SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 159966. March 30, 2005]

IN

RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF ENTRY IN CIVIL REGISTRY OF JULIAN LIN CARULASAN WANG also known as JULIAN LIN WANG, to be amended/corrected as JULIAN LIN WANG, JULIAN LIN WANG, duly represented by his mother ANNA LISA WANG, petitioner, vs. CEBU CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR, duly represented by the Registrar OSCAR B. MOLO, respondent. DECISION

TINGA, J.:

I will not blot out his name out of the book of life. Revelation 3:5
On 22 September 2002, petitioner Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a minor, represented by his mother Anna Lisa Wang, filed a petition dated 19 September 2002 for change of name and/or correction/cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. Petitioner sought to drop his middle name and have his registered name changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang. The petition was docketed as Special Proceedings Case No. 11458 CEB and raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 57. The RTC established the following facts:

Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to parents Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet married to each other. When his parents subsequently got married on September 22, 1998, ...they executed a deed of legitimation of their son so that the childs name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in Singapore for a long time because they will let him study there together with his sister named Wang Mei Jasmine who was born in Singapore. Since in Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother are not carried in a persons name, they anticipate that

Julian Lin Carulasan Wang will be discriminated against because of his current registered name which carries a middle name. Julian and his sister might also be asking whether they are brother and sister since they have different surnames. Carulasan sounds funny in Singapores Mandarin language since they do not have the letter R but if there is, they pronounce it as L. It is for these reasons that the name of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang is requested to be changed to Julian Lin Wang.[1]
On 30 April 2003, the RTC rendered a decision denying the petition. [2] The trial court found that the reason given for the change of name sought in the petition that is, that petitioner Julian may be discriminated against when studies in Singapore because of his middle namedid not fall within the grounds recognized by law. The trial court ruled that the change sought is merely for the convenience of the child. Since the State has an interest in the name of a person, names cannot be changed to suit the convenience of the bearers. Under Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, and there is no reason why this right should now be taken from petitioner Julian, considering that he is still a minor. The trial court added that when petitioner Julian reaches the age of majority, he could then decide whether he will change his name by dropping his middle name. [3] Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but this was denied in a resolution dated 20 May 2004.[4] The trial court maintained that the Singaporean practice of not carrying a middle name does not justify the dropping of the middle name of a legitimate Filipino child who intends to study there. The dropping of the middle name would be tantamount to giving due recognition to or application of the laws of Singapore instead of Philippine law which is controlling. That the change of name would not prejudice public interest or would not be for a fraudulent purpose would not suffice to grant the petition if the reason for the change of name is itself not reasonable.[5] Petitioner then filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari (Under Rule 45)[6] arguing that the trial court has decided a question of substance not theretofore determined by the Court, that is: whether or not dropping the middle name of a minor child is contrary to Article 174[7] of the Family Code. Petitioner contends that [W]ith globalization and mixed marriages, there is a need for the Supreme Court to rule on the matter of dropping of family name for a child to adjust to his new environment, for consistency and harmony among siblings, taking into consideration the best interest of the child.[8] It is argued that convenience of the child is a valid reason for changing the name as long as it will not prejudice the State and others. Petitioner points out that the middle name Carulasan will cause him undue embarrassment and the difficulty in writing or pronouncing it will be an obstacle to his social acceptance and integration in the Singaporean community. Petitioner also alleges that it is error for the trial court to have denied the petition for change of name until he had reached the age of majority for him to decide the name to use, contrary to previous cases[9] decided by this Court that allowed a minor to petition for change of name.[10] The Court required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on the petition. The OSG filed its Comment[11] positing that the trial court correctly denied the

petition for change of name. The OSG argues that under Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of their father and mother, and such right cannot be denied by the mere expedient of dropping the same. According to the OSG, there is also no showing that the dropping of the middle name Carulasan is in the best interest of petitioner, since mere convenience is not sufficient to support a petition for change of name and/or cancellation of entry.[12] The OSG also adds that the petitioner has not shown any compelling reason to justify the change of name or the dropping of the middle name, for that matter. Petitioners allegation that the continued use of the middle name may result in confusion and difficulty is allegedly more imaginary than real. The OSG reiterates its argument raised before the trial court that the dropping of the childs middle name could only trigger much deeper inquiries regarding the true parentage of petitioner. Hence, while petitioner Julian has a sister named Jasmine Wei Wang, there is no confusion since both use the surname of their father, Wang. Even assuming that it is customary in Singapore to drop the middle name, it has also not been shown that the use of such middle name is actually proscribed by Singaporean law.[13] We affirm the decision of the trial court. The petition should be denied. The Court has had occasion to express the view that the State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification, and that a change of name is a privilege and not a right, so that before a person can be authorized to change his name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request should be denied.[14] The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be proper and reasonable cause for which the change is sought.[15] To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.[16] In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper and reasonable cause is left to the sound discretion of the court. The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court and not all the best evidence available. What is involved is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant and with the sole prerogative for making such determination being lodged in the courts. [17]

The petition before us is unlike other petitions for change of name, as it does not simply seek to change the name of the minor petitioner and adopt another, but instead seeks to drop the middle name altogether. Decided cases in this jurisdiction involving petitions for change of name usually deal with requests for change of surname. There are only a handful of cases involving requests for change of the given name [18] and none on requests for changing or dropping of the middle name. Does the law allow one to drop the middle name from his registered name? We have to answer in the negative. A discussion on the legal significance of a persons name is relevant at this point. We quote, thus:

For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is known and called in the community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined as the word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world at large addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. Names are used merely as one method of indicating the identity of persons; they are descriptive of persons for identification, since, the identity is the essential thing and it has frequently been held that, when identity is certain, a variance in, or misspelling of, the name is immaterial. The names of individuals usually have two parts: the given name or proper name, and the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The name or family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child; but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law. A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) It is absolute, intended to protect the individual from being confused with others. (2) It is obligatory in certain respects, for nobody can be without a name. (3) It is fixed, unchangeable, or immutable, at least at the start, and may be changed only for good cause and by judicial proceedings. (4) It is outside the commerce of man, and, therefore, inalienable and intransmissible by act inter vivos or mortis causa. (5) It is imprescriptible.[19]
This citation does not make any reference to middle names, but this does not mean that middle names have no practical or legal significance. Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further distinguish him from others who may have the same given name and surname as he has. Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.[20] The Family Code gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother,[21] while illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the fathers surname.[22]

Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father bears only a given name and his mothers surname, and does not have a middle name. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such. It is only when the illegitimate child is legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a public document or private handwritten instrument that he bears both his mothers surname as his middle name and his fathers surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an acknowledged illegitimate child. Accordingly, the registration in the civil registry of the birth of such individuals requires that the middle name be indicated in the certificate. The registered name of a legitimate, legitimated and recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given or proper name, a middle name, and a surname. Petitioner theorizes that it would be for his best interest to drop his middle name as this would help him to adjust more easily to and integrate himself into Singaporean society. In support, he cites Oshita v. Republic[23] and Calderon v. Republic,[24] which, however, are not apropos both. In Oshita, the petitioner therein, a legitimate daughter of a Filipino mother, Buena Bartolome, and a Japanese father, Kishimatsu Oshita, sought to change her name from Antonina B. Oshita to Antonina Bartolome. The Court granted her petition based on the following considerations: she had elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; her other siblings who had also elected Philippine citizenship have been using their mothers surname; she was embarrassed to bear a Japanese surname there still being ill feeling against the Japanese due to the last World War; and there was no showing that the change of name was motivated by a fraudulent purpose or that it will prejudice public interest. In Calderon, the Court allowed petitioner Gertrudes Josefina del Prado, an illegitimate minor child acting through her mother who filed the petition in her behalf, to change her name to Gertudes Josefina Calderon, taking the surname of her stepfather, Romeo C. Calderon, her mothers husband. The Court held that a petition for change of name of an infant should be granted where to do is clearly for the best interest of the child. The Court took into consideration the opportunity provided for the minor petitioner to eliminate the stigma of illegitimacy which she would carry if she continued to use the surname of her illegitimate father. The Court pronounced that justice dictates that every person be allowed to avail of any opportunity to improve his social standing as long as doing so he does not cause prejudice or injury to the interests of the State or of other people. Petitioner cites Alfon v. Republic,[25] in arguing that although Article 174 of the Family Code gives the legitimate child the right to use the surnames of the father and the mother, it is not mandatory such that the child could use only one family name, even the family name of the mother. In Alfon, the petitioner therein, the legitimate daughter of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon, sought to change her name from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte (her name as registered in the Local Civil Registry) to Estrella S. Alfon (the name she had been using since childhood, in her school records and in her voters registration). The trial court denied her petition but this Court

overturned the denial, ruling that while Article 364 of the Civil Code states that she, as a legitimate child, should principally use the surname of her father, there is no legal obstacle for her to choose to use the surname of herm other to which she is entitled. In addition, the Court found that there was ample justification to grant her petition, i.e., to avoid confusion. Weighing petitioners reason of convenience for the change of his name against the standards set in the cases he cites to support his contention would show that his justification is amorphous, to say the least, and could not warrant favorable action on his petition. The factual antecedents and unique circumstances of the cited cases are not at all analogous to the case at bar. The instant case is clearly distinguishable from the cases of Oshita and Alfon, where the petitioners were already of age when they filed their petitions for change of name. Being of age, they are considered to have exercised their discretion and judgment, fully knowing the effects of their decision to change their surnames. It can also be unmistakably observed that the reason for the grant of the petitions for change of name in these two cases was the presence of reasonable or compelling grounds therefore. The Court, in Oshita, recognized the tangible animosity most Filipinos had during that time against the Japanese as a result of World War II, in addition to the fact of therein petitioners election of Philippine citizenship. In Alfon, the Court granted the petition since the petitioner had been known since childhood by a name different from her registered name and she had not used her registered name in her school records and voters registration records; thus, denying the petition would only result to confusion. Calderon, on the other hand, granted the petition for change of name filed by a mother in behalf of her illegitimate minor child. Petitioner cites this case to buttress his argument that he does not have to reach the age of majority to petition for change of name. However, it is manifest in Calderon that the Court, in granting the petition for change of name, gave paramount consideration to the best interests of the minor petitioner therein. In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is convenience. However, how such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete name. In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which his petition for change of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of majority. [26] As he is of tender age, he may not yet understand and appreciate the value of the change of his name and granting of the same at this point may just prejudice him in his rights under our laws. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED.

SO ORDERED. Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]

RTC Decision, penned by Judge Enriqueta Loquillano-Belarmino, Rollo, p. 21. Id. at 20-23. Ibid. Id. at 24-25. Ibid. Id. at 3-58; with Annexes. Art. 174. Legitimate children shall have the right: (1) To bear the surnames of the father and mother, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on Surnames; . Rollo, p. 5. Petitioner cites the following cases: Tse v. Republic, No. L-20708, 31 August 1967, 20 SCRA 1261; Calderon v. Republic, 126 Phil. 1 (1967); and Republic v. Lee Wai Lam, No. L-22607, 30 July 1969, 28 SCRA 1043. In these three cases, the Court allowed the minor to petition for change of name. Ibid. Ibid. Rollo, pp. 63-80. Ibid. Id. at 71. Republic v. Lee Wai Lam, No. L-22607, 30 July 1969, 28 SCRA 1040, 1047-48, citing Yu Chi Han v. Republic, No. L-22040, 29 November 1965 and Yap Ek Siu v. Republic, No. L-25437, 28 April 1969. Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88202, 14 December 1998, 300 SCRA 138. Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97906, 21 May 1992, 209 SCRA See also Republic v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 117209, 9 February 1996, 253 SCRA 509. Ibid. Go v. Republic, No. L-20160, 29 November 1965; In re: Flaviano C. Zapanta v. Local Civil Register, G.R. No. 55380, 26 September 1994; Republic v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 117209, 9 February 1996. Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra at note 16. Article 364, Civil Code. Article 174, Family Code. Supra at note 7. Article 176, Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255 (An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children to Use the Surname of Their Father, Amending for the Purpose Article 176 of Executive Order No. 209, Otherwise Known as the Family Code of the Philippines), which took effect on 19 March 2004, by allowing illegitimate children to use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, 189.

[8] [9]

[10] [11] [12] [13] [14]

[15] [16]

[17] [18]

[19] [20] [21] [22]

or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father.
[23] [24] [25] [26]

125 Phil. 1098 (1967). Supra note 9. No. L-51201, 29 May 1980, 97 SCRA 858. In Republic v. Marcos, G.R. No. 31065, 15 February 1990, 182 SCRA 223, and Padilla v. Republic, 199 Phil. 226 (1982), the Court denied the petitions for change of name filed by mothers in behalf of their minor children for prematurity.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 153883 January 13, 2004

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CHULE Y. LIM, respondent. DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court stemmed from a petition for correction of entries under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court filed by respondent Chule Y. Lim with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte, Branch 4, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 4933. In her petition, respondent claimed that she was born on October 29, 1954 in Buru-an, Iligan City. Her birth was registered in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte but the Municipal Civil Registrar of Kauswagan transferred her record of birth to Iligan City. She alleged that both her Kauswagan and Iligan City records of birth have four erroneous entries, and prays that they be corrected. The trial court then issued an Order,1 which reads: WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, let the hearing of this case be set on December 27, 1999 before this Court, Hall of Justice, Rosario Heights, Tubod, Iligan City at 8:30 oclock in the afternoon at which date, place and time any interested person may appear and show cause why the petition should not be granted. Let this order be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Iligan and the Province of Lanao del Norte once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks at the expense of the petitioner. Furnish copies of this order the Office of the Solicitor General at 134 Amorsolo St., Legaspi Vill., Makati City and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Iligan City at Quezon Ave., Pala-o, Iligan City.

SO ORDERED. During the hearing, respondent testified thus: First, she claims that her surname "Yu" was misspelled as "Yo". She has been using "Yu" in all her school records and in her marriage certificate.2 She presented a clearance from the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)3 to further show the consistency in her use of the surname "Yu". Second, she claims that her fathers name in her birth record was written as "Yo Diu To (Co Tian)" when it should have been "Yu Dio To (Co Tian)." Third, her nationality was entered as Chinese when it should have been Filipino considering that her father and mother never got married. Only her deceased father was Chinese, while her mother is Filipina. She claims that her being a registered voter attests to the fact that she is a Filipino citizen. Finally, it was erroneously indicated in her birth certificate that she was a legitimate child when she should have been described as illegitimate considering that her parents were never married. Placida Anto, respondents mother, testified that she is a Filipino citizen as her parents were both Filipinos from Camiguin. She added that she and her daughters father were never married because the latter had a prior subsisting marriage contracted in China. In this connection, respondent presented a certification attested by officials of the local civil registries of Iligan City and Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte that there is no record of marriage between Placida Anto and Yu Dio To from 1948 to the present. The Republic, through the City Prosecutor of Iligan City, did not present any evidence although it actively participated in the proceedings by attending hearings and cross-examining respondent and her witnesses. On February 22, 2000, the trial court granted respondents petition and rendered judgment as follows: WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, to set the records of the petitioner straight and in their proper perspective, the petition is granted and the Civil Registrar of Iligan City is directed to make the following corrections in the birth records of the petitioner, to wit: 1. Her family name from "YO" to "YU"; 2. Her fathers name from "YO DIU TO (CO TIAN)" to "YU DIOTO (CO TIAN)"; 3. Her status from "legitimate" to "illegitimate" by changing "YES" to "NO" in answer to the question "LEGITIMATE?"; and, 4. Her citizenship from "Chinese" to "Filipino". SO ORDERED.4 The Republic of the Philippines appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial courts decision.5

Hence, this petition on the following assigned errors: I THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE CORRECTION OF THE CITIZENSHIP OF RESPONDENT CHULE Y. LIM FROM "CHINESE" TO "FILIPINO" DESPITE THE FACT THAT RESPONDENT NEVER DEMONSTRATED ANY COMPLIANCE WITH THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ELECTION OF CITIZENSHIP. II THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ALLOWING RESPONDENT TO CONTINUE USING HER FATHERS SURNAME DESPITE ITS FINDING THAT RESPONDENT IS AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD.6 To digress, it is just as well that the Republic did not cite as error respondents recourse to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court to effect what indisputably are substantial corrections and changes in entries in the civil register. To clarify, Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings under said rule may either be summary or adversary in nature. If the correction sought to be made in the civil register is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary. This is our ruling in Republic v. Valencia7 where we held that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established under Rule 108 provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite partys case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered.8 As likewise observed by the Court of Appeals, we take it that the Republics failure to cite this error amounts to a recognition that this case properly falls under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court considering that the proceeding can be appropriately classified as adversarial. Instead, in its first assignment of error, the Republic avers that respondent did not comply with the constitutional requirement of electing Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority. It cites Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, which provides that the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship.9 Likewise, the Republic invokes the provision in Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625, that legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines."10 Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship apply only to legitimatechildren. These do not apply in the case of respondent who was concededly an illegitimate child, considering that her Chinese father and Filipino mother were never married. As such, she was not required to comply with said constitutional and statutory requirements to become a Filipino citizen. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, respondent automatically became a Filipino upon birth. Stated differently, she is a Filipino since birth without having to elect Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority.

In Ching, Re: Application for Admission to the Bar,11 citing In re Florencio Mallare,12 we held: Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a Filipino, and no other act would be necessary to confer on him all the rights and privileges attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332; Santos Co vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543; Serra vs. Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952; Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28, 1954). Neither could any act be taken on the erroneous belief that he is a non-Filipino divest him of the citizenship privileges to which he is rightfully entitled.13 This notwithstanding, the records show that respondent elected Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority. She registered as a voter in Misamis Oriental when she was 18 years old.14 The exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship.15 In its second assignment of error, the Republic assails the Court of Appeals decision in allowing respondent to use her fathers surname despite its finding that she is illegitimate. The Republics submission is misleading. The Court of Appeals did not allow respondent to use her fathers surname. What it did allow was the correction of her fathers misspelled surname which she has been using ever since she can remember. In this regard, respondent does not need a court pronouncement for her to use her fathers surname. We agree with the Court of Appeals when it held: Firstly, Petitioner-appellee is now 47 years old. To bar her at this time from using her fathers surname which she has used for four decades without any known objection from anybody, would only sow confusion. Concededly, one of the reasons allowed for changing ones name or surname is to avoid confusion. Secondly, under Sec. 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 142, the law regulating the use of aliases, a person is allowed to use a name "by which he has been known since childhood." Thirdly, the Supreme Court has already addressed the same issue. In Pabellar v. Rep. of the Phils.,16 we held: Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 142, which regulates the use of aliases, allows a person to use a name "by which he has been known since childhood" (Lim Hok Albano v. Republic, 104 Phil. 795; People v. Uy Jui Pio, 102 Phil. 679; Republic v. Taada, infra). Even legitimate children cannot enjoin the illegitimate children of their father from using his surname (De Valencia v. Rodriguez, 84 Phil. 222).17 While judicial authority is required for a change of name or surname,18 there is no such requirement for the continued use of a surname which a person has already been using since childhood.19 The doctrine that disallows such change of name as would give the false impression of family relationship remains valid but only to the extent that the proposed change of name would in great probability cause prejudice or future mischief to the family whose surname it is that is involved or to the community in general.20 In this case, the Republic has not shown that the Yu family in China would probably be prejudiced or be the object of future mischief. In respondents case, the change in

the surname that she has been using for 40 years would even avoid confusion to her community in general. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68893 dated May 29, 2002, is AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the Civil Registrar of Iligan City is DIRECTED to make the following corrections in the birth record of respondent Chule Y. Lim, to wit: 1. Her family name from "YO" to "YU"; 2. Her fathers name from "YO DIU TO (CO TIAN)" to "YU DIOTO (CO TIAN)"; 3. Her status from "legitimate" to "illegitimate" by changing "YES" to "NO" in answer to the question "LEGITIMATE?"; and, 4. Her citizenship from "Chinese" to "Filipino". SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Panganiban, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 120587 January 20, 2004

MILAGROS M. BARCO, as the Natural Guardian and Guardian Ad Litem of MARY JOY ANN GUSTILO,petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL SIXTEENTH DIVISION), REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (BR. 133MAKATI), NCJR; THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF MAKATI; and NADINA G. MARAVILLA, respondents. DECISION TINGA, J.: The story behind the present petition is a portrait of dysfunction. The familial situation of the parties is complicated, to say the least. The judicial conferment of the status of illegitimacy on a daughter who is by law legitimate has created a tangled braid of various legal doctrines that, like the Gordian knot of yore, is in this case ultimately unbound through one fell swoop of the sword. On 24 December 1970, private respondent Nadina Maravilla ("Nadina") married Francisco Maravilla ("Francisco"). By February of 1977, the spouses had opted to live separately,1 and in February of the following year they obtained an ecclesiastical annulment of marriage issued by the Catholic Diocese of Bacolod City.2 On 9 June 1978, Nadina gave birth to a daughter named June Salvacion ("June") in Makati, Metro Manila. Junes birth certificate listed Francisco Maravilla as the father, and Maravilla as the childs surname.3 Nadina signed the birth certificate shortly after it was accomplished.

Despite the notation in Junes birth certificate, Nadina subsequently claimed that all along, the real father of her child was Armando Gustilo ("Gustilo"), a former Congressman with whom she maintained a relationship. At the time of Junes birth, Gustilo was married to one Consuelo Caraycong, who would later perish in the MV Don Juan naval accident of 1981.4 On 21 August 1982, Nadina and Gustilo were married in the United States.5 This marriage took place two and a half years before Nadinas marriage to Francisco was alleged to have been annulled in the Philippines. On 12 March 1985, Nadina apparently was able to obtain a judicial declaration annulling her marriage to Francisco.6 On 17 March 1983, Nadina filed in her own name a Petition for Correction of Entries in the Certificate of Birth of her daughter June with the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Makati.7 Therein, she alleged that she had been living separately from her lawful spouse Francisco since February of 1977, and that Gustilo was the real father of June.8She claimed that she did not allow Francisco to have any sexual congress with her within the first 20 days of the three hundred days preceding the birth of June.9 She prayed that the Local Civil Registrar of Makati be directed to correct the birth certificate of June to the effect that the latters full name be made "June Salvacion C. Gustilo," and that the name of her father be changed from "Francisco Maravilla" to "Armando Gustilo." Notably, Francisco affixed his signature to the Petition signifying his conformity thereto.10 On 20 March 1983. Gustilo filed a "Constancia," wherein he acknowledged June as his daughter with Nadina, and that he was posing no objection to Nadinas petition.11 The Petition was docketed as SP Proc. No. M-130. On 26 July 1983, the RTC, in accordance with Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, issued an Order setting the case for hearing and directing that a copy of the order be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. On 7 September 1983, Nadina filed an Amended Petition,12 this time impleading Francisco and Gustilo as respondents. Correspondingly, the RTC amended the Order on 22 September 1983 to reflect the additional impleaded parties.13 The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition on the ground that the RTC "had no jurisdiction over the subject matter and/or the nature of th[e] suit."14 They cited various jurisprudence holding that only innocuous or clerical errors may be corrected under a Rule 108 petition for correction of entries, and that thePetition seeks changes "are substantial and controversial in character which directly affect the filiation and legitimacy of petitioners daughter."15 On 23 February 1984, the Motion to Dismiss was denied by the RTC, which also subsequently denied a Motion for Reconsideration thereto filed by the Solicitor General. On 7 January 1985, the RTC issued an Order ("RTC Order") granting the petition and ordering the requested corrections to be effected. The RTC considered the claim of Nadina that she had relied completely on her uncle William R. Veto16 to facilitate the preparation of Junes birth certificate, that it was through his inadvertence that the mistaken entries were made, and that she was in intense physical discomfort when she had affixed her signature to the birth certificate containing the incorrect entries.17 The RTC also noted that Francisco had signified his conformity to the action by signing the original petition, and that Gustilo had manifested through aConstancia dated 20 March 1983 that he was acknowledging June as his daughter and expressing no objection to the petition.18 Gustilo died in 19 December 1986.19 Two estate proceedings arose from his death, one lodged in Makati,20 the other in Harris County, Texas.21 Among the participants in both estate proceedings was Jose Vicente Gustilo ("Jose Vicente"), allegedly a biological child of Gustilo.22 On 5 March 1993, he filed with the Court of Appeals aPetition23 seeking the annulment of the RTC Order of 7 January 1985 which had effected changes in the civil status of June. Jose Vicente amended his Petition in July of 1993 to implead Nadina as an indispensable party.24In her Comment, Nadina countered that

Jose Vicente had not sufficiently proven that he was a child of Armando, and there was neither extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction that would justify the annulment of the RTC Order.25Nadina also pointed out that the Makati intestate court had approved a compromise agreement wherein the parties had agreed that the only heirs of the decedent Armando are "the surviving spouse, Nadina G. Gustilo, the daughter, June Salvacion G. Gustilo, the son, Jose Vicente Gustilo III, and another daughter, Mary Joy Ann Gustilo."26 However, this compromise agreement was subsequently voided on petition by Jose Vicente to the Court of Appeals, on the ground that the Civil Code prohibited compromise as to the civil status of persons.27 After the Court of Appeals commenced hearings on the petition, petitioner Milagros Barco ("Barco"), on 11 January 1994, filed in her capacity as the natural guardian and/or guardian ad litem of her daughter, Mary Joy Ann Gustilo ("Mary Joy"), a Motion for Intervention with a Complaint-inIntervention attached thereto.28 Barco alleged that Mary Joy had a legal interest in the annulment of the RTC Order as she was likewise fathered by Gustilo. In her Complaint-in-Intervention, Barco claimed that she and Gustilo had maintained a relationship since 1967, and to them was born Mary Joy in 1977.29 Barco also alleged that she actually moved in with Gustilo after the death of the latters wife in 1980, and maintained her affair with Gustilo until 1983, when she was purportedly supplanted by Nadina as Gustilos common-law companion after Gustilo had become gravely ill.30 After the parties had filed their respective memoranda, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision on 13 March 1995, dismissing both the Petition and the Complaint-in-Intervention.31 The appellate court held that neither Jose Vicente nor Barco were able to establish the existence of lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, the two grounds that would justify the annulment of a final judgment.32 It ruled that while Jose Vicente and Barco had not been made parties in the Petition for Correction, the subsequent notice and publication of the Order setting the case for hearing served as constructive notice to all parties who might have an interest to participate in the case. The publication of the Order conferred upon the RTC the jurisdiction to try and decide the case.33 It also found no merit in Jose Vicentes claim that he learned of the RTC Order only in November of 1992, pointing out that as early as 1987, he filed a pleading with the intestate court alleging that Junes birth certificate had been amended to record the name of her true father.34 Only the intervenor Barco filed a Motion for Reconsideration35 of the Court of Appeals Decision, which the appellate court denied on 16 May 1995.36 Thus, Barco filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals Decision and the annulment of the 1985 RTC Order. Before this Court, Barco assails that RTC Order on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. That was the same ground she invoked in the Court of Appeals. Specifically, she raises the following issues: 1) Barco should have been made a party to the Nadinas petition and the failure to implead her deprived the RTC of jurisdiction; 2) This RTC could not have entertained Nadinas petition, since the Courts ruling in a long line of cases, beginning with Republic v. Valencia,37 that a petition for correction of entries in the civil register is not limited to innocuous or clerical mistakes, applies only to citizenship cases; 3) The petition for correction was filed out of time, as Article 263 of the Civil Code of 1950 sets a prescriptive period for impugning the legitimacy of a child which is one year from the recording of birth in the Civil Registry, if the husband should be in the same place, or in a proper case, any of his heirs;

4) Nadinas petition should have been treated as a petition for change of name, which can only be filed by the person whose name is sought to be changed; 5) The RTC Order contravenes the legal presumption that children born during the pendency of a marriage are legitimate and the rule that legitimate children cannot adopt the surname of a person who is not their father; and 6) The RTC should have excluded as hearsay the Constancia allegedly signed by Gustilo and that the surrounding circumstances under which it was issued gave reason to doubt its authenticity and credibility. Interestingly, the questions that Barco raised would tickle the fancies of erudite civilists yearning for a challenge. However, the ultimate resolution of this case hinges on whether the de rigueur requirements of the extraordinary remedy of annulment of judgment have been satisfied. First, a brief revisit of the action to annul judgment. The recourse is equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional cases, as where there is no available or other adequate remedy. Annulment of judgments is a remedy long authorized and sanctioned in our jurisdiction.38 As far back as 1918, this Court in Banco Espaol-Filipino v. Palanca39 recognized the availability of a direct attack of a final judgment on the ground that it is void for want of jurisdiction. In Reyes v. Datu40 we held that the validity of a final judgment or order of the court may be attacked only by a direct action or proceeding or by motion in another case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Yet, it was only in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure that for the first time the procedure for the annulment of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil cases of regional trial courts, through a petition before the Court of Appeals, was formally provided. Rule 47 thereof under which the procedure was integrated incorporates settled jurisprudence on annulment of judgment. Statutory basis for the remedy was laid way back in 1980, with the enactment of The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.41 Section 9 thereof vests in the Court of Appeals exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of the lower courts. Section 2, Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly provides only two grounds for annulment of judgment, namely: extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. This express limitation is significant since previous jurisprudence recognized other grounds as well.42 The underlying reason is traceable to the notion that annulling final judgments goes against the grain of finality of judgment. Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective administration of justice that once a judgment has become final the issue or cause involved therein should be laid to rest. The basic rule of finality of judgment is grounded on the fundamental principle of public policy and sound practice that at the risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final at some definite date fixed by law.43 Even if the rule on annulment of judgment is grounded on equity, the relief is of an extraordinary character, and not as readily available as the remedies obtaining to a judgment that is not yet final. There are two aspects of jurisdiction which are vital for disposition of this case - jurisdiction over the nature of the action or subject matter, and jurisdiction over the parties.44 Barco claims that the RTC failed to satisfy both aspects of jurisdiction. She opines that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the parties due to the failure to implead her as a party to the petition for correction. On the other hand, the remaining issues that she raises as errors put into question whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the subject matter of Nadinas petition.

We shall first tackle the question of whether the RTC had acquired jurisdiction over Barco and all other indispensable parties to the petition for correction. The essential requisite for allowing substantial corrections of entries in the civil registry is that the true facts be established in an appropriate adversarial proceeding. This is embodied in Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, which states: Section 3. Parties When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding. The Court of Appeals held that jurisdiction over the parties was properly acquired through the notice by publication effected in conformity with Section 4 of Rule 108. Barco assails this holding and claims that the failure to implead her as a party to the petition for correction deprived the RTC of jurisdiction. Undoubtedly, Barco is among the parties referred to in Section 3 of Rule 108. Her interest was affected by the petition for correction, as any judicial determination that June was the daughter of Armando would affect her wards share in the estate of her father. It cannot be established whether Nadina knew of Mary Joys existence at the time she filed the petition for correction. Indeed, doubt may always be cast as to whether a petitioner under Rule 108 would know of all the parties whose interests may be affected by the granting of a petition. For example, a petitioner cannot be presumed to be aware of all the legitimate or illegitimate offsprings of his/her spouse or paramour. The fact that Nadina amended her petition to implead Francisco and Gustilo indicates earnest effort on her part to comply with Section 3 as quoted above. Yet, even though Barco was not impleaded in the petition, the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that the defect was cured by compliance with Section 4, Rule 108, which requires notice by publication, thus: Section 4. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the subsequent judgment on the petition. The sweep of the decision would cover even parties who should have been impleaded under Section 3, Rule 108, but were inadvertently left out. The Court of Appeals correctly noted: The publication being ordered was in compliance with, and borne out by the Order of January 7, 1985. The actual publication of the September 22, 1983 Order, conferred jurisdiction upon the respondent court to try and decide the case. While "nobody appeared to oppose the instant petition" during the December 6, 1984 hearing, that did not divest the court from its jurisdiction over the case and of its authority to continue trying the case. For, the rule is well-settled, that jurisdiction, once acquired continues until termination of the case.45 Verily, a petition for correction is an action in rem, an action against a thing and not against a person.46 The decision on the petition binds not only the parties thereto47 but the whole world.48 An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication.49 Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection

of any sort against the right sought to be established.50 It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it.51 Since the RTC properly acquired jurisdiction over the parties, what remains for determination is whether it had acquired jurisdiction over Nadinas cause of action. It should be emphasized that jurisdiction over the nature of the action or the subject matter is conferred by law. This Courts recent holding in Durisol Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals52 is instructive in this regard: [I]t should be stressed that in a petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction, petitioner must show not merely an abuse of jurisdictional discretion but an absolute lack of jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction means absence of or no jurisdiction, that is, the court should not have taken cognizance of the petition because the law does not vest it with jurisdiction over the subject matter.53 The question of whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter can be answered simply by determining if on the basis of the complaint or petition the court has, under the law, the power to hear and decide the case. Barcos remaining arguments are to be tested against this standard. One of Barcos striking assertions is that the general rule still is that the jurisdiction of the court in the correction of entries in the civil register is limited to innocuous or clerical mistakes, as what she insinuates as the apparent contrary holding in Republic v. Valencia54 applies only to citizenship cases. Since the promulgation of the Valencia ruling in 1986 the Court has repeatedly ruled that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the true facts established and the parties aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding. Barco, by seeking to limit the application of the Valencia doctrine to citizenship cases, is flogging a dead horse. This argument was debunked in subsequent cases,55 notably the recent case of Lee v. Court of Appeals.56 The exhaustive disquisition therein of Justice Sabino de Leon should preclude any further arguments on the scope of Rule 108. The Court in Lee acknowledged that there existed a line of decided cases, some of them decided after Valencia,stating that Rule 108 cannot be used to effect substantial corrections in entries of the civil register.57 The doctrine was traced back to the 1954 case of Ty Kong Tin v. Republic,58 the rationale of which the Court reevaluated inLee: We venture to say now that the above pronouncements proceed from a wrong premise, that is, the interpretation that Article 412 pertains only to clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous nature, effectively excluding from its domain, and the scope of its implementing rule, substantial changes that may affect nationality, status, filiation and the like. Why the limited scope of Article 412? Unfortunately, Ty Kong Tin does not satisfactorily answer this question except to opine that the procedure contemplated in Article 412 is summary in nature and cannot, therefore, cover cases involving controversial issues. Subsequent cases have merely echoed the Ty Kong Tin doctrine without, however, shedding light on the matter. The flaw in Ty Kong Tin lies in its theory that Article 412 contemplates a summary procedure. First of all, Article 412 is a substantive law that provides as follows: "No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without a judicial order."

It does not provide for a specific procedure of law to be followed except to say that the corrections or changes must be effected by judicial order. As such, it cannot be gleaned therefrom that the procedure contemplated for obtaining such judicial order is summary in nature. Secondly, it is important to note that Article 412 uses both the terms "corrected" and "changed." In its ordinary sense, to correct means "to make or set right;" "to remove the faults or errors from" while to change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute". The provision neither qualifies as to the kind of entry to be changed or corrected nor does it distinguish on the basis of the effect that the correction or change may have. Hence, it is proper to conclude that all entries in the civil register may be changed or corrected under Article 412. What are the entries in the civil register? We need not go further than Articles 407 and 408 of the same title to find the answer. "Art. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register." "Art. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register: (1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name." It is beyond doubt that the specific matters covered by the preceding provisions include not only status but also nationality. Therefore, the Ty Kong Tin pronouncement that Article 412 does not contemplate matters that may affect civil status, nationality or citizenship is erroneous. This interpretation has the effect of isolating Article 412 from the rest of the articles in Title XVI, Book I of the New Civil Code, in clear contravention of the rule of statutory construction that a statute must always be construed as a whole such that the particular meaning to be attached to any word or phrase is ascertained from the context and the nature of the subject treated.59 Lee also points out that Republic Act No. 9048, enacted in 2001, has effectively changed the nature of a proceeding under Rule 108. Under this new law, "clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname" may now be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal registrar or consul general, without need of any judicial order. The obvious effect is to remove from the ambit of Rule 108 the correction or changing of such errors in entries of the civil register. Hence, what is left for the scope of operation of Rule 108 are substantial changes and corrections in entries of the civil register.60 It may be very well said that Republic Act No. 9048 is Congresss response to the confusion wrought by the failure to delineate as to what exactly is that so-called summary procedure for changes or corrections of a harmless or innocuous nature as distinguished from that appropriate adversary proceeding for changes or corrections of a substantial kind. For we must admit that though we have constantly referred to an appropriate adversary proceeding, we have failed to categorically state just what that procedure is. Republic Act No. 9048 now embodies that summary procedure while Rule 108 is that appropriate adversary proceeding. xxx61

Republic Act No. 9048 may not find application in this case, yet it is clearly another indicium of how entrenched the Valencia ruling is today. With the enactment of the law, the legislature acknowledged the potency of the ruling. To repeat, substantial corrections to the civil status of persons recorded in the civil registry may be effected through the filing of a petition under Rule 108. Any further attempt to limit the scope of application of Rule 108 runs against the wall of judicial precedent cemented by legislative affirmation. Next, Barco argues that the petition for correction had prescribed under the Civil Code; and that the petition for correction should be treated as a petition for change of name which can only be filed by the person whose name is sought to be changed. These arguments can be decided jointly. They both are not well taken as they cannot allude to a lack of jurisdiction that would render the RTC Order subject to annulment. Assuming arguendo that Nadinas petition for correction had prescribed and/or that the action seeking the change of name can only be filed by the party whose name is sought to be changed, this does not alter the reality that under the law the Makati RTC had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition for correction. The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, the applicable law at the time, clearly conferred on the Makati RTC exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation.62 In complementation of grant of jurisdiction, Section 1 of Rule 108 provides that the verified petition to the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto should be filed with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located. Prescription and lack of capacity to bring action cannot be ignored by a court of law in properly resolving an action, to the extent that a finding that any of these grounds exist will be sufficient to cause the dismissal of the action.63 Yet, the existence of these grounds does not oust the court from its power to decide the case. Jurisdiction cannot be acquired through, waived, enlarged or diminished by any act or omission of the parties.64Contrariwise, lack of capacity to sue and prescriptions as grounds for dismissal of an action may generally be rendered unavailing, if not raised within the proper period.65 It thus follows that assuming that the petition for correction had prescribed, or that Nadina lacked the capacity to file the action which led to the change of her daughters name, the fact that the RTC granted the Order despite the existence of these two grounds only characterizes the decision as erroneous. An erroneous judgment is one though rendered according to the course and practice of the court is contrary to law.66 It is not a void judgment.67 As for Barcos remaining arguments, they similarly fail, as the worst they could establish is that the RTC Order is an erroneous judgment. Barco correctly notes, however, that the RTC erred in directing that the name of Nadinas daughter be changed from "June Salvacion Maravilla" to "June Salvacion Gustilo." Following the trial courts determination that Gustilo was the father of June, but prescinding from the conclusive presumption of legitimacy for the nonce assuming it could be done, the child would obviously be illegitimate. The applicable laws mandate that June, as an illegitimate child, should bear the surname of her mother, and not the father.68 From another perspective, the RTCs error in ordering the change of name is merely an error in the exercise of jurisdiction which neither affects the courts jurisdiction over Nadinas petition nor constitutes a ground for the annulment of a final judgment. As the seminal case of Herrera v. Barretto69 explains: xxx Jurisdiction should therefore be distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction. The authority to decide a cause at all, and not the decision rendered therein, is what makes up

jurisdiction. Where there is jurisdiction of the person and subject matter xxx the decision of all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of that jurisdiction.70 In the same vein, it is of no moment that the RTC Order contravenes the legal presumption accorded June of being the legitimate child of Francisco and Nadina.71 A review of the records does indicate the insufficiency of the evidence offered to defeat the presumption, against which the only evidence admissible is the physical impossibility of the husbands having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child.72 It seems that the RTC relied primarily on the testimony of Nadina in adjudging that Gustilo, and not Francisco, was the father of June. Yet, Article 256 of the Civil Code renders ineffectual any pronouncement against legitimacy made by the mother.73 The testimony proffered by the mother has no probative value as regards Junes paternity. The RTCs cognizance of Gustilos Constancia might likewise be subject to critical scrutiny.74 But the Court is now precluded from reviewing the RTCs appreciation of the evidence, however erroneous it may be, because the Order is already final. The RTCs possible misappreciation of evidence is again at most, an error in the exercise of jurisdiction, which is different from lack of jurisdiction. These purported errors do not extend to the competence of the RTC to decide the matter and as such does not constitute a valid ground to annul the final order. The law sanctions the annulment of certain judgments which, though final, are ultimately void. Annulment of judgment is an equitable principle not because it allows a party-litigant another opportunity to reopen a judgment that has long lapsed into finality but because it enables him to be discharged from the burden of being bound to a judgment that is an absolute nullity to begin with. The inevitable conclusion is that the RTC Order, despite its apparent flaws, is not null and void, and thus cannot be annulled. Consequently, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in issuing the assailed decision. This Court has been constrained in the past to leave erroneous decisions as they were.75 Our fealty to justice in its pristine form the upholding of "right" over "wrong" is equipoised with our adherence to due process, and the rules that emanate from that principle. The Court takes great care in drafting rules of procedure so that the axioms that govern the legal battleground may live up to Justice Frankfurters approximation of due process as "the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play."76 Due process dictates that litigants be afforded a reasonable opportunity to attack erroneous judgments and be shielded from the adverse effects of void judgments. Due process likewise demands that a party, after trekking the long road of litigation should be permitted to enjoy the fruits of an auspicious final judgment. Absent any convincing demonstration that the RTC Order is patently null and void, there is no reason under law and jurisprudence to upset it, given the reality that it has long become final. WHEREFORE, the above premises considered, the Petition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. Puno, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 117209 February 9, 1996

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 158, Pasig City and SPOUSES VAN MUNSON y NAVARRO and REGINA MUNSON y ANDRADE, respondents. DECISION REGALADO, J.: Indeed, what's in a name, as the Bard of Avon has written, since a rose by any other name would smell as sweet? This could well be the theme of the present appeal by certiorari which challenges, on pure questions of law, the order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 158, Pasig City, dated September 13, 1994 1 in JDRC Case No. 2964. Said court is faulted for having approved the petition for adoption of Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran and simultaneously granted the prayer therein for the change of the first name of said adoptee to Aaron Joseph, to complement the surname Munson y Andrade which he acquired consequent to his adoption. The facts are undisputed. On March 10, 1994, herein private respondent spouses, Van Munson y Navarro and Regina Munson y Andrade, filed a p petition 2 to adopt the minor Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran, duly alleging therein the jurisdictional facts required by Rule 99 of the Rules of Court for adoption, their qualifications as and fitness to be adoptive parents, as well as the circumstances under and by reason of which the adoption of the aforenamed minor was sought. In the very same petition, private respondents prayed for the change of the first name or said minor adoptee to Aaron Joseph, the same being the name with which he was baptized in keeping with religious tradition and by which he has been called by his adoptive family, relatives and friends since May 6, 1993 when he arrived at private respondents' residence. 3 At the hearing on April 18, 1994, petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name in the same petition for adoption. In its formal opposition dated May 3, 1995, 4 petitioner reiterated its objection to the joinder of the petition for adoption and the petitions for change of name in a single proceeding, arguing that these petition should be conducted and pursued as two separate proceedings. After considering the evidence and arguments of the contending parties, the trial court ruled in favor of herein private respondents in this wise: WHEREFORE, minor child Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran is freed from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to his natural parents, and for all legal intents and purposes shall be known as Aaron Joseph Munson y Andrade, the legally adopted child of Van Munson and Regina Munson effective upon the filing of the petition on March 10, 1994. As soon as the decree of adoption becomes final and executory, it shall be recorded in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig, Metro Manila pursuant to Section 8, Rule 99 and Section 6, Rule 103, respectively, of the Rules of Court, and shall be annotated in the record of birth of the adopted child, which in this case is in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, where the child was born. Likewise, send a copy of this Order to the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila, for its appropriate action consisten(t) herewith. 5 At this juncture, it should be noted that no challenge has been raised by petitioner regarding the fitness of herein private respondents to be adopting parents nor the validity of the decree of adoption

rendered in their favor. The records show that the latter have commendably established their qualifications under the law to be adopters, 6 and have amply complied with the procedural requirements for the petition for adoption, 7 with the findings of the trial court being recited thus: To comply with the jurisdictional requirements, the Order of this Court dated March 16, 1994 setting this petition for hearing (Exh. "A") was published in the March 31, April 6 and 13, 1994 issues of the Manila Chronicle, a newspaper of general circulation (Exhs. "B" to "E" and submarkings). . . . xxx xxx xxx

Petitioners apart from being financially able, have no criminal nor derogatory record (Exhs. "K" to "V"); and are physically fit to be the adoptive parents of the minor child Kevin (Exh. "W"). Their qualification to become the adoptive parents of Kevin Earl finds support also in the Social Case Study Report prepared by the DSWD through Social Worker Luz Angela Sonido, the pertinent portion of which reads: "Mr. and Mrs. Munson are very religious, responsible, mature and friendly individuals. They are found physically healthy; mentally fit, spiritually and financially capable to adopt Kevin Earl Moran aka Aaron Joseph. "Mr. and Mrs. Munson have provided AJ with all his needs. They unselfishly share their time, love and attention to him. They are ready and willing to continuously provide him a happy and secure home life. "Aaron Joseph, on the other hand, is growing normally under the care of the Munsons. He had comfortably settled in his new environment. His stay with the Munsons during the six months trial custody period has resulted to a close bond with Mr. and Mrs. Munson and vice-versa. "We highly recommend to the Honorable Court that the adoption of Kevin Earl Moran aka Aaron Joseph by Mr. and Mrs. Van Munson be legalized." 8 It has been said all too often enough that the factual findings of the lower court, when sufficiently buttressed by legal and evidential support, are accorded high respect and are binding and conclusive upon this Court. 9Accordingly, we fully uphold the propriety of that portion of the order of the court below granting the petition, for adoption. The only legal issues that need to be resolved may then be synthesized mainly as follows. (1) whether or not the court a quo erred in granting the prayer for the change of the registered proper or given name of the minor adoptee embodied in the petition for adoption; and (2) whether or not there was lawful ground for the change of name. I. It is the position of petitioner that respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he additionally granted the prayer for the change of the given or proper name of the adoptee in a petition for adoption. Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two special proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are different from and are not related to each other, being respectively governed by distinct sets of law and rules. In order to be entitled to both reliefs, namely, a decree of adoption and an authority to change the giver or proper name of the adoptee,

the respective proceedings for each must be instituted separately, and the substantive and procedural requirements therefor under Articles 183 to 193 of the Family Code in relation to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court for adoption, and Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code in relation to Rule 103 of the Rules of Court for change of name, must correspondingly be complied with. 10 A perusal of the records, according to petitioner, shows that only the laws and rules on adoption have been observed, but not those for a petition for change of name. 11 Petitioner further contends that what the law allows is the change of the surname of the adoptee, as a matter of right, to conform with that of the adopter and as a natural consequence of the adoption thus granted. If what is sought is the change of the registered given or proper name, and since this would involve a substantial change of one's legal name, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 should accordingly be instituted, with the substantive and adjective requisites therefor being conformably satisfied. 12 Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the petition for adoption with a prayer for change of name predicated upon Section 5, Rule 2 which allows permissive joinder of causes of action in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and in line with the policy of discouraging protracted and vexatious litigations. It is argued that there is no prohibition in the Rules against the joinder of adoption and change of name being pleaded as two separate but related causes of action in a single petition. Further, the conditions for permissive joinder of causes of action, i.e., jurisdiction of the court, proper venue and joinder of parties, have been met. 13 Corollarily, petitioner insists on strict adherence to the rule regarding change of name in view of the natural interest of the State in maintaining a system of identification of its citizens and in the orderly administration of justice. 14 Private respondents argue otherwise and invoke a liberal construction and application of the Rules, the welfare and interest of the adoptee being the primordial concern that should be addressed in the instant proceeding. 15 On this score, the trial court adopted a liberal stance in holding that Furthermore, the change of name of the child from Kevin Earl Bartolome to Aaron Joseph should not be treated strictly, it appearing that no rights have been prejudiced by said change of name. The strict and meticulous observation of the requisites set forth by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court is indubitably for the purpose of preventing fraud, ensuring that neither State nor any third person should be prejudiced by the grant of the petition for change of name under said rule, to a petitioner of discernment. The first name sought to be changed belongs to an infant barely over a year old. Kevin Earl has not exercised full civil rights nor engaged in any contractual obligations. Neither can he nor petitioners on his behalf, be deemed to have any immoral, criminal or illicit purpose for seeking said cha(n)ge of name. It stands to reason that there is no way that the state or any person may be so prejudiced by the action for change of Kevin Earl's first name. In fact, to obviate any possible doubts on the intent of petitioners, the prayer for change of name was caused to be published together with the petition for adoption. 16 Art. 189 of the Family Code enumerates in no uncertain terms the legal effects of adoption: (1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;

(2) The parental authority of the parents by nature over the adopted shall terminate and be vested in the adopters, except that if the adopter is the spouse of the parent by nature of the adopted, parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses; and (3) The adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his parents and other blood relatives. Clearly, the law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It is the change of the adoptee's surname to follow that of the adopter which is the natural and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption and must specifically be contained in the order of the court, in fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner. However, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of the adoptee must remain as it was originally registered in the civil register. The creation of an adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptee's registered Christian or first name. The automatic change thereof, premised solely upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be granted. The name of the adoptee as recorded in the civil register should be used in the adoption proceedings in order to vest the court with jurisdiction to hear and determine the same, 17 and shall continue to be so used until the court orders otherwise. Changing the given or proper name of a person as recorded in the civil register is a substantial change in one's official or legal name and cannot be authorized without a judicial order. The purpose of the statutory procedure authorizing a change of name is simply to have, wherever possible, a record of the change, and in keeping with the object of the statute, a court to which the application is made should normally make its decree recording such change. 18 The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the name appearing therein. If a change in one's name is desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly complying with the substantive and procedural requirements for a special proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly determined. Under Rule 103, a petition for change of name shall be filed in the regional trial court of the province where the person desiring to change his name resides. It shall be signed and verified by the person desiring his name to be changed or by some other person in his behalf and shall state that the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for at least three years prior to such filing, the cause for which the change of name is sought, and the name asked for. An order for the date and place of hearing shall be made and published, with the Solicitor General or the proper provincial or city prosecutor appearing for the Government at such hearing. It is only upon satisfactory proof of the veracity of the allegations in the petition and the reasonableness of the causes for the change of name that the court may adjudge that the name be changed as prayed for in the petition, and shall furnish a copy of said judgment to the civil registrar of the municipality concerned who shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register. A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance with all the requirements therefor is indispensable in order to vest the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication. 19 It is an independent and discrete special proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set of rules. A fortiori, it cannot be granted by means of any other proceeding. To consider it as a mere incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding would be to denigrate its role and significance as the appropriate remedy available under our remedial law system.

The Solicitor General correctly points out the glaring defects of the subject petition insofar as it seeks the change of name of the adoptee, 20 all of which taken together cannot but lead to the conclusion that there was no petition sufficient in form and substance for change of name as would rightfully deserve an order therefor. It would be procedurally erroneous to employ a petition for adoption to effect a change of name in the absence of the corresponding petition for the latter relief at law. Neither can the allowance of the subject petition, by any stretch of imagination and liberality, be justified under the rule allowing permissive joinder of causes of action. Moreover, the reliance by private respondents on the pronouncements in Briz vs. Brit, et al. 21 and Peyer vs. Martinez, et al. 22 is misplaced. A restatement of the rule and jurisprudence on joinder of causes of action would, therefore, appear to be called for. By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of action, is meant the uniting of two or more demands or rights of action in one action; the statement of more than one cause of action in a declaration. 23 It is the union of two or more civil causes of action, each of which could be made the basis of a separate suit, in the same complaint, declaration or petition. A plaintiff may under certain circumstances join several distinct demands, controversies or rights of action in one declaration, complaint or petition. 24 As can easily be inferred from the above definitions, a party is generally not required to join in one suit several distinct causes of action. The joinder of separate causes of action, where allowable, is permissive and not mandatory in the absence of a contrary statutory provision, even though the causes of action arose from the same factual setting and might under applicable joinder rules be joined. 25 Modern statutes and rules governing joinders are intended to avoid a multiplicity of suits and to promote the efficient administration of justice wherever this may be done without prejudice to the rights of the litigants. To achieve these ends, they are liberally construed. 26 While joinder of causes of action is largely left to the option of a party litigant, Section 5, Rule 2 of our present Rules allows causes of action to be joined in one complaint conditioned upon the following requisites: (a) it will not violate the rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties; and (b) the causes of action arise out of the same contract, transaction or relation between the parties, or are for demands for money or are of the same nature and character. The objectives of the rule or provision are to avoid a multiplicity of suits where the same parties and subject matter are to be dealt with by effecting in one action a complete determination of all matters in controversy and litigation between the parties involving one subject matter, and to expedite the disposition of litigation at minimum cost. The provision should be construed so as to avoid such multiplicity, where possible, without prejudice to the rights of the litigants. Being of a remedial nature, the provision should be liberally construed, to the end that related controversies between the same parties may be adjudicated at one time; and it should be made effectual as far as practicable, 27 with the end in view of promoting the efficient administration of justice. 28 The statutory intent behind the provisions on joinder of causes of action is to encourage joinder of actions which could reasonably be said to involve kindred rights and wrongs, although the courts have not succeeded in giving a standard definition of the terms used or in developing a rule of universal application. The dominant idea is to permit joinder of causes of action, legal or equitable, where there is some substantial unity between them. 29 While the rule allows a plaintiff to join as many separate claims as he may have, there should nevertheless be some unity in the problem presented and a common question of law and fact involved, subject always to the restriction thereon regarding jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties. Unlimited joinder is not authorized. 30

Our rule on permissive joinder of causes of action, with the proviso subjecting it to the correlative rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties 31 and requiring a conceptual unity in the problems presented, effectively disallows unlimited joinder. 32 Turning now to the present petition, while it is true that there is no express prohibition against the joinder of a petition for adoption and for change of name, we do not believe that there is any relation between these two petitions, nor are they of the same nature or character, much less do they present any common question of fact or law, which conjointly would warrant their joinder. In short, these petitions do not rightly meet the underlying test of conceptual unity demanded to sanction their joinder under our Rules. As keenly observed and correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General A petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two special proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are different from each other. Each action is individually governed by particular sets of laws and rules. These two proceedings involve disparate issues. In a petition for adoption, the court is called upon to evaluate the proposed adopter's fitness and qualifications to bring up and educate the adoptee properly (Prasnick vs. Republic, 99 Phil. 665). On the other hand, in a petition for change of name, no family relations are created or affected for what is looked into is the propriety and reasonableness of the grounds supporting the proposed change of name (Yu vs. Republic, 17 SCRA 253). xxx xxx xxx

. . . Hence, the individual merits of each issue must be separately assessed and determined for neither action is dependent on the other. 33 The rule on permissive joinder of: causes of action is clear. Joinder may be allowed only if the actions show a commonality of relationship and conform to the rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties (Section 5, Rule 2, Rules of Court). These conditions are wanting in the instant case. As already pointed out in our Petition (pp. 9-10), an action for adoption and an action for change of name are, in nature and purpose, not related to each other and do not arise out of the same relation between the parties. While what is cogent in an adoption proceeding is the proposed adopter's fitness and qualifications to adopt, a petition for change of first name may only prosper upon proof of reasonable and compelling grounds supporting the change requested. Fitness to adopt is not determinative of the sufficiency of reasons justifying a change of name. And similarly, a change of first name cannot be justified in view of a finding that the proposed adopter was found fit to adopt. There is just no way that the two actions can connect and find a common ground, thus the joinder would be improper. In contending that adoption and change of name may be similarly sought in one petition, private respondents rely upon Peyer vs. Martinez and Briz vs. Briz (p. 4, Comment) We however submit that these citations are non sequitur. In both cases, the fact of intimacy and relatedness of the issues is so pronounced. In Peyer, an application to pronounce the husband an absentee is obviously intertwined with the action to transfer the management of conjugal assets to the wife. In Briz, an action for declaration of heirship was deemed a clear condition precedent to an action to recover the land subject of partition and distribution proceeding. However, the commonality of relationship which stands out in both cases does

not characterize the present action for adoption and change of name. Thus the rulings in Peyerand Briz find no place in the case at bar. Besides, it is interesting to note that although a joinder of the two actions was, in Briz, declared feasible, the Supreme Court did not indorse an automatic joinder and instead remanded the matter for further proceedings, granting leave to amend the pleadings and implead additional parties-defendants for a complete determination of the controversy (Briz vs. Briz, 43 Phil. 763, 770). Such cautionary stance all the more emphasizes that although joinders are generally accepted, they are not allowed where the conditions are not satisfactorily met. 34 It furthermore cannot be said that the proposed joinder in this instance will make for a complete determination of all matters pertaining to the coetaneous grant of adoption and change of name of the adoptee in one petition. As already stated, the subject petition was grossly insufficient in form and substance with respect to the prayer for change of name of the adoptee. The policy of avoiding multiplicity of suits which underscores the rule on permissive joinder of causes of action is addressed to suits that are intimately related and also present interwoven and dependent issues which can be most expeditiously and comprehensively settled by having just one judicial proceeding, but not to suits or actions whose subject matters or corresponding reliefs are unrelated or diverse such that they are best taken up individually. In Nabus vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 35 the Court clarified the rule on permissive joinder of causes of action: The rule is clearly permissive. It does not constitute an obligatory rule, as there is no positive provision of law or any rule of jurisprudence which compels a party to join all his causes of action and bring them at one and the same time. Under the present rules, the provision is still that the plaintiff may, and not that he must, unite several causes of action although they may be included in one of the classes specified. This, therefore, leaves it to the plaintiff's option whether the causes of action shall be joined in the same action, and no unfavorable inference may be drawn from his failure or refusal to do so. He may always file another action based on the remaining cause or causes of action within the prescriptive period therefor. (Emphasis supplied.) The situation presented in this case does not warrant exception from the Rules under the policy of liberal construction thereof in general, and for change of name in particular, as proposed by private respondents and adopted by respondent judge. Liberal construction of the Rules may be invoked in situations wherein there may be some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the Rules. Utter disregard of the Rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction. The Court is not impervious to the frustration that litigants and lawyers alike would at times encounter in procedural bureaucracy but imperative justice requires correct observance of indispensable technicalities precisely designed to ensure its proper dispensation. 36 It has long been recognized that strict compliance with the Rules of Court is indispensable for the prevention of needless delays and for the orderly and expeditious dispatch of judicial business. 37 Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities that may be ignored at will to suit the convenience of a party. Adjective law is important in ensuring the effective enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly and speedy administration of justice. These rules are not intended to hamper litigants or complicate litigation but, indeed to provide for a system under which

a suitor may be heard in the correct form and manner and at the prescribed time in a peaceful confrontation before a judge whose authority they acknowledge. 38 It cannot be overemphasized that procedural rules have their own wholesome rationale in the orderly administration of justice. Justice has to be administered according to the Rules in order to obviate arbitrariness, caprice, or whimsicality. 39 We have been cautioned and reminded in Limpot vs. CA, et al. that: 40 Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly administration of justice and the protection of substantive rights in judicial and extrajudicial proceedings. It is a mistake to propose that substantive law and adjective law are contradictory to each other or, as has often been suggested, that enforcement of procedural rules should never be permitted if it will result in prejudice to the substantive rights of the litigants. This is not exactly true; the concept is much misunderstood. As a matter of fact, the policy of the courts is to give both kinds of law, as complementing each other, in the just and speedy resolution of the dispute between the parties. Observance of both substantive rights is equally guaranteed by due process, whatever the source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court. xxx xxx xxx

. . . (T)hey are required to be followed except only when for the most persuasive of reasons they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed. . . . While it is true that a litigation is not a game of technicalities, this does not mean that the Rules of Court may be ignored at will and at random to the prejudice of the orderly presentation and assessment of the issues and their just resolution. Justice eschews anarchy. Only exceptionally in very extreme circumstances, when a rule deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy such that rigid application thereof frustrates rather than promotes substantial justice, will technicalities deserve scant consideration from the court. In such situations, the courts are empowered, even obligated, to suspend the operation of the rules. 41 We do not perceive any injustice that can possibly be visited upon private respondents by following the reglementary procedure for the change in the proper or given name that they seek for their adopted child. We are hard put to descry the indispensability of a change of the first name of the adoptee to his welfare and benefit. Nor is the said change of such urgency that would justify an exemption from or a relaxation of the Rules. It is the State that stands to be prejudiced by a wanton disregard of Rule 103 in this case, considering its natural interest in the methodical administration of justice and in the efficacious maintenance of a system of identification of its citizens. The danger wrought by non-observance of the Rules is that the violation of or failure to comply with the procedure prescribed by law prevents the proper determination of the questions raised by the parties with respect to the merits of the case and makes it necessary to decide, in the first place, such questions as relate to the form of the action. The rules and procedure laid down for the trial court and the adjudication of cases are matters of public policy. 42 They are matters of public order and interest which can in no wise be changed or regulated by agreements between or stipulations by parties to an action for their singular convenience. 43 In Garcia vs. Republic, 44 we are reminded of the definiteness in the application of the Rules and the importance of seeking relief under the appropriate proceeding:

. . . The procedure set by law should be delimited. One should not confuse or misapply one procedure for another lest we create confusion in the application of the proper remedy. Respondent judge's unmindful disregard of procedural tenets aimed at achieving stability of procedure is to be deplored. He exceeded his prerogatives by granting the prayer for change of name, his order being unsupported by both statutory and case law. The novel but unwarranted manner in which he adjudicated this case may be characterized as a regrettable abdication of the duty to uphold the teachings of remedial law and jurisprudence. II. Petitioner avers that it was error for the lower court to grant the petition for change of name without citing or proving any lawful ground. Indeed, the only justification advanced for the change of name was the fact of the adoptee's baptism under the name Aaron Joseph and by which he has been known since he came to live with private respondents. 45 Private respondents, through a rather stilted ratiocination, assert that upon the grant of adoption, the subject minor adoptee ipso facto assumed a new identification and designation, that is, Aaron Joseph which was the name given to him during the baptismal rites. Allowing the change of his first name as prayed for in the petition, so they claim, merely confirms the designation by which he is known and called in the community in which he lives. This largely echoes the opinion of the lower court that naming the child Aaron Joseph was symbolic of naming him at birth, and that they, as adoptive parents, have as much right as the natural parents to freely select the first name of their adopted child. 46 The lower court was sympathetic to herein private respondents and ruled on this point in this manner: As adoptive parents, petitioner like other parents may freely select the first name given to his/her child as it is only the surname to which the child is entitled that is fixed by law. . . . xxx xxx xxx

The given name of the minor was Kevin Earl, a name given for no other purpose than for identification purposes in a birth certificate by a woman who had all intentions of giving him away. The naming of the minor as Aaron Joseph by petitioners upon the grant of their petition for adoption is symbolic of naming the minor at birth. 47 We cannot fathom any legal or jurisprudential basis for this attenuated ruling of respondent judge and must thus set it aside. It is necessary to reiterate in this discussion that a person's name is a word or combination of words by which he is known and identified, and distinguished from others, for the convenience of the world at large in addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. It is both of personal as well as public interest that every person must have a name. The name of an individual has two parts: the given or proper name and the surname or family name. The giver or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law. 48 By Article 408 of the Civil Code, a person's birth must be entered in the civil register. The official name of a person is that given him in the civil register. That is his name in the eyes of the law. 49 And once the name of a person is officially entered in the civil register, Article 376 of the same Code

seals that identity with its precise mandate: no person can change his name or surname without judicial authority. This statutory restriction is premised on the interest of the State in names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification. 50 By reason thereof, the only way that the name of person can be changed legally is through a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. 51 For purposes of an application for change of name under Article 376 of the Civil Code and correlatively implemented by Rule 103, the only name that may be changed is the true or official name recorded in the civil register. As earlier mentioned, a petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, impressed as it is with public interest, strict compliance with all the requisites therefor in order to vest the court with jurisdiction is essential, and failure therein renders the proceedings a nullity. 52 It must likewise be stressed once again that a change of name is a privilege, not a matter of right, addressed to the sound discretion of the court which has the duty to consider carefully the consequences of a change of name and to deny the same unless weighty reasons are shown. Before a person can be authorized to change his name, that is, his true or official name or that which appears in his birth certificate or is entered in the civil register, he must show proper and reasonable cause or any convincing reason which may justify such change. 53 Jurisprudence has recognized, inter alia, the following grounds as being sufficient to warrant a change of name: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) when the change is based on a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudice to anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest. 54 Contrarily, a petition for change of name grounded on the fact that one was baptized by another name, under which he has been known and which he used, has been denied inasmuch as the use of baptismal names is not sanctioned. 55 For, in truth, baptism is not a condition sine qua non to a change of name. 56 Neither does the fact that the petitioner has been using a different name and has become known by it constitute proper and reasonable cause to legally authorize a change of name. 57 A name given to a person in the church records or elsewhere or by which be is known in the community - when at variance with that entered in the civil register - is unofficial and cannot be recognized as his real name. 58 The instant petition does not sufficiently persuade us to depart from such rulings of long accepted wisdom and applicability. The only grounds offered to justify the change of name prayed for was that the adopted child had been baptized as Aaron Joseph in keeping with the religious faith of private respondents and that it was the name by which he had been called and known by his family, relatives and friends from, the time he came to live with private respondents. 59 Apart from suffusing their pleadings with sanctimonious entreaties for compassion, none of the justified grounds for a change of name has been alleged or established by private respondents. The legal bases chosen by them to bolster their cause have long been struck down as unavailing for their present purposes. For, to allow the adoptee herein to use his baptismal name, instead of his name registered in the civil register, would be to countenance or permit that which has always been frowned upon. 60 The earlier quoted posturing of respondent judge, as expressed in his assailed order that -

(a)s adoptive parents, petitioners like other parents may freely select the first name given to his/her child as it is only the surname to which the child is entitled that is fixed by law. . . . The given name of the minor was Kevin Earl, a name given for no other purpose than for identification purposes in a birth certificate by a woman who had all the intentions of giving him away. The naming of the minor as Aaron Joseph by petitioners upon grant of their petition for adoption is symbolic of naming the minor at birth. and supposedly based on the authority of Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Maximo Wong, supra, painfully misapplies the ruling therein enunciated. The factual backdrop of said case is not at all analogous to that of the case at bar. In the Wong case, therein petitioner Maximo Wong sought the change of his surname which he acquired by virtue of the decree of adoption granted in favor of spouses Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong. Upon reaching the age of majority, he filed a petition in court to change his surname from Wong to Alcala, which was his surname prior to the adoption. He adduced proof that the use of the surname Wong caused him embarrassment and isolation from friends and relatives in view of a suggested Chinese ancestry when in reality he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim community, thereby hampering his business and social life, and that his surviving adoptive mother consented to the change of name sought. This Court granted the petition and regarded the change of the surname as a mere incident in, rather than the object of, the adoption. It should be noted that in said case the change of surname, not the given name, and the legal consequences thereof in view of the adoption were at issue. That it was sought in a petition duly and precisely filed for that purpose with ample proof of the lawful grounds therefor only serves to reinforce the imperative necessity of seeking relief under and through the legally prescribed procedures. Here, the Solicitor General meritoriously explained that: Respondent Judge failed to distinguish between a situation wherein a child is being named for the first time by his natural parent, as against one wherein, a child is previously conferred a first name by his natural parent, and such name is subsequently sought to be disregarded and changed by the adoptive parents. In the first case, there is no dispute that natural parents have the right to freely select and give the child's first name for every person, including juridical persons, must have a name (Tolentino, A., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, Vo. I, 1987 edition, page 721). In the second case, however, as in the case at bar, private respondents, in their capacities as adopters, cannot claim a right to name the minor adoptee after such right to name the child had already been exercised by the natural parent. Adopting parents have not been conferred such right by law, hence, the right assertes by private respondents herein remains but illusory. Renaming the adoptee cannot be claimed as a right. It is merely a privilege necessitating judicial consent upon compelling grounds. 61 The liberality with which this Court treats matters leading up to adoption insofar as it carries out the beneficent purposes of adoption and ensures to the adopted child the rights and privileges arising therefrom, ever mindful that the paramount consideration is the overall benefit and interest of the adopted child, 62 should be understood in its proper context. It should not be misconstrued or misinterpreted to extend to inferences beyond the contemplation of law and jurisprudence. The practically unrestricted freedom of the natural parent to select the proper or given name of the child presupposes that no other name for it has theretofore been entered in the civil register. Once

such name is registered, regardless of the reasons for such choice and even if it be solely for the purpose of identification, the same constitutes the official name. This effectively authenticates the identity of the person and must remain unaltered save when, for the most compelling reasons shown in an appropriate proceeding, its change may merit judicial approval. While the right of a natural parent to name the child is recognized, guaranteed and protected under the law, the so-called right of an adoptive parent to re-name an adopted child by virtue or as a consequence of adoption, even for the most noble intentions and moving supplications, is unheard of in law and consequently cannot be favorably considered. To repeat, the change of the surname of the adoptee as a result of the adoption and to follow that of the adopter does not lawfully extend to or include the proper or given name. Furthermore, factual realities and legal consequences, rather than sentimentality and symbolisms, are what are of concern to the Court. Finally, it is understood that this decision does not entirely foreclose and is without prejudice to, private respondents' privilege to legally change the proper or given name of their adopted child, provided that the same is exercised, this time, via a proper petition for change of name. Of course, the grant thereof is conditioned on strict compliance with all jurisdictional requirements and satisfactory proof of the compelling reasons advanced therefor. WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the assailed order of respondent judge is hereby MODIFIED. The legally adopted child of private respondents shall henceforth be officially known as Kevin Earl Munson y Andrade unless a change thereof is hereafter effected in accordance with law. In all other respects, the order is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Republic Act No. 10172 Implementing Rules and Regulations

Republic of the Philippines OFFICE OF THE CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL National Statistics Office Manila ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 1, SERIES OF 2012 Subject: RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10172 (An Act Further Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General to Correct Clerical or Typographical Errors in the Day and Month in the Date of Birth or Sex of a Person Appearing in the Civil Register Without Need of a Judicial Order, Amending for this Purpose Act Numbered Ninety Forty-Eight.)

Pursuant to Section 2 of Act No. 3753, the Office of the Civil Registrar General (OCRG) hereby promulgates the following rules and regulations of Republic Act No. 10172 which was approved on August 15, 2012 for the information, guidance and compliance of all concerned parties. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT Commonwealth Act No. 591 mandates the National Statistics Office (NSO) through the OCRG to carry out and administer the provisions of Act No. 3753 otherwise known as the Civil Registry Law. This Order shall be suppletory to Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 2001 (Implementing Rules and Regulations, Republic Act No. 9048). Republic Act No. 10172 amended Sections 1, 2, 5 and 8 of Republic Act No. 9048. Section 1 of this Amendatory Law provides, No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname, the day and month in the date of birth or sex of a person where it is patently clear that there was a clerical or typographical error or mistake in the entry, which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar (C/MCR) or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations. IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS Rule 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error The duly appointed C/MCR in accordance with the provisions of the existing laws, including the Consul General, are hereby authorized to correct clerical or typographical errors in the day and month (date of birth) or sex of a person in the civil register for birth. Rule 2. Definition of Terms As used in these rules, the following terms shall mean: 2.1. Clerical or typographical error - Refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register on the entry of day and month in the date of birth or the sex of the person, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or records: Provided,

however, that no correction must involve the change of nationality, age (refers to the correction on the year of birth), or legitimacy status of the petitioner/document owner. 2.2. Sex Refers to the biological and physiological characteristics that define men and women. 2.3. Day and Month of Birth Refers to the entry in the month and/or day of birth of the petitioner/document owner which is sought to be corrected. 2.4. Accredited Government Physician Refers to a licensed doctor of medicine who is registered with the Professional Regulations Commission (PRC) and is employed in any government hospitals, health institutions, or public health offices. 2.5. Medical Certification Refers to the certification issued by the accredited government physician attesting to the fact that the petitioner/document owner has not undergone sex change or sex transplant. Rule 3. Who may file the petition. 3.1. For correction of entry on the day and/or month in the date of birth: Any person of legal age, having direct and personal interest in the correction of a clerical or typographical error in the day and/or month in the date of birth of a person in the civil register for birth, may file the petition. A person is considered to have direct and personal interest when he is the owner of the record, or the owner's spouse, children, parents, brothers, sisters, grandparents, guardian, or any other person duly authorized by law or by the owner of the document sought to be corrected; Provided; however, that when a person is a minor or physically or mentally incapacitated, the petition may be filed on his/her behalf by his/her spouse, or any of his/her children, parents, brothers; sisters; grandparents, guardians, or persons duly authorized by law. 3.2. For correction of a clerical or typographical error in sex: The petitioner affected by such error shall personally file the petition with the civil registry office where the birth certificate is registered. Rule 4. Where to file the petition

4.1. For correction of clerical and typographical error in the entry of the day and/or month in the date of birth. The verified petition may be filed with the C/MCR of the city or municipality or the Philippine Consulate, as the case may be, where the birth record containing the day and/or month in the date of birth to be corrected is registered. When the petitioner has migrated to another place within the Philippines and it is not practical for such party, in terms of transportation expenses, time and effort to appear before the C/MCR of the place of birth, the petition may be filed with the C/MCR of the place where the petitioner is residing or domiciled. Any person whose birth record was reported abroad and presently residing in the Philippines, the petition may be filed with the C/MCR of the place of residence following the procedures of migrant petition. Any person whose birth record was registered in the Philippines, or in any Philippine Consulate, but who is presently residing or domiciled in a foreign country, may file the petition with the nearest Philippine Consulate. 4.2. For correction of clerical and typographical error in the entry of sex The verified petition shall be filed, in person, with the C/MCR of the city or municipality or the Philippine Consulate, as the case may be, where the record containing the entry of sex in the birth certificate to be corrected is registered. Rule 5. Processing of the petition Insofar as applicable, Rule 5 of Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 2001, shall be observed. Rule 6. Form and content of the petition Insofar as applicable, Rule 8 of Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 2001 shall be observed. In addition, as supporting documents to the petition, the following shall be submitted: 6.1. Earliest school record or earliest school documents; 6.2. Medical records; 6.3. Baptismal certificate and other documents issued by religious authorities; 6.4. A clearance or a certification that the owner of the document has no pending

administrative, civil or criminal case, or no criminal record, which shall be obtained from the following: 6.4.1. Employer, if employed; 6.4.2. National Bureau of Investigation; and 6.4.3. Philippine National Police. 6.5. The petition for the correction of sex and day and/or month in the date of birth shall include the affidavit of publication from the publisher and a copy of the newspaper clipping; and 6.6. In case of correction of sex, the petition shall be supported with a medical certification issued by an accredited government physician that the petitioner has not undergone sex change or sex transplant. Rule 7. Posting and publication of the petition. Insofar as applicable, Rule 9 of Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 2001 shall be observed. Rule 8. Duties of the C/MCR Insofar as applicable, Rule 10 of Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 2001 shall be observed. In addition, the C/MCR shall issue a certification on the authenticity of the certification issued by the accredited government physician certifying that the petitioner/document owner has not undergone sex change or sex transplant. Rule 9. Duties and powers of the CRG Insofar as applicable, Rule 11 of Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 2001 shall be observed. Rule 10. Authority to collect filing and other fees The C/MCR is hereby authorized to collect from every petitioner three thousand pesos (P3,000.00) for petition to correct the day and/or month in the date of birth or sex. An indigent petitioner shall be exempt from paying the required payment, provided that the petition is supported by a certification from the City/Municipal Social Welfare Office that the petitioner/document owner is indigent.

In the case of a petition filed with the CG, a filing fee of one hundred fifty U.S. dollars ($150.00) or its equivalent value in local currency for the correction of clerical or typographical error is required. In the case of a migrant petition, there shall be a service fee of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) to be collected by the PRCR. When a petitioner/document owner files petition for correction of clerical error under R.A. 9048, simultaneously, with a petition for correction of clerical error under R.A. 10172, and the same document is involved, the petitioner/document owner shall pay only the amount of P3,000.00 corresponding to the fee under R.A. 10172. All fees collected by the C/MCR or the consul general pursuant to this Law shall accrue to the funds of the Local Civil Registry Office concerned or the Office of the Consul General for modernization of the office and hiring of new personnel and procurement of supplies, subject to government accounting and auditing rules. The local legislative body shall ratify the fees herein prescribed upon effectivity of this Order. Prior to ratification by the local legislative body, all fees collected in connection with this Order shall go to the LCRO trust fund, provided, however, that the fees prescribed therein shall be uniform in all cities and municipalities in the country, and in all Philippine Consulates. Rule 11. Retroactivity clause This Order shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code and other laws. Rule 12. Separability clause If any portion or provision of this Order is declared void or unconstitutional, the remaining portions or provisions thereof shall not be affected by such declaration. Rule 13. Repealing clause. All circulars, memoranda, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Order are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. Rule 14. Effectivity clause.

This Order shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two newspapers of general circulation. Approved this 24th day of October 2012.

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1. 2. 3. 4. Home Civil Registration Civil Registration Laws Republic Act No. 9048

Republic Act No. 9048

Republic of the Philippines Congress of the Philippines Metro Manila Eleventh Congress Third Regular Session Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-fourth day of July, two thousand. [REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9048] AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OR THE CONSUL GENERAL TO CORRECT A CLERICAL OR TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN ENTRY AND/OR CHANGE OF FIRST NAME OR NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL REGISTER WITHOUT NEED OF A JUDICIAL ORDER, AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE ARTICLES 376 AND 412 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES. Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled: SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname - No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil

registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations. SECTION 2. Definition of Terms - As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean: 1. "City or Municipal civil registrar" refers to the head of the local civil registry office of the city or municipality, as the case may be, who is appointed as such by the city or municipal mayor in accordance with the provisions of existing laws. 2. "Petitioner" refers to a natural person filing the petition and who has direct and personal interest in the correction of a clerical or typographical error in an entry or change of first name or nickname in the civil register. 3. "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. 4. "Civil Register" refers to the various registry books and related certificates and documents kept in the archives of the local civil registry offices, Philippine Consulates and of the Office of the Civil Registrar General. 5. "Civil registrar general" refers to the Administrator of the National Statistics Office which is the agency mandated to carry out and administer the provision of laws on civil registration. 6. "First name" refers to a name or nickname given to a person which may consist of one or more names in addition to the middle and last names. SECTION 3. Who May File the Petition and Where. - Any person having direct and personal interest in the correction of a clerical or typographical error in an entry and/or change of first name or nickname in the civil register may file, in person, a verified petition with the local civil registry office of the city or municipality where the record being sought to be corrected or changed is kept. In case the petitioner has already migrated to another place in the country and it would not be practical for such party, in terms of transportation expenses, time and effort to appear in person before the local civil registrar keeping the documents to be corrected or changed, the petition may be filed, in person, with the local civil registrar of the place where

the interested party is presently residing or domiciled. The two (2) local civil registrars concerned will then communicate to facilitate the processing of the petition. Citizens of the Philippines who are presently residing or domiciled in foreign countries may file their petition, in person, with the nearest Philippine Consulates. The petitions filed with the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general shall be processed in accordance with this Act and its implementing rules and regulations. All petitions for the clerical or typographical errors and/or change of first names or nicknames may be availed of only once. SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. - The petition for change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases: 1. The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce. 2. The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that by that first name or nickname in the community: or 3. The change will avoid confusion. SECTION 5. Form and Contents of the Petition. - The petition shall be in the form of an affidavit, subscribed and sworn to before any person authorized by the law to administer oaths. The affidavit shall set forth facts necessary to establish the merits of the petition and shall show affirmatively that the petitioner is competent to testify to the matters stated. The petitioner shall state the particular erroneous entry or entries, which are sought to be corrected and/or the change sought to be made. The petition shall be supported with the following documents: 1. A certified true machine copy of the certificate or of the page of the registry book containing the entry or entries sought to be corrected or changed. 2. At least two (2) public or private documents showing the correct entry or entries upon which the correction or change shall be based; and 3. Other documents which the petitioner or the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general may consider relevant and necessary for the approval of the petition.

In case of change of first name or nickname, the petition shall likewise be supported with the documents mentioned in the immediately preceding paragraph. In addition, the petition shall be published at least once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. Furthermore, the petitioner shall submit a certification from the appropriate law enforcement agencies that he has no pending case or no criminal record. The petition and its supporting papers shall be filed in three (3) copies to be distributed as follows: first copy to the concerned city or municipal civil registrar, or the consul general; second copy to the Office of the Civil Registrar General; and third copy to the petitioner. SECTION 6. Duties of the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General. The city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general to whom the petition is presented shall examine the petition and its supporting documents. He shall post the petition in a conspicuous place provided for that purpose for ten (10) consecutive days after he finds the petition and its supporting documents sufficient in form and substance. The city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general shall act on the petition and shall render a decision not later than five (5) working days after the completion of the posting and/or publication requirement. He shall transmit a copy of his decision together with the records of the proceedings to the Office of the Civil Registrar General within five (5) working days from the date of the decision. SECTION 7. Duties and Powers of the Civil Registrar General. - The civil registrar general shall, within ten (10) working days from receipt of the decision granting a petition, exercise the power to impugn such decision by way of an objection based on the following grounds: 1. The error is not clerical or typographical; 2. The correction of an entry or entries in the civil register is substantial or controversial as it affects the civil status of a person; or 3. The basis used in changing the first name or nickname of a person does not fall under SECTION 4. The civil registrar general shall immediately notify the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general of the action taken on the decision. Upon receipt of the notice thereof,

the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general shall notify the petitioner of such action. The petitioner may seek reconsideration with the civil registrar general or file the appropriate petition with the proper court. If the civil registrar general fails to exercise his power to impugn the decision of the city or municipal civil registrar or of the consul general within the period prescribed herein, such decision shall become final and executory. Where the petition is denied by the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general, the petitioner may either appeal the decision to the civil registrar general or file the appropriate petition with the proper court. SECTION 8. Payment of Fees. - The city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general shall be authorized to collect reasonable fees as a condition for accepting the petition. An indigent petitioner shall be exempt from the payment of the said fee. SECTION 9. Penalty Clause. - A person who violates any of the provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction, be penalized by imprisonment of not less than six (6) years but not more than twelve (12) years, or a fine of not less than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) but not more than One Hundred Thousand pesos (P100,000.00), or both, at the discretion of the court. In addition, if the offender is a government official or employee he shall suffer the penalties provided under civil service laws, rules and regulations. SECTION 10. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - The civil registrar general shall, in consultation with the Department of Justice, the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Office of the Supreme Court Administrator, the University of the Philippines Law Center and the Philippine Association of Civil Registrars, issue the necessary rules and regulations for the effective implementation of this Act not later than three (3) months from the effectivity of this law. SECTION 11. Retroactivity Clause. - This Act shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code and other laws.

SECTION 12. Separability Clause. - If any portion or provision of this Act is declared void or unconstitutional, the remaining portions or provisions thereof shall not be affected by such declaration. SECTION 13. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, other issuances, or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. SECTION 14. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its complete publication in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.

Approved. (Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. President of the Senate ((Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR. Speaker of the House of Representatives This Act which is a consolidation of House Bill No. 9797 and Senate Bill No. 2159 was finally passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate on February 7, 2001 and February 8, 2001, respectively.

(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO Secretary of the Senate (Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO Secretary General House of Representatives Approved. MARCH 22, 2001

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO President of the

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 157043 February 2, 2007

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. TRINIDAD R.A. CAPOTE, Respondent. DECISION CORONA, J.: This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) decision2 dated January 13, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66128, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23 of San Juan, Southern Leyte dated September 14, 1999 granting a petition for change of name. Respondent Trinidad R. A. Capote filed a petition for change of name of her ward from Giovanni N. Gallamaso toGiovanni Nadores on September 9, 1998. In Special Proceeding No. R-481,3 Capote as Giovannis guardian ad litem averred: xxx xxx xxx 1. [Respondent] is a Filipino citizen, of legal age, married, while minor GIOVANNI N. GALLAMASO, is also a Filipino citizen, sixteen (16) years old and both are residents of San Juan, Southern Leyte where they can be served with summons and other court processes; 2. [Respondent] was appointed guardian [ad litem] of minor Giovanni N. Gallamaso by virtue of a court order in Special [Proc.] No. R-459, dated [August 18, 1998] xxx xxx authorizing her to file in court a petition for change of name of said minor in accordance with the desire of his mother [who is residing and working abroad]; 3. Both [respondent] and minor have permanently resided in San Juan, Southern Leyte, Philippines for more than fifteen (15) years prior to the filing of this instant petition, the former since 1970 while the latter since his birth [in 1982]; 4. The minor was left under the care of [respondent] since he was yet nine (9) years old up to the present; 5. Minor GIOVANNI N. GALLAMASO is the illegitimate natural child of Corazon P. Nadores and Diosdado Gallamaso. [He] was born on July 9, 1982 [,] prior to the effectivity of the New Family Code and as such, his mother used the surname of the natural father despite the absence of marriage between them; and [Giovanni] has been known by that name since birth [as per his birth certificate registered at the Local Civil Register of San Juan, Southern Leyte]; 6. The father, Diosdado Gallamaso, from the time [Giovanni] was born and up to the present, failed to take up his responsibilities [to him] on matters of financial, physical, emotional and spiritual concerns. [Giovannis pleas] for attention along that line [fell] on deaf ears xxx xxx xxx;

7. [Giovanni] is now fully aware of how he stands with his father and he desires to have his surname changed to that of his mothers surname; 8. [Giovannis] mother might eventually petition [him] to join her in the United States and [his] continued use of the surname Gallamaso, the surname of his natural father, may complicate [his] status as natural child; and 9. The change of name [from] GIOVANNI N. GALLAMASO to GIOVANNI NADORES will be for the benefit of the minor. xxx xxx xxx4 Respondent prayed for an order directing the local civil registrar to effect the change of name on Giovannis birth certificate. Having found respondents petition sufficient in form and substance, the trial court gave due course to the petition.5 Publication of the petition in a newspaper of general circulation in the province of Southern Leyte once a week for three consecutive weeks was likewise ordered.6 The trial court also directed that the local civil registrar be notified and that the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) be sent a copy of the petition and order.7 Since there was no opposition to the petition, respondent moved for leave of court to present her evidence ex parte before a court-appointed commissioner. The OSG, acting through the Provincial Prosecutor, did not object; hence, the lower court granted the motion. After the reception of evidence, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the change of name from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores.8 From this decision, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed an appeal with a lone assignment of error: the court a quo erred in granting the petition in a summary proceeding. Ruling that the proceedings were sufficiently adversarial in nature as required, the CA affirmed the RTC decision ordering the change of name.9 In this petition, the Republic contends that the CA erred in affirming the trial courts decision which granted the petition for change of name despite the non-joinder of indispensable parties.10 Petitioner cites Republic of the Philippines v. Labrador11 and claims that the purported parents and all other persons who may be adversely affected by the childs change of name should have been made respondents to make the proceeding adversarial.12 We deny the petition. "The subject of rights must have a fixed symbol for individualization which serves to distinguish him from all others; this symbol is his name."13 Understandably, therefore, no person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.14 This is a reasonable requirement for those seeking such change because a persons name necessarily affects his identity, interests and interactions. The State must be involved in the process and decision to change the name of any of its citizens. The Rules of Court provides the requirements and procedure for change of name. Here, the appropriate remedy is covered by Rule 103,15 a separate and distinct proceeding from Rule 108 on mere cancellation and correction of entries in the civil registry (usually dealing only with innocuous or clerical errors thereon).16

The issue of non-joinder of alleged indispensable parties in the action before the court a quo is intertwined with the nature of the proceedings there. The point is whether the proceedings were sufficiently adversarial. Summary proceedings do not extensively address the issues of a case since the reason for their conduct is expediency. This, according to petitioner, is not sufficient to deal with substantial or contentious issues allegedly resulting from a change of name, meaning, legitimacy as well as successional rights.17 Such issues are ventilated only in adversarial proceedings wherein all interested parties are impleaded and due process is observed.18 When Giovanni was born in 1982 (prior to the enactment and effectivity of the Family Code of the Philippines),19the pertinent provision of the Civil Code then as regards his use of a surname, read: Art. 366. A natural child acknowledged by both parents shall principally use the surname of the father. If recognized by only one of the parents, a natural child shall employ the surname of the recognizing parent. (emphasis ours) Based on this provision, Giovanni should have carried his mothers surname from birth. The records do not reveal any act or intention on the part of Giovannis putative father to actually recognize him. Meanwhile, according to the Family Code which repealed, among others, Article 366 of the Civil Code: Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. xxx xxx xxx (emphasis ours) Our ruling in the recent case of In Re: Petition for Change of Name and/or Correction/Cancellation of Entry in Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang20 is enlightening: Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father. The Family Code gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, while illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the fathers surname. Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father bears only a given name and his mother surname, and does not have a middle name. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such. It is only when the illegitimate child is legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a public document or private handwritten instrument that he bears both his mothers surname as his middle name and his fathers surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an acknowledged child. 21
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The foregoing discussion establishes the significant connection of a persons name to his identity, his status in relation to his parents and his successional rights as a legitimate or illegitimate child. For sure, these matters should not be taken lightly as to deprive those who may, in any way, be affected by the right to present evidence in favor of or against such change. The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovannis petition. Giovanni availed of the proper remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, and complied with all the procedural requirements. After hearing, the trial court found (and the appellate court affirmed) that the evidence presented during the hearing of Giovannis petition sufficiently established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil Code, Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he was never recognized by

his father while his mother has always recognized him as her child. A change of name will erase the impression that he was ever recognized by his father. It is also to his best interest as it will facilitate his mothers intended petition to have him join her in the United States. This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification of mother and son. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the cases cited by petitioner22 in support of its position deal with cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry, a proceeding separate and distinct from the special proceedings for change of name. Those cases deal with the application and interpretation of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court while this case was correctly filed under Rule 103. Thus, the cases cited by petitioner are irrelevant and have no bearing on respondents case. While the OSG is correct in its stance that the proceedings for change of name should be adversarial, the OSG cannot void the proceedings in the trial court on account of its own failure to participate therein. As the CA correctly ruled: The OSG is correct in stating that a petition for change of name must be heard in an adversarial proceeding. Unlike petitions for the cancellation or correction of clerical errors in entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 cannot be decided through a summary proceeding. There is no doubt that this petition does not fall under Rule 108 for it is not alleged that the entry in the civil registry suffers from clerical or typographical errors. The relief sought clearly goes beyond correcting erroneous entries in the civil registry, although by granting the petition, the result is the same in that a corresponding change in the entry is also required to reflect the change in name. In this regard, [appellee] Capote complied with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding by posting in a newspaper of general circulation notice of the filing of the petition. The lower court also furnished the OSG a copy thereof. Despite the notice, no one came forward to oppose the petition including the OSG. The fact that no one opposed the petition did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear the same nor does it make the proceeding less adversarial in nature. The lower court is still expected to exercise its judgment to determine whether the petition is meritorious or not and not merely accept as true the arguments propounded. Considering that the OSG neither opposed the petition nor the motion to present its evidence ex parte when it had the opportunity to do so, it cannot now complain that the proceedings in the lower court were not adversarial enough.23 (emphasis supplied) A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it.24 Respondent gave notice of the petition through publication as required by the rules.25 With this, all interested parties were deemed notified and the whole world considered bound by the judgment therein. In addition, the trial court gave due notice to the OSG by serving a copy of the petition on it. Thus, all the requirements to make a proceeding adversarial were satisfied when all interested parties, including petitioner as represented by the OSG, were afforded the opportunity to contest the petition. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the January 13, 2003 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66128 AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice WE CONCUR:
Bust:32 inches - 34 inches Length:39 inches

Sleeve Length:11 inches Waist:26-30 inches Shoulder:14 inches Hem:82 inches Belt included Note: Actual measurements vary. 1-2 inches difference is normal due to manual measurement.