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Art II sec 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable. Art III se c 5.

No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibitin g the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profes sion and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed . No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rig hts. Art VI sec 29(2). No public money or property shall be appropriated, applie d, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support o f any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as s uch, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to th e armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosar ium.

occasions might arise when the state will use the church, and the church the sta te, as a weapon in the furtherance of their respective ends and aims. This princi ple was recognized in the Malolos Constitution, inserted in the Treaty of Paris, in the instructions of McKinley to the Phil. Commission and finally embodied in the Constitution as the supreme expression of the Filipino people. Filipinos enjo y both civil and religious freedom guaranteed in the Consti o What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious liberty, not merely religious toleration.

Establishment Clause AGLIPAY vs. RUIZ Justice Laurel 1937 FACTS: Religious Freedom: Religious Freedom as a constitutional mandate is not inhibiti on of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in hu man affairs. o Imploring the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a go vt that shall embody their ideals in the preamble of the Constitution. General Conc essions indiscriminately accorded to religious sects: o Tax exemptions propertie s devoted exclusively to religious purposes o Sectarian aid is not prohibited wh en a priest, preacher, etc. is assigned to the armed forces, penal institution, orphanage or leprosarium. o Optional religious instruction in public schools is allowed by constitutional mandate, etc.

On May 1936, respondent announced in the newspapers that he would order of posta ge stamps commemorating the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress under Act No . 4052 (cited below) Petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Phi l. Independent Church (Aglipayan), seeks a writ of prohibition to prevent respon dent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the said Congress. o Petitioner alleges that respondent in issuing and selling t he postage stamps violated the Constitutional provision on the principle of sepa ration of church and state, specifically section 13, subsection 3, Art. VI which says: No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, de nomination or system of religion PRESENT CASE:

ISSUE: WON ge stamps. nd State: the union

respondent violated the Constitution in issuing and selling the posta HELD: No constitutional infraction. History of Separation of Church a our history, not to speak of the history of mankind, has taught us that of church and state is prejudicial to both, for

Act No. 4052, from which draws authority to issue and sell the stamps contemplat es no religious purpose, but gives the Director of the Posts the discretionary p ower to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be advantageo us to the Government. The present case was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a particular religious denomination. o The stamps were not issued for t he benefit of the Roman Catholic Church, nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to the church. o Purpose of the stamps was to advertise the Phi lippines and attract more tourists to the country officials took advantage of an internationally important event to give publicity to the Philippines and its peo ple. The stamp as actually printed instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of the City of Manila with the inscription Seat XXXIII Batch 2008A. 1

International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937. What is emphasized is not the Congress but Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the seat of that congre ss. The propaganda resulting from the issuance and sale of the staff might redou nd to the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church but this was not the intention an d is only incidental to the original purpose. We are of the opinion that the Gove rnment should not be embarrassed in its activities simply because of incidental results, more or less religious in character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate legislation. There may have peen poor judgment in issuing and selling the stamp but a gap still exists betw een that and the unconstitutionality of the issuance and sale which was not fill ed by the petitioner. wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer was acquired in Cebu City by the barangay cou ncil for four hundred pesos 4. On April 5, 1976, the image was temporarily place d in the altar of the Catholic church of Barangay Valencia so that the devotees could worship the saint during the mass for the fiesta. A controversy arose afte r the mass when the parish priest, Father Sergio Marilao Osmea refused to return that image to the barangay council on the pretext that it was the property of th e church because church funds were used for its acquisition. 5. Several days aft er the fiesta or on April 11, 1976, on the occasion of his sermon during a mass, Father Osmea allegedly uttered defamatory remarks against the barangay captain, Manuel C. Veloso, apparently in connection with the disputed image. That inciden t provoked Veloso to file against Father Osmea in the city court of Ormoc City a charge for grave oral defamation. 6. Father Osmea retaliated by filing administra tive complaints against Veloso with the city mayors office and the Department o f Local Government and Community Development on the grounds of immorality, grave abuse of authority, acts unbecoming a public official and ignorance of the law. 7. Meanwhile, the image of San Vicente Ferrer remained in the Catholic church o f Valencia. Because Father Osmea did not accede to the request of Cabatingan to h ave custody of the image and "maliciously ignored" the councils Resolution No. 6, the council enacted on May 12, 1976 Resolution No. 10, authorizing the hiring of a lawyer to file a replevin case against Father Osmea for the recovery of the image 8. The replevin case was filed in the city court of Ormoc City against Fa ther Osmea and Bishop Cipriano Urgel. After the barangay council had posted a cas h bond of eight hundred pesos, Father Osmea turned over the image to the council ln his answer to the complaint for replevin, he assailed the constitutionality o f the said resolutions. 9. Later, he and three other persons, Andres Garces, a m ember of the Aglipayan Church, and two Catholic laymen, Jesus Edullantes and Nic etas Dagar, filed against the barangay council and its members (excluding two me mbers) a complaint in the Court of First Instance at Ormoc City, praying for the annulment of the said resolutions (Their main argument was it prejudiced member s of the Catholic Church because they could see the image in the church only onc e a year or during the fiesta. <Labo dud!> ) 10. Lower Court dismissed the compl aints. ISSUES 1) WON that the barangay council was not duly constituted because lsidoro M. Maago, Jr., the chairman of the kabataang barangay, was not allowed to participate in its sessions? NO o o GARCES vs. ESTENZO FACTS: 1. On March 23, 1976, the said barangay council adopte d Resolution No. 5, "reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration" every fifth day of April "of the feast day of Seor San Vicente Ferrer, the patron sain t of Valencia". lt provided for (1) the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and (2) the construction of a waiting shed as the barangays projects. Fu nds for the two projects would be obtained through the selling of tickets and ca sh donations " 2. On March 26, 1976, the barangay council passed Resolution No.

6 which specified that, in accordance with the practice in Eastern Leyte, Counci lman Tomas Cabatingan, the Chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta, would be the caretaker of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would remain in his residence for one year and until the election of his successor as chairman of the next feast day. It was further provided in the resolution that the image would be made available to the Catholic parish church during the celebration of the saints feast day. It was ratified in a plebiscite. 3. Funds were raised by means of solicitations and cash donations of the barangay residents and those of the neighboring places of Valencia. With those funds, the waiting shed was cons tructed and the Batch 2008A. 2

RATIO In this case, Maago, the barangay youth chairman, was notified of the sessi ons of the barangay council to be held on March 23 and 26, 1976 but he was not a ble to attend those sessions because he was working with a construction company based at Ipil, Ormoc City. Maagos absence from the sessions of the barangay coun cil did not render the said resolutions void. There was a quorum when the said r esolutions were passed. 2) WON the resolutions contravene the constitutional pro visions that "no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion" and that "no public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, paid, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, chur ch, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teache r or dignitary as such. except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitar y is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government or phanage or leprosarium? (haba, hehe) NO claim that it belongs to his church is wrong. The barangay council, as owner of the image, has the right to determine who should have custody thereof. If it cho oses to change its mind and decides to give the image to the Catholic church, th at action would not violate the Constitution because the image was acquired with private funds and is its private property. The council has the right to take me asures to recover possession of the image by enacting Resolutions Nos. 10 and 12 . Not every governmental activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some religious tint is violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state, freedom of worship and banning the us e of public money or property. (Lower Courts decision affirmed) LEMON vs. KURTZMAN (1971) This case was heard concurrently with two others, Earl y v. DiCenso (1971) and Robinson v. DiCenso (1971). The cases involved controver sies over laws in Pennsylvania and Rhode Island. In Pennsylvania, a statute prov ided financial support for teacher salaries, textbooks, and instructional materi als for secular subjects to non-public schools. The Rhode Island statute provide d direct supplemental salary payments to teachers in non-public elementary schoo ls. Each statute made aid available to "church-related educational institutions. " Question Presented Did the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania statutes violate the First Amendments Establishment Clause by making state financial aid available t o "church-related educational institutions"? Conclusion Ratio The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the b arrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purp ose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or the relig ious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta was th e mass. Consequently, the image of the patron saint had to be placed in the chur ch when the mass was celebrated. If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for the barrio, then any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition and display of his image) cannot be branded as illegal. The barangay council de signated a layman as the custodian of the wooden image in order to forestall any suspicion that it is favoring the Catholic church. A more practical reason for that arrangement would be that the image, if placed in a laymans custody, could easily be made available to any family desiring to borrow the image in connecti on with prayers and novenas. This case is a petty quarrel over the custody of a saints image. lt would never have arisen if the parties had been more diplomati c and tactful and if Father Osmea had taken the trouble of causing contributions to be solicited from his own parishioners for the purchase of another image of S an Vicente Ferrer to be installed in his church. There can be no question that t he image in question belongs to the barangay council. Father Osmea Yes. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger articulated a three-part tes t for laws dealing with religious establishment. To be constitutional, a statute must have "a secular legislative purpose," it must have principal effects which

neither advance nor inhibit religion, and it must not foster "an excessive gove rnment entanglement with religion." The Court found that the subsidization of pa rochial schools furthered a process of religious inculcation, and that the "cont inuing state surveillance" necessary to enforce the specific provisions of the l aws would inevitably entangle the state in religious affairs. The Court also not ed the presence of an unhealthy "divisive political potential" concerning legisl ation which appropriates support to religious schools. FACTS: Batch 2008A. 3

This case is actually 2 cases involving two States, Rhode Island and Pennsylvani a. In each city, laws were enacted to provide aid for non-public schools and tea chers. In both cases, the statutes were challenged for being violitive of the fi rst amendment for creating an entanglement between church and state. RHODE ISLAN D STATUTE: Purpose: Keeping elementary schools. the quality of nonpublic 2) 3) financial support active involvement It also stated 3 tests: 1) 2) 3) Statute must have a secular legislative purpose Principal or primary effect neither advances nor inhibits religion Statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion Means: Direct payment of up to 15% extra salary to nonpublic school teachers. Qu alifications: Teaching in a nonpublic school where average per-pupil expenditure on secular education is less than the average in the public schools. Teachers m ust teach only secular subjects and must not teach religion else lose the benefi ts accorded by the statute. Background of schools: Nonpublic schools: 25% of the States pupils. 95% went to RC schools. Teachers who applied: all come from these RC schools. PENNSYLVANIA: Purpose: Solve nonpublic school crisis due to rising costs. Means: Reimbursing nonpublic schools on expenditures for teachers salaries , textbooks and instructional materials. Qualifications: Limited to courses also taught in public schools. Also limited to secular subjects. Textbooks must be a pproved. Background of schools: Nonpublic schools: 20% of States pupils. 96% atte nded RC schools. ISSUE: WON the statutes enacted violated the first amendment re : separation of Church and State, and are therefore unconstitutional. HELD: Yes they do, and yes they are. (Rhode Island Statute struck down, Pennsylvania case remanded). RATIO: What is held to have been violated is the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. In this, the court stated 3 evils which this Establishment Clause was to protect against: 1) sponsorship Addressing the 3 tests, the first one has been passed as the legislative intent/ purpose is most definitely secular. However, the court states that the cumulative impact of the entire relationship arising under the statutes in each State invo lves excessive entanglement between government and religion. As the schools taken into are church schools, they are seen as powerful vehicles for transmitting th e Catholic faith. As such, this substantial religious character gives rise to en tangling church-state relationships. Also adding to the danger is the particular type of aid (though the case doesnt really say why). Also taken into considerati on is the teachers means of teaching. There is no way of ascertaining if the teac hers will inject a religious aspect into their teaching. Lastly is the fact that the schools and their teachers are subject to religious authority, and teachers are even told (in the Handbook of School Regulations) to stimulate interest in re ligious vocations and missionary work. Mostly, though, the court is most afraid of actual entanglement that will be caused through the implementation of the law s. Due to the need for surveillance and controlling measures (as the State must run through applications to see who qualifies), there is created the entanglemen t that the Clause protects against. ...the very restrictions and surveillance nec essary to ensure that teachers play a strictly nonideological role gives rise to entanglements... The Pennsylvania statute goes even further, as it provides dire ct financial aid to these schools. Another consideration is the divisive politic al potential of the statutes. The court here stated that state assistance will e ntail considerable political activity. This refers to the division that will occ ur between those for and against state aid, thereby making it a political strugg le. Here the state says that while political debate and division are normal, tho se predicated on religious lines are what the First Amendment sought to protect the country from. The court ends by saying that while the tax exemption challeng e fell to over 200 years of universal practice, state aid has no such support. A lso, these statutes create a direct entanglement, which was sought to be avoided

. The constitution deems religion to be a private matter, so the government must exclude itself from such an area. BOARD of EDUCATION vs. ALLEN Batch 2008A. 4

(1968) Justice White FACTS: 1. A law (701 of the Education Law) of New York requ ires local public school boards to purchase textbooks and lend those textbooks f ree of charge to all students in grades seven through 12; students attending pri vate schools are included. The books loaned are "text-books which are designated for use in any public, elementary or secondary schools of the state or are appr oved by any boards of education," and which "a pupil is required to use as a tex t for a semester or more in a particular class in the school he legally attends. " Board of Education of Central School District No. 1 brought suit in the New Yo rk courts against James Allen because Allen would remove the members of the Boar d from office if they fail to lend books to parochial school students. The membe rs of the Board contend that the law was invalid. The trial court held the law u nconstitutional. The NY Court of Appeals held that 701 was not in violation of e ither the State or the Federal Constitution. The CA said that the laws purpose was to benefit all school children, regardless of the type of school they attend ed, and that only textbooks approved by public school authorities could be loane d. It considered 701 "completely neutral with respect to religion, merely making available secular textbooks at the request of the individual student and asking no question about what school he attends." Board of Education brought the case to the US SC. educational opportunities available to the young. Appellants have shown us nothi ng about the necessary effects of the statute that is contrary to its stated pur pose. The law merely makes available to all children the benefits of a general p rogram to lend school books free of charge. Books are furnished at the request o f the pupil and ownership remains, at least technically, in the State. Thus no f unds or books are furnished to parochial schools, and the financial benefit is t o parents and children, not to schools. 3. The record contains no suggestion tha t religious books have been loaned. Absent evidence, the SC cannot assume that s chool authorities are unable to distinguish between secular and religious books or that they will not honestly discharge their duties under the law. In judging the validity of the statute on this record the Court must proceed on the assumpt ion that books loaned to students are books that are not unsuitable for use in t he public schools because of religious content. Everson v. Board of Education. T he test for distinguishing between forbidden involvements of the state with reli gion: what are the purpose and the primary effect of the enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution. To withstand the stri ctures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose a nd a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion. The Court has l ong recognized that religious schools pursue two goals, religious instruction an d secular education. The States interest in education would be served sufficien tly by reliance on the secular teaching that accompanied religious training in t he schools maintained by a religious order (Pierce v Society of Siters). A subst antial body of case law has confirmed the power of the States to insist that if the State must satisfy its interest in secular education through the instrument of private schools, it has a proper interest in the manner in which those school s perform their secular educational function. 2. 4. 3. 5. ISSUE: WoN the statute is a "law respecting an establishment of religion, or pro hibiting the free exercise thereof," and so in conflict with the 1st and 14th Am endments to the Constitution, because it authorizes the loan of textbooks to stu dents attending parochial schools. DECISION: The law Constitution. RATIO: 1. The

language of 701 does not authorize the loan of religious books, and the State c laims no right to distribute religious literature. Although the books loaned are those required by the parochial school for use in specific courses, each book l oaned must be approved by the public school authorities; only secular books may receive approval. The express purpose of 701 was stated by the New York Legislat ure to be furtherance of the is not in violation of the COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY vs. ACLU & LYNCH vs. DONELLY FACTS: This concerns the consti tutionality of 2 recurring holiday displays located on public property in downto wn Pittsburgh. 2. Batch 2008A. 5

The first, a crche depicting the Christian Nativity scene, was placed on the Gran d Staircase of the Allegheny Courthouse, w/c is the main, most beautiful, and mo st public part of the courthouse. The crche was donated by the Holy Name Society, a Roman Catholic group, and bore a sign to that effect. The second was an 18-fo ot Chanukah menorah or candelabrum, w/c was placed just outside the City County building next to the citys 45-foot Christmas tree. At the foot of the tree was a sign bearing the mayors name & containing text declaring the citys salute to liber ty. The menorah is owned by Chabad, a Jewish group, but is stored, erected, and removed each year by the city. Respondents (the Greater Pittsburgh Chapter of th e American Civil Liberties Union & 7 local residents) filed suit seeking permane ntly to enjoin the county from displaying the menorah on the ground that the dis plays violated the Establishment Clause of the 1st Amendment. The CA for the 3rd Circuit ruled that each display violates the Establishment Clause because each has the impermissible effect of endorsing religion. WON display of crche Establis hment clause. YES WON display of menorah Establishment clause. NO violates viola tes display, located in a private park w/n downtown shopping district. By a 5-4 deci sion, Court upheld inclusion of the crche in the display, holding that it didnt ha ve the effect of advancing or promoting religion. J. OCONNOR wrote a concurrence w/c provides framework for evaluating govtl use of religious symbols: 1) OConnor r ecognizes any endorsement of religion as invalid because it sends a message to n onadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community , and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored membe rs of the political community; 2) She provides a method for determining whether the govts use of an object with religious meaning has the effect of endorsing rel igion. The effect of the display depends upon the message that the govts practice communicates: the question is what viewers may fairly understand to be the purp ose of the display. That inquiry turns upon the context in which the contested o bject appears. The concurrence concluded that both because the crche is a traditio nal symbol of Christmas, a holiday with strong secular elements, and because the crche was displayed along with purely secular symbols (i.e. a Santa Claus House w/ a live Santa distributing candy; 40-ft Xmas tree; banner w/ Seasons Greetings, etc) , the creches setting changes what viewers may fairly understand to be the purpos e of the display and negates any message f endorsement of the Christian beliefs represented by the crche. The concurrence and dissent in Lynch agree that: 1) gov ts use of religious symbolism is unconstitutional if it has the effect of endorsi ng religious beliefs; 2) effect of the govts use of religious symbolism depends u pon its context. ON CRECHE There is no doubt that the crche itself is capable of communicating a religious message. The angel in the crche endorses a patently Chr istian message: Glory to God in the Highest Court held in Lynch that the effect of a crche display depends on its setting. Here, unlike in Lynch, nothing in the co ntext of the display detracts from the creches religious message. The Lynch displ ay comprised a series of figures and objects, each group of which had its own fo cal point. Here, in contrast, the crche stands alone: it is the single element of the display on the Grand Staircase. Further, by permitting the display of the c rche in the main & most beautiful part of the building, the county sends an unmis takable message that it supports and promotes the Christian praise to God. The f act that the crche bears a sign disclosing its ownership by a Roman Catholic grou p demonstrates that the govt is endorsing the

ISSUE: 1. 2. RATIO: The Establishment Clause The Establishment Clause: Congress shall make no law res pecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.. Lemon v Kurtzman provides 3 tests for determining whether a govt practice violate s the Clause. A statute or practice w/c touches upon religion, if it is to be pe rmissible under the Clause must 1) have a secular purpose; 2) neither advance no r inhibit religion in its principal or primary effect; 3) not foster an excessiv e entanglement with religion. The essence of the Clause: It prohibits govt from appearing to take a position on questions of religious belief or from making adhe rence to a religion relevant in any way to a persons standing in the political co mmunity. 1. LYNCH V DONNELLY ISSUE: WON the city of Pawtucket had violated the Establishment Clause by includ ing a creche in its annual Christmas Batch 2008A. 6

religious message of that organization, rather than communicating a message of i ts own. The Clause prohibits what occurred here: the govts lending its support to the communication of a religious organizations religious message. Govt may acknowledge Christmas as a cultural phenomenon, but under the ment, it may not observe it as a Christian holy day by suggesting that aise God for the birth of Jesus. Lynch teaches that govt may celebrate ome manner and form, but not in a way that endorses Christian doctrine legheny County did in displaying the crche. 1st Amend people pr Xmas in s as the Al

the fundamental premise of the Establishment Clause itself. In contrast, confini ng the governments own Christmas celebration to the holidays secular aspects d oes not favor the religious beliefs of non-Christians over those of Christians, but simply permits the government to acknowledge the holiday without expressing an impermissible allegiance to Christian beliefs. 2. ON MENORAH The Chanukah men orah is a religious symbol. But its message is not exclusively religious. It is the primary visual symbol for a holiday that, like Christmas, has both religious and secular dimensions. Its display doesnt have the prohibited effect of endorsi ng religion given its particular physical setting. Its combined display with a C hristmas tree & a sign saluting liberty does not impermissibly endorse both the Christian and Jewish faiths (which is no less constitutionally infirm than the e ndorsement of Christianity alone), but simply recognizes that both Christmas and Chanukah are part of the same winter-holiday season, which has attained a secul ar status in our society. The widely accepted view of the Christmas tree as the preeminent secular symbol of the Christmas season emphasizes this point. The tre e, moreover, is clearly the predominant element in the citys display by virtue of its size and central position. The placement of the menorah beside it is readil y understood as a recognition that Christmas is not the only traditional way of celebrating the season. Similarly, the presence of the mayors sign confirms that in the particular context the govts association with a religious symbol does not represent sponsorship of religious beliefs but simply a recognition of cultural diversity. On Justice Kennedys opinion upholding the display of the crche as permissible unde r the Clause Kennedy says the display of the crche is consistent with the Establishment Clause . He argues that this follows from the Marsh v Chambers decision, which sustaine d the constitutionality of a legislative prayer. He also asserts that the crche, even in this setting, poses no realistic risk of representing an effort to prose lytize, having repudiated the Courts endorsement inquiry in favor of a proselytiz ation approach. Courts analysis of the crche reflects an unjustified hostility tow ard religion. Court answered that history cannot legitimate practices like the c rche display that demonstrate the govts allegiance to a particular sect or creed. The proselytization test preferred by Kennedy is much the same as the endorsemen t inquiry except to the extent that the former requires an obvious allegiance be tween the government and the favored sect. *Endorsement inquiry: WON the practic e demonstrates the govts support, promotion or endorsement of the particular cree d of a particular sect *Proselytization test: WON the practice would place the g ovts weight behind an obvious effort to proselytize for a particular religion Cou rt said that Kennedy misperceived a respect for religious pluralism as hostility or indifference to religion. The Constitution mandates that the government rema

in secular, rather than affiliating itself with religious beliefs or institution s, precisely in order to avoid discriminating against citizens on the basis of t heir religious faiths. Thus, the claim that prohibiting government from celebrat ing Christmas as a religious holiday discriminates against Christians in favor o f nonadherents must fail, since it contradicts LYNCH VS. DONNELLY - SUMMARY FACTS: The city of Pawtucket, R. I., annually erect s a Christmas display in a park owned by a nonprofit organization and located in the heart of the citys shopping district. The display includes, in addition to such objects as a Santa Claus house, a Christmas tree, and a banner that reads "SEASONS GREETINGS," a creche or Nativity scene, which has been part of this ann ual display for 40 years or more. Respondents brought an action in Federal Distr ict Court, challenging the inclusion of the creche in the display on the ground that it violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, as made applic able to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court upheld the ch allenge and permanently enjoined the city from including the creche in the displ ay. The Court of Appeals affirmed. ISSUE: WON display of crche violates Establish ment Clause. HELD: Batch 2008A. 7

Notwithstanding the religious significance of the creche, Pawtucket has not viol ated the Establishment Clause RATIO: The concept of a "wall" of separation between church and state is a useful metap hor but is not an accurate description of the practical aspects of the relations hip that in fact exists. The Constitution does not require complete separation o f church and state; it affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely toleranc e, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward any. This Courts interpretati on of the Establishment Clause comports with the contemporaneous understanding o f the Framers intent. That neither the draftsmen of the Constitution, nor the F irst Congress itself, saw any establishment problem in employing Chaplains to of fer daily prayers in the Congress is a striking example of the accommodation of religious beliefs intended by the Framers. Our history is pervaded by official a cknowledgment of the role of religion in American life, and equally pervasive is evidence of accommodation of all faiths and all forms of religious expression a nd hostility toward none. Rather than taking an absolutist approach in applying the Establishment Clause and mechanically invalidating all governmental conduct or statutes that confer benefits or give special recognition to religion in gene ral or to one faith, this Court has scrutinized challenged conduct or legislatio n to determine whether, in reality, it establishes a religion or religious faith or tends to do so. In the line-drawing process called for in each case, it has often been found useful to inquire whether the challenged law or conduct has a s ecular purpose, whether its principal or primary effect is to advance or inhibit religion, and whether it creates an excessive entanglement of government with r eligion. But this Court has been unwilling to be confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area. Here, the focus of the inquiry must be on the creche in the context of the Christmas season. Focus exclusively on the religiou s component of any activity would inevitably lead to its invalidation under the Establishment Clause. Based on the record in this case, the city has a secular p urpose for including the creche in its Christmas display and has not impermissib ly advanced religion or created an excessive entanglement between religion and g overnment. The display is sponsored by the city to celebrate the Holiday recogni zed by Congress and national tradition and to depict the origins of that Holiday ; these are legitimate secular purposes. Whatever benefit to one faith or religion or to all religions inclusio n of the creche in the display effects, is indirect, remote, and incidental, and is no more an advancement or endorsement of religion than the congressional and executive recognition of the origins of Christmas, or the exhibition of religio us paintings in governmentally supported museums. As to administrative entanglem ent, there is no evidence of contact with church authorities concerning the cont ent or design of the exhibition prior to or since the citys purchase of the cre che. No expenditures for maintenance of the creche have been necessary, and, sin ce the city owns the crche (worth $200), the tangible material it contributes is de minimis. Political divisiveness alone cannot serve to invalidate otherwise pe rmissible conduct, and, in any event, apart from the instant litigation, there i s no evidence of political friction or divisiveness over the creche in the 40-ye ar history of the citys Christmas celebration. It would be ironic if the inclus

ion of the creche in the display, as part of a celebration of an event acknowled ged in the Western World for 20 centuries, and in this country by the people, th e Executive Branch, Congress, and the courts for 2 centuries, would so "taint" t he exhibition as to render it violative of the Establishment Clause. To forbid t he use of this one passive symbol while hymns and carols are sung and played in public places including schools, and while Congress and state legislatures open public sessions with prayers, would be an overreaction contrary to this Nations history and this Courts holdings. EPPERSON vs. ARKANSAS J.Fortas FACTS: Susan Epperson, was employed by the Little Rock school system in the fall of 1964 to teach 10th grade biology at Central H igh School. Until 1964 the official textbook furnished for the high school biolo gy course did not have a section on the Darwinian Theory. Then, for the academic year 1965--1966, the school administration, on recommendation of the teachers o f biology in the school system, adopted and prescribed a textbook which containe d a chapter setting forth the theory about the origin * * * of man from a lower form of animal. The Arkansas law makes it unlawful for a teacher in any statesupported school or university to teach the theory or doctrine that mankind asc ended or descended from a lower order of animals, or to adopt or use in any su ch institution a textbook that teaches this theory. Violation is a misdemeanor and subjects the violator to dismissal from his position. The Arkansas statute w as an adaption of the famous Tennessee monkey law which that State adopted in 1925. The constitutionality of the Tennessee Batch 2008A. 8

law was upheld by the Tennessee Supreme Court in the celebrated Scopes case in 1 927. Epperson faced at least a literal dilemma because she was supposed to use t he new textbook for classroom instruction and presumably to teach the statutoril y condemned chapter; but to do so would be a criminal offense and subject her to dismissal. Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of the anti-evolution statute which the State of Arkansas adopted in 1928 to prohibit the teaching in its public schools and universities of the theory that man evolved from other sp ecies of life. ISSUE/HELD: W/O Not the statute violates the constitutional provi sions respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting its free exercise ( 1st Amendment), and free speech ( 14th Amendment) . YES RATIO: Government in our democracy, state and national, must be neutral in matters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice. It may not be hostile to any religion or to the advocacy of no religion; and it may not aid, foster, or promote one religion or religiou s theory against another or even against the militant opposite. The First Amendm ent mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and non-religion. There is and can be no doubt that the First Amendment does not permit the State to require that teaching and learning must be tailore d to the principles or prohibitions of any religious sect or dogma. The States undoubted right to prescribe the curriculum for its public schools does not carr y with it the right to prohibit, on pain of criminal penalty, the teaching of a scientific theory or doctrine where that prohibition is based upon reasons that violate the First Amendment. In the present case, there can be no doubt that Ark ansas has sought to prevent its teachers from discussing the theory of evolution because it is contrary to the belief of some that the Book of Genesis must be t he exclusive source of doctrine as to the origin of man. No suggestion has been made that Arkansas law may be justified by considerations of state policy other than the religious views of some of its citizens. It is clear that fundamentali st sectarian conviction was and is the laws reason for existence. Arkansas law cannot be defended as an act of religious neutrality. Arkansas did not seek to excise from the curricula of its schools and universities all discussion of the origin of man. The laws effort was confined to an attempt to blot out a particu lar theory because of its supposed conflict with the Biblical account, literally read. Plainly, the law is contrary to the mandate of the First, and in violation of the Fourteenth, Amendment to the C onstitution. SCHOOL DISTRICT vs. SCHEMPP Justice CLARK FACTS: Applicable Amendme nts: 1. First Amendment, Establishment Clause: Congress shall make no law respec ting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. No. 142 The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania requires that at least ten verses from the Holy Bible shall be read without comment, at the opening of each Public school on each school day. Any child shall be excused from such Bible reading, or atten ding such Bible reading, upon the request of his parent or guardian. The exercis es are broadcast into each room in the building through an intercom system. This is followed by the recitation of the Lords Prayer. Participation in the open exe rcises was considered voluntary. The student reading the bible must select the p assages and read any form or version he chases. (King James version, Douay or th e Revised Standard versions as well as the Jewish Holy Scriptures) The constitut ionality of the said statute was assailed by Edward Schempp, a member of the Uni tarian faith who, along with his wife and children, questioned the validity of t he statute, contending that his rights have been violated, under the 14th of tab le and to the Constitution of the United States. The children study in Abington Senior High School Schempp testified that he at first refused to exercise his pr erogative of excusing his children from the morning exercises upon fear that his children would be labeled as odd balls. Their classmates would be liable for lu mping religious differences and objections as atheism with immoral and un-patrio tic overtones. Doctor Solomon Grayzel (witness for the appellees): The reading o f such verses without explanation may be psychologically harmful to the children and may cause a divisive force in the social media of the school. Doctor Luther A. Weigle (witness for the defense): The Bible is a non-sectarian piece of lite rature within among the Christian faiths. The exclusion of the New Testament wou

ld be in itself a sectarian practice. The trial court struck down the practices and the statute requiring them after making the specific findings of fact that a ttendance to Abington and undergoing the practices were compulsory. The court fu rther found that the reading of the verses without comment would constitute in e ffect a religious observance. Batch 2008A. 9

The court rejected the defenses argument that the children were allowed to excuse themselves via their parents request, saying that it did not mitigate the obliga tory nature of the ceremony. This was still in violation of the establishment cl ause in that it threatens religious liberty by putting a premium upon belief as opposed to non-belief, rendering sinister, alien, and suspect the beliefs, ideal s, and even morality of the petitioners. ISSUE: WON rule 142 of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is unconstitutional under the violation of the Establishment Cl ause under the Fourteenth Amendment. HELD: Yes. RATIO: I. It is true that religi on has been closely identified with American history and government. This backgr ound is evidence today in our public life through the continuance in our oaths o f office from the Presidency to the Alderman of the final supplication, So held m e God. Indeed, only last year, an official survey of the country indicated that 6 4% of our people have church membership while 3% profess no faith at all. This i s not to say, however that religion has been so identified with our history and government that religious freedom is not likewise as strongly imbedded in out pu blic and private life. Nothing but the most telling of personal experiences in r eligious persecution could have implanted such belief. Minor v. Board of Educati on of Cincinnati: (J. Alphonso Taft) First, the court has decisively settled the First Amendments mandate that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishm ent of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof has been made wholly ap plicable to the States under the 14th amendment. Second, this Court has rejected unequivocally the contention that the Establishment Clause forbids only governm ental preference of one religion over the other. The former forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any form of worship . Freedom to choose a belief cannot be restricted by Law. The latter protects th e freedom to exercise the chosen form of religion. This it embraces two concepts : Freedom to believe and Freedom to Act. (Cantwell v. Connecticut) Public School s are organized on the premise that secular education can be isolated from all r eligious teaching so that the school can inculcate all needed temporal knowledge and also maintain strict and lofty neutrality as to religion. McGowan v. Maryla nd: The First Amendment did not simply bar a congressional enactment establishin g a church; it forbade all laws respecting an establishment of religion. Engel v . Vitale: The establishment and free exercise clauses in certain instances overl ap. The former does not depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsio n and is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether those laws directly operate to coerce non-observing individuals or not. The former works also on the belief that a union of government and religion tend s to destroy government and degrade religion. The neutrality of which the Courts cases speak thus stem from the recognition from history of the tendency of relig ious sects to fuse governmental and religious functions or cause a concert of de pendence of one upon the other placing State support behind the tenets of one or all orthodoxies. Test for Establishment Clause: 1. Existence of a secular legis lative purpose 2. The primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion . Test for Free Exercise Clause: 1. Proof of the coercive effect of the enactmen t as it operates against anyone in the practice of religion. We agree with the t rial court finding as to the religious character of the exercises and are thus in violation of the establishment clause. It is also insisted that unless religiou s exercises are permitted a religion of secularism is established in schools. We a gree that a religion of secularism cannot be established in the sense of affirma tively opposing or showing hostility to religion, thus preferring belief over no n-belief. While the Free Exercise clause clearly prohibits the use of state acti on to deny the rights of free exercise to anyone, it has never meant that a majo rity could use the machinery of the state to practice beliefs. IV.

II. Justice Rutledge, joined by Frankfurter, Jackson and Burton: The First Amendments purpose was to create a complete and permanent separation of the spheres of rel igious activity and civil authority by comprehensively forbidding any form of pu blic aid or support for religion. III. Interrelationship between the Establishme nt and Free Exercise Clauses: Batch 2008A. 10

ENGEL vs. VITALE 04/03/62 Black, J. FACTS: Repondent Board of Education of Union Free School District 9, acting under New York State law, composed a prayer that was to be recited at the start of each class that went: "Almighty God, we ackno wledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Country." The program was supported by the NY State Board o f Regents. The parents of ten pupils brought this action in a New York State Cou rt insisting that use of this official prayer in the public schools was contrary to the beliefs, religions, or religious practices of both themselves and their children. NY CA sustained an order of the lower state courts which had upheld th e power of New York to use the Regents prayer as a part of the daily procedures of its public schools so long as the schools did not compel any pupil to join i n the prayer over his or his parents objection. petitioners appealed. petitoner s: prayer violates the non-establishment of religion clause in the 1st Amendment (the States use of the Regents prayer in its public school system breaches th e constitutional wall of separation between Church and State.) respondents: pray er is "non-denominational"; the program, as modified and approved by state court s, does not require all pupils to recite the prayer but permits those who wish t o do so to remain silent or be excused from the room; to apply the Constitution in such a way as to prohibit state laws respecting an establishment of religious services in public schools is to indicate a hostility toward religion or toward prayer. ISSUE: WON the prayer is a religious exercise, the establishment of whi ch is prohibited by the 1st amendment HELD: YES. There can be no doubt that the prayer is a religious exercise; the State of New York has adopted a practice who lly inconsistent with the NonEstablishment Clause. the constitutional prohibitio n against laws respecting an establishment of religion must at least mean that i n this country it is no part of the business of government to compose official p rayers for any group of the American people to recite as a part of a religious p rogram carried on by government. In an effort to explain the clause, the court l ooked at the history of the separation of church and state saying that " it is a matter of history that this very practice of establishing governmentally compos ed prayers for religious services was one of the reasons which caused many of ou r early colonists to leave England and seek religious freedom in America" In Eng land where there was a state religion, many people who held contrary beliefs were unable to exercise such. By the time of the adoption of the Constitution, our history sho ws that there was a widespread awareness among many Americans of the dangers of a union of Church and State. These people knew, some of them from bitter persona l experience, that one of the greatest dangers to the freedom of the individual to worship in his own way lay in the Governments placing its official stamp of approval upon one particular kind of prayer or one particular form of religious services. The Constitution was intended to avert a part of this danger by leavin g the government of this country in the hands of the people rather than in the h ands of any monarch. But this safeguard was not enough. Our Founders were no mor e willing to let the content of their prayers and their privilege of praying whe never they pleased be influenced by the ballot box than they were to let these v ital matters of personal conscience depend upon the succession of monarchs. The First Amendment was added to the Constitution to stand as a guarantee that neith er the power nor the prestige of the Federal Government would be used to control , support or influence the kinds of prayer the American people can say -- that t he peoples religions must not be subjected to the pressures of government for c hange each time a new political administration is elected to office. Under that Amendments prohibition against governmental establishment of religion, as reinf orced by the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, government in this country, be it state or federal, is without power to prescribe by law any particular for m of prayer which is to be used as an official prayer in carrying on any program of governmentally sponsored religious activity. The history of governmentally e stablished religion, both in England and in this country, showed that whenever g overnment had allied itself with one particular form of religion, the inevitable result had been that it had incurred the hatred, disrespect and even contempt o

f those who held contrary beliefs. Another purpose of the Establishment Clause r ested upon an awareness of the historical fact that governmentally established r eligions and religious persecutions go hand in hand. re: respondents first argum ent Neither the fact that the prayer may be denominationally neutral nor the fac t that its observance on the part of the students is voluntary can serve to free it from the limitations of the Establishment Clause, as it might from the Free Exercise Clause, of the First Amendment, both of which are operative against the States by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. re: respondents second argument I t is neither sacrilegious nor antireligious to say that each separate government in this country should stay out of the business of writing or sanctioning offic ial prayers and leave that purely religious function to the people themselves an d to those the people choose to look to for religious guidance. Reversed and rem anded. Batch 2008A. 11

ZELMAN vs. SIMMONS-HARRIS FACTS: Ohios Pilot Project Scholarship Program gives educational choices to families in any Ohio school district that is under state control pursuant to a federal-court order. The program provides tuition aid for certain students in the Cleveland City School District, the only covered distric t, to attend participating public or private schools of their parents choosing and tutorial aid for students who choose to remain enrolled in public school. Bo th religious and nonreligious schools in the district may participate, as may pu blic schools in adjacent school districts. Tuition aid is distributed to parents according to financial need, and where the aid is spent depends solely upon whe re parents choose to enroll their children. The number of tutorial assistance gr ants provided to students remaining in public school must equal the number of tu ition aid scholarships. In the 1999-2000 school year, 82% of the participating p rivate schools had a religious affiliation, none of the adjacent public schools participated, and 96% of the students participating in the scholarship program w ere enrolled in religiously affiliated schools. Sixty percent of the students we re from families at or below the poverty line. Cleveland schoolchildren also hav e the option of enrolling in community schools, which are funded under state law but run by their own school boards and receive twice the per-student funding as participating private schools, or magnet schools, which are public schools emph asizing a particular subject area, teaching method, or service, and for which th e school district receives the same amount per student as it does for a student enrolled at a traditional public school. Respondents, Ohio taxpayers, sought to enjoin the program on the ground that it violated the Establishment Clause. The Federal District Court granted them summary judgment, and the Sixth Circuit affi rmed. ISSUE: WON the program offends the Establishment Clause. NO. RATIO: (a) A government aid program is not readily subject to challenge under the Establishme nt Clause if it is neutral with respect to religion and provides assistance dire ctly to a broad class of citizens who, in turn, direct government aid to religio us schools wholly as a result of their own genuine and independent private choic e. Under such a program, government aid reaches religious institutions only by w ay of the deliberate choices of numerous individual recipients. The incidental a dvancement of a religious mission, or the perceived endorsement of a religious m essage, is reasonably attributable to the individual aid recipients not the gove rnment, whose role ends with the disbursement of benefits. (b) It is neutral in all respects towards religion, and is part of Ohios general and multifaceted undertaking to provide educational opportunities to children in a failed school district. It confers educational assistance directly to a broad class of individ uals defined without reference to religion and permits participation of all dist rict schools--religious or nonreligious--and adjacent public schools. The only p reference in the program is for low-income families, who receive greater assista nce and have priority for admission. Rather than creating financial incentives t hat skew it towards religious schools, the program creates financial disincentiv es: Private schools receive only half the government assistance given to communi ty schools and one-third that given to magnet schools, and adjacent public schoo ls would receive two to three times that given to private schools. Families too have a financial disincentive, for they have to copay a portion of private schoo l tuition, but pay nothing at a community, magnet, or traditional public school. No reasonable observer would think that such a neutral private choice program c arries with it the imprimatur of government endorsement. Nor is there evidence t hat the program fails to provide genuine opportunities for Cleveland parents to select secular educational options: Their children may remain in public school a s before, remain in public school with funded tutoring aid, obtain a scholarship and choose to attend a religious school, obtain a scholarship and choose to att end a nonreligious private school, enroll in a community school, or enroll in a magnet school. The Establishment Clause question whether Ohio is coercing parent s into sending their children to religious schools must be answered by evaluatin g all options Ohio provides Cleveland schoolchildren, only one of which is to ob tain a scholarship and then choose a religious school. Clevelands preponderance of religiously affiliated schools did not result from the program, but is a phe

nomenon common to many American cities. Eightytwo percent of Clevelands private schools are religious, as are 81% of Ohios private schools. To attribute const itutional significance to the 82% figure would lead to the absurd result that a neutral school-choice program might be permissible in parts of Ohio where the pe rcentage is lower, but not in Cleveland, where Ohio has deemed such programs mos t sorely needed. Likewise, an identical private choice program might be constitu tional only in States with a lower percentage of religious private schools. TILTON vs. RICHARDSON FACTS: The Higher Education Facilities Act was passed in 1 963 in response to a strong nationwide demand for the expansion of college and u niversity facilities to meet the sharply rising number of young people demanding higher education. The Act authorizes federal grants and loans to "institutions of higher education" for the construction of a wide variety of "academic facilit ies." But expressly excludes "any facility used or to be used for sectarian inst ruction or as a place for religious worship, or Batch 2008A. 12

. . . any facility which . . . is used or to be used primarily in connection wit h any part of the program of a school or department of divinity . . . ." no part of the project may be used for sectarian instruction, religious worship, or the programs of a divinity school. If, during this period (a period of 20 years), t he recipient violates the statutory conditions, the United States is entitled to recover an amount equal to the proportion of its present value that the federal grant bore to the original cost of the facility. Four church-related colleges a nd universities in Connecticut receiving federal construction grants under Title I were named as defendants. Federal funds were used for five projects at these four institutions: (1) a library building at Sacred Heart University; (2) a musi c, drama, and arts building at Annhurst College; (3) a science building at Fairf ield University; (4) a library building at Fairfield; and (5) a language laborat ory at Albertus Magnus College. Appellants attempted to show that the four recip ient institutions were "sectarian" by introducing evidence of their relations wi th religious authorities, the content of their curricula, and other indicia of t heir religious character. Appellee colleges introduced testimony that they had f ully complied with the statutory conditions and that their religious affiliation in no way interfered with the performance of their secular educational function s. religious activity." Every analysis must begin with the candid acknowledgment th at there is no single constitutional caliper that can be used to measure the pre cise degree to which these three factors are present or absent. There is only a cumulative criteria which is this: Against this background we consider four ques tions: a) does the Act reflect a secular legislative purpose? Yes ~> United States require that the youth be assured ample opportunity for the ful lest development of their intellectual capacities. This expresses a legitimate s ecular objective entirely appropriate for governmental action. The crucial quest ion is not whether some benefit accrues to a religious institution as a conseque nce of the legislative program, but whether its principal or primary effect adva nces religion. The Act itself was carefully drafted to ensure that the federally subsidized facilities would be devoted to the secular and not the religious fun ction of the recipient institutions. It authorizes grants and loans only for aca demic facilities that will be used for defined secular purposes and expressly pr ohibits their use for religious instruction, training, or worship. None of the f our church-related institutions in this case has violated the statutory restrict ions. There had been no religious services or worship in the federally financed facilities; no religious symbols or plaques in or on them; used solely for nonre ligious purposes. There is no evidence that religion seeps into the use of any o f these facilities. Schools were characterized by an atmosphere of academic free dom rather than religious indoctrination. b) is the primary effect of the Act to advance or inhibit religion? Yes, in effect will help advance religion. This pa rt held unconstitutional. ISSUES/HELD: 1. 2. WON Act authorized grants to churchrelated schools yes WON religion clauses of t he consti have been impaired in part, yes but the entire act is not unconsti * V acated and remanded.

RATIO: 1. We are satisfied that Congress intended the Act to include all college s and universities regardless of any affiliation with or sponsorship by a religi ous body. The Act makes no reference to religious affiliation or nonaffiliation. Under these circumstances "institutions of higher education" must be taken to i nclude church-related colleges and universities. Court have noted the internal t ension in the First Amendment between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exer cise Clause. the Establishment Clause sought to protect: "sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in ~> We note that an institution applying for a federal grant is only required to provide assurances that the facility will not be used for sectarian instruction or religious worship "during at least the period of the Federal interest therein (20 years). This obviously opens the facility to use for any purpose at the end of that period. If, at the end of 20 years, the building is, for example, conver ted into a chapel or otherwise used to promote religious interests, the original federal grant will in part have the effect of advancing religion. So this part was held unconstitutional. c) does the administration of the Act foster an exces sive government entanglement with religion? No. the entanglement is very much le ssened for three reasons. (application of strict scrutiny) 2. ~> these four schools subscribe to a well-established set of principles of acade mic freedom, and nothing in this record shows that these principles are not in f act followed. In short, the evidence shows institutions with admittedly religiou s functions but whose predominant higher education mission is to provide their s tudents with a secular education. Their purpose is not religious Batch 2008A. 13

indoctrination so there is less likelihood than in primary and secondary schools that religion will permeate the area of secular education. This reduces the ris k that government aid will in fact serve to support religious activities. ~> The entanglement between church and state is also lessened here by the nonideologic al character of the aid that the Government provides. Neutral, or non-ideologica l services, facilities, or materials are supplied to all students regardless of the affiliation of the school that they attend. Facilities are religiously neutr al. ~> Government aid here is a one-time, singlepurpose construction grant. Ther e are no continuing financial relationships or dependencies. *these three taken together shape a narrow and limited relationship bet church and govt to become i n danger of realizing the substantive evils against which the Religion Clauses w ere intended to protect. d) lastly, does the implementation of the Act inhibit t he free exercise of religion in violation of the 1st amendment? No. except of co urse that part of 20year limitation ~> Appellants, however, are unable to identif y any coercion directed at the practice or exercise of their religious beliefs. ISSUES: 1. Did the Petition for Declaratory Relief raise a justiciable controver sy? Did it state a cause of action? Did respondent have any legal standing to fi le the Petition for Declaratory Relief? 2. Did the RTC Decision conform to the f orm and substance required by the Constitution, the law and the Rules of Court? 3. May religious leaders like herein petitioner, Bro. Mike Velarde, be prohibite d from endorsing candidates for public office? Corollarily, may they be banned f rom campaigning against said candidates?" HELD & RATIO: 1. NO. SJS miserably fai led to allege an existing controversy or dispute between the petitioner and the respondents. Further, the Petition did not sufficiently state what specific lega l right of the SJS was violated by the petitioners & what particular act or acts of the latter were in breach of its rights, the law or the Constitution. There was no concise & direct statement of the ultimate facts on which it relies on it s pleading for its claim. SJS merely speculated or anticipated without factual m oorings that, as religious leaders, the petitioners below had endorsed or threat ened to endorse a candidate or candidates for elective offices; and that such ac tual or threatened endorsement "will enable them to elect men to public office w ho would in turn be forever beholden to their leaders, enabling them to control the government" & "posing a clear and present danger of serious erosion of the p eoples faith in the electoral process; & reinforcing their belief that religious leaders determine the ultimate result of elections," which would then be violati ve of the separation clause. Such premise is highly speculative and merely theor etical. The Petition does not even allege any indication or manifest intent on t he part of any of the petitioners to champion an electoral candidate, or to urge their so-called flock to vote for, or not to vote for, a particular candidate. It is a time-honored rule that sheer speculation does not give rise to an action able right. There is no factual allegation that SJS rights are being subjected to any threatened, imminent and inevitable violation that should be prevented by t he declaratory relief sought. The judicial power and duty of the courts to settl e actual controversies involving rights that are legally demandable and enforcea ble cannot be exercised when there is no actual or threatened violation of a leg al right. Even if the court relaxed the requirements of locus standi in view of its transcendental importance, counsels for the parties -- particularly for Resp ondent SJS -made no satisfactory allegations or clarifications that would supply the deficiencies discussed. Hence, even if the Court would exempt this case fro m the stringent locus standi requirement, such heroic effort would be futile bec ause the transcendental issue cannot be resolved anyway. VELARDE vs. SOCIETY for SOCIAL JUSTICE J. PANGANIBAN FACTS:

A case was brought by respondent Social Justice Society (SJS) against petitioner Mike Velarde, together with Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin, Erano Manalo, Bro. E ddie Villanueva & Eli Soriano in the Regional Trial Court of Manila for the rres olution of "whether or not the act of a religious leader like any of herein resp ondents, in endorsing the candidacy of a candidate for elective office or in urg ing or requiring the members of his flock to vote for a specified candidate, is violative of the letter or spirit of the constitutional provisions. The trial cou rt opined that the "endorsement of specific candidates in an election to any pub lic office is a clear violation of the separation clause." However, the trial co urt failed to include a dispositive portion in its assailed Decision after its e ssay on the legal issue. Thus, petitioners filed separate Motions for Reconsider ation on the assailed decision questioning whether or not the decision of the lo wer court was proper & valid in lieu of procedural deficiencies & substantive is sues Batch 2008A. 14

2. NO. The Constitution commands that "no decision shall be rendered by any cour t without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on whi ch it is based. No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decisi on of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the basis therefor." Elementary due process demands that the parties to a litigation be gi ven information on how the case was decided, as well as an explanation of the fa ctual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The significan ce of factual finding lies in the value of the decision as a precedent. Such is intended to inform the parties of the reason or reasons for the decision so that if any of them appeals, he can point out to the appellate court the finding of facts or the rulings on points of law with which he disagrees. More than that, t he requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the ju dge did so through the processes of legal reasoning. Essential Parts of a Good d ecision: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Statement of the case Statement of the facts Issues Cour t ruling, in which each issue is, as a rule, separately considered and resolved Dispositive portion Indeed, the assailed Decision was rendered in clear violation of the Constitutio n, because it made no findings of facts and final disposition. Hence, it is void and deemed legally inexistent. Consequently, there is nothing for this Court to review, affirm, reverse or even just modify. Regrettably, it is not legally pos sible for the Court to take up, on the merits, the paramount question involving a constitutional principle. It is a time-honored rule that "the constitutionalit y of a statute [or act] will be passed upon only if, and to the extent that, it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is essenti al to the protection of the rights of the parties concerned." MARCELINO ARIAS vs. UP BOARD of REGENTS AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY vs. CITY of MANILA The assailed decision did not include a resolutory or dispositive portion. It is merely an answer to a hypothetical legal question and just a part of the opinio n of the trial court. It does not conclusively declare the rights (or obligation s) of the parties to the Petition. Failure to comply with the constitutional inj unction is a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdicti on. Decisions or orders issued in careless disregard of the constitutional manda te are a patent nullity and must be struck down as void. 3. Religious Leaders Can didates for Public Office Endorsement of The Court deems this constitutional issue to be of paramount interest to the Fil ipino citizenry, for it concerns the governance of our country and its people. T hus, despite the obvious procedural transgressions by both SJS and the trial cou rt, this Court still called for Oral Argument, so as not to leave any doubt that there might be room to entertain and dispose of the SJS Petition on the merits. Counsel for SJS has utterly failed, however, to convince the Court that there a re enough factual and legal bases to resolve the paramount issue. It failed to s tate directly the ultimate facts that it relied upon for its claim. Neither were there factual findings in the assailed Decision. At best, SJS merely asked the trial court to answer a hypothetical question. In effect, it merely sought an ad visory opinion, the rendition of which was beyond the courts constitutional manda te and jurisdiction. FACTS: o the plaintiff is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit religious, missionary corporation duly registered and doing business in the Philippines through its P hilippines agency established in November of 1898 o the defendant appellee is a municipal corporation with powers that are to be excercised in conformity with t he provisions of R.A No. 409, known as the revised charter of the city of manila o the plaintiffs agency has been distributing and selling bibles and gospel por ionms thereof throughout the Philippines o the acting city treasurer nformed pla

intiff that it was conducting business of general merchandise, without providing itself with the necessary mayors permit and municipal license, in violation of various ordinances, and asked the plaintiff to secure within 3 days, the corresp onding license and fees, together with compromise covering the period from the 4 th quarter of 1945 to the 2nd quarter of 1953 in the sum of Php 5,821 o plaintif f paid the sum and acquired the license fees but at the same time filed a compla int to the courts o plaintiff was able to show that they were exempt from real e state taxes; and that it was never required to pay any municipal licence or atx fee before the war, nor does the American bible society in the U.S pay license f ee or sales tax for the sale of the bible. o however a witness for the appellees was able to prove that the American bibler society in fact does profit from the sale of the Bible. ISSUES: Batch 2008A. 15

(1) whether or not the ordinances of the City of Manila, Nos. 3000, as amended, and 2529, 3028 and 3364, are constitutional and valid?.YES!!! (2) whether said o rdinances are inapplicable, invalid or unconstitutional if applied to the allege d business of distribution and sale of bibles to the people of the Philippines b y a religious corporation like the American Bible Society? Sayang pero YES inval id! HELD: *The only essential difference that We find between these two provisio ns that may have any bearing on the case at bar, is that while subsection (m-2) prescribes that the combined total tax of any dealer or manufacturer, or both, e numerated under subsections (m-1) and (m- 2), whether dealing in one or all of t he articles mentioned therein, shall not be in excess of P500 per annum, the cor responding section 18, subsection (o) of Republic Act No. 409, does not contain any limitation as to the amount of tax or license fee that the retail dealer has to pay per annum. Hence, and in accordance with the weight of the authorities a bove referred to that maintain that "all rights and liabilities which have accru ed under the original statute are preserved and may be enforced, since the reena ctment neutralizes the repeal, therefore continuing the law in force without int erruption", We hold that the questioned ordinances of the City of Manila are sti ll in force and effect. *The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and en joyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to dissemi nate religious information. Any restraint of such right can only be justified li ke other restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds that there is a clea r and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to pr event". (Taada and Fernando on the Constitution of the Philippines, Vol. I, 4th e d., p. 297). In the case at bar the license fee herein involved is imposed upon appellant for its distribution and sale of bibles and other religious literature . *The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious p rofession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious informa tion. Any restraint of such right can only be justified like other restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds that there is a clear and present danger o f any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent". (Taada and Fern ando on the Constitution of the Philippines, Vol. I, 4th ed., p. 297). In the ca se at bar the license fee herein involved is imposed upon appellant for its dist ribution and sale of bibles and other religious literature. *(Citing Murdoch vs. Pennsylvania) It is one thing to impose a tax on the income or property of a pr eacher. It is quite another thing to exact a tax from him for the privilege of d elivering a sermon. The tax imposed by the City of Jeannette is a flat license t ax, payment of which is a condition of the exercise of these constitutional privileges. The power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment. . . . Those who can tax the exercise of this religious practice can make its exercise so costly as to depriv e it of the resources necessary for its maintenance. Those who can tax the privi lege of engaging in this form of missionary evangelism can close all its doors t o all those who do not have a full purse. Spreading religious beliefs in this a ncient and honorable manner would thus be denied the needy. . . . *It may be tru e that in the case at bar the price asked for the bibles and other religious pam phlets was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the sam e, but this cannot mean that appellant was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit. For this reason We believe that the p rovisions of City of Manila Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, cannot be applied to appellant, for in doing so it would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of i ts religious profession and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of re ligious beliefs. *Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be considered unconstitutional, even if applied to plaintiff Society. But as Ordinance No. 2529 of the City of Manil a, as amended, is not applicable to plaintiff-appellant and defendant-appellee i s powerless to license or tax the business of plaintiff Society involved herein for, as stated before, it would impair plaintiffs right to the free exercise an d enjoyment of its religious profession and worship, as well as its rights of di ssemination of religious beliefs, We find that Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, i s also inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff. Reve

rsed and Remanded GERONA vs. SECRETARY of EDUCATION (1959) Montemayor J FACTS: RA 1265 is a law th at makes a flag ceremony compulsory for schools. The implementing rules (Departm ent Order 8)says that the anthem must be played while the flag is raised. It als o says that everyone must salute the flag and no one is to do anything while the ceremony is being held. After the flag everyone is to recite the patriotic pled ge (panatang makabayan). Petitioners children attending the Buenavista Community School in Uson, Masbate refused to salute the flag, sing the anthem and recite the pledge. They did not do so out of religious belief. They are Jehovahs Witne sses. They followed Exodus 20:4-5 thou shalt not make unto thee a graven image, or any likeness of anything that is in heaven above, or that is in earth beneat h or that is in the water under the earth. They consider the flag to be an image in this context. Because of this they were expelled from the school in Sep 1955 . Batch 2008A. 16

Petitioners thru counsel petitione SecEd that their children be exempt from the law and just be allowed to remain silent and stand at attention. SecEd denied pe tition. Writ of preliminary injunction was petitioned and issued. ISSUE: WON Dep Order 8 is unconstitutional This court leans towards Gobitis decision. Special circumstance of Barnette case was that it expelled the students although attendance in schools is mandatory t urnimg them all into truants headed for reformatories. Fortunately, the law requ iring compulsory enrollment here in the Philippines is so riddled with exception s and exemptions that there is no crisis if the children didnt attend school. T here is no penal sanction for failing to attend school. Whenever a man enjoys th e benefits of society and community life he becomes a member and must give up so me of his rights for the general welfare just like everybody else. The practice of religion is subject to reasonable and non-discrimantory regulation by the sta te. Prince vs. Commonwealth of Massachusets: Sarah Prince (Jehovahs Witness agai n)was convicted under the Child Labor law because her hiece distributed religiou s pamphlets. Court said that state can limit control of parent/guardian. The rig ht of practice religion freelydoes not include liberty to expose child to ill he alth. This case was decided after Barnette, supra. SecEd was not imposing a reli gious belief with the flag salute. It was Merely enforcing a non-discriminatory regulation applicable to members of all religions. State carried out duty to sup ervise educational institutions and teach civic duty. Petitioners do not questio n the right of the school to conduct the flag Salute ceremony but question the a ttempt to compel them. The trouble of exempting the petioners is that it would d isrupt school discipline and demoralize the greater student population. There ar e exemptions for cases of religiious belief like an understanding that anti-war religious believers will not be made to fight but help war effort in other non-c ombat ways. But that is for the legislature to decide, not the courts. DISPOSITI ON: decision affirmed. constitutional. writ of preliminary injunction dissolved. No costs. HELD: Flag salute ceremony is secular and the dep order non-discriminatory There fore it is constitutional RATIONALE: The freedom of belief is limitless and boun dless but its exercise is not. If the belief clashes with law then the former m ust yield. What is the nature of the flag? Petitioners maintain that it is an im age but that is not so. It is the symbol of Republic of the Philippines. It is n ot a religious symbol. Saluting it is not therefore a religious ceremony. The de termination whether a ceremony is religious or not is left to the courts not to any religious group. Petitioners are willing to remain silent and stand during f lag ceremony. Petiotners salute the flag during boy scout activities. Their obje ction then rests on the singing of anthem and recitation of pledge. The pledge i s judged to be completely secular. It does not even pledge allegiance to the fla g or to the Republic. The anthem is also secular. It talks about patriotism. It does not speak of resorting to force, military service, or duty to defend the co untry. There was no compulsion involved in the enforcement of the flag salute. T hey were not criminally prosecuted under a penal sanction. If they chose not to obey the salute regulation they merely lost the benefits of public education. Ta ke it or leave it. Hamilton vs Univ of California: Apellants were members of Met hodist Episcopal Church who believed that war and preparations for war are gains t Gods wishes. They did not take required military service training which was r equirement to graduate. Court said that they were not being drafted to attend un iversity. University did not violate due process when it required the mil servic e. Minersville School District vs Gobitis: two Jehovahs Witness children were ex pelled from school for refusing to salute flag. Requirement of participation of all pupils in flag ceremony did not infringe due process. West Virginia State Bo ard of Education. vs. Barnette: reversed the former decision at a divided court. ERBALINAG vs. DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT March 1, 1993 Ponente: Grio-Aquino, J: FACT S: All the petitioners in these two cases are school children who are members of Jehovahs Witnesses who were expelled from their classes by the public school aut

horities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and r ecite the patriotic pledge as required by R.A. No. 1265 (July 11, 1955) and by D ECS Department Order No. 8 (July 21, 1955) which makes the flag ceremony compuls ory in all educational institutions. Batch 2008A. 17

ISSUE: Whether or not school children who are members of a religious sect known as Jehovahs Witnesses may be expelled from school (both public and private) for r efusing, on account of their religious beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremon y. RATIO: It has been held previously in the case of Gerona vs. Secretary of Edu cation (1959) Under a system of complete separation between church and state, th e flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance and therefore saluting it is not a religious ceremony. The requirement of the flag ceremony, which seeks to develop reverence for the flag and love of country, etc., is a non-discrimina tory school regulation applicable to students and teachers regardless of their r eligion. While the necessity to develop such respect for the flag and respect fo r the country still persists until today, there is recognition that religious fr eedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the a mplest protection among human rights (Fernando separate opinion in German vs. Ba rangan) Two-fold aspect of religious profession: Freedom to believe absolute as long as confined to the realm of thought Freedom to act on ones belief subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts affecting the publ ic welfare Petitioners contend that while they did not participate in the flag c eremony, they did not engage in any disruptive behavior that would offend those who choose to participate but rather they just quietly stood at attention during the flag ceremony to show respect to their countrymen. Therefore, in the absenc e of a grave and present danger which is the sole justification for a prior rest raint on the exercise of religious freedom, according to Teehankee in his dissen t in German vs. Barangan, there is no warrant to justify their expulsion. What p etitioners seek is only exemption from the flag ceremony and therefore the virtu es (e.g. patriotism, respect for human rights, love of country, etc.) they are s upposed to imbibe from their participation in the flag ceremony, they can get in their study of the Constitution, the democaratic way of life and form of govern ment, the history and culture of the Philippines, the life of our heroes, etc. T o force a small religious group through the iron hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive t o love of country or respect for duly constituted authorities which are precisel y the values the court in Gerona feared will be lost by exempting some members o f the Jehovahs Witnesses to participate in the flag ceremonies. let it be noted t hat coerced unity and loyalty even to the country is not a goal that is constitut ionally obtainable at the expense of religious liberty. A desirable end cannot b e promoted by prohibited means. (Meyer vs. Nebraska) expulsion of the members will violated their right as citizens under the Constit ution to receive free education which is the duty of the State to protect and pr omote the right of all citizens to quality education and to make such education applicable to all. in closing, the court hopes that it will not take another for eign invasion of our country for our countrymen to appreciate and cherish the Ph ilippine flag as what happened during WWII. NEWDOW vs. U.S. CONGRESS FACTS: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Newdow is an atheist whose daughter attends public elementary school in the Elk Grove Unified School District ("EGUSD") in California. In accordance with state law and a school district rule, EGUSD teachers begin each school day by leading their students in a recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance ("the Pledge"). The C

alifornia Education Code requires that public schools begin each school day with "appropriate patriotic exercises" and that "the giving of the Pledge of Allegia nce to the Flag of the United States of America shall satisfy" this requirement. To implement the California statute, the school district that Newdows daughter attends has promulgated a policy that states, in pertinent part: "Each elementa ry school class recite the pledge of allegiance to the flag once each day." (stu dents are led by teachers) Newdow does not allege that his daughters teacher or school district requires his daughter to participate in reciting the Pledge. Ra ther, he claims that his daughter is injured when she is compelled to "watch and listen as her state employed teacher in her state-run school leads her classmat es in a ritual proclaiming that there is a God, and that ours is one nation und er God. He challenges the constitutionality of the words "under God" in the Ple dge of Allegiance to the Flag. Newdow argues that the addition of these words by a 1954 federal statute to the previous version of the Pledge of Allegiance (whi ch made no reference to God) and the daily recitation in the classroom of the Pl edge of Allegiance, with the added words included, by his daughters public scho ol teacher are violations of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. ISSUES: WON the added phrase under God constitutes a violation of the U.S. Consti? HELD: Batch 2008A. 18

Yes. Case remanded for further proceedings consistent with our holding. Plaintif f to recover costs on his appeal. RATIO: Court used three tests to determine the validity of the added words. Lemon test To survive the "Lemon test," the govern ment conduct in question (1) must have a secular purpose, (2) must have a princi pal or primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion. Historically, the primary purpose of the 1954 Act was to advance religion, in conflict with the f irst prong of the Lemon test. The federal defendants "do not dispute that the wo rds under God were intended" "to recognize a Supreme Being," at a time when th e government was publicly inveighing against atheistic communism. o the federal defendants argue that the Pledge must be considered as a whole when assessing wh ether it has a secular purpose. They claim that the Pledge has the secular purpo se of "solemnizing public occasions, expressing confidence in the future, and en couraging the recognition of what is worthy of appreciation in society." o Court said: As was the case with the amendment to the Alabama statute in Wallace, the legislative history of the 1954 Act reveals that the Acts sole purpose was to advance religion, in order to differentiate the United States from nations under communist rule. "The First Amendment requires that a statute must be invalidate d if it is entirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion." - Defendants: T he phrase under God recognizes only the guidance of God in our national affair s. Court: This alleged distinction is irrelevant for constitutional purposes. Th e Acts affirmation of "a belief in the sovereignty of God" and its recognition of "the guidance of God" are endorsements by the government of religious beliefs . The Establishment Clause is not limited to "religion as an institution"; this is clear from cases such as Santa Fe, where the Court struck down student-initia ted and studentled prayer at high school football games.. The Establishment Clau se guards not only against the establishment of "religion as an institution," bu t also against the endorsement of religious ideology by the government. Because the Act fails the purpose prong of Lemon, we need not examine the other prongs. Similarly, the school district policy also fails the Lemon test. Although it sur vives the first prong of Lemon because, as even Newdow concedes, the school dist rict had the secular purpose of fostering patriotism in enacting the policy, the policy fails the second prong. The second Lemon prong asks whether the challeng ed government action is sufficiently likely to be perceived by adherents of the controlling denominations as an endorsement, and by the non-adherents as a disap proval, of their individual religious choices." *fn11 Ball, 473 U.S. at 390. Giv en the age and impressionability of schoolchildren, as discussed above, particul arly within the confined environment of the classroom, the policy is highly like ly to convey an impermissible message of endorsement to some and disapproval to others of their beliefs regarding the existence of a monotheistic God. Therefore the policy fails the effects prong of Lemon, and fails the Lemon test Justice O Connors endorsement test In the context of the Pledge, the statement that the United States is a nation "under God" is an endorsement of religion. It is a profession of a religious belief, namely, a belief in monotheism. . To recite t he Pledge is not to describe the United States; instead, it is to swear allegian ce to the values for which the flag stands: unity, indivisibility, liberty, just ice, and -- since 1954 -monotheism. The text of the official Pledge, codified in federal law, impermissibly takes a position with respect to the purely religiou s question of the existence and identity of God. Furthermore, the school distric ts practice of teacher-led recitation of the Pledge aims to inculcate in studen ts a respect for the ideals set forth in the Pledge, and thus amounts to state e ndorsement of these ideals. Although students cannot be forced to participate in recitation of the Pledge, the school district is nonetheless conveying a messag e of state endorsement of a religious belief when it requires public school teac hers to recite, and lead the recitation of, the current form of the Pledge. Coerc ion test on the principle that "at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that go

vernment may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exer cise, or otherwise to act in a way which establishes a state religion or religio us faith, or tends to do so." - Although the defendants argue that the religious content of "one nation under God" is minimal, to an atheist or a believer in ce rtain non-JudeoChristian religions or philosophies, it may reasonably appear to be an attempt to enforce a "religious orthodoxy" of monotheism, and is therefore impermissible. The coercive effect of this policy is particularly pronounced in the school setting given the age and impressionability of schoolchildren, and t heir understanding that they are required to adhere to the norms set by their sc hool, their teacher and their fellow students. Batch 2008A. 19

2) (Reversed and Remanded) ANUCENSION vs. NLU FACTS: In a Collective Bargaining Agreement between Hacienda Luisita and the United Luisita Workers Union in 1962, the parties stipulated that, except for those who were members of Inglesia ni Cr isto at the time of the agreement, all employees would be required to join the U nion and must stay in the Union to be able to retain employment in the Hacienda. In 1963 and 1964, 150 members of the Inglesia ni Cristo sought resignation from the Union pursuant to a circular given by Inglesia in 1959 prohibiting any of t heir members from joining any outside association or organization. Members of In glesia were told that they would not lose their jobs pursuant to RA 3350, that s ays that members of religious sects that prohibit affiliation may not be laid of f simply on grounds of their non-affiliation with any workers union. Later this n umber went down to 115 due to 2 of them having already been deceased and 27 not having been in the Union to begin with. The Union then infomed the Hacienda that the 115 members have resigned and demanded for their immediate lay-off due to t he stipulations of the CBA. The Union even proceeded to go on strike until the 1 15 workers were laid off. Respondent Union assailed the constitutionality of RA 3350 and the Court on Industrial Relations struck down the statute. Petitioners here have appealed to the Supreme Court. ISSUES: 1) 2) HELD: 1) 2) RATIO: 1) Pet itioners claim that the Court of Agricultural Relations should have had jurisdic tion as the Hacienda is of an agricultural nature, not an industrial one. Here t he Court says that the agricultural nature of the Hacienda is unquestionable. As such it is clear that the Court of Agricultural Relations should have had juris diction. No it did not. The Court of Agricultural Relations had jurisdiction. No , RA 3350 is not unconstitutional. WON the Court of Industrial Relations had jur isdiction. WON RA 3350 is unconstitutional. The constitutionality of RA 3350 was attacked the Union and struck down by the C ourt of Industrial Relations on the following grounds: A) it abridges the freedo m of workers to form associations B) it impairs the obligation of contracts C) i t discriminates in favor of the religious sect Inglesia ni Cristo in violation o f the constitutional provision prohibiting legislation for the support of any re ligious sect D) it denies equal protection A) On the first claim, the Court said that both the Consti and RA 875 (the original Industrial Peace Act, later amend ed by RA 3350) recognized freedom of association. RA 875 provides for the formin g, joining or assisting of labor organizations for the purpose of collective bar gaining. The court also said that this right to join also includes the right not to join or to abstain from joining any union. The court explains, however, the idea of a closed shop, wherein an agreement of this nature binds employees to th e union bargained with. Hence, the right of said employee not to join the labor u nion is curtailed and withdrawn. However, RA 3350 included the exception with reg ards to religious sects that prohibit affiliation. Here, the members are not bei ng prohibited as they may still join, neither are they being coerced to join. Th erefore, there is no curtailment of the freedom of association. B) With regards to impairing the obligation of contracts, the Court said that legislation impair ing the obligation of contracts can be sustained when it is enacted for the prom otion of the general good of the people, and when the means adopted to secure th at end are reasonable. Here the purpose is to insure freedom of religion, preven t discrimination, and protect the members of those religious sects. Also stated by the Court is that the free exercise of religious profession or belief is supe rior to contract rights. C) The Court cited Aglipay v. Ruiz where they stated th at the government should not be precluded from pursuing valid objectives secular in character even if the incidental result would be favorable to a religion or sect. The purpose of RA 3350 is secular, worldly, and Batch 2008A. 20

temporal, not spiritual or religious or holy and eternal. It was intended to ser ve the secular purpose of advancing the constitutional right to the free exercis e of religion. D) The Court here discussed on equal protection, not being a guar anty of equality. It allows classification. Here we see that the classification is based on real and important differences, as religious beliefs are not mere be liefs or ideas, bit are motives of certain rules of human conduct. Such classifi cation is therefore valid. the TV program Ang Iglesia ni Cristo, and (2) the respondent Board did not act wit h grave abuse of discretion when it denied permit for the exhibition on TV of th e three series of Ang Iglesia ni Cristo on the ground that the materials constitut e an attack against another religion. It also found the series indecent, contrary to law and contrary to good customs. ISSUES: 1. WoN the Board has the power to review petitioners TV program Ang Iglesi a ni Cristo, Assuming it has the power, whether or not the Board gravely abused i ts discretion when it prohibited the airing of petitioners religious program, ser ies Nos. 115, 119 and 121, for the reason that they constitute an attack against other religions and that they are indecent, contrary to law and good customs. 2. IGLESIA ni CRISTO vs. CA 1996 Ponente: Puno FACTS: 1. Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) ha s a television program entitled Ang Iglesia ni Cristo aired on 2 TV channels. The program presents and propagates petitioners religious beliefs, doctrines and prac tices often times in comparative studies with other religions. Sometime in 1992, INC submitted to the BRMPT (Board) the VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the series as X or not for public view ing on the ground that they offend and constitute an attack against other religio ns which is expressly prohibited by law. Petitioner pursued two (2) courses of ac tion against the Board. First, it appealed to the Office of the President the cl assification of its TV Series No. 128. It succeeded in its appeal and the Office of the Pres. reversed the decision of the Board. Second, petitioner filed a civ il case against the Board with the RTC Quezon City. INC alleged that the Board a cted w/o jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in requiring INC to subm it the VTR tapes of its program and x-rating them. The Board invoked its power u nder P.D. 1986 in relation to Art. 201 of the RPC. The RTC ordered the Board to grant the INC the permit for all the series of the Ang Iglesia ni Cristo program. The Board appealed to the Court of Appeals after its motion for reconsideration was denied. The CA reversed the trial courts decision. It ruled that: (1) the res pondent board has jurisdiction and power to review DECISION: The Decision of the CA sustaining the jurisdiction of the Board to review the TV program entitled Ang Iglesia ni Cristo, is AFFIRMED. Its decision sustaining the action of the Board xrating petitioners TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, and 121 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. 2. RATIO: Issue 1. 3. 4. The law gives the Board the power to screen, review and examine all television pr ograms. the Board has the power to approve, delete x x x and/or prohibit the x x x exhibition and/or television broadcast of x x x television programs x x x The l

aw also directs the Board to apply contemporary Filipino cultural values as stand ard to determine those which are objectionable for being immoral, indecent, contra ry to law and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines and its people, or with a dangerous tendency to encourage the commis sion of violence or of a wrong or crime. The SC rejects INCs postulate that its re ligious program is per se beyond review by the respondent Board. Its public broa dcast on TV of its religious program brings it out of the bosom of internal beli ef. Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, viz., freedom t o believe and freedom to act on ones beliefs. The first is absolute as long as th e belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regul ation where the 5. Batch 2008A. 21

belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare. Where th e individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions that affect the publi c, his freedom to do so becomes subject to the authority of the State (Isagani C ruz) attacks against another religion in x-rating the (Cruz) It is error to think that the mere invocation of religious freedom will s talemate the State and render it impotent in protecting the general welfare. The inherent police power can be exercised to prevent religious practices inimical to society. And this is true even if such practices are pursued out of sincere r eligious conviction and not merely for the purpose of evading the reasonable req uirements or prohibitions of the law. religious program of petitioner. Section 3 of PD 1986 will reveal that it is not among the grounds to justify an order prohibiting the broadcast of petitioners t elevision program. The ground attack against another religion was merely added by the respondent Board in its Rules.iThis rule is void for it runs smack against t he doctrine that administrative rules and regulations cannot expand the letter a nd spirit of the law they seek to enforce. Moreover, Article 201 (2) (b) (3) of the Revised Penal Code should be invoked to justify the subsequent punishment of a show which offends any religion. It cannot be utilized to justify prior censo rship of speech. Issue No. 2 The evidence shows that the Board x-rated petitioners TV series for attacking othe r religions, especially the Catholic church. An examination of the evidence will show that the so-called attacks are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held do gmas and tenets of other religions. The videotapes were not viewed by the CA as they were not presented as evidence. Yet they were considered by the CA as indec ent, contrary to law and good customs, hence, can be prohibited from public view ing under Section 3(c) of PD 1986. This ruling clearly suppresses petitioners fre edom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of religion. Respondents failed to apply the clear and present danger rule. The records show that the decision of the Board is completely bereft of findings of facts to just ify the conclusion that the subject video tapes constitute impermissible attacks against another religion. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm th e tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evi l which has taken the life of a reality already on ground. It is also opined tha t it is inappropriate to apply the clear and present danger test to the case at bar because the issue involves the content of speech and not the time, place or manner of speech. Allegedly, unless the speech is first allowed, its impact cann ot be measured, and the causal connection between the speech and the evil appreh ended cannot be established. The contention overlooks the fact that the case at bar involves videotapes that are pre-taped and hence, their speech content is kn own and not an X quantity. Given the specific content of the speech, it is not u nreasonable to assume that the respondent Board, with its expertise, can determi ne whether its sulphur will bring about the substantive evil feared by the law. PAMIL vs. TELERON

The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by peti tioner but that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however, unclea n they may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion. Re ligious dogmas and beliefs are often at war and to preserve peace among their fo llowers, especially the fanatics, the establishment clause of freedom of religio n prohibits the State from leaning towards any religion The Board cannot squelch the speech of petitioner INC simply because it attacks other religions, even if said religion happens to be the most numerous church in our country. The bedroc k of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by encourag ing the marketplace of dueling ideas. When the luxury of time permits, the marke tplace of ideas demands that speech should be met by more speech for it is the s park of opposite speech, the heat of colliding ideas that can fan the embers of truth. MCDANIEL vs. PATY The respondents cannot also rely on the ground (April 19, 1978 ) Batch 2008A. 22

Ponente: CJ Burger FACTS: McDaniel, an ordained minister of a Baptist Church in Chattanooga, Tenn., filed as a candidate for delegate to the constitutional conv ention. An opposing candidate, appellee Selma Cash Paty, sued in the Chancery Co urt for a declaratory judgment that McDaniel was isqualified from serving as a d elegate by a Tennessee statutory provision establishing the qualifications of co nstitutional convention delegates to be the same as those for membership in the State House of Representatives, thus invoking a Tennessee constitutional provisi on barring ministers of the Gospel, or priests of any denomination whatever." Th at court held that the statutory provision violated the First and Fourteenth Ame ndments. and for a judgment striking his name from the ballot. Chancellor Franks of the Chancery Court held that 4 of ch. 848 violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution and declared McDaniel eligible for the of fice of delegate. Accordingly, McDaniels name remained on the ballot and in the ensuing election he was elected by a vote almost equal to that of three opposin g candidates. After the election, the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the Chanc ery Court, holding that the disqualification of clergy imposed no burden upon "r eligious belief" and restricted "religious action . . . [only] in the lawmaking process of government where religious action is absolutely prohibited by the est ablishment clause . . . ."The state interests in preventing the establishment of religion and in avoiding the divisiveness and tendency to channel political act ivity along religious lines, resulting from clergy participation in political af fairs, were deemed by that court sufficiently weighty to justify the disqualific ation, notwithstanding the guarantee of the Free Exercise Clause. ISSUE/HELD: W/ O Not a Tennessee statute barring Ministers of the Gospel, or priests of any den omination whatever from serving as delegates to the States limited constitution al convention deprived appellant of the right to the free exercise of religion g uaranteed by the First Amendment. YES RATIO: The disqualification of ministers f rom legislative office was a practice carried from England by seven of the origi nal States; later six new States similarly excluded clergymen from some politica l offices. The purpose of the several States in providing for disqualification w as primarily to assure the success of a new political experiment, the separation of church and state. Prior to 1776, most of the 13 Colonies had some form of an established, or government-sponsored, church. In light of this history and a widespread awarenes s during that period of undue and often dominant clerical influence in public an d political affairs here, in England, and on the Continent, it is not surprising that strong views were held by some that one way to assure disestablishment was to keep clergymen out of public office. As the value of the disestablishment ex periment was perceived, 11 of the 13 States disqualifying the clergy from some t ypes of public office gradually abandoned that limitation. The essence of this a spect of our national history is that in all but a few States the selection or r ejection of clergymen for public office soon came to be viewed as something safe ly left to the good sense and desires of the people. The right to the free exerc ise of religion unquestionably encompasses the right to preach, proselyte, and p erform other similar religious functions. Tennessee also acknowledges the right of its adult citizens generally to seek and hold office as legislators or delega tes to the state constitutional convention. Yet under the clergydisqualification provision, McDaniel cannot exercise both rights simultaneously because the Stat e has conditioned the exercise of one on the surrender of the other. The Tenness ee disqualification is directed primarily, not at religious belief, but at the s tatus, acts, and conduct of the clergy. Therefore, the Free Exercise Clauses ab solute prohibition against infringements on the "freedom to believe" is inapposi te here. The essence of the rationale underlying the Tennessee restriction on mi nisters is that if elected to public office they will necessarily exercise their powers and influence to promote the interests of one sect or thwart the interes ts of another, thus pitting one against the others, contrary to the anti-establi shment principle with its command of neutrality. However widely that view may ha ve been held in the 18th century by many, including enlightened statesmen of tha t day, the American experience provides no persuasive support for the fear that

clergymen in public office will be less careful of antiestablishment interests o r less faithful to their oaths of civil office than their unordained counterpart s. The challenged provision violates appellants First Amendment right to the fr ee exercise of his religion because it conditions his right to the free exercise of his religion on the surrender of his right to seek office. Though justificat ion is asserted under the Establishment Clause for the statutory restriction on the ground that if elected to public office members of the clergy will necessari ly promote the interests of one sect or thwart those of another contrary to the anti-establishment principle of neutrality, Tennessee has failed to demonstrate that its views of the dangers of clergy participation in the political process h ave not lost whatever validity they may once have enjoyed. GERMAN vs. BARANGAN (March 27, 1985) Ponente: J. Escolin Batch 2008A. 23

FACTS: On Oct 2, 1984, petitioners composed of about 50 businessmen, students an d office employees and who were members of the August Twenty-One Movement (ATOM) , converged at J.P. Laurel Street, Manila, for the purpose of hearing Mass at th e St. Jude Chapel, which adjoins the Malacaang grounds located in the same street . Wearing yellow tshirts, they marched down said street with raised clenched fis ts and shouts of anti-government invectives. Along the way, however, they were b arred by respondent Major lsabelo Lariosa, upon orders of his superior and co-re spondent Gen. Santiago Barangan, from proceeding any further, on the ground that St. Jude Chapel was located within the Malacaang security area. When their effor ts to enter the church became apparently futile, they opted to stay outside, kne eling on the sidewalk in front of the barricades and prayed the Holy Rosary. Aft erwards, they sang Bayan ko with clenched fists of protest against the violation of their rights and thereafter dispersed peacefully. Because of the alleged war ning given them by respondent Major Lariosa that any similar attempt by petition ers to enter the church in the future would likewise be prevented, petitioners t ook this present recourse. ISSUE HELD: 1. WON petitioners constitutionally protec ted freedom to exercise religion (Sec 8, Art IV of the 1973 Consti) was violated NO 2. WON petitioners freedom of locomotion was violated (Sec 5, Art IV of the 1 973 Consti) NO RATIO: 1. Petitioners alleged purpose in converging at J.P. Laur el Street was to pray and hear mass at St. Jude church. At the hearing of this p etition, respondents assured petitioners and the Court that they have never rest ricted, and will never restrict, any person or persons from entering and worship ping at said church. They maintain, however, that petitioners intention was not really to perform an act of religious worship, but to conduct an antigovernment demonstration at a place close to the very residence and offices of the Preside nt of the Republic. Respondents further lament petitioners attempt to disguise their true motive with a ritual as sacred and solemn as the Holy Sacrifice of th e Mass. Undoubtedly, the yellow tshirts worn by some of the marchers, their rais ed clenched fists, and chants of anti-government slogans strongly tend to substa ntiate respondents allegation. These allegations cannot but cast serious doubts on the sincerity and good faith of petitioners in invoking the constitutional gu arantee of freedom of religious worship and of locomotion. While it is beyond de bate that every citizen has the undeniable and inviolable right to religious fre edom, the exercise thereof, and of all fundamental rights for that matter, must be done in good faith. As Art 19 of the Civil Code admonishes: "Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the perform ance of his duties observe honesty and good faith." Even assuming that petitioner s claim to the free exercise of religion is genuine and valid, still respondent s reaction to the October 2, 1984 mass action may not be characterized as violat ive of the freedom of religious worship. Since 1972, when mobs of demonstrators crashed through the Malacaang gates and scaled its perimeter fence, the use by th e public of J.P. Laurel Street and the streets approaching it have been restrict ed. While travel to and from the affected thoroughfares has not been absolutely prohibited, passers-by have been subjected to courteous, unobtrusive security ch ecks. The reasonableness of this restriction is readily perceived and appreciate d if it is considered that the same is designed to protect the lives of the Pres ident and his family, as well as other government officials, diplomats and forei gn guests transacting business with Malacaang. The restriction is also intended t o secure the several executive offices within the Malacaang grounds from possible external attacks and disturbances. These offices include communications facilit ies that link the central government to all places in the land. Unquestionably, the restriction imposed is necessary to maintain the smooth functioning of the e xecutive branch of the government, which petitioners mass action would certainl y disrupt. Cantwell v Connecticut: The constitutional inhibition on legislation on the subject of religion has a double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls c ompulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of w orship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organizati on or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religio

n. Thus the amendment embraces two concepts freedom to believe and freedom to act . The first is absolute, but in the nature of things, the second cannot be. In t he case at bar, petitioners are not denied or restrained of their freedom of bel ief or choice of their religion, but only in the manner by which they had attemp ted to translate the same into action. This curtailment is in accord with the pr onouncement of this Court in Gerona v. Secretary of Education, thus: The realm o f belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by ones imagination a nd thought. So is the freedom of belief, including religious belief, limitless a nd without bounds. One may believe in most anything, however strange, bizarre an d unreasonable the same may appear to others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But between the freedom of belief a nd the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel. If t he exercise of said religious belief clashes with the established institutions o f society and with the law, then the former must yield and give way to the latte r. The government steps in and either restrains said exercise or even prosecutes the one exercising it. Batch 2008A. 24

2. Suffice it to say that the restriction imposed on the use of J.P. Laurel Stre et, the wisdom and reasonableness of which have already been discussed, is allow ed under the fundamental law, the same having been established in the interest o f national security. Petition dismissed. Teehankee, dissenting: I vote to grant the petition on the ground that the right of free worship and movement is a pref erred right that enjoys precedence and primacy and is not subject to prior restr aint except where there exists the clear and present danger of a substantive evi l sought to be prevented. There was and is manifestly no such danger in this cas e. 1. The right to freely exercise ones religion is guaranteed in Section 8 of our Bill of Rights. Freedom of worship, alongside freedom of expression and spee ch and peaceable assembly, along with the other intellectual freedoms, are highl y ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly stres sed that on the judiciaryeven more so than on the other departmentsrests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such prefe rred rights. No verbal formula, no sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense w ith what has been so felicitously termed by Justice Holmes as the sovereign pre rogative of judgment. Nonetheless, the presumption must be to incline the weigh t of the scales of justice on the side of such rights, enjoying as they do prece dence and primacy." 2. In the free exercise of such preferred rights, there is t o be no prior restraint although there may be subsequent punishment of any illeg al acts committed during the exercise of such basic rights. The sole justificati on for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of these basic rights is the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and immine nt, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any othe r legitimate public interest, that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent. 3. The burden to show the existence of grave and imminent danger that would just ify prior restraint and bar a group of persons from entering the church of their choice for prayer and worship lies on the military or police officials who woul d so physically restrain them. Indeed, there is no precedent in this time and ag e where churchgoers whose right of free exercise of their religion is recognized have been physically prevented from entering their church on grounds of nationa l security. On the other hand, it does not lie within the competence or authorit y of such officials to demand of churchgoers that they show and establish their "sincerity and good faith in invoking the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religious worship and of locomotion" as a precondition, as seems to be the thrus t of the majority decision. Respondents themselves in the Solicitor Generals comment admit that "true, ther e were only about 80 persons in petitioners group on October 2 and this number could hardly pose the danger feared," but expressed the fear that petitioners r anks could within hours reach hundreds if not thousands and "peaceful dispersal becomes impossible as in recent demonstrations and rallies." Respondents were in full control and there is no question as to the capability of the security forc es to ward off and stop any untoward move. They had placed an advance checkpoint as far back as the Sta. Mesa Rotonda and could stop the flow of people in the c hurch if they deemed it unmanageable. There definitely was no clear and present danger of any serious evil to public safety or the security of Malacaang. CANTWELL vs. CONNECTICUT COMMONWEALTH vs. TWITCHELL (1993) WILKINS, J. FACTS: David and Ginger Twitchell appeal from their convictions of involuntary manslaughter death of their 2 1/2 y ear old son Robyn. Robyn died of the consequences of peritonitis caused by the p erforation of his bowel which had been obstructed as a result of an anomaly know n as Meckels diverticulum. There was evidence that the condition could be corre cted by surgery with a high success rate. The defendants are practicing Christia n Scientists [CS] who grew up in CS families. They believe in healing by spiritu al treatment. During Robyns five-day illness they retained Nathan Talbot. As a result of that consultation, David Twitchell read a church publication concernin g the legal rights and obligations of CS in Mass. That publication quoted a port

ion of General Laws Sec. 1, as then amended, which accepted remedial treatment b y spiritual means alone as satisfying any parental obligation not to neglect a c hild or to provide a child with physical care. HELD: Parents have a duty to seek medical attention for a child in Robyns circumstances, the violation of which, if their conduct was wanton or reckless, could support a conviction of involunt ary manslaughter and that the spiritual treatment provision [STP] did not bar a prosecution for manslaughter. However, special circumstances in this case would justify a finding that the Twitchells reasonably believed that they could rely o n spiritual treatment without fear of criminal prosecution. But since this defen se has not been presented to the jury, the judgement must be reversed and remand ed. Batch 2008A. 25

ISSUES: WON the law generally imposes a parental duty to provide medical service s to a child. - YES The duty to provide sufficient support for a child is legally enforceable in a civil proceeding against a parent. A breach of that duty is a misdemeanor. Where necessary to protect a childs well-being, the Commonwealth m ay intervene, over the parents objections, to assure that needed services are p rovided. Parental duty of care has been recognized in the common law of homicide in this Commonwealth. There is also a common law duty to provide medical servic es for a child, the breach of which can be the basis, in the appropriate circums tances, for the conviction of a parent for involuntary manslaughter. WON the STP bars any involuntary manslaughter charge against a parent who relies on spiritu al treatment, and who does not seek medical attention for his or her child (even if the parents failure to seek such care would otherwise be wanton or reckless conduct). - NO STP provides no complete protection to a parent against a charge of involuntary manslaughter that is based on the parents wanton or reckless fai lure to provide medical services to a child. Sec.1 concerns child support and ca re in a chapter that deals with the Commonwealths interest that persons within its territory should not be killed by the wanton and reckless conduct of others. It is unlikely that the Legislature placed the STP in Sec. 1 to provide a defen se to common law homicide. The act that added the STP was entitled "An Act defin ing the term proper physical care under the law relative to care of children b y a parent." The amendments concern seems focused on the subject matter of sec. 1 and certainly not directed toward changing the common law of homicide. physical, educational or moral care and guidance shall be punished." The STP was added in 1971. Section 1 was rewritten removing from sec. 1 any reference to wi llful failure to provide necessary and proper physical care and limited any viol ation to matters of failure to support. Nevertheless, the STP was retained. Beca use of the 1986 amendment, the STP of sec. 1 has an application outside of sec. 1 that it did not have before. The STP refers to neglect and willful failure to provide proper physical care as bases for punishment. These concepts do not unde rlie involuntary manslaughter. Wanton or reckless conduct is not a form of negli gence. Wanton or reckless conduct does not involve a willful intention to cause the resulting harm. Involuntary manslaughter does not require willfulness. Thus, the STP in sec. 1 does not apply to involuntary manslaughter. Sec.1 reads: "xxxx any parent of a minor child xxxxx who willfully fails to provide necessary and proper physical, educational or moral care and guidance xxxxx or who fails to provide proper attention for said child, shall be punished xxxx. A child shal l not be deemed to be neglected or lack proper physical care for the sole reason that he is being provided remedial treatment by spiritual means alone in accord ance with the tenets and practice of a recognized church or religious denominati on by a duly accredited practitioner thereof." A predecessor of sec. 1, enacted in 1882, provided that "whoever unreasonably ne glects to provide for the support of his minor child shall be punished by fine o r by imprisonment." Statute was rewritten in 1909 to impose a duty of physical c are of children on parents. In 1954, sec. 1 was amended to state that "any paren t of a minor child who wilfully fails to provide necessary and proper WON the failure to extend the protection of the STP to them would be a denial of

due process because they lacked "fair warning" because they were officially mis led by an opinion of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth. - YES Atty Gen, wh o is statutorily empowered to give his opinion upon questions of law, gave an op inion which answers a general question "whether parents who fail to provide medi cal services to children on the basis of religious beliefs will be subject to pr osecution for such failure." An average person might read the Atty Gens comments as being a negative answer. It is true that the answer comes to focus on neglige nt failures of parents, and we know that wanton or reckless failures are differe nt. Atty Gen: The Massachusetts child abuse reporting law does not specifically a ddress itself to the relationship between the religious beliefs of the parent an d failure to provide medical care. Sec. 1 is a criminal statute and it expressly precludes imposition of criminal liability as a negligent parent for failure to provide medical care because of religious beliefs. However, the intent of Chap 119 is to require that children of such parents be provided services whenever th e need arises. Under Chapter 119, children may receive services notwithstanding the inability to prosecute the parents. Although the Twitchells read a CS publica tion called "Legal Rights and Obligations of CS in Mass" which relied on the abo ve opinion. That opinion was arguably misleading because of what it did not say concerning criminal liability for manslaughter Although it has long been held th at "ignorance of the law is no defense", there is justification for treating as a defense the belief that conduct is not a violation of law when a defendant has reasonably relied on an official statement in an official interpretation of the public official who is charged with the responsibility for the interpretation o r enforcement of the law. ( aka "entrapment by estoppel." ) There is special mer it to such a rule if religious beliefs are involved and if the defendant was att empting to comply with Batch 2008A. 26

the law while adhering to his religious beliefs and practices. CASE REMANDED bec ause some Questions of Fact need be answered: o Whether a person would reasonably conclude that the Attorney General had ruled that sec. 1 provided protection aga inst a manslaughter charge. o Whether the defendants reasonably relied on the ch urchs publication and on the advice of the Committee on Publication. community, physically and emotionally. During this period, the children must acq uire skills needed to perform the adult role of an Amish farmer or housewife. An d, at this time in life, the Amish child must also grow in his faith and his rel ationship to the Amish community. (eto US SC ratio na) 1. The States interest i n universal education is not totally free from a balancing process when it impin ges on other fundamental rights, such as those specifically protected by the Fre e Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their children. In applying strict scrutiny, it was not shown that there is a state interest of sufficient magnitud e to override the interest claiming protection under the Free Exercise Clause. F undamental right to religion is protected, sometimes even at the expense of othe r interests of admittedly high social importance. Only those interests of the hi ghest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion. 2. Respondents have amply supported their claim t hat enforcement of the compulsory formal education requirement after the eighth grade would gravely endanger if not destroy the free exercise of their religious beliefs. It was necessary for the court to determine whether the Amish religiou s faith and their mode of life are, as they claim, inseparable and interdependen t not merely philosophical nor personal. In this case, the Old Order Amish daily life and religious practice stem from their faith is shown by the fact that it is in response to their literal interpretation of the Biblical injunction from t he Epistle of Paul to the Romans, "be not conformed to this world . . . ." This command is fundamental to the Amish faith. This virtually determines their entir e way of life. Values and programs of the modern secondary school are in sharp c onflict with the fundamental mode of life mandated by the Amish religion. Wiscon sin law contravenes the basic religious tenets and practice of the Amish faith, both as to the parent and the child. Furthermore, Wisconsin law affirmatively co mpels them, under threat of criminal sanction, to perform acts undeniably at odd s with fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs. The compulsory-attendance law carries with it precisely the kind of objective danger to the free exercise of religion that the First Amendment was designed to prevent. 3. Aided by a hist ory of three centuries as an identifiable religious sect and a long history as a successful and self-sufficient segment of American society, the Amish have demo nstrated the sincerity of their religious beliefs, the interrelationship of beli ef with their mode of life, the vital role that belief and daily conduct play in the continuing survival of Old Order Amish communities, and the hazards present ed by the States enforcement of a statute generally valid as to others. Beyond this, they have carried the difficult burden of demonstrating the adequacy ESTRADA vs. ESCRITOR WISCONSIN vs. YODER FACTS: Respondents, members of the Old Order Amish religion and the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church, were convicted of violating Wisconsins compulsory scho ol-attendance law (which requires a childs school attendance until age 16) by d eclining to send their children to public or private school after they had gradu ated from the eighth grade. The evidence showed that the Amish provide continuin g informal vocational education to their children designed to prepare them for l ife in the rural Amish community (children ages 14 and 15). The evidence also sh owed that respondents sincerely believed that high school attendance was contrar y to the Amish religion and way of life and that they would endanger their own s alvation and that of their children by complying with the law. ISSUE: WON the co mpulsory-attendance law violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth Ame

ndments. HELD: Yes. RATIO: (state supreme court muna total the US SC upheld thei r decision naman) their childrens attendance at high school, public or private, was contrary to t he Amish religion and way of life. It poses danger of the censure of the church community and endanger their own salvation and that of their children. These rel igious belief were held to be sincere. Expert witnesses (scholars on religion) t estified that this concept of life aloof from the world and its values is centra l to their faith. Amish objection to formal education beyond the eighth grade is firmly grounded in these central religious concepts. Formal high school educati on beyond the eighth grade is contrary to Amish beliefs because it takes them aw ay from their Batch 2008A. 27

of their alternative mode of continuing informal vocational education in terms o f the overall interests that the State relies on in support of its program of co mpulsory high school education. In light of this showing, and weighing the minim al difference between what the State would require and what the Amish already ac cept, it was incumbent on the State to show with more particularity how its admi ttedly strong interest in compulsory education would be adversely affected by gr anting an exemption to the Amish. It is true that activities of individuals, eve n when religiously based, are often subject to regulation by the States in the e xercise of police power but religiously grounded conduct is protected by the Fre e Exercise Clause of the 1st Amendment. Re discrimination: A regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional requi rement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of rel igion. Some degree of education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political system if we are to preserve freedom and independence. However, the evidence adduced by the Amish in this ca se is persuasively to the effect that an additional one or two years of formal h igh school for Amish children in place of their longestablished program of infor mal vocational education would do little to serve those interests. Separated agr arian community is the keystone of the Amish faith. That they would become burde n to society should they leave the community and join the mainstream world with educational shortcomings is highly speculative. 4. The States claim that it is empowered, as parens patriae, to extend the benefit of secondary education to ch ildren regardless of the wishes of their parents cannot be sustained against a f ree exercise claim of the nature revealed by this record, for the Amish have int roduced convincing evidence that accommodating their religious objections by for going one or two additional years of compulsory education will not impair the ph ysical or mental health of the child, or result in an inability to be self-suppo rting or to discharge the duties and responsibilities of citizenship, or in any other way materially detract from the welfare of society. The dissent argues tha t a child who expresses a desire to attend public high school in conflict with t he wishes of his parents should not be prevented from doing so. There is no reas on for the Court to consider that point since it is not an issue in the case. Th e State has at no point tried this case on the theory that respondents were prev enting their children from attending school against their expressed desires. Par ents have a right to direct the religious up-bringing of their children which may be subject to limitation ] if it appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or h ave a potential for significant social burdens. But in this case, the Amish have introduced persuasive evidence undermining the arguments the State has advanced to support its claims in terms of the welfare of the child and society as a who le. we cannot accept a parens patriae claim of such all-encompassing scope and w ith such sweeping potential for broad and unforeseeable application as that urge d by the State. (overinclusive) affirmed. U.S. vs. BALLARD FACTS: Respondents, Edna W. Ballard and Donald Ballard were convicted of using and cons piring to use the mails to defraud. The indictment was in twelve counts. It char ged a scheme to defraud by organizing and promoting the I Am movement through th e use of the mails. The charge was that certain designated corporations were for med, literature distributed and sold, funds solicited, and memberships in the I Am movement sought by means of false and fraudulent representations, pretenses and promises Misrepresentations: o That the words of ascended masters and the words of the alleged divine entity, Saint Germain, would be transmitted to mank ind through the medium of the said Guy W. Ballard, Edna W. Ballard, and Donald B allard through their high spiritual attainment and righteous conduct. That the r espondent were able to cure hundreds of people of diseases classified either cur able or incurable.

o Each of them, well knew that all of said aforementioned representations were fal se and untrue and were made with the intention on the part of the defendants, an d each of them, to cheat, wrong, and defraud persons intended to be defrauded, a nd to obtain from persons intended to be defrauded by the defendants, money, pro perty, and other things of value and to convert the same to the use and the bene fit of the defendants, and each of them. Defense: There was a demurrer and a mot ion to quash each of which asserted among other things that the indictment attac ked the religious beliefs of respondents and sought to restrict the free exercis e of their religion in violation of the Constitution of the United States. Batch 2008A. 28

Lower Court: Did not want to rule on the truth or validity of the religious clai ms made by the respondents but rather limited the scope of the case to this issu e: WON these defendants honestly and in good faith believe those things? If they did, they should be acquitted. I cannot make it any clearer than that o (3) The part of the scheme concerning phonograph records sold by respondents on representations that they would bestow on purchasers great blessings and reward s in their aim to achieve salvation whereas respondents well knew that said * * * records were manmade and had no ability to aid in achieving salvation. o

If these defendants did not believe those things, they did not believe that Jes us came down and dictated, the jury should find them guilty.
The Lower court convicted the respondents. The latter, initially acquiesced to t he verdict but soon filed for a motion for retrial since the withdrawal of the i ssue of truth and verity would run contrary to the nature of the indictment itse lf. it was necessary to prove that they schemed to make some, at least, of the ( eighteen) representations * * * and that some, at least, of the representations which they schemed to make were false Court of Appeals reversed the decision and granted a new trial, with one judge dissenting. The United States contends that respondents acquiesced in the withdrawal from th e jury of the truth of their religious doctrines or beliefs and that their conse nt bars them from insisting on a different course once that one turned out to be unsuccessful o Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189, 63 S.Ct. 549, 87 L.Ed. 704. That case st ands for the proposition that, apart from situations involving an unfair trial, an appellate court will not grant a new trial to a defendant on the ground of im proper introduction of evidence or improper comment by the prosecutor, where the defendant acquiesced in that course and made no objection to it. In fairness to respondents that principle cannot be applied here ISSUE: WON the 1st Amendment precluded the court from judging upon the truth, ve rity, and validity of the beliefs of the respondent. Yes, decision reversed. of the Court of Appeals Supreme court: Ruled that Johnson v. United States cannot be applied in the case at bar. The real objection of respondents is not that the truth of their religi ous doctrines or beliefs should have been submitted to the jury. Their demurrer and motion to quash made clear their position that that issue should be withheld from the jury on the basis of the First Amendment. o We do not agree that the t ruth or verity of respondents religious doctrines or beliefs should have been s ubmitted to the jury. Whatever this particular indictment might require, the Fir

st Amendment precludes such a course, as the United States seems to concede. The First Amendment has a dual aspect. It not only forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship but also s afeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Cantwell v. State o f Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303, 60 S.Ct. 900, 903, 84 L.Ed. 1213, 128 A.L.R. 1 352. Thus the Amendment embraces two concepts,--freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be . Freedom of thought, which includes freedom of religious belief, is basic in a society of free men Misrepresentations Supreme Court: o ascertained by the o (1) A portion of the scheme as to healing which we have already quoted and which alleged that respondents had in fact cured either by the activity of one, eith er, or all of said persons, hundreds of persons afflicted with diseases and ailm ents; (2) The portion of the scheme relating to certain religious experiences d escribed in certain books (Unveiled Mysteries and The Magic Presence) and concer ning which the indictment alleged that the defendants represented that Guy W. B allard, Edna W. Ballard, and Donald Ballard actually encountered the experiences pertaining to each of their said names as related and set forth in said books, whereas in truth and in fact none of said persons did encounter the experiences ; o o Batch 2008A. 29

o The First Amendment does not select any one group or any one type of religion fo r preferred treatment. It puts them all in that position. submit to induction. In his Selective Service System form he stated that he was not a member of a religious sect or organization; he failed to execute section V II of the questionnaire but attached to it a quotation expressing opposition to war, in which he stated that he concurred In a later form he hedged the question as to his belief in a Supreme Being by saying that it depended on the definitio n and he appended a statement that he felt it a violation of his moral code to t ake human life and that he considered this belief superior to his obligation to the state. Conscientious Objector personal scruples against war Individual bel ief--rather than membership in a church or sect--determined the duties that God imposed upon a person in his everyday conduct; and that there is a higher loyal ty than loyalty to this country, loyalty to God. Thus, while shifting the test from membership in such a church to ones individual belief the Congress neverth eless continued its historic practice of excusing from armed service those who b elieved that they owed an obligation, superior to that due the state, of not par ticipating in war in any form. religious training and belief belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human re lation. In assigning meaning to this statutory language we may narrow the inqui ry by noting briefly those scruples expressly excepted from the definition. The section excludes those persons who, disavowing religious belief, decide on the b asis of essentially political, sociological or economic considerations that war is wrong and that they will have no part of it. These judgments have historicall y been reserved for the Government, and in matters which can be said to fall wit hin these areas the conviction of the individual has never been permitted to ove rride that of the state. The essence of religion is belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation. By compari ng the statutory definition with those words, however, it becomes readily appare nt that the Congress deliberately broaden them by substituting the phrase Supre me Being for the appellation God. And in so doing it is also significant that Congress did not elaborate on the form or nature of this higher authority which it chose to designate as Supreme Being. By so refraining it must have had in mind the admonitions of the Chief Justice when he said in the same opinion that even the word God had myriad meanings for men of faith: (P)utting aside dogma s with their particular conceptions of deity, freedom of conscience itself impli es respect for an innate conviction of paramount duty. The test might be stated in these words: A sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of it s possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly quali fying for the exemption comes within the statutory definition. This construction avoids imputing to Congress an intent to classify different religious beliefs, exempting some and excluding others, and is in accord with the well-established congressional policy of equal treatment for those whose opposition to service is grounded in their religious tenets. U.S. vs. SEEGER FACTS: Seeger was convicted in the District Court for the Southe rn District of New York of having refused to submit to induction in the armed fo rces. He first claimed exemption as a conscientious objector in 1957 after succe ssive annual renewals of his student classification. Although he did not adopt v erbatim the printed Selective Service System form, he declared that he was consc ientiously opposed to participation in war in any form by reason of his religio us belief; that he preferred to leave the question as to his belief in a Suprem e Being open, rather than answer yes or no"; that his skepticism or disbeli ef in the existence of God did not necessarily mean lack of faith in anything whatsoever; that his was a belief in and devotion to goodness and virtue for t heir own sakes, and a religious faith in a purely ethical creed. He was convicte d and the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Supreme Being requirement of the section distinguished between internally derived and externally compelle

d beliefs and was, therefore, an impermissible classification under the Due P rocess Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Jakobson was also convicted in the Souther n District of New York on a charge of refusing to submit to induction. On his ap peal the Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that rejection of his claim may have rested on the factual finding, erroneously made, that he did not believe i n a Supreme Being as required He explained that his religious *168 and social th inking had developed after much meditation and thought. He had concluded that ma n must be partly spiritual and, therefore, partly akin to the Supreme Reality ; and that his most important religious law was that no man ought ever to wi lfully sacrifice another mans life as a means to any other end The Court of App eals reversed, finding that his claim came within the requirements of s 6(j). Be cause it could not determine whether the Appeal Board had found that Jakobsons beliefs failed to come within the statutory definition, or whether it had conclu ded that he lacked sincerity, it directed dismissal of the indictment. Forest Br itt Peter was convicted in the Northern District of California on a charge of re fusing to Batch 2008A. 30

The test is simple of application. It is essentially an objective one, namely, d oes the claimed belief occupy the same place in the life of the objector as an o rthodox belief in God holds in the life of one clearly qualified for exemption? (1971) Per curiam FACTS: Petitioner was being drafted to fight in the Vietnam Wa r. To avoid it, he requested to be classified as a conscientious objector. The loc al draft board turned down his request. He appealed. State Appeal Board still cl assified him as eligible for unrestricted service then passed it on to Justice D ept. FBI made an inquiry. Hearing officer recommended that he be classified a con scientious objector because of testimony from inquiry of petitioner, parents, atto rney and religious minister proved that petitioner was sincere. Nevertheless Jus tice Dept advised denial of request. Appeal Board denied the request w/o stating reasons for such a claim. Petitioner refused to be drafted and was convicted. IS SUE: HELD: RATIONALE: In order to be classified as a conscientious objector, a r egistrant must satisfy three basic tests. He must show 1) that he is conscientio usly opposed to war in any form; 2) that this opposition is based upon religious training and belief; 3) and that this objection is sincere. In applying the tes t, the Selective Service System must be concerned with the registrant as an indi vidual, not with its own interpretation of the dogma of the religious sect, if a ny, to which he may belong. Justice Dept believed that Clay did not satisfy any r equirement. 1) Clays belief did not preclude war in any form but are limited to service in the US Armed Forces. He objects to certain types of war in certain ci rcumstances, rather than a general scruple against participation in war in any f orm. 2) Clays religion did not preclude fighting for the US because of political and racial objectives to US policies instead of objections to participate in wa r in any form. 3) Clay as a conscientious objector only surfaced when drafting w as imminent. He has not shown overt manifestation of his opposition. However, in t his Court, the govt has conceded that petitioners belief are based on religious t raining. His beliefs, like those in US vs Seeger, are clearly founded on the ten ets of the Muslim religion as he understands them. The govt also conceded that it no longer questions the sincerity of petitioners belief. The hearing officer wh o decided on the sincerity of the petitioner with info from FBI inquiry was conv inced of his sincerity and recommended his classification as a conscientious obj ector. Justice dept was wrong to disregard such a finding. Since the Appeal Board gave no reasons for denying Clays request, no one knows which ground he did not pass. But since two of the grounds no longer hold, it is clear that the dept was wrong. ISSUES: W/O the plaintiffs religious beliefs exempted them from induction in U.S military training? HELD: Seager Seeger professed religious belief and religi ous faith. He did not disavow any belief in a relation to a Supreme Being; in deed he stated that the cosmic order does, perhaps, suggest a creative intellig ence. He decried the tremendous spiritual price man must pay for his willingn ess to destroy human life. In light of his beliefs and the unquestioned sincerit y with which he held them, we think the Board, had it applied the test we propos e today, would have granted him the exemption. We think it clear that the belief s which prompted his objection occupy the same place in his life as the belief i n a traditional deity holds in the lives of his friends, the Quakers. We are rem inded once more of Dr. Tillichs thoughts: And if that word (God) has not much meaning for you, translate it, and speak of the depths of your life, of the sour ce of your being, or your ultimate concern, of what you take seriously without a ny reservation. Perhaps, in order to do so, you must forget everything tradition al that you have learned about God * * *. Tillich, The Shaking of the Foundatio ns. It may be that Seeger did not clearly demonstrate what his beliefs were with regard to the usual understanding of the term Supreme Being. But as we have s aid Congress did not intend that to be the test. We therefore affirm the judgmen t. Peter It will be remembered that Peter acknowledged some power manifest in n ature * * * the supreme expression that helps man in ordering his life. As to w hether he would call that belief in a Supreme Being, he replied, you could call that a belief in the Supreme Being or God. These just do not happen to be the w

ords I use. We think that under the test we establish here the Board would gran t the exemption to Peter and we therefore reverse the judgment in No. 29 Jakobso n The Court of Appeals found that the registrant demonstrated that his belief as to opposition to war was related to a Supreme Being. We agree and affirm that j udgment. CASSIUS CLAY (MUHAMMAD ALI) vs. U.S Batch 2008A. 31

This case then falls in Sicurella vs US. There, the Court was asked to hold that an error in an advice letter prepared by the Justice Dept did not require revers al of a criminal conviction because there was a ground on which the Appeal Board might properly have denied a conscientious objector classification. This Court refused because in cases where it is impossible to determine exactly which groun ds the Appeal Board decided, the integrity of the Selective Service System deman ds, at least, that the govt not recommend illegal grounds. (in other words: the g rounds must be clearly legitimate from the first and finding a clearly legitimat e ground afterwards wont work.) DISPOSITION: Judgment reversed. Ali is free! SEPA RATE OPINIONS Douglas, concurs: Sicurella vs US: Congress couldnt possibly mean c onscientious objector must go to participation in war in any form. Negre v Larsen: Petitioners church did not oppose war in Vietnam but provided guidelines for un just wars. His conscience did not allow him to go to Vietnam. Court said screw h is conscience, go and fight! Clay is different. As a Muslim he follows Koran. Ko ran proclaims jihad by believers against nonbelievers. All other wars are unjust . Clays believes only in war sanctioned by the Koran. Therefore, it becomes a ma tter of belief, of conscience, of religious principle. Harlan, concurs in the re sult: Justice dept gives bad advice. Not all conscientious objectors are weasels trying to get out of fighting in Vietnam. BYRNE article: ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A SPECIAL CONCERN OF THE 1ST AMMENDMENT J. Pete r Byrne I. INTRODUCTION The First Amendment protects academic freedom but there has been no adequate ana lysis of what academic freedom the Constitution protects or why it protects it. Lacking definition or guiding principle, the doctrine floats in the law. Authors definition of academic freedom: non-legal term referring to the liberties claime d by professors through professional channels against administrative or politica l interference with research, teaching and governance. Of constitutional academi c freedom: essence is the insulation of scholarship and liberal education from e xtramural political interference insulate the university in core academic affair s from state interference II. FIRST AMENDMENT ON CAMPUS Concern is only with the substantive protection of academic freedom by the 1st A mendment isolating which has been difficult because 1) courts have used legal do ctrines not based on academic freedom to protect liberties of professors and stu dents; 2) courts have declined to recognize a constitutional shield for many for ms of classroom speech that seem at first blush to implicate general principles of free expression. Central paradox: The institutional right seems to give a uni versity the authority to hire and fire without government interference those ver y individuals apparently granted a personal right to write and teach without ins titutional hindrance. Nonetheless, this paradox should be seen as neither collat eral nor embarrassing; academic discourse benefits from the tension between the independence of a scholars judgment and the universitys evaluation of her prof essional competence. A. Academic Speech Academic Freedom ARTICLE XIV EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, ARTS, CULTURE AND SPORTS EDUCATIO N Sec 1. The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to qualit y education at all levels, and shall take appropriate steps to make such educati on accessible to all. Sec 5(2) Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institut ions of higher learning. Students and junior professors (considered neophytes in the field) suffer real p unishment for speech deemed inadequate by the masters. Compared to general civil society where the 1st Amendment opposes prior and subsequent restraint based on determination if the speech is valuable or not. The First Amendment value of ac ademic speech rests on its commitment to truth (however partially understood by the discipline), its honesty and carefulness, its richness of meaning, its doctr inal freedom, and its invitation to criticism. society ought to strive towards s

peech that is truthful. Batch 2008A. 32

Academic freedom resembles other free expression values insofar as it protects t he individual scholars point of view; it is distinct insofar as it protects tho se structures that permit the individual scholar to engage with others in collec tive scholarship of gentlemen for elite professions. The change is usefully, if simple-mindedly, expressed as a movement from a paradigm of fixed values vouchsafed by religious faith to one of relative truths continuously revised by scientific endeavor. Cha nges in the structure enlarged the status of the faculty now highly-trained prof essionals. Yet low salary and uncertain tenure remained They were no longer depe ndent on the will of clergymen but answerable to businessmen. Academic freedom b ecame rallying cry for professors seeking more control over their professional l ives. B. Student Speech and Extracurricular Political Activity The term "academic freedom" should be reserved for those rights necessary for th e preservation of the unique functions of the university, particularly the goals of disinterested scholarship and teaching. First Amendment rights w/c should no t properly be a part of constitutional academic freedom: 1) no recognized studen t rights of free speech are properly part of constitutional academic freedom, be cause none of them has anything to do with scholarship or systematic learning (e .g. wearing of armbands, demonstrations, etc.) while the Constitution affords st udents at public institutions extensive civil rights, it affords them no rights of academic freedom at all. 2) the right of a professor to participate in politi cal activity off campus and on her own time without institutional reprisal shoul d not be viewed as a matter of constitutional academic freedom academic freedom should be understood to include only rights unique or necessary to the functions of higher education; exist as a necessary incident to universitys commitment t o the pursuit of truth and the controvertibility of dogma. C. Tenure Tenure is n ot equal to academic freedom but it promotes academic freedom since it requires public airing of explicit and categorically neutral reasons for dismissal. does not protect academic freedom of untenured since they will direct their scholarsh ip to those likely to be accepted by the tenured. III. THE AMERICAN TRADITION AC ADEMIC FREEDOM Early History and Structure OF C. Development Freedom of the Concept of Academic Problem was the interference by the lay board of trustees or regents. Professors demanded that no ideological test be applied and evaluation done by professiona l peers. The American concept of academic freedom emerged from this ideological and practical conflict between academic social scientists and their lay employer s. American Assoc. of University Professors (AAUP) insisted on a clear distincti on between speech that was academic and that which was merely political or secta rian. AAUPs vision of academic freedom: 1) noble vision of the academic calling; 2) eliminates gravest evils of lay control over universities; 3) concept of peer

review according to professional standards. D. The Challenge of other Academic Values Humanistic values: valuable knowledge includes ideas that arent scientifically de monstrable and that students must receive a coherent education in the traditions of civilized thought, writing and art. The democratic value in higher education reflects the demands placed on our colleges and universities by the society at large that they help fulfill broad goals of social mobility and general prosperi ty. E. A. Professional Standard Competence as a Regulatory The structural elements ed early: legal control strators set apart from entation; dependent and that would give shape to academic freedom were establish by non-academic trustees; effective governance by admini the faculty by political allegiance and professional ori insecure faculty.

The integrity of academic freedom depends on the good faith of the professorate and on its collective ability to distinguish between scholars who disagree with accepted findings and those who do not understand them. what defines competence? When this question arises trouble develops. Without agreement about basic parad igms, competence loses much of the neutrality that might ordinarily be assumed, as there may be no shared criterion for evaluation. B. The Rise of the Scientific Research Value Higher education began to be seen as scientific training for practical jobs rath er than moral training Batch 2008A. 33

IV. CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOM AND THE SCHOLAR ACADEMIC INDIVIDUAL The Proper Scope of Judicial Intervention Courts seem entirely ill-equipped to r esolve these disputes. Asked to protect the academic freedom of a candidate deni ed tenure by faculty vote, a court would need to determine what, in fact, are th e requirements for tenure, whether the candidate met the requirements, and wheth er the faculty rejected the candidate for some non-academic reason. Such an inqu iry, backed by the coercive power of the state, would put the department or scho ol into intellectual receivership, with the court determining the appropriate pa radigms of thought. Courts then should only ascertain if the administrators can establish that they in good faith rejected the candidate on academic grounds. Th e Court has come to limit the judiciarys role to excluding non-academics from i mposing ideological criteria on academic decision-making, while refusing to impo se substantive limits on academic administrators who in good faith penalize facu lty for academic speech V. CONSTITUTIONAL ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE PROTECTION OF INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY Concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Sweezy: university freedom for teac hing and scholarship without interference from government is a positive right an d that the state here had failed to provide a compelling justification for quest ioning an academic about the content of a lecture the four essential freedoms" o f a university--to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study Three si gnificant oddities about the plurality and concurring opinions in Sweezy: 1) nev er before had the Court suggested that academic freedom was protected by the 1st Amendment. 2) Frankfurters decision looks solely to nonlegal sources to describe the contents of acad. freedom 3) Although the content of acad. freedom was draw n from non-legal sources, they praised acad freedom by stressing the social util ity of free universities. Sweezy endowed the new constitutional right of academi c freedom with a legacy of triumphant rhetoric but also with an ambiguous descri ption of the relationship between academic custom and positive legal right. The Courts decision not to ground its ruling on a positive right of academic freedo m, moreover, presaged the Courts refusal to give this right the practical force that its rhetorical enthusiasms promised. Also in other cases, Barenblatt and K eyishian, the Courts use of rhetoric to define the content of academic freedom increases the ambiguity already created by basing the cases holding upon vaguen ess. However, despite their analytical shortcomings, Sweezy and Keyishian contri buted substantially to the virtual extinction of overt efforts by non-academic g overnment officials to prescribe political orthodoxy in university teaching and research. Constitutional Academic Freedom and the State Action Doctrine: An Asid e Faculty and students at state universities enjoy extensive substantive and pro cedural constitutional rights against their institutions while faculty and stude nts at private institutions enjoy none. Thus, the state action doctrine mandates judicial enforcement of constitutional liberties against institutional infringe ments for half the nations academics and denies it to the other half for reason s which, if desirable at all, are very far removed from the realities of academi c life While the right to institutional academic freedom has arisen at the time in our history when universities have been most subject to federal regulation, no feder al regulation has been invalidated under the right. As in Sweezy and Keyishian, the new turn in academic freedom has flowered in dicta and rhetoric more than in holdings and rules A.

The Supreme Court and Institutional Academic Freedom Academic freedom is described by Frankfurter not as a limitation on the grounds or procedures by which academics may be sanctioned but as "the exclusion of gove rnmental intervention in the intellectual life of a university." Justice Stevens concurring opinion in Widmar v. Vincent represents both a refreshing acknowled gment that universities must and should distinguish among speakers on the basis of the content of their speech and a pioneering inquiry into which university ad ministrative decisions the First Amendment should protect. Thus, core academic a dministrative decisions-determining who may teach, what may be taught, how it sh all be taught, and who may be admitted to study-cannot be interfered with by civ il authorities without impairing the unique virtues of academic speech. When jud ges are asked to review the substance of a genuinely academic decision, such as this one, they should show great respect for the facultys professional judgment . Plainly, they may not override it unless it is such a substantial departure fr om accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the person or committee respon sible did not actually exercise professional judgment. Batch 2008A. 34

Academic Abstention It describes the traditional refusal of courts to extend com mon law rules of liability to colleges where doing so would interfere with the c ollege administrations good faith performance of its core functions. The recogn ition of authority over internal affairs and the exclusion of judicial governanc e go hand in hand; they amount to a substantial degree of common law autonomy. I nstitutional academic freedom can be viewed as academic abstention raised to con stitutional status, so that judges can consider whether statutes or regulations fail to give sufficient consideration to the special needs or prerogatives of th e academic community. State Constitutional Law The tradition of constitutional a utonomy for state universities seems to have contributed to the development of t he federal right of institutional academic freedom. At a minimum, it confirms th e persistence of the view, inherent in academic abstention, that civil authoriti es ought to respect the special needs and values of universities, even when erec ted and supported by the state. Constitutional academic freedom can perhaps best be seen as a principle that regulation should not proceed so far as to deprive the university of control over its academic destiny. This principle has been fas hioned by courts, explaining why they restrain themselves from imposing farreach ing constitutional or common law duties on the university. As such, it represent s academic abstention raised to a constitutional level. Institutional Academic F reedom and the First Amendment And what are the indigenous values served by univ ersities? 1) the university is the preeminent institution in our society where k nowledge and understanding are pursued with detachment or disinterestedness. 2) The disinterested search for knowledge fosters a manner of discourse that, at it s best, is careful, critical, and ambitious 3) The university aspires to instill in those entering adulthood a capacity for mature and independent judgment. Pre serving the fundamental academic values of disinterested inquiry, reasoned and c ritical discourse, and liberal education justifies a constitutional right of aca demic freedom. These goals give intellectual and educational expression to the v ision of human reason implicit in the Constitution. Who are do be protected by constitutional academic freedom? Universities that do not respect the academic freedom of professors (understood as the core of the d octrine developed by the AAUP) or the essential intellectual freedom of students (a concept barely developed) ought not to be afforded institutional autonomy. V I. CONCLUSION Through repetition, the scope of institutional autonomy has come to be understoo d as the four freedoms offered by Justice Frankfurter: "to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study. The four freedoms adequately express the degre e of autonomy necessary for a university to harbor liberal studies. The great vi rtue of these freedoms is that they recognize that liberal studies involve more than the simple act of speaking--that they require "that atmosphere which is mo st *340 conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. This requires securit y, stimulation, tolerance, generosity of mind, the hiring of competent people, a nd the reward of excellence. Constitutional protection can preserve the possibil ity that academics might attain the goals of learning and scholarship. It cannot do more; it should not do less. SWEEZY vs. NEW HAMPSHIRE June 15, 1957 Ponente: Warren, CJ: FACTS: Defendant, Pa ul Sweezy, was convicted of contempt for failure to answer questions asked by th e Attorney General of New Hampshire In 1951 a statute was passed by the New Hamp shire legislature to regulate subversive acts. In 1953, legislature adopted a jo int resolution authorizing the attorney general to make full and complete invest igations with respect to violations of the subversive activities act of 1951 whi ch includes among others authorizing him to act upon his own motion and upon such information as in his judgment may be reasonable or reliable. o Statute defines a person to be subversive if he, by any means, aids in the commission of any act intended to assist in the alteration of the constitutional form of govt by force or violence.

Sweezy was summoned to appear on two separate occasions in 1954 under suspicion of subversion in connection with the membership of his wife in the Progressive P arty, an article he wrote wherein he affirmed that he styled himself as a classica l Marxist and a socialist, Batch 2008A. 35

and a lecture he delivered on March 22, 1954 for a humanities course at the univ ersity. overthrow of the Government, never knowingly associated with Communists in the S tate, but was a socialist believer in peaceful change He refused to answer questi ons regarding: 1) a lecture given by him at the University of New Hampshire, 2) activities of himself and others in the Progressive political organizations, and 3) opinions and beliefs, invoking the constitutional guarantees of free speech SC stated that: For societys good if understanding be essential need of society inqu iries and speculations into the natural sciences, into anthropology, economics, law, etc. must be left as unfettered as possible except for reasons that are exi gent and obviously compelling. exclusion of governmental intrusion into the inte llectual life of a university. Cites a quote from the Open Universities in South Africa: In a university knowledge is its own end, not merely a means to an end A university is characterized by the spirit of free inquiry, it ideal being the id eal of Socrates to follow the argument where it leads. This implies the right to e xamine, question, modify or reject traditional ideas and beliefs Freedom to reaso n and freedom for disputation on the basis of observation and experiment are the necessary conditions for the advancement of scientific knowledge It is the busin ess of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to specul ation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which prevail the four ess ential freedoms of a university to determine for itself on academic grounds who m ay teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.

Petitioner answered most of the questions but declined to answer certain questio ns about his knowledge regarding the Progressive Party in his 1st appearance and about the lecture he delivered and his opinions or beliefs in his 2nd appearanc e stating only that he hat never been a member of the Communist Party. Because o f his continuous decline to answer he was cited in contempt.

ISSUE: W/N the investigation deprived Sweezy of due process of law under the 14t h Amendment HELD: Yes. It is recognized that the right to lecture or associate a re civil liberties guaranteed by the Constitution but they are not absolute righ ts. o In this case, it is believed that there was an unquestionable invasion of the petitioners liberties in the areas of academic freedom and political expressi on areas in which the government should be extremely reticent to tread. To impos e any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universiti es would imperil the future of our Nation.

In this case, the record does no reveal what reasonable or reliable information led the Attorney General to question petitioner (no showing of probable cause) t herefore, if the interrogation of the Attorney General was in fact entirely unre lated to the object of the legislature in authorizing such inquiry, the Due Proc ess Clause would preclude the endangering of constitutional liberties and can be treated as an absence of authority to conduct the inquiry. Because of this ther e can be no showing of a sufficient state interest to infringe the constitutiona l rights of the petitioner.

The inviolability of privacy belonging to a citizens political loyalties has so o verwhelming an importance to the well-being of our kind of society that it canno t be constitutionally encroached upon on the basis of so meager a countervailing

interest of the State as may be argumentatively found in the remote, shadowy th reat to the security of New Hampshire allegedly presented in the origins and con tributing elements of the Progressive Party and the petitioners relations to thes e. Concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter: Whether the Attorney General of New H ampshire acted within the scope of the authority given him by the state legislat ure is not for the US SC to determine but is a matter for the decision of the co urts of that State. Petitioner as mentioned answered most of the questions asked of him, making it known that he had never been a Communist, never taught the vi olent GARCIA vs. FACULTY ADMISSION COMMITTEE Epicharis (wat a name) Garcia vs. T he Faculty Admission Committee represented by Fr. Lambino 1. That in summer, 197 5, Respondent admitted Petitioner for studies leading to an M.A. in Theology; 2. That on May 30, 1975, when Petitioner wanted to enroll for the same course for the first semester, 1975-

Batch 2008A. 36

76, Respondent told her about the letter he had written her, informing her of th e facultys decision to bar her from re-admission in their school; reason in the letter: Pet.s frequent questions and difficulties had the effect of slowing down the progress of the class although she ahd the requisite intellectual capabilit y 3. That the reasons stated in said letter, dated May 19, 1975 ... do not const itute valid legal ground for expulsion, for they neither present any violation o f any of the schools regulation, nor are they indicative of gross misconduct; 4 . That from June 25, 1975, Petitioner spent much time and effort in said school for the purpose of arriving at a compromise that would not duly inconvenience th e professors and still allow her to enjoy the benefits of the kind of instructio n that the school has to offer, but all in vain; she was in fact told by Fr. Ped ro Sevilla, the schools Director, that the compromises she was offering were un acceptable, their decision was final, and that it were better for her to seek fo r admission at the UST Graduate School; 5. Petitioner then subsequently made inq uiries in said school, as to the possibilities for her pursuing her graduate stu dies for an for M.A. in Theology, and she was informed that she could enroll at the UST Ecclesiastical Faculties, but that she would have to fulfill their requi rements for Baccalaureate in Philosophy in order to have her degree later in The ology which would entail about four to five years more of studies whereas in the Loyola School of Studies to which she is being unlawfully refused readmission, it would entail only about two years more; 6. Considering that time was of the e ssence in her case, and not wanting to be deprived of an opportunity for gaining knowledge necessary for her lifes work, enrolled as a special student at said UST Ecclesiastical Faculties, even if she would not thereby be credited with any academic units for the subject she would take; 7. That Petitioner could have re course neither to the President of her school, Fr. Jose Cruz, he being with the First Couples entourage now in Red China, nor with the Secretary of Education, since this is his busiest time of the year, and June 11, 1975 is the last day fo r registration; ... " 8. She prayed for a writ of mandamus for the purpose of al lowing her to enroll in the current semester Issues: WON the Faculty Admissions Committee had authority and discretion in allowing Pet. to continue studying or not? Held: Yes. Being a particular educational institution (seminary). Petition dismissed for lack of merit Ratio: 1. Pet. cannot compel the res by mandamus to admit her into further studies since the respondent had no clear duty to admit t he pet. -That respondent Fr. Antonio B. Lambino, S.J., and/or the Loyola School of Theology thru its Faculty Admission Committee, necessarily has discretion as to whether to admit and/or to continue admitting in the said school any particular student, co nsidering not only academic or intellectual standards but also other considerati ons such as personality traits and character orientation in relation with other students as well as considering the nature of Loyola School of Theology as a sem inary. - technical aspect of admissions: the Chairman of the Faculty Admission Committe e of the Loyola School of Theology, which is a religious seminary situated in Lo yola Heights, Quezon Cityis in in collaboration with the Ateneo de Manila Univer sity, the Loyola School of Theology allows some lay students to attend its class es and/or take courses in said Loyola School of Theology but the degree, if any, to be obtained from such courses is granted by the Ateneo de Manila University and not by the Loyola School of Theology; For the reason above given, lay studen ts admitted to the Loyola School of Theology to take up courses for credit there in have to be officially admitted by the Assistant Dean of the Graduate School o f the Ateneo de Manila University in order for them to be considered as admitted to a degree program Petitioner in the summer of 1975 was admitted by respondent to take some courses for credit but said admission was not an admission to a de gree program because only the Assistant Dean of the Ateneo de Manila Graduate Sc hool can make such admission; That in the case of petitioner, no acceptance by t he Assistant Dean of the Ateneo de Manila Graduate School was given, so that she was not accepted to a degree program but was merely allowed to take some course

s for credit during the summer of 1975; Being admitted to the school is a privil ege and not a right. -There are standards that must be met. There are policies t o be pursued. Discretion appears to be of the essence. In terms of Hohfelds ter minology, what a student in the position of petitioner possesses is a privilege rather than a right. She cannot therefore satisfy the prime and indispensable re quisite of a mandamus proceeding. Such being the case, there is no duty imposed on the Loyola School of Theology. In a rather comprehensive memorandum of petiti oner, who unfortunately did not have counsel, an attempt was made to dispute the contention of respondent. There was a labored effort to sustain her stand, but it was not sufficiently persuasive. It is understandable why. It was the skill o f a lay person rather than a practitioner that was evident. While she pressed he r points with vigor, she was unable to demonstrate the existence of the clear le gal right that must exist to justify the grant of this writ. Batch 2008A. 37

2. the recognition in the Constitution of institutions of higher learning enjoyi ng academic freedom. -It is more often identified with the right of a faculty me mber to pursue his studies in his particular specialty and thereafter to make kn own or publish the result of his endeavors without fear that retribution would b e visited on him in the event that his conclusions are found distasteful or obje ctionable to the powers that be, whether in the political, economic, or academic establishments - For the sociologist, Robert McIver it is "a right claimed by t he accredited educator, as teacher and as investigator, to interpret his finding s and to communicate his conclusions without being subjected to any interference , molestation, or penalization because these conclusions are unacceptable to som e constituted authority within or beyond the institution - philosopher Sidney Ho ok, this is his version: "What is academic freedom? Briefly put, it is the freed om of professionally qualified persons to inquire, discover, publish and teach t he truth as they see it in the field of their competence. It is subject to no co ntrol or authority except the control or authority of the rational methods by wh ich truths or conclusions are sought and established in these disciplines 3. Cou rt further discusses academic freedom that its reference is to the "institutions o f higher learning" as the recipients of this boon. - Former President Vicente G. Sinco of the University of the Philippines, in his Philippine Political Law, is similarly of the view that it "definitely grants the right of academic freedom to the university as an institution as distinguished from the academic freedom o f a university professor." - Dr. Marcel Bouchard, Rector of the University of Di jon, France, "It is a well-established fact, and yet one which sometimes tends t o be obscured in discussions of the problems of freedom, that the collective lib erty of an organization is by no means the same thing as the freedom of the indi vidual members within it; in fact, the two kinds of freedom are not even necessa rily connected. In considering the problems of academic freedom one must disting uish, therefore, between the autonomy of the university, as a corporate body, an d the freedom of the individual university teacher." (2 types) - "the four essen tial freedoms" of a university to determine for itself on academic grounds who m ay teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study. 4. The decision is not to be construed as in any way reflecting on the s cholastic standing of petitioner. There was on the part of respondent due acknowledgment of her intelligence. None theless, for reasons explained in the letter of Father Lambino, it was deemed be st, considering the interest of the school as well as of the other students and her own welfare, that she continue her graduate work elsewhere. There was nothin g arbitrary in such appraisal of the circumstances deemed relevant. It could be that on more mature reflection, even petitioner would realize that her transfer to some other institution would redound to the benefit of all concerned. At any rate, as indicated earlier, only the legal aspect of the controversy was touched upon in this decision. ISABELO vs. PERPETUAL HELP J. Vitug FACTS: Petitioner Isabelo was a criminology student in Perpetual Help College of Rizal (PHCR). Being the PRO and acting Secr etary of the student council, he was asked to sign Resolution No. 105, which wou ld increase tuition payments by 20%. He refused to sign and asked for a 2week pe riod to talk it over with his fellow officers. After they met on the matter, the council presented a 9-point proposal. With an assurance that the request of the student council would be considered favorably, the petitioner finally signed Re solution No. 105. PHCR then announced that its application to increase school fe es was approved by DECS. The student council then filed a motion for considerati on. DECS then put the implementation on hold pending talks on the matter. In the meantime the CMT commandant gave a list of students with CMT deficiencies, with petitioner Isabelo being on the list. As such, he was expelled and not allowed to enroll for the next semester on the following grounds: * Non compliance of CM T requirement as per DECS Order No. 9, S. 1990 and DECS Memorandum No. 80, S. 19 91 and PHCR Internal Memo. No. 891-007; * No NCEE during the admission in the BS Criminology course; * Official Admission Credential not yet submitted; * Void d

eclaration of CMT subjects (MS 11, 12, 21 and 22) which are docketed in the regi stration card. Not being allowed into the school premises, Isabelo sent a letter to DECS. Director Rosas of DECS then issued Order No. 9 which stated: . . . con cerning the dropping from the rolls without due process of the students petition ers . . . , Manuelito Isabelo, Jr., . . ., please be advised that pending resolu tion thereof, the propriety of allowing the students to continue attending their classes to protect their interest as well as that of the school, is hereby enjo ined. Batch 2008A. 38

In this connection, it is hereby directed that the above-named students be re-ad mitted to classes and be allowed to take all examinations that they have missed pending final resolution of this case/issue. PHCR did not comply with the direct ive. Petitioner claims that the reason why he was not being admitted was due to his being against the increase on tuition payments. Respondent school invokes ac ademic freedom in the expulsion of Isabelo. ISSUE: WON Isabelos expulsion was wit hin the schools academic freedom. HELD: NO RATIO: Here the court sites Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, which upheld the rule that admission to an institut ion of higher learning is discretionary upon the school and that such an admissi on is a mere privilege, rather than a right, on the part of the student. Like an y other right, however, academic freedom has never been meant to be an unabridge d license. It is a privilege that assumes a correlative duty to exercise it resp onsibly. With regards to contracts, the court said that the contract between stu dent and school is not one that is only on a semestral basis, but the student ha s a right to be enrolled for the entire period in order to complete his course. Finally the court says that the punishment of expulsion appears to us rather dis proportionate to his having had some deficiencies in his CMT course. There is, h owever, an administrative determination to be made whether petitioner does indee d deserve to be a senior in PHCR. Case remanded to DECS for further proceedings. However, their scores were lower than the 90 percentile cut-off score prescribed by the UPCM Faculty in its meeting of October 8, 1986 effective for academic ye ar 1987-88. Upon appeal of some concerned Pre-Med students, the BOR in its 996th resolution reverted to the NMAT cut-off score of 70 percentile. The Dean of the UPCM and the Faculty did not heed the BOR directive for them to admit the stude nts. This prompted the students to file a petition for mandamus with the RTC. Th e RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction for their admission. After the RTC issued the writ of preliminary injunction, the BOR in its 1001st meeting resolv ed that "the act of fixing cut-off scores in any entrance examination required i n any college of the University is within the authority of the College Faculty. Any question regarding the exercise of such act should be elevated and resolved finally by the University Council of the autonomous campus." In the interim, the RTCs order was questioned before the SC by the UPCM Committee on Admissions, w hich was dismissed. Hence, the students were admitted to the UPCM and passed thr ee years in the college. Before the onset of school year 1990-91, the students, upon advice of the U.P. President and burdened with "three agonizing years of un certain relationship in the College" as well as the BORs 1001st resolution, wro te a letter to the UPCM Faculty where they manifested that they never intended t o question the Facultys right to academic freedom; that they believed the issue was simply on the question of observance of the proper procedure in implementin g admission requirements; that they felt they no longer have any moral right to pursue the court action; that they would leave to the Faculty the determination of humanitarian consideration of their case; that they apologized for offending the Faculty and that they would like to appeal for a chance to remain in the col lege. The students filed with the RTC a motion to dismiss and attached was the le tter to the UPCM Faculty. The RTC dismissed their case with prejudice. In view o f this development, the UPCM Faculty held an emergency meeting where it denied t he appeal of the students by a vote of 86 on the ground that they were not quali fied for admission to the UPCM. The students filed with the RTC a motion to reco nsider its order of dismissal. The RTC issued an order for the admission of the students to the college. The BOR in its 1031st meeting resolved to approve the a dmission of the students in the interest of justice and equity and to order the petitioners to admit them. The petitioners questioned the said BOR order with th e CA. The Dean and Secretary of the UPCM refused to follow the BOR directive. Co nsequently, the UP President issued a formal charge of Grave Misconduct against them and later, issued an Order for their Preventive Suspension. The CA dismisse d the petition of the REYES vs. COURT of APPEALS (Ponente: Medialdea, 1991) FACTS: Respondent-students as then applicants to the University of the Philippines College of Medicine (UP

CM) obtained scores higher than 70 percentile in the NMAT which was the cutoff s core prescribed for academic year 1986-1987 by the UPCM Faculty in its meeting o f January 17, 1986 as approved by the University Council (UC) on April 8, 1986. Batch 2008A. 39

petitioners. The petitioners brought the issue before the SC. ISSUE: WoN the BOR violated the academic freedom of the petitioners. NO. The BOR could validly dir ect the petitioners to admit the students to the college of medicine. RATIO: categorical admission of the absence of a legal right. Considering such antagoni stic conditions, We can empathize with the students mental anxiety and emotiona l strain in their three years in college in the company of some professors who l ooked down on them as academic pretenders. Furthermore, the students were presse d for time as they have only one more year before graduation. These circumstance s combined with the advice of the U.P. President unduly influenced the students to write this reconciling letter. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. The powers vested in the BOR and the UC by the UP Charter (Act No. 1870) are cle ar: to the BOR belongs the governance and the general powers of administration o f the university and to the UC the power to fix the admission requirements to an y college in the university. The University Code grants to the College Faculty t he power to determine the entrance requirements of the college subject to the ap proval of the autonomous UC. Any entrance requirement that may be imposed by the College Faculty must bear the UCs approval. Otherwise, the same becomes unenfo rceable. At the time the students took the NMAT, the new UPCM Faculty prescribed NMAT cut-off score of 90 percentile was without the UCS and University Preside nts approval. Under the UP Charter, the power to fix admission requirements is ve sted in the University Council of the autonomous campus which is composed of the President of the University of the Philippines and of all instructors holding t he rank of professor, associate professor or assistant professor (Section 9, Act 1870). The UC has the final say in admission requirements provided the same con forms with law, rules and regulations of the university. In the event the power is abused or misused, it becomes the duty of the BOR, being the highest governin g body in the university, to step in and to correct the anomaly. The questioned order of the Board of Regents in upholding the admission requirement approved by the University Council in 1986 is supportive of right of the University Council to fix or approve admission requirements, against the UPCM faculty and Dean who changed the admission requirements approved by the University Council without f ollowing the prescribed rules and procedures of the University. We are, likewise , unconvinced by petitioners arguments that the BORs 1031st is contrary to jus tice and equity because the students themselves judicially confessed that they h ave no right to admission. In their letter to the Faculty, The students aforesa id feeling does not amount to a U.P. vs. COURT of APPEALS Ponente: J. Romero FACTS: Petitioner UP questions, in this petition for review on certiorari the Order of the lower court denying the motion to dismiss the complaint for damages filed against two of its professors for alleged derogatory statement uttered concerning the Tasadays, the cave-dwell ing inhabitants of the rain forest of Mindanao. August 15-17, 1986: The "Interna tional Conference on the Tasaday Controversy and Other Urgent Anthropological Is sues" was held at the Philippine Social Science Center in Diliman, Quezon City.

Jerome Bailen, Professor of the University of the Philippines (UP) Dept of Anthr opology was the designated conference chairman. He presented therein the "Tasada y Folio," a collection of studies on Tasadays done by leading anthropologists wh o disputed the authenticity of the Tasaday find and suggested that the "discover y" in 1971 by a team led by former Presidential Assistant on National Minorities (PANAMIN) Minister Manuel Elizalde, Jr. was nothing more than a fabrication mad e possible by inducing Manobo and Tboli tribesmen to pose as primitive, G-strin ged, leaf-clad cave dwellers. In the same conference, UP history professor, Zeus Salazar, traced in a publication the actual genealogy of the Tasadays to Tboli and Manobo ethnic groups. He likewise presented ABCs "20/20" videotaped televi sion documentary showing interviews with natives claiming to have been asked by Elizalde to pose as Tasadays. Almost a year later or in July 1988, UP allegedly sent Salazar and Bailen to Zagreb, Yugoslavia to attend the 12th Intl Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences. There, Salazar and Bailen reiterated their claim that the Tasaday find was a hoax. Their allegations were widely pub licized in several dailies. In their complaint, plaintiffs allege the ff causes of action: 1. defendants conduct and statements that the Tasadays were nonexist ent or frauds deprived them of their peace of mind and defiled the Tasadays dign ity and personality Batch 2008A. 40

2. defendants contention that Elizalde caused the Tasadays to pose and pretend was defamatory and pictured the plaintiffs as dishonest and publicity-seeking perso ns, thereby besmirching their reputation and causing them serious anxiety 3. def endants "concerted efforts to publicly deny plaintiff Tasadays personality and their existence as a distinct ethnic community within the forest area reserved under the Proclamation (No. 995) unjustly becloud or tend to becloud their right s thereunder 4. defendants "deliberate and continuing campaign to vex and annoy " the Tasadays and the use of "false and perjured evidence to debase and malig n" them, caused them to incur attorneys fees and expenses of litigation. The pl aintiffs invoked Art. 26 of the Civil Code and pegged their claims for moral and nominal damages at the "amount equivalent to defendants combined salaries for two (2) months, estimated at P32,000.00." Procedural crap: Plaintiffs (defendant s herein) filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief against the UP pr ofessors stating the above causes of action. UP filed a motion to intervene, sta ting that the UP profs were under their supervision. Salazar and Bailen filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied. With the MFR denied in the lower court, the y filed a petition for certiorari for gadalej, which was dismissed by the SC. Me anwhile, UP filed a motion to dismiss in the lower court, but it was struck off the record. In the CA, everything else was denied, because petitioners allegation s were not stated in the complaint. Hence, this instant petition. ISSUE HELD: 1. WON res judicata applies as regards the denial of the UP profs petition for cert iorari NO 2. WON the UP professors are covered by the protective mantle of Acade mic Freedom YES, but UP should have defended its profs in the course of the tria l case, instead of trying to terminate the proceedings prematurely Hence, the CAs denial of the profs motion to dismiss is AFFIRMED and the case is remanded. RATI O: 1. Super daming procedural crap nakakahilo. While it is true that the instant petition and the previous case revolve around the issue of WON the lower court c orrectly denied the motion to of the UP profs, there is an aspect of the case wh ich takes it out of the ambit of the principle of res judicata (final judgment b y a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive upon the parties in any subseq uent litigation involving the same cause of action). The said principle applies when there is, among others, identity of parties and subject matter in two cases . Concededly, the fact that UP is the petitioner here while Salazar and Bailen w ere the petitioners in the previous case is not a hindrance to the application o f res judicata because the situation is akin to the adding of other parties to a case which had been finally resolved in a previous one. UP was not an original party-defendant in th e original suit, but it intervened and made common cause with Bailen and Salazar in alleging that the case should be dismissed in order to hold inviolate academ ic freedom, both individual and institutional. There is, therefore, a resultant substantial identity of parties, as both UP, on the one hand, and Bailen and Sal azar, on the other hand, represent the same interests in the two petitions. Howe ver, the requisite of identity of subject matter in the two petitions is wanting . Private respondents identify the subject matter as "the trial judges refusal . . . to dismiss the complaint against Bailen and Salazar. It should be noted, h owever, that two motions to dismiss the same complaint were filed in this case a nd they were separately resolved. The first was the one filed by Bailen and Sala zar. The second motion to dismiss was filed by UP but on February 15, 1989, the lower court struck it off the record. Thus, to hold that res judicata applies to herein facts would be stretching to its limits the requirement of identity of s ubject matter. 2. Academic Freedom UP has no cause of action because there are i nsufficient allegations in its new complaint. It cannot invoke the same allegati ons in its original complaint because that has been previously struck off the re cord by the lower court. On its face, herein complaint, however, does not allege any right or interest of the petitioner that is affected by the complaint simpl y because it was not an original defendant. As correctly observed by the lower c ourt, the complaint does not even show that petitioner authorized Bailen and Sal

azar to conduct a study on the Tasaday. Neither does it even appear that the tri p to Zagreb, Yugoslavia of Bailen and Salazar was sanctioned or sponsored by the petitioner. Hence, by filing the motion to dismiss the complaint against Salaza r and Bailen or by alleging defenses in its answer which amounted to invoking la ck of cause of action as a ground for dismissal, the petitioner confined itself to the allegations of the complaint. On the other hand, a cause of action agains t Bailen and Salazar can be made out from the complaint: their acts and utteranc es allegedly besmirched the reputation of the plaintiffs as they were shown ther ein to have staged a fraud. This is not to say, however, that UPs intervention was improper. Coming to the defense of its faculty members, it had to prove that the alleged damaging acts and utterances of Bailen and Salazar were circumscrib ed by the constitutionally-protected principle of academic freedom. However, it should have championed the cause of Bailen and Salazar in the course of the tria l of the case. It erred in trying to abort the proceedings at its inception thro ugh the device of filing the motion to dismiss. This procedural lapse, notwithst anding, no irremediable injury has been inflicted on the petitioner as, during t he trial, it may still invoke and prove the special defense of institutional aca demic freedom as defined in Tangonan v. Pao and in Garcia v. The Faculty Admissio n Committee, Loyola School of Theology. Batch 2008A. 41

Since Bailen and Salazar had defaulted and thereby forfeited their right to noti ce of subsequent proceedings and to participate in the trial, petitioners answe r in intervention shall be the gauge in determining whether issues have been joi ned. With respect to the prayer of the complaint for "judgment declaring plainti ff Tasadays to be a distinct ethnic community within the territory defined under Presidential Proclamation No. 995" the lower court is cautioned that the same i s akin to a prayer for a judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship which ma y not be granted in a petition for declaratory relief. The issue of WON Bailen a nd Salazar infringed on plaintiffs civil and human rights when they maliciously and falsely spoke and intrigued to present plaintiffs Tasaday as fakers and imp ostors collaborating in a hoax or fraud upon the public with and under the super vision of plaintiff Elizalde, is not within the province of the court to make pr onouncements on for these are matters beyond its expertise. RTC declared the Order invalid because it deprived San Diegos of his right to pur sue a medical education through an arbitrary exercise of police power. Angles of t he Case : 1. MECS Order No. 12 creating the three-flunk rule is a valid exercise o f police power. - In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, which upheld the constitutionality o f the NMAR in limiting the admission to medical schools to those that initially proved their competence and preparation for a medical school, Justice Florentino Feliciano raised the following point: - The test is the reasonable relation bet ween the lawful method, which is prescribing the passing of the NMAR as conditio n for admission to medical schools, and the lawful subject the securing of the h ealth and safety of the general community. - The regulation of the practice of m edicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of p rotecting the health and safety of the public. - The power to regulate and contr ol the practice of medicine includes also covers the admission to the practice. - For MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, the lawful subject is the improvement of the p rofessional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools by upgradi ng through selectivity in the process of admission like limiting admission to th ose who passed the NMAT (lawful method). - Furthermore, the use of admission tes ts is widely used in the United States (Medical College Admission Test) and in o ther countries with more educational resources than that of the Philippines. - U ltimately, the measure contributes to the protection of the public from the pote ntially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance that could infiltrate the m edical profession. - Test for the valid exercise police power involves the concu rrence between: a. b. the interest of the of public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State; the mea ns employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to b e accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. DECS vs. SAN DIEGO J. Cruz The basic issue of the case is whether or not a perso n who failed the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) thrice, in violation of the three-flunk rule, is entitled to take it again. FACTS: Roberto Rey C. San Dieg o is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of Bachelor of Scien ce in Zoology. He took the NMAT THREE times and flunked all of them [Court found that he actually failed FOUR times a misplaced persistence like a hopeless love]. W hen he applied for the FIFTH time, the DECS and the Director of Center for Educa tional Measurement rejected his application on the basis of the three-flunk rule: MECS [Minister of Education, Culture and Sports] Order No. 12, Series of 1972: A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After three (3 ) consecutive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time. San Diego went to the RTC to compel his admission to the test. Throu gh a petition for mandamus, he invoked his rights to academic freedom and qualit y education. He also raised the issues of due process and equal protection. By a greement of the parties, he was allowed to take the NMAT. 2. Right to quality education is not absolute - While every person is entitled t o aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to be a doctor A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace to his patient

s. If one who want to be a lawyer Batch 2008A. 42

may prove better a plumber, he should be so advised and advised. - San Diego mus t yield to the rule and the fact that there are other people who are more prepar ed than him, considering the crowded medical schools that we have today. 3. The order does not violate the equal protection clause - A law does not have to operate with equal force on all persons or things. There are substantial distinc tions between medical students and other students who are not required to take t he NMAT and not subjected to the three-flunk rule. The medical profession have a delicate responsibility towards society that warrants a different treatment tow ards them. standardization and regulation of the medical education. It created the Board of Medical Education composed by representatives from education government institu tions, private medical specialty societies, association of medical schools and d ean of the UP College of Medicine. The one of the administrative functions of th e Board is to prescribe requirements for admission with necessary rules and regu lations for proper implementation. The Medical Act of 1959 provides that one of the minimum requirements is certificate of eligibility given by the Board. b. re quiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certifica tes of eligibility for admission. MECS Order No. 52, s. of 1985 provided a unifo rm admission test called the NMAT as an additional requirement for the issuance of the certificate of eligibility. proceeding with accepting applications for ta king the NMA, and administering the NMAT. c. d. Holding: The three-flunk rule is a valid exercise of police power. Court said th at San Diegos intellectual capacity is not depreciated, rather, he may be meant for another calling. The rule is intended to avoid a nation of misfits square pegs trying to fit into round holds. The decision of the RTC declaring MECS Order No. 12 invalid is reversed. The petition was denied by the RTC and the NMAT was conducted and administered. It was noted that the petitioners were not able to present a case of unconstitut ionality strong enough to overcome the presumption of constitutionality. Angles of the case: 1. Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382 , as amended [Medic al Act of 1959], and MECS Order No. 52, s. of 1985 do not violate the provisions of the 1987 Constitution presented by the petitioners. - The petitioners cited S tate Policies which include Article II, Section 11 on the dignity of every human person and human rights, Article II, Section 13 on the vital role of the youth i n nation building, Article II, Section 17 on the priority to education. They als o cited Article XIV, Section 1 giving emphasis to the phrase right of ALL citizen s to quality education. Furthermore, the NMAT requirement is challenged as a viol ation of the fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements st ated by Article XIV, Section 5 (3). - Court said that the petitioners did not de monstrated how the measures provided by the Board collide with these relatively specific State policies. In short, they were not able to present a prima facie c ase with regards to the State Policies angle. - About the right of all citizens t o quality education, this phrase should not be construed as compelling to State t o make quality education available across the board. Quality education, will be shouldered by the State in so far that the citizens were able to quality under fa ir, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements. TABLARIN vs. GUTIERREZ J. Feliciano FACTS: Teresita Tablarin and other students, in their behalf and in behalf of other applicants for admission into the Medica l Colleges who have not taken or taken but failed the NMAT during 1987-88 and fo r the future years to come, wants to be admitted into schools of medicine for th e school year 1987-1988. However, Tablarin and company either did not take or fa

iled the NMAT which is required by the Board of Medical Education (Board) and co nducted by the Center for Educational Measurement (CEM). The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical E ducation and the CEM from: a. enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No . 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the Medical Act of 1959 provides that one of its objectives the Batch 2008A. 43

2. Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382 , as amended [Medical Act of 1 959], is not an undue delegation of legislative power. - The general principle o f non-delegation of powers (delegates non potest delegare or delegati potestas n on potest delegare a delegated power may not be further delegated by the person to whom such power is delegated) flows from the fundamental rule of the separati on of and allocation of powers among the three great departments of government. However, this rule was made to adapt to the complexities of the modern governmen t referred to by Justice Laurel in Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. vs. The P ublic Service Commission. This is known as the principle of subordinate legislat ion. - Standards for subordinate legislation may be expressed or implied. The bo dy of the statute and the goal to standardize and regulate the medical professio n satisfy the necessary standards required. 3. The NMAT is not an unfair, unreaso nable and inequitable requirement which results in a denial of due process. - The petitioners did not specify what factors in the NMAT support their claim. If th ey are questioning the burden imposed by the NMAT, which would pertain to the ut ility and wisdom of the NMAT, then these are matters that should be addressed by the administrative and legislative bodies not by the Court. 4. The provisions q uestioned are part of the valid exercise of the police power of the State. - Pol ice power is the pervasive and non-waivable power of the sovereign to promote th e important interests and needs the general order of the general community. - Th e provisions pass the test for the valid exercise of police power: concurrence t est between lawful subject and lawful method. 5. The flexible cut-off score that can be changed by the Board after consultation with the Association of Philippi ne Medical Colleges does not violate the equal protection clause. - The measure is not arbitrary or capricious. It is a flexible measure that takes into conside ration changes of different factors that would merit a commensurate change in th e cut-off score like: number of students who reached the cut-off score in the pr evious year, available slots, average scores, level of difficulty of the examina tion. Setting a permanent cut-off scores would result to unreasonable rigidity. HOLDING: Prescribing the NMAT and requiring to pass successfully pass it as requirements for entering medical schools are not unconstitutional impositions. Decision of t he RTC DENYING the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. NON vs. JUDGE DAMES FACTS: Petitioner students of Mabini Colleges were not allow ed to re-enroll because they participated in student mass actions against their school the preceding sem On Feb 22, 1988, the date of the resumption of classes at Mabini College, petitioners continued their rally picketing, even though with out any renewal permit, physically coercing students not to attend their classes , thereby disrupting the scheduled classes and depriving a great majority of stu dents of their right to be present in their classes Together with the abovementi oned fact, the lower court considered that in signing their enrollment forms, th ey waived the privilege to be re-enrolled. The Mabini College reserves the right to deny admission of students xxx whose activities unduly disrupts or interfere with the efficient operation of the college xxx In addition the students signed p ledges saying they respect their alma matter, that they will conduct themselves in a manner that would not put the college in a bad light. Judge Dames decision c onsidering these facts said that what the students assert is a mere privileges n ot a legal right. Respondent Mabini College is free to admit or not to admit the petitioners for re-enrollment in view of the academic freedom enjoyed by the sc hool. ISSUE/HELD: WON the doctrine laid down in Alcuaz insofar as it allowed sch ools to bar the re-admission or re-enrollment of students on the ground of termi nation of contract should be reversed. The re-admission or re-enrollment of stud ents on the ground of termination of contract should be reversed. YES RATIO: In A lcuaz, it was said that enrollment is a written contract for one semester and co ntracts are respected as the law between the contracting parties. At the end of each sem, the contract is deemed terminated. However, this case is not a simple case about a school refusing re-admission. The refusal to readmit or to re-enrol l petitioners was decided upon and implemented by school authorities as a reacti

on to student mass actions Batch 2008A. 44

This is a case that focuses on the right to speech and assembly as exercised by students vis--vis the right of school officials to discipline them. The student d oes not shed his constitutionally protected rights at the schoolgate. In protest ing grievances disorder is more or less expected because emotions run high. That the protection to the cognate rights of speech and assembly guaranteed by the C onsti is similarly available to students is well-settled in our jurisdiction. Ri ght to discipline cannot override constitutional safeguards. Citing Malabanan an d Villar the court reiterated that the exercise of the freedom of assembly could not be a basis for barring students from enrolling. Under academic freedom, stu dents my be barred from re-enrollment based on academic deficiencies. Permissibl e limitations on student exercise of constitutional rights within the school. Co nstitutional freedom of free speech and assembly also not absolute. However, imp osition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due process and penalty imposed must be proportionate to the offense committed. (procedural due process: right to be informed in writing, right to ans the charges, right to be informed of the charges against them, right to adduce evidence, and for this evidence to be duly considered) The nature of contract between a school and its students is not an ordinary contract but is imbued with public interest. The Co nsti allows the State supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational ins titutions. [see art XIV sec1-2, 4(1) ]. According to par 107 and 137 of the resp ondent schools manual, a student is enrolled not just for one sem but for the ent ire period necessary for the student to complete his/her course. BP blg 232 give s the students the right to continue their course up to graduation. Academic fre edom not a ground for denying students rights. In Villar, the right of an institu tion of higher learning to set academic standards cannot be utilized to discrimi nate against students who exercise their constitutional rights to speech and ass embly, for otherwise there will be a violation of their right to equal protectio n. School said most of them had failing grades anyway. In answer students say th ey are graduating students and if there are any deficiencies these do not warran t nonreadmission. Also there are more students with sores deficiencies who are r e-admitted. And some of the petitioners had no failing marks. The court held tha t the students were denied due process in that there was no due investigation. I n fact it would appear from the pleadings that the decision to refuse them re-enrollment because of failing grades was a mere afterthought. Discipline may be warranted but penalty shld be commensurate to the offense committed with due process. But penalty, if any is deserved should not anymore be enforced. Mo ot and academic. Theyve already suffered enough. ALCUAZ vs. PSBA Justice Paras: FACTS: Students and some teachers of PSBA rallied and barricaded the school because they wanted to admin to hear their grievances with regards to not being able to participate in the policymaking of the school, despite the regulations set by the admin with regards to protest actions During the regular enrollment period, petitioners and other students similarly situated were allegedly blacklisted and denied admission for the second semester of scho ol year 1986-1987. court ordered the school authorities to create a special inve stigating committee to conduct an investigation, who made recommendations which the school adopted a lot of procedural crap, petitioners and respondents filing and answering the complaints petitioners claim that they have been deprived of d ue process when they were barred from re-enrollment and for intervenors teachers whose services have been terminated as faculty members, on account of their par ticipation in the demonstration or protest charged by respondents as "anarchic" rallies, and a violation of their constitutional rights of expression and assemb ly. Petitioners allege that they have been deprived of procedural due process wh

ich requires that there be due notice and hear hearing and of substantive due pr ocess which requires that the person or body to conduct the investigation be com petent to act and decide free from bias or prejudice. ISSUE: A. Whether or not t here has been deprivation of due process ? B. WON there was contempt of Court by the respondents HELD: A. NO. there was no deprivation of due process. 1. There is no existing contract between the two parties. Par 137 of Manual of Regulation s for Private Schools states that when a college student registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling for the entire semester. Likewise, it is p rovided in the Manual, that the "written contracts" required for college teacher s are for Batch 2008A. 45

one semester. after the close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has any existing contract either with the students or with the intervening teachers. It is a time-honored principle that contracts are respected as the law between the contracting parties The contract having been terminated, there is no more co ntract to speak of. The school cannot be compelled to enter into another contrac t with said students and teachers. "The courts, be they the original trial court or the appellate court, have no power to make contracts for the parties." 2. Th e Court has stressed, that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. Standards of procedural due process are: a. the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accus ation against them; b. they shall have the right to answer the charges against t hem, with the assistance of counsel, if desired: c. they shall be informed of th e evidence against them; d. they shall have the right to adduce evidence in thei r own behalf and e.the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating com mittee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the c ase. 3. Printed Rules and Regulations of the PSBA-Q.C. were distributed at the b eginning of each school Enrollment in the PSBA is contractual in nature and upon admission to the School, the Student is deemed to have agreed to bind himself t o all rules/regulations promulgated by the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sp orts. Furthermore, he agrees that he may be required to withdraw from the School at any time for reasons deemed sufficiently serious by the School Administratio n. Petitioners clearly violated the rules set out by the school with regard to t he protest actions. Necessary action was taken by the school when the court issu ed a temporary mandatory injunction to accept the petitioners for the first sem & the creation of an investigating body. 4. The Court, to insure that full justi ce is done both to the students and teachers on the one hand and the school on t he other, ordered an investigation to be conducted by the school authorities, in the resolution of November 12, 1986. Findings of the investigating committee: 1 . students disrupted classes
2. petitioners involved were found to be academically deficient & the teachers are found to have committed various acts of misconduct. 5. The right of the school to refuse re-enrollment of students for academic deli nquency and violation of disciplinary regulations has always been recognized by this Court Thus, the Court has ruled that the schools refusal is sanctioned by law. Sec. 107 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools considers academi c delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations vs as valid grounds for refusing re-enrollment of students. The opposite view would do violence to the a cademic freedom enjoyed by the school and enshrined under the Constitution. Cour t ordinarily accords respect if not finality to factual findings of administrati ve tribunals, unless : 1. the factual findings are not supported by evidence; 2. where the findings are vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion; 3. where the procedure which led to the factual findings is irregular; 4. when palpable erro rs are committed; or 5. when a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capr iciousness is manifest. investigation conducted was fair, open, exhaustive and a dequate. .B. No. The urgent motion of petitioners and intervenors to cite respon dents in contempt of court is likewise untenable. 1. no defiance of authority by mere filing of MOR coz respondent school explained that the intervenors were ac tually reinstated as such faculty members after the issuance of the temporary ma ndatory injunction. 2. respondent school has fully complied with its duties unde r the temporary mandatory injunction The school manifested that while the invest igation was going on, the intervenors-faculty members were teaching and it was o nly after the investigation, that the recommendations of the Committee were adop ted by the school and the latter moved for the dismissal of the case for having become moot and academic

A. Non- impairment of Obligations of Contracts Art III sec 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed. Ci vil Code Art 1306 The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, claus es, terms and conditions as they may deem Batch 2008A. 46

convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. PADILLA ARTICLE: A CIVIL LAW Article 1306 (Civil Code)- The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they deem conv enient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public orde r, or public policy. The article was taken from Article 1255 of the Spanish Civi l Code. The old provision stipulated that an agreement between contracting parti es was the law between them, and such an agreement must be complied with in good faith. Under the old article, limitations to the freedom of contract included t hose against law, morals or public order. Article 1306 adds those contrary to go od customs and public policy to these limitations. The freedom to contract is pr otected under the constitutional clause that no person shall be deprived of life , liberty or property without due process of law. The author explains that Libert y includes the freedom to contract. He illustrates this through the case of Peop le vs. Pomar, where the Court held that The right to enter into lawful contracts constitutes one of the liberties of the people of the state A citizen cannot be c ompelled to give employment to another citizen, nor can any one be compelled to be employed against his will. Liberty includes not only the right to labor, but to refuse to labor, and consequently, the right to refuse to make such contracts To enter into legal contacts freely and without restraint, is one of the liberti es guaranteed to the people of the state. Also, freedom of contract is both a con stitutional and statutory right. Parties to a contract are free to stipulate ter ms and conditions. However, freedom of contract is not absolute, and is subject to several limitations. The limitations to the freedom of contract are those aga inst: a) Law (The parties cannot stipulate against the law, because the law is s upreme and is always deemed to be an integral part of every contract. It may be possible to compromise a liability coming from a civil case, but this is not pos sible with a liability arising from a criminal case.) b) Morals c) Good Customs d) Public Order e) Public Policy Valid Stipulations include those onerous stipul ations in leonine contracts, stipulations in bond that suretys liability is solid ary and primary, stipulations limiting liability on bond, etc. HOME BUILDERS & LOAN ASSOC. vs. BLAISDELL 01/08/34 Hughes, C.J. FACTS: Minnesota passed a moratorium law providing that in a time of emergency, parties may seek judicial relief with respect tp the foreclosure of mortgages & execution sales of real estate, in that sales may be postponed and periods may be extended. The statute leaves it to the courts discretion as to the length of time that it wil l give an applicant "as it will deem just & equitable." The Act is to remain in effect "only during the continuance of the emergency and in no event beyond May 1, 1935." No extension of the period for redemption and no postponement of sale is to be allowed which would have the effect of extending the period of redempti on beyond that date.The section also provides that the time for redemption from foreclosure sales theretofore made, which otherwise would expire less than thirt y days after the approval of the Act shall be extended to a date thirty days aft er its approval, and application may be made to the court within that time for a further extension as provided in the section. By another provision of the Act, no action, prior to May 1, 1935, may be maintained for a deficiency judgment unt il the period of redemption as allowed by existing law or as extended under the provisions of the Act has expired. Prior to the expiration of the extended perio d of redemption, the court may revise or alter the terms of the extension as cha nged circumstances may require. Blaisdell, under the statute, applied for an ord er extending the period of redemption from a foreclosure sale. Their petition st ated that they owned a lot in Minneapolis which they had mortgaged to appellant; that the mortgage contained a valid power of sale by advertisement and that, by reason of their default, the mortgage had been foreclosed and sold to appellant on May 2, 1932, for $3,700.98; that appellant was the holder of the sheriffs c ertificate of sale; that, because of the economic depression appellees had been unable to obtain a new loan or to redeem, and that, unless the period of redempt ion were extended, the property would be irretrievably lost, and that the reason able value of the property greatly exceeded the amount due on the mortgage, incl

uding all liens, costs and expenses. Though initially denied by the district cou rt, upon appeal the extension was granted by the state supreme court, The state court upheld the statute as an emergency measure. Although conceding that the ob ligations of the mortgage contract were impaired, the court decided that what it thus described as an impairment was, notwithstanding the contract clause of the Federal Constitution, within the police power of the State as that power was ca lled into exercise by the public economic emergency which the legislature had fo und to exist. PETITIONERS: the moratorium law is contrary to the contract clause (Art 1, S 10) and the due process and equal protection clauses (14th Amd). ISSU E-HELD: Batch 2008A. 47

WON the moratorium law is constitutional-YES RATIO: At the outset the court made it very clear that except for the time factor, no other aspect of the mortgage relation was altered. The indebtness remains; in fact, the mortgagor still has t he right to the rentals for the time when the period is suspended. The court the n discussed the historical backgorund of the contracts clause vis-a-vis the conc ept of emergency powers. Emergency does not create power. Emergency does not inc rease granted power or remove or diminish the restrictions imposed upon power gr anted or reserved. The Constitution was adopted in a period of grave emergency. Its grants of power to the Federal Government and its limitations of the power o f the States were determined in the light of emergency, and they are not altered by emergency. While emergency does not create power, emergency may furnish the occasion for the exercise of power. Although an emergency may not call into life a power which has never lived, nevertheless emergency may afford a reason for t he exertion of a living power already enjoyed. In Wilson v. New, the constitutio nal question presented in the light of an emergency is whether the power possess ed embraces the particular exercise of it in response to particular conditions. In other words, there must be a compelling state interest coupled with a narrowl ytailored means to achieve it. The "non-impairment of contracts" clause came to life because at the time the Constitution was being drafted, the drafters were m indful of the fact that there have been an ignoble array of legislative schemes for the defeat of creditors and the invasion of contractual obligations. Legisla tive interferences had been so numerous and extreme that the confidence essentia l to prosperous trade had been undermined and the utter destruction of credit wa s threatened.But as J. Johnson wrote in Ogden v Saunders, to give such a sweepin g protection to the sanctity of contracts could not have been the intent of the Constitution, given the fact that law has over a hundred examples wherein a cont ract may be vioded.Societies exercise a positive control as well over the incept ion, construction and fulfillment of contracts as over the form and measure of t he remedy to enforce them. Therefore there is a need to determine: what is a con tract? What are the obligations of contracts? What constitutes impairment of the se obligations? What residuum of power is there still in the States in relation to the operation of contracts, to protect the vital interests of the community? The obligation of a contract is "the law which binds the parties to perform thei r agreement." Sturges v. Crowninshield. The laws which subsist at the time and p lace of the making of a contract, and where it is to be performed, enter into an d form a part of it, as if they were expressly referred to or incorporated in it s terms. This principle embraces alike those which affect its validity, constructi on, discharge and enforcement. Nothing can be more material to the obligation th an the means of enforcement. The ideas of validity and remedy are inseparable, a nd both are parts of the obligation, which is guaranteed by the Constitution aga inst invasion.Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy. But there is a distinction betwwen an obligation & a remedy as pointed out in Sturges: The distinction between the obligation of a contract and the remedy given by the legislature to enforce that obligation has been taken at the bar, and exists in the nature of things. Witho ut impairing the obligation of the contract, the remedy may certainly be modifie d as the wisdom of the nation shall direct. It is competent for the States to ch ange the form of the remedy, or to modify it otherwise, as they may see fit, pro vided no substantial right secured by the contract is thereby impaired. No attem pt has been made to fix definitely the line between alterations of the remedy, w hich are to be deemed legitimate, and those which, under the form of modifying t he remedy, impair substantial rights. Every case must be determined upon its own circumstances. The general doctrine of this court on this subject may be thus s tated: in modes of proceeding and forms to enforce the contract, the legislature has the control, and may enlarge, limit, or alter them, provided it does not de ny a remedy or so embarrass it with conditions or restrictions as seriously to i mpair the value of the right. Not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of essentia l attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of th

e legal order. The policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government by virtue of which contractual relations are wo rthwhile a government which retains adequate authority to secure the peace and g ood order of society. Into all contracts, whether made between States and indivi duals, or between individuals only, there enter conditions which arise not out o f the literal terms of the contract itself; they are superinduced by the preexis ting and higher authority of the laws of nature, of nations or of the community to which the parties belong; they are always presumed, and must be presumed, to be known and recognized by all, are binding upon all, and need never, therefore, be carried into express stipulation, for this could add nothing to their force. Every contract is made in subordination to them, and must yield to their contro l, as conditions inherent and paramount, wherever a necessity for their executio n shall occur. Thus, the economic interests of the State may justify the exercis e of its continuing and dominant protective power notwithstanding interference w ith contracts. The interdiction of statutes impairing the obligation of contract s does not prevent the State from exercising such powers as are vested in it for the promotion of the common weal, or are necessary for the general good of the public, though contracts previously entered into between individuals may thereby be affected. Sa madaling sabi, police power measure ang nasabing batas. Taking all of this into account, the court concludes: 1)that there was an "emergency" i n Minnesota that warranted the enactment of the moratorium law; 2)the Batch 2008A. 48

statute addressed a legitimate need, the protection of a basic interest of socie ty (here the protection of the economic system and the justness of giving debtor s time; 3)the conditions are not unreasonable; 4)the legislation is temporary in operation. Petition dismissed, affirmed. judgment of Minn SC RUTTER vs. ESTEBAN Bautista Angelo, j.: FACTS: August 20, 1941 Rutter sold to Es teban 2 parcels of land situated in the city of Manila for P9,600. P4,800 paid o utright, P2,400 on or before August 7, 1942, and P2,400 on or before August 27, 1943, with interest at the rate of 7%. To secure the payment of the balance of P 4,800, a 1st mortgage over the parcels of land has been constituted in favor of the plaintiff. New title was issued in favor of Placido J.Esteban with a mortgag e duly annotated on the back thereof. Esteban failed to pay. On Aug 2, 1949, Rut ter instituted this action in the CFI to recover the balance, interest, and the attorneys fees. The complaint also contains a prayer for sale of the properties mortgaged. Esteban admitted the averments of the complaint, but set up a defens e the moratorium clause embodied in RA 342. He claims that this is a prewar obli gation contracted on Aug 20, 1941; that he is a war sufferer, having filed his c laim with the Philippine War Damage Commission [PWDC] for the losses he had suff ered as a consequence of the last war; and that under sec 2 of RA 342, payment o f his obligation cannot be enforced until after the lapse of 8 years from the se ttlement of his claim by the PWDC, and this period has not yet expired. ISSUE: W ON RA 342, approved by Congress on July 26, 1948, if declared applicable to the present case is unconstitutional being violative of the constitutional provision forbidding the impairment of the obligation of contracts YES, unreasonable peri od (see subissue). RATIO: RA 342 o Sec 2: all debts and other monetary obligatio ns contracted before December 8, 1941 shall not due and demandable for a period of 8 years from and after settlement of the war damage claim of the debtor by th e PWDC; o sec 3: should the provision of section 2 be declared void and unenforc eable, then as regards the obligation affected thereby, the provisions of EO 25 dated November 18, 1944, as amended by EO 32, dated March 10 , 1945, shall continue to be in force and effect Moratorium (defn) - is postponem ent of fulfillment of obligations decreed by the state through the medium of the courts or the legislature. Its essence is the application of the sovereign powe r" The test of the constitutionality of the moratorium statute: It is required t hat the period of a suspension of the remedy be definite and reasonable. Impairs the obligation of contracts? Yes, but it is justified as a valid exercise of po lice power. Chief Justice Hughes says: Not only are existing laws read into cont racts in order to fix obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts. The policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a gov ernment to secure the peace and good order of society. State power must be consi stent with the fair intent of the constitutional limitation of that power. The c onstitutional prohibition should not be construed as to prevent limited and temp orary interpositions with respect to the enforcement of contracts if made necess ary by great public calamity. Blaisdell case has its limitations: o impairment s hould only refer to the remedy and not to a substantive right. The State may pos tpone the enforcement of the obligation but cannot destroy it by making the reme dy futile. o propriety of the remedy. The rule requires that the alteration or c hange that the new legislation desires to write into an existing contract must n ot be burdened with restrictions and conditions that would make the remedy hardl y pursuing Blaisdell summary: Police power may only be invoked and justified by an emergency, temporary in nature, and can only be exercised upon reasonable con ditions in order that it may not infringe the constitutional provision against i mpairment of contracts SUB-ISSUE: WON the period of 8 years which RA 342 grants to debtors is unreasonable under the present circumstances. YES RATIO: The purpo se of the law is to afford to prewar debtors an opportunity to rehabilitate them selves by giving them a reasonable time within which to pay their prewar. Case a t bar: These obligations had been pending since 1945 as a result of the issuance of EOs 25 and 32 and at present their enforcement is still inhibited because of

the enactment of RA 342 and would continue to be unenforceable during the 8-yea r period granted to prewar debtors to afford them an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves, which in plain language means that the creditors would have to obse rve a vigil of at least 12 years before they could effect a liquidation of their investment dating as far back as 1941. This period seems unreasonable, if not o ppressive. And the Batch 2008A. 49

injustice is more patent when, under the law, the debtor is not even required to pay interest during the operation of the relief. Reconstruction and rehabilitat ion has swept the country since liberation. it can now be safely stated that the financial condition of our country and the people have returned to normal. This is so not only as far as observation and knowledge are capable to take note but also because of the official pronouncements made by the Chief Executive. 1. ORTIGAS vs. FEATI Yes. Although the validity of the resolution was never questioned in the past pr oceedings, its validity was at least impliedly admitted from the facts. Sec 3 of RA 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) empowers a Municipal Council to adopt zoning and su bdivision ordinances or regulations for the municipality. It gives more power to local governments in promoting the economic conditions, social welfare and mate rial progress of the community. The only exceptions are existing vested rights a rising out of a contract between "a province, city or municipality on one hand a nd a third party on the other," in which case the original terms and provisions of the contract should govern. The exceptions, clearly, do not apply in the case . Yes, the resolution as an exercise of police power by the municipality can sup ersede contractual obligations assumed by the defendants. While nonimpairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it ha s to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power. Police power is the most essential, insistent & illimitable of powers, the greatest & most illi mitable of powers. It is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the healt h, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the peo ple. Its exercise may be judicially inquired into and corrected only if it is ca pricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there having been a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guarantee. Philipp ine Long Distance Company vs. City of Davao . police power "is elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions; it is not, confined within narrow ci rcumscriptions of precedents resting on past conditions; it must follow the lega l progress of a democratic way of life." Dobbins v. Los Angeles - the right to exercise the police power is a continuing one, and a business lawful today may i n the future, because of changed situation, the growth of population or other ca uses, become a menace to the public health and welfare, and be required to yield to the public good. Vda. de Genuino vs. The Court of Agrarian Relations - "We d o not see why public welfare when clashing with the individual right to property should not be made to prevail through the states exercise of its police power. The state, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons may be subje cted to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comf ort health and prosperity of the state and to this fundamental aim of our Govern ment, the rights of the individual are subordinated. Philippine American Life In s. Co. v. General - the laws and reservation of attributes of sovereign power ar e read into agreed upon by the parties. Thus not Auditor essential contracts onl y are J. Santos (1979) FACTS: March 4, 1952 Ortigas & Co., a partnership involved in r eal estate particularly the Highway Hills Subd. along EDSA in Mandaluyong, enter ed into a contract of sale on installments over 2 parcels of land with Augusto a nd Natividad Angeles who later transferred their rights and interests to a certa in Emma Chavez Under the agreement, it was stipulated among others that: xxx this shall be used exclusively for residential purposes xxx 2.

Eventually, defendant Feati Bank and Trust company acquired the lots and started the construction of a building on the said lot devoted to banking purposes Orti gas then filed for a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain & enjoin the def endant from continuing with the construction of the commercial bank in violation of the restrictions set in the contract of sale that was imposed by the plainti ff as part oif its general building scheme designed for the beautification and d evelopment of the Highway Hills Subd Defendant maintains that the area in questi on has been declared as a commercial and industrial zone by the Zoning Regualtio n of RESOLUTION no. 27 on Feb 4, 1980 of the Municipal Councilk of Mandaluyong, Rizal Trial Court ruled in favor of defendant bank Feati holding that the restri ctions set by plaintiff Ortigas were subordinate to Municipal Resolution 27 beca use of the municipals valid exercise of police power. It stressed that the privat e interest should bow down to general interest & welfare. Plaintiff appealed till it finally reached the SC ISSUES: 1. WON Resolution No. 27 is a valid exercise of police power 2. WON the said Resolution can nullify or supersede the contractual obligations assumed by defendants HELD & RATIO: Batch 2008A. 50

existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as between the par ties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also rea d into contracts as a postulate of the legal order. The policy of protecting con tracts against impairments presupposes the maintenance of a government by virtue of which contractual relations are worthwhile a government which retains adequa te authority to secure the peace and good order of society. Dolan vs. Brown - "A grantor may lawfully insert in his deed conditions or restrictions which are no t against public policy and do not materially impair the beneficial enjoyment of the estate. Resolution No. 27, in declaring that the western part of EDSA is an industrial and commercial zone, was obviously passed by the Municipal Council o f Mandaluyong, Rizal in the exercise of police power to safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the people in the loca lity. Judicial notice may be taken of the conditions prevailing in the area. Ind ustrial and commercial complexes have flourished about the place. EDSA, a main t raffic artery which runs through several cities and municipalities in the Metro Manila area, supports an endless stream of traffic and the resulting activity, n oise and pollution are hardly conducive to the health, safety or welfare of the residents in its route. Having been expressly granted the power to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations, the municipality of Mandaluyong, thro ugh its Municipal council, was reasonably justified under the circumstances, in passing the subject resolution. was renewed in July 1985, it became subject to BP 877, which had come into effec t on June 12, 1985. Petitioner: BP 877 should not be given retroactive applicati on because it would violate the impairment clause and the prohibition against ex post facto laws. Relying on Art. 16501, she also claims that sublease was not p rohibited when it was concluded in 1976 and since it was valid at that time, it should continue to be valid even now. Also, she says her mom is the proper party defendant since her mom was the one who inherited the leasehold right from Serv illano, the original lessee. ISSUE: WON the ejectment of lessee Virginia Suarez be allowed? HELD: Yes. Petitioner can no longer retain the leased lot since she is making a profitable business of subleasing it w/o the written consent of the landlord. RATIO According to Art.16872, if the period for lease has not been fix ed, it is understood to be from month to month if the rent agreed is from month to month. As the original contract of lease didnt prescribe a fixed period and th e rentals were paid monthly, the same should be considered renewable from month to month. When the sublease was renewed by Capuchino in July 1985, it became inv alid under BP877, w/c already became effective. The law then, operated prospecti vely upon the new or renewed contract of sublease, w/c to be valid needed the wr itten consent of the lessor. Moreover, BP877 provides that all residential units (The Lot comes under this) the total monthly rental of w/c doesnt exceed P480.00 as of the effectivity of this Act shall be covered. Impairment clause (IC)3 is no w no longer inviolate. More and more, interests of the public have become involv ed in what are supposed to be still private agreements, which have as a result b een removed from the protection of the IC. As long as the contract affects publi c welfare one way or another so as to require the interference opf the State, th en must the police power be asserted and prevail, over the IC. JUAREZ vs. CA CRUZ, J.: FACTS: Lot 502 (hereafter known as The Lot) was leased i n early 1900s to Serviliano Ocampo who built a house therein and lived there w/ his parents and sister Angela. When he died in March 1956, Angela took over the lease and stayed there with her children (including Virginia). In 1976, she move d to Virginias house and leased the lot to Roberto Capuchino. Meantime, Aranetas sold it to Susanna Realty. Inc. which sold it in 1985 to Cetus Devt Corp. After a cquiring it, Cetus filed a complaint for ejectment against petitioner on the gro und that she violated BP877 by subleasing The Lot w/o its consent. Respondents: CA ruled that BP 877 (effective on June 12, 1985) was applicable because the ori gl contract of lease didnt specify a fixed term and payment of the rental was made on a monthly basis. Contract was deemed terminated from month to month. Hence, when it

1 When in the contract of lease of thing there is no express prohibition, the less ee may subject the thing leased, in whole or in part, without prejudice to his r esponsibility for the performance of the contract toward the lessor. 2 If the period for the lease has not been fixed, it is understood to be from year to year, if the rent agreed upon is annual; from month to month, if it is month ly; from week to week, if the rent is weekly; and from day to day, if the rent i s to be paid daily. However, even though a monthly rent is paid, and no period f or the lease has been set, the courts may fix a longer term for the lease after the lessee has occupied the premises for over one year. If the rent is weekly, t he courts may likewise determine a longer period after the lessee has been in po ssession for over six months. In case of daily rent, the courts may also fix a l onger period after the lessee has stayed in the place for over one month. 3 Impairment of obligation any enactment of legislative character is said to impair the obligation of a contract w/c attempts to tgake from a party a right to w/c h e is entitled by its terms, or w/c deproves him of the means of enforcing such a right. Batch 2008A. 51

PVB Employees Union v. PVB Contract is protected by guaranty only if it doesnt af fect public interest. Housing is one of the most serious social problems of the country. The regulation of rentals has long been the concern of the govt to preve nt the lessor from imposing arbitrary conditions on the lessee while at the same time deterring the lessee from abusing the statutory benefits accorded to him. Purpose of BP877 is to protect both landlord and tenant from their mutual imposi tions that can only cause detriment to society as a whole. Here, rental on The L ot is only P69.70/mo. while the petitioner charges Capuchino a monthly rental of P400. While it is true that P400 covers the lot and building, the point is that she isnt paying the lessor enough for the use of the lot in light of the total r ental she is charging Capuchino for the use of building and lot. She has taken u ndue advantage of the rental laws by holding on to the leased premises although they no longer need them for their own residence or administering them to the pr ejudice of the landlord. BP877 is not an ex post facto law. Its not penal in natu re. Virginia is not being prosecuted under the said penal provisions as well. An gela is 92 yrs. Old and is now under the care of Virginia. Thus, it is Virginia who is proper party defendant. She has been receiving the rent from Capuchino an d paying rent on the lot to Cetus. She has taken over the leasehold right for al l intents and purposes. After the trial the court rendered its decision ordering petitioner and all pers ons claiming possession over her to vacte the premises alluded to the complaint and to remove whatever improvement she introduced to the property. Rita moved fo r procedural appeals and of course the decision of the trial court was affirmed hence its elevation to the supreme court. 1. 2. W/o the lease of an apartment in cludes a sublease of the lot on which it is constructed? YES W/o B.P 25 is contr ary to the promotion of social justice policy of the new constitution? NO ISSUE: HELD: 1. The issue has already been laid to rest in the case of Duellome vs. Got ico where this court ruled that the lease of a building naturally leases the lot therein, and the rentals of the building includes those of the lot. 2. The obje ctive of B.P 25 is to remedy the plight of the lessees, but such objective is no t subject to the exploitation of lessees for whose benefit the law was enacted. Thus the prohibition provided for in the law against the sublease of the premise s without the consent of the owner. It must be remembered that the social justic e cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of the property owner, who under ou r constitution and laws are also entitled to protection. The social justice cons ecrated in our constitution was not intended to take away the rights from a pers on to give them to another who is not entitled thereto. CALEON vs. AGUS DEVELOPMENT FACTS: Private respondent Agus Development is the pr ivate owner of lot 39 block 28 situated in Lealtad Sampaloc when it leased the p roperty to Rita Calleon for a monthly rental of Php 180.00. Petitioner construct ed on the lot leased a 4-door apartment building. Without the consent of the own er of the lot, the petitioner sub-leased two of the 4-door apartment building fo r a monthly rental of Php 350.00 each. After learning of the sublease private re spondent filed a complaint for ejectment, citing as ground thereof the provision s of Batas Pambansa blg. 25, section 5, which is the unauthorized subleasing of part of the leased premises to third persons without securing the consent of the lessor within the required 60 day period from the promulgation of the new law. B. Involuntary Servitude

Sec18. (2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishme nt for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted. RUBI vs. PROVINCIAL BOARD [If all are to be equal before the law, all must be app roximately equal in intelligence. main opinion by Justice Malcolm] [They (Manguian es) are citizens of the Philippine Islands. Legally they are Filipinos. They are entitled to all the rights and privileges of any other citizen of this country. dissenting opinion of Justice Moir] Malcolm, J.: FACTS: Under Section 2145, Revi sed Administrative Code, with prior approval of the Department Head, the Batch 2008A. 52

governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authori zed, when he deems it necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct nonChristian inhabitants to make permanent settlements on unoccupied public land to be selected by the provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. In February 1, 1917, the Provincial Board of Mindoro adopted Resolution No. 25 whi ch was presented by Provincial Governor of Mindoro Juan Morente Jr. The resoluti on presents that since several attempts and schemes of the past for the advancem ent of the non-Christian people of Mindoro have failed, it is deemed necessary to ob lige the Manguianes to live in one place in order to make a permanent settlement . The reasons for the resolution are: [1] failure of former attempts for the adv ancement of the non-Christian people of Mindoro [2] the only successful method i s to oblige them to live in a permanent settlement [3] protection of the Manguia nes [2] protection of public forests [3] introduce civilized customs Governor Mo rente Jr. chose the sitio of Tigbao on Lake Naujan, containing 800 hectares of p ublic land for approximately 15,000 Manguianes. The resolution was approved by t he Secretary of the Interior. Executive Order No. 2 was then issued by the gover nor directing all the Mangyans in Naujan, Pola, Dulangan and Calapan [Rubis place ] to take their habitation in the site not later than December 31, 1917. Section 2759Revised Administrative Code provides for an imprisonment not exceeding 60 da ys for those who refuse to obey the order. Rubi and his companions did not fix t heir dwelling within the reservation and they were punished with imprisonment. O n the other hand, Doroteo Dabalos was detained by the sheriff of Mindoro because he escaped from the reservation. Rubi and the rest of the Manguianes sued out a writ of habeas corpus alleging that they are deprived of their liberty. They ar e also questioning the validity of Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 19 17. Exposition of the Court (Baka magtanong si Dean) II. History [Court wants to say that the reservation approach is not new and in fact accepted in the past. In s hort, Court is saying that they deserve it.] A. Before acquisition of the Philip pines by the United States During the Spanish period, the Indios were already reduc ed [reducciones] into poblaciones [communities]. The purpose is to instruct them in t he Catholic faith so that the Indios will forget the blunders of their ancient rig hts and ceremonies eventually allowing them to live in a civilized manner. The crown offered tax exemptions for those who obeyed. Pueblos and reducc iones were provided with basic facilities for survival. Lands previously owned b y the Indios were not confiscated. Each town contained around 80 Indios supervis ed by an Indio mayor. Later, the Governor General issued a decree in 1881, sayin g that it is the duty to conscience and humanity for all governments to civilize those backward races. Provincial authorities should help the priests in their mis sion to civilize. To attain their mission, the Spaniards adopted the policy of br inging under the bell [establish homes of Indios within the reach of the sound of the bell]. Incentives in terms of tax and labor reductions were offered. B. Aft er the Acquisition of the Philipines by the United States President MacKinleys In structions was ratified by the Philippine Bill and the Act of Congress of 1902. In essence, these laws provide that the reservation approach was the same course used by US Congress in dealing with tribes of North American Indians. The approac h was deemed a wise and firm regulation to prevent barbarous practices and introd uce civilized customs. Jones Law was later passed empowering the Philippine Legis lature. The law established the Bureau of nonChristian Tribes that recognized th e dividing line between the territory occupied by Christians and that of non-Chr istians. The distinction is latter recognized by special laws. C.D. Terminology and Meaning Non-Christian tribes was common term used. Religious signification of the term was removed. The whole intent of the term is to denote the civilization or lack of civilization of the inhabitants. It relates to degree of civilizatio n rather than religious denomination. In United States v. Tubban, the term was u sed for an uncivilized tribe, of a low order of intelligence, uncultured and uned ucated. It was held that mere baptism in the Christian faith will not changed ones degree of civilization. E. Manguianes They are placed in the third class in the fo ur-stage classification approaching civilization used by the Philippine census. I n local dialect, Manguianes means ancient, savage etc. III. Comparative The American

ndians [Court is saying that the reservation approach was used also for the Americ an Indians which was perfectly ok.] The treatment for the Manguianes is no diffe rent form the methods used by the US Government in dealing with the Indian tribe s. Their relationship is one in a state of pupilage between a guardian and a ward. Congress had plenary authority in this guardianship. Batch 2008A. 53

The Indians were not treated as having a state or nation. They are treated as a s eparate people. Thus, the US Government is there to protect the Indians form the people of the State that harbor illfeelings against them. These laws were deemed political in nature not subject to the jurisdiction of the Courts. In United St ates v. Crook, a group of Indians led by Standing Bear who fled from their reser vation to avoid disease and starvation were issued habeas corpus after they were detained. Using this case, Rubi was then declared as a citizen of the Philippin es, a person within the Habeas Corpus Act. ISSUES: 1. WON there was Section 2145 i nvolved an undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial board of Mind oro. - NO. Judge Ranney declared that the true distinction therefore is between t he [1] delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discret ion as to what it shall be, and [2] conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cann ot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. Section 2145 was issued under the second mode of delegation. - Section 2145 falls under the exception t o the general rule sanctioned by immemorial practice: The central legislative bo dy is permitted to delegate legislative powers to local authorities. The Philipp ine Legislature conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro. - The reason i s that provincial officers are better fitted to select sites for reservations. 2 . WON there was religions discrimination against non-Christian tribes under Sectio n 2145. - NO. It is clear that the Legislature meant that non-Christian tribes ref ers to natives of low grade of civilization and does not discriminate on account of religious differences. 3. WON the protection afforded by President MacKinleys Ins tructions, the Philippine Bill and the Jones Law providing that no person shall b e deprived of life, liberty and property without due process of law extends to me mbers of nonChristian tribes. - NO. Civil liberty can be said to mean that measu re of freedom which may be enjoyed in a civilized community. It is a legal and ref ined idea, the offspring of high civilization. Considering the that the Manguian es do not have a civilized conception of liberty, they cannot claim the they wer e deprived of it. Furthermore, Section 2145 is applicable to all of a class. The classification based on degree of civilization is not arbitrary. - Due process means that: [1] there is a law prescribed in harmony with the gene ral powers of the legislature [2] that law is reasonable in its application [3] it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure [4] it is applicabl e to all the citizens of the state or to all of a class - Liberty as understood in democracies, is not license; it is liberty regulated by law. It is not unrest ricted license. It is only freedom from restraint. It is not an absolute right. However, it is not limited to freedom from physical restraint. - Chief elements of the civil liberty are right to contract, right to chose ones employment, right to labor and right of locomotion. 4. WON bringing the Manguianes into the reser vation amounts to slavery and involuntary servitude. - NO. Slavery and involunta ry servitude denote a condition of enforced, compulsory service of one to anothe r. In the reservation, the Manguianes are working for no other but for themselve s. - If the Manguianes are not in the reservation, there are vulnerable subjects to involuntary servitude of civilized communities who may take advantage of the ir ignorance. They are being protection from involuntary servitude and abuse. Th ey are, through Bureau of nonChristian Tribes, slowly fused with the civilized wor ld bringing them under the bells. 5. WON Section 2145 is a valid exercise of polic e power. - YES. Without attempting to define police power, it is the power co-ex tensive with self-protection. It is the inherent and plenary power to prohibit a ll things hurtful to the welfare of society. Thus, the law protects the forests from the illegal caingins [slash and burn agriculture in forested areas]. They a re restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. - The w hole tendency therefore of the Court is toward non-interference on the political id eas of the legislature. - In fact, the Manguianes liked the plan. There were encour aging reactions from the children who attended the schools. They were eager to be r eceiving benefits of civilization in the reservations. HOLDING: Section 2145 of the Administrative Code is valid. Their confinement in the reservation does not amount to slavery and involuntary servitude. Habeas corpus cannot issue. Carson,

J. concurring: - I agree that non-Christian tribes denote a low grade of civilizat ion. The test for civilizations has been: [1] mode of life [2] degree of advancem ent in civilization Batch 2008A. 54

[3] connection or lack of connection with some civilized community - Degree of c ivilization can only increase by withdrawal of permanent allegiance or adherence to non-Christian tribes. Johnson, J., dissenting: - They were deprived of their liberty without a hearing. All persons in the Philippines are entitled to a hea ring, at least, before they are deprived of their liberty. Moir., with Araullo a nd Street, dissenting: - The case of the Indian nations in the US cannot apply t o this case because the Indian nations were considered a separate nations where the US dealt with them using treaties. Also, the reservations given to them were very large about thousand of square miles. - In this case, the Manguianes are n ot a separate state. There are not treaties. They are Filipinos, legally speakin g. They are entitled to all the rights and privileges of any other citizen of th is country. - The caingin argument will not lie because the fires never spread t o the tropical undergrowth. These burnings are isolated these are not great abus es meriting their incarceration. - The Manguianes have never been a burden to the State. They have not committed any crimes. In fact, they were described as peacef ul, timid, primitive, semi-nomadic. When there are in reservations, there are mor e vulnerable to involuntary servitude. The needs for survival in an enclosed com munity like food and clothing would be tempting incentives for the Manguianes, w ho do not have the means to produce these things, to trade their freedom to invo luntary servitude. - The majority claim that Section 2145 is substantially the s ame as Act, No. 547 of the Philippine Commission. However, the constitutionality of this earlier Act was not passed upon by the Court. - If the rationale of the Court is applied, then decapitation en masse will result. It will be an open ai r jail for all natives even those who have proven their progress measured agains t standards of the civilized world like the Ifugaos and Tinguianes. - Like the c ase of Standing Bear in the US, I think that the Court should rule that the Mang uianes were deprived of their right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness. determination of the case. Court issued the compromise in their return to work o rder together with injunction company is enjoined not to lay-off, suspend or di smiss any laborer affiliated with the petitioning union, nor suspend the operati on of the temporary agreement, and the labor union is enjoined not to stage a wa lk-out or strike during the pendency of the hearing. Afterwards gotamco filed a nother case w/ CIR because Kaisahan resumed the strike. Kaisahan filed a counter petition saying that gotamco violated the terms first by certain discriminations , by not hearing grievances, by employing four new chinese laborers w/o authorit y of the court and in violation of sec 19 of Commonwealth Act 103 and by firing a certain Naximino Millan. CIR held that there was a violation of the court orde r by kaisahan, that there was no clear proof that gotamco employed 4 new chinese laborers and that Millan was a troublemaker and his petition for reinstatement was denied. Petitioner now contends that court order and sec 19 CA 103 is uncons titutional because it amounts to involuntary servitude. ISSUE: WON sec 19 CA 103 creates involuntary servitude HELD: It cant be involuntary servitude if a pers on voluntarily contracts employment and impliedly voluntarily puts himself under the province of sec 19 CA 103. RATIONALE: CIR: This section is presumed to be c onstitutional. Several laws promulgated which apparently infringe the human righ ts of individuals were "subjected to regulation by the State basically in the ex ercise of its paramount police power". The provisions of Act No. 103 were inspir ed by the constitutional injunction making it the concern of the State to promot e social justice to insure the well being and economic security of all the peopl e. ... Section 19 complements the power of the Court to settle industrial disput es and renders effective such powers which are conferred upon it by the differen t provisions of the Courts organic law, more particularly, sections 1 and 4, an d "other plenary powers conferred upon the Court to enable it to settle all ques tions matters, controversies or disputes arising between, and/or affecting emplo yers and employees", "to prevent nonpacific methods in the determination of indu strial or agricultural disputes" Manila Trading and Supply Company vs. Philippin e Labor Union: the ultimate effect of petitioners theory is to concede to the C ourt of Industrial Relations the power to decide a case under section 19 but den y it, the power to execute its decision thereon. The absurdity of this propositi

on, is too evident to require argument. In the second place considering that the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations under section 19 is merely in cidental to the same jurisdiction it has previously acquired under section 4 of the law, if follows that the power to execute its orders under section 19 is als o the same power that it possesses under section 4. KAISAHAN vs. GOTAMCO (1948) ponente: Hilado J FACTS: Kaisahan staged a strike wh ich paralyzed Gotamco. The two parties were brought to the Court of Industrial R elations. A compromise was made: kaisahan returns to work if Gotamco raises wage s by P2 w/o meal plus the right to bring back little pieces of firewood front go tamco, until the final Batch 2008A. 55

Sec 19 CA 103 does not offend against the constitutional inhibition prescribing involuntary servitude. Whenever an employee enters into a contract of employment , under the said law he also voluntarily accepts those comditions prescribed in sec 19, among which is the "implied condition that when any dispute between the employer or landlord and the employee, tenant or laborer has been submitted to t he Court of Industrial Relations for settlement or arbitration, pursuant to the provisions of this Act, and pending award or decision by it, the employee, tenan t or laborer shall not strike or walk out of his employment when so joined by th e court after hearing and when public interest so requires, and if he has alread y done so, that he shall forthwith return to it, upon order of the court, which shall be issued only after Hearing when public interest so requires or when the dispute can not, in its opinion, be promptly decided or settled ...". The employ ee has a free choice between entering into a contract of employment or not. Such an implied condition, negates the possibility of involuntary servitude ensuing. The court is satisfied that there were formal hearings before the order was iss ued. As to public interest requiring that the court return the striking laborers , the economic and social rehabilitation of the country urgently demands reconst ruction work from the late war that the government is striving to accelerate as much as is humanly possible. The court construes the provision to mean that the very impossibility of prompt decision or settlement of the dispute confers upon the court the power to issue the order for the reason that the public has an int erest in preventing undue stoppage or paralyzation of the wheels of industry. An d, as well stated by the courts resolution of July 11, 1947, this impossibility of prompt decision or settlement was a fact which was borne out by the entire r ecord of the case and did not need express statement in the order. Finally, this Court is not authorized to review the findings of fact made by the Court of Ind ustrial Relations DISPOSITION: Affirm CIR decision. Kaisahan in contempt of cour t with costs. FACTS: The constitutionality of B.P. 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law, which was ap proved on April 3, 1979, is the sole issue presented by the petitions for decisi on. o An essential element of the offense under BP 22 is knowledge on the part o f the drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with th e bank to cover the check upon its presentment. It creates a prima facie presump tion of such knowledge when the check is dishonored by the bank if presented wit hin 90 days from the date on the check. BP 22 is aimed at stopping or curbing th e practice of issuing worthless, i.e. checks that end up being rejected or disho nored for payment. Before the enactment of said statute, issueing worthless chec ks was punished under the provisions on estafa in the RPC but because of the rel iance by the Court on the concept underlying the felony of estafa through false pretenses or deceit (i.e. the deceit or false pretense must be prior to or simul taneous with the commission of the fraud),checks as payments for pre-existing de bts were not covered. o Statistics have shown that a greater bulk of dishonored checks consisted of those issued in payment of pre-existing debts. o BP 22 addre ssed the problem frontally and directly making the act of issuing a worthless ch eck malum prohibitum. Constitutional Challenges to B.P. 22: 1. offends the const itutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt; 2. impairs freedom of cont ract; 3. contravenes equal protection clause 4. unduly delegates legislative and executive powers 5. enactment is flawed since Interim Batasan violated consti p rovision prohibiting amendments on third reading. RATIO: Most serious of these c hallenges is that the statute runs counter to the inhibition in the Bill of Righ ts saying, No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax. Pe titioners claim that the statute is nothing more than a veiled device to coerce payment of a debt under the threat of penal sanction. C. Imprisonment for NonPayment of Debt Section 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax. LOZANO vs. MARTINEZ December 18, 1986 Yap, J:

Prohibition in the Bill of Rights was intended to prevent commitment of debtors to prison for liabilities arising from actions ex contractu and was never meant to include damages arising in actions ex delicto. In answering whether BP 22 vio lates the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt, it is necessa ry to examine what the statute prohibits and punishes as an offense. The gravame n of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation Batch 2008A. 56

which the law punishes. The law is not intended to coerce a debtor to pay his de bt but is to prohibit under pain penal sanction the making of worthless checks a nd putting them into circulation because of the deleterious effects it has on th e public interest. o An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong , hence, not malum in se, but because of the harm that inflicts on the community , it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum in the exercise of the states police power. o The harmful practice of putting valueless commerci al papers in circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can very well pollute the c hannels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. It is not for the judiciary to ques tion the wisdom behind the statute. It is sufficient that there exists a nexus b etween means and ends. HELD: We find the enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against impri sonment for debt. Regarding violation of freedom to contract: freedom to contrac t which is protected is freedom to enter into lawful contracts. Besides, checks are commercial instruments and cannot be categorized as mere contracts. Regardin g violation of equal protection: contended that is just as responsible for the c rime as the drawer of the check and should also be punished since without his in dispensable participation there is not crime. Unacceptable since it is tantamoun t to saying that swindled should be punished alongside the swindler. Regarding u ndue delegation: What cannot be delegated is the power to make laws which is the power to define the offense sough to be punished and to prescribe the penalty, it does not cover the contention that the offense is not completed by the sole a ct of the drawer but depends on the will of the payee in presenting the check to the bank for payment. Regarding violation of prohibition against amendments in 3rd reading: text approved by the body is the text approved on second reading. with the crime of illegal detention. The said defendants, together with other pe rsons unknown armed with revolvers and daggers, went one night about the middle of November, 1902, to the house of one Felix Punsalan, situated in Matang-tubig, barrio of Malinta, town of Polo, Province of Bulacan, and by force and violence took the said Felix Punsalan, without, up to the date of this information, havi ng given any information as to his whereabouts or having proven that they set hi m at liberty. The defendants on being arraigned pleaded not guilty. The court be low rendered judgment condemning each one of the defendants, Baldomero Navarro, Marcelo de Leon, and Feliciano Felix (alias Bulag), to life imprisonment and pay ment of the costs of prosecution. Against this judgment the defendants appealed. Article 481 of the Penal Code provides that a private person who shall lock up or detain another, or in any way deprive him of his liberty shall be punished wi th the penalty of prision mayor. The second paragraph of article 483 provides th at one who illegally detains another and fails to give information concerning hi s whereabouts, or does not prove that he set him at liberty, shall be punished w ith cadena temporal in its maximum degree to life imprisonment. ISSUE: WON artic le 143 has the effect of forcing a defendant to become a witness in his own beha lf or to take a much severer punishment ? HELD: Yes. Judgment reversed. Defendan ts are found guilty of the crime defined and punished in by article 482 of the P enal Code, with AC of nocturnity with legal accessory penalties and payment of c osts. RATIO: -This provisions of the law has the effect of forcing a defendant t o become a witness in his own behalf or to take a much severer punishment. The b urden is put upon him of giving evidence if he desires to lessen the penalty, or , in other words, of criminating himself, for the very statement of the whereabo uts of the victim or the proof that the defendant set him at liberty amounts to a confession that the defendant unlawfully detained the person. And so in order to arrive at a true interpretation of article 483 it is necessary to examine tha t system of procedure. In Escriches Jurisprudence: Dictionary of Legislation an d D. Right Against Self Incrimination U.S vs. NAVARRO

FACTS: The defendants, Baldomero Navarro, Marcelo de Leon, and Fidel Feliciano ( alias Bulag) are charged criminal prosecution is divided into two principal parts or sections which are, first, the summary, and second, the penalty stages. The principal purpose of the summary trial is to inquire whether a criminal act has been committed and to de termine by whom the act has been committed that is to say, the object is to get Batch 2008A. 57

together all the date possible for the purpose of proving that an act falling wi thin the sanction of the penal law has been committed by such and such persons. In the plenary stage the purpose is a contradictory discussion of the question o f the guilt or innocence of the defendant, and the rendition of a judgment of co nviction or acquittal. It may well be that although it appears in the summary st age of the proceeding that the act has been performed by the accused, still in t he plenary stage it may be shown that the act was not really criminal or that th ere was a lawful excuse for its commission. The record of the summary proceeding should contain evidence of the commission of a punishable act, all possible dat a tending to point out the delinquent, a record of all proceedings connected wit h his arrest and imprisonment, the answers of the accused to the interrogatories put to him as to any other witness to obtain from him a statement of all he kno ws concerning the crime and those guilty of it. Now let us apply the rules of la w above indicated to the case in question, supposing that the crime had been com mitted prior to the passage of the Philippine bill or General Orders, No. 58. Th e judicial authorities having reason to believe that someone has been illegally detained or kidnapped proceed to make a secret investigation of the case, arrest the suspected culprit, and demand of him that he give any information he may ha ve concerning the act under investigation and to state whatever may have been hi s own participation therein. The evidence shows that someone has been taken away from home and has not been heard of again, and the facts point to the prisoner as the presumptive criminal. He is told to state what he knows of the matter. If he does so, and proves that the person detained was liberated by him, or that s uch person is living in such and such a place, then the prosecuting attorney wil l know that he must draw a charge under the first or following sections of artic le 481, according to whether the facts elicited by the preliminary or summary in vestigation show only a detention in general, or for the specific periods of tim e indicated in the latter part of the section. But if the prisoner fails to prov e the whereabouts of the person whom he is accused of making away with, or that he liberated him, then the prosecuting attorney has a case falling within the la st paragraph of article 483. It follows, therefore, from an examination of the o ld law that no prosecution under this article would have ever been possible with out a concomitant provision of the procedural law which made it the duty of the accused to testify and permitted the prosecution to draw an unfavorable deductio n from his refusal to do so. The crime defined by article 483 was composed of th ree elements: (a) The illegal detention of a person by the accused. (b) Lack of evidence up to the time of the summary investigation that this perso n had recovered his liberty. (c) A failure on the part of the accused in the cou rse of the summary proceeding to prove that he had liberated the person detained , or to give information at that time of his whereabouts, or a refusal to give a ny evidence at all which left him in the same position as would an unsuccessful attempt to prove the facts above mentioned, and which were necessary to overcome the prima facie case made out by the proof of the first two elements Now every one of these ingredients of the offense must exists before an information can be filed for a prosecution under this article. The real trial was the plenary and was very similar to out regular trial after arraignment. But the summary, with i ts secret and inquisitorial methods, was vastly different from our preliminary i nvestigation. If the right had been taken away to question the accused and compe l him to testify, then element (c) above indicated, would have always been lacki ng. And that right has been taken from the prosecution by both General Orders, N o. 58, and by the guaranty embodied in the Philippine bill. That being the case the crime defined in article 483 can not now be committed, because the possibili ty of adding to the element (a) arising from the act of the accused the other tw o elements equally essential to the offense has been forever swept away by the e xtension to these Islands of the constitutional barrier against an inquisitorial investigation of crime. this case the prosecuting attorney charges the accused with kidnapping some person and with not having given any information of the whe reabouts of that person, of having proved that he the accused has set him at lib erty. To make out a case the Government must show that the prisoner has been gui

lty of every act or omission necessary to constitute the crime of which he is ch arged, and it will not be disputed that the exercise of an absolute right can no t form part of a crime. In this case the Government has proved that the defendan t was guilty of a breach of his duty to respect the rights of others by showing that he, with others, carried a certain individual away from his house against h is will, the accused not being vested with authority to restrain his fellow-citi zens of liberty. It is impossible for the Government to prove the other elements of the crime, because the acts necessary to constitute them must be anterior in point of time to the trial, and must constitute some breach of duty under an ex isting law. It has been demonstrated that the omission which, under the former l aw constituted the two remaining elements, is no longer penalized but is nothing more than the exercise of one of the most essential rights pertaining to an acc used person. - The provision that no one is bound to criminate himself is older than the Gove rnment of the United States. At an early day it became a part of the common law of England. Batch 2008A. 58

- It was established on the grounds of public policy and humanity of policy, bec ause if the party were required to testify, it would place the witness under the strongest temptation to commit the crime of perjury, and of humanity, because i t would prevent the extorting of confessions by duress. - It had its origin in a protest against the inquisitorial methods of interrogating the accused person, which had long obtained in the continental system. (Joness Law of Evidence, sec . 887; Blacks Constitutional Law, 575.) Precisely the same of law applies to th e case at bar. If the defendant does not do certain things, if he does not make certain statements or proofs, he is severely punished. It may be said that the d efendant is only required to speak on one point in the case, that the prosecutio n must prove the illegal detention, and that the burden of showing the whereabou ts only is put upon the defendant. - it be urged that the defendant is not compe lled to testify, that he remain mute, the answer is that, the illegal detention only being proved by the prosecution, if he does not make certain proof, if he r emains mute, then not only the presumption but the fact of guilt follows as a co nsequence of his silence, and such a conclusion is not permitted under American law. - It is the duty of the prosecution, in order to convict one of a crime, to produce evidence showing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; and the accused can n ot be called upon either by express words or acts to assist in the production of such evidence; nor should his silence be taken as proof against him. He has a r ight to rely on the presumption of innocence until the prosecution proves him gu ilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged. -In the language of Mr. Justice Bradley, in the Boyd case, "any compulsory discovery by extorting t he partys oath . . . to convict him of a crime . . . is contrary to the princip les of free government; it is abhorrent to the instincts of an Englishman; it is abhorrent to the instincts of an American. It may suit the purposes to despotic power but it can not abide the pure atmosphere of political liberty and persona l freedom." ISSUE: WON the compelling of a woman to permit her body to be examined violates the Bill of Rights and the Code of Criminal Procedure. HELD: No it does not. Wri t of habeas corpus being prayed for is denied. RATIO: The court here acknowledge d that there are a number of authorities that deal with the subject, though many are conflicting. Cited was the case of People v. McCoy, a case dealing in infan ticide, where the court deemed it a violation of the Constitution to compel the defendant to submit her body to examination, being a violation of the right agai nst selfincrimination. In State v. Height, J. McClain recommended that the gener al rule should be that a defendant can be compelled to disclose only those parts of the body which are not usually covered. The court in this case, progressive de cisions. however, looks to more Cited was the decision of J. Holmes in Holt v. US, where he said based upon what he termed "an extravagant extension of the Fifth Amendment," said: "The prohibit ion of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material." Th e Philippine SC also seemed to limit the protection, stating that the limitation was to be "simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the defen dants own lips, against his will, an admission of his guilt. While the court ag rees with the latter two interpretations, it does not attempt to draw any dividi ng line, as this would be too difficult to determine. This case, however, is see n as one of the most extreme cases which could be imagined. Quote: For the nonce we would prefer to forget them entirely, and here in the Philippines, being in t he agreeable state of breaking new ground, would rather desire our decision to r est on a strong foundation of reason and justice than on a weak one blind adhere nce to tradition and precedent. Going into the history of the law, it is seen tha t it was made as a deterrent to odious inquisitorial methods of interrogating an accused person by which to extort unwilling confessions with the ever-present te mptation to commit the crime of perjury. DUE PROCESS

VILLAFLOR vs. SUMMERS J. Malcolm FACTS: Petitioner Emeteria Villaflor here was c harged with adultery. She was then asked to submit to a physical examination to determine if she was pregnant or not. She refused to obey and challenged the ord er on the ground of being in violation of the constitutional provision relating to self incrimination. Batch 2008A. 59

Under the due process of law, every person has a natural and inherent right to t he possession and control of his own body. However, superior to the complete imm unity of a person to be let alone is the inherent which the public has in the or derly administration of justice. Between a sacrifice of the ascertainment of tru th to personal considerations, between a disregard of the public welfare for ref ined notions of delicacy, law and justice cannot hesitate. ELEMENTS/PURPOSE OF C RIMINAL TRIAL (in case he wants to discuss this) The object of having criminal l aws is to purge the community of persons who violate the laws to the great preju dice of their fellow men. Criminal procedure, the rules of evidence, and constit utional provisions, are then provided, not to protect the guilty but to protect the innocent. No evidence of physical facts can for any substantial reason be he ld to be detrimental to the accused except in so far as the truth is to be avoid ed in order to acquit a guilty person. a 9 year-old girl. The RTC convicted him and sentenced him with the penalty of d eath. 2. Vallejo questions the validity of the oral and written confessions pres ented as evidence against him. He alleges that the oral confessions were inadmis sible in evidence for being hearsay, while the extrajudicial confessions were ob tained through force and intimidation. According to him, the police forced him t o admit that he had raped and killed the girl and that he admitted having commit ted the crime to stop them from beating him up. He also claimed the police even burned his penis with a lighted cigarette and pricked it with a needle. He furth er claims that, although he admitted to Mayor Abutan and Atty. Leyva the commiss ion of the crime, this was because the police had maltreated him. He did not tel l the mayor or Atty. Leyva that he had been tortured because the policemen were around and he was afraid of them. Mayor Abutan and Atty. Leyva were not also pre sent when he gave his confession to the police and signed the same. He claims th at although the extrajudicial confession was in his own handwriting, he merely c opied the contents thereof from a pattern given to him by the police. 3. 4. PEOPLE vs. VALLEJO (2002, per curiam) PERTINENT PROVISIONS: Section 12 of Art. I II of the Constitution provides in pertinent parts: "(1) Any person under invest igation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, prefer ably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and i n the presence of counsel. "(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidatio n or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secr et detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detentio n are prohibited. "(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 shall be inadmissible in evidence against him." There are two kin ds of involuntary or coerced confessions treated in this constitutional provisio n: (1) coerced confessions, the product of third degree methods such as torture, force, violence, threat, and intimidation, which are dealt with in paragraph 2 of Section 12, and (2) uncounselled statements, given without the benefit of Mir anda warnings, which are the subject of paragraph 1 of the same section. FACTS: 1. Accused Vallejo was charged with the crime of rape with homicide for the rape -slaying of ISSUE: WoN the extrajudicial confessions of the accused are admissible as evidence hese were allegedly obtained through force and intimidation and without the of a lawyer. HELD: YES, these are admissible. The accused failed to support contention that these were obtained through fraud and intimidation and that as not assisted by proper counsel. as t aid his he w

RATIO: Vallejo cannot now claim that he was not apprised of the consequences of

the statements he was to make as well as the written confessions he was to execu te. Neither can he question the qualifications of Atty. Lupo Leyva who acted as his counsel during the investigation. To be an effective counsel, a lawyer need not challenge all the questions being propounded to his client. The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from saying anything which might inc riminate him but, rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to preclude the sli ghtest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. Indeed, coun sel should not prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. Batch 2008A. 60

Atty. Leyva testified that he "sort of discouraged" the former from making state ments as anything he said could be used against him. But, as accused-appellant w as willing to be investigated, Atty. Leyva said he advised him to tell the truth Vallejo admitted that he was first asked whether he wanted the services of Atty . Leyva before the latter acted as his defense counsel. And counsel who is provi ded by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where the latter never raised any objection against the formers appointment during the course of the investigation but, on the contrary, thereafter subscribed to the veracity of his statement before the swearing officer. In previous cases decided by the SC, the accused made extrajudicial confessions to the municipal mayor freely and volunt arily. In all of them, the extrajudicial confessions were held admissible in evi dence, being the spontaneous, free, and voluntary admissions of the guilt of the accused. We note further that the testimony of Mayor Abutan was never objected to by the defense. In this case, the mayors questions to accused-appellant were not in the nature of an interrogation, but rather an act of benevolence by a le ader seeking to help one of his constituents. OBITER: At all events, even if accused-appellant was truthful and his assailed c onfessions are inadmissible, the circumstantial evidence, as already shown, is s ufficient to establish his guilt beyond all reasonable doubt. The prosecution wi tnesses presented a mosaic of circumstances showing accused-appellants guilt. T heir testimonies rule out the possibility that the crime was the handiwork of so me other evil mind. These witnesses have not been shown to have been motivated b y ill will against accused-appellant. BELTRAN vs. SAMSON Ponente: J. Romualdez (1929) FACTS: The petitioner complains that Judge Samson ordered him to appear before the provincial fiscal to take dic tation in his own handwriting from the latter. The order was given upon petition of said fiscal for the purpose of comparing the petitioners handwriting and de termining whether or not it is he who wrote certain documents supposed to be fal sified. The respondents contend that the petitioner is not entitled to the remed y applied for, inasmuch as the order prayed for by the provincial fiscal and lat er granted by the court below, and against which the instance action was brought , is based on the provisions of section 1687 of the Administrative Code and on t he doctrine laid down in case law The fiscal under section 1687 of the Administr ative Code, and the proper judge, upon motion of the fiscal, may compel witnesse s to be present at the investigation of any crime of misdemeanor. But this power must be exercised without prejudice to the constitutional rights of persons cit ed to appear. The petitioner, in refusing to perform what the fiscal demanded, s eeks refuge in the constitutional provision contained in the Jones Law and incor porated in General Orders, No. 58. The said provision is found in paragraph 3, s ection 3 of the Jones Law which (in Spanish) reads: "Ni se le obligara a declara r en contra suya en ningun proceso criminal" and has been incorporated in our Cr iminal Procedure (General Orders, No. 58) in section 15 (No. 4) and section 56. As to the extent of this privilege, it should be noted first of all, that the En glish text of the Jones Law, which is the original one, reads as follows: "Nor s hall he be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." As t o its scope, this privilege is not limited precisely to testimony, but extends t o all giving or furnishing of evidence. ISSUE/HELD: W/O Not writing from the fis cals dictation by the petitioner for the purpose of comparing the latters hand writing and determining whether he wrote certain documents supposed to be falsif ied, violates the petitioners right against self-incrimination. YES

The bare assertions of maltreatment by the police authorities in extracting conf essions from the accused are not sufficient. The standing rule is that "where th e defendants did not present evidence of compulsion, or duress nor violence on t heir person; where they failed to complain to the officer who administered their oaths; where they did not institute any criminal or administrative action again st their alleged intimidators for maltreatment; where there appeared to be no ma rks of violence on their bodies; and where they did not have themselves examined by a reputable physician to buttress their claim," all these will be considered as indicating voluntariness. Accused testified that he was made to stay in the municipal hall from 10:00 oclock in the morning until 11:00 oclock that night of July 10, 1999, during which time he was boxed, tortured, and hit with a piece of wood by policemen to make him admit to the crime. However, accused was physi cally examined by Dr. Antonio Vertido at about 9:00 oclock in the evening of th e same day. While the results show that accused-appellant did sustain injuries, the same are incompatible with his claim of torture. Batch 2008A. 61

RATIO: Whenever a defendant, at the trial of his case, testifying in his own beh alf, denies that a certain writing or signature is in his own hand, he may on cr oss-examination but compelled to write in open court in order that the jury may be able to compare his handwriting with the one in question. It was so held in t he case of Bradford vs. People and Sprouse vs. Com. However, in the case of Spro use vs. Com., the defendant voluntarily offered to write, to furnish a specimen of his handwriting. We cite this case particularly because the court there gave prominence to the defendants right to decline to write, and to the fact that he voluntarily wrote. In this case, we are not concerned with a defendant, for it does not appear that any information was filed against the petitioner for the su pposed falsification, and still less is it a question of a defendant on trial te stifying and under cross-examination. This is only an investigation prior to the information and with a view to filing it. Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hand, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical and a ttention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states. Except that it is more serious, we believe the present case is similar to that of producing documents of chattels in ones pos session. For the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is requir ed to furnish evidence against himself. And we say that the present case is more serious than that of compelling the production of documents or chattels, becaus e here the witness is compelled to write and create, by means of the act of writ ing, evidence which does not exist, and which may identify him as the falsifier. It cannot be contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a speci men of the petitioners handwriting is not granted, the crime would go unpunishe d. Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is a municipal treasurer, ac cording to Exhibit A, it should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obta in genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain a specimen or specimens without resorting to the means complained of here in, that is not reason for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the con stitution. It might be true that in some cases criminals may succeed in evading the hand of justice, but such cases are accidental and do not constitute the rai son detre of the privilege. This constitutional privilege exists for the protec tion of innocent persons. With respect to the judgments rendered by this court a nd cited on behalf of the respondents, it should be remembered that in the case of People vs. Badilla (48 Phil., 718), it does not appear that the defendants and other witnesses were que stioned by the fiscal against their will, and if they did not refuse to answer, they must be understood to have waived their constitutional privilege, as they c ould certainly do. "The privilege not to give self-incriminating evidence, while absolute when claimed, may be waived by any one entitled to invoke it." CABAL vs. KAPUNAN FACTS: Col. Maristela filed w/ Sec of Natl Defense a complaint charging Manuel Cabal, then AFP Chief of Staff, with graft and corrupt practices , unexplained wealth, conduct unbecomingdictatorial tendencies, giving false stat ements as to financial life, etc. A month later, the President created a committe e (3 former justices, 2 generals) to investigate the administrative charge and s ubmit a report asap. Upon request of Maristela, Cabal was asked to take the witn ess stand and be sworn to as witness for Maristela. Cabal objected, invoking his right against self-incriminatn. Committee insisted he take the witness stand su bject to his right to refuse to answer incriminatory questions. Cabal still refu sed. Committee referred matter to City Fiscal of Manila who filed with the CFI a charge on Cabal of contempt under section 580 of RAC. Respondent judge Kapunan ordered petitioner to show cause. Instead petitioner tried to have charges again st him quashed. Note that an accused in a criminal case may refuse to answer inc riminatory ?s and take the witness stand. Thus, the issue is: ISSUE: WON the pro ceedings before the committee is civil or criminal, determining won Cabal may in

voke right against self-incrimination HELD Yes. Although technically a civil pro ceeding, as a consequence of forfeiture being in the nature of a penalty, procee dings for forfeiture of property are deemed criminal in substance and effect. He nce, exemption of Cabal in criminal case from obligation to be witnesses against himself is proper. RATIO: The purpose of the charge is to apply RA 1379 Anti-Gr aft Law, which authorizes the forfeiture of the State of property of a public of ficer or employee which is out of proportion of his salary and other lawful inco me. Such forfeiture is of the nature of a penalty as it is a divestiture of prop erty w/o compensation, imposed by way of punishment by the lawmaking power to in sure a prescribed course of conduct. It restrains the commission of an offense, the effect of which is to Batch 2008A. 62

transfer the title to the specific thing from owner to the sovereign power. More over, where the position of the witness is is virtually that of an accused on tr ial, as in the case at bar, he may invoke the right against selfincrimination in support of a blanket refusal to answer any and all questions. 4. WON the inquiry violates the petitioners right to due process. NO. RATIO: 1. As the court held in Angara vs. Electoral Commission, the Constitution provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the departments of the government, and it is the judiciary th at was vested of the powers to determine the scope, nature and extent of such po wers. 2 and 3. Sec 21, Art VI of the Consti provides: The Senate may conduct inqui ries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of proced ure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be r espected. The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquries in aid of legi slation is not, therefore, absolute or unlimited. With regard to the rights that shall be respected, it should be considered to refer to the Bill of Rights, par ticularly the right to due process and the right not to be compelled to testify against ones self. The speech of Sen. Enrile contained no suggestion on contempla ted legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violat ion of Sec. 5 of RA 3019. The purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by responde nt SBRC was to find out WON the relatives of President Aquino, particularly Rica rdo Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36/39 corporations of Kokoy Romualdez to the Lopa Group. There appears no intended leg islation involved. The inquiry also is not conducted pursuant to Senate Resoluti on No. 2124 (SR 212), as the committee alleges. The inquiry under SR 212 is to l ook into the charges against PCGG filed by stockholders of Oriental Petroleum in connection with the implementation of Section 26 Article XVIII of the Constitut ion. Mr. Lopa and the petitioners are not connected with the government and did their acts as private citizens; hence, such a case of alleged graft and corrupti on is within the jurisdiction, not of the SBRC, but of the courts. In fact, the Sandiganbayan already took jurisdiction of this issue before the SBRC did. The i nquiry of the respondent committee into the same justiciable controversy already before the Sandiganbayan would be an encroachment of into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction. 4. One of the basic rights guaranteed by the Consti to an individual is the right against self-incrimination. This right construed as the right to remain completely silent may be availed of by the accused in a crim inal case; but it may be invoked by other witnesses only as questions are asked of them (Chavez v CA). This extends also to respondents in administrative invest igation but only if they partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding. This is not so in this case. BUT since the court already held that the inquiry is not i n aid of legislation, the petitioners therein cannot be compelled to testify. 4 BENGZON vs. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE (20 November 1991) Ponente: J. Padilla FACTS: On 30 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Pres idential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG), filed a complaint with Sandiganba yan against the petitioners of this case. PCGG allege, among others, that: defen dants (petitioners therein) Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez and Juliette Gomez Romualdez, alleged cronies of former President Marcos and First Lady Imelda Romualdez Marcos , engaged in schemes and stratagems to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of the Filipino people. Among these stratagems are (1) obtained control of some bigbusiness enterprises such as MERALCO, Pilipinas Shell, and PCI Bank, (2) man ipulated the formation of Erectors Holding Inc, to appear viable and borrow more capital, reaching a total of more that P2 billion, (3) collaborated with lawyer s (petitioners therein) of the Bengzon Law Offices in concealing funds and prope rties, in maneuvering the purported sale of interests in certain corporations, i n misusing the Meralco Pension Fund worth P25 million, and in cleverly hiding be

hind the veil of corporate entity. On 13 September 1988, Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile delivered a speech before the Senate on the alleged take-over of SolOil Incorpor ated by Ricardo Lopa (who died during the pendency of this case) and called upon the senate to look into possible violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practi ces Act or RA 3019. The Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers or Blue Ribbon Committee (SBRC) started its investigation through a hearing on 23 May 1989, but Lopa and Bengzon declined to testify. The SBRC rejected petitioner Bengzons plea and voted to pursue its investigation. Petitioner claims that the SBRC, in requiring their attendance and testimony, acted in excess of its jurisd iction and legislative purpose. Hence this petition. ISSUES: 1. 2. 3. WON the co urt has jurisdiction over this case. YES. WON the SBRCs inquiry has a valid legis lative purpose. NO. WON the sale or disposition of the Romualdez corporations is a purely private transaction which is beyond the power of the SBRC to inquire i nto. YES. Senate Resolution wherein the activities of PCGG be investigated on the ground, among others, that the Sandiganbayan has ordered the PCGG to answered charges fi led by three stockholders of Oriental Petroleum that it has adopted a get-rich qu ick scheme. Batch 2008A. 63

Held: Petition is GRANTED. The SBRC is enjoined from compelling the petitioners and intervenor to testify before it and produce evidence at the said inquiry. respondents before the Agrava board, to which the respondents objected. The Sand iganbayan resolved to admit all the evidences offered by the prosecution except the testimonies in view of he immunity given by PD 1886. Petitioners: (Saturnina & Reynaldo Galman, Tanodbayan) 1. said testimonies are admissible because the r espondents failed to invoke before the Agrava Board the immunity granted by PD18 86 2. non-invocation of privilege constitutes a valid waiver. 3. right against s elf-incrimination functions only criminal cases Repondents (Sandiganbayan, Ver, Olivas et.al) 1. evidences cannot be used against them as mandated by Sec 5 PD18 86 2. without the immunity provided for in the 2nd clause of Sec 5, the legal co mpulsion imposed by the 1st clause of the same Sec would be unconstitutional for being violative of the right against self incrimination. ISSUE/HELD: w/n the te stimonies of the respondents before the Board are admissible as evidence - NO RA TIO: Though designated as a fact-finding commission, the Agrava board was for al l intents and purposes an entity charged with the determination of the person/s criminally responsible so that they may be brought before the bar of justice. In the course of the investigation it is but natural that those who are suspected of the commission of the crime are to be called in. And when suspects are summon ed & called to testify, they are not merely "sheding light on the incident, the y are in fact undergoing investigation (the crim law definition, which in this c ase can be analogized to a prelim investigation). Therefore, they are supposed t o be read their rights (remain silent, etc) and are supposed to afford themselve s the full protection of the law, which includes the right against self incrimin ation. In this case, because of PD 1886 compelling respondents to testify on pai n of contempt, that option has effectively been eliminated. However, the rights of the accused, being constitutional rights, cannot be set aside. Their act of c ontinuing to testify before the board cannot be accepted as a valid waiver of th e right to remain silent, because in the first place they had no option to do so . The contempt power of the Board acted as a form of compulsion. Lefkowitz v NJ. The right against selfincrimination is not limited to criminal cases, for it is not the character of the suit involved but the nature of te proceedings that co ntrols. Cabal v Kapunan. The Court continues to rule that the private respondent s were not merely denied of the afore-mentioned rights but more broadly the righ t to due process. While it is true that Sec 5 of PD 1886 provides some sort of i mmunity, analyzed closely, it will be shown that it is a form of "use immunity" (prohibiting the use of the witness compelled testimony & its fruits in any man ner in connection with the criminal prosecution of the witness) but it grants me rely immunity from use of any statement given before the Board, but not immunity from prosecution by reason or on the basis thereof. Merely testifying and/or pr oducing evidence do not render the witness immuned GALMAN vs. PAMARAN Cuevas, J. 08/30/85 FACTS: After the death of Ninoy, Marcos i ssued PD 1886, creating the Agrava Fact-Finding Board to investigate on the trag edy. The statute gave the board broad powers, among them : Sec. 4 The Board may hold any person in direct or indirect contempt, and impose appropriate penalties . A person guilty...including...refusal to be sworn or to answeras a witness or to subscribe to an affidavit or disposition when lawfully required to do so may be summarily adjudged in direct contempt by the Board. Sec. 5 No person shall be excused from attending and testifying...on the ground that his testimony or evi dence required of him may to incriminate him...but his testimony or any evidence produced by him shall not be used against him in connection with any transactio n, matter or thing concerning which he is compelled, after having invoked his pr ivilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence, except that such individual son testifying shall not be exempt from prosecution and punishme nt fro perjury committed in so testifying... Sec 12. The findings...shall be mad e public. Should it warrant the prosecution of any person, the Board may initiat e the filing of the proper complaint with the appropriate govt agency. Among th ose who were called in by the Board were private respondents Gen. Fabian Ver and

Maj. Gen. Prospero Olivas. Eventually two reports came out of the Agrava Board and both were presented to Marcos; the majority report by board chair Justice Ag rava and the minority report authored by 4 others. They were turned over to the Tanodbayan, who filed two informations for murder (for the death of Ninoy, anoth er for Rolando Galman, the other dead person on the tarmac who was supposedly a Communist hitman) with the Sandiganbayan against private respondents herein char ged as accesories, with several principals & 1 accomplice. In the course of the trial, the prosecuting Tanodbayan marked and offered as part of their evidence t he individual testimonies of the private Batch 2008A. 64

from prosecution notwithstanding his invocation of the right against self-incrim ination. This the Court said is contrary to due process, as they were not apprai sed of their rights and also because such a "confession/testimony" is inadmissib le under the exclusionary rule in Sec20, Art 4 of the Consti. In order to save P D 1886 from unconstitutionality, the Court held that in view of the potent sanct ion found in Sec4 of the said law on the refusal, the compelled testimonies are deemed immunized by Sec 5 of the same. Petition dismissed. Makasiar, C.J. concur ring: There can be no implied waiver of the right against self incrimination. Al so, because of the nature of the proceedings, the invitations to testify handed out by the Agrava board are effectively subpoenas, hence it takes the nature of a criminal proceeding. the respondents were under the impression it was not, thu s they were not fully appraised of their rights. (Escolin, Dela Fuente, Alampay hold essentially a similar view) Concepcion, concurring: testimony cannot be use d in any subsequent proceeding. (Plana holds a similar view) Teehankee, dissent: It is wrong to exclude totally and absolutely inadmissible the testimonies of t eh private respondents. The right against selfincrimination in proceedings other than criminal is considered an option of refusal to answer, not a prohibition o f inquiry. Thus, it must be invoked at the proper time (according to him, the pr oper time was during the testimony to the board); a person summoned to testify c annot decline to appear, nor can he decline to appear as a witness, and no claim of privilege can be made until a question calling for a criminating answer is a sked. Gonzales v Sec of Labor. Nor were the respondents in a criminal trial, the y were ordinary witnesses. An ordinary witness before the Board could not invoke the right to silence and refuse to take the witness stand. Their right & privil ege (which is not self-executory/automatic ipso jure) was, while testifying, whe ther voluntary or by subpoena, to invoke the privilege and refuse to answer as a nd when a question calling for an incriminating answer is propounded. Failure to invoke this personal privilege automatically results in loss ipso facto. Respondents-Judges: Judges Roan, Cansino, Clauag, Mencias, Jimenez FACTS: Upon a pplication of respondents-prosecutors, several judges issued, on different dates , 42 search warrants against petitioners and/or the corporations of which they w ere officers to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offi ces, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize documents and papers showing all business transactions of petitioners as the subject of the offense in violating Ce ntral Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and the RPC. Pet itioners alleged that the search warrants are null & void as contravening the Co nstitution and Rules of Court (ROC) because: 1. they do not describe w/ particul arity the documents, books, and things to be seized 2. cash money not mentioned in the warrants were actually seized 3. they were issued to fish evidence agains t the petitioners in deportation cases filed against them 4. searches and seizur es were made in an illegal manner 5. the things seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with the law R espondents-prosecutors alleged: 1. the search warrants are valid & issued in acc ordance with the law 2. the defects, if any were cured by petitioners consent 3. the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners regardl ess of the alleged illegality of the searches and seizures The SC issued writ of prelim injunction prayed for. However, it was partially lifted insofar as the p apers, documents, and things seized from the offices of the corporations are con cerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards those seized in the reside nces of petitioners herein. Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized may b e split into 2 groups: 1) those found and seized in the offices of the corporati ons, and 2) those seized in the residences of petitioners. ON FIRST GROUP Petiti oners have no cause of action to assail the legality of the warrants and seizure s made for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective person alities, separate and distinct from the personality of petitioners. The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely per sonal and cannot be availed of by third parties. Consequently, petitioners herei n may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, p

apers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusi vely to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invo ked by the E. Unlawful Search & Seizure STONEHILL vs. DIOKNO PARTIES: Petitioners: Harry Stonehill, Robert Brooks, John Brooks, Karl Beck Respondents-Prosecutors: Hon. Jose Diokno (Sec of Justice), Jo se Lukban (Acting Director, NBI), Special Prosecutors Cenzon, Plana, Villareal, and Asst. Fiscal Maneses Reyes Batch 2008A. 65

corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity. (Th us, the issues pertain to the second group) ISSUES: 1. WON the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures are valid. NO 2. if invalid, WON said d ocuments, papers, and things may be used in evidence against petitioners. NO RAT IO: Art III, Sec 1, par 3: The right of the people to be secure in their persons , houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall n ot be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon a probable cause, to be det ermined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complain ant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to b e searched, and the persons or things to be seized. ISSUE #1 Constitution requir es: 1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manners set forth; and 2) the warrant shall particularly descri be the things to be seized. None of these has been complied with in the conteste d warrants. They were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juri dical persons named had committed a violation of CB Laws, Tariff and Custom Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and RPC. In other words, no specific offense had been all eged in said applications. The averments with respect to the offense committed w ere abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against who it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given p rovision of our criminal laws. To uphold the validity of the warrants in questio n would be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental Constl rights, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the quoted provision to out law the so-called general warrants. The grave violation of the Consti made in th e application for the search warrants was compounded by the description made of the effects to be searched for and seized. The warrants authorized the search fo r and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanc tioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the corporations, whate ver their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of R ights that the things to be seized be particularly described as well as tending to defeat its m ajor objective, the elimination of general warrants. ISSUE #2 The ruling in Monc ado v. Peoples court relied upon by respondents that illegally seized documents, papers and things are admissible in evidence must be abandoned. This ruling is i n line with American common law rule that the criminal should not be allowed to go free just because the constable has blundered upon the theory that the constitu tional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by me ans other than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained (i.e. action for da mages against searching officer). Most common law jurisdictions have already giv en up this approach and eventually adopted the exclusionary rule (exclusion of i llegally obtained evidence), realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizur es. Mapp vs. Ohio: All evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation o f the Constitution, is, by that same authority, inadmissible. The non-exclusiona ry rule is contrary to the spirit of the constitutional injunction against unrea sonable searches and seizures. If the applicant for a search warrant has compete nt evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by th e party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the ap plicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for t he Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation for its issuance is t he necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of the crime. But then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a proba ble cause.

A. Citizenship & Alienage Art IV CITIZENSHIP Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines: [1] Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Co nstitution; [2] Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines; [3] Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippin e citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and [4] Those who are naturaliz ed in accordance with law. Batch 2008A. 66

Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines f rom birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippi ne citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragr aph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens. Section 3. Phil ippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law. Sect ion 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizensh ip, unless by their act or omission, they are deemed, under the law, to have ren ounced it. Section 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national in terest and shall be dealt with by law. Inquiry. The same memorandum directed the Board of Commissioners to review all c ases where entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant was a Philippine cit izen. Among those cases was that of William and others. On July 6, 1962, the new Board of Commissioners, after a review motu proprio of the proceedings had in t he Board of Special Inquiry, reversed the decision of the latter and ordered the exclusion of, among others, respondent Gatchalian. A warrant of exclusion was i ssued alleging that "the decision of the Board of Commissioners dated July 6, 19 62 . . . has now become final and executory. Sometime in 1973: respondent Gatchal ian, as well as the others covered by the July 6, 1962 warrant of exclusion, fil ed a motion for re-hearing with the Board of Special Inquiry where the deportion case against them was assigned. March 14, 1973: the Board of Special Inquiry re commended to the then Acting Commissioner Victor Nituda the reversal of the July 6, 1962 decision of the then Board of Commissioners and the recall of the warra nts of arrest issued therein. March 15, 1973: Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an order reaffirming the July 6, 1961 decision of the Board of Special Inquiry t hereby admitting respondent Gatchalian as a Filipino citizen and recalled the wa rrant of arrest issued against him. June 7, 1990: the National Bureau of Investi gation wrote the Secretary of Justice recommending that respondent Gatchalian al ong with the other applicants covered by the warrant of exclusion dated July 6, 1962 be charged with violation of Commonwealth Act No. 613, also known as the Im migration Act of 1940. August 1, 1990: the Secretary of Justice indorsed the rec ommendation of the NBI to the Commissioner of Immigration for investigation and immediate action. August 15, 1990: petitioner Commissioner Domingo of the Commis sion of Immigration and Deportation issued a mission order commanding the arrest of respondent William Gatchalian. The latter appeared before Commissioner Domin go on August 20, 1990 and was released on the same day upon posting P200,000.00 cash bond. August 29, 1990: Gatchalian filed a petition for certiorari and prohi bition with injunction before the RTC of Manila, presided by respondent Judge de la Rosa. September 4, 1990: petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the case, alle ging that respondent judge has no jurisdiction over the Board of Commissioners a nd/or the Board of Special Inquiry. Nonetheless, respondent judge dela Rosa issu ed the assailed order dated September 7, 1990, denying the motion to dismiss. Se ptember 6, 1990: respondent Gatchalians wife and minor children filed before th e RTC of Valenzuela, presided by respondent judge Capulong for injunction with w rit of preliminary injunction. The complaint BOARD of COMMISSIONERS (CID) vs. DELA ROSA FACTS: July 12 1960: Santiago Gatchal ian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by the Bureau of Immigrat ion as a native born Filipino citizen following the citizenship of his natural m other, Marciana Gatchalian. Before the Citizenship Evaluation Board, Santiago Ga tchalian testified that he has 5 children with his wife Chu Gim Tee, namely: Jos e, Gloria, Francisco, Elena and Benjamin. June 27, 1961: William Gatchalian, the n a twelveyear old minor, arrived in Manila from Hongkong together with Gloria, Francisco, and Johnson. They had with them Certificates of Registration and Iden tity issued by the Philippine Consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing the signature of the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and sought admission as Filipino citizens. Gloria and Francisco are the daughter and son, respectively, of Santiago Gatchalian; while William and Johnson are the sons of Francisco. Ju ly 6, 1961: After investigation, the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 rendered a d ecision, admitting William Gatchalian and his companions as Filipino citizens. A

s a consequence thereof, William Gatchalian was issued Identification Certificat e No. 16135 by the immigration authorities. January 24, 1962: the then Secretary of Justice issued Memorandum No. 9 setting aside all decisions purporting to ha ve been rendered by the Board of Commissioners on appeal or on review motu propr io of decisions of the Board of Special Batch 2008A. 67

alleged, among others, that petitioners acted without or in excess of jurisdicti on in the institution of deportation proceedings against William. On the same da y, respondent Capulong issued the questioned temporary restraining order restrai ning petitioners from continuing with the deportation proceedings against Willia m Gatchalian. Argument of the Petitioners: 1) respondent judges have no jurisdic tion over petitioners (Board of Commissioners, et al.,) and the subject matter o f the case, appellate jurisdiction being vested by BP 129 with the Court of Appe als; 2) assuming respondent judges have jurisdiction, they acted with grave abus e of discretion in preempting petitioners in the exercise of the authority and j urisdiction to hear and determine the deportation case against respondent Gatcha lian, and in the process determine also his citizenship; 3) respondent judge del a Rosa gravely abused his discretion in ruling that the issues raised in the dep ortation proceedings are beyond the competence and jurisdiction of petitioners; and 4) respondent judge Capulong should have dismissed the case in Valenzuela fo r forumshopping. Argument of the Respondents: 1) assuming that the evidence on r ecord is not sufficient to declare him a Filipino citizen, petitioners have no j urisdiction to proceed with the deportation case until the courts shall have fin ally resolved the question of his citizenship; 2) petitioners can no longer judi ciously and fairly resolve the question of respondents citizenship in the depor tation case because of their bias, prejudgment and prejudice against him; and 3) the ground for which he is sought to be deported has already prescribed On Appe llate Jurisdiction Petitioners: under Sec. 9 (3) of BP 129, it is the Court of A ppeals which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments or or ders of quasi-judicial agencies, boards or commissions, such as the Board of Com missioners and the Board of Special Inquiry Respondent: petitioners are not quas i-judicial agencies and are not in equal rank with Regional Trial Courts. Suprem e Court: There are quasi-judicial agencies, as the National Labor Relations Comm issions, whose decisions are directly appealable to this Court. It is only when a specific law, as Republic Act No. 5434, provides appeal from certain bodies or commissions to the Court of Appeals as the Land Registration Commission (LRC), Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and others, that the said commissions o r boards may be considered co-equal with the RTCs in terms of rank, stature and are logically beyond the control of the latter. However, the Bureau of Immigrati on (or CID) is not among those quasi-judicial agencies specified by law whose de cisions, orders, and resolutions are directly appealable to the Court of Appeals . Hence, B.P. Blg. 129 did not intend to raise all quasi-judicial bodies to the same level or rank of the RTC except those specifically provided for under the law as aforestated. As the Bureau of Immigration is not of equal rank as the RTC, its decisions may be appealable to, and may be reviewed through a special civil action for certior ari by, the RTC. On the Bureau of Immigrations jurisdiction to hear cases against alleged aliens and determine their citizenship Petitioners: Bureau of Immigrati on has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and hear cases against an alleged alien, and in the process, determine also their citizenship. And a mere claim of citizenship cannot operate to divest the Board of Commissioners of its jurisdiction in deportation proceedings. Supreme Court: the Petitioners content ion admits of an exception, at least insofar as deportation proceedings are conc erned. Judicial intervention, should be granted in cases where the claim of citi zenship is so substantial that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the claim is correct. In other words, the remedy should be allowed only on sound dis cretion of a competent court in a proper proceeding. It appearing from the recor ds that respondents claim of citizenship is substantial, judicial intervention should be allowed. The competent court which could properly take cognizance of t he proceedings instituted by respondent Gatchalian would nonetheless be the Regi onal Trial Court and not the Court of Appeals. Ordinarily, the case would then b e remanded to the Regional Trial Court. But not in the case at bar. Considering the voluminous pleadings submitted by the parties and the evidence presented, We deem it proper to decide the controversy right at this instance. On Arrest as N ecessary Consequence of Warrant of Exclusion Petitioners: the arrest of responde

nt follows as a matter of consequence based on the warrant of exclusion issued o n July 6, 1962. Supreme Court: From a perusal of Sec. 37 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, otherwise known as the Immigration Act of 1940, it is clea r that in matters of implementing the Immigration Act insofar as deportation of aliens are concerned, the Commissioner of Immigration may issue warrants of arre st only after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien. In other words, a warra nt of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, to be valid, must be for the sole purpose of executing a final order of deportation. A warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration for purposes of investigation only, i s null and void for being unconstitutional. It is not indispensable that the all eged alien be arrested for purposes of investigation. If the purpose of the issu ance of the warrant of arrest is to determine the existence of probable cause, s urely, it cannot pass the test of constitutionality for only judges can issue th e same. Moreover, respondent Gatchalian, along with others previously covered by the 1962 warrant of exclusion, filed a motion for re-hearing before the Board o f Special Batch 2008A. 68

Inquiry (BSI) sometime in 1973. The Board of Special Inquiry, after giving due c ourse to the motion for re-hearing, submitted a memorandum to the then Acting Co mmissioner recommending the reconsideration of the July 6, 1962 decision of the then Board of Commissioners which reversed the July 6, 1961 decision of the then Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 and 2 the lifting of the warrants of arrest issu ed against applicants. The memorandum inferred that the "very basis of the Board of Commissioners in reversing the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry was due to a forged cablegram by the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, . . ., which was dispatched to the Philippine Consulate in Hong Kong authorizing the registr ation of applicants as P.I. citizens." The Board of Special Inquiry concluded th at "(i)f at all, the cablegram only led to the issuance of their Certificate(s) of Identity which took the place of a passport for their authorized travel to th e Philippines. It being so, even if the applicants could have entered illegally, the mere fact that they are citizens of the Philippines entitles them to remain in the country. On March 15, 1973, then Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an Ord er which affirmed the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 decision dated July 6, 1961 admitting respondent Gatchalian and others as Filipino citizens; recalled the J uly 6, 1962 warrant of arrest and revalidated their Identification Certificates. The order admitting respondent as a Filipino citizen is the last official act o f the government on the basis of which respondent William Gatchalian continually exercised the rights of a Filipino citizen to the present. Consequently, the pr esumption of citizenship lies in favor of respondent William Gatchalian.. On Cit izenship of William Gatchalian (procedural) Supreme Court: There should be no qu estion that Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, is a Filipin o citizen. As a matter of fact, in the very order of the BOC of July 6, 1962, wh ich reversed the July 6, 1961 BSI order, it is an accepted fact that Santiago Ga tchalian is a Filipino. In said order it was found that the applicants therein h ave not satisfactorily proven that they are the children and/or grandchildren of Santiago Gatchalian. The status of Santiago Gatchalian as a Filipino was reiter ated where advertence is made to the "applicants being the descendants of one Sa ntiago Gatchalian, a Filipino. In the sworn statement of Santiago Gatchalian befo re the Philippine Consul in Hongkong in 1961, he reiterated his status as a Phil ippine citizen being the illegitimate child of Pablo Pacheco and Marciana Gatcha lian, the latter being a Filipino; that he was born in Manila on July 25, 1905; and that he was issued Philippine Passport by the Department of Foreign Affairs in Manila. In his affidavit of January 23, Santiago reiterated his claim of Phil ippine citizenship as a consequence of his petition for cancellation of his alie n registry which was granted on February 18, 1960; and that on July 20, 1960, he was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a Filipino and was issued Certif icate No. 1-2123. Furthermore, petitioners position is not enhanced by the fact that respondents arrest came twenty-eight (28) years after the alleged cause of deportation aros e. Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act states that deportation "shall not be e ffected . . . unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within fi ve (5) years after the cause of deportation arises." The petitioners alleged ca use of action and deportation against herein respondent arose in 1962. However, the warrant of arrest of respondent was issued by Commissioner Domingo only on A ugust 15, 1990 28 long years after. It is clear that petitioners cause of actio n has already prescribed and by their inaction could not now be validly enforced by petitioners against respondent William Gatchalian. Furthermore, the warrant of exclusion dated July 6, 1962 was already recalled and the Identification cert ificate of respondent, among others, was revalidated on March 15, 1973 by the th en Acting Commissioner Nituda. The Court, therefore, holds that the period of ef fecting deportation of an alien after entry or a warrant of exclusion based on a final order of the BSI or BOC are not imprescriptible. The law itself provides for a period of prescription. Prescription of the crime is forfeiture or loss of the rights of the State to prosecute the offender after the lapse of a certain time, while prescription of the penalty is the loss or forfeiture by the governm ent of the right to execute the final sentence after the lapse of a certain time

. Thus, in the case at bar, it took petitioners 28 years since the BOC decision was rendered on July 6, 1962 before they commenced deportation or exclusion proc eedings against respondent William Gatchalian in 1990. Undoubtedly, petitioners cause of action has already prescribed. Neither may an action to revive and/or enforce the decision dated July 6, 1962 be instituted after ten (10) years. On C itizenship of William Gatchalian (substantive) Respondents arguments on his citiz enship: he has continuously resided in the Philippines. He married Ting Dee Hua on July 1, 1973 with whom he has four (4) minor children. The marriage contract shows that said respondent is a Filipino. He holds passports and earlier passpor ts as a Filipino. He is a registered voter of Valenzuela, Metro Manila where he has long resided and exercised his right of suffrage. He engaged in business in the Philippines since 1973 and is the director/officer of the International Poly mer Corp. and Ropeman International Corp. as a Filipino. He is a taxpayer. Respo ndent claims that the companies he runs and in which he has a controlling invest ment provides livelihood to 4,000 employees and approximately 25,000 dependents. He continuously enjoyed the status of Filipino citizenship and discharged his r esponsibility as such until petitioners initiated the deportation proceedings ag ainst him. Petitioners arguments on respondents alienage: Santiago Gatchalians m arriage with Chu Gim Tee in China as well as the marriage of Francisco (father o f William) Gatchalian to Ong Chiu Kiok, likewise in China, were not supported by any evidence other than their own self-serving testimony nor was there any show ing what the laws of China were. It is the postulate advanced by petitioners tha t for the said marriages to be valid in this country, it should have been shown that they were valid by the laws of China wherein the same were contracted. Ther e being none, petitioners conclude that the aforesaid Batch 2008A. 69

marriages cannot be considered valid. Hence, Santiagos children, including Fran cisco, followed the citizenship of their mother, having been born outside of a v alid marriage. Similarly, the validity of the Franciscos marriage not having be en demonstrated, William and Johnson followed the citizenship of their mother, a Chinese national. Supreme Court: absence of evidence to the contrary, foreign l aws on a particular subject are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippi nes. In the case at bar, there being no proof of Chinese law relating to marriag e, there arises the presumption that it is the same as that of Philippine law. T he lack of proof of Chinese law on the matter cannot be blamed on Santiago Gatch alian much more on respondent William Gatchalian who was then a twelve-year old minor. The fact is, as records indicate, Santiago was not pressed by the Citizen ship Investigation Board to prove the laws of China relating to marriage, having been content with the testimony of Santiago that the Marriage Certificate was l ost or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of China. Neither was Francisco Gatchalians testimony subjected to the same scrutiny by the Board of Special In quiry. Nevertheless, the testimonies of Santiago Gatchalian and Francisco Gatcha lian before the Philippine consular and immigration authorities regarding their marriages, birth and relationship to each other are not self-serving but are adm issible in evidence as statements or declarations regarding family reputation or tradition in matters of pedigree. Philippine law, following the lex loci celebr ationis, adheres to the rule that a marriage formally valid where celebrated is valid everywhere. (see Art. 26 of the Family Code). Thus, he who asserts that th e marriage is not valid under our law bears the burden of proof to present the f oreign law. Having declared the assailed marriages as valid, respondent William Gatchalian follows the citizenship of his father Francisco, a Filipino, as a leg itimate child of the latter. Francisco, in turn is likewise a Filipino being the legitimate child of Santiago Gatchalian who (the latter) is admittedly a Filipi no citizen whose Philippine citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of Immigrat ion in an order dated July 12, 1960. Moreover, respondent William Gatchalian bel ongs to the class of Filipino citizens contemplated under Sec. 1, Article IV of the Constitution, which provides: Those who are citizens of the Philippines at th e time of the adoption of this Constitution This forecloses any further question a bout the Philippine citizenship of respondent William Gatchalian. WHEREFORE, G.R . Nos. 95122-23 is DISMISSED for lack of merit; G.R. Nos. 95612-13 is hereby GRA NTED and respondent William Gatchalian is declared a Filipino citizen. Petitione rs are hereby permanently enjoined from continuing with the deportation proceedi ngs docketed as DC No. 90523 for lack of jurisdiction over respondent Gatchalian , he being a Filipino citizen; Civil Cases No. 90-54214 and 3431-V-90 pending be fore respondent judges are likewise DISMISSED. Without pronouncement as to costs . DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring-dissenting: On Appellate Jurisdiction I can easily a gree with the summary of antecedent facts in the ponencia of Mr. Justice Bidin a nd the reiteration therein of the established doctrine that the Bureau of Immigr ation has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and hear cases against alleged aliens, and in the process, determine also their citizenship, and that "a mere claim of citizenship cannot operate to divest the Board of Commissioners of its jurisdiction in deportation proceedings." I also agree with the conclusi on that the petitioners in G.R. No. 95122-23, the Board of Commissioners and Boa rd of Special Inquiry, hereinafter referred to as the Boards, are quasi-judicial bodies. However, I cannot go along with the view that the case of William Gatch alian should be treated as an exception to that doctrine and, above all, to the law which vests upon the Court of Appeals exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the Boards. Neither can I have solidarity with his opinion that this Court shoul d, in this instance, rule on the citizenship of Mr. Gatchalian instead of remand ing the case to the Regional Trial Court. To grant him these benefits would do v iolence to the law, liberally stretch the limits of the exceptions or misapply t he exceptionary rule, and to unduly pollute the settled doctrine. No fact or cir cumstance exists to justify the application of the exceptions for the benefit of Mr. Gatchalian. On the contrary, substantial facts exist to render immutable th

e unqualified application of the law and the doctrine. On Respondents forum shopp ing William Gatchalian did not stop in his forum-shopping in the regional trial courts. Under the guise of a counterpetition, he is now before this Court in an active offensive role. This is a very clever, albeit subtle, ploy to bang direct ly to this Court the issue of his deportation and to divest the Boards of their original jurisdiction thereon. He could have done this at the first instance; he did not. He and his wife and minor children deliberately chose, instead, to sep arately go to the wrong court, evidently to delay the proceedings before the Boa rds, which they accomplished when the two judges separately issued orders restra ining said Boards from commencing or continuing with any of the proceedings whic h would lead to the deportation of William Gatchalian (Civil Case No. 90-54214) and from proceeding with the deportation charges against William Gatchalian. On respondents citizenship The facts before this Court do not constitute, or even sh ow, a conclusive or substantial evidence that William Gatchalian is a Filipino c itizen. On the contrary, very serious doubts surround such a claim from the begi nning. His initial entry into the Philippines was made possible through a Certif icate of Identity (as Filipino) which was issued on the basis of a forged cableg ram by the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs. Then on 6 July 1962 the then new B oard of Commissioners promulgated a written decision in I.C. Cases Nos. 612108-C to 61-2116-C inclusive (Application for admission as Philippine citizens of Jos e, Elena, Benjamin, Juan, Pedro, Gloria, Francisco, William and Johnson, all sur named Gatchalian) reversing the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 o f 6 July 1961 and ordering the exclusion of William Gatchalian and the others as aliens not properly documented. Batch 2008A. 70

Accordingly, a warrant of exclusion, also dated 6 July 1962, was issued by the C ommissioners commanding the deportation officer to exclude William Gatchalian, a nd others, and to cause their removal from the country on the first available tr ansportation in accordance with law to the port of the country of which they wer e nationals. If indeed Santiagos parents, Pablo Pacheco and Marciana Gatchalian , were married, what was his reason for insisting, through his brother Joaquin, that he, is an illegitimate son? The only possible reason is that Pablo Pacheco is a Chinese citizen, in which case Santiago would follow the citizenship of Mar ciana, a "filipina." But to give full faith and credit to the oral insistence of illegitimacy is to do violence to the presumptions of validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds and the legitimacy of children. (Art. 220 , Civil Code). These are among the presumptions which the ponencia precisely app lied when it rejected the petitioners claim that Santiago failed to establish h is claimed marriage to Chu Gim Tee and Franciscos (father of William) claimed m arriage to Ong Chiu Kiok, both of which were allegedly celebrated abroad. I cann ot find any valid justification why these presumptions should be liberally appli ed in favor of claimed marriages allegedly celebrated abroad but denied to purpo rted marriages celebrated in the Philippines. Assuming that indeed William is th e grandson of Santiago, I find it rather strange why Santiago did not mention hi m in his testimony before the Citizenship Evaluation Board. At that time William was already eleven years old. It is logical to presume that the proceeding init iated by Santiago was principally for the benefit of his alleged children and gr andchildren. It was, as subsequent events proved, intended to prepare the legal basis for their entry into the country as Filipino citizens. Thus, eleven months after he obtained a favorable decision from the Board, and on two successive da tes, his alleged children and grandchildren entered the country. On 25 June 1961 his alleged children Jose, Elena, Benjamin, and his alleged grandchildren Pedro and Juan arrived from Hongkong. On 27 June 1961, his alleged daughter Gloria an d son Francisco with his alleged children William and Johnson also arrived from Hongkong. That he has continuously resided in the Philippines since 1961; he is married to Ting Dee Hua on July 1, 1973, and his marriage contract shows that he is a Filipino citizen; he holds passports and earlier passports as a Filipino; he is a registered voter of Valenzuela, Metro Manila where he has long resided a nd exercised his right of suffrage; he is engaged in business in the Philippines since 1973, and is a director/officer of the International Polymer Corp. and Ro peman International Corp. as a Filipino, and that the companies he runs and in w hich he has a controlling investment provided a livelihood to 4,000 employees an d approximately 25,000 dependents; he is a taxpayer; and he has continuously enj oyed the status of Filipino citizenship, discharged his responsibility as such u ntil petitioning Boards initiated the deportation proceedings against him, are not of any help to William Gatchalian. For, they neither confer nor strength en his claim of Filipino citizenship since they are all rooted on the illegal an d void decision of then Acting Commissioner Victor Nituda of 15 March 1973. A de cision which is void and invalid ab initio cannot be a source of valid acts. Nei ther can such substantive infirmity be cured by salutary acts that tend to confi rm the status conferred by the void decision. On prescription I disagree with th e view advanced in the ponencia that the State can no longer enforce the warrant of exclusion because it is already barred by prescription considering that Sect ion 37 (b) of the Immigration Act states that deportation "shall not be effected . . . unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five (5) years after the cause of deportation arises. Note that the fiveyear period appli es only to clauses other than 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of paragraph (a) of the Section . Mr. Gatchalian is covered by clause (2), which reads: Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act, who was not lawfully admissibl e at the time of entry. Moreover, the warrant for his exclusion was issued within a period of five years following his entry. IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, I vot e to GRANT the petition in G.R. Nos. 95122-23, SET ASIDE the questioned orders o f respondents Judge Joselito Dela Rosa and Judge Teresita Dizon Capulong as havi ng been issued beyond their jurisdiction, ORDER the DISMISSAL of Civil Case Nos.

90-54214 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila and 3431-V-90 of the Regional Tr ial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila and to DISMISS for lack of merit the COUNT ER-PETITION FELICIANO, J., dissenting: 1. I agree that the Warrant of Arrest dat ed 14 August 1990 is defective in its language. The surrounding facts, however, make quite clear that an amended warrant of arrest or mission order, or a new on e correctly worded, may be issued by Immigration Commissioner Domingo for the pu rpose of carrying out an existing and valid Warrant of Exclusion covering respon dent William Gatchalian and his co-applicants for admission. 2. The 6 July 1962 Decision of the Board of Commissioners ("BOC") and Warrant of Exclusion remain v alid and effective and enforceable against respondent William Gatchalian, and hi s co-applicants for that matter. That Decision reversed a 6 July 1961 decision o f the Board of Special Inquiry ("BSI") and held that respondent William Gatchali an and his coapplicants failed to subtantiate and prove their claim to Philippin e citizenship in 1961. Respondent William Gatchalian does not claim Philippine c itizenship by any mode of entitlement subsequent to his application for entry as a citizen of the Philippines in 1961, i.e., by any act or circumstance subseque nt to his birth and supposed filiation as a legitimate son of Francisco Gatchali an, also a supposed citizen of the Philippines. 3. In its Decision in Arocha vs. Vivo, 1 the Supreme Court upheld the validity and legal effect of the 6 July 19 62 Decision of the BOC and the Warrant of Exclusion not only against Pedro Gatch alian, the particular Gatchalian who was taken into custody by immigration autho rities Batch 2008A. 71

in 1965, but also against Pedros co-applicants, which include respondent Willia m Gatchalian. The validity of the claim to Philippine citizenship by Pedro Gatch alian, as a supposed descendant of Santiago Gatchalian, allegedly a natural born citizen of the Philippines, was directly placed in issue in the 1961-1962 proce edings before the BSI and the BOC, and by the Solicitor General and Pedro Gatcha lian in Arocha vs. Vivo (supra). In upholding the validity and legal effect of t he 6 July 1962 BOC Decision that the Gatchalian applicants had not substantiated their claim to Philippine citizenship, this Court in effect ruled that the Gatc halian applicants were not Philippine citizens, whatever their true nationality might be. 4. Should this Court now determine to examine once more the claim to P hilippine citizenship of respondent William Gatchalian, a detailed examination o f the facts, including the supposed status of Santiago Gatchalian as a natural b orn Philippine citizenship, shows that those claims to Philippine citizenship we re indeed not proven by respondent William Gatchalian and his coapplicants. Sinc e respondent William Gatchalian does not claim to have been naturalized as a Phi lippine citizen after rendition of the 6 July 1962 BOC Decision, he must accordi ngly be held to be not a Philippine citizen. 5. Should the legal results thus re ached seem harsh to some, I respectfully submit that the remedy lies not with th is Court which is charged with the application of the law as it is in fact writt en, but with the political branches of the Government. It is those departments o f Government which must consider the desirability and wisdom of enacting legisla tion providing for the legalization of the entry and stay of aliens who may be i n the same situation as respondent William Gatchalian and his coapplicants. Acco rdingly, I vote to GRANT the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition in G.R. Nos . 95122-23, and to SET ASIDE the Resolution/Temporary Restraining Order dated 7 September 1990 issued by respondent Judge Dela Rosa in Civil Case No. 90-5214, a s well as the Order of respondent Judge Capulong dated 6 September 1990 in Civil Case No. 3431-V-90; and to REAFFIRM that respondent William Gatchalian is not a Philippine citizen. Trial Court upheld the validity of the delegation by the president to the Deport ation Board of his power to conduct investigations for the purpose of determinin g whether the stay of an alien in this country would be injurious to the securit y, welfare and interest of the State. Power to issue warrants and fix bonds were held to be essential to and complement the power to deport aliens under sec 69 of the revised admin code ISSUE (PETITIONERS ALLEGATIONS) AND HELD: WON the President has the power to depo rt aliens and delegate those powers, under EO 398 of Pres Quirino which authoriz ed the Deportation Board to issue warrants of arrest of aliens during investigat ion (on the ground that such power is vested in the legislature and that there m ust be a legislation authorizing the same) ~> The Pres has the power to carry ou t order of deportation but may not order arrest during investigation. And no, po wer may not be delegated. RATIO: Sec 69 of the Revised Administrative Code SEC. 69 Deportation of subject to foreign power. A subject of a foreign power residin g in the Philippines shall not be deported, expelled, or excluded from said Isla nds or repatriated to his own country by the President of the Philippines except upon prior investigation, conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent, of the ground upon which Such action is contemplated. In such case the person co ncerned shall be informed of the charge or charges against him and he shall be a llowed not less than these days for the preparation of his defense. He shall als o have the right to be heard by himself or counsel, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to cross-examine the opposing witnesses." While it did not expre ssly confer on the President the authority to deport undesirable aliens and mere ly lays down the procedure, the fact that such a procedure was provided for befo re the President can deport an alien is a clear indication of the recognition, a

nd inferentially a ratification, by the legislature of the existence of such pow er in the Executive. Under the present and existing laws, therefore, deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected in two ways: by order of the President, after due investigation, pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative C ode, and by the Commissioner of Immigration, upon recommendation by the Board of Commissioners, under Commonwealth Act No. 613. SEC. 52. This Act is in substitu tion for and supersedes all previous laws relating to the entry of aliens into t he Philippines, and their exclusion, deportation, and repatriation QUA CHEE GAN vs. DEPORTATION BOARD FACTS: In May 1952 petitioners were charged b efore the Deportation Board with having purchased US Dollars in the total sum of $130, 000 without the necessary license from the Central Bank of the Philippine s and having remitted the money to Hong Kong and to themselves. Warrants were is sued but upon filing for a surety and cash bond they were released. Batch 2008A. 72

therefrom, with the exception of section sixty-nine of Act Numbered Twenty-seven hundred and eleven which shall continue in force and effect: ..." (Comm. Act No . 613). Re: the extent of the Pres power to investigate- does it include authorit y to arrest? May it be delegated? Heres the history Pres Roxas (EO 69) in July 194 7 provided for filing of a bond to secure appearance of alien under investigatio n Pres Quirino (EO 398) in January 1951 reorganized the deportation board to iss ue the warrant of arrest of the alien complained of and to hold him under detent ion during the investigation unless he files a bond for his provisional release <this is incompatible with.> 3. The right of the People to be secure in their per sons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shal l not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be de termined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complai nant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." (Sec 1, Art. III, Bill of Rights, Philippine Constitution). Justice Laurel said that this consti provision is not among the rights of the accused. Under our Constitution, the same is dec lared a popular right of the people and, of course, indisputably it equally appl ies to both citizens and foreigners in this country. This requirement "to be det ermined by the judge" do not specify who will determine the existence of a proba ble cause. Hence, under their provisions, any public officer may be authorized b y the Legislature to make such determination, and thereafter issue the warrant o f arrest. The contention of the Solicitor General that the arrest of a foreigner is necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation is valid only when, as already stated, there is already an order of deportation. To carry out the or der of deportation, the President obviously has the power to order the arrest of the deportee. But, certainly, during the investigation. The extent of the curta ilment of liberty dependent upon conditions determined by the discretion of the person issuing a warrant. In other words, the discretion of whether a warrant of arrest shall issue or not is personal to the one upon whom the authority devolv es. an implied grant of power, considering that no express authority was granted by the law on the matter under discussion, that would serve the curtailment or limitation on the fundamental right of a person, such a s his security to life and liberty, must be viewed with caution. The guarantees of human rights and freedom can not be made to rest precariously on such a shaky foundation. WHEREFORE: Executive Order No. 398, series of 1951, insofar as it empowers the D eportation Board to issue warrant of arrest upon the filing of formal charges ag ainst an alien or aliens and to fix bond and prescribe the conditions for the te mporary release of said aliens, is declared illegal. As a consequence, the order of arrest issued by the respondent Deportation Board is declared null and void and the bonds filed pursuant to such order of arrest, decreed cancelled. With th e foregoing modification, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. No cost s. So ordered. HARVEY vs. DEFENSOR - SANTIAGO FACTS: The case stems from the apprehension of pe titioners on 27 February 1988 from their respective residences by agents of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) by virtue of Mission Orders issu ed by respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago of the CID. Petiioners ar e presently detained at the CID Dentention Center. Petitioners were among the tw enty-two (22) suspected alien pedophiles who were apprehended after three motnhs of close surveillance by CID agents in Pagsanjan, Lahuna. Two (2) days after ap prehension, or on 29 February 1988, seventeen (17) of the twenty-two (22) arrest ed aliens opted for self-deportation and have left the country. On March 7 1988, Warrants of Arrest were issued by respondent against petitioners for violation of Sections 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised A dministrative Code. On March 14 1988, petitioners filec an Urgent Petiion for Re

lease Under Bond alleging that their health was being seriously affected by thei r continuous detention. Upon recommendation of the Board of Commissioners for th eir provisional release, respondent ordered the CID doctor to examine petitioner s, who certified that petitioners were healthy. On April 4 1988, as heretofore s tated, petitioners availes of this Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. ISSUES: Petitioners question the validity of their detention on the following gr ounds: 1. There is no provision in the Philippine Immigration Act og 1940 nor un der Section 69 of the Revised Batch 2008A. 73

Administrative Code, which legally clothes the Commissioner with any authority t o arrest and detain petitioners pending determination of the existence of a prob able cause leading to an administrative investigation. 2. Repondent violated Sev tion 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting unreasonable searches a nd seizures since the CID agents were not clothed with valid Warrants of arrest, search and seizure as required by the said provision. 3. Mere confidential info rmation made to the COD agents and their suspicion of the activities of petition ers that they are pedophiles, coupled with their association with other suspecte d pedophiles, are not valid legal grounds for their arrest and detention unless they are caught in the act. They further alleged that being a pedophile is not p unishable by any Philippines Law nor is it a crime to be a pedophile. HELD: 1. T he ruling in Vivo vs. Montesa (G.R> No. 24576, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 155) that t he issuance of warrants of arrest by the Commissioner of Immigration, solely for purposes of investigation and before a final order of deportation is issued, co nflicts with paragraph 3, Section 1 of Article III of the COnstistution (referrin g to the 1935 Constituion) is not invocable herein. Respondent Commissioners warr ant of Arrest is issued on 7 March 1988 did not order petitioners to appear and show cause why they should not be deported. They were issued specifically for vio lation of Section 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Rev ised Administrative Cede. Before that, deportation proceedings had been commenced against them as undesirable aliens on 4 March 1988 and the arrest was a step pr eliminary to their possible deportation. The denial be respondent Commisioner of petitioners release on bail, also challenged by them, was in order because in de portation proceedings, the right to bail is not a matter of right but a matter o f discretion on thepart of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation. The use of the word may in said provision indicates that the grant of bail is merely p ermissive and not mandatory on the part of the Commissioner. The exercise of the power is wholly discretionary Section 37 (a) is not constitutionally proscribed . The specific constraints in both the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions, which are s ubstantially identical, contemplate prosecutions essentially criminal in nature. Deportation proceedings, on the other hand, are administrative in character. An order of deportation is never construed as a punishment. It is preventive, not a penal process. It need not be conducted strictly in accordance with ordinary C ourt proceedings. 2. In this case, the arrest of petitioners was based on probab le cause determined after close surveillance for three (3) months during which p eriod their activities were monitored. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and the seizure of the photo negatives, photographs a nd posters without warrant. Those articles were seized as an incident to a lawfu l arrest and, are therefore, admissible in evidence. (Section 12, Rule 126, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure). But even assuming arguendo that the arrest of pet itioners was not valid at its inception, the records show that formal deportatio n charges have been filed against them, as undesirable aliens, on March 4, 1988. Warrants of arrest were issued against them on March 7, 1988 for violation of Se ction 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Administrative Code. The restraint against their persons, therefore, has become legal. The Writ has served its purpose. The process of the law is being followed. 3. The petiti oners were not caught in the act does not make their arrest illegal. Petitioners w ere found with young boys in their respective rooms, the ones with John Sherman being naked. Under those circumstances the COID agents had reasonable grounds to believe that petitioners had committed pedophilia defines as psycho-sexual pervers ion involving children. Paraphilia (or unusual sexual activity) in which children are the preferred sexual object. While not a crime under the revised Penal Code, it is behavior offensive to public morals and violative of the declared policy o f the State to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual, and social we ll-being of our youth (Article II, Section 13, 1987 Constitution). Every soverei gn power has the inherent power to exclude from its territory upon such grounds as it may deem proper for its self-preservation or public interest The power to deport aliens is an act of State, an act done by or under the authority of the s overeign power. It is a police measureaginst undesirable aliens whose continued

presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and the dome stic tranquility of the people. YU vs. DEFENSOR - SANTIAGO 1989 FACTS In 1971 Yu was originally issued a Portugu ese passport, valid for 5yrs. He renewed it for the same period upon presentment before the proper Portuguese consular officer. On Feb 19, 1978, he was naturali zed as a Phil. Citizen. On July 21, 1981 applied for and was issued a Portuguese passport by the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo. Sometime in April 1980, he declare d his nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents he signed like the Compa nies Registry in Hongkong. Commission on Immigration and Deportation are holding him and are about to deport him. He petitions for habeas corpus, seeking releas e from detention. ISSUE: Batch 2008A. 74

WON he should still be considered a citizen of the Philippines despite acquisiti on and use of a Portuguese passport HELD: No RATIO: The foregoing acts considere d together constitute an express renunciation of petitioners Phil citizenship acq uired through naturalization. In Board of Immigration Commissioners vs. Go Galla no, express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made known dist inctly and explicitly and not left to interference or implication. Yu, with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after having renounced Portuguese citizenship up on naturalization as a Phil citizen 1) resumed and reacquired his prior status a s Portuguese citizen, 2) applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport and 3) represented himself as such in official documents after he had become a natural ized citizen of the Phils. Such is grossly inconsistent with his maintenance of Phil citizenship. Material facts are not disputed by petitioner. He was given an opportunity to show proof of continued Phil citizenship and has failed. As such , while normally the ? of WON a person has renounced his Phil citizenship should be heard before a trial court of law in adversary proceedings, this has become unnecessary as the SC, no less, upon insistence of petitioner, looked into the f acts and satisfied itself on WON petitioners claim to continued Phil citizenship is meritorious. Phil citizenship is not a commodity or were to be displayed when required and suppressed when convenient. Fernan and Gutierrez, dissent: Citizen ship shouldnt be held to have been lost in a summary proceeding such as this. Gut ierrez and Cortes, dissent: Evidence was too informal.Mere use of foreign passpo rt is not ipso facto express renunciation. One may get a foreign passport for co nvenience, employment, avoidance of discriminatory visa requirements but he rema ins at heart a Filipino. Full day in court must be given to petitioner. Disposit ion: Denied petition. Lifting of TRO on deportation procedure. Petitioner was proclaimed mayor-elect of Baguio City on January 20, 1988. A peti tion for quo warranto was filed by the private respondent, Luis Lardizabal, on J anuary 26, 1988 seeking to disqualify the petitioner on the ground that he is no t a Filipino citizen, but no filing fee was paid on that date. This fee was fina lly paid on February 10, 1988, or twenty-one days after his proclamation. The pe titioner says that he allegation that he is a foreigner, he says, is not the iss ue. The issue is whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction to conduc t any inquiry into this matter, considering that the petition for quo warranto a gainst him was not filed on time since the petition itself is only deemed filed upon payment of the filing fee which was done beyond the ten day reglementary pe riod provided for under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. Private respon dent denies that the filing fee was paid out of time since when he first filed h is petition for quo warranto it was treated as a pre-proclamation controversy an d it was only on February 8, 1988 decided to treat his case as solely for quo wa rranto. The Court has considered the arguments of the parties and holds that the petition for quo warranto was filed on time. Considering that the sole issue ra ised by the petitioner is the timeliness of the quo warranto proceedings against him, this matter should normally end here. However, as his citizenship is the s ubject of that proceeding, and considering the necessity for an early resolution of that more important question clearly and urgently affecting the public inter est, we shall address it now in the same action. There are two administrative de cisions on the question of the petitioners citizenship: 1. rendered by COMELEC on May 12, 1982 petitioner found to be a citizen of the Phils. no direct proof was presented that petitioner had been formally naturalized as an Australian citize n. this conjecture, which was eventually rejected, was merely inferred from the fact that he had married an Australian citizen, obtained an Australian passport, and registered as an alien with the CID upon his return to this country in 1980 . rendered by Commission on Immigration and Deportation on Sept. 13, 1988 petiti oner found to be an Australian citizen. took into account the official statement of the Australian Government dated August 12, 1984, through its Consul in the P hilippines, that the petitioner was still an Australian citizen as of that date by reason of his naturalization on July 28, 1976. That prior to 17 July 1986, a candidate for Australian citizenship had to either swear an oath of allegiance o r make an affirmation of allegiance which carries a

2. LABO vs. COMELEC August 1, 1989 Ponente: Cruz, J: FACTS: Batch 2008A. 75

renunciation allegiance. of "all other requirements of the Local Government Code and the Constitution. The fact that pe titioner has been disqualified does not by default make private respondent, the person who obtained the second highest number of votes, the mayor of Baguio City . The doctrine in Geronimo vs. Ramos states that, The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle th e candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the w inner of the elective office On the importance of Phil. Citizenship: Philippine ci tizenship is not a cheap commodity that can be easily recovered after its renunc iation. It may be restored only after the returning renegade makes a formal act of re-dedication to the country he has abjured and he solemnly affirms once agai n his total and exclusive loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. This may n ot be accomplished by election to public office. The petitioner also categorically declared that he was a citizen of Australia in a number of sworn statements voluntarily made by him and. even sought to avoid the jurisdiction of the barangay court on the ground that he was a foreigner. Th e COMELEC in 1982 said that these mistakes did not divest the petitioner of his citizenship. This is rejected by the Court. He became a citizen of Australia bec ause he was naturalized as such through a formal and positive process, simplifie d in his case because he was married to an Australian citizen. As a condition fo r such naturalization, he formally took the Oath of Allegiance and/or made the A ffirmation of Allegiance. Petitioner claims that at worst his naturalization as an Australian citizen maed him only a dual national and did not divest him of hi s Philippine citizenship. Such an argument cannot stand against the clear provis ions of CA no. 63 which enumerates the modes by which Phil. Citizenship may be l ost: (1) naturalization in a foreign country; (2) express renunciation of citize nship; and (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country, all of which are applicable to the petitioner. The claim of petitioner that his naturalization was annulled after it was found tha t his marriage to an Australian was bigamous does not concern us here since that is a matter him and his adopted country. The possibility that he may have been subsequently rejected by Australia, as he claims, does not mean that he has been automatically reinstated as a citizen of the Philippines. Under CA No. 63 as am ended by PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of C ongress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. It does not appear in the record , nor does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship b y any of these methods. The petitioner is not now, nor was he on the day of the local elections on January 18, 1988, a citizen of the Philippines. In fact, he w as not even a qualified voter under the Constitution itself because of his alien age. 21 He was therefore ineligible as a candidate for mayor of Baguio City, und er Section 42 of the Local Government Code providing in material part as follows : Sec. 42. Qualifications. An elective local official must be a citizen of the P hilippines, at least twenty-three years of age on election day The petitioner cla ims that a mere technicality like citizenship should not be allowed to frustrate the will of the electorate. In any event, even unanimously, the people of that locality cannot change the AZNAR vs. COMELEC Ponente: Paras, J: May 25, 1990 FACTS: On November 19, 1987, p rivate respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmea filed his certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in the January 18, 1988 local elections. On January 22, 1988, Aznar as the Chairman of the Ceb

u PDP-Laban Provincial Council filed with the COMELEC a petition for the disqual ification of private respondent on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipin o citizen, being a citizen of the United States of America. On January 27, he su bmitted a Certificate by then Immigration Commissioner Defensor-Santiago that Os mea is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. B-21448 and Immigr ant Certificate of Residence (ICR) No. 133911, issued at Manila on March 27 and 28, 1958, respectively. He asked the Comelec to issue a TRO to enjoin the Cebu P rovincial Board of Canvassers from canvassing the votes. On January 28 however, the Comelec en banc ordered the Board to continue the canvass but to suspend the proclamation. Petitioners evidence to show Osmea is a US citizen: Application for Alien Registration Form No. 1 of the Bureau of Immigration signed by private re spondent dated November 21, 1979; Alien Certificate of Registration No. 015356 i n the name of private respondent dated November 21, 1979; Permit to Re-enter the Philippines dated November 21, 1979; Immigration Certificate of Clearance dated January 3, 1980. Batch 2008A. 76

Osmea: maintained that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging: that he is the legitim ate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmea, a Filipino and son of the late President Sergio Osmea, Sr.; that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport No . 0855103 issued on March 25, 1987; that he has been continuously residing in th e Philippines since birth and has not gone out of the country for more than six months; and that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines since 1965. O n March 3, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) directed the Board of Canvassers to pr oclaim the winning candidates. Having obtained the highest number of votes, priv ate respondent was proclaimed the Provincial Governor of Cebu. Thereafter, on Ju ne 11, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) dismissed the petition for disqualificatio n for not having been timely filed and for lack of sufficient proof that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen. ISSUE: W/N Osmea is a US citizen. NO Osmea filed his certificate of candidacy on Nov. 19, 1987 and that the petitioner file d for his disqualification only on Jan. 22, 1988 which was beyond the 25 day per iod as required under Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. However, it is a mat ter of public interest to ascertain the respondents citizenship and qualificati on to hold the public office to which he has been proclaimed elected. There is e nough basis for us (SC) to rule directly on the merits of the case. There is lac k of substantial and convincing evidence to support the assertion that private r espondent is not a Filipino citizen and therefore is disqualified from running. respondent "must have taken and sworn to the Oath of Allegiance required by the U.S. Naturalization Laws." Philippine Courts are only allowed to determine who a re Filipino citizens or not. Whether a person is considered as an American under US laws do not concern us here. By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino fa ther, the presumption that private respondent is a Filipino remains. It was incu mbent upon the petitioner to prove that private respondent had lost his Philippi ne citizenship. Frivaldo and Labo are not applicable here since in both cases th e evidence, as well as by their own admissions, shows that they were naturalized as US and Australian citizens respectively and therefre no longer owe any alleg iance to the Philippines. In the instant case, private respondent vehemently den ies having taken the oath of allegiance of the United States. He is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and has continuously participated in the electoral process in this country since 1963 up to the present, both as a vo ter and as a candidate. Thus, private respondent remains a Filipino and the loss of his Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed. In the learned dissent of Mr. Justice Teodoro Padilla, he stresses the fact that because Osmea obtained Certif icates of Alien Registration as an American citizen, the first in 1958 when he w as 24 years old and the second in 1979, he, Osmea should be regarded as having ex pressly renounced Philippine citizenship. To Our mind, this is a case of non seq uitur (It does not follow). Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. Also the statement i n the 1987 Constitution that "dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the nat ional interest and shall be dealt with by law"(Art. IV, Sec. 5) has no retroacti ve effect. In any case it shall be dealt with by a future law which has not yet been enacted. In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to present direct p roof that private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the mod es provided for under C.A. No. 63. Among others, these are: (1) by naturalizatio n in a foreign country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by s ubscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a for eign country. From the evidence, it is clear that private respondent Osmea did no t lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or b y any other mode of losing Philippine citizenship. In concluding that private re spondent had been naturalized as a citizen of the United States of America, the petitioner merely relied on the fact that private respondent was issued alien ce rtificate of registration and was given clearance and permit to re-enter the Phi lippines by the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. Petitioner assumed th

at because of the foregoing, the respondent is an American and "being an America n", private B. Juridical Persons STONEHILL vs. DIOKNO (supra) CENTRAL BANK vs. MORFE FACTS: 1. the First Mutual Savings and Loan Organization, Inc. hereinafter referred to as the Organization is a registered non-stock corporation, the main purpose of whic h, according to its Articles of Incorporation, dated February 14, 1961, is "to e ncourage . . . and implement savings and thrift among its members, and to extend financial assistance in the form of loans," to them. The Organization has three (3) classes of "members,"1 namely: (a) founder members who originally joined th e Batch 2008A. 77

2. organization and have signed the preincorporation papers with the exclusive righ t to vote and be voted for ; (b) participating members with "no right to vote or be voted for" to which category all other members belong; except (c) honorary m embers, so made by the board of trustees, "at the exclusive discretion" thereof due to "assistance, honor, prestige or help extended in the propagation" of the objectives of the Organization without any pecuniary expenses on the part of sai d honorary members. On February 14, 1962, the legal department of the Central Ba nk of the Philippines hereinafter referred to as the Bank rendered an opinion to the effect that the Organization and others of similar nature are banking insti tutions, falling within the purview of the Central Bank Act.2 Hence, on April 1 and 3, 1963, the Bank caused to be published in the newspapers the following: 6. Announcement: xxx operations similar in nature to said "associations" HAVE NEVER BEEN AUTHORIZED BY THE MONETARY BOARD OF THE CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES TO ACCEPT DEPOSIT OF FUNDS FROM THE PUBLIC NOR TO ENGAGE IN THE BANKING BUSINESS N OR TO PERFORM ANY BANKING ACTIVITY OR FUNCTION IN THE PHILIPPINES. Such institut ions violate Section. 2 of the General Banking Act, Republic Act No. 337, should they engage in the "lending of funds obtained from the public through the recei pts of deposits or the sale of bonds, securities or obligations of any kind" wit hout authority from the Monetary Board. Their activities and operations are not supervised by the Superintendent of Banks and persons dealing with such institut ions do so at their risk. 7. Organization commenced Civil Case No. 50409 of the Court of First Instance of Ma nila, an original action for "certiorari, prohibition, with writ of preliminary injunction and/or writ of preliminary mandatory injunction," against said munici pal court, the Sheriff of Manila, the Manila Police Department, and the Bank, to annul the aforementioned search warrant, upon the ground that, in issuing the s ame, the municipal court had acted "with GADALEJ" because: (a) "said search warr ant is a roving commission general in its terms . . .;" (b) "the use of the word and others in the search warrant . . . permits the unreasonable search and se izure of documents which have no relation whatsoever to any specific criminal ac t . . .;" and (c) "no court in the Philippines has any jurisdiction to try a cri minal case against a corporation . . ." - pending hearing of the case on the mer its, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued ex parte restraining the aforeme ntioned search and seizure, or, in the alternative, if the acts complained of ha ve been partially performed, that a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction be forthwith issued ex parte, ordering the preservation of the status quo of the pa rties, as well as the immediate return to the Organization of the documents and papers so far seized under, the search warrant in question. After due hearing, J udge Morfe issued. Bank moved for a reconsideration thereof, which was denied on August 7, 1962. Accordingly, the Bank commenced, in the Supreme Court, the pres ent action, against Judge Morfe and the Organization, alleging that respondent J udge had acted with GADALEJ in issuing the order in question. ISSUE: WON Judge Cancino, in issuing the order (was it unreasonable) acted with GADALEJ? HELD: No. Preliminary mandatory injunction issued by Judge Morfe annull ed. Writ of preliminary injunction issued by the SC made permanent with costs ag ainst the organization. RATIO: it cannot be gainsaid the Constitutional injuncti on against unreasonable searches and seizures seeks to forestall, not purely abs tract or imaginary evils, but specific and concrete ones. Indeed, unreasonablene ss is, in the very nature of things, a condition dependent upon the circumstance s surrounding each case, in much the same way as the question whether or not "pr obable cause" exists is one which must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in given situations. Referring particularly to the one at bar, it is not clear from the order complained of whether respondent Judge opined that the

above 3. 4. 5. April 23, 1962, the Governor of the Bank directed the coordination of "the inves tigation and gathering of evidence on the activities of the savings and loan ass ociations which are operating contrary to law on May 18, 1962, a member of the i ntelligence division of the Bank filed with the Municipal Court of Manila a veri fied application for a search warrant against the Organization Upon the filing o f said application, on May 18, 1962, Hon. Roman Cancino, as Judge of the said mu nicipal court, issued the warrant commanding the search of the aforesaid premise s at No. 2745 Rizal Avenue, Manila, and the seizure of the foregoing articles, t here being "good and sufficient reasons to believe" upon examination, under oath , of a detective of the Manila Police Department and said intelligence officer o f the Bank Batch 2008A. 78

mentioned statement of the deponent to the effect that the Organization was enga ged in the transactions mentioned in his deposition deserved of credence or not. Obviously, however, a mere disagreement with Judge Cancino, who issued the warr ant, on the credibility of said statement, would not justify the conclusion that said municipal Judge had committed a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to la ck of jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction. Again, the aforementioned order would seem to assume that an illegal banking tra nsaction, of the kind contemplated in the contested action of the officers of th e Bank, must always connote the existence of a "victim." If this term is used to denote a party whose interests have been actually injured, then the assumption is not necessarily justified. The law requiring compliance with certain requirem ents before anybody can engage in banking obviously seeks to protect the public against actual, as well as potential, injury. Similarly, we are not aware of any rule limiting the use of warrants to papers or effects which cannot be secured otherwise. The deposition of a member of the Intelligence Division of the Centra l Bank, that after close observation and investigation, the office of a savings and loan association, illegally engaged in banking activities, is being unlawful ly used, is sufficient for the issuance of a search warrant. The failure of the deponent to mention particular individuals does not necessarily prove that the h ad no personal knowledge of specific illegal transactions of the savings and loa ns association, for the witness might be acquainted with specific transactions e ven if the names of the individuals are unknown to him. The line of reasoning of respondent Judge might, perhaps, be justified if the acts imputed to the Organi zation consisted of isolated transactions, distinct and different from the type of business in which it is generally engaged. In such case, it may be necessary to specify or identify the parties involved in said isolated transactions, so th at the search and seizure be limited to the records pertinent thereto. Such, how ever, is not the situation confronting us. The records suggest clearly that the transactions objected to by the Bank constitute the general pattern of the busin ess of the Organization. Indeed, the main purpose thereof, according to its By-l aws, is "to extend financial assistance, in the form of loans, to its members," with funds deposited by them. It is true, that such funds are referred to in the Articles of Incorporation and the By-laws as their "savings." and that the depositors thereof are designated as "members," but, even a cursory examination of said documents will readily sho w that anybody can be a depositor and thus be a "participating member." In other words, the Organization is, in effect, open to the "public" for deposit account s, and the funds so raised may be lent by the Organization. Moreover, the power to so dispose of said funds is placed under the exclusive authority of the "foun der members," and "participating members" are expressly denied the right to vote or be voted for, their "privileges and benefits," if any, being limited to thos e which the board of trustees may, in its discretion, determine from time to tim e. As a consequence, the "membership" of the "participating members" is purely n ominal in nature. This situation is fraught, precisely, with the very dangers or evils which Republic Act No. 337 seeks to forestall, by exacting compliance wit h the requirements of said Act, before the transactions in question could be und ertaken. It is interesting to note, also, that the Organization does not serious ly contest the main facts, upon which the action of the Bank is based. The princ ipal issue raised by the Organization is predicated upon the theory that the afo rementioned transactions of the Organization do not amount to " banking," as the term is used in Republic Act No. 337. We are satisfied, however, in the light o f the circumstance obtaining in this case, that the Municipal Judge did not comm it a grave abuse of discretion in finding that there was probable cause that the Organization had violated Sections 2 and 6 of the aforesaid law and in issuing

the warrant in question, and that, accordingly, and in line with Alverez vs. Cou rt of First Instance (64 Phil. 33), the search and seizure complained of have no t been proven to be unreasonable. C. State Action Requirement (who are subject to constitutional prohibitions) PEOPLE vs. MARTI J. Bidin: January 18, 1991 FACTS: Appeal from a conviction unde r RA 6425, aka the Dangerous Drugs Act. Appellant Andre Marti and his common-low wife, Shirley Reyes, went to Manila Packing and Export Forwarders with 4 giftwrap ped packages. Proprietress Anita Reyes attended to them and they presented the p ackages to be sent to a friend, Walter Fierz, in Zurich, Switzerland. Batch 2008A. 79

When Anita asked if she could examine and inspect the packages, appellant refuse d saying that the packages merely contained books, cigars and gloves. The boxes were then packaged for shipment. Before delivery of the box to the Bureau of Cus toms, Job Reyes, husband of Anita, opened the boxes for final inspection (SOP). He smelled a peculiar odor and felt dried leaves inside one of the packages. He opened one of the packages and took several grams of the contents and sent a let ter to the NBI requesting a lab exam of what he had found. NBI and Job Reyes wen t to the latters office and proceeded to open the packages, finding dry marijuana leaves. The NBI then took custody of the contents of the packages. Appellant co uld not be contacted, but was later invited by the NBI when he was claiming mail a t the Central Post Office. On that same day, a forensic chemist in the NBI certi fied the contents of the packages as being marijuana leaves. ISSUE: WON the open ing and seizure of the contents of appellants packages warranted an unreasonable search and seizure. HELD: No it did not. RATIO: Illegal search and seizure Secti ons 2 and 3 of Art. III provide for the guarantee against unreasonable search an d seizure. These provisions were taken from the 4th amendment of the US constitu tion. In deciding WON the case at bar was an instance of an unreasonable search and seizure, the Court said that it was not, for the main reason that it was don e by a private individual, namely Job Reyes. What the law contemplates is a prot ection against actions of the state against individuals, not those between indiv iduals. Cases cited: Villanueva v. Querubin: This constitutional right...refers t o the immunity...from interference by the government... Burdeau v. McDowell: ...it s protection applies to governmental action...it was intended as a restraint upo n the activities of sovereign authority... Walker v. State: ...search and seizure clauses are restraints upon the government and its agents, not upon private individuals... Bernas v. US: ...the governmental action. Presence of NBI The Court also said that the mere presence of the NBI di d not make the search and seizure unreasonable. Mere observation is not a search . The search was conducted merely by Job Reyes. The Court cited Gandy v. Watkins : where the search was initially made by the owner there is no unreasonable searc h and seizure... The Court here again stressed that the Bill of Rights is not mean t to be invoked against acts of private individuals and this is seen in the inten tion of the framers as Bernas states that they are a protection against the Stat e. In this case we see that the search and seizure was done by Job Reyes, a priv ate individual. As such, the Constitutional guarantee cannot be invoked by the a ppellant. Other issues 1) Informed of rights Court here said that he was informe d of his constitutional rights by the NBI, and even availed of their Constitutio nal right not to give a written statement. Not being the owner of the packages u ntenable as he gave his name as the owner. Also unbelievable that he would send a package for someone who he merely met in a bar. Moreover, appellant was also c onvicted of possession of hashish by the Kleve Court in Germany. amendment only proscribes 2) PRUNEYARD vs. SHOPPING CENTER supra BORJAL vs. COURT of APPEALS Justice Bellosillo, 1999 FACTS: 1. State v. Bryan: A parking attendant searched an automobile and found marijuana w ithout aid of authorities. Marijuana was deemed admissible. Between May and July 1989, a series of articles written by petitioner Borjal was published on different dates in his column Jaywalker. The articles dealt with t he alleged anomalous activities of an "organizer of a conference" without naming or identifying private respondent Wenceslao. Neither did it refer to the First National Conference on Land Transportation (FNCLT) as the conference therein men

tioned. Wenceslao reacted to the articles. He sent a letter to The Philippine St ar insisting that he was the 2. Batch 2008A. 80

"organizer" alluded to in petitioner Borjals columns. In a subsequent letter to The Philippine Star, he refuted the matters contained in Borjals columns. 3. W enceslao filed a complaint with the National Press Club (NPC) Borjal for unethic al conduct. He accused petitioner Borjal of using his column as a form of levera ge to obtain contracts for his public relations firm. In turn, Borjal published a rejoinder to the challenge of private respondent not only to protect his name and honor but also to refute the claim that he was using his column for characte r assassination. 4. Wenceslao filed a criminal case for libel against petitioner s Borjal and Soliven (publisher). The Prosecutor handling the case dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. He instituted against petitioners a ci vil action for damages based on libel subject of the instant case. The RTC decid ed in favor of private respondent Wenceslao and ordered petitioners Borjal and S oliven to indemnify private respondent P1M for actual and compensatory damages, in addition to P200K for moral damages, P100K for exemplary damages, P200K for a ttorneys fees, and to pay the costs of suit. The CA affirmed the decision but r educed the amount of the monetary award. The CA ruled that private respondent wa s sufficiently identifiable, although not named, in the questioned articles; tha t private respondent was in fact defamed by petitioner Borjal by describing him variously as a "self-proclaimed hero," "a conference organizer associated with s hady deals who has a lot of trash tucked inside his closet," "thick face," and " a person with dubious ways;" that petitioners claim of privilege communication was unavailing since the privileged character of the articles was lost by their publication in a newspaper of general circulation. The petitioners brought the a ction to the SC. 3. of the conference organizer since these contained only an enumeration of names w here Wenceslao was described as Executive Director and Spokesman and not as a co nference organizer. It is also not sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the person attacked or defamed. It must be shown that at least a thi rd person could identify him as the object of the libelous publication. Wencesla o himself entertained doubt that he was the person spoken of in Borjals columns . The former even called up columnist Borjal to inquire if he (Wenceslao) was th e one referred to in the subject articles. Identification is grossly inadequate when even the alleged offended party is himself unsure that he was the object of the verbal attack. Publications which are privileged for reasons of public poli cy are protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech. A privileg ed communication may be either absolutely privileged or qualifiedly privileged. Absolutely privileged communications are those which are not actionable even if the author has acted in bad faith. Qualifiedly privileged communications contain ing defamatory imputations are not actionable unless found to have been made wit hout good intention justifiable motive. Borjals questioned writings are not wit hin the exceptions of Art. 354 of The Revised Penal Code for they are neither pr ivate communications nor fair and true report without any comments or remarks. H owever this does not necessarily mean that they are not privileged. The enumerat ion under Art. 354 is not an exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged communicat ions since fair commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise privileg ed. The rule on privileged communications had its genesis not in the nations pe nal code but in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution guaranteeing freedom of s peech and of the press. The concept of privileged communications is implicit in the freedom of the press. Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are pr ivileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The d octrine of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable imputati on publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until h is guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, n evertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public pers on in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. The SC applied the Sullivan v NY Ties doctrine in considering the respondent as a public figure. Th e FNCLT was an undertaking infused with public interest. It was promoted as a jo int project of the government and the private sector, and organized by top gover nment officials and prominent businessmen. For this reason, it attracted media m

ileage and drew public attention not only to the conference itself but to the pe rsonalities behind as well. As its Executive Director and spokesman, 4. 5. 5. 6. 6. ISSUE: WON the CA was correct in its ruling that Borjal was guilty of libel. NO. RATIO: 1. In action for libel, the victim shall be identifiable although it is not necessary that he be named. The questioned articles written by Borjal do not identify Wenceslao as the organizer of the conference. There were millions of " heroes" of the EDSA Revolution and anyone of them could be "self-proclaimed" or an "organizer of seminars and conferences. Borjal wrote about the so-called Firs t National Conference on Land Transportation whose principal organizers are not specified. Neither did the FNCLT letterheads disclose the identity 7. 2. Batch 2008A. 81

Wenceslao consequently assumed the status of a public figure. 8. The guarantees of freedom of speech and press prohibit a public official or publ ic figure from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his off icial conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with actual malice, i .e., with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it w as false or not. To be considered malicious, the libelous statements must be sho wn to have been written or published with the knowledge that they are false or i n reckless disregard of whether they are false or not. "Reckless disregard of wh at is false or not" means that the defendant entertains serious doubt as to the truth of the publication, or that he possesses a high degree of awareness of the ir probable falsity. The articles subject of the instant case can hardly be said to have been written with knowledge that these are false or in reckless disrega rd of what is false or not 9. 10. SC declares Borjal to have acted in good faith. Moved by a sense of civic du ty and prodded by his responsibility as a newspaperman, he proceeded to expose a nd denounce what he perceived to be a public deception. Surely, we cannot begrud ge him for that. Every citizen has the right to enjoy a good name and reputation , but we do not consider that petitioner Borjal has violated that right in this case nor abused his press freedom. 11. Freedom of expression is mans birthright -constitutionally protected and guaranteed, and that it has become the singular role of the press to act as its "defensor fidei" in a democratic society such a s ours. But it is also worth keeping in mind that the press is the servant, not the master, of the citizenry, and its freedom does not carry with it an restrict ed hunting license to prey on the ordinary citizen. Batch 2008A. 82