1i:" or "D=d fiIrther study". a IIIOIC DgOlOI1S ewhmtion should
b:peafinntd
b. Addjrjrms to ami Jmdjficalh !!IS of exisriug sttacbII'eS ohD tdggez the Deed to
upgrade :I1UittI4eS to aweut code teCJ.1ihC"e
lilS
Upgmdi:ag may be to the code
of recmd if appxoved by the local bm1tf'ttg ofIiciaL However the CiIIdm SIrIJCtDle
may DOt u=d to be dreW against the cwxeut seiwi: code; for CiampI!! if the
4:..1I __ w I'
6\N&Wft'M16 C a .. - "" lOS cxJSt
1. Addition is cfesigncd to the aweut code.
10-1
2. Acfditirm docs DOt :iIIW seisiilic forces. strtsses. ami dispJarenmts in the
entire DlJdi!le.f structare by DlDle thaD a set of the design values
from the code of record. Values of 5% to 25% have been used by local
buDding oficials
3. Dd ,l,ga'w'O"",ljrjJ .. nsdo notreducc the capacity aftbc existing stmc:tm:e by
:mOle tban a set petc:entagc.
4. Addjrkm docs DOl deaase the seismi:: resistanrc of any structural em
n
'Cprs of
ezisring sttuctutes uaIcss the 1M hi" Is equal to or gn:atr:r tba:il tbat
u;quiIedforJIDW i!iIlUCtWtS.
.
.. .
c. Ownss o1hm will UJIIIIIdc exis!;,,! Dc
i1
jries to mduce the rlsk of hJSjness
inteaupliua 10 .
'::-.:": !Jj .
10.3 Ckl"lERfA IOKVOLlJNTARY SEISMIC UPGRADJNG
'. ' . '.,
- -. ' - "'
'I'hD iab:at of"'ltilllilj 5 is"" _ upgradiDg and modiNa,M,u of e1jsrjng suuc:tares is
not to brias them up to the caucut codes. Rattler, tbe goal Is to p.rovide .. ma
naMe
IISSU1'aDCe to the pnb1ir. owam, IIIIIl stare bnikfing aflicials tbat stI:UCtIJzeS aDd systems
will sarviw=. a JD9Ir eaztbquake without catastrophic fjriIntr, though they DIlY S1JfI'm'
eJ'eDSiYc damage_ a,s' OWi&tS may desire to n=trofit to ahigJzrpea fi.ii.d'C
.. .. '.
aneffmtto iiiini"- hiS;' _inteauptionlosscs. AdrfitiJ.naDy, tb:rearesjrmttjoaswla'e
zeguIatDJy age'" jes set the lettofi1 standard. Sec 0Japu:r 2 for adem, !pal "harlcg.oDUd.
10.4 GtlIDEL1NIS/PKOCEDURFS
". !I,.... .
Criteria fOr desip'o{1Iew. sttuctUttS aad sysiems arr: well ""fined in bnlding codes
such as time dig . J in "*prw L Bowew:r. aiteria for 8S l"g audlor upgrading
eAt;";"1 61Hii"i
e
es am puody defiled. 0Im:atly. tb:re am DO c::ode dOO'ii.ns that
51'" i&:aDj onr1&'ielloit stpzvIards. Suggested gnideHms far piC =tbquake r;"',,:
upgradizIg"aad lu'.a,ians are J4 "ed in tbe faD.owiag:
.'
1. O'btaiDanllJH"H'* potft J,,,; all sei
Si

i
.logicalrepmt.
; '" r,:':;;o ....t1$l ... "(' ,.
e""'- ,_ .... !
2.. bel;;'ii. desip rabtlgtigns aDd drawiogs.
.'. :. J
3
ft_"":"'.L; :u...... "=-=- _ ......... -:..... _.I '--I ": 4:.-
u.::;: IWUiII __ ,.-. .. ytiilll.M3 UG 'Hill"""" GIIU Aill'AAi IUJ,..--
,"hi;''' i)51t'" aDdideutiyanyspecialloads fordetdi,.;..j,c die potemjaJ weak
Jiaks in the stli
b
1,,,.1 S)SttIDS.
. ?a::---:T, :..'
4. Use FEMA.-178 It fi1ct ..... ( in lieu ofR.1ictors fiOm the USC) for P"ldings mad
Q f!v ''1m fnml the RMPP Qbelia (see Appendix 4F) for pIIIIIt struc:tmes in
mlc:nJaringthe iii;' 1brc:es for IID8iysIs.
10-2
s. Whc:n dyDamic lIDIIlysis is Jequhcd, use either of the following design respouse
spa:aa:
L Par bntldings, use tile FEMA-l7B sejsmic acceJem.tion spectntl shape or a site
spc:cim: spectrum. if avaU,ble, Jmdified per FEMA-l7B.
b. Par plant stwenues, use a siJ:c.specitic acccbation iCSponSC spectLwn based
on DaD N'i' I.tes of 0CCUDCDCe for lepz setj1i1tg the mean values of spec:.ual
ea:e1mtioas. These values should amsider the iii!iwilling li1i: of the SIi\lCbl[C
IIJId the coasequc'" cs offailule. - .
-
7. Use in sim ne
ml
..,. Stlengtbs for cU:nJating the .. euiber Mlp'ciries Non-
destructi.e testiDg may be requhed to obtain tile as-built sueagth of SttUCtUrel
'Ie,lets.
L ClIck the eyRjng +;"";: calG' bi'S ( C ) of stractara1'"e.
iJ
etS. billib tjJ,DS,
aad eqtFiI"'c'" suppca1S waas tID 1'. "'i; dtmpnd (D). IfC > D. DO fartb:r
action is Jajl'hed. Otbaiwise, a;S3iij: upgradiDg aad ."."..rJficarinD sbmJJd be
f inffietec! It is Ii ... liiiilridM tbat sttcagth design metbnds be used to calmlpte
9. When defomwtioDs aud drlft JimiIs need to be c:bec:kM against tile allowable, they
s"auld be (;III 'lit with tbosc diw " din CIIIpter S.
10. Alternate lined'" cs usiag 19' H .. ad IIIIIIlyIes besed on well estabJisbcd aualysis
maybe IJ!Ied. Methods IUellas non-liDear ineJastic DB histmy IIIIlIl.yses
wouldbo
a
'1 fl'Iable .-
10.5 S'l'RENGI'BENlNG CRll'ElUA
'Ii tbat
0 0 _ dO o. _"'_
o cnsme plop" wnecttve e"dI, me nap "e"'PL m. semmc ....
programs. engin =xs sbDukl be fWly of tile latest develot'II!iI$ in earthquake
17ngDw. ing The Applied Tecimology Couacil (ATe) is CWleutly fina!jzjng a gnideJjm
51'0 i&aIIy addrcssiDg tiM',; 1CtrOfiniDg. A 7SCJiI CMlpwe draft of -GnideHnes for dID
Seismic R""""'Dtarinp of Dm1dings" (ATe 33JB) has bam issued for xcvew, aad is
CApCCted to be c:ompIetrd SOlle DB in 1996. 1bis dm'Jl'"tt is tile fi:st codc-like
guide1ine to address so., ,ie lellufit woxk, aad while tix:ns ...... I" i,' wrily on bn1dings will be
III important msomcc for petux:1e"'" at fac.1jties AddtioDaI xesoma;s would jacInde
seveml Olp"ip'ions and pIOpum iiUilh"rG tbmugbnm tbS doc
lli
'"', such as the
Am,," an CouaCie Insti!JJ1e (Ae), tile And aD Jnsritnte of Steel Consuuction (AISC),
the Ahc,i! ali Soc:.iety of Civil Engmms (ASCE), tile Natioual EaIthquakc Huard
Reilumm Proglatn (NEHRP (FEMA. the Earthquake Engirrtlilig R=s .,.:11 !none
(EERI), tile Structm:al Engin rs Assoc iae iI 'n of Cali6" nia (SBAOC).
10-3
When lettu
6l1
j"g a stiuctuze, tbe main objective is to provjde reasonable assmm:e
tbat the 1etrofitted it1NCtD1C wiIllC' ti ..... in an acceptab1e Iii" "jCr when SIlbjeet to strong
groUJld 1II)U"n It 11IIISt bo kept in miad that tbe iIttcut of lettl'6" jllg in DOt to bring tbe
SIiUCtUIc up to tbeleuri ofumeu1 code. However, in an sjm
8
'j
C
ms. it is nen,n uy to
meet the iIttcut of tbe code, iL. :mm-coBapse, as a mjnimnm C:j j'm ia. It may be advisable
to SIImgIbeD beyoDd tbese shj;Oi"''',' require """ if j.d .;. ;?"" h1siMss iDtemJpticm or
ja1I1 S'tistbepet&"i'M'RZObjective.
- __ .. ... ..,... .. ' _.r
"' __ w ... ..,.Li-1..ho ...... _.
Anotb=r jwpoUlnt point to c:cms!der wI:rCD ptii ti Ii mjllS lettotit design is the concept of
pxupor'jcmjng widdD tbe iitU!11"'c. OvetSbeligtbetring IIlI:BS of a that me
CWieutlyde&jej
l1
msbwgtlu:lJli'an:e the weakJiDk(s) to otberele'il'lUts that me ptiihaps
ewn weakt::r or mare bxittJa. If this nccms, the impact upon the oYetall .stntt:tuml
p:4 6 .. ii-ofteD'imrb,.dt; T.beiefbxe, care D1DSt be take:a. so that a CWiemly weak,
but cluett", stiiu::tUie is Dot 'ni'HJfflri! such that it beo::um:s a stlucnu:e w.Id1 a bdttIe 1iIiIuIe ,
smdc.
''''B' uoo issues that DD.1St be conso 'cd wb:n leanfiuing a
........ -... -> > > .. .!..;2.:'::...... . .. fl d m.... --' Ii iIily be
su:u=ue.. .uIaUIiD .ii. '_mootty, Am,... -...u WDSIluti ' IIIISt
adchCsseCL. JDscJiD, eaSiS;'p,;, -JeqWCi.MIS may be b He 'i,iniIC &ctor ill sele:riag
aretrofitiiclii,WlrA ni"'\e is the use of 'bmw tareS as opposed to ClOSS
1nciDg. ID ad01!jnn, tbe ",unB. DIDSt be liljd:tilmal ml DDt cn:ato IDlY addirjhllaJ
pmbJems AD emi''\e is fila. air-cooled beat ftjIi hmgetS, or fin...fim 1io1l'iJCUlies, atop
devaIed PP'i.P;1. TIi" "!ioils far the em 1+angers 8ft: oftm DDt designed for seiS"ijC
loads aDd may lii:k. JUojila de! 1fiIing>. When rettofittiug, the II1mCtIire should DOt bo
qjftP:"trl such that its DeW Arm him1 pt:rlod awl' Idr
hes
that of the fim motors. Dt:taffing
is also a Jcqi'iftDside.1itIIiniasi:uutit design ODe oftbe pzimw:y Joals ofzetIotitting is to
. -- ......... :. ',. '---.
provide a dnc'. ADe
S8fH
ij,1e is leaufit ofanlyn hoJrs GIl tall pt'" L cnhunns
Retrofit design sbonJd r:IISIIIe tbat the DIIde of iiIilmc wm bo a dnctiIe, i.e., yielding of the
aachm bolts, and DOt bdtI:I=. i.e.. pulkmt Uom. tbe ccmcrcte or hv*1ing of the sappcn:t
skirt. EaaJly. COlIsti"DtJihility of the lettofits Is a key CO
nsL1e
idlitm K:aowledge of
whetber M!tiag or weIdiDg is preimd. stiUCtUJ'C Ii' e iIWty, poteu1ial jnlPijfi::!etees,
t:tc.. an wm. tWriniw the _' cted JeDotit optkm.
- ... -.... $d? it.:- ,
-, ':":i7; .. "
, \.., '-'i. "'f7'" __ ;:.;.,:-
. ,:.., .... :0-' l ..... ,ji:./' - .. r. ... _ ..... :' ... _
.:.
10-4
NOMENCLATURE
C :: N1IDXlrical coefIicient representing poteDtial amplification of seismic forces
due to resonance effects
c:.. = I.Jmit impulsive ar=Jention (m g's)
Cp :: N1IDXlrical coefficient representing poteDtial amplffic:arion of ground motion
through the structure into the subsystem
D = Dead load is the total weight of materials forming the per lIIanent part oh
structure, jncb,cfing structural framing, pJatfol1l1S. waDs, fixed equipment,
vessels, piping, insulation and fhepzoofing.
D = Tank diameter
D = ResuIvmt displacement
De = EJasticaIJy computed displacements
DP ::: Piping opelating load jncJndes weight of any liquids or solids within piping
and on line eqWpment during normal operation
DV = Vessel operating load. jncbtdjng the weight of any liquids or solids within
the vessel, attached equiplilent, and .ping during nonna! opelati.on
E
=-
Earthquake load
E
=
Young's moduluS
F, =
Yield stress of tank shell
g
=
Acceleration due to gravity
G
=
Specific gravity of mmained liquid
A-I
'':', -.. "' _." ",' : ' ",' ,. .,. p' ' -
H = Soil loads, includiDg the effects due to weight and lateral pressure of soil
aDd water in soil
H = Tauk liquid height
I = Importance factor
L = Live load is the weight of an movable loads such as personncl, tools, stOred
materW. movable panitioJlS, cranes and hoists, majntenanre loads. snow
and ire loads. Unpact. surge forces, vibration. and longitudinal aDd
ttaDSVel'Se hnrjmataJ fences from moving equipment
. --: ;; .
M = O\IeJ'IiI;dngmnmmtatbottomoftaDkshell
lilt = Uquic1 impulsive mass ., .
p = Probabflity of m bil! e
Q - Ductility based mu:,itm factor for evaluation of existing fac
lTtw
... using the
RMPP guidance" ... ""!eDt (RMPP.1992)
R - Taukiadius"....::!c :'L.
t; i'W_ .. ",_ r .
Rw = Ductility baSed'm
t
" ciOn iactor for design of new fac:tl;
ri
es
"' .. .. :;t ..... :'-Vi? ,. .
S := Foundation def",,,biIity coefficient fortaDk aualysis
. '..-
S = Snow loads
S := Site cocf6cient for sail c:hamcteristics
T = Retum period
T = 'I'henIIalloads lIB die loads caused by a change in te"'i"'atwe and may
n:suk :from both "pe:'" iag and enviroJJJDeDtal conditioJlS, including those
callsed by vessel. piping. and sttUCtI1rC expansjon and contracIion.
T = Fundamental p:rind of structD%I: under consideration
I = Number ofyem
, .
.It.-......
A-2
TE = Test loads, inchJding all loads in the empty condition and the weight of test
fluids
n. = Longitudinal Pipe Thermal Loads, including pipe anchor fon:e. if any
1, = Bottom plate thickness
t. ::. Shell thickness
v = Base shear
W = W"Uld loads
W = Weight of the strUCtIU'e
WI = Liquidimpu1siveweight
w
L
= Mi"""" weight of tank contents that may be used to resist shell
oveuDming
Wp = Weight of subsystem
W
T
= Total liquid weight
WI = Weight of tank shen and portion of fixed roof Sappolled by tmk shell
Z = Seismjc zone factor
'1: = COUsraDt = 3.14159
p. = Mass deJIsity of water = 62.4/g

A-3
GLOSSARY
Acutely Hazardous Material- Material amsidered hazardous to health of general
pubHc if released to atmosphete, defined by FedetalIStare/Local agencies
AttenuatiOD - Decay of ground motion with distance
BDlldfng-Uke Structures - NonbuildiDg structures whose structaral characteristics
1= S il !hIe those of a building
CoDvec:tive ComPODent 1bat portion of the tank c:onteDts which accelerares
iDdepeDdeDtly of the tank shell when subjected to seimic sbaking; the CODVectivo
componcmt of the liquid is in the upper portion of the taDk and responds in a sJosbing
mode
Da'rit - A small c:rane that projects over the side of a platfoml to lift small relatively
light items, such as tools, manhole covers, etc.
DJamODd Shape Buckling. A foml of bnckJing of the tank sfJelI, often fcnmd in the
upper courses of sl .... der tmks, in which the shell wrinJrles in "diamond-shaped-
patterns
Drift - Lateral displacem .... t between floozs or segmems of a structure UDder
earthquake loading
Dvctilfty. Maximum deformation divided by elastic ,Mmwlltion; IODtiDely refers to
a measure of energy absoJbiDg capability
Dvctilfty Based Reduction Factor - A factor lepm ,,!j"g a mrasme of energy
absoJbing capability of a structIJie
Elephant Foot BncJdiDg A fozm of lmcIding of the tauk shell Dear ils COJmecdoD
with the bottom plate that m mbles aD "elephant's foot, fD which the shell bulges
outward Dear the bottom, but is coDStJaiDed at iIs base by the bottom plate
Event Occummce of aD earthquake
FIll Height. Height to which a taDk is filled
FiDfaD Air cooled heat exchangers, often located on top of pipeways
Freeboard - Verti!:al distance between the free smface of liquid contained in the tank
and the top of the iauk shell or UDdeJside of tank!OOf
BAZOPs Hazard aDd Operability smdies; a patticular stmctuzcd method of piO':ess
hazatds analysis commODly used in petrochemical fa",1ities to identify piocess safety
concem8
B-1
-_-r-;'. ',.-,_",_.,_v, ." ___ _. _ .. __
Importance Factor - A factor lepxesenting the importance of a structures depending
on usage category

Impulsive Componeut 'lbat portion of the taDk CODteJlts which accelerates in
UJIison with the taDk shell when subjected to seismic sbaking
Intensity - Measure of an earthquake at a particular site
". :: .. ...
IDtermedJate Mameut ReslSIiug Frame - A c:onaete moment resisting frame with
certain design featmes to provide ductile post yield behavior. but not containing all of
the design features of a special moment fl!Sisting:fJ:ame
(.:", "'. ... "_-
Magnitude - Meiaswe of released during an earthquake
Maxlill"''' Credible EarIhqaake - Maximum earthquake potential of a source
'.: ": '! .... ; ,zi:' .. -, ..... .
Moment ResIstlng Frimie- A:fJ:ame in which mcmtben; and joints aIO capable of
resisting fcm:es primarily tImriigh flexure
. .. , "'::"!r. 3f.Jw . .'
Near field - Area in c1pse Pi'" ;mily to active faults usually taken. as within S to 10
kilametel:S of the faulttti........... --
Stractans- NCIIIbuildiDg structures wlIosc stmcInral
,. ;,.. '.,1; ..1""";. __ " - - .... -
c:baIac:tedstics do not I : 5 mbIe those of a building .
OYeICjUlstralDed - PipiDg exfn"biting a lack of flexibility between the nozzle
100000n on the taDk Shell Imt the pipe support or gI0111ld penetration
Prying J\ctfnn Im:;rase ia.1aad on a Qiliq'Ollent or fasteD"" caused by the heDcUng
.",,, .. -,.. . . , .
PA EIfecta.- B!amdaty effect on shears, fcm:es. and meting 1'!!!J!I'U!J1ts in:fJ:ame
mcmbeIs m!'n=' by the iediLa1loads acting on the lateraUy displaoed stmd:W:o
-........ .
", .. .: . --: - .{ :.'!"-: t ... ;... .. ',,",_""'".'
Redundancy Ormmonly Iefem to striidliles with multiple ftemeJ!1S and load paths
in the IatmIl fence misting SJstaD ,
Resonance - J\mpUficatitm of carthqnake motion due to sjnn1arl1y in iiequen.ey
amtent of the applied JD01iaIi Bad the structure under consideration
_J; , .
RIDgwaIl- A circul8r Bnug- fonimmrmmeatb the taDk shell
Seiche. Large waves generated by local sulnnarine earthquakes in enclosed bodies of
water, such as lakes. bays, reservoUs, or estuaries
Seismic Interaction Interaction, such as impact or differential displacement,
between adjllCCDt structures, systems, or components during an earthquake
Seismic We1gbt - Total weight of the structme that gets excited by an earthquake
Seismic Zone Factor - A factor lept s::rt:ing the seveJity of earthquake motion
depending on msmic zonation
Slosblng Relative movement of the free smface of liquid mmained in the taDk as a
result of seismic sbaJdug
Soft story One in which the story stiffness is less than about 709& of that of the
storyabove
SoU-Stru.ctare IDteraction -1nteJactiOD effects between son and stJ11CtUrC under
seismic Joading
Special Moment ResistIng Frame A mmnCDt msistiDg frame 'riaBy detailed to
provide ductile post yield behavior thJOugb membeJ piopmtioning and COJIDI"dion
detailing
SRSS Squaie root of the sum of the squares; a method for combining modes
Stabillty Ratio The quantity ~ W t + wJl in the API 650, Appcmdfx B code
check (API, 1993), as used in Chapter 7. The stahtuty ratio is a fuDcticm of
_.-l- - - ~ ..
ovextwwngmomeDtiWUre"sli'tgmnm
cmt
Subsystems - Nonstructmal elements and COiDpODCDIS
TJme HIstory - TJDlC variation of '''''lODSe such as acce1eJation, velocity, or
displacement
Tsnna
mi
Long peJiod waves (also lefened to as "tidal waves") typically generated
by large, sometimes cfistant, mhmarine earthquake
Weak story - One in which the story st:reDgth is less than about 809& of that of the
storyabove
B-!
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C-l
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.- ... -.
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.' -W.J. .'-_" . -
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--- - ____ ,.,
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1
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Q ._- .... -
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; __
.. .. -. .

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C-3

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led
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i
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..
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-"' .... - ... "(;" .off ... '
FEMA-l78, for the Seismic El'nluatitm, of Erim, Buildings,
Bm1ding Seismic Safe1yCounciJ, WashiDgtIm. DC.
. .... ...... \ ...... .:.- ........... .'--
GuptM,- 15 -FoundaIion Vlbratitms." FoU"rImjtm Enginuring
Hfl1IIIbooIc, H. Y. Fang (editor). Van Nostrand Rr:jnbold. NY.
" --:. '...:...-' .... ..- .. ,- .. -
Gutenberg. &;: ami c. F. lUrhta-. 1956. "Eazthqua'ke Magnitude, lJrtensity,
Energy. 8mI A.cceitiimim," Bulletin of the Seismologictzl Societ! of America.
46:105-145.
A.R.. R. B. M. R. Tufenkfan, 1992,. "Dyzzamic SoD-Pile-
StrucbJre iDieiai:tion; Th= siaie-of-the-Practicc," Pila Um:ler Dynomic Loading,
. ......
C4
Geotechnical SpedDl Publiryrrjem No. 34 S. Prakash (editor). pp. 1-26. ASCE,
NY.
Banks T. c.. ami H. Kanamoria, 1979. "A Moment Magnitude Scale." Joumai of
Geophysical Remzrch., 84:2348-2350.
HeatOD, T .. F. Tajima, ami A. W. Morl. 1986, ",Estimating GtoIlJld MOtioDS Using
Recorded Accelcrogxams," Surveys in Geophysics, 8:25-83.
Boomer, G. W .. and M. A. Haroan. 1980, "Seismic Design of Liquid Storage
Tanks., .. ASCE Convention and Exposition. Pottland. Oregon. Aprlll4-18, 1980.
Bousner. G. W .. October 1977. "DyDawic Prcssuxes onAccelmated Fluid
Comajnm." Bulletin of 1M Seismologlt:a1 Society of America, Volume 47, pp.
15-35.
BOIIShm., J. R.. and A. W. Garda. 1978, -:r,pe 16 FJoocI lDSuram:e Study:
Tsnnami Predictions For Pacific Coastal Communities," U.s. Amrj Corps of
Mginem W ..... ways E:qediliMt Station TccJmica! ReportH-78-26. 38 p.
ltasea CoDSUltfag Group. IDe.. 1995, FDSt LAgrangian Amdy.ri.r of Continua.
User's MIlnUIll, PLAC Vmsion 3.3. . -
JO)'Der. W.1, ami D. E. Boore, 1988, "MeaswcmMt. ",,","tel i>alion, and
PJediction of Strong Ground Motion," In Proceedlngs of. ASCE Geotechnical
Division Specialty Ctnifennce DJI EarthquDke Enginuring and Soll Dynamic8,
Park Cit;y, Utah, pp. 43-102.
- .
KrlDitzsky, E. L, J. P. Gould, P.IL FAmger. 1993, "FuDdpmenrals ofEartbquake
ResistlUlt Consauc:tio.n, .. 101m WDey, NY. .
Lai, c. So, 1979. "BdJavior ofRctaining Walls tinder Scismic: Loading," ME Report
7919, Dept. Of Civil Enginwing, UDivcrsIty of Cametbwy, Cbrjstc:Imrch, New
ZeaJ",d
Ledbetter, R. H.,198S, "ImpzovctDeIlt ofLiqaefiab1c Foundation ConditiODS
BeJlcatb Existing S1mctures," Technical Report REMR-GT-2. U.s.. Army CoIps of
EDgb=:rs, Washington, DC. .
Manos. G. W .. August 1986, ".Earthquake Tank-Wan Stability of Upam:borcd
Tanks," American Society of Civil Engineers, JD1ImfZl of StnlCtU1'II1 Engineering,
Vol 112. No.8, im:lmiing Enatum ill Joumtit of StnIt:IUTtll Engineering, VoL
113, No.3. March 1987.
C-s
McCuJloc:h. 1985, "BvaJuatlng Tsunami Pottmria
l
," Ziony, J. L, eel, "Bva
bl8t
ing
Earthquake Hazards in the Los Angeles Region," U.S. Geological Survey
Professional Paper J36fJJ. p. 375-413.
. .. . . .:,"
Men, B. A.. aDd C. A. CameII, December 1973, "Scismic Risk Analysis Based OD
a Quadratic Fn:qwmcy Mode]," BulletiD of the Seismological Society of America.
Vol. 63, No. 6, pp: 199,9-2006 .
.... ' -f
Monanobe, M, aDd B. 1929, "On the DetemrinatioD of Earth Pressures
During EarthquaJciS. .. J:ilPrneudings World Engineering Congress, 9.
o. ..... : ".;) .
Nadlm, F. aDdR. V. Wilh",.n, July 1983, "SeismfcaUy Indnc:ed Movement of
Retai"ing Walls. ")liWiiti{ of Gtunet:hn.it:al Civil Engineering (ASCE) 109(7),
915-931. oJ .. \0
Nadfm, F .. 1980. ad Sliding of Gravity Retaining Walls," SoM. Thesis, Res.
. - "f", __ '., - .
Rpt. R82-33,])ept. ofCiviI Engineering, MlT, Cambridge. CA.
...... ,j :
'- "":".' .11'" ,.-.... ,'-'" ',-' . .
Nadlm, F';".- itv;mdliMn, 1984, "Coupled SJidiDg and'IiItiDg of Gravity
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' ..... i). ... 1', .
. l "
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. ',' -. ,... . .... ... - ,... .
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Patbquake 'BurN';,,! __ web lDstimte.
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, . .,-' '- ...
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m
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. . "-:-- ....
Nogami. "SeismicResponseADalysisof
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Geot4chnictJl Earthquake Eaginuring and Soil Dynomics, S. Prakash (editor). S1-
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... ....
C6
--"-".' ','
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Un
l!8%' Soil-Pile
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C-7
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__ . ~ : . . . ~ : - .. '-::\:19 .'
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... ..,.- '.,.. -,
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l
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. . ,,' ....... - ~ . ~ - . ".",.-..
,. I" .". _ .
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TOlonlO, Canada " . ~ '-
"
"
C-S
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,"
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SM Thesis. Dept. of Civil Engineering, MIT, Cambridge, MA.
C-9
USO SEISMIO OODE
/"/
/'
Inverted pendulum
structUres (can be
modeled &SD
lumped mass
lIolllpop))
R
w
=3
.:0--
-
\,
./
_lzedsph ....
on legs lbraced and unbraced)

blns.nd
"-
walls
continuous
to the
foundation
c:ast4noplBce lelP)
concrete silos end
chlmn<IVI
R
w
&
signs and
billboards
R
w
=&
distributed
...... cantll ......
IItl'UctUra
"
oon-<:Ip .. llo.
chlmnaya,st8Cks,and
sklrt supported
.-tIcal_I.
monuments
R
w
=3
Rw=4
Figure 37 Typical NonbuiIding Structures

111 NONBUILDING STRUCTURES
stl'UcturesIUI!C Sec. 2312(i)] are significant
tsen-suOPorting structures, that are not housed within
buUdings but, nevertheless, come within the jurisdiction
of the local building official.
107
Covered by the UBC
107 Other items specIll.eaUy not lneIuded In the UBC are ofFshore
. platforms, electrical tra
D
8Dllaalon tower&, cIlmm, and highway and
.'. railroad brldgea. These structures ..... not normally within the
lurlsdlctlou of the JocaJ buDding of!IcIal.
are structures that (1) have building-like structural sys-
tems such as those described in UBC Sec. 2312( d)6,
(2) are rigid systems, or (3) are specifically mentioned
UBC Table 23-Q. quaIlfy B!I. a
.like 8!/stem. strUcture must have one or
J!lOrB leyels (fl9ors and roof) at which the mass is con-
tlw !!:!!!li!]gNStem.must extend
The basic base shear formula, Eq. 68, is used for non-
building structures. The weight, W. includes the weight
of the full contents (if any) of the structure. Values
PROFESSIONAL PUBLICATIONS. INO . Be1mout, CA
'f"
1
. .'
/' --------.-P'-:"'"P-'N--G-:"""""":" -s-----....................
.'
..
'Structural design of stacks
Equations and considerations for designing stacks to resist
wind, earthquake, operating, piping and weight lC)8ds
0. c. Leite, T-Thermal, Inc., COlIShohocken, PCDil8ylvania
THE' PRINCIPAL loads to be considered in the design of
stacks are:
Wind load
Earthquake load
Design press1lt'e and temperature
Dead loads
Piping loads:
The most probable combination ofloads must be seleeted
for a1l8fe and economlcal design. Only the greater ofwind or
seismic loads is used for design.
Wmd loads. The wind load is aft'eeted by tIi.e earth
'
sur-
If i. a:nd increases v?th the height bY
Th The standard height for WInd speed li1easUrement IS 33
feet (10 meters) above ground, and a power liihction is used
to detennihe, and correet wind velocitii'S at other heights.
The basic wind speed, V, is the fastest mile per hotir wind
velocity at 33 ft above ground of terrain expbsure "C" and
associated With an annual probability of oc:currenceofO.02.
Exposure "c" represents open terrain with scaItered and
shon obstructions.
The velocity pressure, f/Z, at height Z is calculated by the
.ormula: '
gz - 0.00256 Kz (IV'f, psf
The velocity pressure exposure, Kz, can be obtained using
the foIJowing equation, assuming exposure "0":
Kz _ 0.3694- ZO2B>'
Z - Stack height, ft
Below 15 ,ft height, Kz is COnstant and eIJ.U81 to 0.8. The
imponante factor, I, adjUBts the design wind speed with an-
nual probability exceetfing the value 0.02. ,
For regions between oceah and 100 mi1es iI\IaDd, the im-
pcinaiice factor has a vaiue between 1.05 and 1.00, deter
mined by 1inear interpolation.
. The constI!Dt, 0.00256, reflectIl the air mass ilensity at
lltandard conditions and dimensions a-aattd with mph of
wUid sjieed, v. " .
All exposed structures should be dddgned for wind forces.
"'''' The total forct is 1he sum of the forces on all elements, ap-
ng 0 plied at the centroids of the projeeted areas.
The wind force, F, according with ANSI A-58.1, 1982, is
given by the formula:
F-qzGhCjAJ
The guit response factor, Gh, for main wind force resisting
systems evaluated at height z - A, can be given by the fol-,
10wing fitting equation:
Gh _ 1.57Z-o.GIS2 '
The foice coeftlclent, Cf, varies with the clil'femit struc-
tural shapes. For auicks, the most common value of CJis 0.7.
The projeeted area. JlO1'DUIl to wind, A,f, shliuld take into ,
consideration conneeting piping, Jadder and phitfarDIS, and
twice bisuIation thickness of the atai:k.
'. caged hidders can be assumed ruimhig tiom the to\) of the"
stack to the ,gtouhd, resulting in an increase in stack diame-
ter of approximately 12 inches. Alsci, pIatforDIS can be as
lIIlmed to have a)lliiform distribution. '"
The aiqjustment due to piping can be baied all the in ."
a:- in the stack by the pipC in the top
third of the stack nmnmg to the gi'OUnd leYel.
Wlitd loads and moments ,....,dtsnt tiom large top over
sized platforms should be calculated separately and added' to
stack loading. . . .
Eai1hquake load. The sudden horizontal shift of a tall
stack dUring an earthquake causes the vesse1 to defleet, sinCe
the inertia of the vessel mass restl'IIiJ?S tI!e vesse1 tiom uiqy-
ing simllltantoJlsly with the foundation. The vibratioll ibiti-
ated by the deflection is then reduced by damping or paniaI
yIe1ding'in the stack.
The stack should be designed to resist ntinimum lateral
forceS, V, applied at the base in any horizontal dim:tion, in
accordance with the fol"inula:
V-ZIKCSW
The seismic zone factor, Z, Varies with the earthquake
zone.
Zone. Z
4 1
3 'I.
2 3fa
1
3lta
0, 0
The oCcupancy importance factor, I, is typically I - 1 for
all refmery structures. .
The horizontal force factor, K,. is typically K - 2 !!,r
stacks.
The structure period response factor, C, is determined by:
C - 11(15 ro')
...
.f .. -". '. -,oj
.. .
'Structural design of stacks
Equations and considerations foi' deslgnlngstaClts to reslst-
wind, earthquake, operating, piping and weight loads
0. c. Lelt., T-Therma1, IDc., Conshohocken,
THE' PlUNCIPAL loads to be coll8idered in the design of
stacks are:
Wmd\oad
Earthquake load
Design pn:ssnre and temperature
Dead loads
Piping loads:
The most probable combination ofloads must be se1ected
for a'll8feand econom!cal design. Only the greater ofwind or
seismic loads is used for design.
W"md The wind load is afi'ected by the earth!. sur-
face and increases with the stack height by t'unetion.
. n.:e staodard height for wind speed measurement: is 33
feet (10 ineters) above ground, and a power filiu:tion is 1lsed
to lind correct wind ve1neiriH at other heights.
The basic wind speed, V, Is the fastest mile lJer hoUr wind
velocity at 33 ft above ground of terrain exposure "c" and
associated With an amiual probability ofoccurrenceOfO.02.
Exposure "e" represents open terrain with and
short obstruclioos.
The velocity pressure, gz, at height Z is c:aIMuated by the
.ormula: .
gz - 0.00256 Kz (1V'f, psf
The velocity pressure exposure, Kz, can be obtained using
the foiIowing equation, assuming exposure "0":
Kz - 0.3694 zom.
Z - Stack height, ft
Below 15 ft height, Kz is CIinstaot and equal to 0.8. The
importante factor, I, adjusts the design wind speed with lin-
nual probability exceeding the value 0.02. .
For. regions between and 100 mi1es iti.land, the im-
porr.ance factor has a value between 1.05 and 1.00, der.ez-
mini:<! by 1inear interpolation.
. The <:OIISIl!J1t, 0.00256, ref1eco the air mass ilensity at
staodard conditions and dimensions assnC:iattd with mph of
whiii sPeed, Yo. . ..
All exposed structures should he designed for wind forces.
The total fora; is sum of the forces on all elements, ap-
plied at the centroids of the projected areas.
The wind force, F, according with ANSI A-58.1, 1982, is
given by the formula:
F- gz GIl CIA!
The guSt response l8Ctor, Ok, for main wind force resisting
""",rbonP' r
systems evaluated at heighc II - II, can be given by the fol-.
lowing fitting equation: .
GIl - 1.57Z-
0MS2

The fofte c:aeff'Jdent, Cj,varies with the dilrererit struc'
tural shapes. For suicks, the most cmnmOD wiue of Cfis 0.7.
The projected _.norma\ to wind, 4t. shciuld take into
consideration COIlIiecting piping, ladder and pbitforms, and
twice lrisulation thickness of the staCk.
'. caged bidders carl be assumed ruiming from the top of the ..
IItaCk to the .groulld, resulting in an increase in stack diame-
ter of apprrudmately 12 inches. Alsci, platforms can be as-
sumed to have a !lIiiform distributinn. '"
The IiiljustmeDt due to piping can be baied on the in- ..
c:reIise In the staek diameter by the pipe; in the top
third of the stack running to the gtcniiJd level:
WInd loads and moments resultant from 1arge toP over- .
sizi:d platforms shnuld be calculated separately and added' to
stack loading. . .
Earthquake load. The sudden horizontal shift of a tall
stack dUring lin earthquake causes the vesse1 to deflect, sinCe
the inertia of the vesse1 mass mtrainS the vessel from mov-
big aimu1tanto)ls1y with the foundation, The vibration initi-
ated by the defJ.ecIion is then reduced by damping or partial
yie\dingill the stack.
The stack should be designed to resist nlinimum lateral
forces, V, applied at the base in any horizontal direction, ill
accordance with the formula:
V-ZIKCSW
The seismic zone factor, Z, Varies with the earthquake
zone.
Zone . Z
4- 1
3
Sf4
2 3fs
1 Sfl6
O.
0
The occupancy importance l8Ctor,l, is typically 1 - I for
all refmery structureli.
The horizontal force .factor, K,. is typically K - 2 !Ir
stacks.
The structure period response factor, C, is determined by:
C - 11(15 ro!)

';, T - structure period
I'Q8IC. -_0.12
r1"he I!Oil prome ccelfJcient, S; mes between 1.0 and 1.5,
nth an intermediate value of 1.2.
\, The product, CS"need not exceed 0.14 or wheD S - 1.5 in
1 seismic zones 3 and 4, the product need not exceed 0.11.
The rU'St natural period of vibration, T, of a tall stack is .
given by:
T --1.785 (w WIg E I)U
Substituting the modulus of elasticity, E, and gravity, g, by
, their values and also replacing the inertia moment,I, by the
approximate equation, the previous equation reduces to:
T - 2.7 x 10-$ (HJd'f (w tlIl)u
where H - height, ft
I - average thickriess of top half, in.
d - average diameter of top half, ft
w ., weight per foat of top half, IbIft
Substituting w based on bare steel materiaJ and rearrang-
ing further, the equation becomes
T _ 3.06 x 10-' H21d
For a more accurate calculation of the Period, Ray!eight's
etbod should be used.
The total lateral force, V, at the base is:
V - Ft +1"1 + F2 + ... +:Fi
The' concentrated force at the top, Ft, is determined by the
formula:
FI - 0.07 TV
Max FI - 0.25 V and
if Ft - 0
"
The remaining portion of the total base shear, V, is dis-
tributed over the height of the structure, according to the
formula:
Fx - (V - FI) lUX lucI(wl hl + w2 h2 + . + wi III)
wi, wx are the portions of the stack weight, W, located at lev-
els hi, hx, respectively.
When guyed stacks are used, the total lateral force is dis-
tributed to the masses in direct proportion to their weights
nd applied at their centers of gravity.
De,ign preIJure and temperature. JP:lign anri
temperature are used to determine the minimum required
thickness of each vessel component.
The shell must be designed to withstand the worst condi-
tions of pressure and temperature of the operating condi-
tions, based on the allowable stress given by the code. Corro-
sion allowance should be addt;d to the minimum required
thickness of the vessel wall.
Dead loads. These loads are due to the vessel's own
weight and can be considerCd based on operating conditions,
as well HI erection and shop test conditions.
Piping load. Piping loatis acting on the vessel are due to
the thOmtaI expansion of the pipes and the weight of the
pipes on the vessel nozzles.
'The average expansion pipe moment can be determined
by the fitting equation:
Mp - 60 (d + 3)', Ib-in.
where d is the connecting pipe outside diameter.
Design of self.supportlng stacks. Self-supporting
stacks are cylindrical shells r1Xed to the concrete foundation
b,y anchor bolts and they are designed as cantilever
'fhe of steel stac!" is the guyed stack in which the
external loads are taken by the stack shell and aIsothe SUy
wires. Guyed itacb are designed as an overhang beam with
one fixed end, with the guy wires gCnerating an axial force
on the shell. '
The design procedure of a selfsupporting stack requires
calculations of the following: . . , "
.. Staek plate thirlmea at each level. ..
.. Anchor bolt chair, size and number of anchor bolts
.. Vibration analysis.
Stack plate tbick;' ... , The stack plate CorrOded thickness -
required to resist wind or eattitquake moment, M, at each
1evel is given by the following equarloJ!:, .
t - 48M1(1I' d
2
Se) + WI(1I' d Se)
d - I.D., in
",here Se is the a1lowabIe bw:kling stress determined from the
equation: .. -.
Se - 0.56 E (tld)/(J + 0.004 Ely), psi
tid - 0.00425 max
Se - 15,000 psi max.
E and Y are the elastic:ity modulus and the yield stress,
both at the design temperature.
Corrosion allowance should be added to the required
thicknea for carbon steel shells, typically lila or Ifa.in.
Staek deI1ection ,at the tip due to static: wind should be lim
ited to 6 inches per 100 feet of height, assuming corroded
thickness of plate shell. . ,
The stack weight, W, represents the uncorroded weight
including ladder and platform at the bottom of each section.
. . . .'.
Anchor bolt tension in each bolt, Wh, is given ."
by the equation:
Wh - (48MICb - WYN,Ibs
where Cb - bolt ciri:!e, in.
M - moment at base, ft}b
-,
The number ofbolts. N, is a multiple.of four, wid. 18 to 24
inches of bolt spacing. '
The required bolt area at the root of the thread is deter
miuedby:
Ab - WhISh, in.
2
Sh - boll allowable stress, psi
The required base p1ate thickness, Ib, is:
Ib - 21 (PhIY)"', in.
Y - yield stress, psi
"," is the distance between the skirt outside and the outer
edge of the base ring.
The bearing-pressure, Ph, on the foundaticin concrete due
, to the overturning moment, M, combined with the dead
1oad, W. is:
Ph - (48 MlDb + WYAr, psi
Db - outside diameter of base skirt, in.
Ar - area of the base ring . resting on .C!Jncrete, 'in.
2
Vilnaiion anal,... Stack vibration is due ui vortex shed ."
ding from the stack circular obstruction to the flowing air
(wind). ,
The vortex shedding generates twO cIifl'erent types of vi- . -,
bration: ova1ing and cantilever motion.
Vibration analysis mUst be performCii when:
W/d2H<20
where d - average J.D. of the top half, ft
HydtDcarbcm Pl'OC888Ina. November 1890 is
: ;;:
"

. If !I> '/.5 YlDration analysis need not be performed.
, The damping factor, Fd, is given by:
. ,'. Fd - I W/d
2
H
_ The logarithmic decrement, I, is the logarithm or the ratio

. two successive amplitudes or a damped freely vibrating


otack and is a measure of the stack's ability to diaaipate en-
ergy during vibration. For bare steel stacks, 1 varies from
0.035 for very ati1l' solls to 0.105 for soft solls.
For lined stacks, 1 varies between 0.07 to 0.314.
If Fd<0.75 inatability is expected, UDlesa critical wind ve-
locity exceeds the maximum expected wind ve1ocity.
0.7S<Fd<0.95 inatability is probable.
Fd>0.95 instability is not expected.
Fd> 0.95 instability is not expeeted.
The critical wind velocity, V" is the wind velocity at reao-
nance.
V, - f DIS, ftlaec with
S - Strouhal number - 0.2
..

Where p, is. the unit wind pressure baaed on'critical veloc-
Ity. 'the magn1fication f8.ct0z; MJ, for UDlined scaCks,' varies'
between SO for soft soil to 90 Cor piled very atift'
soU and rock. For Iined.stacks, MJ, yllfiea between 10 to 45.
Substituting p, and also T, the dynamic deflectjon be-
tomes:
.1 - 2..8 X 10.
1
Mf d
2
11
d - 1.0. or top half, ft'
.
1 - average conoded thicknesa or top half, in.
Excessive viIInUian can be damped by the use or the fol- .
1owinr. .
D ...... __ linin or increase the -"--_. density
---'1 g. ."'!"-r
Reducrion or the stack diameter aDcIIor increase or shell
thickness
Addition or beIical 8Irakea or apoiIera
Placing external attachments, like piping, ladders 8Q.C1
platforms, properly distributed around the atac:k
Addition of guy cabIea.
OvaIing vibration is the periodic flexing of the ey1indrical
shell into an ellipse shape.
f - fundamental frequeney or stack vibration - liT
.. D stack C.D., ft
V, - 3.4 DlT. mph
For atep tapered stacks, V, must be checked for each diam-
eter in the top half or the stack.
. This phenomen occurs when the natura1 frequeney1lf the
i:ircuIar "ring. Jr, coini:idea with the vortex shedding fre..'
queney,}il.
Maximum wind velocity, Vw, at the top or the stack is
given by the equation: ' .
Vw - V(H/33)'ln, mph
V - Basic wind velocity, mph
Jr - 0.126 1 E0.5/42
fo - 2 Vd3.4 d
. .
, 'Ib avoid ovaIing vibration,Jr> fo, and the requin:d thick-
Deal I, becomes:
t>d Vdl,153, in.
E - 29 x 10&, psi
.The maximum gust velocity, Vg, is expressed by the fitting
"'Iuation:
Vg _ (1.57 H-o.0602) Vw, mph
Where" d, in ft, is thj,'atac:k I.D. at the,level Under conaid-
eration.
If V,< Vg, the stack must be ehecked further.
The total force on the stack caused by the aitical wind ve-
locity, V" should not exceed 1115 of the operatiog (corroded)
weight or the stack.
The maximum allowable dynamic deflection,.1, at the top
of the stack should not exceed half percent of stack height.
.1 - 6 HI100 max., in.
.At critical wind velocity the stack vibrates at natural fre.
. eney, remlting in magnification of the atat!c deflection,:;s.
This magnified deflection is the dynamic deflection,.1,
given by:
Ve, in mph, is the resonant wind ve1oc:ity that induces
ovaIing, uaually 45 mph, the moat economical and safe'value .
Cor stack vibration design. .
Consequently, tlD>O:OO33
D - Stack I.D., in.
If the tbicknesa is 1eaa than required, reinforcing rings
(stitTenera) with a n:quired section mpdu!ua can be added !!l
the top third or the stack to prevent ovaIing. Also, a spiral
vortex can rep1ace the rings; The atiff"1lera ahould be placed
apart by a distance ortwo to three atac:k diameters. The stack
thlcknesa should be 1arger than DI600 to avoid vibration or
the shell between atift'enera.
'y;; Mf:;s
. ,
" ."
y - Mf p, H' d 12'/8 E I
1-1rd'tl8
E - 29 X iO&, psi
Pc - 0.00256 (3.4 DIT)2
The author
LlT.EBAT1IBE CITED
I ANSI _.1. 1182
'1Icdotot, H. -- yon :;U""" Co., 1981 , K.. "13dl Stack N .. 8cpJ:. 1983
'=-E. "PrcdIcdog _01-:': OiI!dc.iJ_,
NO'I'. 1.1971
5 .. Manual atStccl Comtntafop." A.I.8.C. .
Olaw CUnJra.LaIIe Is a pIIJject 1IIBII8f16Tw/th To
7I7lmnBI, formIIrIy ll'lIne Thermal. on bazBnIous
/JquId ami f1IIS wastelnclneJator systums.
Pti01expaleno8fnc/Udss chifII engineer, profeat
ami eppllcatlcns for PDgdm StBsI Co., FIBre QM.
sIon. project and epp/JcBllon eng/neeJ1IJg for
I'BBbody Eng/mlBtIng.Co., deSIgn and_ca-
llen ang/neaIIng for FIBrBgBs CoIp., and BIBff
engineer for lIIe Unlvetslty of Azores. Mr.
CUnhB-l.Blte holds 8 fiv&.yDar degnJe In me-
chanical engIneetIng fJom lIIe 7lIchnIoa1 UnJver
1liiy 01 Lisbon, Portugal.
66 Hydrocarbon ProceaIng, November 1990
.'

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