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The contemporary view of lifespan development (Denney, 1982) is based on the assumption that children develop their abilities

during childhood and can reach their innate potential under favorable experiential conditions. Further, the general view is that the individuals potential is limited by innate biological capacities that will ultimately constrain the highest level of achievement. Most importantly, he argued that innate mechanisms also regulated size and characteristics of internal organs, such as the nervous system and the brain, and thus must similarly determine mental capacities. Galton (1869/1979) clearly acknowledged the need for training and practice to reach high levels of performance in any domain. However, he argued that improvements of performance for mature adults are rapid only in the beginning of training and that subsequent increases diminish, until Maximal performance becomes a rigidly determinate quantity (p. 15 ). According to Galton, the relevant heritable capacities determine the upper bound for the performance that an individual can attain through practice, and reflect the immutable limit that Nature has rendered him capable of performing (p. 16). According to Galton, the characteristics that limit maximal performance after all benefits of training have been gained must, therefore, be innately endowed. When individuals are first introduced to a skilled activity such as driving a car, typing on a computer, or playing golf, their primary goal is to reach a level of proficiency that will allow them to perform these everyday tasks at a functional level. During the first phase of learning (Fitts & Posner, 1967), beginners try to understand the requirements of the activity and focus on generating actions while avoiding gross mistakes. This phase is illustrated in the lower arrow in Figure 38.1. In the second phase of learning, when people have had more experience, noticeable mistakes become increasingly rare, performance appears smoother, and learners no longer need to focus as intensely on their performance to maintain an acceptable level. After a limited period of training and experience frequently less than 50 hours for most everyday activities such as typing, playing tennis, and driving a car an acceptable level of performance is typically attained. As individuals adapt to a domain during the third phase of learning, their performance skills become automated, and they are able to execute these skills smoothly and with minimal effort (as is illustrated in the lower arrow in Figure 38.1). As a consequence of automatization, performers lose the ability to control the execution of those skills, making intentional modifications and adjustments difficult (see Hill & Schneider, Chapter 37). In the automated phase of learning, performance reaches a stable plateau, and no further improvements are observed in agreement with Galtons (1869/1979) assumption of a performance limit.

Figure 38.1. An illustration of the qualitative difference between the course of improvement of expert performance and of everyday activities. The goal for everyday activities is to reach as rapidly as possible a satisfactory level that is stable and autonomous. After individuals pass through the cognitive and associative phases, they can generate their performance virtually automatically with a minimal amount of effort (see the gray/white plateau at the bottom of the graph). In contrast, expert performers counteract automaticity by developing increasingly complex mental representations to attain higher levels of control of their performance and will therefore remain within the cognitive and associative phases. Some experts will at some point in their career give up their commitment to seeking excellence and thus terminate regular engagement in deliberate practice to further improve performance, which results in premature automation of their performance. (Adapted from The scientific study of expert levels of performance: General implications for optimal learning and creativity by K. A. Ericsson in High Ability Studies, 9, p. 90. Copyright 1998 by European Council for High Ability.) Whereas initial proficiency in everyday and professional skills may be attained within weeks and months, development to very high levels of achievement appear to require many years or even decades of experience. In fact, Bryan and Harter claimed already in 1899 that over ten years are necessary for becoming an expert. In their seminal theory of expertise, Simon and Chase (1973) proposed that future experts gradually acquired patterns and knowledge about how to react in situations by storing memories of their past actions in similar situations. Hence, performance is assumed to improve as a consequence of continued experience. Some scientists started to consider the possibility that expertise was an automatic consequence of lengthy experience, and they considered individuals with over ten years of full-time engagement in a domain to be experts. These scientists typically viewed expertise as an orderly progression from novice to intermediate and to expert, where the primary factors mediating the progression through these stages were instruction, training, and experience.

Extended engagement in domain-related activities is necessary to attain expert performance in that domain. First, longitudinal assessments of performance reveal that all individuals improve gradually, as illustrated in Figure 38.3 . There is no objective evidence that a child or adult is able to exhibit a high level of performance without any relevant prior experience and practice. Elite performance keeps improving beyond the age of physical maturation the late teens in industrialized countries (Ulijaszek, Johnston, & Preece, 1998) and is, thus, not directly limited by the functional capacity of the body and brain. Peak performance of experts is nearly always attained in adulthood many years, and even decades, after initial exposure to the domain, as illustrated in Figure 38.3 . Increases in Performance over Historical Time: The Relation between Performance and Improved Methods of Practice Today the development of expert levels of achievement requires instruction by teachers that helps performers gain access to the body of domain-specific knowledge, which is expressed and accumulated in terms of predefined concepts, notation systems, equipment, and measurement devices. Record-breaking levels of performance are nearly always originally attained by only a single eminent performer. However, after some time, other athletes are able to design training methods that allow them to attain that same level of performance. Eventually, these training methods become part of regular instruction, and all elite performers in the domain are expected to attain the new higher standard. From Experience to Designed Practice At the same time the best training environments are not sufficient to produce the very best performers, and there are substantial individual differences even among individuals in these environments. Expert violinists at the music academy in Berlin kept a weekly diary on how much time they spent during a week on different activities (Ericsson et al., 1993). All groups of expert violinists were found to spend about the same amount of time (over 50 hours) per week on music-related activities. However, the best violinists were found to spend more time per week on activities that had been specifically designed to improve performance, which we call deliberate practice. A prime example of deliberate practice is the expert violinists solitary practice, in which they work to master specific goals determined by their music teacher at weekly lessons. The core assumption of deliberate practice (Ericsson, 1996, 2002, 2004; Ericsson et al., 1993) is that expert performance is acquired gradually and that effective improvement of performance requires the opportunity to find suitable training tasks that the performer can master sequentially typically the design of training tasks and monitoring of the attained performance is done by a teacher or a coach. Deliberate practice presents performers with tasks that are initially outside their current realm of reliable performance, yet can be mastered within hours of practice by concentrating on critical aspects and by gradually refining performance through repetitions after

feedback. Hence, the requirement for concentration sets deliberate practice apart from both mindless, routine performance and playful engagement, as the latter two types of activities would, if anything, merely strengthen the current mediating cognitive mechanisms, rather than modify them to allow increases in the level of performance. Hansson, Ericsson, and Theorell (2003) revealed reliable differences of skill in the level of physiological and psychological indicators of concentration and effort during a singing lesson. Whereas the amateur singers experienced the lesson as self-actualization and an enjoyable release of tension, the professional singers increased their concentration and focused on improving their performance during the lesson. Rare longitudinal studies of elite performers (some of them world class, Schneider, 1993) have found that the most potent variables linked to performance and future improvements of performance involved parental support, acquired task-specific (in this case, tennis) skills, and motivational factors including concentration. In a particularly interesting study McKinney and Davis (2004) examined successful handling of emergency situations during flying by expert pilots. They found that if prior to the emergency event the expert pilots had practiced the same emergency situation in the simulator, they were reliably more successful in dealing with the actual event. More generally, Deakin, C ot e, and Harvey (Chapter 17) review evidence on methods for recording the amount and structure of deliberate practice, using diary methods and other kinds of observations. In this handbook several chapters discuss the role of deliberate practice in relation to selfregulated learning (Zimmerman, Chapter 39), to successful training in simulators (Ward, Williams, & Hancock, Chapter 14), to maintained performance in older experts (Krampe & Charness, Chapter 40), and in creative activities (Weisberg, Chapter 42). Deliberate Practice and the Acquisition of Complex Mechanisms Mediating Expert Performance In the introduction of this chapter, the stages of everyday skill acquisition were described. At the first encounter with a task, people focus on understanding it and carefully generating appropriate actions, as illustrated in the lower arm of the previously discussed Figure 38.1. With more experience, individuals behaviors adapt to the demands of performance and become increasingly automatized, people lose conscious control over the production of their actions and are no longer able to make specific intentional adjustments to them. For example, people have difficulty describing how they tie their shoelaces or how they get up from sitting in a chair. When the behaviors are automatized, mere additional experience will not lead to increased levels of performance. In direct contrast to the acquisition of everyday skills, expert performers continue to improve their performance with more experience as long as it is coupled with deliberate practice. The key

challenge for aspiring expert performers is to avoid the arrested development associated with automaticity and to acquire cognitive skills to support their continued learning and improvement. By actively seeking out demanding tasks often provided by their teachers and coaches that force the performers to engage in problem solving and to stretch their performance, the expert performers overcome the detrimental effects of automaticity and actively acquire and refine cognitive mechanisms to support continued learning and improvement, as shown in the upper arm of Figure 38.1. The expert performers and their teachers identify specific goals for improving particular aspects of performance and design training activities that allow the performer to gradually refine performance with feedback and opportunities for repetition (deliberate practice). The performers will gradually acquire mechanisms that increase their ability to control, self-monitor, and evaluate their performance in representative situations from the domain and thus gain independence from the feedback of their teachers (Ericsson, 1996, 2002; Glaser, 1996). Although the overall structure of these mechanisms reflects general principles, the detailed structure and practice activities that mediate their acquisition will reflect the demands of that particular activity and thus differ from one domain of expertise to another. The Acquisition of Mental Representations for Performance and Continued Learning One of the principal challenges to continued improvement of expert performance is that the acquired representations and mechanisms mediating expert performance must be modifiable to allow gradual changes that incrementally improve performance. They need to allow for improvements of specific aspects of the performances as well as for the coordination of necessary adjustments required by the associated changes. The experts mental representations thus serve a dual purpose of mediating the superior expert performance while also providing the same mechanisms that can be incrementally altered to further enhance performance after practice and training. Finally, individuals must engage in deliberate-practice activities to continue to stretch their performance. A Broader View of Expert Performance and Deliberate Practice The theoretical framework of deliberate practice asserts that improvement in performance of aspiring experts does not happen automatically or casually as a function of further experience. Improvements are caused by changes in cognitive mechanisms mediating how the brain and nervous system control performance and in the degree of adaptation of physiological systems of the body. The principal challenge to attaining expert level performance is to induce stable specific changes that allow the performance to be incrementally improved. Once we conceive of expert performance as mediated by complex integrated systems of representations for the planning, analysis, execution, and monitoring of performance (see Figure 38.5 ), it becomes clear that its acquisition requires a systematic and deliberate approach. Deliberate practice is therefore designed to improve specific aspects of performance in a manner that assures that attained changes can be successfully measured and integrated into representative performance.

Research on deliberate practice in music and sports shows that continued attempts for mastery require that the performer always try, by stretching performance beyond its current capabilities, to correct some specific weakness, while preserving other successful aspects of function. This type of deliberate practice requires full attention and concentration, but even with that extreme effort, some kind of failure is likely to arise, and gradual improvements with corrections and repetitions are necessary. With increased skill in monitoring, skilled performers in music focus on mastering new challenges by goal-directed deliberate practice involving problem solving and specialized training techniques (Chaffin & Imre, 1997; Ericsson, 2002; Gruson, 1988; Nielsen, 1999). In their research on sports, Deakin and Cobley (2003) found that ice skaters spend a considerable portion of their limited practice time on jump-combinations they have already mastered, rather than working on the yet-to-be-mastered combinations, where there is the largest room for improvement. More generally, they found that with increasing levels of attained skill the skaters spent more time on jumps and other challenging activities that had the potential to improve performance. Practice aimed at improving integrated performance cannot be performed mindlessly, nor independently of the representative context for the target performance. In addition, moreaccomplished individuals in the domain, such as professional coaches and teachers, will always play an essential role in guiding the sequencing of practice activities for future experts in a safe and effective manner. The deliberate-practice framework can also explain the necessity for further deliberate practice in order for individuals simply to maintain their current level of skill. It is well known that athletes and musicians who reduce or stop their regular practice will exhibit a reduced level of performance a maintained level of challenge and strain appear necessary to preserve the attained physiological and cognitive adaptations. The same type of account has been developed to explain age-related reductions in music performance and how they can be counteracted by maintained levels of deliberate practice Concluding Remarks: General Characteristics of Deliberate Practice The perspective of deliberate practice attributes the rarity of excellence to the scarcity of optimal training environments and to the years required to develop the complex mediating mechanisms that support expertise. Until most individuals recognize that sustained training and effort is a prerequisite for reaching expert levels of performance, they will continue to misattribute lesser achievement to the lack of natural gifts, and will thus fail to reach their own potential. The effects of mere experience differ greatly from those of deliberate practice, where individuals concentrate on actively trying to go beyond their current abilities. Consistent with the mental demands of problem solving and other types of complex learning, deliberate practice requires concentration that can be maintained only for limited periods of time. Although the detailed nature of deliberate practice will differ across domains and as a function of attained skill, there appear to be limits on the daily duration of deliberate practice, and this limit seems to generalize

across domains of expertise. Expert performers from many domains engage in practice without rest for only around an hour, and they prefer to practice early in the morning when their minds are fresh (Ericsson et al., 1993). Even more interestingly, elite performers in many diverse domains have been found to practice, on the average, roughly the same amount every day, including weekends, and the amount of practice never consistently exceeds five hours per day (Ericsson, 1996; Ericsson et al., 1993). The limit of four to five hours of daily deliberate practice or similarly demanding activities holds true for a wide range of elite performers in different domains, such as writing by famous authors (Cowley, 1959; Plimpton, 1977), as does their increased tendency to take recuperative naps. Furthermore, unless the daily levels of practice are restricted, such that subsequent rest and nighttime sleep allow the individuals to restore their equilibrium, individuals often encounter overtraining injuries and, eventually, incapacitating burnout. Development and Adaptation of Expertise: The Role of Self-Regulatory Processes and Beliefs The attainment of expertise in diverse fields requires more than nascent talent, initial task interest, and high-quality instruction; it also involves personal initiative, diligence, and especially practice. Both the quality and quantity of an experts practice have been linked directly to acquisition and maintenance of high levels of performance. Regarding its quality, the practice of experts is characterized by its conscious deliberate properties namely, a high level of concentration and the structuring of specific training tasks to facilitate setting appropriate personal goals, monitoring informative feedback, and providing opportunities for repetition and error correction. Deliberate attention (i.e., strategic awareness) is believed to be necessary to overcome prior habits, to selfmonitor accurately, and to determine necessary adjustments. Although a skilled teacher typically structures these desirable dimensions of practice episodes, a student must implement them on his or her own before returning to the teacher for evaluation and new assignments. Expert musicians rated both lessons with their teacher and their solitary practice as two keys to their improvement, but only the latter was solely under their control . Interestingly, the quantity of deliberate practice, but not total amount of musicrelated activity, was predictive of the musicians acquisition and maintenance of expert performance. Ericsson (2003) has discussed a persons attempts to acquire expertise as deliberate problem solving because they involve forming a cognitive representation of the task, choosing appropriate techniques or strategies, and evaluating ones effectiveness. These properties of deliberate practice (e.g., task analysis, goal setting, strategy choice, self-monitoring, self-evaluations, and adaptations) have been studied as key components of self-regulation. Self-regulation is defined formally as self-generated thoughts, feelings, and actions that are strategically planned and adapted to the attainment of personal goals (Zimmerman, 1989).

Feedback from ones performance is used cyclically to make strategic adjustments in future efforts. Expertise involves self-regulating three personal elements: ones covert cognitive and affective processes, behavioral performance, and environmental setting. These triadic elements are selfregulated during three cyclical phases: forethought, performance, and selfreflection (see also Feltovich, Prietula, & Ericsson, Chapter 4, Expertise is Reftective). Expertise is defined as a sequence of mastered challenges with increasing levels of difficulty in specific areas of functioning (Ericsson, 2003). In this chapter, the terms expert and novice refer to high or low positions respectively on this continuum of task difficulty, without limiting the term expertise to the pinnacle of performance. Expertise involves more than self-regulatory competence; it also involves task knowledge and performance skill. Self-regulatory processes can assist a person to acquire both knowledge and skill more effectively, but improvements in ones use of self-regulatory processes will not immediately produce high levels of expertise. What then is the role of self-regulatory processes in the development of expertise? A Social Cognitive View of Self-Regulation From this perspective, expertise develops from both external support and self-directed practice sessions. A childs acquisition of expertise in both common and more esoteric activities emerges from modeling, instruction, monitoring, and guidance activities by his or her parents, teachers, and peers within the social milieu of the family, the school, and the community. Because high levels of skill must be practiced and adapted personally to dynamic contexts, aspiring experts need to develop a selfdisciplined approach to learning and practice to gain consistency (Nicklaus, 1974). As children attain higher levels of performance, parents and teachers gradually eliminate external supports (Glaser, 1996). Parental activities that foster childrens selfregulatory control of learning have been found to increase the social and cognitive competence of the children. Social cognitive researchers view selfregulatory competence as involving three elements: selfregulating ones covert personal processes, behavioral performance, and environmental setting (Bandura, 1986). Successful learners monitor and regulate these triadic elements in a strategically coordinated and adaptive manner. Because each of these triadic elements fluctuates during the course of learning and performance, it must be monitored and evaluated using a separate self-oriented feedback loop, which is depicted in Figure 39.1 (Zimmerman, 1989). During behavioral self-regulation, an individual self-observes and strategically adjusts his or her overt performance, such as when a tennis player double faults when serving and decides to adjust his or her ball toss. With environmental self-regulation, a person observes and adjusts his or her environmental conditions or outcomes, such as when a golfer has trouble with sun glare and decides to wear sunglasses. During covert self-regulation, an individual monitors and adjusts cognitive and affective states, such as when a basketball player begins to choke under pressure

and decides to form a relaxing mental image to counteract the pressure. For all three selfregulatory elements, peoples accuracy and constancy in self-monitoring of outcomes positively influence the effectiveness of their strategic adjustments and the nature of theirself-beliefs, such as perceptions of selfefficacy their self-belief in their capability to perform effectively. The latter belief, in turn, is a major source of motivation to self-regulate ones functioning (Bandura, 1997; Zimmerman, 1995), and its cyclical role during self-regulation, along with that of other key self-motivational beliefs, is discussed next.

Figure 39.1. Triadic forms of self-regulation. From A social cognitive view of self-regulated academic learning, by Barry J. Zimmerman, 1989, Journal of Educational Psychology, 81, p. 330. Copyright 1989 by the American Psychological Association. Adapted with permission. A Cyclical Phase View of Self-Regulatory Processes and Motivational Beliefs To explain self-enhancing cycles of learning, social cognitive researchers (Bandura, 1991; Zimmerman, 2000) have proposed that self-regulatory processes are linked to key selfmotivational beliefs during three cyclical phases: forethought, performance control, and selfreflection (see Figure 39.2). The forethought phase involves learning processes and motivational beliefs that precede and can enhance efforts to learn, practice, and perform. The performance phase involves use of processes to improve the quality and quantity of learning, practice, and performance, and the self-reflection phase involves processes that occur after efforts to learn, practice, or perform that influence a learners cognitive and behavioral reactions to that experience. These self-reflections, in turn,

influence a persons forethought processes and beliefs regarding subsequent learning, which completes the self-regulatory cycle. Although all learners attempt to self-regulate their personal functioning in some way, developing experts focus proactively on learning processes (i.e., as a means to an end) during the forethought and performance control phases, rather than only reactively on personal outcomes during self-reflection.

Figure 39.2 . Phases and subprocesses of self-regulation. From Motivating self-regulated problem solvers, by B. J. Zimmerman & M. Campillo, 2003, in J. E. Davidson & R. J. Sternberg (Eds.), The nature of problem solving (p. 239). New York: Cambridge University Press. Copyright by Cambridge University Press. Reprinted with permission. Forethought phase To prepare to perform at their desired level, aspiring learners or their instructors analyze the learning tasks in order to set appropriate practice goals and plan an effective strategy for attaining those goals (Ericsson, 1996). The self-regulatory process of goal setting refers to specifying intended actions or outcomes (Locke & Latham, 2002). Experts set more specific technique or processes goals for themselves than non-experts. For example, experts reported technique goals such as toss the ball properly, whereas non-experts reported general goals such as concentrate, and novice learners fail to set goals for themselves at all. In other research, learners who set a combination of process and outcome strategies performed better than learners who set singular goals.

Process goals refer to improving ones strategy or technique, whereas outcome goals refer to enhancing the results of performance, such as points won or applause from an audience. An exclusive focus on outcome goals can detract from ones technique on an athletic task (Zimmerman & Kitsantas, 1996), and coaches often try to alter this mind-set. Strategic planning refers to decisions about how one can accomplish a particular goal, and there is evidence that experts select more technique-oriented strategies. For example, Natalie Coughlin is an extraordinary American swimmer who broke four world records during 2002 and was a gold medallist in the 2004 Olympics in Athens. She credits her success to her staunch work ethic and her strategic planning. Her practice strategy focuses on swimming technique rather than brute effort. Theres so much technique involved in swimming . . .Youre constantly manipulating the water. The slightest change of pitch in your hand makes the biggest difference (Grudowski, August, 2003, p. 73). As a result of her disciplined practice strategy, she could complete each leg of her races with fewer but more efficient strokes, which gives her exceptional stamina. In support of Coughlins strategic planning, researchers have found that learners use of technique-oriented strategies significantly improves their athletic and academic learning (Zimmerman & Kitsantas, 1996; 1999). The willingness of talented youths to engage in effective forms of goal setting and strategy use depends on their high levels of motivation (Bloom, 1985), and coaches and expert performers have ranked desire to succeed as the most important factor for eventual success in a domain (Starkes, Deakin, Allard, Hodges, & Hayes, 1996). Social cognitive researchers have identified four key self-motivational beliefs that underlie efforts to self-regulate: self-efficacy, outcome expectations, task interest/ valuing, and goal orientation. Learners with high self-efficacy beliefs have been found to set higher goals for themselves (Zimmerman, Bandura, & Martinez-Pons, 1992) and are more committed to those goals than learners with low selfefficacy beliefs. Outcome expectations refer to self-motivational beliefs about the ultimate ends of learning, practice, and performance, such as Geena Davis hope of making the Olympic team. Because successful learners view strategic processes as effective means to an end, they are motivated more by the attraction of positive outcomes of these processes than by the fear of adverse outcomes (Pintrich, 2000). Outcomes that reflect increases in ones learning competence have been found to increase the perceived value of a task (Karniol & Ross, 1977; Zimmerman, 1985). Because of their valuing of a task, experts are more motivated to continue striving, even in the absence of tangible rewards (Kitsantas & Zimmerman, 2002). A mastery or learning goal orientation refers to self-motivational beliefs about valuing learning progress more than achievement outcomes (Ames, 1992). There is evidence that students with strong learning goals display higher levels of cognitive engagement and performance on learning tasks than students with weak learning goals. Performance phase

Experts advantageous goals, strategic planning, and motivational beliefs during the forethought phase lead to the self-controlled and self-observed implementation of these strategies, methods, or techniques during the performance phase. However, forethought phase task analyses that are superficial or inaccurate, like those of many novices, can lead to ineffective or even counterproductive efforts to control performance phase processes. Because strategies vary in their situational effectiveness, they must be constantly self-observed and adjusted, which is the second class of performance phase processes. The first self-control process to be discussed is self-instruction. This form of selftalk refers to vocal or subvocal guidance of ones performance, and there is evidence of its effectiveness in enhancing academic (Meichenbaum, 1977; Schunk, 1986) and athletic (Hardy, Gammage, & Hall, 2001) expertise. For example, with athletes who have trouble controlling their negative outbursts, Loehr (1991), a sports psychologist at the elite Nick Bolletierri Tennis academy, recommended listing all of their negative responses and finding a positive alternative for each one, such as saying let it go or come on (p. 47) when they lose a point. However, selfdirective verbalizations must be adapted to task outcomes and generally should be faded as a skill is mastered (Meichenbaum, 1977), or they can limit further improvement (Zimmerman & Bell, 1972). The self-regulatory process of imagery is used to create or recall vivid mental images to assist learning and performance. Athletic performers who imagine themselves as successful have reported higher levels of motivation and performance than those who do not use this technique. Task strategies refer to advantageous methods for learning or performing particular tasks. In the domain of academic learning, an extensive number of task strategies, such as mnemonics, cognitive maps, note-taking, and outlines, have been found to be effective (e.g., Schneider & Pressley, 1997; Weinstein & Mayer, 1986). Often task strategies are domain specific in their scope and are context specific in their effectiveness. For example, the concert pianist Alicia de la Rocha used the practice strategy of playing difficult passages very slowly and very softly to improve her technique (Mach, 1991). As her technique on a passage became proficient, she modified her strategy and began practicing at normal speed. This illustrates the issue discussed earlier: The utility of a particular strategy needs to be carefully monitored to ensure its optimal utilization. Time management refers to estimating and budgeting ones use of time (Zimmerman, Greenberg, &Weinstein, 1994), and experts often structure their practice and work time carefully. For example, to improve the quantity and quality of his writing, the German poet Goethe recommended, Use the day before the day. Early morning hours have gold in their mouth (Murray, 1990, p. 16). Although professional writers differ in the timing of their optimal states for writing (such as the morning), those who structure their writing time have reported evidence of its effectiveness. Among student instrumental musicians, high achievers in annual competitions have reported a greater amount of practice time than low achievers (McPherson & Zimmerman, 2002). Thus, time management can involve regulation of both the quality and quantity of time use.

It should be noted that implementation of these self-control strategies often involves significant others, such as parents and teachers. The self-regulatory process of adaptive help seeking is defined as choosing specific models, teachers, or books to assist oneself to learn (Newman, 1994). For example, parents often structure practice environments for talented youth, and master teachers coach students how to improve their practice techniques. Among expert musicians, the concert pianist Janina Fialkowska frequently sought out Arthur Rubinstein as an exemplary model. He couldnt tell me how to do something, but he could demonstrate how it should sound . . . So when Id play something that wasnt up to par, he became very exasperated, and believe me he became exasperated very easily. Then hed kick me off the bench and play it the way he thought it should be played (Mach, 1991, pp. 7980). Environmental structuring, which refers to selecting or creating effective settings for learning or performance, is another important self-control process. For example, students who had difficulty concentrating during studying were taught how to create an effective study environment where daydreaming, eating, or other off-task behaviors were excluded and where a structured study method and self-reinforcement were included (Fox, 1962). All the students in the study reported increases in their grade points of at least one letter grade. These favorable results of environmental structuring were replicated a decade later (Beneke & Harris, 1972). Experts are very sensitive to the impact of their surroundings on quality and quantity of their functioning. For example, the French poet and novelist Cendrars described his need to write in a quiet undistracted place, such as an enclosed room with the window shade pulled down. The American bike racer Lance Armstrong prepared himself to win the Tour de France in the mountainous sections of the racecourse by sleeping in a low oxygen tent to adapt himself physiologically to those conditions ahead of time (Lehrer, 2001, July 30). The key self-observation processes during the performance phase are metacognitive monitoring and self-recording, which refer respectively to mentally tracking or physically recording ones performance. Experts observe the implementation and effectiveness of their self-control processes and outcomes more systematically than non-experts or novices. Metacognitive self-monitoring is difficult for novices because the amount of information involved in complex performances can easily overwhelm and can lead to inconsistent or superficial tracking. Experts are selective in their cognitive self-monitoring during practice because of the specificity of their learning, practice, and performance goals (Abrahams, 2001). Experts recall of information about a completed task has been found to be more accurate and complete than that of novices and less accomplished individuals in the same domain (Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995). Experts are also more likely to recall pertinent or substantial information that is pitched at a higher level of abstraction (see also Feltovich et al., Chapter 4, Expertise Involves Functional, Abstracted Representations). The legendary golfer Bobby Jones (1966) described his method of monitoring as follows, It has never been possible for me to think of more than two or three details of the swing and still hit the ball correctly . . . The two or three are not always the same, sometime a mans swing will be functioning so well he need worry about nothing (p. 203). Experts can improve the accuracy of their self-observations by self-recording their progress (see also, Deakin, C ot e, & Harvey, Chapter 17). Literary experts, such as Trollope (1905) and

Hemingway (Wallace & Pear, 1977), were acutely aware of the value of self-recording in enhancing the quantity of their literary output and consistently utilized this technique. A persons records are more effective if they track not only his or her performance but also the conditions that surround it, and the results that it produces (Zimmerman & Paulsen, 1995; Ericsson, 1996). Unfortunately, novices often self-record in a cursory and inaccurate way (Hallam, 1997). However, it should be noted that record keeping can be time consuming, and as a result, its effectiveness needs to be monitored carefully. After a skill has been mastered to a personally acceptable level, people can often cease record keeping unless problems arise (Zimmerman & Paulsen, 1995). Self-reflection phase Experts increase the accuracy of their feedback by generating self-evaluative standards for themselves (Hamery, 1976). Selfevaluation judgments compare self-observed information with one of three types of standards or criteria: (a) a self-improvement criterion (e.g., comparing current efforts to ones best previous effort), (b) a social comparison criterion (e.g., comparing ones efforts to those of competitors), or (c) a mastery criterion (e.g., comparing ones performance to a national record). Self-evaluations are not automatic outcomes of performance but, rather, depend on an individuals selection and interpretation of an appropriate criterion (Bandura, 1991). When self-evaluative standards are too high or too low, peoples learning and performance is diminished (Schunk, 1983a). Conversely, individuals who fail to set challenging standards for themselves have displayed lower levels of performance than persons who challenged themselves (Locke & Latham, 2002). A second self-judgment that is hypothesized to play a pivotal role in self-reflection involves the causal attribution of errors. For example, when errors are attributed to uncontrollable sources, such as an opponents luck, learners display negative selfreactions and diminished attainment of skill. By contrast, when errors are attributed to controllable sources, such as ones strategies, learners experience positive self-reactions and increased skill (Zimmerman&Kitsantas, 1999). Expert golfers have exhibited this favorable pattern of attributions when discussing differences between good and bad rounds. They tend to discount the possibility that chance factors played an important role (Kirschenbaum, OConnor, & Owens, 1999) and instead attribute their errors to personally controllable processes, such as poor concentration, tenseness, poor imagination and feel (McCaffrey & Orlick, 1989). The swimmer Natalie Coughlin put it this way, In general, Im pretty inwardly focused . . . I like to concentrate on my stroke and do my race, because thats all I can control (Grudowski, August, 2003, p. 73). Novices are prone to attributing causation for errors to such uncontrollable sources as a lack of ability, task difficulty, or bad luck Cleary & Zimmerman, 2001; Kitsantas & Zimmerman, 2002). These unfortunate attributions occur because of novices poor self-regulatory processes and beliefs during the forethought and performance phases, such as vague goal setting, non-strategic efforts to learn, and low perceptions of selfefficacy (Bandura, 1991). Self-evaluation and attribution selfjudgments are closely linked to two key self-reactions: selfsatisfaction and adaptive inferences. Perceptions of self-satisfaction or dissatisfaction and

associated emotions, such as elation or depression, regarding ones practice or performance influence the courses of action that people pursue, such as expertise in writing (Zimmerman & Bandura, 1994). In general, self-satisfaction reactions are positively related to subsequent sources of motivation (e.g., Zimmerman & Kitsantas, 1997; 1999), but there is anecdotal evidence that expert writers increase their self-evaluative standards as they progress, which initially decreases their satisfaction. For example, the American novelist William Faulkner warned that a writer must never be satisfied with what he (sic) does. It never is as good as it can be (Stein, 1959, p. 123). Clearly, selfsatisfaction is not an automatic outcome of performance; rather, it depends on peoples self-judgment standards as well as their forethought goals. Adaptive or defensive inferences refer to self-reactions about how to alter ones self-regulatory approach during subsequent efforts to learn or perform. There is evidence (Kitsantas & Zimmerman, 2002) that experts are more adaptive, rather than defensive, in their self-reactions, preferring to adjust their strategy rather than to avoid the task. Adaptive inferences guide learners to new and potentially more effective forms of performance self-regulation, whereas defensive inferences serve primarily to protect the person from future dissatisfaction and aversive affect (Garcia & Pintrich, 1994). Personal adaptations can lead to extraordinary outcomes, such as those of the bike racer Lance Armstrong. After a lifethreatening bout with cancer and physical debilitation from chemotherapy, Armstrong had to alter his bicycle training methods to minimize pedal resistance (which taxes leg strength), so he adapted by increasing pedal speed (which taxes aerobic capacity). As he improved his aerobic capacity, this adaptation became an advantage over his competitors, especially in mountainous stretches of the racecourse (Lehrer, 2001). Adaptive inferences during practice experiences are affected by other self-reflection phase beliefs, such as attributions and perceptions of satisfaction with ones progress, as well as by forethought phase self-efficacy beliefs and by performance phase selfcontrol strategies. By attributing errors to specific learning methods, experts sustain their self-satisfaction and foster variations in their methods until they discover an improved version (Cleary & Zimmerman, 2001). In contrast, novices attribution of unfavorable results to uncontrollable factors leads to dissatisfaction and undermines further adaptive efforts. In this way, the strategic process goals of experts lead cyclically to greater self-satisfaction and more effective forms of adaptation. The latter outcomes were correlated with their forethought self-motivational beliefs, goals, and strategy choices regarding further efforts to learn (Kitsantas & Zimmerman, 2002). Research on Experts Use of Cyclical Self-Regulatory Processes There were no significant differences between experts and non-experts in their frequency of practice, playing experience, and knowledge of free-throw shooting techniques, but there were significant differences in their methods of self-regulation during practice. As expected, novices differed from experts and non-experts on all variables except age. It was found that experts set more specific goals, selected more technique-oriented strategies, made more attributions to strategy use, and displayed higher levels of self-efficacy than either nonexperts or novices. When asked to selfreflect after two consecutive misses, freethrow experts were more mindful of their specific, technique-oriented flaws than boys in the other two groups. Although 60% of the experts indicated that they needed to focus on their techniques (i.e., to keep my elbow in, to follow through) in order to make the next shot, only 20% of the nonexperts and 7% of the

novices mentioned this type of strategy. Non-experts preferred strategies related to the rhythm of shooting and general focus strategies (e.g., to concentrate or to try harder) for a majority (i.e., 53%) of their responses. Unfortunately, these self-reflections do not correct faulty techniques because they divert attention away from essential athletic form processes. We found that goal setting was correlated with choice of strategy. Athletes who set outcomespecific goals (e.g., to make ten out of ten) were more likely to select specific techniqueoriented strategies (e.g., to follow through), whereas those athletes setting outcome-general goals (e.g., to make them) were more likely to select general technique strategies (e.g., to concentrate on my form). It appears that teaching athletes to set specific goals can lead to their selection of specific strategies to achieve those goals. A key finding about the self-reflection phase was that the boys attributions of errors to strategies were predictive of the boys forethought strategy selections during further efforts to learn. For example, boys who attributed their failure to specific techniques (i.e., I missed the last two shots because my elbow was going to the left) were more likely to select a specific technique-oriented strategy to improve their shooting accuracy (e.g., I need to keep my elbow in). Overall, this study revealed highly significant differences in the quality of self-regulation during self-directed practice efforts by high school basketball players of varying ability. Experts were more focused on specific shooting processes during goal setting, strategic planning, and selfreflecting than non-experts or novices, and they were more self-efficacious about their performance. Development of Greater Expertise through Multi-Phase Self-Regulatory Training Although there was unambiguous evidence of superior self-regulation during athletic practice by experts, the causal role of these self-regulatory processes and beliefs in the development of expertise is another issue. To develop free-throw expertise of male and female college students, Cleary, Zimmerman, and Keating (in press) trained them to shoot basketball free-throws more effectively during their physical education classes. The participants assigned to a threephase self-regulation group were instructed to set technique goals (a forethought phase process), self-record (a performance phase process), and to make strategic attributions and adjustments following missed free throws (selfreflection phase processes). Setting technique goals involved focusing on properly executing the final four steps of the shooting process (i.e., grip, elbow position, knee bend, follow through) rather than on shooting outcomes. The examiner showed the participants a cue card delineating the process goal. This group was then taught how to use a self-recording form in order to monitor the step(s) of the strategy that they were focusing on while shooting the shots. This recording form also allowed the participants to monitor whether they missed any shots, the reasons for the missed shots, and strategies needed to make the next shot. In addition to this selfreflection phase training, the participants were taught how to link poor shots with one or more of the shooting techniques taught in the study. The participants assigned to the two-phase selfregulation group received the same forethought phase goal setting and performance phase selfrecording training as the three-phase group, but they were not instructed how to selfreflect.

The one-phase self-regulation group received instruction in only the forethought phase process of goal setting. There was also a practice-only control group and a no-practice control group, which did not receive selfregulation training. All of the participants were randomly assigned to one of the five conditions and were tested and trained individually by an experimenter It was expected that one-phase training would influence subsequent phases of self-regulation, and two-phase training would influence self-reflection phase selfregulation to some degree due to the cyclical dependence of later phase processes on earlier phase processes, but we expected that total phase training, including explicit training in self-reflection phase processes, would be optimal. Thus, a positive linear relationship was predicted between the students free-throw shooting performance and the number of self-regulatory phases in which they were trained. The results revealed that there were no gender differences in learning and that there was in fact a linear relationship between amount of phase training and two key measures of learning: freethrow shooting accuracy and shooting adaptation. A more sensitive measure of shooting accuracy than simple making or missing the basket was developed. It involved earning one to five points for each shot according to the following criteria: (a) five points for swishing the shot (not hitting any part of the rim), (b) four points for making the shot after hitting the rim, (c) three points for hitting the front or back of the rim but not making the shot, (d) two points for hitting the side of the rim and not making the shot, and (e) one point for completely missing the rim or hitting the backboard first. A missed shot hitting the front or back of the rim earned more points (i.e., three points) than a missed shot hitting the sides of the rim (i.e., two points) because the former indicated greater accuracy. Shooting adaptation referred to the frequency of improvements on the next shot following a poor shot. The group means ranged in order from lowest to highest as was predicted: no practice control group, practice-only control group, one-phase training, two-phase training, and three-phase training. This suggested that not only did the participants who received multiple-phase selfregulation training show greater accuracy when shooting, but they were also able to improve on poor shots with a more successful throw on a more consistent basis than those individuals who received only one-phase or no selfregulation training. Furthermore, the threephase group and the two-phase group took significantly fewer practice shots than both the one-phase and practiceonly control groups, perhaps because they were called on to self-record their shooting techniques at various points during the practice session. Thus, the quality (i.e., defined in terms of selfregulatory sophistication) of these novices practice methods proved to be more important than the quantity of their practice (i.e., number of shots taken) (see also Ericsson, Chapter 38) This study focused particular attention on the effects of self-regulation training on the participants self-reflective phase self-judgments (i.e., attributions and selfevaluations) and selfreactions (i.e., adaptive inferences) to missed free throws because they reveal how these learners think about their failures as well as their ability to improve future performances. Learners who received three-phase training displayed the most adaptive motivational profile. For example, they evaluated their performance based on personal processes (e.g., use of correct strategy or personal improvement) more frequently (60%) than all other groups: two-phase group (10%), one-phase group (20%), practice-only control group (20%), and the no-practice control group (10%).

This is consistent with the self-regulation cyclical phase hypothesis that using a process criterion to evaluate performance is linked to learning or mastery goal orientation, which has been found to be related to a variety of motivational and achievement variables in sports (Fox, Goudas, Biddle, Duda, & Armstrong, 1994; Williams & Gill, 1995) and academic functioning (Ames, 1992; Pintrich, 2000). In terms of causal attributions and adaptive inferences, significantly more members of the multiphase training group focused on specific shooting techniques or strategies following missed free throws, such as not keeping my elbow in and not touching my elbow to my side as I shot the ball. In contrast, participants from the onephase training group or the practice control group often attributed their misses to general, non-technique factors, such as a lackof concentration or ability. These technique attributions and adaptive inferences were associated with more accurate shooting performance on the posttest and greater shooting adaptation during practice. Thus, these inexperienced free-throw shooters ability to improve their poor free-throw shots during practice was related to deficiencies in attributions and adapting these techniques during subsequent shot attempts. Focusing on controllable processes is important because it helps athletes become more aware of what and how they are doing something rather than simply their level of attained outcomes (Cleary & Zimmerman, 2001; Clifford, 1986). In another study of multi-phase selfregulatory training, Anastasia Kitsantas and I (Zimmerman & Kitsantas, 1997) examined the effects of multiple goal setting and self-recording on the dartthrowing performance and self-reflections with novice high school girls. Girls in a process goal group focused on practicing strategy steps for acquiring high-quality dart-throwing technique (e.g., the take-back, release, and follow-through positions). By contrast, girls in an outcome goal group focused on improving their scores. The bullseye on the target had the highest numerical value and the surrounding concentric circles declined in value. Previous research had demonstrated that process goals were more effective than outcome goals with novice dart throwers (Zimmerman & Kitsantas, 1996). From a multiple goal perspective, girls who shifted goals from processes to outcomes when automaticity was achieved should acquire more skill during practice than girls who adhere to only one goal (see Zimmerman, 2000). Automaticitywas operationally defined as performing the strategy steps without error for a specified number of dart-throwing trials. Self-recording was taught to half of the girls in each goal group. Girls in the processmonitoring group recorded any strategy steps they may have missed on each practice throw, whereas girls in the outcome monitoring group wrote down their target scores for each throw. Girls in the shiftinggoal group changed their method of selfmonitoring when they shifted goals. Before being asked to practice on their own, all of the girls were taught strategic components of the skill. Thus, the experiment compared the effects of process goals, outcome goals, and shifting goals as well as self-recording during self-directed practice. The results were supportive of the multiple goal hypothesis: Girls who shifted goals from processes to outcomes surpassed classmates who adhered solely to either process or outcome goals in posttest dart-throwing skill. Girls who focused on outcome goals exclusively were the lowest in dart-throwing skill. Self-monitoring assisted learning for all goal-setting groups. In

addition to their superior learning outcomes, girls who shifted their goals displayed superior forms of self-reflection than girls who adhered to either process or outcome goals exclusively. The former girls attributed more errors to controllable causes (i.e., to strategy use) and reported greater self-satisfaction than the latter girls. The girls in the shiftinggoal condition also exhibited superior forethought phase motivational beliefs: These girls reported more positive self-efficacy beliefs and greater interest in the dart throwing than girls who adhered exclusively to either process or outcome goals. The same researchers conducted another study of the effects of multiple-goal training and selfrecording on the writing skill of girls attending an academically challenging high school (Zimmerman & Kitsantas, 1999). The design of this study closely paralleled the dart-throwing study, but in this case, the task involved revising a series of writing problems drawn from a sentence-combining workbook. These exercises involved transforming a series of simple and often redundant kernel sentences into a single non-redundant sentence. For example, the sentences: It was a ball. The ball was striped. The ball rolled across the room could be rewritten as The striped ball rolled across the room. The entire group of experimental participants was initially taught a three-step writing revision strategy that involved identifying key information, deleting duplicate information, and combining the remaining words. During a practice session following training, girls in a process goal group focused on implementing the strategy for revising each writing task, whereas girls in an outcome goal group focused on decreasing the number of words in the revised passage, which was the main outcome criterion. Process goals, which focused on strategy steps, had been found to be more effective than outcome goals in prior writing research (Schunk & Swartz, 1993). As in the dart-throwing study (Zimmerman & Kitsantas, 1997), the most effective goal setting condition was expected to involve shifting from process goals to outcome goals when automaticity in performance was achieved. Half of the girls in each goal group were asked to selfrecord during practice. Girls in the process monitoring group recorded strategy steps they missed on each of a series of revision problems, whereas girls in the outcome monitoring group wrote down the number of words used on each problem. Girls in the shifting-goal group changed their method of self-monitoring when they shifted goals. The results were supportive of a multiple goal hypothesis. Girls who shifted forethought phase goals from processes to outcomes surpassed the writing revision skill of girls who adhered exclusively to process goals or to outcome goals. Girls who focused on outcomes exclusively displayed the lowest writing skill of the three goal groups. As in the dart-throwing study, selfrecording enhanced writing skill for all goal-setting groups. Forethought phase goals significantly increased the girls performance phase writing skill and also their self-reflection phase attributions to strategy use and their selfsatisfaction reactions. Performance phase selfrecording also enhanced the girls writing skill and self-reflection phase attributions and their self-satisfaction. The latter two self-reflection phase processes were predictive of increases in the girls task interest and self-efficacy beliefs regarding subsequent efforts to learn (i.e., their forethought). These findings provided further evidence of causality in cyclical relations among self-regulatory processes and selfmotivational beliefs.