TO BELIEVE IN BELIEF POPPER AND VAN FRAASSEN ON SCIENTIFIC REALISM

HERMAN C.D.G. DE REGT

SUMMARY. Take the following version of scientic realism: we have good reason to believe that (some of the) current scientic theories tell us something specic about the underlying, i.e. unobservable, structures of the world, for instance that there are electrons with a certain electric charge, or that there are viruses that cause certain diseases. Popper, the rationalist, would not have adhered to the proposed formulation of scientic realism in terms of the rationality of existential beliefs concerning unobservables. Popper did not believe in belief. According to Van Fraassen, the empiricist, one may yet have a rational existential belief concerning unobservables, given a liberal notion of rationality of belief. In this paper I will investigate to what extent a reassessment of both Poppers rejection of the rationality of belief and Van Fraassens reformulation of the rationality of belief, points towards a new and pragmatist dissolution of the problem of scientic realism. Key words: belief, constructive empiricism, pragmatism, scientic realism, Van Fraassen, Peirce, Popper

1.

INTRODUCTION

Take the following version of scientic realism: we have good reason to believe that (some of the) current scientic theories tell us something specic about the underlying, i.e. unobservable, structures of the world, for instance that there are electrons with a certain electric charge, or that there are viruses that cause certain diseases. Popper argued in his Realism and the Aim of Science (1983) that [we] cannot justify our theories, or the belief that they are true; nor can we justify the belief that they are near to the truth. We can, however, rationally defend a preference sometimes a very strong one for a certain theory, in the light of the present results of our discussion (61). This stance is echoed throughout Poppers work, for instance in his Objective Knowledge (1972): critical discussion can (. . .) establish sufcient reason for the following claim: This theory seems at present, in the light of a thorough critical discussion and of severe and ingenious testing, by far the best (the strongest, the best tested); and so it seems the one nearest to the truth among the competing theories (82).
Journal for General Philosophy of Science (2006) 37: 2139 DOI: 10.1007/s10838-006-0479-z Springer 2006

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However, this is not to say that Popper would adhere to the proposed formulation of scientic realism in terms of the rationality of existential beliefs concerning unobservables. In fact, we know that Popper, like E. M. Forster, did not believe in belief: I am not interested in a philosophy of belief, and I do not believe that beliefs and their justication, or foundation, or rationality, are the subject-matter of the theory of knowledge (1956, 22). In earlier publications (De Regt, 1994b, 1996, 2002a) I have tried to argue, to the contrary, that the current discussion about scientic realism between realists and Van Fraassen is indeed about the rationality of belief (cf. also Van Fraassen, 1985). According to Van Fraassens empiricism one may very well have a rational existential belief concerning unobservables. This is due to his extremely liberal notion of rationality of belief (Van Fraassen, 1989). Yet, in other places Van Fraassen explains he is actually in search for a new epistemology which rejects the idea of having good reasons for belief (1989, 170). In this paper I will investigate to what extent a reassessment of both Poppers rejection of the rationality of belief as a proper subject-matter of epistemology, and Van Fraassens rejection of traditional epistemology, may point towards a new, and notably a pragmatist, dissolution of the problem of scientic realism, formulated in terms of the rationality of belief. First I will show how close Popper, the critical rationalist, and Van Fraassen, the constructive empiricist, are to one another in this respect1 ; my further aim is to contribute to the further dissolution (not: solution) of the problem of scientic realism by bringing Peircean pragmatism to the oor, which may combine the best of both worlds (rationalism and empiricism), and hopefully only the best.

2.

SCIENTIFIC REALISM AND EMPIRICISM

My way of introducing the problem of scientic realism owes a great deal to Bas Van Fraassens footnoted remark in his almost 20 year old essay on empiricism in philosophy of science in which he says that it is philosophers, not scientists (as such), who are realists or empiricists, for the differences in view is not about what exists but about what science is (1985, 255). Although I do not agree with Van Fraassens interpretation of science, the statement is an apt formulation of the idea that the issue over scientic realism is not an ontological one. Since Van Fraassen takes statements literally (1980, 11) which is something realists would normally accept, neither is the dispute a straightforward semantic issue. Crucial to the contemporary debate on scientic realism is the assigned role of empirical evidence in science and the answer the empiricist offers to the question of its reach. Sometimes we nd empiricism

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interpreted as the claim that empirical evidence will only get you to claiming that some hypothesis (postulating unobservables) may be empirically adequate. Some may interpret empiricism as the stronger claim that we have never reason enough to even believe that some hypothesis (postulating unobservables) is true. We should always remain agnostic with regard to its truth. Clearly, whatever the details of the discussion, the issue of scientic realism has turned into an epistemological dispute. Although these characterizations of empiricism are of course much too crude, they did captivate the minds of those who wanted to argue that science takes us beyond the observable. More to the point, scientic realists thought they had an argument for this by offering an inference to the best or (even better) only explanation: only if we suppose that our hypotheses depict the world truthfully can we understand the empirical success of science at all. If this isnt reason enough to think that science reaches beyond the empirical evidence, nothing is. Many of us are familiar with the extensive discussions on the inference-to-the-only-explanation argument for scientic realism, and I will not repeat them here. Many realists must have felt condent that on every possible interpretation of science one cannot escape the implication that we hold rational beliefs with regard to the unobservables postulated by our most successful scientic theories about the world. Empiricism was understood as denying just this. Empiricism was accused of thinking that it is wholly irrational to hold an existential belief about some unobservables. Sure, scientists are excused for their irrational beliefs because they are immersed in the scientic world picture, but if they step back for a moment and reect on their beliefs (become philosophers of science as it were) they would, according to empiricists, easily admit that their beliefs are not backed up by good reasons and they would equally easily refrain from belief and confess to a mea culpa. Scientic realists exposed a strong aversion against blaming scientists of being irrational in their beliefs. They thought that we have good reasons, indeed, to believe that (some of the) current scientic theories tell us (something specic) about the underlying, i.e. unobservable, structures of the world. However, and to the realists surprise, Van Fraassen, arguably the most prominent empiricist philosopher of science of our times, claimed that empiricism does not imply that to believe in unobservables is (always) irrational. It is not irrational to go beyond the evidence, and belief in angels or electrons or the truth of theories in molecular biology does not ipso facto make one irrational (Van Fraassen, 1985, 248). Arguing for permission rather than obligation when concerned with the rationality of beliefs, the empiricist is able to admit that scientists are not irrational in believing that unobservables exist. As long as they do not sabotage the

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possibilities of vindication of their hypotheses beforehand (by their own lights) they are not irrational. We must conclude that the debate over scientic realism has become a dispute over the rationality of beliefs (cf. De Regt, 1996; Van Fraassen, 2001, Section 3). In the case of both parties arguing that existential beliefs concerning unobservables may be rational, it might help to redene the respective positions, so as to bring out the difference that remains. The remaining difference seems to lie in the fact that to the realist only epistemic reasons are good reasons to believe unobservables exist (epistemic reasons being reasons to think that the hypothesis is true), while the empiricist seems to claim that all reasons to believe in unobservables are, in essence and in exactly this sense, (mere) pragmatic reasons (that is, reasons not concerned with the truth of the hypothesis). So the obvious critique of the realist then is to accuse the empiricist of thinking that pragmatic reasons can be reason for belief, which is clearly wrong.2 The equally obvious answer of the empiricist while admitting this, is to claim that a belief held for ulterior motives is still a belief (Van Fraassen, 2001, 167). In his latest work The Empirical Stance (2002), Van Fraassen argues just this. He acknowledges the distinction between belief in a wide sense and belief in the strict sense. Belief in the strict sense is a belief for which one may ask reasons pertaining to the truth of the hypothesis (reasons that make the theory more likely to be true). Reasons for belief in the wide sense include all that may have been reasons/cause why one came to believe the hypothesis (cf. De Regt, 2002a). Van Fraassen says:
A belief is still a belief if it is held for ulterior motives. But in such a case we have to say something like: I realize that this was not a reason for belief; it did not make the matter any more likely to be true, but still, that is how or why I came to believe it (2002, 89).

My point will be that this distinction between belief in the strict sense and belief in the wide sense makes only sense given a specic idea about the nature of belief. But before addressing the question of the nature of belief in Section 5 let me make room for a Popperian view on the current dispute on realism. Given recent developments in empiricism, we might wonder how close, prima facie, Van Fraassens position is to Poppers. 3.
THE CRITICAL RATIONALISTIC STANCE

In this section I will not discuss Poppers view on scientic realism as such but will rather try to see how Poppers critical rationalism might be of relevance given the shift in the realism debate towards the question of belief. Poppers understanding of realism is quite concise: realism [is] the thesis of the reality of the world (1972, 33). Arguing against idealism

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Popper points to the fact that my own existence will come to an end without the worlds coming to an end too. This is a common sense view, and it is the central tenet of what may be termed realism (ibid., 31). Popper readily admits that realism as such is not a scientic hypothesis. It cant be falsied. However, it is a thesis that can be argued and the weight of the arguments is overwhelmingly in its favour (38). We sometimes tend to forget that Popper in his criticism on logical positivism actually made room again for discussion of metaphysical problems. In his Conjectures and Refutations (1963) Popper argues that if a philosophical theory [like realism] were no more than an isolated assertion about the world (. . .) then it would indeed be beyond discussion (198). He continues to point out that every rational theory [like realism] (. . .) tries to solve certain problems [and] it can be rationally discussed only by discussing this relation (199). As long as realism is (1) not an isolated statement and as long as realism is (2) a suggested solution to a specic problem it can be rationally discussed. In the case of realism the doctrine is intimately linked, according to Popper, to the world via science, and it offers general guidance in methodological heuristics:
almost all, if not all, physical, chemical, or biological theories imply realism, in the sense that if they are true realism must also be true. This is one of the reasons why some people speak of scientic realism. It is quite a good reason. Because of its apparent lack of testability, I myself happen to prefer to call realism metaphysical rather then scientic (. . .) the whole question of the truth and falsity of our opinions and theories clearly becomes pointless if there is no reality, only dreams or illusions (1972, 40, 42, cf. 290).

Read with a contemporary eye this approach to the problem of scientic realism shows that what we are looking for in the debate on scientic realism are indeed the reasons we may cite to believe that our scientic theories are true. Realism means nothing over and above the statement that if we think that our theories are true, so is realism. Is this not a refreshing return to basics? Well, it might have been if Popper actually thought we have indeed reasons to believe our scientic theories to be true. However, as we all know, Popper thought otherwise. Just to remind ourselves let me briey summarize Poppers view on reasons for belief. Popper distinguished between positive reasons (reasons offered with the intention of justifying a theory), and critical reasons (reasons used to defend our preference for a theory (i.e. our deciding to use it)), and we cannot give positive reason for our theories and beliefs we can give critical reasons for regarding one theory as preferable to another (1983, 1920). In his Conjectures and Refutations he states:
critical discussion can (. . . ) establish sufcient reason for the following claim: This theory seems at present, in the light of a thorough critical discussion and of severe and ingenious testing, by far the best (the strongest, the best tested); and so it seems the one nearest to the truth among the competing theories (1972, 82).

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This difference between the justication of our belief that a theory is true or near to the truth and the rational defence of our preference for a theory is, of course essential to Poppers view on science (1983, 61). In the light of our discussion of the present clash between empiricism and scientic realism it is the distinction between belief and preference that we are most interested in. Recall that my expos e of the issue of scientic realism ended in claiming that we are mainly concerned with the rationality of belief. Here is Popper, the scientic realist, explicitly stating that he is not interested in a philosophy of belief, that he does not believe that beliefs and their justication, or foundation, or rationality, are the subject-matter of the theory of knowledge (1983, 22). Even if one would argue that saying that we have reasons to prefer one theory over another is just another way of saying that we have reasons to believe one theory rather than another, Popper sharply replies that he never quarrels over words (23, cf. 1972, 18). See where we have arrived: Popper seems to claim that there is belief in the wide sense and belief in the strict sense. We never have reasons that make a theory more likely to be true, so we never believe in a strict sense that a theory is true. However a belief is still a belief even if it is held for ulterior motives, but in such a case we have to say something like: I realize that this was not a reason for belief; it did not make the matter any more likely to be true, but still, that is how or why I came to believe it. Popper would then welcome us to the realm of rational discussion and we would presumably come to rational preferences for theories. I used Van Fraassens quotes to illustrate that Poppers critical rationalism and constructive empiricism are actually quite close to one another, or so it seems. Both Van Fraassen and Popper think that our best theories may be true but that we will never know whether they are in fact true; both think that one may believe a theory to be true (or closer to the truth), yet only in a wide sense of believing, not in a strict sense. But more importantly, we would nowadays not call their position a scientic realist position. Before we probe further into their ideas of the nature of belief (Sections 5 and 6), let me rst offer a feedback of all this to the present-day problem of scientic realism. 4.
THE SPIRIT OF SCIENTIFIC REALISM

Remember what a scientic realist would like to claim: SR = we have good reasons to believe that (some of the) current scientic theories tell us (something specic) about the underlying, i.e. unobservable, structures of the world. Weak as this thesis is, it was long held to be unacceptable to the empiricist. But now we face an empiricist attitude according to which (roughly3 )

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one is free to believe any scientic theory to be true, except when the theory is excluded by the empirical data. Moreover, this seems compatible with Poppers critical rationalist view. Not quarrelling about words, Popper would accept that one is indeed free to believe anything that is not refuted by the (accepted) empirical data. However, the critical rationalist would add that, since rationality is synonymous with critical discussion, the belief must also be admitted by the current state of critical discussion. His scientic realism would in present-day terms sound like this: SRCR = we have found some critical reasons to believe some specic theory over its rivals, even where we are concerned with the underlying, i.e. unobservable, structures of the world. Van Fraassen seems to propose a more radical attitude, at least in this respect: even given the current discussion one is free to believe anything that is not refuted by accepted empirical data.4 Scientic realism may be reformulated in such a way that it becomes almost acceptable even to the empiricist: SREMP = we are free to believe any empirically acceptable scientic theory which postulates unobservables. I hope that it may be clear that, using the terms of the present debate, both Popper and Van Fraassen would accept the most general claim that it is rational to think that (for instance) viruses exist. Both would also defend the more stringent claim that it is rational to believe that (for instance) viruses exist. Van Fraassen would suggest that we take belief here in the wide sense, Popper would suggest its ok as long as we dont quarrel over words. However I also hope it is equally clear that even these weak reformulations of SR are indeed too weak to count as scientic realist doctrines today. In order to show what is at stake we may bring in the problem of underdetermination (for which I will not argue here (cf. De Regt, 1994b, ch. 3). Suppose we accept the idea that for any hypothesis (postulating unobservables) there is in principle an innite number of empirically equivalent but ontologically incompatible alternatives. Suppose this argument is part and parcel of current critical discussion (which it is not, I presume5 ). In that case both the empiricist and the critical rationalist would argue that, given the virus theory and its empirical success, whatever the empirical evidence, as long as it does not contradict the virus theory, it is always rational to believe that there are no viruses.6 The realist must, to my mind, point out that this latter statement is against the very spirit of scientic realism. It is in the spirit of scientic realism to hold that, in science, it is (now) simply irrational to not believe in the

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existence of viruses! So here is my suggested redenition of scientic realism (cf. Miller, 1987; De Regt, 1996, 2002a): SR = given scientic inquiry, it is irrational to not believe what (some of the)7 current scientic theories tell us about the underlying, i.e. unobservable, structures of the world. To see whether this thesis of scientic realism clashes with empiricism and rationalism where it matters we must say more about the nature and rationality of belief in Sections 5 and 6. 5.
THOUGHTS : OPINIONS AND BELIEFS

In an earlier attempt to clarify the contemporary discussion on scientic realism I tried to make a distinction between opinions and beliefs (De Regt, 2002a). In fact it is the same distinction Van Fraassen seems to have in mind. When we distinguish between two kinds of questions, we must distinguish between (at least) two kinds of thoughts. If we ask someone how he came to think that viruses exist we are satised with the answer that he (for instance) read about Andrewes, Smith, and Laidlaw isolating the rst human inuenza virus in 1933, or that he read a childrens encyclopedia at primary school, or that he spoke to his parents and high-school teachers who told him that there are viruses, or that he recently saw a fascinating Discovery Channel program about viruses, etc. We tend to count such a thought as a mere opinion bestowed upon someone by a complex social learning process. But when we ask the same person why he thinks everyone ought to think that there are viruses, we ask for evidence that would drive anyone (ultimately) to the same conclusion (viz. that as far as we now know viruses exist). This means entering the ongoing critical discussion on the status of viruses but not in terms of mere Popperian preferences. In this case we ask for reasons of belief. What I mean is that there are different reasons on the basis of which one judges some thought to be a rational opinion or a rational belief. Opinions we could characterize as historically (ir)rational thoughts: we understand (or fail to understand) why someone came to think that viruses exist. Beliefs we could characterize as systematically (ir)rational thoughts: we understand (or fail to understand) that anyone presented with the same evidence ought to think that viruses exist. On this reconstruction empiricism implies that scientists (grosso modo and normally) entertain historically rational thoughts, yet most of the time these are systematically irrational thoughts (in the case of postulating unobservables). Empiricists may see a task for themselves here: to educate scientists. Critical rationalism seems to imply the same if we accept that the

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underdetermination argument is part of the current discussion: there is no reason why one ought to think that viruses exist, although we may understand how (a personal) history led to thinking viruses exist. The scientic realist challenge, then, is to argue that the thought scientists entertain about the existence of viruses (namely that they exist) is a systematically rational thought, i.e. a rational belief. But what is a belief? Is a belief itself of such a nature that one can intelligibly ask what one ought to believe? What if having a believe is rather a question of fact? If as a matter of fact I believe it to be true that p, is it then appropriate for someone to point out to me what I ought to believe? I think that the empiricist and rationalist both offer a notion of belief that makes it very difcult to the realist to maintain that scientists entertain beliefs one ought to have, given the accepted empirical data. So let us now see what they say about the nature of belief. 6.
BELIEF : WHAT IS IT ?

My suggestion is that both Popper and Van Fraassen accept a notion of belief according to which having a belief (amongst other things) is basically a matter of fact. As I will point out, this has consequences for the contemporary debate on scientic realism. 6.1. Popper on Belief If my intuition about belief in the preceding section is correct, having a belief is foremost to entertain a certain subjective thought for reasons the person thinks should drive anyone to his thought. Nevertheless, a belief in this sense is a subjective thought. But if it is a subjective thought (not yet part of the realm of objective thought), a Popperian will argue, it belongs to world 2. The present discussion of scientic realism in terms of the rationality of belief is, therefore, from a Popperian perspective, part of traditional epistemology with its concentration on the second world, or on knowledge in the subjective sense, and this kind of epistemology is irrelevant to the study of scientic knowledge tout court (1972, 111, 122). Having a belief in this sense (as scientist, philosopher or layman) is simply a matter of fact! To believe something is to think it is true that p. To the extent that this is a subjective state (and not yet a critically discussed linguistic expression of a hypothesis about the world) it is a matter of certain inborn dispositions to act, and of their acquired modications8 (121). If having a belief is a matter of fact, what must we understand by the rationality of belief? Popper addresses this question (again) in the rst volume of his Postscript (1983, 5859). Is it rational to believe in the

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Copernican model of the solar system? This is transformed into the question what our reasons are for believing in the truthlikeness of the theory:
they consist in the story of the critical discussion (...) which ultimately persuaded everybody that a great step had been made towards the truth (1983, 59)

But here Popper talks of belief as it is already (capable of) being criticized, that is, as already part of world 3 of objective thought. Belief is already taken to be more than just a subjective thought. That is why Popper concludes:
This persuasion, this belief, this preference, is reasonable because it is based upon the result of the present state of the critical discussion; and a preference for a theory may be called reasonable if it is arguable, and if it withstands searching critical argument. (59)

This is, of course, a familiar statement of critical rationalism. In conclusion, having a belief, belief as belonging to world 2, is just a matter of fact. It is just a subjective thought and to demand of it to be rational is an ill-posed demand. Reasonable or rational belief can only be interpreted as a reasonable preference for a theory, as an objective thought, as belonging to world 3. This Popperian notion of belief and having a belief has (at least) two consequences: (1) it places the present-day discussion on scientic realism clearly into the domain of belief philosophy or traditional philosophy,9 so that on a Popperian account the debate is crucially ill-conceived; and (2) (scientic) realism is accepted as the only sensible hypothesis as a conjecture to which no sensible alternative has ever been offered (1972, 42, my italics, cf. also 1963, ch. 3). I would like to object to both (1) and (2). I will play the empiricist card against (2) and the pragmatist card against (1) and empiricism. 6.2. Van Fraassen on Belief The point of departure of the present debate on the status of scientic knowledge is (as I see it) xed by Van Fraassens empiricist critique on realism as the allegedly sole candidate for an explanation of the empirical success of science (Van Fraassen, 1980). It is his claim that empiricism can also explain the empirical success of science (Van Fraassen, 1980, ch. 4, De Regt, 1994b, ch. 4, Van Fraassen, 2001, Section 2). And this instigated a renewed and erce discussion on realism in the last couple of decades of the 20th century. Because of the fact that empiricism explains the empirical success of science, realists sought refuge in the claim that only according to realism is it rational to believe what scientists tell us about the unobservable world.

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Since we want to save the rationality of scientic beliefs, we ought to be realists. Yet empiricism also claims that it may be rational to believe what scientists tell us, even when they talk about unobservables. And so we plunged ourselves into a debate on the rationality of belief!10 The Popperian thing to do, I reckon, is to acknowledge that the critical discussion on the interpretation of science is, at this very moment, undecided (statement (2) needs further criticizing). But does this mean that, according to the empiricist, we are back into anti-Popperian belief philosophy? Well, that depends on the empiricists notion of belief. To Van Fraassen, as far as I can see, having a belief is indeed, as Popper held, nothing but a matter of fact:
the very point of belief is to have something, some picture of what things are like, of which we can say: that is how I think it is, period (Van Fraassen, 2002, 89).

To have a belief is to think of a (partial) model of the world that it is true (or: to believe that p means that one thinks that the world is such that p is true). How one acquired the belief is quite irrelevant; to have it is what counts. What distinguishes a belief from mere acceptance is the attitude we have towards what we think11 :
The distinction between what a person believes and what s/he merely accepts is not made on the basis of why s/he has that attitude, but only on the basis of what that attitude is (Van Fraassen, 2001, 167).

If having a belief is just a matter of fact, a state one nds oneself to be in, what can we say about the rationality of belief within empiricism? The important thing to emphasize here is that in epistemology, according to empiricism, we are concerned with belief revision (Van Fraassen, 1985). Rationality has therefore to do with the way in which we revise our beliefs if need be. As long as we do not manoeuvre ourselves wilfully into a sure loss situation (for instance Dutch Book situations), and as long as we do not wilfully contradict ourselves in a more direct way by claiming that we hold beliefs for reasons that do not make what we believe more likely to be true, we are free to revise our beliefs as we wish. Thus, empiricism wants to keep away from belief philosophy by arguing that belief is in an important sense simply a matter of fact and that belief revision has nothing to do with good reasons for belief. But the distinction between belief in the strict sense and belief in the wide sense shows the empiricists true colours. To ask of belief in the wide sense whether it is rational is to a large extent nonsensical. Having a belief in the wide sense is simply a matter of fact. Rationality of belief in the wide sense refers to our understanding of (or failure to understand) the process which led to the belief formation. On Van Fraassens account, belief in the strict sense has everything to do

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with offering reasons for belief, although we may think differently about what reasons may account for what beliefs on which grounds. It is here that we pose the question of the rationality of belief. Here is where empiricists and realists quarrel. Here is where scientic realists want to argue that it is (sometimes) irrational to not believe in science; here is where the empiricist argues that the constraints of coherence are actually amazingly weak. However, this is also the point where we hear an echo of Musgraves critique (1988, 249): if you are already a realist you will now, given the present empirical evidence, judge it irrational to not believe in viruses, yet if you are already an empiricist you will always judge it rational (for yourself) to not believe in viruses.12 The realist cannot compel the empiricist to believe in viruses. The reason is that the empiricist accepts the argument from underdetermination13 (in other words, the real problem for realism is underdetermination). That is why I would like to suggest the pragmatist stance in the closing section: pragmatism may be interpreted as one long argument against underdetermination. But let me rst summarize the consequences of all this for the present debate on scientic realism in terms of the rationality of belief. My conclusions are, of course, very tentative but I would nevertheless like to suggest that: (1) in contrast to Popper, belief is a crucial concept in the discussion on scientic realism; it needs further elucidation since it is the nature of belief that determines whether it makes sense to speak of reasons for belief and belief revision, and of rationality of belief and belief revision, including scientic beliefs and revision of scientic beliefs; (2) only if scientic realism is described as the rather strong thesis that, accepting all currently available results of scientic inquiry, it is irrational to not believe in the presently sole survivors of science, does it contrast with Van Fraassens well-developed empiricism (for instance, it is now irrational to not believe in the existence of viruses); and (3) the problem of underdetermination is the only problem for scientic realism. In the last section I will only sketch the underestimated classical pragmatist stance, which may offer comfort to the scientic realist, as it is in fact one long argument against underdetermination.

7.

THE PRAGMATIST STANCE

When I speak of pragmatism I mean to refer to the work of Peirce, rather than the work of James or Dewey. Recently Rorty picked up especially on Deweys pragmatism (1980, 1991), and Putnam focused on the work of

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James, more specically his natural realism in his Threefold Cord (1999)14 . Here is not the place to argue in detail how a reevaluation of Peirces original depiction of pragmatism might shed some light on the obscure discussion of realism in philosophy of science (cf. De Regt, 1999, 2002a,b), so I will only offer a broad outline of the argument. A pragmatic dissolution (not solution) of the problem of scientic realism uses the pragmatic maxim15 and the doubt/inquiry notion of belief to come to a clarication of the status of scientic knowledge. In brief, the (admittedly elliptical) argument runs as follows: (a) humans are such that the irritation of doubt causes a struggle to attain a state of belief (b) the object of any inquiry is the xation of our beliefs (c) belief involves the establishment in our nature of a rule of action (Peirce, 1878, 129) (d) application of the pragmatic maxim shows that the opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real (Peirce, 1878, 139)16 (e) therefore we will (naturally) fail to understand anyone who, accepting all presently available scientic data, acts against an established rule of action in the community of investigators, except those who accept the argument from underdetermination (f) given the pragmatic maxim, the concept of underdetermination (in the sense that it must be understood by the empiricist) is radically unclear (g) therefore we will (naturally) fail to understand anyone who, accepting all presently available scientic data, acts against an established rule of action in the community of investigators. A couple of remarks are needed to bring out the underlying idea of this sketchy argument. First of all Peirce endorses the idea, defended by many, that to have a belief is to have a disposition to feel or act.17 However, Peirce is more radical. In his many attempts to elucidate the concept of pragmatism he states:
What the pragmatist has his pragmatism for is to be able to say, here is a denition and it does not differ at all from your confusedly apprehended conception because there is no practical difference. But what is to prevent his opponent from replying that there is a practical difference which consists in his recognizing one as his conception and not the other, that is, one is expressible in a way in which the other is not expressible? Pragmatism is completely volatilized if you admit that sort of practicality. (1903, 141)

I interpret Peirces point of view as stating that belief is a disposition to act rather than a disposition to feel. Of course, dispositions to act are accompanied by many feelings but a mere feeling does not constitute a practical

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difference. Peirces maxim is a suggestion how we may clarify the concepts we use and we have learned that the scientic method helps clarifying our concepts most efciently. The result is the xation of belief, i.e. the establishment of rules of actions or habits. This method of science, it is apt to notice, is very generally stated as the postulation of an external permanency. In Peirces anthropology we are craving for the elimination of the contingency of our opinions, and this postulate is extremely instrumental in fullling that desire.18 Given this sketch of pragmatism, what are the implications for the discussion of scientic realism, belief, and the rationality of belief? According to the pragmatist anthropology we have many beliefs, namely in all those cases we do not manifest a living doubt about the world. To say of beliefs that they are rational is a bit awkward to say the least. If we understand the rationality of belief in terms of good reasons for belief what good reasons can there be to be in a state as a matter of fact? We do not have good reasons for our beliefs except that our social learning has led us to act in certain ways in certain circumstances, and away from irritating states of doubt. We might want to recall Peirces remark (1877, 111) that each chief step in science has been a lesson in logic (as reasoning). This is not to say that there is no room for reasons in pragmatism. In case of a living doubt reasons do matter. Reasons play a role in the process of xing our beliefs, to come to a state of thought at rest. However, the reasons that may play this role will have to be concerned with explicating practical differences between hypotheses (the concept of a reason must of course also be made as clear as possible using the pragmatic maxim). So rationality of belief might refer to nothing over and above our understanding or lack of understanding why someone acts the way he or she acts. Let us now, by way of conclusion, return to our example of our belief in viruses.

8.

CONCLUSION

What does it mean to have the belief that viruses exist? It means that we have acquired a disposition to act in a certain way in certain circumstances (we have acquired a habit). We might want to avoid contact with those who have the u, we claim that viruses are the cause of several diseases and we prepare medicines and probe the world for viruses. If someone, familiar with and accepting all the results of our inquiry, would act in such a way that it violates an established rule of action in the community of investigators, we would classify his behaviour as unreasonable. That is, to not think, under these conditions, that viruses exist is taken to be unreasonable.

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Suppose next that there actually is someone who, familiar with and accepting all the results of our inquiry, would act in such a way that it violates an established rule of action in the community of investigators. How would such a person get us in a state of irritating doubt? At this moment, not having available an alternative hypothesis to explain u phenomena, there is but one possibility: to try to convince us of the argument of underdetermination. The pragmatic point is that it is not clear to us at all (although it may feel to some) what we could possibly mean by underdetermination in this sense (cf. Quine, 1975). I accept Van Fraassens distinction between observables and unobservables19 , and I accept that there is an epistemic relevance to the distinction. But Popper, not surprisingly20 , is much closer to the Peircean pragmatic treatment of the problem of scientic realism I suggest. Yet, Poppers critical rationalism is unacceptable to the extent that he seems to hold meaningfully that we will never, not even if all the information is in, know the truth.21 My stance would be: lets just wait and see what happens in the history of our inquiries and meanwhile debunk the argument from underdetermination by arguing from the pragmatic maxim and the doubt/inquiry model of belief. I know that this means that I put my money on the Enlightenment, the scientic method, and on modernity.22 John Searle rhetorically said in a lecture on the future of philosophy: We do not live in a post-modernist era, we live in a post-sceptical era: modernity is just starting up!. Charles S. Peirce, at the end of the 19th century, would, in this context and more humanely, repeat his adagium (1868, 29): Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts.

NOTES
1 Of

course there are many differences between critical rationalism and constructive empiricism. These differences (like their interpretations of probability, of quantum mechanics, and their account of explanation for instance) stem from the obvious fact that Popper tried to defend a scientic realistic stance whereas Van Fraassen defends an anti-scientic realistic stance. What interests me is the very fact that, as I will show, both accept the idea that it is (sometimes) rational to believe that unobservables exist, that this is prima facie the right way to formulate the scientic realist stance (given the discussion that followed Van Fraassens The Scientic Image), but that Popper glosses reasons to believe in a different way the present-day scientic realist would do, while Van Fraassen introduces his voluntarist notion of rationality a notion present-day scientic realists would not accept. The result is paradoxical: both Popper and Van Fraassen turn out to be scientic realists (they both think it is rational to believe certain unobservables exist), yet neither of them resonate with scientic realism (sometimes we have epistemic reasons to believe unobservables exist)! Below Id like to clear up the confusion, without introducing new ones.

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2 In his (2000) Van Fraassen thinks that I tried to argue that besides coherence, rationality requires that we have pragmatic reasons for belief (277), but I did not. What I tried to point out in my (1996) is that to believe that p means to think that p is true and that this forces one to offer reasons that bear on the truth of p whenever one is being asked why one believes that p. Later I tried to distinguish between opinions and beliefs (as modes of thought) (2002a) which suggests the same sort of distinction Van Fraassen has in mind when he speaks of belief in the wide sense and belief in the strict sense (Van Fraassen, 2001, 2002). 3 We need the further assumption that there is no self-sabotage (cf. Van Fraassen, 1989, 2000, 2001). 4 I already assume that we do not sabotage ourselves (by our own lights). 5 That is why Popperians may not be worried too much. 6 Again: assuming that we do not sabotage ourselves. 7 Namely those that currently have no competitors and satisfy scientists. 8Popper: it is questionable whether the word belief is used by philosophers to describe psychological states in this sense [viz. as expectations]. It seems that they more often use it to denote not momentary states but what may be called settled beliefs, including those countless unconscious expectations which make up our horizon of expectations. It is a far cry from these to formulated hypotheses, and therefore also to statements of the form I believe that . . .. Now almost all such formulated statements can be considered critically (1972, 2526). 9Popper: I used to take pride in the fact that I am not a belief philosopher: I am primarily interested in ideas, in theories, and I nd it comparatively unimportant whether or not anybody believes in them. And I suspect that the interest of philosophers in belief results from that mistaken philosophy which I call inductivism. They are theorists of knowledge, and starting from subjective experiences they fail to distinguish between objective and subjective knowledge. This leads them to believe in belief as the genus of which knowledge is a species (. . .). This is why, like E.M. Forster, I do not believe in belief. (1972, 25). 10 The current discussion on structural realism (as a specic form of scientic realism) doesnt change the issue. 11 Van Fraassen: A typical object of [epistemic or at least doxastic] attitudes is a proposition, or a set of propositions, or more generally a body of putative information about what the world is like, what the facts are (1989, 190). 12Notice that an empiricist may accept the rationality of the realists beliefs (if coherence conditions are being satised), but that a realist does not have the resources to judge empiricist beliefs in the strict sense as being rational. I accept this asymmetry but do not consider it to be an argument for empiricism. 13 Either as a technical argument or as the more informal and familiar as if argument. 14 But also on Dewey (Putnam, 2001, 2002) and Peirce (Putnam and Ketners introduction to Reasoning and the Logic of Things (1992)). 15 My reformulation: concepts can only be clear to us to the extent that they refer to some context of action. This may relate pragmatism to Hackings entity realism, but see my (1994a) for a criticism on Hackings entity realism. 16 In L.Sc.D. Popper rejects those pragmatists who dene true as useful or else as successful or conrmed or corroborated (1959, 276). Peirce is not one of those pragmatists, but I will leave that issue aside here, although it is a widespread belief that Peirce does not offer a timeless concept of truth. 17 For instance Russell (1948, 161164), Ryle (1949, 129), Cohen (1992, 4), Baker (1995, 154, 171) and more recently Schwitzgebel (2002, 253).

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18 It

37

is therefore method that has priority, not content, and this has implications for the image of science as I discussed in my 2002b. 19 See Muller (2004, 2005) for a recent clarication of the notion of observability in the debate on realism. 20 See Poppers reference to Peirce in the preface to his L.Sc.D. (1959, 22). Yet, his aversion to subjective belief distinguishes his rationalism from Peirces pragmatism. See also Gadenne (1998) for the pragmatic turn in relation to critical rationalism. Wendel (1998) comes very close to Peirces pragmatism which I conjecture can be used to classify underdetermination as an inconceivable option, but in the end he says: Ist Ubereinstimmung in der Kommunikationsgemeinschaft erreicht, so k onnen wir mit Peirce sagen: wird die Frage nach der Gewiheit u ber ussig, denn es bleibt niemand u brig, der sie in Zweifel zieht. Suchen wir daher, was wir nicht mehr ernsthaft bezweifeln k onnen, was nicht heit, dass es damit nicht mehr bezweifelbar w are (159). Yet, the Peircean concept of truth points toward an (ideal) situation in which the community of scientists cant even imagine to doubt certain conjectures (cf. Peirces distinction between paper doubt and living doubt). 21 In an important footnote Popper states: It cannot be too strongly emphasized that Tarskis idea of truth (for whose denition with respect to formalized languages Tarski gave a method) is the same idea which Aristotle had in mind and indeed most people (except pragmatists): the idea that truth is correspondence with the facts (or with reality). But what can we possibly mean if we say of a statement that it corresponds with the facts (or with reality)? Once we realize that this correspondence cannot be one of structural similarity, the task of elucidating this correspondence seems hopeless; (1959, 274). My interpretation of the concept of truth as given by Peirce does not contradict anything in this statement by Popper. 22 Cf. Putnams Spinoza Lecture I, The Three Enlightenments (Putnam, 2001).

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