SANLAKAS Vs. Executive Secretary 421 SCRA 656 G.R. No.

159085 February 3, 2004 Facts: During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some threehundred junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP, acting upon instigation, command and direction of known and unknown leaders have seized the Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the AFP and declared their withdrawal of support for the government, demanding the resignation of the President, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts constitute a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, the Philippines was declared under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the officers went back to their barracks in the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and General Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation of the State of Rebellion was issued. In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec. 18 Article VII of the Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and that there is no factual basis for such proclamation. (2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al, petitioners contending that the proclamation is a circumvention of the report requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that the presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to the President. (3) Rep.

Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo, petitioners contending that there was usurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. (4) Pimentel v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion. Issue: Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional? Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to bring suit? Held: The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion. The President in addition to its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution executive powers. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court may examine whether the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that the President acted without factual basis. The issue of the circumvention of the report is of no merit as there was no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts or that military authorities have taken over the functions of Civil Courts. The issue of usurpation of the legislative power of the Congress is of no moment since the President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely

executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. The fear on warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since any person may be subject to this whether there is rebellion or not as this is a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and as long as a valid warrantless arrest is present. Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of Issue upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Based on the foregoing, petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS Officers/Members have no legal standing to sue. Only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have standing to challenge the subject issuances. It sustained its decision in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, that the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution. OPLE V TORRES Puno, J. Facts: On December 12, 1996, then President FIDEL V. RAMOS issued Administrative Order No. 308 entitled ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM.

The AO seeks to have all Filipino citizens and foreign residents to have a Population Reference Number (PRN) generated by the National Statistics Office (NSO) through the use of BIOMETRICS TECHNOLOGY . The AO was questioned by Senator Ople on the following grounds: 1. The establishment of the PRN without any law is an unconstitutional usurpation of the legislative powers of the Congress of the Philippines; 2. The appropriation of public funds for the implementation of the said AO is unconstitutional since Congress has the exclusive authority to appropriate funds for such expenditure; and 3. The AO violates the citizens right to privacy protected by the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. Held: 1. The AO establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizens and foreign residents and therefore, it is supposed to be a law passed by Congress that implements it, not by an Administrative Order issued by the President. Administrative Power, which is supposed to be exercised by the President, is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. Prescinding from the foregoing precepts, AO 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an Administrative Order. An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the

administrative operation of the government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. The subject of AO 308 therefore is beyond the power of the President to issue and it is a usurpation of legislative power. 2. The AO likewise violates the right to privacy since its main purpose is to provide a common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies through the use of BIOMETRICS TECHNOLOGY. Biometry is the science of the application of statistical methods to biological facts; a mathematical analysis of a biological data. It is the confirmation of an individuals identity through a fingerprint, retinal scan, hand geometry or facial features. Through the PRN, the government offices has the chance of building a huge and formidable information base through the electronic linkage of the files of every citizen. The data, however, may be gathered for gainful and useful government purposes; but the existence of this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be too great for some of our authorities to resist. Further, the AO does not even tell us in clear and unequivocal terms how these information gathered shall be handled. It does not provide who shall control and access the data and under what circumstances and for what purpose. These factors are essential to safeguard the privacy and guaranty the integrity of the information. The computer linkage gives other government agencies access to the information. YET, THERE ARE NO CONTROLS TO GUARD AGAINST LEAKAGE OF INFORMATIONS. WHEN THE ACCESS CODE OF THE CONTROL PROGRAMS OF THE PARTICULAR COMPUTER SYSTEM IS BROKEN, AN INTRUDER, WITHOUT FEAR OF SANCTION OR PENALTY, CAN MAKE USE OF THE DATA FOR WHATEVER PURPOSE, OR WORSE, MANIPULATE THE DATA STORED WITHIN THE SYSTEM.

AO No. 308 is unconstitutional since it falls short of assuring that personal information gathered about our people will be used only for specified purposes thereby violating the citizens right to privacy REVIEW CENTER ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA and COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION represented by its Chairman ROMULO L. NERI, Respondents. CPA REVIEW SCHOOL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (CPAR), PROFESSIONAL REVIEW AND TRAINING CENTER, INC. (PRTC), ReSA REVIEW SCHOOL, INC. (ReSA), CRC-ACE REVIEW SCHOOL, INC. (CRCACE) Petitioners-Intervenors. PIMSAT COLLEGES, Respondent-Intervenor. Carpio, 2009 Facts: - There was a report that handwritten copies of two sets of 2006 Nursing Board examination were circulated during the examination period among examinees reviewing at the R.A. Gapuz Review Center and Inress Review Center. The examinees were provided with a list of 500 questions and answers in two of the examinations five subjects, particularly Tests III (Psychiatric Nursing) and V (Medical-Surgical Nursing). The PRC later admitted the leakage and traced it to two Board of Nursing members. Exam results came out but Court of Appeals restrained the PRC from proceeding with the oath-taking of the successful examinees. - President GMA ordered for a re-examination and issued EO 566 which authorized the CHED to supervise the

establishment and operation of all review centers and similar entities in the Philippines. CHED Chairman Puno approved CHED Memorandum Order No. 49 series of 2006 (Implementing Rules and Regulations). - Review Center Association of the Philippines (petitioner), an organization of independent review centers, asked the CHED to "amend, if not withdraw" the IRR arguing, among other things, that giving permits to operate a review center to Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) or consortia of HEIs and professional organizations will effectively abolish independent review centers. CHED Chairman Puno however believed that suspending the implementation of the IRR would be inconsistent with the mandate of EO 566. - A dialogue between the petitioner and CHED took place. Revised IRR was approved . Petitioner filed before the CHED a Petition to Clarify/Amend RIRR praying to exclude independent review center from the coverage of the CHED; to clarify the meaning of the requirement for existing review centers to tie-up with HEIs; to revise the rules to make it conform with RA 7722 limiting the CHEDs coverage to public and private institutions of higher education. - In 2007, then CHED Chairman Neri responded to the petitioner that: to exclude the operation of independent review centers from the coverage of CHED would clearly contradict the intention of the said Executive Order No.566; As to the request to clarify what is meant by tie-up/be integrated with an HEI, tie-up/be integrated simplymeans, to be in partner with an HEI. - Petitioner filed a petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before this Court praying for the annulment of the RIRR, the declaration of EO 566 as invalid and unconstitutional exercise of legislative power , and the prohibition against CHED from implementing the RIRR. Motion to intervene filed by other organizations/institutions were granted by the Court.

- On 21 May 2008, CHED issued CHED Memorandum Order No. 21, Series of 2008 (CMO 21, s. 2008) extending the deadline for six months from 27 May 2008 for all existing independent review centers to tie-up or be integrated with HEIs in accordance with the RIRR. On 25 November 2008 Resolution, SC resolved to require the parties to observe the status quo prevailing before the issuance of EO 566, the RIRR, and CMO 21, s. 2008. Issues: 1. Whether EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise by the Executive of legislative power as it expands the CHEDs jurisdiction [Yes, it expands CHEDs jurisdiction, hence unconsititutional]; and 2. Whether the RIRR is an invalid exercise of the Executives rule-making power. [Yes, it is invalid.] Held/Ratio: 1. The scopes of EO 566 and the RIRR clearly expand the CHEDs coverage under RA 7722. The CHEDs coverage under RA 7722 is limited to public and private institutions of higher education and degreegranting programs in all public and private postsecondary educational institutions. EO 566 directed the CHED to formulate a framework for the regulation of review centers and similar entities. The definition of a review center under EO 566 shows that it refers to one which offers "a program or course of study that is intended to refresh and enhance the knowledge or competencies and skills of reviewees obtained in the formal school setting in preparation for the licensure examinations" given by the PRC. It does not offer a degreegranting program that would put it under the jurisdiction of the CHED. A review course is only intended to "refresh and enhance the knowledge or competencies and skills of reviewees." Thus, programs given by review centers could

not be considered "programs x x x of higher learning" that would put them under the jurisdiction of the CHED. "Higher education," is defined as "education beyond the secondary level or "education provided by a college or university." Further, the "similar entities" in EO 566 cover centers providing "review or tutorial services" in areas not covered by licensure examinations given by the PRC, which include, although not limited to, college entrance examinations, Civil Services examinations, and tutorial services. These review and tutorial services hardly qualify as programs of higher learning. 2. ) The exercise of the Presidents residual powers under Section 20, Title I of Book III of EO (invoked by the OSG to justify GMAs action) requires legislation; as the provision clearly states that the exercise of the Presidents other powers and functions has to be "provided for under the law." There is no law granting the President the power to amend the functions of the CHED. The President has no inherent or delegated legislative power to amend the functions of the CHED under RA 7722. The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct. Legislative power is "the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them." The Constitution, as the will of the people in their original, sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines. Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. The President has control over the executive department, bureaus and offices. Meaning, he has the authority to assume directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office, or interfere with the discretion of its officials. Corollary to

the power of control , he is granted administrative power. Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations. An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. Since EO 566 is an invalid exercise of legislative power, the RIRR is also an invalid exercise of the CHEDs quasilegislative power. Administrative agencies exercise their quasi-legislative or rulemaking power through the promulgation of rules and regulations. The CHED may only exercise its rule-making power within the confines of its jurisdiction under RA 7722. But The RIRR covers review centers and similar entities. Other issues: Re: issue judicial hierarchy, the alleged violation of the Constitution by the Executive Department when it issued EO 566 justifies the exercise by the Court of its primary jurisdiction over the case. The Court is not precluded from brushing aside technicalities and taking cognizance of an action due to its importance to the public. Re: police power, no delegation of police power exists under RA 7722 authorizing the President to regulate the operations of non-degree granting review centers. Re: RA 8981 as the appropriate law, the PRC has the power to adopt measures to preserve the integrity and inviolability of licensure examinations. However, this power should properly be interpreted to refer to the conduct of the examinations. The

power to preserve the integrity and inviolability of licensure examinations should be read together with these functions. These powers of the PRC have nothing to do at all with the regulation of review center Divinagracia v. Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc. Facts: Divinagracia, alleging to be the actual and beneficial owner of 12% of Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc (CBS) and Peoples Broadcasting Service, Inc. (PBS), filed two complaints with the NTC against CBS and PBS praying for the cancellation of all the provisional authorities or Certificates of Public Convenience (CPCs) as well as the legislative franchise issued to CBS (R.A. 7582) and PBS (R.A. 7477) on account of the alleged violation of the conditions set therein, to wit: failure to comply with the mandated public offering of at least 30% of their common stocks. NTC dismissed the complaints. While positing that it had full jurisdiction to revoke or cancel CPCs for violations or infractions of the terms and conditions embodied therein, the complaints constitute collateral attacks on the legislative franchise and that NTC is not competent to render judgment on such issue. Issue: WoN the NTC has the power to cancel the CPCs it has issued to legislative franchisees. Held: The Radio Control Act in 1931 requires broadcast stations to obtain a legislative franchise and such requirement was not repealed by E.O. 546 which established the NTC, the administrative agency which has regulatory jurisdiction over broadcast stations. When the Congress grants a legislative franchise, it is the legal obligation of the NTC to facilitate the

operation by the franchisee of its broadcast station and since public administration of the airwaves is a highly technical function, the Congress has delegated to the NTC the task of administration over the broadcast spectrum. The licensing power of the NTC arises from the necessary delegation by Congress of legislative power geared towards the orderly exercise by franchisees of the rights granted them by Congress. The life and authority of an administrative agency emanates solely from an Act of Congress, and its faculties confined within the parameters set by the legislative branch of government. Even as the NTC is vested with the power to issue CPCs to broadcast stations, it is not expressly vested with the power to cancel such CPCs, or otherwise prevent broadcast stations with duly issued franchises and CPCs from operating radio and television stations. Although the Radio Control Act empowered the government through the then Secretary of Public Works and Communications to suspend or revoke issued licenses, the NTC did not retain such power when it was established by E.O. 546 to replace the previous regulatory agencies. Said E.O. 546 promulgated by then President F. Marcos in the exercise of his legislative power withheld from it the authority to cancel licenses and CPCs.

PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO V GPH

Facts: The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the 1 MILF were scheduled to sign a MOA-AD Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur. The following filed petitions assailing the constitutionality of the MOA-AD and seeking to prohibit the signing thereof:
1

Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain; Other aspects of Tripoli Agreement are security and rehabilitation

North Cotabato and Vice Governor Pino City of Zamboanga, Mayor Lobregat, Rep. Climaco, and Rep. Enrico Fabian City of Iligan Province of Zamboanga del Norte, Gov. Yebes, Vice-Gov. Olvis, Rep. Jalosjos-Carreon, Rep. Jalosjos, members of the Sanggu Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Norte Ernesto Maceda, Jejomar Binay and Aquilino Pimentel

For a taxpayer, one is allowed to sue where there is an assertion that public funds are illegally disbursed or deflected to an illegal purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. The Court retains discretion whether or not to allow a taxpayer's suit.

The following parties moved to intervene: Sen. Roxas, former Senate Pres. Franklin Drilon, Atty. Adel Tamano, City of Isabela, Mayor Santos-Akbar, Province of Sultan Kudara, Gov. Suharto Mangdadatu, Municipality of Linamon in Lanao del Norte, Ruy Elias Lopez of Davao City, Bagogo Tribe, Sanggu Panlungsod member Ridao and businessman Kisin Buxani of Cotabato City, lawyers Carlo Gomez, Gerardo Dilig, Nesario Awat, Joselito Alisuag, Richalex Jagmix of Palawan City, Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation, Inc. (Muslaf) and the Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and Development (MMMPD). Issue: WON the petitioners/intervenors are the proper parties to the case Held: YES

In the case of a legislator or member of Congress, an act of the Executive that injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury that can be questioned by legislators. A member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.

An organization may be granted standing to assert the rights of its members, but the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member of the legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law does not suffice to clothe it with standing.

As regards a local government unit (LGU), it can seek relief in order to protect or vindicate an interest of its own, and of the other LGUs.

Ratio: For a party to have locus standi, one must allege "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." Intervenors, meanwhile, may be given legal standing upon showing of facts that satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing intervention, such as a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties.

When suing as a citizen, the person complaining must allege that he has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. When the issue concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in the execution of the laws.

In any case, the Court has discretion to relax the procedural technicality on locus standi, given the liberal attitude it has exercised, highlighted in the case of David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, where technicalities of procedure were brushed aside, the constitutional issues raised being of paramount public interest or of transcendental importance deserving the attention of the Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. The Court's

forbearing stance on locus standi on issues involving constitutional issues has for its purpose the protection of fundamental rights. With respect to Intervenors Ruy Elias Lopez, as a former congressman rd of the 3 district of Davao City, a taxpayer and a member of the Bagobo tribe; Carlo B. Gomez, et al., as members of the IBP Palawan chapter, citizens and taxpayers;Marino Ridao, as taxpayer, resident and member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City; and Kisin Buxani, as taxpayer, they failed to allege any proper legal interest in the present petitions. Just the same, the Court exercises its discretion to relax the procedural technicality on locus standi given the paramount public interest in the issues at hand.

In the petitions at bar, petitioners Province of North, Province of Zamboanga del Norte, City of Iligan and City of Zamboanga and petitionersin-interventionProvince of Sultan Kudarat, City of Isabela and Municipality of Linamon have locus standi in view of the direct and substantial injury that they, as LGUs, would suffer as their territories, whether in whole or in part, are to be included in the intended domain of the BJE. These petitioners allege that they did not vote for their inclusion in the ARMM which would be expanded to form the BJE territory. Petitioners' legal standing is thus beyond doubt.

Petitioners Ernesto Maceda, Jejomar Binay and Aquilino Pimentel III would have no standing as citizens and taxpayers for their failure to specify that they would be denied some right or privilege or there would be wastage of public funds. The fact that they are a former Senator, an incumbent mayor of Makati City, and a resident of Cagayan de Oro, respectively, is of no consequence. Considering their invocation of the transcendental importance of the issues at hand, however, the Court grants them standing.

Intervening respondents Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and Development, an advocacy group for justice and the attainment of peace and prosperity in Muslim Mindanao; and Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation Inc., a non-government organization of Muslim lawyers, allege that they stand to be benefited or prejudiced, as the case may be, in the resolution of the petitions concerning the MOA-AD, and prays for the denial of the petitions on the grounds therein stated. Such legal interest suffices to clothe them with standing.

Banda v. Ermita April 20, 2010 FACTS: President GMA issued Executive Order No. 378 on 2004 amending Section 6 of Executive Order No. 285 by, inter alia, removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO (National Printing Office) over the printing services requirements of government agencies and instrumentalities. Pursuant to Executive Order No. 378, government agencies and instrumentalities are allowed to source their printing services from the private sector through competitive bidding, subject to the condition that the services offered by the private supplier be of superior quality and lower in cost compared to what was offered by the NPO. Executive Order No. 378 also limited NPOs appropriation in the General Appropriations Act to its income.

Intervenors Franklin Drilon and Adel Tamano, in alleging their standing as taxpayers, assert that government funds would be expended for the conduct of an illegal and unconstitutional plebiscite to delineate the BJE territory. On that score alone, they can be given legal standing. Their allegation that the issues involved in these petitions are of "undeniable transcendental importance" clothes them with added basis for their personality to intervene in these petitions.

With regard to Senator Manuel Roxas, his standing is premised on his being a member of the Senate and a citizen to enforce compliance by respondents of the public's constitutional right to be informed of the MOAAD, as well as on a genuine legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success or failure of either of the parties. He thus possesses the requisite standing as an intervenor.

Perceiving Executive Order No. 378 as a threat to their security of tenure as employees of the NPO, petitioners now challenge its constitutionality, contending that: (1) it is beyond the executive powers of President Arroyo to amend or repeal Executive Order No. 285 issued by former President Aquino when the latter still exercised legislative powers; and (2) Executive Order No. 378 violates petitioners security of tenure, because it paves the way for the gradual abolition of the NPO. ISSUE: Whether EO 378 is constitutional. HELD : YES J. Leonardo-de Castro . It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the President has the power to reorganize the offices and agencies in the executive department in line with the Presidents constitutionally granted power of control over executive offices and by virtue of previous delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing statutes. Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 gives the President continuing authority to reorganize and redefine the functions of the Office of the President. Section 31, Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of the said Code, is explicit: The President , subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President.

It is undisputed that the NPO, as an agency that is part of the Office of the Press Secretary (which in various times has been an agency directly attached to the Office of the Press Secretary or as an agency under the Philippine Information Agency), is part of the Office of the President. To be very clear, this delegated legislative power to reorganize pertains only to the Office of the President and the departments, offices and agencies of the executive branch and does not include the Judiciary, the Legislature or the constitutionally-created or mandated bodies. Moreover, it must be stressed that the exercise by the President of the power to reorganize the executive department must be in accordance with the Constitution, relevant laws and prevailing jurisprudence. J. Carpio: RA 9184 mandates the conduct of competitive bidding in all the procurement activities of the government including the acquisition of items, supplies, materials, and general support services x x x which may be needed in the transaction of the public businesses or in the pursuit of any government x x x activity save for limited transactions. By opening governments procurement of standard and accountable forms to competitive bidding (except for documents crucial to the conduct of clean elections which has to be printed solely by government), EO 378 merely implements RA 9184s principle of promoting competitiveness by extending equal opportunity to enable private contracting parties who are eligible and qualified to participate in public bidding

UNITED CLAIMANTS V NEA Doctrine: Reorganization involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. It could result in the loss of one's position through removal or abolition of an office.

However, for a reorganization for the purpose of economy or to make the bureaucracy more efficient to be valid, it must pass the test of good faith; otherwise, it is void ab initio. Facts: NEA is a GOCC created in accordance with PD 269 wherein it states that the NEA Board is empowered to organize or reorganize NEAs staffing structure. When The Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA Law) was thereafter enacted to restructure the electric power industry, including the privatization of the assets of the National Power Corp. (NPC), it imposed upon NEA additional mandates in relation to the promotion of the role of rural electric cooperatives to achieve national electrification. Its Implementing Rules and Regulations provides that all NEA employees shall be considered legally terminated with the implementation of a reorganization program pursuant to a law enacted by Congress or pursuant to Sec. 5(a)(5) of PD 269 through which the reorganization was carried out. Issue: Whether the NEA Board has the power to terminate all the NEA employees Held: Yes. Pursuant to PD 269, the termination of all the employees of NEA was within the NEA Board's powers and may not successfully be impugned absent proof of bad faith to which the petitioners have clearly failed to establish. It is undisputed that NPC was in financial distress and the solution found by Congress was to pursue a policy towards its privatization. The privatization of NPC necessarily demanded the restructuring of its operations. The privatization and restructuring of the NPC was, therefore, done in good faith as its primary purpose was for economy and to make the bureaucracy more efficient

QUARTO V MARCELO Doctrine: Mandamus is the proper remedy to compel the performance of a ministerial duty imposed by law upon the respondent. In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus may only be resorted to, to compel the respondent to take action; it cannot be used to direct the manner or the particular way discretion is to be exercised Facts: The DPWH Secretary created a committee to investigate alleged anomalous transactions involving the repairs and/or purchase of spare parts of DPWH service vehicles with the DPWH Internal Audit Service to conduct the actual investigation. The DPWH-IAS discovered that from March to December 2001, several emergency repairs and/or purchase of spare parts of hundreds of DPWH service vehicles, which were approved and paid by the government, did not actually take place, resulting in government losses of approximately P143 million for this tenmonth period alone. The committee then filed before the Office of the Ombudsman complaints charging the petitioner, the respondents, who are officials and employees of the DPWH, and other private individuals who purportedly benefitted from the anomalous transactions. The Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan several information charging the said DPWH officials and employees with plunder, estafa through falsification of official/commercial documents and violation of Section 3(e), RA No. 3019. On the other hand, the Ombudsman granted the respondents' request for immunity in

exchange for their testimonies and cooperation in the prosecution of the cases filed. Issue: Whether the Ombudsman has the authority to grant immunity from prosecution to witnesses Held: Yes. RA No. 6770 specifically empowers the Ombudsman to grant immunity "in any hearing, inquiry or proceeding being conducted by the Ombudsman or under its authority, in the performance or in the furtherance of its constitutional functions and statutory objectives." In the exercise of his investigatory and prosecutorial powers, he enjoys the same latitude of discretion in determining what constitutes sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause and the degree of participation of those involved or the lack thereof. His findings and conclusions on these matters are not ordinarily subject to review by the courts except when he gravely abuses his discretion, which the petitioner has failed to establish in this case PICHAY VS DEPUTY ES Executive Order No. 13 which abolishes the Presidential AntiGraft Commission and transfers its functions to the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division of the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, is constitutional pursuant to the Presidents continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency. In 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 13 (E.O. 13), abolishing the Presidential Anti-Graft

Commission (PAGC) and transferring its functions to the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division of the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (IAD-ODESLA). Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima later on filed before the IAD-ODESLA a complaint affidavit for grave misconduct against Prospero A. Pichay, Jr. (Pichay), Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) for the purchase by the LWUA of shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc. In defense, Pichay filed a Motion to Dismiss Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam manifesting that a case involving the same transaction is already pending before the Office of the Ombudsman. Alleging that no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available, Pichay has resorted to the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of E.O. 13. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not E.O. 13 is constitutional 2. Whether or not there is usurpation of legislative power to appropriate public funds in view of such reorganization 3. Whether or not the IAD-ODESLA encroaches upon the powers and duties of the Ombudsman 4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 13 violates Pichays right to due process and the equal protection of the laws HELD: E.O. 13 is constitutional Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292 (E.O. 292), otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, vests in the President the continuing authority to reorganize the offices under him to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency. The Office of the President must, in order to remain effective and efficient, be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner he deems fit to carry out his directives

and policies. Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division specially created within the ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the President under his continuing delegated legislative authority to reorganize his own office. Since both of these offices belong to the Office of the President Proper, the reorganization by way of abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the IAD-ODESLA is allowable under Section 31 (1) of E.O. 292. There is no usurpation of the legislative power to appropriate public funds There is an express recognition under Section 78 of Republic Act No. 9970 or the General Appropriations Act of 2010 of the Presidents authority to direct changes in the organizational units or key positions in any department or agency. This recognizes the extent of the Presidents power to reorganize the executive offices and agencies under him, which is, even to the extent of modifying and realigning appropriations for that purpose. Thus, while there may be no specific amount earmarked for the IAD-ODESLA from the total amount appropriated by Congress in the annual budget for the Office of the President, the necessary funds for the IAD-ODESLA may be properly sourced from the Presidents own office budget without committing any illegal appropriation. After all, the President simply allocates the existing funds previously appropriated by Congress for his office. The IAD-ODESLA does not encroach upon the powers and duties of the Ombudsman The primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute cases refers to criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and not to administrative cases. It is only in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction that the Ombudsman may, at any time, take over the investigation being conducted by another investigatory agency. Since the case filed before the IAD-ODESLA is an administrative disciplinary case for grave misconduct, Pichay may not invoke the primary

jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to prevent the IAD-ODESLA from proceeding with its investigation. In any event, the Ombudsmans authority to investigate both elective and appointive officials in the government, extensive as it may be, is by no means exclusive. It is shared with other similarly authorized government agencies. ust law law review, vol lvii, no. 1, november 2012 136 recent jurisprudence Moreover, as the function of the Ombudsman goes into the determination of the existence of probable cause and the adjudication of the merits of a criminal accusation, the investigative authority of the IAD-ODESLA is limited to that of a fact-finding investigator whose determinations and recommendations remain so until acted upon by the President. As such, it commits no usurpation of the Ombudsmans constitutional duties. Executive Order No. 13 does not violate Pichays right to due process and the equal protection of the laws Pichays right to due process was not violated when the IADODESLA took cognizance of the administrative complaint against him. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process, which simply means having the opportunity to explain ones side. Hence, as long as Pichay was given the opportunity to explain his side and present evidence, the requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied with because what the law abhors is an absolute lack of opportunity to be heard. Also, Pichay is a presidential appointee occupying the highlevel position of Chairman of the LWUA. Necessarily, he comes under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the President, who is well within his right to order an investigation into matters that require his informed decision. There are substantial distinctions that set apart presidential appointees occupying upper-level positions in government from non-presidential

appointees and those that occupy the lower positions in government. MACALINTAL V PET LONZANIDA V COMELEC Facts: Petitioner Lonzanida was duly elected and served two consecutive terms as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 1995 elections. In the May 1995 elections Lonzanida ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was again proclaimed winner. He assumed office and discharged the duties thereof. His proclamation in 1995 was contested by his opponent who filed an election protest. The court rendered a judgment declaring the results of the said election last May 8, 1995, as null and void on the ground that there was a failure of election. In the May 11, 1998 elections Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of San Antonio and was proclaimed winner. Prior proclamation, His opponent timely filed a petition to disqualify him from running on the ground that he had served three consecutive terms in the same post. The COMELEC found that Lonzanidas assumption of office by virtue of his proclamation in May 1995, although he was later unseated before the expiration of the term, should be counted as service for one full term in computing the three term limit under the Constitution and the Local Government Code. Hence, COMELEC issued a resolution granting the petition for disqualification Petitioner Lonzanida challenges the validity of the COMELEC resolutions maintaining that he was duly elected mayor for only two consecutive terms and that his assumption of office in 1995 cannot be counted as service of a term for the purpose of applying the three term limit for local government officials,

because he was not the duly elected mayor of San Antonio in the May 1995 elections. The private respondent maintains that the petitioners assumption of office in 1995 should be considered as service of one full term because he discharged the duties of mayor for almost three years until March 1, 1998 or barely a few months before the next mayoral elections. Issue: WON petitioners assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio Zambales from May 1995 to 1998 may be considered as service of one full term for the purpose of applying the three-term limit for elective local government officials. Held: No. Section 8, Art. X of the Constitution provides that, the term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law shall be three years and no such officials shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. Section 43 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) restates the same rule, that: No local elective official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected. The petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term.

Pursuant to the constitutional provision above, voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term. LEGARDA V DE CASTRO P.E.T. Case No. 003, 18 January 2008, Presidential Electoral Tribunal, (Quisumbing, J. ) We are also in agreement that the protestant, in assuming the office of Senator and discharging her duties as such, which fact we can take judicial notice of, has effectively abandoned or withdrawn her protest, or abandoned her determination to protect and pursue the public interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate. FACTS OF THE CASE: Petitioner Loren B. Legarda filed before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal a petition to annul the proclamation of Respodent Noli L. De Castro as the Vice-President of the Philippines. The protest filed by Legarda consisted of two aspects. The First Aspect covers the alleged erroneous, manipulated and/or falsified results of the election. While the Second pertains to the revision of the ballots of the precincts specified in the protest. The Second Aspect was earlier dismissed by the Supreme Court for the failure of Legarda to pay the required deposit for the expenses.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner clearly and convincingly proved the presence of manipulation or falsification of election results HELD: Petition DISMISSED. We are also in agreement that the protestant, in assuming the office of Senator and discharging her duties as such, which fact we can take judicial notice of, has effectively abandoned or withdrawn her protest, or abandoned her determination to protect and pursue the public interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate. The most relevant precedent on this issue is Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos, a decision rendered by this Tribunal, which held that: The term of office of the Senators elected in the 8 May 1995 election is six years, the first three of which coincides with the last three years of the term of the President elected in the 11 May 1992 synchronized elections. The latter would be Protestant Santiagos term if she would succeed in proving in the instant protest that she was the true winner in the 1992 elections. In assuming the office of Senator then, the Protestant has effectively abandoned or withdrawn this protest, or at the very least, in the language of Moraleja, abandoned her determination to protect and pursue the public interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate. Such abandonment or withdrawal operates to render moot the instant protest. Moreover, the dismissal of this protest would serve public interest as it would dissipate the aura of uncertainty as to the results of the 1992 presidential election, thereby enhancing the all-[too] crucial political stability of the nation during this period of national recovery. It must also be stressed that under the Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, an election protest may be

summarily dismissed, regardless of the public policy and public interest implications thereof, on the following grounds: (1) The petition is insufficient in form and substance; (2) The petition is filed beyond the periods provided in Rules 14 and 15 hereof; (3) The filing fee is not paid within the periods provided for in these Rules; (4) The cash deposit, or the first P100,000.00 thereof, is not paid within 10 days after the filing of the protest; and (5) The petition or copies thereof and the annexes thereto filed with the Tribunal are not clearly legible. Other grounds for a motion to dismiss, e.g., those provided in the Rules of Court which apply in a suppletory character, may likewise be pleaded as affirmative defenses in the answer. After which, the Tribunal may, in its discretion, hold a preliminary hearing on such grounds. In sum, if an election protest may be dismissed on technical grounds, then it must be, for a decidedly stronger reason, if it has become moot due to its abandonment by the Protestant. In the case at bar, protestants tenure in the Senate coincides with the term of the Vice-Presidency 2004-2010, that is the subject of her protest. On the matter of the alleged spurious ER copies, we agree with the protestee that the protestant had not adequately and convincingly rebutted the presumption that as public documents, the Congress-retrieved ER copies, used for the proclamation of the protestee by the NBC, are authentic and duly executed in the regular course of official business. The evidence adduced by protestee to show that the supposed security features and markings in the Congress-retrieved ERs and the COMELEC/NAMFRELs copies are different, did not categorically establish that the Congress-retrieved ERs are fake and spurious. To overcome the presumption of regularity, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than

merely preponderant. Absent such convincing evidence, the presumption must be upheld. In fact, the records show that even the witnesses presented by the protestant testified that they were able to discern security features and markings in the Congress-retrieved ERs. The records also show that witnesses were not made to examine all Congress-retrieved ERs in making observations relative to security features and markings, but only a sample set thereof was utilized, resulting in grave insufficiency in the evidence presented by protestant. As to the alleged break-in in Congress, which allegedly facilitated the switching of ERs, no conclusive evidence has been given. One of the protestants own witnesses, Atty. Artemio Adasa, Deputy General for Legislative Operations of the House of Representatives, categorically denied that a break-in and a switching of ERs had occurred in Congress. At any rate, as pointed out by protestee, even assuming arguendo that all the votes in the 497 precincts included in the pilot areas for the First Aspect with approximately 99,400 votes are considered in favor of protestant, still the protestant would not be able to overcome the lead of the protestee. The margin in favor of protestee adds up to a total of 881,722 votes, and it would take much more than a hundred thousand votes to overcome this lead. This is what the protestant had set out to do in her protest before the Tribunal, but unfortunately she failed to make out her case. In fact, Taraka and Balindong, the only two municipalities on which protestant anchors her arguments for the First Aspect, would only yield an additional 9,931 votes (4,912 votes for Taraka and 5,019 votes for Balindong), a mere fraction of the lead of protestee over protestant. To say that she could have shown that such fraudulent machination was replicated in several other municipalities of Lanao del Sur and other provinces, such as Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and Lanao del Sur if she had enough time, is mere conjecture and can not be considered convincing by this Tribunal. It is the protestant herself who admits that she was able to adduce

evidence only in Taraka and Balindong, for lack of time. But this Tribunal has been liberal in granting her plea for time extension. To say that the protestant had shown enough evidence to prove that the whole or even half (440,862) of the lead of the protestee over the protestant is spurious, would go against the grain of the evidence on hand. One cannot say that half a million votes were illegally obtained based on unclear evidence of cheating in less than ten thousand. The protestant has been afforded ample opportunity to adduce evidence in her behalf for the First Aspect of the protest but the evidence presented is simply insufficient to convince the Tribunal to render invalid all or even half of the 881,722 votes that protestee had over her in the last elections for VicePresident.

submission that respondent Bautistas designation as OIC of MARINA was merely an imposition of additional duties related to her primary position as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport. It appears that the DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport is not even a member of the Maritime Industry Board, which includes the DOTC Secretary as Chairman, the MARINA Administrator as Vice-Chairman, and the following as members: Executive Secretary (Office of the President), Philippine Ports Authority General Manager, Department of National Defense Secretary, Development Bank of the Philippines General Manager, and the Department of Trade and Industry Secretary. It must be stressed though that while the designation was in the nature of an acting and temporary capacity, the words hold the office were employed. Such holding of office pertains to both appointment and designation because the appointee or designate performs the duties and functions of the office. The 1987 Constitution in prohibiting dual or multiple offices, as well as incompatible offices, refers to the holding of the office, and not to the nature of the appointment or designation, words which were not even found in Section 13, Article VII nor in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B. To hold an office means to possess or occupy the same, or to be in possession and administration, which implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions and duties of the office. The disqualification laid down in Section 13, Article VII is aimed at preventing the concentration of powers in the Executive Department officials, specifically the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants. Civil Liberties Union traced the history of the times and the conditions under which the Constitution was framed, and construed the Constitution consistent with the object sought to be accomplished by adoption of such

FUNA V ERMITA Public officials; multiple office. The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution was held inapplicable to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein, without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said office. The reason is that these posts do not comprise any other office within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials. Apart from their bare assertion that respondent Bautista did not receive any compensation when she was OIC of MARINA, respondents failed to demonstrate clearly that her designation as such OIC was in an ex-officio capacity as required by the primary functions of her office as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport. Given the vast responsibilities and scope of administration of the MARINA, we are hardly persuaded by respondents

provision, and the evils sought to be avoided or remedied. We recalled the practice, during the Marcos regime, of designating members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants as members of the governing bodies or boards of various government agencies and instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations. This practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the government led to abuses by unscrupulous public officials, who took advantage of this scheme for purposes of self-enrichment. The blatant betrayal of public trust evolved into one of the serious causes of discontent with the Marcos regime. It was therefore quite inevitable and in consonance with the overwhelming sentiment of the people that the 1986 Constitutional Commission would draft into the proposed Constitution the provisions under consideration, which were envisioned to remedy, if not correct, the evils that flow from the holding of multiple governmental offices and employment

1. Whether or not PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 arrogated upon the President the power to enact laws and decrees 2. If so, whether or not PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional HELD: Take-Care Power This refers to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed, based on Sec. 17, Art. VII: The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. As the Executive in whom the executive power is vested, the primary function of the President is to enforce the laws as well as to formulate policies to be embodied in existing laws. He sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. Before assuming office, he is required to take an oath or affirmation to the effect that as President of the Philippines, he will, among others, execute its laws. In the exercise of such function, the President, if needed, may employ the powers attached to his office as the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the country, including the Philippine National Police under the Department of Interior and Local Government. The specific portion of PP 1017 questioned is the enabling clause: to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction. Is it within the domain of President Arroyo to promulgate decrees?

DAVID V ARROYO 1. "Take Care" Power of the President 2. Powers of the Chief Executive 3. The power to promulgate decrees belongs to the Legislature FACTS: These 7 consolidated petitions question the validity of PP 1017 (declaring a state of national emergency) and General Order No. 5 issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. While the cases are pending, President Arroyo issued PP 1021, declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist, thereby, in effect, lifting PP 1017. ISSUE:

The President is granted an Ordinance Power under Chap. 2, Book III of E.O. 292. President Arroyos ordinance power is limited to those issuances mentioned in the foregoing provision. She cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by Former President Marcos under PP 1081. Presidential Decrees are laws which are of the same category and binding force as statutes because they were issued by the President in the exercise of his legislative power during the period of Martial Law under the 1973 Constitution. This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Sec. 1, Art. VI categorically states that the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyos exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. But can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all decrees and laws through the military? As this Court stated earlier, President Arroyo has no authority to enact decrees. It follows that these decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to laws, she cannot call the military to enforce or implement certain laws, such as customs laws, laws governing family and property relations, laws on obligations and contracts and the like. She can only order the military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence. KILOSBAYAN V ERMITA Facts: Kilosbayan and Bantay Katarungan filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court, assailing Executive

Secretary Eduardo Ermitas appointment of Justice Gregory Ong as a member of the Supreme Court, in view of his alleged Chinese citizenship. Kilosbayan contended that Ongs father was naturalized eleven years after Ongs birth; as such the same did not make Ong a natural-born Filipino which was a requirement for membership in the Supreme Court. Kilosbayan also argued that Ongs birth certificate shows that he is a Chinese citizen. Ong maintained that his mother was a Filipina at the time of her marriage to Ongs father, who was a Chinese citizen prior to his naturalization. He also presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration showing that he is indeed a naturalborn Filipino citizen, since his mother was a Filipina at the time of his birth. Issues: 1. Whether petitioners have standing (Proper Party) 2. Whether Ong is a natural-born Filipino citizen (Appointments, Qualifications) Held: 1. Petitioners have standing. 2. Ong is not a natural-born Filipino, but rather a naturalized Filipino. Ratio: 1. Petitioners have standing to file the suit as peoples organizations and taxpayers. The matter involves an issue of utmost and far-reaching Constitutional importance, namely the citizenship a person to be appointed a member of the Supreme Court. 2. Ong is a naturalized Filipino and thus cannot be a member of the Supreme Court. His Petition to be admitted to the Philippine Bar stated that he is a Filipino citizen because his father, Eugenio Ong Han

Seng, a Chinese citizen, was naturalized in 1964 when he, respondent Ong, was a minor of eleven years, and by virtue of his fathers naturalization, he, too, became a Filipino citizen. The trial court then granted the petition. Given these, Ong is not a natural-born Filipino citizen, having acquired Filipino citizenship only because of his fathers naturalization. The alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating that Ong and his mother were naturalized along with his father. Moreover, his birth certificate, which showed that he is Chinese by birth, can only be amended in a judicial proceeding.

RUBRICO V ARROYO PARTIES: 4. PETITIONERS: LOURDES RUBRICO, JEAN RUBRICO APRUEBO, and MARY JOY RUBRICO CARBONEL 5. RESPONDENTS: PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, P/DIR. GEN. AVELINO RAZON, MAJ. DARWIN SY, JIMMY SANTANA, RUBEN ALFARO, CAPT. ANGELO CUARESMA, P/SUPT. EDGAR ROQUERO, ARSENIO GOMEZ, JONATHAN, and OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN NATURE: Petition for Review on Certiorari of CA decision PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND: 3. Supreme Court: Original Action for a Petition for the Writ of Amparo 4. Court of Appeals: Upon order of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals summarily heard the Original Action for Petition of Amparo. Thereafter, the Court of

Appeals issued a partial judgment which is the subject of the present Petition for Review on Certiorari. FACTS: On 03 April 2007, Lourdes Rubrico, chair of Ugnayan ng Maralita para sa Gawa Adhikan, was abducted by armed men belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and Security Squadron (AISS) based in Lipa City while attending a Lenten pabasa in Dasmarinas, Cavite. She was brought to and detained at the air base without charges. She was released a week after relentless interrogation, but only after she signed a statement that she would be a military asset. Despite her release, she was tailed on at least 2 occasions. Hence, Lourdes filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal complaint for kidnapping and arbitrary detention and grave misconduct against Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, and Jonathan, but nothing has happened. She likewise reported the threats and harassment incidents to the Dasmarinas municipal and Cavite provincial police stations, but nothing eventful resulted from their investigation. Meanwhile, the human rights group Karapatan conducted an investigation which indicated that men belonging to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) led the abduction of Lourdes. Based on such information, Rubrico filed a petition for the writ of amparo with the Supreme Court on 25 October 2007, praying that respondents be ordered to desist from performing any threatening act against the security of petitioners and for the Ombudsman to immediately file an information for kidnapping qualified with the aggravating circumstance of gender of the offended party. Rubrico also prayed for damages and for respondents to produce documents submitted to any of them on the case of Lourdes. The Supreme Court issued the desired writ and then referred the petition to the Court of Appeals (CA) for summary hearing and appropriate action. At the hearing conducted on 20 November 2007, the CA granted petitioners motion that the petition and writ be served on Darwin Sy/Reyes, Santana,

Alfaro, Cuaresma, and Jonathan. By a separate resolution, the CA dropped the President as respondent in the case. On 31 July 2008, after due proceedings, the CA rendered its partial judgment, dismissing the petition with respect to Esperon, Razon, Roquero, Gomez, and Ombudsman. Hence, the petitioners filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court. PERTINENT ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of command responsibility is applicable in an amparo petition. ANSWER: No. SUPREME COURT RULINGS: DOCTRINE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY and THE WRIT OF AMPARO Doctrine of Command Responsibility has little, if at all, bearing in amparo proceedings [C]ommand responsibility, as a concept defined, developed, and applied under international law, has little, if at all, bearing in amparo proceedings. The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, command responsibility, in its simplest terms, means the responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict. In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command responsibility, foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control over them. As then formulated, command responsibility is an omission mode of individual criminal liability, whereby the

superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators. There is no Philippine law that provides for criminal liability under the Doctrine of Command Responsibility While there are several pending bills on command responsibility, there is still no Philippine law that provides for criminal liability under that doctrine. It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold military/police commanders liable for extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory that the command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of international law or customary international law in accordance with the incorporation clause of the Constitution. Still, it would be inappropriate to apply to these proceedings the doctrine of command responsibility, as the CA seemed to have done, as a form of criminal complicity through omission, for individual respondents criminal liability, if there be any, is beyond the reach of amparo. In other words, the Court does not rule in such proceedings on any issue of criminal culpability, even if incidentally a crime or an infraction of an administrative rule may have been committed. Reluctance of the amparo petitioners or their witnesses to cooperate ought not to pose a hindrance to the police in pursuing, on its own initiative, the investigation in question to its natural end [T]he right to security of persons is a guarantee of the protection of ones right by the government. And this protection includes conducting effective investigations of extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats of the same kind. The nature and importance of an investigation are captured in the Velasquez Rodriguez case, in which the Inter-American Court of Human Rights pronounced: [The duty to investigate] must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not a step taken

by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon offer of proof, without an effective search for the truth by the government. The remedy of amparo ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously The privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the rights to life, liberty, and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of this life. It is an extraordinary writ conceptualized and adopted in light of and in response to the prevalence of extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for purposes less than the desire to secure amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations. DISPOSITIVE: The Supreme Court partially granted the petition for review. It issued a decision as follows: 1. Affirming the dropping of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo from the petition; 2. Affirming the dismissal of the amparo case as against Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, and P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon, insofar as it tended, under the command responsibility principle, to attach accountability and responsibility to them, as then AFP Chief of Staff and then PNP Chief, for the alleged enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the ensuing harassments allegedly committed against petitioners. The dismissal of the petition with respect to the Ombudsman is also affirmed for failure of the petition to allege ultimate facts as to make out a case against that body for the enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the threats and harassment that followed; and 3. Directing the incumbent Chief of Staff, AFP, or his successor, and the incumbent Director-General of the

PNP, or his successor, to ensure that the investigations already commenced by their respective units on the alleged abduction of Lourdes Rubrico and the alleged harassments and threats she and her daughters were made to endure are pursued with extraordinary diligence as required by Sec. 17 of the Amparo Rule. The Chief of Staff of the AFP and Director-General of the PNP are directed to order their subordinate officials, in particular, to do the following: (a) Determine based on records, past and present, the identities and locations of respondents Maj. Darwin Sy, a.k.a. Darwin Reyes, Jimmy Santana, Ruben Alfaro, Capt. Angelo Cuaresma, and one Jonathan; and submit certifications of this determination to the OMBUDSMAN with copy furnished to petitioners, the CA, and this Court; (b) Pursue with extraordinary diligence the evidentiary leads relating to Maj. Darwin Sy and the Toyota Revo vehicle with Plate No. XRR 428; and (c) Prepare, with the assistance of petitioners and/or witnesses, cartographic sketches of respondents Maj. Sy/Reyes, Jimmy Santana, Ruben Alfaro, Capt. Angelo Cuaresma, and a certain Jonathan to aid in positively identifying and locating them. The investigations shall be completed not later than six (6) months from receipt of the Decision; and within thirty (30) days after completion of the investigations, the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Director-General of the PNP are likewise directed to submit a full report of the results of the investigations to the Court, the CA, the OMB, and petitioners. The Supreme Court accordingly referred the case back to the CA for the purpose of monitoring the investigations and the actions of the AFP and the PNP. ESTRADA V DESIERTO FACTS:

the same as Estrada v. Desierto Round One ISSUES: did prejudicial publicity affect Estradas right to a fair trial? were there evidentiary issues with regard to the 2 March decision? did the Court correctly interpret 22 Art. VII of the Constitution? did the Court disregard par. 7 3 Art. XI of the Constitution? REASONING: ON PREJUDICIAL PUBLICITY (AGAIN) in the 2 March decision, the SC used the totality test by referring to and analyzing prior, contemporaneous and posterior events to arrive at the conclusion that Estrada had resigned; these events were facts that were well-established and irrefutable, within the judicial notice of the Court and the news accounts only adding and buttressing them while there was pressure exerted on Estrada to resign, this didnt completely vitiate the voluntariness of his resignation the three-part test for duress brought on by government action: 1.whether one side involuntarily accepted the others terms 2.whether circumstances permitted no other alternative 3.whether such circumstances were the result of coercive acts of the opposite side factors to be considered when determining under the totality of the circumstances it appeared that the employers conduct effectively deprived the employee of choice in the matter: 1.whether the employee was given some alternative to resignation 2.whether the employee understood the nature of the choice he or she was given

3.whether the employee was given a reasonable time in which to choose 4.whether he or she was permitted to select the effective date of resignation ON EVIDENTIARY ISSUES the Angara Diary was not an out of court statement, but part of the pleadings in the cases at bar it wasnt covered by the hearsay rule evidence is hearsay when its probative value depends in whole or in part on the competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to produce it hearsay evidence is usually excluded because: 1.absence of cross-examination 2.absence of demeanor evidence 3.absence of the oath but hearsay evidence has been admitted by courts due to their relevance, trustworthiness and necessity the rules of exclusion didnt cover admissions of a party such as the Angara Diary; these admissions were admissible even if they were hearsay the Diary contained direct statements of Estrada which could be categorized as admissions of a party also falls under the doctrine of adoptive admission, where a partys reaction to a statement or action by another person when it is reasonable to treat the partys reaction as an admission of something stated or implied by the other person didnt violate the res inter alios acta rule since it admitted the exception of admissions by a co-partner or agent (Angara was the Executive Secretary)

ban on hearsay evidence didnt cover independently relevant statements, which are relevant independent of whether they were true or not; has two classes: 1. statements which are the very facts in issue 2. statements which are circumstantial evidence of the facts in issue ON TEMPORARY INABILITY Estrada himself made the submission that Congress had ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine if the President was capable of performing his functions; Arroyos recognition as de jure President was made by Congress exercising its political judgment and could not be corrected by the Court ON THE IMPEACHMENT AND DOUBLE JEOPARDY Estrada could not invoke double jeopardy, which only attaches: 1. upon a valid complaint 2. before a competent court 3. after arraignment 4. when a valid plea has been entered 5. when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused Estradas case did not satisfy the fifth requirement since he wasnt convicted/acquitted/had his case dismissed by the impeachment court a failure to prosecute, which happens when the accused isnt given a speedy trial, means failure of the prosecution to prove its case; dismissal on such grounds is a dismissal on the merits of the case citing Esmea v. Pogoy : if the defendant wants to exercise his constitutional right to a speedy trial, he should ask for the trial of the case, not its dismissal; only when the fiscal cannot

produce evidence can the court dismiss the case, which amounts to acquittal Estrada didnt move to have the impeachment case against him dismissed; only unjustified postponements which prolong the trial for an unreasonable length of time are what offend the right of the accused to speedy trial; the case wasnt terminated without his express consent, since the impeachment court was functus officio after he resigned the rule on res ipsa loquitur cant be applied to alleged prejudicial publicity; the right to a fair trial not incompatible with the free press RULING: petitions denied for lack of merit BURGOS V ARROYO PARTIES: PETITIONER: EDITA BURGOS RESPONDENTS: PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGALARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., LT. GEN. ROMEO P. TOLENTINO, MAJ. GEN. JUANITO GOMEZ, MAJ. GEN. DELFIN BANGIT, LT. COL. NOEL CLEMENT, LT. COL. MELQUIADES FELICIANO, and DIRECTOR GENERAL OSCAR CALDERON NATURE: Petition for Review on Certiorari PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND: Court of Appeals: Petition for the Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus FACTS: At around 1:00 in the afternoon of April 28, 2007, Jonas Joseph T. Burgos a farmer advocate and a member of Kilusang Magbubukid sa Bulacan was forcibly taken and

abducted by a group of four (4) men and a woman from the extension portion of Hapag Kainan Restaurant, located at the ground floor of Ever Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City. On April 30, 2007, the petitioner, Edita Burgos, held a press conference and announced that her son Jonas was missing. That same day, the petitioner sought confirmation from the guard if the person abducted was her son Jonas. In a subsequent police investigation and Land Transportation Office (LTO) verification, it was discovered that plate number TAB 194 was registered to a 1991 Isuzu XLT vehicle owned by a certain Mauro B. Mudlong. The said vehicle was seized and impounded on June 24, 2006 for transporting timber without permit. However, in May 2007, right after Jonas abduction was made public, it was discovered that plate number TAB 194 of this 1991 Isuzu XLT vehicle was missing, and the engine and other spare parts were cannibalized. The police was likewise able to generate cartographic sketches of two of the abductors of Jonas based on its interview of eyewitnesses. On August 29, 2007, the Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG) presented Emerito Lipio a.k.a. Ka Tibo/Ka Cris, Marlon D. Manuel a.k.a. Ka Carlo, and Melissa Concepcion Reyes a.k.a. Ka Lisa/Ramil to support the theory that elements of the New Peoples Army (NPA) perpetrated the abduction of Jonas. In its July 17, 2008 decision, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition for the Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, denied the petitioners motion to declare the respondents in contempt; and partially granted the privilege of the Writ of Amparo in favor of the petitioner. Essentially, the CA found that the evidence the petitioner presented failed to establish her claimed direct connection between the abductors

of Jonas and the military. It also found that the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the PNP did not fully exert their effort in the conduct of investigation. The CA ruled that the AFP has the burden of connecting certain loose ends regarding the identity of Ka Ramon and the allegation that Ka Ramon is indeed Jonas in the Order of Battle. As for the PNP-CIDG, the CA branded its investigation as rather shallow and conducted haphazardly. PERTINENT ISSUE: Whether or not the failure of the PNP and AFP to conduct an exhaustive and meaningful investigation and to exercise extraordinary diligence in the performance of their duties is a fatal to the grant of the privilege of the Writ of Amparo. ANSWER: Yes. ON PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO Effect of the failure of the PNP and AFP to conduct an exhaustive and meaningful investigation and to exercise extraordinary diligence in the performance of their duties Considering the findings of the CA and our review of the records of the present case, we conclude that the PNP and the AFP have so far failed to conduct an exhaustive and meaningful investigation into the disappearance of Jonas Burgos, and to exercise the extraordinary diligence (in the performance of their duties) that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires. Because of these investigative shortcomings, we cannot rule on the case until a more meaningful investigation, using extraordinary diligence, is undertaken. DISPOSITIVE: In disposing of the case, the Supreme Court issued the following directives: 5. DIRECTED the Commission on Human Rights to conduct

appropriate investigative proceedings, including field investigations acting as the Courts directly commissioned agency for purposes of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo 6. REQUIRE the incumbent Chiefs of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to make available and to provide copies, to the Commission on Human Rights, of all documents and records in their possession and as the Commission on Human Rights may require, relevant to the case of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos, subject to reasonable regulations consistent with the Constitution and existing laws; 7. DIRECTED the PNP-CIDG and its incumbent Chief to submit to the Commission on Human Rights the records and results of the investigation the PNP-CIDG claimed to have forwarded to the Department of Justice, which were not included in their previous submissions to the Commission on Human Rights, including such records as the Commission on Human Rights may require, pursuant to the authority granted under this Resolution; 8. DIRECTED the PNP-CIDG to provide direct investigative assistance to the Commission on Human Rights as it may require, pursuant to the authority granted under this Resolution; 9. AUTHORIZED the Commission on Human Rights to conduct a comprehensive and exhaustive investigation that extends to all aspects of the case (not limited to the specific directives as outlined above), as the extraordinary measures the case may require under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo; and 10. REQUIRED the Commission on Human Rights to submit to this Court a Report with its recommendations, copy furnished the petitioner, the incumbent Chiefs of the AFP, the PNP and the PNPCIDG, and all the respondents, within ninety (90) days

from receipt of the Resolution. In light of the retirement of Lt. General Alexander Yano and the reassignment of the other respondents who have all been impleaded in their official capacities, all subsequent resolutions and actions from the Supreme Court were served on, and directly enforceable by, the incumbents of the impleaded offices/units whose official action is necessary. The present respondents shall continue to be personally impleaded for purposes of the responsibilities and accountabilities they may have incurred during their incumbencies. The Supreme Court likewise affirmed the dismissal of the petitions for Contempt and for the Issuance of a W RODRIGUEZ V ARROYO Doctrine: The presidential immunity from suit exists only in concurrence with the presidents incumbency but not beyond. Facts: Petitioner Noriel Rodriguez is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan (Kagimungan), a peasant organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP). He claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State under the Oplan Bantay Laya, making its members targets of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. Rodriguez was abducted by military men and was tortured repeatedly when he refused to confess to his membership in the NPA. When released, he filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and and Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of Documents and Personal Properties. The petition was filed against former Pres. Arroyo, et al. The writs were granted but the CA dropped

Pres Arroyo as party-respondent, as she may not be sued in any case during her tenure of office or actual incumbency. Issue: Whether former Pres GMA should be dropped as respondent on the basis of presidential immunity from suit Held: No. As was held in the case of Estrada v Desierto, a nonsitting President does not enjoy immunity from suit, even for acts committed during the latters tenure; that courts should look with disfavor upon the presidential privilege of immunity, especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission also reveal that the intent of the framers is clear that presidential immunity from suit is concurrent only with his tenure and not his term. Therefore, former Pres. GMA cannot use such immunity to shield herself from judicial scrutiny that would assess whether, within the context of amparo proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the abduction of Rodriguez SAEZ V ARROYO SENATE V ERMITA
Facts: Executive Order No. 464 issued by the president last September 28, 2005 is argued by petitioners to be unconstitutional. On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project). The public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the North Rail Project.

Requests for postponement of the investigation were sent by member of the executive branch, including the President, in order to "afford said officials ample time and opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues so that they may better enlighten the Senate Committee on its investigation and also until a copy of the report of the UP Law Center on the contract agreements relative to the project had been secured. On September 28, 2005, the President issued E.O. 464, "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes," which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately. Because of this issuance, Executive Secretary Ermita informed Senate President Drilon that officials of the Executive Department would not be able to attend the meeting regarding the project without consent from the President. Another letter bearing the same content was sent by the office of the AFP. Despite the communications received from Executive Secretary Ermita and Gen. Senga, the investigation scheduled by the Committee on National Defense and Security pushed through, with only Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani among all the AFP officials invited attending. Military personnel who attended regardless of the EC were relieved from their posts and were made to face court martial proceedings. The following challenged the constitutionality of EO No. 464: Bayan Muna et al all claim to have standing to file the suit because of the transcendental importance of the issues they posed. Additionally, petitioners claim that E.O. 464 infringes on their rights and impedes them from fulfilling their respective obligations. Thus, Bayan Muna alleges that E.O. 464 infringes on its right as a political party entitled to participate in governance; Satur Ocampo, et al. (party-list representatives) allege that E.O. 464 infringes on their rights and duties as members of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws; Francisco I. Chavez, claiming that his constitutional rights as a citizen, taxpayer and law practitioner, are affected by the enforcement of E.O. 464, prays in his petition that E.O. 464 be declared null and void for being unconstitutional. Alternative Law Groups, Inc. (ALG), alleging that as a coalition of 17 legal resource non-governmental organizations engaged in developmental lawyering and work with the poor and marginalized

sectors in different parts of the country, and as an organization of citizens of the Philippines and a part of the general public, it has legal standing to institute the petition to enforce its constitutional right to information on matters of public concern, a right which was denied to the public by E.O. 464, prays, that said order be declared null and void for being unconstitutional and that respondent Executive Secretary Ermita be ordered to cease from implementing it. Senate of the Philippines, alleging that it has a vital interest in the resolution of the issue of the validity of E.O. 464 for it stands to suffer imminent and material injury, as it has already sustained the same with its continued enforcement since it directly interferes with and impedes the valid exercise of the Senates powers and functions and conceals information of great public interest and concern, filed its petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 169777 and prays that E.O. 464 be declared unconstitutional. PDP-Laban, a registered political party with members duly elected into the Philippine Senate and House of Representatives, filed a similar petition for certiorari and prohibition, allegedly because it hampers its legislative agenda to be implemented through its members in Congress, particularly in the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation and transcendental issues need to be resolved to avert a constitutional crisis between the executive and legislative branches of the government.

(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. With regard to the issue of standing, respondents assert that in order to be considered a proper party to the case, one must have personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury due to the enforcement of E.O. 464. PETITIONER Bayan Muna as a political party YES or NO? RATIO. YES. It obtained three seats in the House of Representatives in the 2004 elections and is, therefore, entitled to participate in the legislative process consonant with the declared policy underlying the party list system of affording citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties who lack well-defined political constituencies to contribute to the formulation and enactment of legislation that will benefit the nation. YES. Allowed to sue to question the constitutionality of E.O. 464, the absence of any claim that an investigation called by the House of Representatives or any of its committees was aborted due to the implementation of E.O. 464 notwithstanding, it being sufficient that a claim is made that E.O. 464 infringes on their constitutional rights and duties as members of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws. YES. It is well-settled that when suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner in assailing the constitutionality of laws, presidential decrees, orders, and other

Satur Ocampo et al as party list representatives

Issue: W/N the petitioners have standing to file a case. W/N petitioners are proper parties to the case. Held: YES (except PDP-Laban) Ratio: Essential requisites for judicial review: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;

Chavez

regulations, must be direct and personal. In Franciso v. House of Representatives, this Court held that when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest. ALG which claims to be an organization of citizens, and the incumbent members of the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP in behalf of its lawyer members YES. The members invoke their constitutional right to information on matters of public concern, asserting that the right to information, curtailed and violated by E.O. 464, is essential to the effective exercise of other constitutional rights and to the maintenance of the balance of power among the three branches of the government through the principle of checks and balances. YES. The Senate of the Philippines has a fundamental right essential not only for intelligent public decisionmaking in a democratic system, but more especially for sound legislation is not disputed. E.O. 464, however, allegedly stifles the ability of the members of Congress to access information that is crucial to law-making. Verily, the Senate, including its individual members, has a substantial and direct interest over the outcome of the controversy and is the proper party to assail the constitutionality of E.O. 464. Indeed, legislators have standing to maintain inviolate the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which they claim infringes their prerogatives as legislators.

PDP-Laban

NO. For it to be accorded standing on the ground of transcendental importance it must establish: (1) the character of the funds (that it is public) or other assets involved in the case, (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government, and (3) the lack of any party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised. The first and last determinants not being present as no public funds or assets are involved and petitioners in G.R. Nos. 169777 and 169659 have direct and specific interests in the resolution of the controversy, petitioner PDP-Laban is bereft of standing to file its petition. Its allegation that E.O. 464 hampers its legislative agenda is vague and uncertain, and at best is only a "generalized interest" which it shares with the rest of the political parties. Concrete injury, whether actual or threatened, is that indispensable element of a dispute which serves in part to cast it in a form traditionally . capable of judicial resolution In fine, PDP-Labans alleged interest as a political party does not suffice to clothe it with legal standing.

Senate of the Philippines

NERI V SENATE
The Court required the parties to consider a proposal that would lead to a possible compromise only did so to avoid a piecemeal consideration of the questions for review and to avert a constitutional crisis between the executive and legislative branches of government.

United Stated v. American Tel. & Tel Co.: the coordinate branches do not exist in an exclusively adversary relationship to one another when a conflict in authority arises. Rather each branch should take cognizance of an implicit constitutional mandate to seek optimal accommodation through a realistic evaluation of the needs of the conflicting branches in the particular fact situation. The Separation of Powers often impairs efficiency, in terms of dispatch and the immediate functioning of government. It is the long-term staying power of government that is enhanced by the mutual accommodation required by the separation of powers. The fundamental constitutional principles which underlie our tripartite system of government: the Legislature enacts the law, the Judiciary interprets it and the Executive implements it. They are considered separate, co-equal, coordinate and supreme within their respective spheres but, imbued with a system of checks and balances to prevent unwarranted exercise of power. The Court's mandate is to preserve these constitutional principles at all times to keep the political branches of government within constitutional bounds in the exercise of their respective powers and prerogatives, even if it be in the search for truth. This is the only way we can preserve the stability of our democratic institutions and uphold the Rule of Law

AKBAYAN V AQUINO 1. JPEP 2. Diplomatic Negotiations are Privilege 3. Executive Privilege, an Exception to Congress' Power of Inquiry 4. Treaty-making Power 5. Executive Privilege vs. People's Right to Information FACTS: This is regarding the JPEPA, the bilateral free trade agreement ratified by the President with Japan, concerning trade in goods, rules of origin, customs procedures, paperless trading, trade in services, investment, etc. Prior to Presidents signing of JPEPA in Sept. 2006, petitioners non-government organizations, Congresspersons, citizens and taxpayers sought via petition for mandamus and prohibition to obtain from respondents the full text of the JPEPA, including the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto. Particularly, Congress through the House Committee are calling for an inquiry into the JPEPA, but at the same time, the Executive is refusing to give them the said copies until the negotiation is completed. ISSUES: 11. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing 12. Whether or not the Philippine and Japanese offers during the negotiation process are privileged 13. Whether or not the President can validly exclude Congress, exercising its power of inquiry and power to concur in treaties, from the negotiation process RULING: Standing

In a petition anchored upon the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, which is a public right by its very nature, petitioners need not show that they have any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that they are citizens and, therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right. As the present petition is anchored on the right to information and petitioners are all suing in their capacity as citizens and groups of citizens including petitioners-members of the House of Representatives who additionally are suing in their capacity as such, the standing of petitioners to file the present suit is grounded in jurisprudence. JPEPA, A Matter of Public Concern To be covered by the right to information, the information sought must meet the threshold requirement that it be a matter of public concern xxx From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement, it is evident that the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiations towards its execution are matters of public concern. This, respondents do not dispute. They only claim that diplomatic negotiations are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege, thus constituting an exception to the right to information and the policy of full public disclosure. Privileged Character of Diplomatic Negotiations Recognized The privileged character of diplomatic negotiations has been recognized in this jurisdiction. In discussing valid limitations on the right to information, the Court in Chavez v. PCGG held that information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements may be subject to reasonable safeguards for the sake of national interest.

Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential since there should be ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved the offers exchanged by the parties during the negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to conclude that the Japanese representatives submitted their offers with the understanding that historic confidentiality would govern the same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future negotiations. A ruling that Philippine offers in treaty negotiations should not be open to public scrutiny would discourage future Philippine representatives from frankly expressing their views during negotiations. While, on first impression, it appears wise to deter Philippine representatives from entering into compromises, it bears noting that treaty negotiations, or any negotiation for that matter, normally involve a process of quid pro quo, and oftentimes negotiators have to be willing to grant concessions in an area of lesser importance in order to obtain more favorable terms in an area of greater national interest. Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations constituting no exception. It bears emphasis, however, that such privilege is only presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermita holds, recognizing a type of information as privileged does not mean that it will be considered privileged in all instances. Only after a consideration of the context in which the claim is made may it be determined if there is a public interest that calls for the disclosure of the desired information, strong enough to overcome its traditionally privileged status. Does the exception apply even though JPEPA is primarily economic and does not involve national security?

While there are certainly privileges grounded on the necessity of safeguarding national security such as those involving military secrets, not all are founded thereon. One example is the informers privilege, or the privilege of the Government not to disclose the identity of a person or persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement of that law. The suspect involved need not be so notorious as to be a threat to national security for this privilege to apply in any given instance. Otherwise, the privilege would be inapplicable in all but the most high-profile cases, in which case not only would this be contrary to long-standing practice. It would also be highly prejudicial to law enforcement efforts in general. Also illustrative is the privileged accorded to presidential communications, which are presumed privileged without distinguishing between those which involve matters of national security and those which do not, the rationale for the privilege being that a frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power. In the same way that the privilege for judicial deliberations does not depend on the nature of the case deliberated upon, so presidential communications are privileged whether they involve matters of national security. It bears emphasis, however, that the privilege accorded to presidential communications is not absolute, one significant qualification being that the Executive cannot, any more than the other branches of government, invoke a general confidentiality privilege to shield its officials and employees from investigations by the proper governmental institutions into possible criminal wrongdoing. This qualification applies whether the privilege is

being invoked in the context of a judicial trial or a congressional investigation conducted in aid of legislation. Closely related to the presidential communications privilege is the deliberative process privilege recognized in the United States. As discussed by the U.S. Supreme Court in NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co, deliberative process covers documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated. Notably, the privileged status of such documents rests, not on the need to protect national security but, on the obvious realization that officials will not communicate candidly among themselves if each remark is a potential item of discovery and front page news, the objective of the privilege being to enhance the quality of agency decisions. The diplomatic negotiations privilege bears a close resemblance to the deliberative process and presidential communications privilege. It may be readily perceived that the rationale for the confidential character of diplomatic negotiations, deliberative process, and presidential communications is similar, if not identical. The earlier discussion on PMPF v. Manglapus shows that the privilege for diplomatic negotiations is meant to encourage a frank exchange of exploratory ideas between the negotiating parties by shielding such negotiations from public view. Similar to the privilege for presidential communications, the diplomatic negotiations privilege seeks, through the same means, to protect the independence in decision-making of the President, particularly in its capacity as the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations. And, as with the deliberative process privilege, the privilege accorded to diplomatic negotiations arises, not on account of the content of the information per se, but because the information is part of a process of deliberation which, in pursuit of the public interest,

must be presumed confidential. Clearly, the privilege accorded to diplomatic negotiations follows as a logical consequence from the privileged character of the deliberative process. Does diplomatic privilege only apply to certain stages of the negotiation process? In Chavez v. PEA and Chavez v. PCGG, the Court held that with regard to the duty to disclose definite propositions of the government, such duty does not include recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public order. Treaty-making power of the President xxx they (petitioners) argue that the President cannot exclude Congress from the JPEPA negotiations since whatever power and authority the President has to negotiate international trade agreements is derived only by delegation of Congress, pursuant to Article VI, Section 28(2) of the Constitution and Sections 401 and 402 of Presidential Decree No. 1464. The subject of Article VI Section 28(2) of the Constitution is not the power to negotiate treaties and international agreements, but the power to fix tariff rates, import and export quotas, and other taxes xxx. As to the power to negotiate treaties, the constitutional basis thereof is Section 21 of Article VII the article on the Executive Department. xxx While the power then to fix tariff rates and other taxes clearly

belongs to Congress, and is exercised by the President only be delegation of that body, it has long been recognized that the power to enter into treaties is vested directly and exclusively in the President, subject only to the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty. In this light, the authority of the President to enter into trade agreements with foreign nations provided under P.D. 1464 may be interpreted as an acknowledgment of a power already inherent in its office. It may not be used as basis to hold the President or its representatives accountable to Congress for the conduct of treaty negotiations. This is not to say, of course, that the Presidents power to enter into treaties is unlimited but for the requirement of Senate concurrence, since the President must still enure that all treaties will substantively conform to all the relevant provisions of the Constitution. It follows from the above discussion that Congress, while possessing vast legislative powers, may not interfere in the field of treaty negotiations. While Article VII, Section 21 provides for Senate concurrence, such pertains only to the validity of the treaty under consideration, not to the conduct of negotiations attendant to its conclusion. Moreover, it is not even Congress as a while that has been given the authority to concur as a means of checking the treaty-making power of the President, but only the Senate. Thus, as in the case of petitioners suing in their capacity as private citizens, petitioners-members of the House of Representatives fail to present a sufficient showing of need that the information sought is critical to the performance of the functions of Congress, functions that do not include treatynegotiation. Did the respondents alleged failure to timely claim executive privilege constitute waiver of such privilege?

That respondent invoked the privilege for the first time only in their Comment to the present petition does not mean that the claim of privilege should not be credited. Petitioners position presupposes that an assertion of the privilege should have been made during the House Committee investigations, failing which respondents are deemed to have waived it. xxx (but) Respondents failure to claim the privilege during the House Committee hearings may not, however, be construed as a waiver thereof by the Executive branch. xxx what respondents received from the House Committee and petitioner-Congressman Aguja were mere requests for information. And as priorly stated, the House Committee itself refrained from pursuing its earlier resolution to issue a subpoena duces tecum on account of then Speaker Jose de Venecias alleged request to Committee Chairperson Congressman Teves to hold the same in abeyance. The privilege is an exemption to Congress power of inquiry. So long as Congress itself finds no cause to enforce such power, there is no strict necessity to assert the privilege. In this light, respondents failure to invoke the privilege during the House Committee investigations did not amount to waiver thereof. Showing of Need Test In executive privilege controversies, the requirement that parties present a sufficient showing of need only means, in substance, that they should show a public interest in favor of disclosure sufficient in degree to overcome the claim of privilege. Verily, the Court in such cases engages in a balancing of interests. Such a balancing of interests is certainly not new in constitutional adjudication involving fundamental rights. xxx However, when the Executive has as in this case invoked the privilege, and it has been established that the subject

information is indeed covered by the privilege being claimed, can a party overcome the same by merely asserting that the information being demanded is a matter of public concern, without any further showing required? Certainly not, for that would render the doctrine of executive privilege of no force and effect whatsoever as a limitation on the right to information, because then the sole test in such controversies would be whether an information is a matter of public concern. Right to information vis-a-vis Executive Privilege xxx the Court holds that, in determining whether an information is covered by the right to information, a specific showing of need for such information is not a relevant consideration, but only whether the same is a matter of public concern. When, however, the government has claimed executive privilege, and it has established that the information is indeed covered by the same, then the party demanding it, if it is to overcome the privilege, must show that that information is vital, not simply for the satisfaction of its curiosity, but for its ability to effectively and reasonably participate in social, political, and economic decision-making. GALICTO V AQUINO Facts: On September 8, 2010, President Benigno Aquino III issued EO 7, entitled Directing the Rationalization of the Compensation and Position Classification System in the [GOCCs] and [GFIs], and for Other Purposes, which (1) provided for the guiding principles and framework to establish a fixed compensation and position classification system for GOCCs and GFIs; (2) created a Task Force review all remunerations of GOCC and GFI employees and officers (3) ordered GOCCs and GFIs to submit to the Task Force information regarding their compensation; and (4) ordered (a) a moratorium on the increases in the salaries and other forms of compensation of all GOCC and GFI employees for an indefinite period to be set by the President, except salary adjustments

under EO 8011 and EO 900; and (b) a suspension of all allowances, bonuses and incentives of members of the Board of Directors/Trustees until December 31, 2010. Galicto, a Philhealth employee, filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court, alleging that EO 7 was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Among the grounds were: (1) lack of legal basis, (2) derogation of congressional prerogative, and (3) lack of standards. Pending resolution, or on 6 June 2011, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10149, or the GOCC Governance Act of 2011. Section 11 of RA 10149 expressly authorizes the President to fix the compensation framework of GOCCs and GFIs. Issue: Whether or not the Petition for Certiorari should be granted. Held: No. The same should be dismissed for formal and procedural infirmities and mootness. Ratio: (Re Actual Case) Given the enactment of RA 10149, the President is now empowered to establish the compensation systems of GOCCs and GFIs. For the Court to still rule upon the supposed unconstitutionality of EO 7 will merely be an academic exercise. Any further discussion of the constitutionality of EO 7 serves no useful purpose. The question of constitutionality has become moot. (Re Proper Party) Galicto failed to show that he has a personal stake or material interest in the outcome of the case because his interest is speculative and based on a mere expectancy. The curtailment of

future increases in his salaries and other benefits can only be characterized as contingent events or expectancies. He has no vested rights to salary increases. The alleged injury must be direct and substantial. If the asserted injury is merely superficial and insubstantial, then the Court should not rule on the issue of constitutionality. Even if Galicto claimed that he instituted the present petition as a member of the bar in good standing who has an interest in ensuring that laws and orders of the Philippine government are legally and validly issued, such supposed interest is too general.

Mootness The Solicitor General argues that the petition is moot considering that President Arroyo already extended to respondents ad interim appointments on Sept. 23, 2004, immediately after the recess of Congress. xxx However, as an exception to the rule on mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading review. In the present case, the mootness of the petition does not bar its resolution. The question of the constitutionality of the Presidents appointment of department secretaries in an acting capacity while Congress is in session will arise in every such appointment. Nature of the power to appoint The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the legislature may not interfere with the exercise of this executive power except in those instances when the Constitution expressly allows it to interfere. Limitations on the executive power to appoint are construed strictly against the legislature. The scope of the legislatures interference in the executives power to appoint is limited to the power to prescribe the qualifications to an appointive office. Congress cannot appoint a person to an office in the guise of prescribing qualifications to that office. Neither may Congress impose on the President the duty to appoint any particular person to an office. However, even if the Commission on Appointments is composed of members of Congress, the exercise of its power is executive and not legislative. The Commission on Appointments does not legislate when it exercises its power to give or withhold consent to presidential appointments.

PIMENTEL V ERMITA 1. Power of Appointment 2. Ad Interim Appointments vs. Temporary Appointments FACTS: This case was brought on when President Arroyo through Executive Secretary Ermita issued appointments to respondents as acting secretaries of their respective departments. Several senators filed this petition in Court. After Congress adjourned on Sept. 22, 2004, President Arroyo issued ad interim appointments to same respondents, now as secretaries of the departments to which they were previously appointed in an acting capacity. ISSUE: Whether or not President Arroyos appointment of respondents as acting secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments while Congress is in session

RULING:

cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be. Standing of petitioners as individual members of Congress Considering the independence of the Commission on Appointments from Congress, it is error for petitioners to claim standing in the present case as members of Congress. President Arroyos issuance of acting appointments while Congress is in session impairs no power of Congress. Among the petitioners, only the following are members of the Commission on Appointments of the 13t Congress: Senator Enrile as Minority Floor Leader, Senator Lacson as Assistant Minority Floor Leader, and Senator Angara, Senator Ejercito-Estrada, and Senator Osmena as members. Thus, on the impairment of the prerogatives of members of the Commission on Appointments, only Senators Enrile, Lacson, Angara, Ejercito-Estrada, and Osmena have standing in the present petition. Constitutionality of President Arroyos issuance appointments to respondents as acting secretaries of The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the Presidents confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a department secretary, the President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice even while Congress is in session. That person may or may not be the permanent appointee, but practical reasons may make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be the permanent appointee. Express provision of law allows President to make acting appointment Sec. 17, Chap. 5, Title I, Book III, EO 292 states that [t]he President may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch. Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the government service, as long as the President deems that person competent. But does Sec. 17 apply to appointments vested in the President by the Constitution? Petitioners assert that it only applies to appointments vested in the President by law. Petitioners forget that Congress is not the only source of law. Law refers to the Constitution, statutes or acts of Congress, municipal ordinances, implementing rules issued pursuant to law, and judicial decisions. Issuance of appointments in an acting capacity is susceptible to abuse: Petitioners fail to consider that acting appointments cannot exceed one year. The law has incorporated this safeguard to prevent abuses, like the use of acting appointments as a way to circumvent confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office. Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office,

Ad interim appointments vs. appointments in an acting capacity Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from appointments in an acting capacity. Both of them are effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments (Bernas, 1987 Constitution: A commentary (1996)) However, we find no abuse in the present case. The absence of abuse is readily apparent from President Arroyos issuance of ad interim appointments to respondents immediately upon the recess of Congress, way before the lapse of one year. MATIBAG V BENIPAYO Maria J. Angelina G. Matibag questions the constitutionality of the appointment by President Arroyo of Benipayo (Chairman of the Commission on Elections), and Bora and Tuason (COMELEC Commissioners). She questions the legality of appointment by Benipayo of Velma J. Cinco as Director IV of the Comelecs EID and reassigning her to the Law department. Issues: 1. Instant petition satisfies all requirements 2. Assumption of office by Benipayo, Bora and Tuason; ad interim appointments amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by Sec 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution

3. Renewal of ad interim violated the prohibition on reappointment under Sec 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution 4. Benipayos removal of petitioner is illegal 5. OIC of COMELECs Finance Services Department acting in excess jurisdiction Matibags Argument: 1. Failure to consult for reassignment 2. Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No 7; transferring and detailing employees are prohibited during the election period beginning January 2 until June 13, 2001 3. Reassignment violated Sec 261 of the Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC Resolution No. 3258 4. Ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Bora and Tuason violated the constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC 5. Illegal removal or reassignment 6. Challenges the designation of Cinco 7. Questions the disbursement made by COMELEC 8. No ad interim appointment to the COMELEC or to Civil Service Commission and COA 9. Sec 1 (2) of Article IX-C; an ad interim appointee cannot assume office until confirmed by the Commission on Appointments Benipayos Argument: 1. Comelec Resolution No. 3300 2. Petitioner does not have personal interest, not directly injured 3. Failure to question constitutionality of ad interim appointments at the earliest opportunity. She filed only after third time of reappointments 4. Ad interim is not the lis mota because the real issue is the legality of petitioners reassignment. Ruling of Court: 1. Real issue is whether or not Benipayo is the lawful Chairman

of the Comelec 2. Petitioner has a personal and material stake. 3. It is not the date of filing of the petition that determines whether the constitutional issue was raised at the earliest point. The earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional issue is to raise it in the pleading. 4. Questioned the constitutionality of the ad interim appointments which is the earliest opportunity for pleading the constitutional issue before a competent body. 5. Ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn. It is not the nature of appointment but the manner on which appointment was made. It will avoid interruptions that would result to prolonged vacancies. It is limited the evil sought to be avoided. 6. Termination of Ad interim appointment (Sword of Damocles); (1) disapproval (2) recess 7. Two modes of appointment: (1) in session (2) in recess 8. By-passed appointments (1) lack of time/failure of the Commission on Appointments to organize, (2) subject of reconsideration, (3) can be revived since there is no final disapproval 9. Four situations in for a term of seven years without replacement: (1) serves his full seven-year term, (2) serves a part of his term and then resigns before his seven-year term, (3) served the unexpired term of someone who died or resigned, (4) served a term of less than seven years, and a vacancy arises from death or resignation. Not one of the four situation applies to the case of Benipayo, Borra or Tuason 10. Reappointment cannot be applied; (1) appointed by president, (2) confirmed by Commission on Appointments 11. Without reappointment means: (first phrase) prohibits reappointment of any person previously appointed for a term of seven years (second phrase) prohibits reappointment of any person previously appointed for a term of 5 or 3 years pursuant to the first set of appointees 12. Reasons for prohibition of reappointments: (1) prevent second

appointment (2) not serve beyond the fixed term 13. Two important amendments: (1) requiring the consent by Commission of Appointments (2) prohibition on serving beyond the fixed term of 7 years 14. Twin Prohibition (ironclad): (1) prohibition of reappointments (2) prohibition of temporary or acting appointments 15. Third issue not violation because the previous appointments were not confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. 16. Benipayo is the de jure COMELEC Chairman. He is not required by law to secure the approval of the COMELEC en banc. 17. The petitioner is acting only temporary because a permanent appointment can be issued only upon meeting all the requirements. COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 refers only to COMELEC field personnel not to head office personnel. SORIANO V LISTA Facts: Eight officers of the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) were promoted by the President to Vice Admiral, Rear Admiral, Commodore, Naval Captain, and they assumed office without confirmation by the Commission on Appointments (COA). Petitioner, as a taxpayer, filed a petition with the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of their assumption of office, which requires confirmation of the COA. Held: Petitioner has no locus standi. A party bringing a suit challenging the constitutionality of an act or statute must show not only that the law or act is invalid, but also that he has sustained, or is in immediate or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. The instant petition cannot even be classified as a taxpayers suit because petitioner has no interest as such and this case does not involve the exercise by Congress of its taxing power. Pursuant to Executive Order of President Ramos, the PCG was

transferred from the Department of National Defense to the Office of the President, and later to the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC). OMBUDSMAN V CSC Facts: It appears that Carandang and Clemente were in the meantime conferred with CSE Eligibility pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 03-0665 dated June 6, 2003.Petitioner subsequently reclassified several positions by Resolution No. 0203 dated August 18, 2003 including Graft Investigation Officer III which was reclassified to Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer III. The Ombudsman thereupon requested the approval of the proposed Qualification Standards for the reclassified positions. With respect to the reclassified Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer III position, the Qualification Standards were the same as those for Graft Investigation Officer III. Subsequently, the CSC, by the challenged Resolution of August 28, 2003, changed the status of Carandangs and Clementes appointments to permanent effective June 6, 2003, but not with respect to De Jesus on the ground that he has not met the eligibility requirements. Issue: Wether or not that there are independent offices specifically authorized by the constitution to appoint their officials ,does this imply that their appointment will not be subject to civil service law and rules?

NAZARENO V COMELEC
Facts: Pursuant to CSC's Accreditation Program, it issued a resolution granting City Government of Dumaguete the authority to take final action on all its appointments subject to the following conditions: 1. exercise of said authority shall be subject to Civil Service Law, rules and regulations and within the limits and restrictions of the implementing guidelines of the CSC Accreditation Program 2. appointments issued under this authority shall be subject to monthly monitoring by the CSC 3. appointments found in the course of monthly monitoring to have been issued and acted upon in violation of pertinent rules, standards, and regulations shall immediately be invalidated by the Civil Service Regional Office (CSRO), upon recommendation by the CSFO Then Dumaguete City Mayor Felipe Antonio B. Remollo sought re-election in the May 14, 2001 elections, but lost to respondent Mayor Agustin R. Perdices. Thereafter, on June 5, 7, and 11, 2001, outgoing Mayor Remollo promoted 15 city hall employees, and regularized another 74 city hall employees, including the herein 52 petitioners. Mayor Perdices publicly announced at the flag raising ceremony at the Dumaguete City Hall grounds that he would not honor the appointments made by former Mayor Remollo. On the same day, he instructed the City Administrator to direct City Assistant Treasurer, to refrain from making any cash disbursements for payments of petitioners' salary differentials based on their new positions. Petitioners filed a Petition for Mandamus with Injunction and Damages with prayer for TRO against the City, represented by the mayor and other officers. (This was later on dismissed by the RTC.) CSC invalidated the said appointments for violating the Resolution No. 010988 which states that: 3. All appointments, whether original, transfer, reemployment, reappointment, promotion or demotion, except in cases of renewal and reinstatement, regardless of status, which are issued AFTER the elections, regardless of their dates of effectivity and/or date of receipt by the Commission, including its Regional or Field Offices, of said appointments or the Report of Personnel Actions (ROPA) as the case may be, shall be disapproved unless the following requisites concur relative to their issuance: a) The appointment has gone through the regular screening by the Personnel Selection Board (PSB) before the prohibited period on the

Ruling: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Resolution No. 030919 of the Civil Service Commission dated August 28, 2003 is hereby SET ASIDE. The appointment of Jose Tereso U. de Jesus, Jr., as well as those of Melchor Arthur H. Carandang, Paul Elmer M. Clemente, is hereby ordered made permanent effective December 18, 2002.

issuance of appointments as shown by the PSB report or minutes of its meeting; b) That the appointee is qualified; c) There is a need to fill up the vacancy immediately in order not to prejudice public service and/or endanger public safety; d) That the appointment is not one of those mass appointments issued after the elections. 4. The term mass appointments refers to those issued in bulk or in large number after the elections by an outgoing local chief executive and there is no apparent need for their immediate issuance. CSC En Banc: denied petitioner's appeal CA: dismissed petitioner's appeal Petitioner: 1. CSC Resolution No. 010988 is invalid because the Commission is without authority to issue regulations prohibiting mass appointments at the local government level. 2. Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution is only applicable to the President or Acting President. They claim that outgoing or defeated local appointing authorities are authorized to make appointments of qualified individuals until their last day in office, and that not all mass appointments are invalid. 3. Dumaguete City had been granted authority to take final action on all appointments and CSC has no authority to disapprove Respondents: 1. petitioners appointments violated civil service rules and regulations other than CSC Resolution No. 010988 2. Commission is authorized to invalidate the petitioners appointments, because the CSC accreditation program carried with it the caveat that said exercise of authority shall be subject to Civil Service law, rules and regulations. 3. petitioners were guilty of forum shopping Issue: WON the "mass appointment" is valid Held: No, CSC has authority to invalidated the appointments Ratio: AUTHORITY OF CSC The Commission, as the central personnel agency of the government, has statutory authority to establish rules and regulations to promote efficiency and professionalism in the civil service. VALIDITY OF MASS APPOINTMENT

There is no constitutional prohibition against the issuance of mass appointments by defeated local government officials prior to the expiration of their terms. Clearly, this is not the same as a midnight appointment, proscribed by the Constitution, which refers to those appointments made within two months immediately prior to the next presidential election. De Rama v. CA: prohibition (on midnight appointments - Art. 7, Sec. 15) applies only to presidential appointments. In truth and in fact, there is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making appointments during the last days of his or her tenure. Quirog v. Aumentado: ruling (in De Rama case) does not mean that the raison d' etre behind the prohibition against midnight appointments may not be applied to those made by chief executives of local government units. Indeed, the prohibition is precisely designed to discourage, nay, even preclude, losing candidates from issuing appointments merely for partisan purposes thereby depriving the incoming administration of the opportunity to make the corresponding appointments in line with its new policies. Indeed, not all appointments issued after the elections by defeated officials are invalid. CSC Resolution No. 010988 does not purport to nullify all mass appointments. However, it must be shown that the appointments have undergone the regular screening process, that the appointee is qualified, that there is a need to fill up the vacancy immediately, and that the appointments are not in bulk. CSC Resolution No. 010988 does not totally proscribe the local chief executive from making any appointments immediately before and after elections. The same Resolution provides that the validity of an appointment issued immediately before and after elections by an outgoing local chief executive is to be determined on the basis of the nature, character, and merit of the individual appointment and the particular circumstances surrounding the same. Each appointment must be judged on the basis of the nature, character, and merits of the individual appointment and the circumstances surrounding the same. It is only when the appointments were made en masse by the outgoing administration and shown to have been made through hurried maneuvers and under circumstances departing from good faith, morality, and propriety that this Court has struck down "midnight" appointments. In the instant case, Mayor Remollo issued the 89 original and promotional appointments on three separate dates, but within a ten-day period, in the same month that he left office. Further, the Commissions audit found violations of CSC rules and regulations that justified the disapproval of the appointments.

Also, there was only one en banc meeting of the city PSB to consider the appointments, without any evidence that there were any deliberations on the qualifications of the petitioners, or any indication that there was an urgent need for the immediate issuance of such appointments. The absence of evidence showing careful consideration of the merits of each appointment, and the timing and the number of appointments, militate against petitioners cause. On the contrary, the prevailing circumstances in this case indicate that the appointments were hurriedly issued by the outgoing administration. Accreditation of Dumaguete City did not remove CSC's authority to review appointments. Resolution No. 992411 states that such exercise of authority shall be subject to civil service law, rules and regulations and that appointments in violation of pertinent rules shall immediately inavlidated

DE CASTRO V JBC (MAR 2010) FACTS: This case is based on multiple cases field with dealt with the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory requirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010 or seven days after the presidential election. On December 22, 2009, Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio member of the JBC, addressed a letter to the JBC, requesting that the process for nominations to the office of the Chief Justice be commenced immediately. In its January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, the JBC passed a resolution which stated that they have unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice to be vacated on May 17, 2010 upon the retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice. As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for application or recommendation, and published for that purpose its announcement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Philippine Star. In its meeting of February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of announcing the names of the following candidates to invite to the public to file their sworn complaint, written report, or opposition, if any, not later than February 22, 2010. Although it has already begun the process for the filling of the position of Chief Justice Puno in accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when to

submit to the President its list of nominees for the position due to the controversy in this case being unresolved. The compiled cases which led to this case and the petitions of intervenors called for either the prohibition of the JBC to pass the shortlist, mandamus for the JBC to pass the shortlist, or that the act of appointing the next Chief Justice by GMA is a midnight appointment. A precedent frequently cited by the parties is the In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the RTC of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively, shortly referred to here as the Valenzuela case, by which the Court held that Section 15, Article VII prohibited the exercise by the President of the power to appoint to judicial positions during the period therein fixed. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing. 2. Whether or not there is justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. 3. Whether or not the incumbent President can appoint the next Chief Justice. 4. Whether or not mandamus and prohibition will lie to compel the submission of the shortlist of nominees by the JBC. HELD: 1.Petitioners have legal standing because such requirement for this case was waived by the Court. Legal standing is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because in some cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. But even if, strictly speaking, the petitioners are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.

2. There is a justiciable issue. The court holds that the petitions set forth an actual case or controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. The reality is that the JBC already commenced the proceedings for the selection of the nominees to be included in a short list to be submitted to the President for consideration of which of them will succeed Chief Justice Puno as the next Chief Justice. Although the position is not yet vacant, the fact that the JBC began the process of nomination pursuant to its rules and practices, although it has yet to decide whether to submit the list of nominees to the incumbent outgoing President or to the next President, makes the situation ripe for judicial determination, because the next steps are the public interview of the candidates, the preparation of the short list of candidates, and the interview of constitutional experts, as may be needed. The resolution of the controversy will surely settle with finality the nagging questions that are preventing the JBC from moving on with the process that it already began, or that are reasons persuading the JBC to desist from the rest of the process. 3. Prohibition under section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the judiciary. The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the framers devoted time to meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the Constitution. Such meticulousness indicates that the organization and arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution were not arbitrarily or whimsically done by the framers, but purposely made to reflect their intention and manifest their vision of what the Constitution should contain. As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The presidential power of appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done

so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. 4.Writ of mandamus does not lie against the JBC. Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It is proper when the act against which it is directed is one addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or officer. Mandamus is not available to direct the exercise of a judgment or discretion in a particular way. For mandamus to lie, the following requisites must be complied with: (a) the plaintiff has a clear legal right to the act demanded; (b) it must be the duty of the defendant to perform the act, because it is mandated by law; (c) the defendant unlawfully neglects the performance of the duty enjoined by law; (d) the act to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and (e) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. DE CASTRO V JBC (APR 2010) SUPRA RELAMPAGOS V AUMENTADO
Facts: Governor Relampagos permanently appointed Liza M. Quirog as Provincial Government Department Head of the Office of the Bohol Provincial Agriculture (PGDH-OPA). The appointment was confirmed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in Resolution No. 2001-199 on June 1, 2001. On even date, Quirog took her oath of office. The Director of Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. VII (CSCROVII) invalidated Quirog's appointment as PGDH-OPA upon finding that the same was part of the bulk appointments issued by then Governor Relampagos after the May 14, 2001 elections allegedly in violation of Item No. 3(d) of CSC Resolution No. 010988 dated June 4, 2001. The Order

pointed out that the prohibition against the issuance of midnight appointments was already laid down as early as February 29, 2000 in CSC Resolution No. 000550. Relampagos and Quirog moved for reconsideration of the CSCROVII Order, alleging that when the latter took her oath of office on June 1, 2001, CSC Resolution No. 010988 was not yet effective as it took effect only on June 4, 2001. They argued that the subject appointment cannot be considered a midnight appointment because it was made days before the expiration of Relampagos' term, and that Quirog was already the acting Provincial Agriculturist a year prior to said appointment or since June 19, 2000. They asserted, since Quirog had already taken her oath of office, assumed her duties and collected her salary for the month of June, 2001, she had already acquired a legal, not merely equitable, right to the position in question, which cannot be taken away from her either by revocation of the appointment or by removal except for cause and with previous notice and hearing. CSCROVII denied Quirog's and Relampagos' motion for reconsideration for lack of legal personality to file such pleading CSC, on appeal before it, set aside the order and decision of the CSCROVII. Incumbent Bohol Governor Erico B. Aumentado filed an amended Motion for Reconsideration of the CSC Resolution No. 011812, which was denied by CSC. CA reversed CSCs decision. Whether or not Relampagos and Quirog posess legal personality to file a motion for reconsideration before CSCROVII Whether or not Quirog's appointment violated Item 3 of CSC Resolution No. 010988 dated June 4, 2001 Whether or not the subject appointment was a midnight appointment.

Quirog had the right to ask for reconsideration of, or to appeal the adverse ruling of CSCROVII. In contrast, Relampagos, by reason of the expiration of his term as governor, had lost the legal personality to contest the disapproval of the appointment. As to the validity of Quirog's appointment, the CSCROVII disapproved Quirog's appointment for non-compliance with Item No. 3 of CSC Resolution No. 010988 dated June 4, 2001. Item No. 3 refers to the disapproval of appointments unless certain requisites are complied with. Item No. 3 reads: 3. All appointments, whether original, transfer, reemployment, reappointment, promotion or demotion, x x x which are issued AFTER the elections, regardless of their dates of effectivity and/or date of receipt by the Commission, x x x shall be disapproved unless the following requisites concur relative to their issuance: a) The appointment has gone through the regular screening by the Personnel Selection Board (PSB) before the prohibited period on the issuance of appointments as shown by the PSB report or minutes of its meeting; b) That the appointee is qualified; c) There is a need to fill up the vacancy immediately in order not to prejudice public service and/or endanger public safety; d) That the appointment is not one of those mass appointments issued after the elections. The CSC ruled that the promotional appointment extended to Quirog by Governor Relampagos was not violative of the aforesaid CSC Resolution. This interpretation by the CSC of its own rules should be given great weight and consideration for after all, it is the agency tasked with interpreting or applying the same Having no provision regarding its retroactive application to appointments made prior to its effectivity, CSC Resolution No. 010988 must be taken to be of prospective application. 3. It cannot also be said that Quirog's appointment was a midnight appointment. The constitutional prohibition on so-called midnight appointments, specifically, those made within two (2) months immediately prior to the next presidential elections, applies only to the President or Acting President 2.

Issue: 1. 2. 3.

Held: 1. 2. 3. Ratio: 1.

Yes as to Quirog. No. No.

Both the appointing authority and the appointee are equally real parties in interest who have the requisite legal standing to bring an action challenging a CSC disapproval of an appointment.

The aforementioned ruling does not mean that the raison d' etre behind the prohibition against midnight appointments may not be applied to those made by chief executives of local government units, as here. Indeed, the prohibition is precisely designed to discourage, nay, even preclude, losing candidates from issuing appointments merely for partisan purposes thereby depriving the incoming administration of the opportunity to make the corresponding appointments in line with its new policies. The appointment of Quirog cannot be categorized as a midnight appointment. For it is beyond dispute that Quirog had been discharging and performing the duties concomitant with the subject position for a year prior to her permanent appointment thereto. Surely, the fact that she was only permanently appointed to the position of PGDH-OPA after a year of being the Acting Provincial Agriculturist more than adequately shows that the filling up of the position resulted from deliberate action and a careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee's qualifications. The fact that Quirog had been the Acting Provincial Agriculturist since June 2000 all the more highlights the public need for said position to be permanently filled up. A careful evaluation of the circumstances obtaining in the issuance of the appointment of Quirog shows the absence of the element of hurriedness on the part of former Governor Relampagos which characterizes a midnight appointment. There is also wanting in the records of the case the subversion by the former governor of the policies of the incumbent Governor Erico Aumentado as a logical consequence of the issuance of Quirog's appointment by the latter. Both elements are the primordial considerations by the Supreme Court when it laid down its ruling in prohibiting midnight appointments in the landmark case of Aytona vs Castillo, et. al

Urros appointment paper is dated March 5, 2010; while the appointment papers of De Guzman and Escueta are both dated March 8, 2010. On March 9, 2010, Escueta took his oath of office before Makati Regional Trial Court Judge Alberico Umali. Petitioner filed the present petition questioning the validity of the respondents appointments mainly on the ground that it violates the constitutional prohibition against midnight appointments. His Excellency Benigno S. Aquino III, issued Executive Order No. 2 (E.O. No. 2) "Recalling, Withdrawing, and Revoking Appointments Issued by the Previous Administration in Violation of the Constitutional 2 Ban on Midnight Appointments." What is the nature of the petitioners appointment as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner? Does the petitioner have the clear right to be reinstated to his former position and to oust respondent Urro as NAPOLCOM Commissioner?

Issue: 1. 2.

Held: 1. 2. Ratio: 1.

Temporary, thus no security of tenure. No. In the present case, the constitutionality of the respondents appointments is not the lis mota of the case. From the submitted pleadings, what is decisive is the determination of whether the petitioner has a cause of action to institute and maintain this present

GENERAL V URRO
Facts: PGMA appointed Imelda C. Roces (Roces) as acting Commissioner of the NAPOLCOM, representing the civilian sector. When Roces died PGMA appointed the petitioner as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner in place of Roces. On the same date, PGMA appointed Eduardo U. Escueta (Escueta) as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner and designated him as NAPOLCOM Vice Chairman. PGMA appointed Alejandro S. Urro in place of the petitioner, Constancia P. de Guzman in place of Celia Leones, and Escueta as permanent NAPOLCOM Commissioners.

SECTION 1. Midnight Appointments Defined. The following appointments made by the former President and other appointing authorities in departments, agencies, offices, and instrumentalities, including governmentowned or controlled corporations, shall be considered as midnight appointments: (a) Those made on or after March 11, 2010, including all appointments bearing dates prior to March 11, 2010 where the appointee has accepted, or taken his oath, or assumed public office on or after March 11, 2010, except temporary appointments in the executive positions when continued vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger public safety as may be determined by the appointing authority. (b) Those made prior to March 11, 2010, but to take effect after said date or appointments to office that would be vacant only after March 11, 2010. (c) Appointments and promotions made during the period of 45 days prior to the May 10, 2010 elections in violation of Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code. SECTION 2. Recall, Withdraw, and Revocation of Midnight Appointments. Midnight appointments, as defined under Section 1, are hereby recalled, withdrawn, and revoked. The positions covered or otherwise affected are hereby declared vacant.

petition a quo warranto against respondent Urro. If the petitioner fails to establish his cause of action for quo warranto, a discussion of the constitutionality of the appointments of the respondents is rendered completely unnecessary. The inclusion of the grounds for certiorari and/or prohibition does not alter the essential character of the petitioners action since he does not even allege that he has a personal and substantial interest in raising the constitutional issue insofar as the other respondents are concerned. The resolution of whether a cause of action exists, in turn, hinges on the nature of the petitioners appointment. We frame the issues under the following questions Appointments may be classified into two: first, as to its nature; and second, as to the manner in which it is made. Under the first classification, appointments can either be permanent or temporary (acting). A basic distinction is that a permanent appointee can only be removed from office for cause; whereas a temporary appointee can be removed even without hearing or cause. Under the second classification, an appointment can either be regular or ad interim. A regular appointment is one made while Congress is in session, while an ad interim appointment is one issued during the recess of Congress. In strict terms, presidential appointments that require no confirmation from the Commission on Appointments cannot be properly characterized as either a regular or an ad interim appointment. In this light, what the petitioner may have meant is a permanent (as contrasted to a temporary or acting) appointment to the office of a NAPOLCOM Commissioner, at least for the duration of the unexpired portion of his predecessor (Roces). Generally, the power to appoint vested in the President includes the power to make temporary appointments, unless he is otherwise specifically prohibited by the Constitution or by the law, or where an acting appointment is repugnant to the nature of the office involved. The purpose of an acting or temporary appointment is to prevent a hiatus in the discharge of official functions by authorizing a person to discharge those functions pending the selection of a permanent or another appointee. An acting appointee accepts the position on the condition that he shall surrender the office once he is called to do so by the appointing authority. Therefore, his term of office is not fixed but endures at the pleasure of the appointing authority. His separation from

the service does not import removal but merely the expiration of his term a mode of termination of official relations that falls outside the coverage of the constitutional provision on security of tenure since no removal from office is involved. Generally, the purpose for staggering the term of office is to minimize the appointing authoritys opportunity to appoint a majority of the members of a collegial body. It also intended to ensure the continuity of the body and its policies. A staggered term of office, however, is not a statutory prohibition, direct or indirect, against the issuance of acting or temporary appointment. It does not negate the authority to issue acting or temporary appointments that the Administrative Code grants. Under Section 16 of R.A. No. 6975, the NAPOLCOM Commissioners are all given a fixed term of six years (except the two of the first appointees who hold office only for four years). By staggering their terms of office however, the four regular commissioners would not vacate their offices at the same time since a vacancy will occur every two years. Under the NAPOLCOM set up, the law does not appear to have been designed to attain the purpose of preventing the same President from appointing all the NAPOLCOM Commissioners by staggering their terms of office. R.A. No. 6975 took effect on January 1, 1991. In the usual course, the term of office of the first two regular commissioners would have expired in 1997, while the term of the other two commissioners would have expired in 1995. Since the term of the President elected in the first national elections under the 1987 Constitution expired on June 30, 1998, then, theoretically, the sitting President for the 1992-1998 term could appoint all the succeeding four regular NAPOLCOM Commissioners. The next President, on the other hand, whose term ended in 2004, would have appointed the next succeeding Commissioners in 2001 and 2003. As the law now stands, the petitioners claim that the appointment of an acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner is not allowed based on the staggering of terms of office does not even have any statutory basis. Given the wide latitude of the Presidents appointing authority (and the strict construction against any limitation on or qualification of this power), the prohibition on the President from issuing an acting appointment must either be specific, or there must be a clear repugnancy between the nature of the office and

the temporary appointment. No such limitation on the Presidents appointing power appears to be clearly deducible from the text of R.A. No. 6975. 2. An acting appointee has no cause of action for quo warranto against the new appointee. Since the petitioner merely holds an acting appointment (and an expired one at that), he clearly does not have a cause of action to maintain the present petition. The essence of an acting appointment is its temporariness and its consequent revocability at any time by the appointing authority. The petitioner in a quo warranto proceeding who seeks reinstatement to an office, on the ground of usurpation or illegal deprivation, must prove his clear right to the office for his suit to succeed; otherwise, his petition must fail.

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a holdover. Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into the constitutional appointment power of the President. Hence, holdover whichever way it is viewed is a constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not have undertaken. 2. After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional problem is more apparent than real and becomes very real only if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly read as a law that changes the elective and representative character of ARMM positions. RA No. 10153, however, does not in any way amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to "appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office." This power is far different from appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of the officials elected in the May 2013 elections. Admittedly, the grant of the power to the President under other situations or where the power of appointment would extend beyond the adjustment period for synchronization would be to foster a government that is not "democratic and republican." For then, the peoples right to choose the leaders to govern them may be said to be systemically withdrawn to the point of fostering an undemocratic regime. This is the grant that would frontally breach the "elective and representative" governance requirement of Section 18, Article X of the Constitution. But this conclusion would not be true under the very limited circumstances contemplated in RA No. 10153 where the period is fixed and, more importantly, the terms of governance both under Section 18, Article X of the Constitution and RA No. 9054 will not systemically

ABAS KIDA V SENATE

Facts: RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the ARMM elections to May 2013, to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country. The petitioners challenged the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to undertake the functions of the elective ARMM officials until the officials elected under the May 2013 regular elections shall have assumed office. Corrolarily, they also argue that the power of appointment also gave the President the power of control over the ARMM, in complete violation of Section 16, Article X of the Constitution. Issue: 1. 2.

W/N the holdover option is constitutional Whether the power of appointment(OIC) given to the violates Section 16, Article X of the Constitution

Held: 1. 2. Ratio: 1.

Hold over option is unconstitutional. No. We rule out the first option holdover for those who were elected in executive and legislative positions in the ARMM during the 2008-2011 term as an option that Congress could have chosen because a holdover violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. This provision states:

be touched nor affected at all. To repeat what has previously been said, RA No. 9054 will govern unchanged and continuously, with full effect in accordance with the Constitution, save only for the interim and temporary measures that synchronization of elections requires. Viewed from another perspective, synchronization will temporarily disrupt the election process in a local community, the ARMM, as well as the communitys choice of leaders, but this will take place under a situation of necessity and as an interim measure in the manner that interim measures have been adopted and used in the creation of local government units and the adjustments of sub-provinces to the status of provinces. These measures, too, are used in light of the wider national demand for the synchronization of elections (considered vis--vis the regional interests involved). The adoption of these measures, in other words, is no different from the exercise by Congress of the inherent police power of the State, where one of the essential tests is the reasonableness of the interim measure taken in light of the given circumstances. Furthermore, the "representative" character of the chosen leaders need not necessarily be affected by the appointment of OICs as this requirement is really a function of the appointment process; only the "elective" aspect shall be supplanted by the appointment of OICs. In this regard, RA No. 10153 significantly seeks to address concerns arising from the appointments by providing, under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the assailed law, concrete terms in the Appointment of OIC, the Manner and Procedure of Appointing OICs, and their Qualifications. Based on these considerations, we hold that RA No. 10153 viewed in its proper context is a law that is not violative of the Constitution (specifically, its autonomy provisions), and one that is reasonable as well under the circumstances.

Justice secretary and Solicitor General during the tail-end of the Arroyo administration. The ruling stemmed from a petition filed by lawyers Dennis Funa and Melanio Elvis Balayan, who said Agras two positions are unconstitutional because it runs counter to Article 7, Section 13 of the Constitution prohibiting dual or multiple positions in the government. "The SC today unanimously held in Funa v Agra that the designation of then acting Sec. of Justice Alberto Agra as secretary of Justice concurrent with his designation as acting solicitor general was unconstitutional and void," the Supreme Court Public Information Office told reporters in a text message. The resolution voiding Agra's dual posts was written by Justice Lucas Bersamin. The Supreme Court, however, clarified that its latest ruling does not nullify Agra's acts while sitting in those two positions. "The SC declares that Agra was a de facto officer and thus his acts were valid for all purposes," it said. Agra, an Acting Solicitor General, was appointed to the DOJ post in March 2010 after his predecessor, Agnes Devanadera, resigned to pursue her congressional bid in the first district of Quezon province in that year's elections. Aside from being unconstitutional, Funa said that under Administrative Code of 1987, the Office of the Solicitor General is supposed to be independent" and autonomous" from the DOJ. Funa was the same litigant who had successfully challenged the dual position of Elena Bautista as Maritime Industry Authority (Marina) administrator and undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC)

FUNA V ERMITA (SUPRA) BETOY V BOARD NPC FUNA V AGRA The Supreme Court on Tuesday declared as illegal Alberto Agra's holding of two concurrent positions as acting Department of

PEZA V COA ABAS KIDA V SENATE SUPRA GENERAL V URRO SUPRA FETALINO V COMELEC SANGGUNIAN V MARTINEZ Facts: 1. Martinez, the incumbent Punong Barangay of Don Mariano Marcos, Bayambang, Nueva Vizcaya, was administratively charged with Dishonesty and Graft and Corruption by the petitioner through the filing of a complaint before the Sangguniang Bayan. Petitioner then filed with the Sangguniang Bayan an Amended Administrative Complaint against Martinez for Dishonesty, Misconduct in Office and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. 2. The SB placed Martinez under preventive suspension for 60 days. It then rendered its Decision which imposed upon Martinez the penalty of removal from office. 3. The Decision was conveyed to Municipal Mayor Bagasao for its implementation. He issued a Memorandum, stating that the Sanggunaing Bayan is not empowered to order Martinezs removal from service. However, the Decision remains valid until reversed and must be executed by him. For the meantime, he ordered the indefinite suspension of Martinez since the period of appeal had not yet lapsed.

4. Martinez filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari with a prayer for a TRO and Preliminary Injunction before the trial court against petitioner, questioning the validity of the Decision. 5. Petitioner claims that the courts are merely tasked with issuing the order of removal, after the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayanfinds that a penalty of removal is warranted. Issue: Whether or not the Sangguniang Bayan may remove Martinez, an elective local official, from office. Decision: No, the Sanggunaing Bayan is not empowered to do so. Ratio: 1. Section 60 of the Local Government Code conferred upon the courts the power to remove elective local officials from office. 2. During the deliberations of the Senate on the Local Government Code, the intent to confine to the courts jurisdiction over cases involving the removal of elective local officials was evident. 3. In Salalima v. Guingona, Jr., the Court en banc nullified Article 125, Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 which granted to the disciplining authority the power to remove elective officials, a power which the law itself granted only to the proper courts. 4. The rule which confers to the proper courts the power to remove an elective local official from office is intended as

a check against partisan activity. Vesting the local legislative body with the power to remove from office a local chief executive, and only relegating to the courts a mandatory duty to implement the decision, would still not free the resolution of the case from partisanship. 5. Thus, if the acts allegedly committed by the barangay official would merit the penalty of removal from office, the case should be filed with the RTC. Once the court assumes jurisdiction, it retains jurisdiction over the case even if it would be subsequently apparent during the trial that a penalty less than removal from office is appropriate. On the other hand, the most extreme penalty that the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan may impose on the elective official is suspension; if it deems that the removal of the official from service is warranted, then it can resolve that the proper charges be filed in court. GONZALES V OP DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 196231, the decision of the Office of the President in OP Case No. 10-J-460 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III is ordered REINSTATED with payment of backwages corresponding to the period of suspension effective immediately) even as the Office of the Ombudsman is directed to proceed with the investigation in connection with the above case against petitioner. In G.R. No. 196232, We AFFIRM the continuation of OP-DC Case No. 11-1 B-003 against Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit for alleged acts and omissions tantamount to

culpable violation of the Constitution and a betrayal of public trust, in accordance with Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act of 1989. The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act is hereby DENIED. DOES THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT HAVE ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION OVER THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN AND THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR? YES. THE OMBUDSMANS ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY POWER OVER A DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN AND SPECIAL PROSECUTOR IS NOT EXCLUSIVE. SECTION 8 OF RA 6770 (THE OMBUDSMAN ACT OF 1989) GRANTS THE PRESIDENT THE POWER TO REMOVE THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN AND THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR FROM OFFICE AFTER DUE PROCESS. Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6770, the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides that Section 8. Removal; Filling of Vacancy. xxxx (2) A Deputy or the Special Prosecutor, may be removed from office by the President for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman, and after due process. WAS THE DISMISSAL OF GONZALES AS DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN BY THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT CORRECT? NO. HIS REMOVAL MUST BE FOR ANY OF THE GROUNDS PROVIDED IN THE REMOVAL OF THE OMBUDSMAN. THE ALLEGED GROUND OF BETRAYAL OF PUBLIC TRUST W AS NOT PRESENT IN HIS CASE. PETITIONER GONZALES MAY NOT BE REMOVED FROM OFFICE W HERE THE QUESTIONED ACTS, FALLING SHORT OF CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS, DO NOT CONSTITUTE BETRAYAL OF PUBLIC TRUST. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

Congress laid down two restrictions on the Presidents exercise of such power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman, namely: (1) that the removal of the Deputy Ombudsman must be for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman and (2) that there must be observance of due process. MANUBAY V GARILAO Needless to state, elevating the matter to the OP was consistent with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. A party aggrieved by an order of an administrative official should first appeal to the higher administrative authority before seeking judicial relief. Otherwise, as in this case, the complaint will be dismissed for being premature or for having no cause of action ANAK V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Under the principle of separation of powers, Congress, the President, and the Judiciary may not encroach on fields allocated to each of them. The legislature is generally limited to the enactment of laws, the executive to the enforcement of laws, and the judiciary to their interpretation and application to cases and controversies. The principle presupposes mutual respect by and between the executive, legislative and judicial departments of the government and calls for them to be left alone to discharge their duties as they see fit The Constitution confers, by express provision, the power of control over executive departments, bureaus and offices in the President alone. And it lays down a limitation on the legislative power. The Constitutions express grant of the power of control in the President justifies an executive action to carry out reorganization measures under a broad authority of law. In enacting a statute, the legislature is presumed to have deliberated with full knowledge of all existing laws and jurisprudence on the subject. It is thus reasonable to conclude

that in passing a statute which places an agency under the Office of the President, it was in accordance with existing laws and jurisprudence on the Presidents power to reorganize. (Anak Mindanao Party-List Group vs. Executive Secretary, GR 166052, 29 August 2007; En Banc, Carpio-Morales J,) In establishing an executive department, bureau or office, the legislature necessarily ordains an executive agencys position in the scheme of administrative structure. Such determination is primary, but subject to the Presidents continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure. As far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are concerned, the power of control may justify the President to deactivate the functions of a particular office. Or a law may expressly grant the President the broad authority to carry out reorganization measures. The Administrative Code of 1987 is one such law. (Anak Mindanao Party-List Group vs. Executive Secretary, GR 166052, 29 August 2007; En Banc, Carpio-Morales J,) As provided by law, the President may transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other department or agency, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency. (Anak Mindanao Party-List Group vs. Executive Secretary, GR 166052, 29 August 2007; En Banc, Carpio-Morales J,) DAVID V ARROYO (SUPRA) ANGELES V GAITE Facts 1. Petitioner was given custody of her grand niece, Maria Mercedes Vistan, to take care and provide for as she grew up. Petitioner became attached to such child and took care of her as her own. Petitioner also gave the same attention to the half-brother of the grand niece. The latter would seek petitioners financial support

2.

3. 4.

5.

6.

7. 8.

ranging from daily subsistence to hospitalization expenses. After one incident wherein the half-brother of the grand niece, Michael Vistan, failed to do an important task, the petitioner and the Michael Vistan had a falling out. Since no more support was given to the latter, he took his half-sister away. He brought her to different provinces while asked the help of certain individuals to mislead the petitioner and the police. The police was able to apprehend Michael Vistan through a dragnet operation. The petitioner filed a complaint against Michael Vistan before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in Malolos, Bulacan for five counts of Violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI of RA 7610, otherwise known as the Child Abuse Act, and for four counts of Violation of Sec. 1 (e) of PD 1829. She likewise filed a complaint for Libel against Maria Cristina Vistan, aunt of Michael and Maria Mercedes. The Investigating prosecutor issued a resolution to continue with the filing of the case. This was however denied by the provincial prosecutor who also issued a decision to dismiss the case. Petitioner filed a petition for review with USEC. Teehankee but was denied. Petitioner then filed a petition for review with SEC Perez and was also denied She tried appealing to the Office of the President but was dismissed by such on the ground of Memorandum Circular No. 58 which bars an appeal or a petition for review of decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice except those involving offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or death Petitioner went to the CA which sustained the dismissal Petitioner contends that such Memo Circular was unconstitutional since t diminishes the power of control

of the President and bestows upon the Secretary of Justice, a subordinate officer, almost unfettered power. Issue W/N Memorandum Circular No. 58 is unconstitutional since it diminishes the power of the President? Ruling NO, it does not diminish the power of the President The President's act of delegating authority to the Secretary of Justice by virtue of said Memorandum Circular is well within the purview of the doctrine of qualified political agency, long been established in our jurisdiction. Under this doctrine, which primarily recognizes the establishment of a single executive, "all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department; the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive; and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive."The CA cannot be deemed to have committed any error in upholding the Office of the President's reliance on the Memorandum Circular as it merely interpreted and applied the law as it should be. Memorandum Circular No. 58, promulgated by the Office of the President on June 30, 1993 reads:

In the interest of the speedy administration of justice, the guidelines enunciated in Memorandum Circular No. 1266 (4 November 1983) on the review by the Office of the President of resolutions/orders/decisions issued by the Secretary of Justice concerning preliminary investigations of criminal cases are reiterated and clarified. No appeal from or petition for review of decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice on preliminary investigations of criminal cases shall be entertained by the Office of the President, except those involving offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua to death x x x. Henceforth, if an appeal or petition for review does not clearly fall within the jurisdiction of the Office of the President, as set forth in the immediately preceding paragraph, it shall be dismissed outright x x x. It is quite evident from the foregoing that the President himself set the limits of his power to review decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice in order to expedite the disposition of cases. Petitioner's argument that the Memorandum Circular unduly expands the power of the Secretary of Justice to the extent of rendering even the Chief Executive helpless to rectify whatever errors or abuses the former may commit in the exercise of his discretion is purely speculative to say the least. Petitioner cannot second- guess the President's power and the President's own judgment to delegate whatever it is he deems necessary to delegate in order to achieve proper and speedy administration of justice, especially that such delegation is upon a cabinet secretary his own alter ego.

BUT THERE ARE LIMITATIONS: Justice Jose P. Laurel, in his ponencia in Villena, makes this clear that There are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no amount of approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any of those powers by any other person. Such, for instance, is his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law (par. 3, sec. 11, Art. VII) and the exercise by him of the benign prerogative of mercy (par. 6, sec. 11, idem). These restrictions hold true to this day as they remain embodied in our fundamental law. There are certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of government. The declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power, notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this special class that demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a showing that the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import. In the case at bar, the power of the President to review the Decision of the Secretary of Justice dealing with the preliminary investigation of cases cannot be considered as falling within the same exceptional class which cannot be delegated. Besides, the

President has not fully abdicated his power of control as Memorandum Circular No. 58 allows an appeal if the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua or higher. Certainly, it would be unreasonable to impose upon the President the task of reviewing all preliminary investigations decided by the Secretary of Justice. To do so will unduly hamper the other important duties of the President by having to scrutinize each and every decision of the Secretary of Justice notwithstanding the latters expertise in said matter. The Constitutional interpretation of the petitioner would negate the very existence of cabinet positions and the respective expertise which the holders thereof are accorded and would unduly hamper the Presidents effectivity in running the government. PHILLIPS V BOI COCOFED V REPUBLIC
Facts: Petitioners assert that the Sandiganbayans refusal to recognize the vested rights purportedly created under the coconut levy laws constitutes taking of private property without due process of law. They reason out that to accord retroactive application to a declaration of unconstitutionality would be unfair inasmuch as such approach would penalize the farmers who merely obeyed then valid laws. Issue: W/N the operative fact doctrine applies Held: NO. Ratio: [170] In Yap v. Thenamaris Ships Management, the Operative Fact Doctrine was discussed in that: As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. The general rule is supported by Article 7 of the Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse or custom or practice to the contrary.

The doctrine of operative fact serves as an exception to the aforementioned general rule. In Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation, we held:

The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.

The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law [171] creating it.

In that case, this Court further held that the Operative Fact Doctrine will not be applied as an exception when to rule otherwise would be iniquitous and would send a wrong signal that an act may be justified when based on an unconstitutional provision of law. The Court had the following disquisition on the concept of the Operative Fact Doctrine in the case of Chavez v. National Housing Authority:

The operative fact doctrine is embodied in De Agbayani v. Court of Appeals, wherein it is stated that a legislative or executive act, prior to its

being declared as unconstitutional by the courts, is valid and must be complied with, thus:

particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official.

As the new Civil Code puts it: When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws of the Constitution. It is understandable why it should be so, the Constitution being supreme and paramount. Any legislative or executive act contrary to its terms cannot survive.

In the case at bar, the Court rules that the dictates of justice, fairness and equity do not support the claim of the alleged farmer-owners that their ownership of the UCPB shares should be respected. Our reasons: 1. Said farmers or alleged claimants do not have any legal right to own the UCPB shares distributed to them. It was not successfully refuted that said claimants were issued receipts under R.A. 6260 for the payment of the levy that went into the Coconut Investment Fund (CIF) upon which shares in the Coconut Investment Company will be issued. The Court upholds the finding of the Sandiganbayan that said investment company is a different corporate entity from the United Coconut Planters Bank. This was in fact admitted by petitioners during the April 17, 2001 oral arguments in G.R. Nos. 147062-64. 2. To grant all the UCPB shares to petitioners and its alleged members would be iniquitous and prejudicial to the remaining 4.6 million farmers who have not received any UCPB shares when in fact they also made payments to either the CIF or the CCSF but did not receive any receipt or who was not able to register their receipts or misplaced them. Section 1 of P.D. No. 755 which was declared unconstitutional cannot be considered to be the legal basis for the transfer of the supposed private ownership of the UCPB shares to petitioners who allegedly paid the same under R.A. 6260. The Solicitor General is correct in concluding that such unauthorized grant to petitioners constitutes illegal deprivation of property without due process of law. Due process of law would mean that the distribution of the UCPB shares should be made only to farmers who have paid the contribution to the CCSF pursuant to P.D. No. 276, and not to those who paid pursuant to R.A. 6260. What would have been the appropriate distribution scheme was violated by Section 1 of P.D. No. 755 when it required that the UCPB shares should be distributed to coconut farmers without distinction in fact, giving the PCA limitless power and free hand, to determine who these farmers are, or would be. The SC cannot sanction the award of the UCPB shares to petitioners who appear to represent only 1.4 million members without any legal basis to the extreme prejudice of the other 4.6 million coconut farmers (Executive Order No. 747 fixed the number of coconut farmers at 6 million in 1981). Indeed, petitioners constitute only a small percentage of the coconut farmers in the Philippines. Thus, the Sandiganbayan correctly declared that the UCPB shares

Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. It may not however be sufficiently realistic. It does not admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or executive act must have been in force and had to be complied with. This is so as until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and respect. Parties may have acted under it and may have changed their positions. What could be more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to what has been done while such legislative or executive act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.

In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, with respect to

are government assets in trust for the coconut farmers, which would be more beneficial to all the coconut farmers instead of a very few dubious claimants; 3. The Sandiganbayan made the finding that due to enormous operational problems and administrative complications, the intended beneficiaries of the UCPB shares were not able to receive the shares due to them. Due to numerous flaws in the distribution of the UCPB shares by PCA, it would be best for the interest of all coconut farmers to revert the ownership of the UCBP shares to the government for the entire coconut industry, which includes the farmers; 4. The Court also takes judicial cognizance of the fact that a number, if not all, of the coconut farmers who sold copra did not get the receipts for the payment of the coconut levy for the reason that the copra they produced were bought by traders or middlemen who in turn sold the same to the coconut mills. The reality on the ground is that it was these traders who got the receipts and the corresponding UCPB shares. In addition, some uninformed coconut farmers who actually got the COCOFUND receipts, not appreciating the importance and value of said receipts, have already sold said receipts to non-coconut farmers, thereby depriving them of the benefits under the coconut levy laws. Ergo, the coconut farmers are the ones who will not be benefited by the distribution of the UCPB shares contrary to the policy behind the coconut levy laws. The nullification of the distribution of the UCPB shares and their transfer to the government for the coconut industry will, therefore, ensure that the benefits to be deprived from the UCPB shares will actually accrue to the intended beneficiaries the genuine coconut farmers. From the foregoing, it is highly inappropriate to apply the operative fact doctrine to the UCPB shares. Public funds, which were supposedly given utmost safeguard, were haphazardly distributed to private individuals based on statutory provisions that are found to be constitutionally infirm on not only one but on a variety of grounds. Worse still, the recipients of the UCPB shares may not actually be the intended beneficiaries of said benefit. Clearly, applying the Operative Fact Doctrine would not only be iniquitous but would also serve injustice to the Government, to the coconut industry, and to the people, who, whether willingly or unwillingly, contributed to the public funds, and therefore expect that their Government would take utmost care of them and that they would be used no less, than for public purpose.

Issue: WON the insurance benefits granted to the employees require prior approval from the President as required under Administrative Order No. 103 Petitioner: The payment of the insurance premium for the health benefits of its officers and employees was not unlawful and improper since it was paid from an allocation of its retained earnings pursuant to a valid appropriation ordinance. oSuch enactment was a clear exercise of its express powers under the principle of local fiscal autonomy which includes the power of LGUs to allocate their resources in accordance with their own priorities. oAlso, an LGU has fiscal control over its own revenues derived solely from its own tax base. Respondent: Although LGUs are afforded local fiscal autonomy, LGUs are still bound by RA 6758 and their actions are subject to the scrutiny of the DBM and applicable auditing rules and regulations enforced by the COA. The grant of additional compensation, like the hospitalization and health care insurance benefits in the present case, must have prior Presidential approval to conform with the state policy on salary standardization for government workers. Held: NO Ratio: AO 103 took effect eleven months before the Sangguniang Panlalawigan passed Resolution No. 720-A. The main purpose of AO 103 is to prevent discontentment, dissatisfaction and demoralization among government personnel, national or local, who do not receive, or who receive less, productivity incentive benefits or other forms of allowances or benefits. It is clear from Sec. 1 of AO 103 that the President authorized all agencies of the national government as well as LGUs to grant the

NEGROS OCC V COMMISSIONERS Substantial

maximum amount of P2,000 productivity incentive benefit to each employee. In Sec. 2, the President enjoined all heads of government offices and agencies from granting productivity incentive benefits or any and all similar forms of allowances and benefits without the Presidents prior approval. From a close reading of the provisions of AO 103, petitioner did not violate the rule of prior approval from the President since Sec. 2 states that the prohibition applies only to government offices/agencies, including GOCCs, as well as their respective governing boards. Nowhere is it indicated that the prohibition also applies to LGUs. The requirement then of prior approval from the President under AO 103 is applicable only to departments, bureaus, offices and GOCCs. Since LGUs are subject only to the power of general supervision of the President, the Presidents authority is limited to seeing to it that rules are followed and laws are faithfully executed. Thus, the grant of additional compensation like hospitalization and health care insurance benefits in the present case does not need the approval of the President to be valid. Also, while it is true that LGUs are still bound by RA 6758, the COA did not clearly establish that the medical care benefits given by the government at the time under PD 1519 were sufficient to cover the needs of government employees especially those employed by LGUs. Petitioner correctly relied on the CSC Memorandum Circular No. 33 which provided the policy framework for working conditions at the workplace. All government offices including LGUs were directed to provide a health program for government employees which included hospitalization services and annual mental, medical-physical examinations. oThe CSC, through MC No. 33, as well as the President, through AO 402, recognized the deficiency of the state of health care and

medical services implemented at the time. RA 7875 (National Health Insurance Act) instituting a National Health Insurance Program (NHIP) for all Filipinos was only approved two months after the Sangguniang Panlalawigan passed Resolution No. 720A. Even with the establishment of the NHIP, AO 402 was still issued three years later addressing a primary concern that basic health services under the NHIP either are still inadequate or have not reached geographic areas like that of petitioner. Thus, consistent with the state policy of local autonomy as guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution, under Sec. 25, Article II and Section 2, Article X, and the LGC, the Court declares that the grant and release of the hospitalization and health care insurance benefits were validly enacted through an ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. HERITAGE HOTEL MANILA V NUWHRAIN AMBIL V SANGIDANBAYAN MANALANG-DEMIGILLIO V TRADE INVESTMENT EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN V SURIO BALANGAUAN V CA MANILA ELECTRIC V ATILANO PCGG V JACOBI DACUDAO V SOJ Remedial law; Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus ; Hierarchy of courts. Firstly, petitioners have unduly disregarded the hierarchy of courts by coming directly to the Court with their petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus without tendering therein any special, important or compelling reason to justify the direct filing of the petition.

We emphasize that the concurrence of jurisdiction among the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts to issue the writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warrant, habeas corpus and injunction did not give petitioners the unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. An undue disregard of this policy against direct resort to the Court will cause the dismissal of the recourse. Accordingly, every litigant must remember that the Court is not the only judicial forum from which to seek and obtain effective redress of their grievances. As a rule, the Court is a court of last resort, not a court of the first instance. Hence, every litigant who brings the petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus should ever be mindful of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, x x x x. The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in the aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the petition shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. LIM PO V DOJ ARROYO V DOJ DAVID V ARROYO SUPRA BIRAOGO V PHIL TRUTH COMMISSION

When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. --- Justice Jose P. Laurel Facts: The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic May 2010 elections, when then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan, "Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap." The Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and of his ability to carry out this noble objective, catapulted the good senator to the presidency. The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution as it usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor. The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of the House of Representatives. Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission).

Issues: 1. Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to file their respective petitions and question Executive Order No. 1; 2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions; 3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ; 4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause; and 5. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to injunctive relief. Held: Legal Standing of the Petitioners The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Where the issues are of transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, they should be resolved for the guidance of all. Undoubtedly, the Filipino people are more than interested to know the status of the Presidents first effort to bring about a promised change to the country. The Court takes cognizance of the petition not due to overwhelming political undertones that clothe the issue in the eyes of the public, but because the Court stands firm in its oath to perform its constitutional duty to settle legal controversies with overreaching significance to society. Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission

The Chief Executives power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry. Power of the Truth Commission to Investigate The distinction between the power to investigate and the power to adjudicate was delineated by the Court in Cario v. Commission on Human Rights.59 Thus: The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn described as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; x x an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters." In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. x x. Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment."

Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it be inferred that the findings of the PTC are to be accorded conclusiveness. Much like its predecessors, the Davide Commission, the Feliciano Commission and the Zenarosa Commission, its findings would, at best, be recommendatory in nature. And being so, the Ombudsman and the DOJ have a wider degree of latitude to decide whether or not to reject the recommendation. These offices, therefore, are not deprived of their mandated duties but will instead be aided by the reports of the PTC for possible indictments for violations of graft laws. Violation of the Equal Protection Clause The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is violative of this constitutional safeguard. They contend that it does not apply equally to all members of the same class such that the intent of singling out the "previous administration" as its sole object makes the PTC an "adventure in partisan hostility." Thus, in order to be accorded with validity, the commission must also cover reports of graft and corruption in virtually all administrations previous to that of former President Arroyo. The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken. Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth "concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration"only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent

and manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the questioned executive order. Decision The issue that seems to take center stage at present is - whether or not the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its constitutionally mandated power of Judicial Review with respect to recent initiatives of the legislature and the executive department, is exercising undue interference. Is the Highest Tribunal, which is expected to be the protector of the Constitution, itself guilty of violating fundamental tenets like the doctrine of separation of powers? Time and again, this issue has been addressed by the Court, but it seems that the present political situation calls for it to once again explain the legal basis of its action lest it continually be accused of being a hindrance to the nations thrust to progress. WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. As also prayed for, the respondents are hereby ordered to cease and desist from carrying out the provisions of Executive Order No. 1. FLORES V MONTEMAYOR The Office of the President received a letter from "a concerned citizen" relating to Atty. Antonio F. Montemayors then Regional Director II of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), Region IV, in San Fernando, Pampanga - ostentatious lifestyle which is apparently disproportionate to his income as a public official. The Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) immediately conducted a fact-finding inquiry and issued subpoenas duces tecum to the BIR and LTO. The BIR submitted a copy of Montemayors appointment papers along with his Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SSAL) for the year 2002. The

LTO submitted a record of vehicles registered to Montemayor, to wit: a 2001 Ford Expedition, a 1997 Toyota Land Cruiser, and a 1983 Mitsubishi Galant. During the investigation, the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, a media organization which had previously published an article on the unexplained wealth of certain BIR officials, also submitted to the PAGC copies of Montemayors SSAL for the years 1999, 2000 and 2001. In Montemayors 1999 and 2000 SSAL, the PAGC noted that Montemayor declared his ownership over several motor vehicles, but failed to do the same in his 2001 SSAL. On the basis of the said documents, the PAGC issued a Formal Charge against Montemayor on May 19, 2003 for violation of Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 in relation to Section 8 (A) of RA No. 6713 due to his failure to declare the 2001 Ford Expedition with a value ranging from 1.7 million to 1.9 million pesos, and the 1997 Toyota Land Cruiser with an estimated value of 1 million to 1.2 million pesos in his 2001 and 2002 SSAL. The PAGC issued a Resolution finding Montemayor administratively liable as charged and recommended his dismissal. The Office of the President adopted PAGCs recommendation. Montemayor (of course) filed a petition before the CA. The CA (of course) ruled in his favor. In deciding in favor of Montemayors dismissal, the SC held: Montemayors argument that he did not deliberately omit to declare the 2001 Ford Expedition in his 2001 SSAL and the 1997 Toyota Land Cruiser in his 2001 and 2002 SSAL fails to persuade us. Even if a motor vehicle was acquired through chattel mortgage, it is a government employees ethical and legal obligation to declare and include the same in his SSAL. Montemayor cannot wiggle his way out of the mess he has

himself created since he knows for a fact that every asset acquired by a civil servant must be declared in the SSAL. The law requires that the SSAL be accomplished truthfully and in detail without distinction as to how the property was acquired. Montemayor, therefore, cannot escape liability by arguing that the ownership of the 2001 Ford Expedition has not yet passed to him on the basis of a lame excuse that the said vehicle was acquired only on installment basis sometime on July 3, 2001. Montemayor also argues that even if ownership of the said vehicle had been transferred to him upon acquisition, the vehicle was sold to another person on December 15, 2002; hence, there is no need to declare it in his 2001 SSAL. [His] reasoning is anemic and convoluted. It is evasive of the fact that the said vehicle was not reported in his 2001 SSAL. Notably, the acquisition value of the 2001 Ford Expedition was P1,599,000.00 is significantly greater than the amount declared by Montemayor under "machinery/equipment," worth P1,321,212.50, acquired by him as of December 31, 2001, and to the P1,251,675.00 worth of "machinery/ equipment" acquired by him as of December 31, 2002. This belies Montemayors claim that the said vehicle has been included among the "machinery/equipment" assets he declared in his 2001 and 2002 SSAL. Neither did Montemayor satisfactorily reflect the P1,000,000.00 that has come to his hands as payment for the alleged sale of his 2001 Ford Expedition in his 2002 SSAL. [Montemayor] apparently fails to understand that the SSAL is not a mere scrap of paper. The law requires that the SSAL must be accomplished as truthfully, as detailed and as accurately as possible. The filing thereof not later than the first fifteen (15) days of April at the close of every calendar year must not be treated as a simple and trivial routine, but as an obligation that is part and parcel of every civil servants duty to the people. It serves as the basis of the government and the people in monitoring the income and lifestyle of officials and employees in the government in

compliance with the Constitutional policy to eradicate corruption, promote transparency in government, and ensure that all government employees and officials lead just and modest lives. It is for this reason that the SSAL must be sworn to and is made accessible to the public, subject to reasonable administrative regulations. We note that Mr. Montemayor filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the SCs decision above which prompted a decision from the SCs Special Third Division[4]. The facts remain the same but the SC added: we maintain that the penalty of dismissal from the service is justified as no acceptable explanation was given for the nondeclaration of the two expensive cars in his 2001 and 2002 SSAL. Pursuant to Section 11, paragraph (b) of R.A. No. 6713, any violation of the law "proven in a proper administrative proceeding shall be sufficient cause for removal or dismissal of a public official or employee, even if no criminal prosecution is instituted against him." [Montemayor]s deliberate attempt to evade the mandatory disclosure of all assets acquired during the period covered was evident when he first claimed that the vehicles were lumped under the entry "Machineries/Equipment" or still mortgaged, and later averred that these were already sold by the end of the year covered and the proceeds already spent. Under this scheme, [Montemayor] would have acquired as many assets never to be declared at anytime. Such act erodes the function of requiring accuracy of entries in the SSAL which must be a true and detailed statement. It undermines the SSAL as "the means to achieve the policy of accountability of all public officers and employees in the government" through which "the public are able to monitor movement in the fortune of a public official; [as] a valid check and balance mechanism to verify undisclosed properties and wealth."

PICHAY V DEPUTY ES (SUPRA) PCGG V JACOBI (SUPRA) GUDANI V SENGA: The Pres through the Chief of Staff prohibited the Gen and Col fr appearing in Senate. The Court ruled ifo CoS bec military discipline DAVID V ARROYO (SUPRA) PROV OF NOTH COT V GPH (SUPRA) RODRIGUEZ V ARROYO (SUPRA) KULAYAN V TAN GARCIA V ES Facts: On 27 November 1990, Cory issued EO 438 which imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad valorem. This additional duty was imposed across the board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil products imported into the Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty to 9%. In the same year, EO 475 was passed reinstating the previous 5% duty except that crude oil and other oil products continued to be taxed at 9%. Garcia, a representative from Bataan, avers that EO 475 and 478 are unconstitutional for they violate Sec 24 of Art 6 of the Constitution which provides: " All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments." He contends that since the Constitution vests

the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the President may not assume such power of issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-generating measures. Issue: whether or not EO 475 and 478 are unconstitutional Held: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to the President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines. Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows: "(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government." There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President "subject to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose" to fix "within specific limits" "tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . . ."

SAEZ V ARROYO (SUPRA) BURGOS V ARROYO (SUPRA) BALAO V ARROYO

FACTS: The siblings of James Balao, and Longid (petitioners), filed with the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in favor of James Balao who was abducted by unidentified armed men earlier. Named respondents in the petition were then President GMA, Exec Sec Eduardo Ermita, Defense Sec Gilberto Teodoro, Jr., ILG Secretary Ronaldo Puno, National Security Adviser (NSA) Norberto Gonzales, AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Alexander . Yano, PNP Police Director General Jesus Verzosa, among others. James M. Balao is a Psychology and Economics graduate of the UP-Baguio. In 1984, he was among those who founded the Cordillera Peoples Alliance (CPA), a coalition of NGOs working for the cause of indigenous peoples in the Cordillera Region. According to witnesses testimony, James was abducted by unidentified men, saying they were policemen and were arresting him for a drugs case and then made to ride a white van. petitioners prayed for the issuance of a writ of amparo and likewise prayed for (1) an inspection order for the inspection of at least 11 military and police facilities which have been previously reported as detention centers for activists abducted by military and police operatives; (2) a production order for all documents that contain evidence relevant to the petition, particularly the Order of Battle List and any record or dossier respondents have on James; and (3) a witness protection order. the RTC issued the assailed judgment, disposing as follows: ISSUE a Writ of Amparo Ordering the respondents to (a) disclose where James is detained or confined, (b) to release James considering his unlawful detention since his abduction and (c) to cease and desist from further inflicting harm upon his person; and DENY the issuance of INSPECTION ORDER, PRODUCTION ORDER and WITNESS PROTECTION ORDER for failure of herein Petitioners to comply with the stringent provisions on the Rule on the Writ of Amparo and substantiate the same

ISSUE: WON the totality of evidence satisfies the degree of proof required by the Amparo Rule to establish an enforced disappearance. HELD: NO; The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated on October 24, 2007 amidst rising incidence of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. It was formulated in the exercise of this Courts expanded rule-making power for the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, albeit limited to these two situations. Extralegal killings refer to killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other hand, enforced disappearances are attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention, or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such person outside the protection of law. ** The trial court gave considerable weight to the discussion in the petition of briefing papers supposedly obtained from the AFP indicating that the anti-insurgency campaign of the military under the administration of President Arroyo included targeting of identified legal organizations under the NDF, which included the CPA, and their members, as enemies of the state. We hold that such documented practice of targeting activists in the militarys counter-insurgency program by itself does not fulfill the evidentiary standard provided in the Amparo Rule to establish an enforced disappearance. In the case of Roxas v. Macapagal-Arroyo, the Court noted that the similarity between the circumstances attending a particular case of abduction with those surrounding previous instances of enforced disappearances does not, necessarily, carry sufficient weight to prove that the government orchestrated such abduction. Accordingly, the trial court in this case cannot simply infer government involvement in the abduction of James from past

similar incidents in which the victims also worked or affiliated with the CPA and other left-leaning groups. ** The petition further premised government complicity in the abduction of James on the very positions held by the respondents. The Court in Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo had the occasion to expound on the doctrine of command responsibility and why it has little bearing, if at all, in amparo proceedings. It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold military/police commanders liable for extralegal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory that the command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of international law or customary international law in accordance with the incorporation clause of the Constitution. Still, it would be inappropriate to apply to these proceedings the doctrine of command responsibility, as the CA seemed to have done, as a form of criminal complicity through omission, for individual respondents criminal liability, if there be any, is beyond the reach of amparo. In other words, the Court does not rule in such proceedings on any issue of criminal culpability, even if incidentally a crime or an infraction of an administrative rule may have been committed. As the Court stressed in Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo (Manalo), the writ of amparo was conceived to provide expeditious and effective procedural relief against violations or threats of violation of the basic rights to life, liberty, and security of persons; the corresponding amparo suit, however, is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt x x x or administrative liability requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings. Of the same tenor, and by way of expounding on the nature and role of amparo, is what the Court said in Razon v. Tagitis: It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance [threats thereof or extrajudicial killings]; it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance [threats thereof or extrajudicial killings]

for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance [or extrajudicial killings]. x x x x As the law now stands, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances in this jurisdiction are not crimes penalized separately from the component criminal acts undertaken to carry out these killings and enforced disappearances and are now penalized under the Revised Penal Code and special laws. The simple reason is that the Legislature has not spoken on the matter; the determination of what acts are criminal x x x are matters of substantive law that only the Legislature has the power to enact. x x x[ Assessing the evidence on record, we find that the participation in any manner of military and police authorities in the abduction of James has not been adequately proven. The identities of the abductors have not been established, much less their link to any military or police unit. There is likewise no concrete evidence indicating that James is being held or detained upon orders of or with acquiescence of government agents. Consequently, the trial court erred in granting amparo reliefs. Such pronouncement of responsibility on the part of public respondents cannot be made given the insufficiency of evidence. However, we agree with the trial court in finding that the actions taken by respondent officials are very limited, superficial and one-sided. Its candid and forthright observations on the efforts exerted by the respondents are borne by the evidence on record. ** An inspection order is an interim relief designed to give support or strengthen the claim of a petitioner in an amparo petition, in order to aid the court before making a decision. A basic requirement before an amparo court may grant an inspection order is that the place to be inspected is reasonably determinable from the allegations of the party seeking the order. In this case, the issuance of inspection order was properly denied since the petitioners specified several military and police establishments based merely on the allegation that the testimonies of victims and witnesses in previous incidents of similar abductions involving activists disclosed that those premises were used as detention

centers. In the same vein, the prayer for issuance of a production order was predicated on petitioners bare allegation that it obtained confidential information from an unidentified military source, that the name of James was included in the so-called Order of Battle. Indeed, the trial court could not have sanctioned any fishing expedition by precipitate issuance of inspection and production orders on the basis of insufficient claims of one party. DAVID V ARROYO AMPATUAN V PUNO PARTIES: Petitioners: DATU ZALDY UY AMPATUAN, ANSARUDDIN ADIONG, REGIE SAHALIGENERALE Respondents : HON. RONALDO PUNO, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE FACTS: On November 24, 2009, the day after the gruesome massacre of 57 men and women, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946, placing the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of emergency. She directed the AFP and the PNP to undertake such measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in the named places. Under AO 273, she also delegated to the DILG the supervision of the ARMM. The petitioners claimed that the Presidents issuances encroached the ARMMs autonomy, that it constitutes an invalid exercise of emergency powers, and that the President had no factual basis for declaring a state of emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents occurred. They want Proc. 1946 and AO 273 be declared unconstitutional. The respondents, however, said that its purpose was not to

deprive the ARMM of its autonomy, but to restore peace and order in subject places. It is pursuant to her calling out power as Commander-in-Chief. The determination of the need to exercise this power rests solely on her wisdom. The President merely delegated her supervisory powers over the ARMM to the DILG Secretary who was her alter ego any way. The delegation was necessary to facilitate the investigation of the mass killings ISSUE: WON President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called out the AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City HELD: NO. The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a congressional authority to exercise the same. ISSUE (2): WON there is factual basis on the calling out of the Armed Forces. HELD: Yes. The Presidents call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence springs from the power vested in her under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the Presidents exercise of the above power, unless it is shown that such determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion, the Court will accord respect to the Presidents judgment. FORTUN V ARROYO THE FACTS: On November 23, 2009, heavily armed men

believed led by the ruling Ampatuan family of Maguindanao gunned down and buried under shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians. In response to this carnage, President Arroyo issued on November 24, 2009 PP 1946 declaring a state of emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City. On December 4, 2009, President Arroyo issued PP 1959 declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao except for identified areas of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. On December 6, 2009, President Arroyo submitted her report to Congress. On December 9, 2009, Congress convened in joint session to review the validity of the Presidents action. But two days later, or on December 12, 2009, before Congress could act, the President issued PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. THE ISSUE: Did the issuance of PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the [privilege of the] writ in Maguindanao, render the issues moot and academic? THE RULING [The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions on the ground that they have become MOOT and ACADEMIC.] YES, the issuance of PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the [privilege of the] writ in Maguindanao, rendered the issues moot and academic Prudence and respect for the co-equal departments of the government dictate that the Court should be cautious in entertaining actions that assail the constitutionality of the acts of the Executive or the Legislative department. The issue of constitutionality, said the Court in Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, must be the very issue of the case, that the resolution of such issue is unavoidable.

The issue of the constitutionality of Proclamation 1959 is not unavoidable for two reasons: One. President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus before the joint houses of Congress could fulfill their automatic duty to review and validate or invalidate the same. xxx. xxx xxx xxx

on the same. Consequently, the petitions in these cases have become moot and the Court has nothing to review. The lifting of martial law and restoration of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao was a supervening event that obliterated any justiciable controversy. Two. Since President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in just eight days, they have not been meaningfully implemented. The military did not take over the operation and control of local government units in Maguindanao. The President did not issue any law or decree affecting Maguindanao that should ordinarily be enacted by Congress. No indiscriminate mass arrest had been reported. Those who were arrested during the period were either released or promptly charged in court. Indeed, no petition for habeas corpus had been filed with the Court respecting arrests made in those eight days. The point is that the President intended by her action to address an uprising in a relatively small and sparsely populated province. In her judgment, the rebellion was localized and swiftly disintegrated in the face of a determined and amply armed government presence. xxx xxx xxx

[U]nder the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not only sequentially, but in a sense jointly since, after the President has initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only the Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of the situation on the ground, a power that the President does not have. Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow Congress to exercise its own review powers, which is automatic rather than initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to defend the Constitution through such review should the Supreme Court step in as its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the Presidents proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court. xxx xxx xxx

xxx. In a real sense, the proclamation and the suspension never took off. The Congress itself adjourned without touching the matter, it having become moot and academic. KAPUNAN V CA
Facts: Eduardo Kapunan and Oscar Legaspi face criminal charges in connection with the 1986 killing of Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) Chairman Rolando Olalia and his driver, Leonor Alay-ay. President Fidel V. Ramos issued Proclamation Nos. 347 and 348 on the same day, 25 March 1994. Proclamation No. 347 was entitled Granting Amnesty to Rebels, Insurgents, and All Other Persons Who Have or May Have Committed Crimes Against

Here, President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint houses of Congress, which had in fact convened, could act

Public Order, Other Crimes Committed in Furtherance of Political Ends, and Violations of the Article of War, and Creating a National Amnesty Commission. Proclamation 348 granted amnesty to all personnel of the AFP and PNP who have committed acts or omissions punishable under the Revised Penal Code, the Articles of War or other special laws, in furtherance of, incident to, or in connection with counter-insurgency operations. Secretary of Justice Serafin R. Cuevas created a panel of investigators, who were tasked to conduct the preliminary investigation on the complaint. The Panel recommended the filing of two informations each for a separate count of murder against Kapunan, Jr. and Legaspi. Kapunans defense: (1) an amnesty has been granted to him; and (2) the Olalia-Alay-ay double murder was committed in pursuit of a political belief. Legapis defense: the grant of amnesty to him under Proclamation No. 347.

Issue: WON the grant of amnesty extinguished Kapunan and Legaspis criminal liability. Held: No. Ratio: Proclamation No. 347 reveals that it is not a unilateral grant of amnesty. Section 1 states that it is granted to all persons who shall apply therefore. It is the National Amnesty Commission (NAC) which is primarily tasked with receiving and processing applications for amnesty, and determining whether the applicants are entitled to amnesty under this Proclamation. Pursuant to its functions, it has the power to promulgate rules and regulations subject to the approval of the President. Final decisions or determinations of the NAC are appealable to the Court of Appeals. The extension of amnesty under Proclamation No. 347 takes effect only after the determination by the National Amnesty Commission as to whether the applicant is qualified under the terms of the proclamation. To fulfill its mandate, the NAC is empowered to enact rules and regulations, to summon witnesses and issue subpoenas. Evidently, the NAC does not just stamp its approval to every application before it. It possesses the power to determine facts, and therefrom, to decide whether the applicant is qualified for amnesty. The fact that the decisions of the NAC are subject to judicial review further supports the conclusiveness of its findings. Both Kapunan had duly applied for amnesty with the National Amnesty Commission, and both had been issued amnesty certificates. However, an examination of these certificates reveals that the grant of amnesty was not as far-reaching as the petitioners imply.

The amnesty granted to Kapunan extends to acts constituting only one crime, rebellion. Thus, any inquiry whether he is liable for prosecution in connection with the Olalia killings will necessarily rely not on the list of acts or crimes enumerated in Section 1 of Proclamation No. 347, but on the definition of rebellion and its component acts. The limited scope of the amnesty granted to Legaspi is even more apparent. At most, it could only cover offenses connected with his participation in the 1987 and 1989 coup attempts. The murders of Olalia and Alay-ay do not indicate they are components of rebellion. It is not self-explanatory how the murders of two private citizens could have been oriented to the aims of rebellion, explained in the Revised Penal Code as removing from the allegiance to [the] Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, of depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives. It is difficult for the Court to appreciate at this point how the Olalia/Alay-ay killings were connected with the 1987 or 1991 coup attempts.

MAGDALO (SUPRA) NERI V SENATE (SUPRA) NICOLAS V ROMULO

Facts: Lance Corporal (L/CPL) Daniel Smith is a member of the US Armed Forces. He was charged with the crime of rape committed against Suzette Nicolas sometime on November 1, 2005. He was convicted of the crime by the RTC Makati. Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the US entered into, the US, at its request, was granted custody of Smith. During the trial, the US Government faithfully complied with its undertaking to bring defendant Smith to the trial court every time his presence was required. The RTC of Makati rendered a decision finding defendant Smith guilty due to sufficient evidence. Smith was taken out of the Makati jail by a contingent of Philippine law enforcement agents, purportedly acting under orders of the DILG and brought to a facility for detention under the control of the US government under the new agreements between the Philippines and the US, referred to as the Romulo-Kenney Agreements.

Petitioners contend that the Philippines should have custody of defendant L/CPL Smith because, first of all, the VFA is void and unconstitutional.

Issues: 1. 2. Held: 1. 2. RATIO 1. The VFA is valid and constitutional. YES NO WON the VFA is valid and constitutional. WON the Romulo-Kenney Agreements are valid.

The provision of Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 of the Constitution, is complied with by virtue of the fact that the presence of the US Armed Forces through the VFA is a presence allowed under the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. Since the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty itself has been ratified and concurred in by both the Philippine Senate and the US Senate, there is no violation of the Constitutional provision resulting from such presence. The SC addressed the recent case of Medellin v. Texas, which held that treaties entered into by the United States are not automatically part of their domestic law unless these treaties are self-executing or there is an implementing legislation to make them enforceable. First, the VFA is a self-executing Agreement, as that term is defined in Medellin itself, because the parties intend its provisions to be enforceable, precisely because the Agreement is intended to carry out obligations and undertakings under the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. As a matter of fact, the VFA has been implemented and executed, with the US faithfully complying with its obligation to produce L/CPL Smith before the court during the trial. Secondly, the VFA is covered by implementing legislation, namely, the Case-Zablocki Act, USC Sec. 112(b), inasmuch as it is the very purpose and intent of the US Congress that executive agreements registered under this Act within 60 days from their ratification be immediately implemented. The parties to these present cases do not question the fact that the VFA has been registered under the Case-Zablocki Act. Finally, the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty was advised and consented to by the US Senate on March 20, 1952, as reflected in the US Congressional nd Record, 82 Congress, Second Session, Vol. 98 Part 2, pp. 2594-2595. 2. The Romulo-Kenney Agreements are not valid for not being in accordance with the VFA. The equal protection clause is not violated, because there is a substantial basis for a different treatment of a member of a foreign military armed forces allowed to enter our territory and all other accused. Applying, however, the provisions of VFA, the Court finds that there is a different treatment when it comes to detention as against custody. The moment the accused has to be detained, e.g., after conviction, the rule that governs is the following provision of the VFA: Criminal Jurisdiction x x x Sec. 10. The confinement or detention by Philippine authorities of United States personnel shall be carried out in facilities agreed on by

First, VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the United States as attested and certified by the duly authorized representative of the United States government. The fact that the VFA was not submitted for advice and consent of the United States Senate does not detract from its status as a binding international agreement for this is a matter of internal United States law. Notice can be taken of the internationally known practice by US of submitting to its Senate for advice and consent agreements that are policymaking in nature, whereas those that carry out or further implement these policymaking agreements are merely submitted to Congress, under the provisions of the so-called CaseZablocki Act, within sixty days from ratification.

Second, under the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, the joint RP-US military exercises for the purpose of developing the capability to resist an armed attack are covered. he VFA, which is the instrument agreed upon to provide for the joint RP-US military exercises, is simply an implementing agreement to the main RP-US Military Defense Treaty. As an implementing agreement of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, it was not necessary to submit the VFA to the US Senate for advice and consent, but merely to the US Congress under the CaseZablocki Act within 60 days of its ratification. It is for this reason that the US has certified that it recognizes the VFA as a binding international agreement, i.e., a treaty, and this substantially complies with the requirements of Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 of our Constitution.

appropriate Philippines and United States authorities. United States personnel serving sentences in the Philippines shall have the right to visits and material assistance. It is clear that the parties to the VFA recognized the difference between custody during the trial and detention after conviction, because they provided for a specific arrangement to cover detention. And this specific arrangement clearly states not only that the detention shall be carried out in facilities agreed on by authorities of both parties, but also that the detention shall be by Philippine authorities. Therefore, the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2006, which are agreements on the detention of the accused in the United States Embassy, are not in accord with the VFA itself because such detention is not by Philippine authorities.

In 2009 RA 9851 the Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against Humanity was enacted. It said that the Philippines may surrender suspected persons to international court provided that it is pursuant to other extradition treaties. Petitioner contends that the agreement amends existing municipal laws because where as RA 9851 would give the international court jurisdiction if the Philippines decides not to pursue it, the Agreement will require the consent of the US first. The agreement therefore amends a municipal law.

PIMENTEL V ES (SUPRA) AKBAYAN V AQUINO (SUPRA) NERI V SENATE (SUPRA) BAYAN MUNA V ROMULO
Facts: The Philippines signed the Rome Statute in 2000 subject to the ratification, acceptance or approval. (This decision was decided prior to the ratification of the Rome Statute last year.) The Rome Statute through the ICC had the power to exercise jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern. In 2003, an exchange note between the US and the Philippines by their Departments of foreign affairs agreed on a Non-Surrender Bilateral Agreement which aimed to protect persons of the RP and US from frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought against them in international tribunal. A key feature being that persons of one party present in the territory of the other shall not, absent the express consent of the first Party, (a) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any international tribunal for any purpose, unless such tribunal has been established by the UN Security Council, or (b) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any other entity or third country, or expelled to a third country, for the purpose of surrender to or transfer to any international tribunal, unless such tribunal has been established by the UN Security Council.

Bayan Muna seeks to nullify the Non Surrender Agreement between the Philippines and the United States. Bayan Muna argued (in relation to the topic for class) that there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the President and the DFA Secretary for concluding the agreement by means of the Exchange of Notes No. BFO-028-03 when the Philippine Government already signed the Rome Statute although it was still a pending ratification by the Philippine Senate. Issue: W/N there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the President, through the DFA Secretary for executing the non-surrender agreement. Held: NO. Ratio: It appears to the Court that the petitioner virtually faults the President for performing, through respondents, a task conferred the President by the Constitution the power to enter into international agreements. By constitutional fiat and by the nature of his or her office, the President, as head of state and government, is the sole organ and authority in the external affairs of the country. The Constitution vests in the President the power to enter into international agreements, subject, in appropriate cases, to the required concurrence votes of the Senate. But as earlier indicated, executive agreements may be validly entered into without such concurrence. As the President wields vast powers and influence, her conduct in the external affairs of the nation is, as Bayan would put it, "executive altogether." The right of the President to enter into or ratify binding executive agreements has been confirmed by long practice.

The Court cited Pimentel, Jr. v. Office of the Executive Secretary where the issue of ratification was laid to rest: The power to ratify a treaty, the Statute in that instance, rests with the President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate, whose role relative to the ratification of a treaty is limited merely to concurring in or withholding the ratification. And concomitant with this treaty-making power of the President is his or her prerogative to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate; or having secured the latters consent to the ratification of the treaty, refuse to ratify it. This prerogative, the Court hastened to add, is the Presidents alone and cannot be encroached upon via a writ of mandamus. Barring intervening events, then, the Philippines remains to be just a signatory to the Rome Statute. Under Art. 125 thereof, the final acts required to complete the treaty process and, thus, bring it into force, insofar as the Philippines is concerned, have yet to be done.

CHINA V STA MARIA PICHAY (SUPRA) REYES V GARILAO (SUPRA) NERI V SENATE (SUPRA)