Pax at Sea

-- Vijai S. Chaudhari1 Every political regime offers its followers the vision of a stable environment where they can exercise their rights and freedoms. This quest for peace and stability may be as old as human civilization but is it a realistic expectation at sea? The ancient Romans had a remarkable record of inventions, innovations and achievements. They invented concrete and used it to build exceptionally well-engineered roads, arches and aqueducts. Their imprint on European languages, law, politics, art, theatre, public administration, medicine, clothing, customs and religion continues to this day. The Pax Romana or the Roman Peace was one of their less recognised achievements. It was only towards the end of the 18th Century that Edward Gibbon, author of The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, first popularized the term. The Roman Peace was a period of relative peace and stability within the empire. It lasted two centuries, from 27 BC until the death of Marcus Aurelius in 180 AD. However, the Roman Peace did not imply a complete absence of conflict or even a particularly benign government. The period had its share of tyrannical and extravagant rulers (notably Nero). Many of them came to violent ends. Some fighting continued at the borders of the Empire, including the conquest of Britain. Many writers even describe the Pax Romana as a balance of terror. But it was nevertheless a peace of sorts. The common citizens were largely free to go about their daily lives with some assurance of stability and protection of the law. The Roman policy of conquest and expansion gave way to stabilization and creation of conditions for prosperity. However, like much in history, the idea may be more important than the reality. Besides, it is an idea that has persisted. A thousand years after the Pax Romana, Genghis Khan laid the foundations of the largest contiguous empire in human history, extending 9700 km across the Eurasian land mass. The Mongol
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Vijai S. Chaudhari is Additional Director of the Centre for Joint Warfare Studies, New Delhi. He is a former Rear Admiral of the Indian Navy. The opinions expressed here are his personal views.

Empire ensured safety and good governance which made the Silk Road a lucrative trade route. A network of well-maintained roads connected China to the Mediterranean and even Marco Polo used it to make his epic journey in relative safety. Well before the current wave of globalization, the government considered it important to protect merchants and traders. Trade thrived and safe travel was open to all law-abiding users. The prevailing conditions came to be known as the Pax Mongolica. The modern Colonial Era started some time after the Mongol Empire faded into obscurity. Unlike previous empires, seaborne commerce was the lifeblood of the colonial system and its administration stretched across large stretches of ocean. A strong navy was needed to sustain a Pax across the oceans so that profitable commerce could flow unhindered. Every sizeable European maritime power entered the fray but it was Pax Britannica that prevailed. At the height of its power, the British navy was more powerful than any two other navies combined. Despite this large investment, many critics have described it as a Pax on the cheap. Rebecca Matzke offers a more balanced explanation: The Royal Navys main role in the nineteenth century was to be a deterrent force . . . . . . Britains navy was visible and credible. British naval power posed a genuine threat, but British governments exercised discretion in using it. On some occasions they chose not to act but inaction did not necessarily mean that the British battle fleet was too weak to assert British influence. . . . . British statesmen were prepared to use its force to guard Britains interestsand maintenance of peace was, generally speaking, one of those interestsbut they rarely needed to do so. A worldwide naval presence was needed to underwrite Britains colonial empire. Good order at sea was perhaps an unintended benefit that had to wait another century for Geoffrey Till to propose a supporting theoretical framework. The dawn of the 20th Century found British resources, appetite and need for shouldering the burden of good order at sea in steady decline. Pax Britannica soon gave way to the Pax Americana. The United States was motivated by Cold War requirements and empowered by a navy more powerful than the combined fleets of all its competitors. Today, the Cold War has receded into history and multilateral arrangements have overtaken unilateralism. Meanwhile, the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention has given coastal states jurisdiction over large sea areas. These states differ widely in their ability, inclination or even willingness to cooperate in maintaining

good order within their areas of jurisdiction. Criminals and terrorists therefore use the gaps to undermine good order at sea. Exploitation of natural resources is already the subject of much conjecture and environmental issues could well create the next crisis. The United States has the naval forces to sustain a Pax Americana but finding the political support, financial resources and international acceptability seems difficult. Given the forces of globalization and the large number of diverse stakeholders, multilateral or UN sponsored solutions hold the most promise. Overwhelming naval superiority would help but it is numbers, presence, persistence, national resolve, legal structures and cooperation on a global scale that would really count. The future of the oceans as a global commons may depend on whether the world can forge a consensus on good order at sea before it is too late.