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Childhood

The Sociology of Childhood as Scientific Communication: Observations from a social systems perspective
Michael King Childhood 2007 14: 193 DOI: 10.1177/0907568207078327 The online version of this article can be found at: http://chd.sagepub.com/content/14/2/193

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THE SOCIOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD AS SCIENTIFIC COMMUNICATION Observations from a social systems perspective
MICHAEL KING University of Reading Key words: children as agents, childrens autonomy, childrens rights, Luhmanns theory of social systems, new sociology of childhood, sociology of identity Mailing address: Michael King School of Law, University of Reading, Foxhill House, Whiteknights Road, Reading, RG6, 7BA, UK. [email: m.j.king@reading.ac.uk]
Childhood Copyright 2007 SAGE Publications. Los Angeles, London, New Delhi and Singapore, Vol 14(2): 193213. www.sagepublications.com 10.1177/0907568207078327

This article begins by identifying a close relationship between the image of children generated by several sociologists working within the new sociology of childhood perspective and the claims and ambitions of the proponents of childrens autonomy rights. The image of the child as a competent, self-controlled human agent are then subjected to observation from the perspective of Niklas Luhmanns social systems theory. The new sociology of childhoods constructivist approach is compared and contrasted with Niklas Luhmanns theory of operational constructivism. The article applies tenets of Luhmanns theory, to the emergence of the new childhood sociologists image of the child as a competent, self-controlled social agent, to the epistemological status of this image and, in particular, to claims that it derives from scientific endeavour. The article proceeds to identify two theoretical developments within sociology sociology of identity and social agency which have brought about fundamental changes in what may be considered sociological and so scientific and paved the way for sociological communications about what children really are. In conclusion, it argues that the merging of sociology with polemics, ideology, opinion and personal beliefs and, at the level of social systems, between science and politics represents in Luhmanns terms dedifferentiation a tendency he claims may have serious adverse consequences for modern society. This warning is applied to the scientific status of sociology its claim to be able to produce facts for society, upon which social systems, such as politics and law, may rely. Like the mass media, sociology may now be capable of producing only information, and not facts, about children.

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The new childhood sociology It would appear that academic sociology has now fully embraced into its fold the theoretical approaches to issues concerning children known in Englishspeaking countries as the new sociology of childhood. It is now over 10 years since this new perspective for the study of childhood and children first appeared on the sociological scene. During that time, it has consolidated its position, not only in the English-speaking world but also in Germany and Scandinavia, as the dominant theoretical framework, for anyone seeking a sociological understanding of childhood and children (see, for example, Corsaro, 1997; James and Prout, 1997; James et al., 1998; Jenks, 1996; Qvortrup et al., 1994).1 For a measure of its success one has only to open any recent social scientific book or article on an issue concerning children, where one is sure to find acknowledgements and references to theorists and researchers writing within this all-prevailing framework. In this article I wish to focus attention on those theoretical aspects of the new sociology of childhood that rely heavily upon the creation of a new image of the child. It may seem strange that so far they appear to have escaped any serious critical analysis from within sociology or social policy.2 This may in part be due to the current enthusiasm for childrens rights in legal and political circles. The suggestion here is that there may well be some disinclination generally to make adverse comments about any sociological account of children and childhood that promotes and maintains an image of children, as people in their own right, lest such criticisms are interpreted as encouraging a return to paternalistic attitudes towards children with all their authoritarian connotations. Moreover, anyone who subjects this view of children to critical comment, may also risk being seen as doubting childrens competence to make decisions for themselves or, worse still, as a childrens rights sceptic. As far as sociological theorists specifically are concerned, there could also be some reluctance to criticize a theoretical approach that had successfully dethroned those functionalists and developmental psychologists who had for so long thoroughly dominated the study of children and childhood. One of the difficulties faced by the new sociology of childhood has been that of establishing a clear demarcation line between what claims to be a new theoretical understanding of children and the discourse of childrens rights. Clearly, it would be naive to suggest that the simultaneous occurrence of this renewed theoretical interest in childhood and the growth of childrens rights as a global phenomenon was a mere coincidence.3 The two relate to each other symbiotically in that, the more competent and autonomous children appear to be, the more unjustified adults paternalism and the refusal to recognize childrens capabilities appear and the more appropriate it is for children to be given similar rights to adults (see, for example, Alderson, 2000; Lansdown, 1995, 2001). It is, therefore, not surprising to find some childhood researchers welcoming this new sociological theory as a scientific bolster to 194

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the campaign for enhancing childrens rights and countering what they identify as societys mistreatment and undervaluation of children, for example:
. . . we need a sociology of childhood . . . to draw attention to certain neglected features of childhood, to provide a better account of how the social order works; and to use this knowledge as a basis for righting childrens wrongs. (Mayall, 2000: 246)

Such a blatantly instrumental use of theory may not be typical of those researchers who apply this new approach to children and childhood. However, it does typify their widely expressed belief that their theoretical approach is able to provide a better understanding of childhood and introduce a firmer scientific basis for policy issues based upon recognition of the capacity of children for autonomy, competent decision-making and of their role as social agents.4 Even if some of the new childhood theorists do attempt to distance their theory of childhood from the rhetoric of childrens rights,5 it cannot be denied that in the writings of many English-speaking new sociologists of childhood the two are intricately interconnected (see, for example, Alderson, 2000; Corsaro, 1997; James and Prout, 1990; James et al., 1998; Prout and James, 1997). Seen in the context of the widening of the boundaries of sociology and the relaxation of its criteria for research validity,6 the closeness between demands for childrens autonomy rights and the evidence of competence and agency generated by the results of research applying a new sociology of childhood perspective might well raise concerns. An interesting and original way of observing sociologically such relationships between disciplines or discourses that has emerged in recent years is Niklas Luhmanns theory of autopoietic systems. In the remainder of this article I present an account of aspects of this theory and the ways in which it may be applied in order to observe, from a systems perspective, the development within sociology of this particular theoretical stance with regard to childhood and children. As a matter of shorthand, I continue to refer to this theoretical stance as that of the new sociology of childhood, although I am aware that some of those who work within the childhood sociology framework may well reject in whole or in part the claims of the construction of an explicit or exclusive image of childhood autonomy, competence and agency. Social construction and Luhmannian systems theory The social construction of childhood and children Like so many social theoretical critiques of the taken-for-granted world, the new sociology of childhood relies heavily upon a social constructionist approach (see James et al., 1998: 8; James and Prout, 1997: 3). Indeed, one of the new sociologists of childhood describes the social constructionist nature of childhood as one of the key features of the theory (James and Prout, 1997: 10). The notion that childhood is a constructed concept may well seem uncontroversial. As Ian Hacking points out, it could mean simply that the idea

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of childhood has been constructed, but it could also mean that a certain state of person, or even a period in the life of a human being has been constructed. Some thinkers, he adds, may even mean that children as they exist today have been constructed (Hacking, 1999: 102). The new childhood sociologists base their theory on this third proposition, that children should be regarded as constructions of their particular society. Clearly, they are not suggesting that children do not exist as physical entities or that their existence depends upon whether or not people believe that they exist. Rather, the argument is that what a society expects of children, the way that they are perceived, what is seen as good or bad for them and what they are competent or incompetent to perform depends upon the particular concept of childhood that society has constructed. There is no definitive or universal account of what childhood is or what children should be. All is relative and depends upon the particular constructions of childhood of different societies or of the same society at different times and the expectations associated with children (and adults) resulting from these constructions. When this notion of a constructed childhood was first proposed by Aris (1962), it may have been a surprising proposition, but it was seen as not an unreasonable one. However, the new childhood sociologists, or at least some of them, have taken the construction idea much further. They argue that by revealing (or deconstructing) the artificial nature of these constructions and the power interests that are being served by their existence, sociologists, such as themselves, are able to gain access to the truth about childrens social relationships or, at least, to take themselves and us closer to that truth, independent of the perspective and concerns of adults.7 According to them, therefore, the truth about childrens understanding of the world around them is accessible and, moreover, sociologists of childhood are able to assist in the task of gaining access to it, first through its theoretical deconstructionist accounts and, second, through the facts about children revealed in the research carried out by those who apply their theory. According to them, therefore, the truth about children is accessible and, moreover, sociology is able to assist in the task of gaining access to it, first through its theoretical deconstructionist accounts and, second, through the facts about children revealed in the research carried out by those who apply their theory. Luhmannian systems theory Niklas Luhmanns theory of social systems also relies upon a constructionist account of society (e.g. King, 1993; King and Schtz, 1994; Luhmann, 1995; Mingers; 2002; Sciulli, 1994; Teubner, 1993; Vanderstraeten, 2000), but his constructionism takes a very different form. His general approach portrays society as consisting, not of individuals, but of communications that are organized socially within societal systems. Society is the sum total of all meaningful communications. The system of society consists of communications. There are no other elements; there is no further substance but communications 196

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(Luhmann, 1990a: 100). Events in the world are random, contingent and chaotic. Through these systems, and only through these systems, is the impression of order, understanding and control within society possible. Each of societys subsystems (social systems) codes its otherwise inaccessible environment in ways that enable it to formulate and generate meaningful communications. The organization of societys subsystems has been subjected to radical change over the centuries. Modern society stands in sharp contrast to traditional societies in that it has no central core and no hierarchical structure; instead it is organized according to functional differentiation. Each of those systems that are functional to the organization of meaningful communications for society (science, law, politics, economy, etc.) has its unique, non-replicable function, which determines the form and nature of its communications. Each exist within the environment of the other systems to be reconstituted within those systems according to their own unique ways of processing their world. There can, therefore, be no direct, inputoutput, communication between them only structural coupling, the co-evolution of different systems (King and Thornhill, 2003: 323).8 Operational constructivism One way of entering Luhmanns complex theory is through operational constructivism a concept which Luhmann sets out in his book The Reality of the Mass Media (Luhmann, 2000: 6), but which is also to be found in various guises throughout his theoretical writings. The approach to social phenomena that Luhmann adopts in his theory of operational constructivism contrasts sharply with that of the new sociology of childhood, which applies social construction selectively. It claims access to the reality of modern childhood that corresponds to the perceptions, beliefs, capacities and understandings of children themselves. Luhmanns theory does not deny the existence of reality there is a world out there, but it sees this world as accessible only through the medium of societys social systems. In other words, it can never be observed directly. The world is not an object but rather a horizon in the phenomenological sense (Luhmann, 1990a: 32). What reality is depends entirely on the different ways that it can be described and accounted for within a society consisting of social systems. Operational constructivism does not attempt to present reality, but describes rather how other systems undertake this task. It starts, therefore, from a very different position both to that of social scientists, who accept the idea of ultimately accessible truth, and that of the relativists, who believe that social reality is a construct of those individuals, groups and cultures who believe in and rely upon it, and see their task as exposing the myths and delusions that form the basis of their constructions. Operational constructivism by contrast sees any systems version of reality as a product of that systems operations. Moreover, it treats these operations themselves as constructions of the system. Systems then construct their version of the external environment reality using specific codes and programmes, which they themselves construct. 197

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From the perspective of operational constructivism, it is not possible for society to communicate about childrens bodies or childrens minds without the intermediary of some social communication system. Any observations of children are always then second order observations (see next subsection), that is observations by way of an observing system, which may then communicate what it observes. There can be no facts about children in society, only observations that may or may not be accepted by other systems in society as facts. Observing systems If one envisages a system observing the external world, reality for that system consists of what it takes to be its environment, that is, the world, including other systems and what it understands as its own identity within that environment. This means that it can observe itself and its own operations only from within its own boundaries, that is from its own limited perspective. It requires a second observing system to be able to see the first system observing its environment, that is seeing both the system and environment from a position outside the first observing system. Put another way, only a second observing system can identify the ways in which the first system makes sense of its environment. Yet even what a second order observing system may take to be facts or reality is just as much constructed as the beliefs and assumptions of the first system the system that it is observing. In other words, this second order observer is no more entitled to claim access to objective reality than the first. Indeed, it would be possible for a third observing system to identify the limited vision of the second system in its observing operations. Its observations would appear no less an artifice of that systems own making as those of the second observing system. No matter at what order or level observations take place, therefore, there can be no all-perceiving, all-knowing system that is able to provide ultimate truths about the world. Communications and communicating What then is the nature of the social systems upon which different versions of social reality depend? As I have explained, within Luhmanns version of social systems theory, society consists only of communication, where communication means the process of transferring meaningful information; it occurs only when someone watches listens, reads and understands to the extent that further communication could follow on (Luhmann, 1990a: 4). Anything that takes place outside society has necessarily to be transformed into a communication before it can become part of society and society consists of the sum total of communicable meaning. Social systems in the generic sense may be defined, therefore, as different ways of communicating, of giving communicable meaning to what otherwise would be regarded as mere noise. The essential point is that anything that takes place outside society, that is outside the universe of communicable meaning, has necessarily to be transformed into a communication before it 198

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can become part of society and, as indicated earlier, this can be achieved only by social systems. Luhmann further distinguishes between different types of communication, depending upon the location in which they are uttered. These are: 1. Interactional the transient communications between individuals, which may at some later stage be reconstructed in a more permanent form (for example, writing, print, film or collective memory) as organizational or societal communications. 2. Organizational these include communications within businesses, universities, courts, ministries, factories, parliaments, financial markets as well as less formal bodies such as families, sports teams, clubs, etc. The communications within these organizations may go beyond mere interactions and take on an institutional nature, that is they may convey information that has significance for all members of the organization. 3. Societal that is uttered or produced by societys social function systems. These are very specifically those subsystems that at any one time organize those meanings and understandings necessary for society to exist as society and to reproduce itself. It is on these systems that the continued existence of society depends. In modern society, they include politics, law, economics, science and education. While these systems (like all systems) are closed and self-referring, the operations of each of them are dependent upon the communications produced by the other systems. Of particular concern to the issues to be raised by this article, is the dependence of both law and politics upon scientific communications, on which they rely for facts. They need scientific facts to justify and legitimate their own communications, which take the form respectively of legal decisions and legislation. Communications about children In the terms of the theory, any communicable statements about children, their nature, their capabilities and the difference between them and adults are necessarily, therefore, products of a system. From a Luhmannian standpoint, such communications concerning children could well be seen as emanating from a system of pedagogy or (using the French term) ducation, which makes it possible to communicate about the specific period of life between birth and adulthood. Such communications are achieved by reducing and transforming the myriad of complexities, contradictions and indeterminacies into a coherent and consistent account of what children are, what they need, how they differ from adults, what causes them to develop in different ways, and how adults may influence and control these causes, etc. The system of pedagogy thus codes its environment into the binary code children/adults, so that everything that it sees as existing in its environment enters the system in these binary terms either it pertains to children or it pertains to adults. There are always 199

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present within this system differing accounts of, for example, childrens true nature, childrens needs or childrens abilities. These constitute the systems programmes, enabling it to process its environment in a meaningful way to produce understandable communications about children and their behaviour. Its programmes may include any of a wide range of conceptual frameworks or, in Luhmanns terms, programmes. Examples range from psychoanalytic theories, religious constructs of children as inherently good or inherently bad, childrens rights or, for that matter, any social theory that conceptualizes childhood or children in particular ways. Seen in these terms, the current discourse on childrens autonomy and their rights to self-expression and participation in decisions represents one such programme within modern society. It is a programme that emphasizes childrens capacity for agency or to act in adult-like ways. In doing so it minimizes differences between them and adults, while at the same time retaining the children/adults distinction as the binary code of the system. The new sociology of childhood represents the reproduction within sociology, a reconstitution in scientific terms, of a programme of pedagogy, which generates images of children as competent beings to whom autonomy is denied by adults. In this way it hopes to be able to gain societal acceptance for its communications. Its image of children is accompanied by a parallel image of adults as people who subject children to frustration and oppression by failing to recognize and denying them their agency and autonomy. The reconstruction of these images of children and adults within scientific, sociological theory means that it cannot be dismissed merely as ideology, idealism or polemic. As sociological theory, the notion of childrens competence and potential for autonomy contained in these images is insulated against counter-images from other disciplines, such as psychology or from the subjective experiences of children expressed by parents, teachers and so on. In Luhmanns terms, a self-referring theory need only take notice of evidence that it itself regards as pertinent and legitimate to its own account of reality, that is to communications that it recognizes as belonging to itself in this case sociological communications about childhood and children. Some readers may wish to ask at this point how this pedagogic programme came to be accepted as scientific. Suffice it to refer at this stage to the absence of any overriding authority in modern society and the consequent ability of each function system to determine its own boundaries. Thus only law can decide what law is, only politics can determine what is and what is not a political issue and only science is capable of defining what is meant by scientific. The definition of this new theory of childhood as sociology is thus self-evident by its acceptance within sociological books and journals. If the communications of sociology are treated by social science as scientific, the theory and the results of research into childhood and children generated by theory may also be treated as scientific. They may be taught and examined in schools and universities and referred to in the media as existing within the 200

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scientific discipline of sociology. They become scientific communications rather than political or legal communications or mere statements of personal values or opinions. As scientific communications they may, in Luhmanns terms, be relied upon to provide the truth and facts on which other systems in society, law, politics, education, family, economics, depend. Indeed, the way in which childhood sociologists define their task certainly indicates that they believe themselves to be engaged in a scientific enterprise. The new sociology of childhood is premised on a belief that it is possible to acquire real knowledge and understanding of children, their behaviour, perceptions, beliefs and capacity for rationality and autonomy through the device of listening to and reporting on their communications. The mission statement of this new sociology is thus,first, that of providing scientific facts about children: what they are, the levels of decision-making competence they have achieved and are capable of achieving, and second, that of exposing the obstacles to children fulfilling their capacity for autonomy. The new sociology of childhood tells us that the concept of childhood should be treated as a social construction that reflects the historical, culture, values and the power structure of the particular society in which it occurs. It explains how in todays society both the concept of childhood and the image of the child have been formulated by developmentalists and structuralists, whose insistence on treating children as passive objects or as human becomings rather than human beings (Qvortrup et al., 1994: 4) has blinded society to childrens true abilities and deafened it to their authentic voices. The fact that there may serious doubts over, for example, the basic assumptions of the theory and the generalizability of the evidence on which it relies do in themselves not make the theory itself any less sociological or scientific. Such controversies occur within every system, including science, and can be resolved only within the system itself. Theories of childhood within sociology Nothing that I have covered so far explains or accounts for the acceptance by sociology of the new sociology of childhood as sociological theory. At this point I return in rather more detail to another aspect of Luhmanns theory, that of functionality. In Luhmannian theory this functional differentiation of modern society, with its closed systems, based on the distinct and unique function of each one of them in disseminating or organizing communications is seen as both an obstacle and a facilitator. On the one hand, it presents insurmountable problems for putting into effect any concerted programme for social control or steering. On the other, it helps to facilitate almost boundless creativity and a capacity to manage rapid change, as each system strives to recreate and communicates about the others, but always on its own terms. Systems functions relate, as I have explained, not to some notion of the body politic, but to the organization of societys communications. Whereas for Luhmannian theory the function of the political system is that of producing 201

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collectively binding decisions and that of law, the stabilization of counterfactual expectations over time, for science it is to establish facts for society (that is other social communication systems) to rely upon. Furthermore, functionality consists not only as a general facilitator for a society consisting of communications; but also, more specifically, each subsystem of society depends for the effectiveness of its operations on the performance of other subsystems in producing their function-specific communications. The system of science will often play an essential role, therefore, in producing communications that are able to be used in a reconstituted form within other function systems. Yet What is decisively important [for scientific communications] is that specific meanings can be isolated vis--vis uncontrolled interferences from the sphere of truths generally accepted in the life-world (Luhmann, 1984: 133). For science to be accepted as science, there needs, in other words, to be a clear demarcation between subjective experience (the life-world), moral beliefs or political opinions and what is claimed as scientific objectivity (Luhmann, 1984: 133). To be accepted by society (that is, other social function systems) as capable of producing facts, scientific knowledge needs to be based on a different kind of quest for certainty than that based on experience, law, morality or politics. The problem facing any set of beliefs, which wishes to claim the privileged status of scientific respectability for its way of seeing the world, is to how to distinguish itself from non-science. For social sciences, this problem may be more severe than for the natural sciences, but this does not make the task of policing its scientific borders any less essential. Even the social sciences, or perhaps the social sciences especially, need to maintain their separate identity, to distinguish themselves from their environment, to reassure themselves that they are doing science a task that other systems are unable to perform. Let me return at this point to the concerns I expressed earlier in this article over the emergence of a sociological theory about children that clearly has much in common with the notions of childhood agency, competence and autonomy disseminated by childrens rights activists. It is not sufficient in the light of both social construction theory or Luhmanns theory of operational constructivism to accept the contention that both the new sociologists of childhood and the childrens rights activists have in their own distinct ways stumbled across the same universal truths about children. If, in Luhmanns terms specific meanings are to be isolated vis--vis uncontrolled interferences from the sphere of truths generally accepted in the life-world (Luhmann, 1984: 131), one would expect some formidable obstacles to be erected by science to keep polemics, unproven beliefs and superstitions about childrens true nature out of sociology. As I argue in the next section, however, recent developments within sociology have made it virtually impossible to erect any such obstacles or formulate any clear demarcation between itself and its environment. I should add that what is being described in this section are events that sociology itself identifies and defines as significant developments. 202

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Children, childhood and the recent evolution of sociology Identity groups A sociology or sociologies of identity: One of the most significant sociological phenomena to emerge in the latter half of the 20th century has been that of identity politics (Calhoun, 1994). The grand ideologies and the politics of commitment that they inspired appear to have given way to political groupings that reflect a particular aspect of the identity of the participating individuals: feminist women, gays, black people, Muslims, born-again Christians, as well as groups based on minority national, regional or linguistic identities have campaigned for recognition, dignity, equality and the advancement of what they see as their interests. The formation of these group identities and the importance given to them in legal and political communications has coevolved with distinct groupings based on these identities being established within the social sciences. Racial, sexual, gender and religious divisions have inspired their own theories and research. Feminists sociology, black sociology, Islamic or Muslim sociology, Christian sociology and lesbian and gay sociology, have all made their appearance within the social sciences within recent years. Although these diverse groups within sociology may address issues that go well beyond identity, what makes them distinctive is the fact that the theories that they offer and the research based on those theories tend to enhance the separate identity of their particular grouping, making that group the centre and starting point of their sociological enquiry. They also tend to be critical of other sociologies that, they claim, fail to give sufficient recognition or attention to these identities. The arrival of children as yet another such identity group may be seen as an obvious or inevitable next step in the steady process of fragmentation into identity groups. However, there is a fundamental difference between those who press for recognition, dignity and equality for themselves and those who campaign for children, to be granted these privileges, where no discernible benefits accrue to the campaigners themselves. Nor is the case of activists for childrens rights quite analogous to that of campaigners who seek to make things better for others such as those who want to free slaves, release political prisoners or liberate laboratory animals. Unlike these other campaigners (or the vast majority of them), childrens rights activists have actually experienced what it is like to be in the position of those whose interests they wish to promote. They have all been children. Children as a group identity: In the case of the structural coupling of childrens rights and sociology one finds a somewhat different relationship between individual identity and social group membership, whether the group exists for the promotion and protection of those possessing the identity or is a support group existing in the social sciences. While identity group membership may be nominally reserved for children, those who take it upon themselves to protect and promote the interests of these members are predominantly adults. 203

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For societal (or social system) communication, the identity group consists of adults who identify with children. Indeed, the age constraints on entry into higher education ensure that the academic support group that provides sociological knowledge on the oppression of children and on ways of improving their situation in society, consists entirely of adults. In general terms, it is adults, and not the children themselves, who promote childrens rights as a movement and it is adults who theorize about children. Communications about children may also come to represent a way for society to reformulate itself so as to conform to idealized, but unrealized, self-images projected by the communicative systems of morality and religion. Children come to be seen as a vehicle for social transformation, for the reinvention of society. There can never be any consensus as to the precise form that this transformation or reinvention will take or indeed for the society that will emerge at the end of the process, just as there can never be agreement as to whose morality, which religion or what image of human nature should prevail. But it is this very indeterminacy and agnosticism that makes possible the emergence of different social groups, each claiming to promote the welfare and interests of children. In the terms of Luhmannian theory, there is no possibility of society gaining access to what children really are or where their needs or interests really lie and even less possibility of gaining access to what the future really holds for them! Furthermore, there is no ultimate or universal authority in modern society, whether religious or secular, to decree on these matters. Groups claiming to represent children, therefore, are free to stake their claims in these matters with little fear of being proved wrong. Even if evidence is produced that appears to go against them, they can always reinterpret this evidence or find counter-examples that give the impression of supporting their arguments. Both the new sociologists of childhood and organizations promoting childrens agency, autonomy and competence exist outside the political system that is the communicative system that fulfils societys need for collectively binding decisions. For Luhmann, the political system, like all other social systems, is closed and self-referring. Before any information, including scientific information, can enter the political system, it is transformed by that systems binary code of government/governed. The exercise of power, on which the political system is functionally concentrated, is . . . only possible for those who are in government, and who apply power to those who are governed (King and Thornhill, 2003: 71). Everything that takes place within the political system today is structured by this opposition between government and governed and to have any meaning within the system anything existing outside the system has to be reconstituted in these terms (see King and Thornhill, 2003: 712). Although organizations representing children may campaign vociferously to redress the imbalance of power between children and adults and sociologists of childhood may publish research findings on, for

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example, the disregard of childrens views in decisions about their lives, there is no possibility of these organizations becoming the government, of their members gaining political office, of the research findings giving rise to changes in policy solely on the ground of their support for childrens autonomy. All that they can hope for is for oppression of children by adults to enter the political agenda involving government and opposition and so be perceived within politics as a matter on which votes (and thus power) may be won and lost. Such a scenario is highly unlikely for, as recent history tells us, children tend rather to enter the system of politics as threats to the social order (young delinquents), as vulnerable creatures in need of protection (victims of child abuse or deprivation) or as recipients of good or bad schooling. I might add, in parentheses, that, paradoxically, it may be the ultimate powerlessness of these organizations as a force within politics that accounts for their endurance and popularity. There is virtually no opposition to confront them, first because they exist outside party politics and, second, because they speak, not for themselves and campaign not for their self-interests, but for the benefit of children. If their claims are denied or ignored by governments and in legal decisions, therefore, there is every incentive to continue to press for their acceptance always on behalf of the child, while every success is greeted as if it were a triumph for children. The rise of the social agent The sociological divide between structure and agency: In the terms that sociology applies to itself, there were until recently theories of structure and theories of agency with little or no dialogue or overlap between the two. In their simplest terms, theories of structure direct attention to the institutions operating within society and the effects of these institutions on the behaviour of its members, while theories of agency are concerned with the ways in which people, as social agents understand the world and affect changes in society.9 Since the 1970s, there has been little place for structural theories within sociology. Mainstream sociology has moved from a position where it saw itself as capable of improving society through the operation of social institutions to a more modest role of discovering how people make sense of and exist within their social world. It is people as social agents who are now the principal focus of sociological theorizing (see Bauman, 1994: 823). According to this view, if you wish to understand society sociologically, you need to study the ways in which people understand their social world and operate within that world. Anthony Giddens is of particular significance here, because his work on agency is that most often cited by sociologists of childhood (see James et al., 1998: 202; James and Prout, 1997: 5; Mayall, 1996: 53; Prout and James, 1997: 27). Since the time that Giddens introduced the concept of structuration, the traditional structure-versus-agency duality is discarded in favour of an ever evolving and mutually penetrative dualism (Wilson, 1995: 121). For

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Giddens, social structures are both constituted by human agency and yet at the same time are the very medium of this constitution (Wilson, 1995: 121; emphasis in original). Social structures provide the framework within which people, as agents, act, but, at the same time, their actions may have the effect of changing this framework. Yet, for Giddens, as for the other social theorists on whom he draws, the term social agent is something of a term of art (as is the term structure). Social agents are not simply actors who affect the behaviour of others within society. Much more significantly for social theory, their actions, whether intentional or unintentional, must have caused or contributed to social change or resistance to such change. The identification of social agents has, necessarily, to be a retrospective exercise you cannot begin to identify the social agents until you know what it is that their agency has brought about or prevented from happening (Giddens, 1984: 11). Children as social agents: The unlikely transformation from childrens rights to a sociological theory that conceptualizes children as autonomous actors within a social world dominated by adults would certainly not have been possible without the ascendancy within sociology of theories of agency over those of structure. Indeed, if the new sociologists of childhood were to fit the distinction, child/adult, neatly onto the footprint of sociologys agency/structure distinction, children somehow had to be transformed from the products of societys structures to social agents capable of influencing these structures through their constructions of the external world. These child agents needed to be seen in juxtaposition with the oppressive structures imposed by adults. Having achieved this feat, it is a short step to creating within sociological theory itself a space for childhoods as the products of adults attempts to predetermine childrens lives and children as legitimate social agents. Once established, this new theoretical version of childhood and children both contrasts with and offers a sharp rebuke to previous sociological accounts that conceptualized the child only as existing within social institutions the family or school the child . . . determined by structure . . . rather than pronounced through the exercise of agency (James et al., 1998: 25; emphasis added). The task, in other words, was to recover children as social actors and their activity as a source of social change (James and Prout, 1997: 27). In the hands of the new sociologists of childhood, therefore, childhood becomes a magnificent testing ground for th[e] dichotomy between agency and structure and it is adult society which constitutes the structure and the child the agent, and that the former determines or socializes the latter (James et al., 1998: 202). The reconstitution of the child from rights-holder, a citizen to be consulted, a voice to be heard to a fully-fledged theoretical concept that of the child as social agent has thus been completed. A Luhmannian operational constructivist observer of this transformation may wish first of all to question the use of the term social agent within this 206

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childhood sociology. Is it the same social agent as exists in social theory, that is an agent capable of bringing about changes in social structures or has the concept mutated in entering the pedagogical programme of childrens autonomy? Among some new sociologists of childhood the claim is that children are agents from their earliest days. They do things that make a difference to relationships. They make assessments of events and relations, so children can be properly understood as active agents, because, so it is claimed, sociology has come to understand them as carrying out socially useful, indeed necessary activities (Mayall, 2003: 9, 14). Similar accounts depicting children as social actors, because they are able by their acts alone to change society, permeate the writings of the new childhood sociologists. For example:
. . . our new discourses of childhood understand the child as being. The child is conceived as a person, a status, a course of action, a set of needs, rights or differences in sum, as a new social actor . . . as an agent in its own construction and as naturally an agent as any adult, in the sense of agency that concerns the initiation of action by choice. (James et al., 1998: 207)

Yet, outside these self-referring sociological communications there is little in other forms of communication about children that is congruent with this perception of them as capable of taking an active agency role in bringing about or resisting social change. One study, for example, specifically discredits claims that children as witnesses should be seen as social agents within the legal system. What one has here, it suggests,
. . . is a clear example of agency as dependency. This image of agency is at odds with any essentialist image. Essentialist agency is precisely that which grants independence. On the view presented here, agency is an effect of independence that emerges from a fundamental dependency. (Lee, 1998: 472; emphasis added)

The fundamental dependency referred to is, of course, that of children upon adult agency. If one of the avowed purposes of the new childhood sociology is to draw attention to the contribution that children make to society and to promote awareness of childrens views and their understanding of their world, it would seem that this could well be done outside the realm of social theory and without any reliance on the theoretical concept of social agency. Indeed, the suggestion, raised earlier in this article, that the sociology label may be being used here to give scientific respectability and provide scientific support for campaigns for childrens autonomy rights and against their oppression by adults may be difficult to refute. Its accuracy is reinforced on reading the childhood researcher cited earlier describing the task of a sociology of childhood as that of drawing attention to certain neglected features of childhood, to provide a better account of how the social order works; and to use this knowledge as a basis for righting childrens wrongs (Mayall, 2000: 246; emphasis added). Within a society constructed by the new sociology of childhood, consisting of a sedimented network of interrelationships or patterns of interaction or what one might call social relationships (James et al., 1998: 201), it might 207

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well be possible to envisage a direct causal connection between individual actions (by children or adults) and social structures, even if the important question as to how that relationship might operate in practice remains unanswered.10 From the perspective of Luhmannian social systems theory, by contrast, a direct inputoutput influence of transient interactions upon social function systems simply cannot exist, for society and interactions, as I have indicated earlier, represent two separate and distinct forms of communication. This is not to say that the images of the child generated by these systems have not changed in recent years. They clearly have, for example, in the ways that law and politics perceive children. However, the changes that have occurred, such as the Gillick decision in the English courts and the legislation passed by governments in many postindustrial countries directed against internet child pornographers and child sex abusers, do not convey a consistent image of the rational, self-controlled and autonomous child. On the one hand, children may be seen in some situations as competent, of making decisions independently of their parents and even of decisions about medical treatment and other important matters. On the other, they are also portrayed in other situations as vulnerable, inexperienced and in need of protection against such evils as sexual and physical abuse and commercial exploitation. Yet, what is quite clear in these examples is that neither the changes in the images of children nor the many diverse accounts of what children are or are not capable of achieving that occur within the communications of societys function systems have been brought about entirely through the actions of children themselves. Indeed, there may well be plenty of examples of children who carry out socially useful and necessary activities, but these activities on their own do not bring about changes in the programmes of social function systems. Children do not affect directly the way in which politics, law, economics and education communicate about children. Their influence is only indirect and whether or not it occurs depends on the operations of these systems and not on the actions of children themselves. Structural changes in Luhmannian terms may indeed happen, if childrens actions become recognized by one or more of societys function systems, as a perturbation in that systems environment that needs to be addressed by the system. However, here again the system is the social agent rather than children. It is the system that selects the issue that needs addressing and reconstitutes it in its own terms. Measures against youth crime or truancy are obvious examples. There are also numerous examples of how changing perceptions of childrens needs provoke changes in social systems, but it is hardly open to the new sociologists of childhood to claim that children themselves are responsible for generating these changes in perception. Even if one adopts Giddenss theory of structuration, rather than Luhmanns systems theory as ones theoretical perspective, the account of the child as social agent owes much more to the new sociologists of childhoods preferred image of rational, competent, selfcontrolled children than to any evidence that the social institutions on which society depends actually change themselves as the direct result of childrens 208

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concerted actions and that these changes reflect what the children wanted or intended. Conclusions It has not been my objective in this article to identify where the truth or reality about children, their welfare and their capacities lie or who might have access to them. Instead, I have used Niklas Luhmanns general social theory and his more specific theory of operational constructivism as vehicles which allow us to recognize in societys interactions and organizations the existence of a specific system of communications about children and childhood. My principal focus in this article, however, has been the introduction into science of a perspective or programme for communicating about children, which, while retaining the code children/adults, concentrates upon and magnifies the similarities between children and adults. This reconstitution within sociology of accounts of what children are, their capacities, understandings, beliefs and wishes, has become possible only because sociology itself has undergone major transformations in recent years. This sociological revolution now allows different identity groups to produce their own brand of sociology, sees individuals as autonomous beings capable of changing the social structure and accepts as factual evidence mediated and selective accounts of the ways that people see themselves and understand their world. Finally, two related set of questions emerge from my analysis. The first relates to Luhmanns notion of differentiation into interdependent, yet autopoietic social function systems as the distinctive feature of modern society. To what extent is it still possible for other function systems, such as law, politics, health or education, to rely upon communications emanating from sociology in the form of theory and research results as providing facts for their own operations? In the terms of Luhmannian theory, as I have already mentioned, the only way that science is able to make a distinction between its own communications and the life-world is to objectify the subject of its enquiry. The new sociology of childhoods denial of the very notion of objectivity (as well as that of several other sociological identity theories) is to proceed as if science can be formulated out of subjective beliefs and experiences and to suggest that everything that calls itself research should be treated as generating scientifically approved, factual evidence, just so long as it has been carried out within the auspices of its own theoretical framework. This is of particular concern when much of the research evidence on which sociological theories are based cannot be replicated or verified and when sociology itself may at times lack any reliable criteria to assess their validity. Furthermore, for sociology itself to deny that this subjectification of research poses any real problem to its own identity is to cast doubt that sociology, as a subdiscipline of science, has the ability to police its own epistemic borders. This concern, I should add, must not necessarily be seen as plea for sociology to resurrect objectivity as the overriding criteria for sociological 209

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research. My concern is rather that expressed by Niklas Luhmann and relates to the dangers for society of dedifferentiation, the merging of social systems to a point where it is no longer possible for each one to maintain its separate identity and unique function. The problem is not that present-day sociology no longer insists on objectivity or theories that are amenable to empirical testing. It is rather that many of sociologys communications do not have even the appearance of being able to convey facts or truth that can then be relied upon by other social systems in their operations. They are only facts or the truth to those who share the ideological orientation of the theory and the beliefs, values and assumptions of the researchers. There is a real risk, then, that sociological communications will be seen by other systems as undifferentiated from the communications of the mass media, that is, as able to provide information, but not facts, for society. Just as the credibility of newspaper stories and television programmes depends on the pre-existing beliefs and values of their readers and viewers, so sociologists can expect their research reports to be judged not on their methodological soundness but on whether they endorse, reject or ignore the opinions, beliefs and values of those who read them. The second related issue concerns specifically sociological communications concerning the competence and abilities of childhood emerging from the new sociology of childhood. How much confidence can be placed on the new sociological image of the autonomous, capable child agent? Is this new image of the child to be accepted as a scientific fact for the purposes of government directives, legislation and courtroom decisions? Clearly, those who wave the flag of childrens rights have no hesitation in regarding these communications as factual and reliable. Take, for example Michael Freeman, a leading legal advocate for childrens rights:
The sociology of childhood has much to teach those concerned with childrens rights. The child as agent or social actor features strongly in these sociological studies of childhood: it was key to an important research initiative funded by the ESRC in the United Kingdom in the late 1990s. . . . Recognizing (and encouraging) childrens agency (as in fact Article 12 of the Convention does) emphasizes that children are social beings who can contribute to society . . . the work of Alderson . . . amongst others, has shown that children are much more competent than we choose to believe, and at much younger ages too. (Freeman, 2004: xviiixix)

But what about ministers of state and judges, to say nothing of those anxious parents, doctors, teachers and educationalists who seek assurance from scientific research as to how to find the right way to meet the needs of children of different ages or how much responsibility should be given to the child in a wide range of decision-making situations? Of course, accusations of lack of empirical verifiability could also be (and, indeed, have been) directed against Luhmannian sociology. However, there are major differences between its theoretical concerns and those of the new sociologists of childhood who have identified this revised image of the child. Luhmanns theory does not make any truth claims other than those concerning the ways in which society represents itself to itself. It does not seek to
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influence law, or social policies. It is not founded upon a priori assumptions about human (or childrens) nature and, indeed, deliberately eschews the individual subject as a valid unit of analysis for sociology. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the new sociology of childhood presents one very specific aspect of society the division of the world into children and adults and necessarily ignores any accounts of events that lie outside this narrow perspective. Luhmannian systems theory, by contrast, attempts to offer a broad and complex account of the operations of different systems in modern society and the relations between them. The enormous task that it sets itself is to provide an account of how society transforms chaotic and contingent environmental complexity into manageable system complexity. It is this fulfilment of this task, rather than the impossible quest for ultimate truth about children, childhood or anything else, that it sets itself and through which it hopes to achieve what Luhmann optimistically terms a sociological enlightenment.11 Notes
1. Past editions of Childhood have contained many articles that have referred to or applied the new sociology of childhood uncritically as a major theoretical advance in the sociological understanding of children. 2. A notable exception is Lee (1998), who in an article titled Towards an Immature Sociology questioned whether the new sociology of childhood had in fact achieved the theoretical status that some of its proponents claimed for it. 3. Although the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which came into force in 1990, tends to emphasize childrens welfare rather than autonomy rights, Articles 14 and 15 identify certain individual liberties or freedoms which must be guaranteed by the state in order to underwrite the concept of childrens autonomy, such as the right to freedom of assembly and of thought, conscience and religion (Fortin, 1998: 21); Article 12 requires the state to assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to express those views freely, in all matters affecting the child, the view of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child. Quite apart from the Convention, there has been considerable disquiet expressed among lawyers, philosophers and political theorists over what is seen as paternalism towards children and the failure to recognize childrens capacity to participate as citizens in their own right (e.g. Feinberg, 2004; Roche, 1999). 4. James et al. (1998: 21718) write, for example: It has been our intention to present a broad account of the different ways in which childhood studies can, through careful theorizing, engage more effectively or incisively with those policy or welfare debates which for so long have shaped the direction of research. While James and Prout (1997: 10) specifically emphasize childrens self-determination as one of the imperatives of the new sociology of childhood: Children are and must be seen as active in the construction and determination of their own social lives and of those around them and of the societies in which they live. 5. An example is contained in Chris Jenkss account of his major contribution to the development of the new sociology of childhood: I had a need for real, active children, embodiment of agency, interactional partners, constructors of worlds, competent social members. . . . Not actually, for this would have simply been another naturalistic reduction. I had a sociologists need, not that of a civil-rights campaigner. (Jenks, 2000: 65; emphasis added)

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6. I refer here to the increasing use of qualitative methods and subjective narrative accounts of social events, which have proved particularly attractive initially for feminist researchers (see, for example, Denzin and Lincoln, 2000; Reinharz, 1992) and later for childhood researchers (e.g. Christensen and James, 2000). These methods have been subjected to critical comments from Lazaraton (2003) and Overcash (2003) among others. 7. James and Prout (1997: 8); see Lee (1998: 273) for a criticism of these claims. 8. For an account of Luhmanns general theory, see King and Thornhill (2003: Ch. 1). 9. Talcott Parsons is seen as the prime instigator of structural sociology. 10. No such direct relationship is proposed by Giddens in his theory of structuration. 11. Luhmann wrote four volumes titled Soziologische Aufklrung. For a discussion of their significance, see King and Thornhill (2003: 1316).

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