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Sarmiento III vs Mison GR No. 79974 December 17, 1987 This is a petition for prohibition of Salvador Mison from performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget from effecting disbursements in payments of Misons compensation. Sarmientos Arguments: Mison not been confirmed by the Commission of Appointments Misons Arguments: Section 16 Article VII; Congress may by law vest their appointment in the President, in the courts or in heads of various dept, agencies, commissions, or boards in the government. No reason for the word alone. Rules of Court: Section 16, Article VII Four groups of officers; heads of executive depts, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of AFP from the rank colonel or naval captain and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution all other officers of the Gov't whose appointments are otherwise provided by law whom President may be authorized by law to appoint

First group Second group Third group 3. 4.

1. 2. 5. 6. 7.

Fourth group officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the Pres alone Section 10, Article VII of 1935 differentiated with 1987 limitation of consent from Commission on Appointments due to 1935s horse-trading, absolute power of appointment by the President in 1987 Constitution, Two major changes proposed and approved by 1986 Commission; (1) exclusion of the appointments of heads of bureaus from requirement of nd consent (2) exclusion of appointments made under 2 sentence of Article VII Reasons: Position of bureau director is quite low Confirmation of head of bureau would lead to political influence st nd Section 16, Article VII; the word also means 1 sentence needs consent and 2 sentence does not need consent Power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in character. The word alone is a lapse of draftmanship. The word alone meant without consent. RA No. 1937 Sec 601 and PD No. 34 (enacted during 1935 constitution) harmonized with the new constitution AGLIPAY Vs RUIZ AGLIPAY Vs. RUIZ G.R. No. L-45459 March 13, 1937

FACTS: The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, seeks the issuance from this court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress. In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issues of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty-third international Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioner's attorney, the respondent publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of the postage stamps for printing ISSUE : WON the selling of stamps in commemorating the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress. constitutional HELD: YES .The stamps were not issue and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. On the contrary, it appears from the latter of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of the petitioner's complaint, that the only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist to this country." The officials concerned merely, took advantage of an event considered of international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people I. Facts In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issuance of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the protes t of the petitioners attorney, the Director of Posts publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of the postage for printing. The said stamps were actually issued and sold though the greater part thereof remained unsold. The further sale of the stamps was sought to be prevented by the petitioner. II. Issue Whether or not the respondent violated the Constitution in issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress III. Ruling What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious freedom and not mere religious toleration. It is however not an inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. The phrase in Act No. 4052 advantageous to the government does not authorize violation of the Constitut ion. The issuance of

the stamps was not inspired by any feeling to favor a particular church or religious denomination. They were not sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. The postage stamps, instead of showing a Catholic chalice as originally planned, contains... Case Digest of Tanada vs. Tuvera TANADA V. TUVERA [136 S 27] - F: Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in the Constitution, as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the OG or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the OG of various PDs, LOIs, general orders, proclamations, EOs, letters of implementation and administrative orders. Respondents contend, among others that publication in the OG is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the OG is indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Art. 2 of NCC. HELD: The interpretation given by respondent is in accord w/ this Court's construction of said article. In a long line of decisions, this Court has ruled that publication in the OG is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-- for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, w/c is the 15th day following its publication-- but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect. Respondent's argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws w/ the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Art. 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the OG, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. xxx The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. The clear object of the law is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws w/c are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. W/o such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of w/c he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. It is needless to say that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents.

Case Digest: Primicias vs Municipality of Urdaneta

Facts: On February 8, 1965, Primicia was driving his car within the jurisdiction of Urdaneta when he was found violating Municipal Order 3, Series of 1964 for overtaking a truck. The Courts of First Instance decided that from the action initiated by Primicias, the Municipal Order was null and void and had been repealed by Republic Act 4136, the Land Transportation and Traffic Code Issues: 1. Whether or not Municipal Order 3 of Urdaneta is null and void 2. Whether or not the Municipal Order is not definite in its terms or ambiguous. Held: 1. Municipal Order 3 is null and void as there is an explicit repeal in RA 4136 and as per general rule, the later law prevails over an earlier law and any conflict between a municipal order and a national law must be ruled in favor of the statute. 2. Yes, the terms of Municipal Order 3 was ambiguous and not definite. Vehicular Traffic is not defined and no distinctions were made between cars, trucks, buses, etc. Appealed decision is therefore AFFIRMED.