Political Law Case Digests

1.) UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DIZON G.R. No. 171182, August 23, 2012 State Immunity Reason: It is important to know what the difference between suability and liability is. In this case, I apprehend when it comes to a period wherein a Government instrumentality is liable yet its funds cannot be subject to garnishment without proper appropriation. FACTS: The University of the Philippines (UP) entered into a General Construction Agreement with respondent Stern Builders Corporation (Stern Builders) for the construction of the extension and the renovation of the College of Arts and Sciences Building in the campus of the UP Los Banos (UPLB). In the course of the implementation of the contract, Stern Builders submitted three progress billings corresponding to the work accomplished, but the UP paid only two of the billings. The third billing was not paid due to its disallowance by the Commission on Audit (COA). Despite the lifting of the disallowance, the UP failed to pay the billing, prompting Stern Builders to sue the UP and officials to collect the unpaid billing and to recover various damages. Meanwhile, the sheriff served notices of garnishment on the UPs depository banks, namely: Land Bank of the Philippines (Buendia Branch) and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), Commonwealth Branch. The UP assailed said garnishment of funds. Stern Builders and dela Cruz meanwhile sought the release of the garnished funds. ISSUE: Whether or not the funds of UP are subject to garnishment? HELD: Despite its establishment as a body corporate, the UP remains to be a chartered institution performing a legitimate government function. The UP is a government instrumentality, performing the States constitutional mandate of promoting quality and accessible education. As a government instrumentality, the UP administers special funds sourced from the fees and income enumerated under Act No. 1870 and Section 1 of EO 174 and from the yearly appropriations, to achieve purposes laid down by Section 2 of Act 1870, as expanded in RA 9500. All the funds going into the possession of the UP, including any interest accruing from the deposit of such funds in any banking institution, constitute a special trust fund, the disbursement of which should always be aligned with the UPs mission and purpose and should always be subject to auditing by the COA. The funds of the UP are government funds that are public in character. They include the income accruing from the use of real property ceded to the UP that may be spent only for the attainment of its institutional objectives. Hence, the funds subject of this action could not be validly made the subject of writ of garnishment. The adverse judgement rendered against the UP in a suit to which it had impliedly consented was not immediately enforceable by execution against the UP, because suability of the state did not necessarily mean its liability. The funds of the UP are
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Political Law Case Digests

government funds that are public of character which could not be validly made the subject of a writ of execution or garnishment. The respondent should file first at Commission on Audit (COA). 2.) REPUBLIC represented by PCGG vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and BENEDICTO G.R. No. 129406, March 6, 2006 State Immunity Reason: It interests me because this case laid down one exception to the general rule that a state cannot be sued without its consent. It is when the State may be sued even witho ut its express consent, precisely because by entering into a contract the sovereign descends to the level of the citizen. FACTS: The PCGG issued writs placing under sequestration all business enterprises, entities and other properties, real and personal, owned or registered in the name of private respondent Benedicto, or of corporations in which he appeared to have controlling or majority interest due to his involvement in cases of ill-gotten wealth. Among the properties thus sequestered and taken over by PCGG fiscal agents were the 227 shares in NOGCCI owned by and registered under the name of private respondent. As sequester of the 227 shares formerly owned by Benedicto, PCGG did not pay the monthly membership fee. Later on, the shares were declared to be delinquent to be put into an auction sale. Despite filing a writ of injunction, it was nevertheless dismissed. So petitioner Republic and private respondent Benedicto entered into a Compromise Agreement which contains a general release clause where petitioner agreed and bound itself to lift the sequestration on the 227 NOGCCI shares acknowledging that it was within private respondents capacity to acquire the same shares out of his income from business and the exercise of his profession. Implied in this undertaking is the recognition by petitioner that the subject shares of stock could not have been ill-gotten, Benedicto filed a Motion for Release from Sequestration and Return of Sequestered Shares/Dividends praying, inter alia, that his NOGCCI shares of stock be specifically released from sequestration and returned, delivered or paid to him as part of the parties Compromise Agreement in that case. It was granted but the shares were ordered to be put under the custody of the Clerk of Court. Along with this, PCGG was ordered to deliver the shares to the Clerk of Court which it failed to comply with without any justifiable grounds. In a last-ditch attempt to escape liability, petitioner Republic, through the PCGG, invokes state immunity from suit. ISSUE: Whether or not the Republic can invoke state immunity? HELD:

Prepared by: BUENO, Melissa J.

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Political Law Case Digests

NO. In fact, by entering into a Compromise Agreement with private respondent Benedicto, petitioner Republic thereby stripped itself of its immunity from suit and placed itself in the same level of its adversary. When the State enters into contract, through its officers or agents, in furtherance of a legitimate aim and purpose and pursuant to constitutional legislative authority, whereby mutual or reciprocal benefits accrue and rights and obligations arise therefrom, the State may be sued even without its express consent, precisely because by entering into a contract the sovereign descends to the level of the citizen. Its consent to be sued is implied from the very act of entering into such contract, breach of which on its part gives the corresponding right to the other party to the agreement. 3.) ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST vs. ERMITA G.R. No. 168056, July 5, 2005 Non-delegation of Legislative Power Reason: This case gave importance about one of the powers granted by the Philippine Constitution. However, such power has its own limitations. Furthermore, it interests me because such delegation of power reiterated in this case is about taxation, which is a power that can be delegated to the local government and to the President. FACTS: Motions for Reconsideration filed by petitioners, ABAKADA Guro party List Officer and et al., insist that the bicameral conference committee should not even have acted on the no pass-on provisions since there is no disagreement between House Bill Nos. 3705 and 3555 on the one hand, and Senate Bill No. 1950 on the other, with regard to the no pass-on provision for the sale of service for power generation because both the Senate and the House were in agreement that the VAT burden for the sale of such service shall not be passed on to the end-consumer. As to the no pass-on provision for sale of petroleum products, petitioners argue that the fact that the presence of such a no pass-on provision in the House version and the absence thereof in the Senate Bill means there is no conflict because a House provision cannot be in conflict with something that does not exist. Escudero, et. al., also contend that Republic Act No. 9337 grossly violates the constitutional imperative on exclusive origination of revenue bills under Section 24 of Article VI of the Constitution when the Senate introduced amendments not connected with VAT. Petitioners Escudero, et al., also reiterate that R.A. No. 9337s stand-by authority to the Executive to increase the VAT rate, especially on account of the recommendatory power granted to the Secretary of Finance, constitutes undue delegation of legislative power. They submit that the recommendatory power given to the Secretary of Finance in regard to the occurrence of either of two events using the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as a benchmark necessarily and inherently required extended analysis and evaluation, as well as policy making. Petitioners also reiterate their argument that the input tax is a property or a property right. Petitioners also contend that even if the right to credit the input VAT is merely a statutory privilege, it has already evolved into a vested right that the State cannot remove. ISSUE:

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Political Law Case Digests

Whether or not the R.A. No. 9337 or the Vat Reform Act is constitutional? HELD: The Court is not persuaded. Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution provides that all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. The Court reiterates that in making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the two conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or even her subordinate. He is acting as the agent of the legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect. The Secretary of Finance becomes the means or tool by which legislative policy is determined and implemented, considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather data and information and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them. His function is to gather and collate statistical data and other pertinent information and verify if any of the two conditions laid out by Congress is present. In the same breath, the Court reiterates its finding that it is not a property or a property right, and a VAT-registered persons entitlement to the creditable input tax is a mere statutory privilege. As the Court stated in its Decision, the right to credit the input tax is a mere creation of law. More importantly, the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 9337 already involve legislative policy and wisdom. So long as there is a public end for which R.A. No. 9337 was passed, the means through which such end shall be accomplished is for the legislature to choose so long as it is within constitutional bounds. The Motions for Reconsideration are hereby denied with finality. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court is lifted. 4.) SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC G.R No. 127325, March 19, 1997 Peoples Initiative Reason: This case enlightens me the process on one of the rights of the people or citizens of the Philippines which is granted by the Constitution in terms of amending or and repealing laws. FACTS: On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative, filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" citing Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Acting on the petition, the COMELEC set the case for hearing and directed Delfin to have the petition published. After the hearing the arguments between petitioners and opposing parties, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days. On December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 raising the following arguments, among others:

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Political Law Case Digests

1.) That the Constitution can only be amended by peoples initiative if there is an enabling law passed by Congress, to which no such law has yet been passed; and 2.) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law on peoples initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative. ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 6735 is sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution by peoples initiative? HELD: NO. R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions." The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed" denotes that R.A. No. 6735 excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Also, while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for Local Initiative and Referendum, no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This means that the main thrust of the law is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If R.A. No. 6735 were intended to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws. While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing initiative and referendum on national and local laws, it intentionally did not do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Wherefore, the petition is granted. 5.) MARCELO LASOY and FELIX BANISA vs. HON. MONINA A. ZENAROSA G.R. No. 129472, April 12, 2005 Double Jeopardy Reason: Double jeopardy is one of the main issues that most cases involve. The defense of double jeopardy must be stressed out in order for it to be valid. Facts: On July 2, 1996 the accused were arrested for possession and transport of marijuana leaves (in bricks). They were charged with the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, with the information containing the fact that they were in possession of and were transporting, selling or
Prepared by: BUENO, Melissa J. BMPE 06/29/2013

Political Law Case Digests

offering to sell 42.410 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops. The accused was then arraigned, pleaded guilty and convicted. Subsequently they applied for probation. Thereafter the prosecutors office filed two motions to admit amended information (claiming that the marijuana recovered was 42.410 kilos, not grams) and to set aside the arraignment of the accused; the accused then moved to quash the motion raising the constitutional protection against double jeopardy. Issue: Whether or not double jeopardy attaches? Held: To invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must be present: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2) the court has jurisdiction to try the case; (3) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (4) he has been convicted or acquitted or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. In other words, if the offense is stated in such a way that a person of ordinary intelligence may immediately know what is meant, and the court can decide the matter according to law, the inevitable conclusion is that the information is valid. The inescapable conclusion, then, is that the first information is valid inasmuch as it sufficiently alleges the manner by which the crime was committed. Verily the purpose of the law, that is, to apprise the accused of the nature of the charge against them, is reasonably complied with. Moreover, an administrative order of the Supreme Court designated Regional Trial Courts to exclusively try and decide cases of violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, regardless of the quantity of the drugs involved. Therefore, the requisites of double jeopardy being present, the defense attaches.

Prepared by: BUENO, Melissa J.

BMPE

06/29/2013