U.S.

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

The Report on the U.S. Naval War College

Workshop on Somali Piracy
Fresh Thinking for an Old Threat
Commander James Kraska, JAGC, USN
28 April 2009

The Naval War College thanks Booz Allen Hamilton, Science Applications International Corpo-
ration (SAIC) and the Naval War College Foundation for generous support for the Workshop.
 Key Insights
• Piracy has emerged from a complex political, economic and
cultural milieu. No single response will solve the problem.

• Regional capacity-building and collective maritime action are

required to contend with the challenge of piracy so long as pirates
enjoy sustained sanctuary in Somalia. Proposals to stop piracy by
“fixing” Somalia, however, beg the question—it is doubtful the
international community has the capability or will to transform
Somalia quickly into a stable and viable state.

• Major maritime powers should rapidly expand coastal and littoral

security assistance to the regional states, including training and
provision of patrol craft and eventually corvettes, in order to shift
responsibility for maintaining rule of law at sea to the regional powers.

• The civil shipping industry will have to take a greater role in protecting
merchant vessels, including provision of armed security in appropriate
circumstances.

O
n April 7 and 8, the Interna-
tional Law Department of
the Center for Naval Warfare
Studies at the U.S. Naval
War College conducted a
Counter-piracy Workshop comprised of
50 legal and policy experts from across
the globe. The Workshop was designed to
take a fresh look at the threat of maritime
piracy off the Horn of Africa, assess the
tremendous progress in international law
and diplomacy that has transpired to ad-
dress the problem, and to take a measure
of the way forward. By collecting many
of the world’s top experts to consider the
threat of maritime piracy, and by pro-
viding a forum to discuss the issue in a
frank and open dialogue, the Workshop
revisited some conventional thinking and
explored new approaches. The participants
brought significant diversity and depth of
expertise. Many are involved in day-to-
day decision-making on counter-piracy
operations, policy and international law in
Europe, Asia and the United States. This
point was underscored on the second day
of the Workshop, when a number of attend-
ees joined a U.S. Government interagency
phone conference to plan a course of action
for dealing with the overnight hijacking
and ensuing hostage stand-off involving
the M/V Maersk Alabama. The Workshop
was conducted in the Naval War College’s
Decision Support Center, a state-of-the-art
briefing center which can anonymously
tabulate participants’ responses to issues
under consideration, creating a non-
attribution record of the proceedings.

1
 I. The Threat
The Workshop opened with a prominent
irregular maritime warfare expert who
provided a threat assessment for the
group. The threat assessment concluded
that although Somalia is a failed state, it
is not a failed society. Central government
has collapsed but other forms of author-
ity remain. Some forms of authority are
local, restricted to individual towns and
villages. Other forms of authority derive
from clan or sub-clan positions, and elders
are often able to exercise their authority
using traditional means. Power also flows
from political figures who exercise author-
ity through negotiation or patronage of
largely self-interested supporters or allies.
Finally, militias and Islamic courts exercise
considerable influence in Somali society.
Clan organization is a context rather than
a determinant of piracy.
1
Workshop Commissioned by the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the UN to Somalia, Nairobi, Kenya, Nov. 10–21, 2008,
Piracy off the Somali Coast: Final Report: Assessment and Recommendations (prepared by Ambassador Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah).
2
On November 21, 2008, the UN released a
report by the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General on piracy off the coast of
Somalia based on meetings held in Nairobi,
Kenya.1 The Nairobi Report suggests that
piracy off the coast of Somalia is driven by
the volatile security and political situation
inside the country, rampant poverty and
other factors. Using the Nairobi Report as
a point of departure, the NWC Workshop
considered the leading contributors to
maritime piracy in East Africa. The causal
factors contained in the Nairobi Report
were considered as potential drivers of
Somali piracy. The Workshop participants
independently scored the drivers of Somali
piracy according to the level of perceived
importance. The data are presented in
Figure 1, which displays the results of the
exercise. A score of 100 represents a factor
of very high importance, whereas a score of
1 signifies a factor of very low importance.
 The aggregated scores show that the average of the participants was highest in relation to the
volatile security and political situation in Somalia and lowest in regard to environmental
hardship. The scores were sorted into quintiles and are reproduced in Figure 1.
Page | 4

Figure 1: Drivers of SomaliFigure

Piracy1: Drivers of Somali Piracy

In addition
The aggregatedto considering
scores showthe listthat
of drivers containedcontinues
the aver- in the UN’stoNairobi
drawReport,
Somalis several
intoNWC
the illicit
Workshop experts suggested additional
age of the participants was highest in rela- factors that were important in fostering permissive
business. The risk-reward calculus is fa-
conditions in which piracy can flourish. First, the availability of pirate sanctuary ashore provides
tion to the volatile security and political vorable to piracy and has to be changed.
a safe haven from which pirates operate with apparent impunity. Second, the opportunity to
situation in Somalia
conduct piracy and lowest
is presented in regard to
by the geographic location of the nation of Somalia and close
environmental hardship. The scores
proximity of the major piracy hubs of Haradhere were andAEyl, number of situated
which are nationsalong
havethefacilitated pay-
sorted into quintiles
international shipping and
routeare
fromreproduced
the Suez Canal.in Third,
ment the of ransoms
availability in order
of legions to obtain the
of destitute,
Figure
young1. men combines with numerous unpaid or underpaid release of their
complicit and nationals and toships held
corrupt officials
populate the piracy enterprise. Finally, the low level by of risk associated
Somali with Some
pirates. piracy, states,
and the including
Inprospect
addition of high rewards, continues
to considering the list to draw SomalisDenmark,
of driv- into the illicithave
business. The risk-reward
released captured pirates
calculus is favorable to piracy and has to be changed.
ers contained in the UN’s Nairobi Report, unpunished due to legal and diplomatic
several NWC Workshop experts suggested confusion or difficulty with detaining and
A number of nations have facilitated payment of ransoms in order to obtain the release of their
additional factors that were important
nationals and ships held by Somali pirates. Some states,in prosecuting the perpetrators
including Denmark, have releasedin criminal
fostering permissive
captured pirates conditions
unpunished due to legalin and
which court.
diplomatic The or
confusion Nairobi
difficultystudy suggests that
with detaining
piracy can flourish.
and prosecuting First, thein availability
the perpetrators criminal court. Thethese practices
Nairobi have encouraged
study suggested that these piracy. Al-
ofpractices
pirate sanctuary ashore
have encouraged provides
piracy. Although a safe
the widerthough the wider
international international
community community
has universally
condemned piracy activity off
haven from which pirates operate with the coast of Somali, the Nairobi Report indicates that the
has universally condemned piracy activity same
nations have
apparent been tolerant
impunity. of the existence
Second, the oppor-of piracy off
by either sanctioning
the coast the crime
of Somalia, theorNairobi Report
facilitating
tunity payment piracy
to conduct of ransoms. In some cases,
is presented bynations appear tothat
indicates havethedeployed
same warships
nations to the been
have
area without authority to take robust action to arrest or detain pirates or use force to disrupt
the geographic location of the nation of tolerant of piracy by either sanctioning the
Somalia and close proximity of the major crime or facilitating payment of ransoms.
piracy
. hubs of Haradhere and Eyl, which In some cases, nations appear to have
are situated along the international ship- deployed warships to the area without au-
ping route from the Suez Canal. Third, the thority to take robust action to arrest or de-
availability of legions of destitute, young tain pirates or use force to disrupt attacks.
men combines with numerous unpaid or The NWC Workshop experts were asked to
underpaid complicit and corrupt officials characterize whether they agreed with the
to populate the piracy enterprise. Finally, description of the response by the interna-
the low level of risk associated with pi- tional community contained in the Nairobi
racy, and the prospect of high rewards, Report. Many of the NWC experts—30 of

3
 34—either agreed or strongly agreed with system, with no single nation bearing the
the Nairobi Report’s characterization that burden. Consequently, organizing a re-
the
attacks. The NWC Workshop experts were asked tosponse
international community has either to thwart
characterize piracy
whether theyrepresents
agreed witha classic
the
sanctioned or tolerated maritime piracy collective action problem. The need to
description of the response by the international community contained in the Nairobi report. Many shift
off the coast of Somalia, and the responses the outcome of this equation
of the NWC experts—30 of 34—either agreed or strongly agreed with the Nairobi Report’s is obvious,
provided by the
characterization thatexperts are contained
the international in has
community buteither
the means to doorsotolerated
sanctioned are more debatable.
maritime
Figure 2. the coast of Somalia, and the responses provided
piracy off This conclusion givesare
by the experts rise to the in
contained division
Figure 2. of responsibility among regional states, Page | 5

The Nairobi Report also suggested that the 1 2 3 4 5

wider international community has universally Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly
condemned piracy activity off the coast of Disagree Agree
Somalia, but then has generally been tolerant by
either sanctioning or facilitating payment of
ransoms or deploying warships to the area
without authority to take robust action (arrest
and detain, use of force).
What is your level of agreement with this 1 3 0 18 12
characterization of the response of the
international community? (Number of experts
responding under each column.)
Figure 2: Condemning International Piracy
Figure 2: Condemning International Piracy

The NWC Workshop received a detailedThe NWC Workshop received a detailed brief on
brief on the political, social and economicthe political, social and economic motivations of
motivations of Somali pirates. Pirates areSomali pirates. Pirates are exploiting the vacuum
exploiting the vacuum created by anarchycreated by anarchy in Somalia. The lack of rule of
in Somalia. The lack of rule of law insidelaw inside the nation spills offshore. Somali
the nation spills offshore. Somali piratespirates are driven by the goal of pecuniary gain.
are driven by the goal of pecuniary gain.Moreover, the crime of maritime piracy has some
Moreover, the crime of maritime piracyamount of acceptance in a society whose values
have been distorted by conflict and violence.
has some amount of acceptance in a so-
Piracy in the offshore areas of Somalia is
ciety whose values have been distorted
perpetrated by organized criminal gangs who
by conflict and violence. Piracy in the
benefit from political protection, so solutions will
offshore areas of Somalia is perpetrated
have to account for the wider political context inside the country. The rational risk-reward
by organized
calculus criminal
of the pirate gangsgangs
has towho benefitby ensuring
be changed distant piracy
states isand
lessthe privatewhile
rewarding sector. The
at the
from political
same time protection,
infusing piracy withso greater
solutionsrisk.will
So far NWC experts
there has been aprovided individual
high tolerance assess-
for piracy
have
because costs are diffuse throughout the international system, with no single nation bearingpiracy
to account for the wider political con- ments of the likely impact of Somali the
text
burden. Consequently, organizing a response to thwart piracy represents a classic collective Asia
inside the country. The rational risk- on international trade from Europe to
reward calculusThe
action problem. of the pirate
need gangs
to shift has to beof these
the outcome overequations
the next isfive years.but
obvious, Figure 3 provides
the means to do
changed by ensuring piracy is less reward- the data on the anticipated risk
so are more debatable. This conclusion gives rise to the division of responsibility among regional of Somali
ing while
states, at the
distant same
states and time infusing
the private piracy
sector. piracy which
In considering on thenations
Europe-Asia trademost
might serve route.
with greater
effectively risk. Sopiracy
to counter far there
in the has
Hornbeen a
of Africa, the NWC experts provided individual
high tolerance
assessments of thefor piracy
likely impactbecause
of Somalicosts In international
piracy on Figure 3, the experts
trade from individually
Europe to Asiachar-
are diffuse
over throughout
the next five the 3international
years. Figure provides the dataacterized the likely
on the anticipated impact
risk of Somali
of Somali piracypiracy
on
the Europe-Asia trade route.

4
.
The impact of Somali piracy is likely to be severe on 1 2 3 4 5
Europe to Asia maritime trade through the Suez Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly
Canal, Strait of Bab el Mandeb, and the Gulf of Disagree Agree
Aden over the next five years.
Page | 6
Number of experts responding in each column. 1 12 1 17 3
Figure 3: Anticipated ImpactImpact
Figure 3: Anticipated of Somali Piracy
of Somali Piracy on Europe-to-Asia
on Europe-to-Asia Trade Trade

In figure
on 3, the experts
Europe-to-Asia individually
maritime tradecharacterized
through the 2012.likely
In impact
2008, more of Somali thanpiracy on Europe-
100 vessels were
to-Asia maritime trade through
the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aden. In the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aden. Although
attacked and more than 40 were hijacked 13 experts either
strongly disagreed
considering whetheror disagreed,
the impact 20 were in agreement
is likely or strong agreement.
successfully in watersOnoff thisthequestion
Hornit isof
safe to say there was a lack
to be severe, 13 experts either stronglyof consensus on the severity of the impact of Somali
Africa. When asked, “By 2012, how many piracy along the
critical tradeorroute
disagreed connecting
disagreed, while Europe and Asia.
20 were in vessels do you expect to be successfully hi-
agreement or strong agreement. On this jacked in the region?,” the estimates among
The Workshop also considered
question it is safe to say there was a lack of the anticipated impact
the of Somaliranged
experts piracy on from global
a lowshipping
of 2 orover
3 per
the next fiveon
consensus years, and the results
the severity of theofimpactthat question
of are contained
year to a highinofFigure 4.
450 attacks per year, with
Somali piracy along the critical trade route most responses in the 50 to 250 range.
The impact of
connecting Somaliand
Europe piracy is likely to be severe on
Asia. 1 2 3 4 5
global shipping trade over the next five years. ThereStrongly
was, Disagree
however, Neutral
quite Agree
strongStrongly
agree-
Disagree Agree
The Workshop also considered the an- ment that in order for Somali piracy to
Number ofimpact
ticipated expertsofresponding
Somali piracy in each oncolumn.
global 2
be successfully 14addressed, 7 the11rule of0law
Figure 4:over
shipping Anticipated
the next five Impactyears,of andSomali
the Piracy
has to on Global Shipping
be restored in Puntland. Trade Puntland
results of that question are contained in is the region of Somalia that serves as
Regarding
Figure 4. the impact of Somali piracy on global shipping the primary over the next five
staging years,
area for themostresults
piracy
displayed in Figure 4 were even more circumspect emanating than those infrom Figure 3. A greater number
the country. Thirty-three of
experts—16—either disagreed
Regarding the impact of Somali piracy on or strongly disagreed with the proposition that
out of 34 experts agreed or strongly agreedthe likely impact
The
of impactpiracy
Somali of Somali
on piracyshipping
global is likelywill to be be severe on Seven
“severe.” 1 participants 2 3
registered a4 “neutral”
5
global shipping over the next five years, that restoration of the rule of law in Soma-
Europe
response. to Asia
and maritime
no expertinwas trade through
in strong the Suez
agreement Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly
the results displayed Figure 4 were even with lia the
wasstatement.
essential for curbing piracy. The
Canal, Strait of Bab el Mandeb, and the Gulf of Disagree Agree
more
Aden circumspect
over the next than
five those in Figure 3. actual numbers in response to the question
years.
Similarly, the Workshop experts were not in agreement on the number of piracy attacks
A greater number of experts—16—either appear in Figure 5, and indicate that only Page | 6
Number
anticipated of experts
to occurresponding
in the region in each
in 2012.column.
In 2008, more than 1 100 12 vessels were 1 attacked17 and3
disagreed or strongly disagreed with one expert disagreed with the statement
more than3:40Anticipated
Figure were hijackedImpact successfully in watersPiracy
of Somali off the Horn of Africa. When
Asia asked, “By
the
2012,proposition
how many vessels that the likely
do you impact
expect to beof that “Inon
successfully
Europe
order
hijacked toincurb to piracy
the region?,”
Trade
inthe theestimates
offshore
Somali
among piracy on global shipping will be region, it is necessary for law and order
to a to
In figurethe 3,experts of the
the experts anticipatedcharacterized
individually level of piracy theranged
likely from
impact a low of 2 orpiracy
of Somali 3 per year
on Europe-
“severe.”
high of 450 Seven
attacks participants
per through
year, with registered a bethe restored inrange.
Puntland and the coastal
to-Asia maritime trade themost
Suezresponses
Canal andinthe 50 to
Gulf of250
Aden. Although 13 experts either
“neutral” response, and no expert was in areas of Somalia.”
strongly disagreed or disagreed, 20 were in agreement or strong agreement. On this question it is
strong
safe agreement
Theretowas,
say there waswith
however, aquite
lack theofstatement.
strong agreement
consensus thatseverity
on the in orderoffor theSomali
impactpiracy of Somalito bepiracy
successfully
along the
addressed, the rule of law has to
critical trade route connecting Europe and Asia.be restored in Question
Puntland. 5
Puntland poses
is thea broader
region of challenge—if
Somalia that
Similarly,
serves as the primary staging area for most piracy emanating from the country. Thirty-three outin
the Workshop experts were not it is necessary to restore law and order
in
The agreement
of 34 experts agreed
Workshop on considered
also thestrongly
or number agreed
the of that
piracy
anticipated Somalia,
restoration
impact thehow
ofofSomali rule can
of
piracy law that
on goalshipping
inglobal
Somalia bewasachieved?
over
attacks
the next anticipated
essential for curbing
five years, and to occur
piracy.
the Thein the
results of region
actualthatnumbers in inare
question There
response isto an
contained the absence
question
in Figure of international
4. appear in Figure 5,
and indicate that only one expert disagreed with the statement that, “In order to curb piracy in the
offshore
The impact region, it is necessary
of Somali piracy is for likelylawtoand order toonbe restored
be severe 1 in Puntland
2 and
3 the coastal
4 areas
5
of Somalia”
global shipping trade over the next five years. Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly
Disagree Agree
Number of experts responding in each column. 2 14 7 11 0
Figure
. 4: Anticipated ImpactImpact
Figure 4: Anticipated of Somali of SomaliPiracy
Piracy ononGlobal
Global Shipping
Shipping Trade Trade

Regarding the impact of Somali piracy on global shipping over the next five years, the results 5
displayed in Figure 4 were even more circumspect than those in Figure 3. A greater number of
experts—16—either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the proposition that the likely impact
of Somali piracy on global shipping will be “severe.” Seven participants registered a “neutral”
 In order to curb piracy in the offshore region, it is 1 2 3 4 5
necessary for law and order to be restored in Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly
Puntland and the coastal areas of Somalia. Disagree Agree
Number of experts responding in each column. 0 1 0 10 23
Page | 7
Figure 5: Necessity of Restoring
Figure 5: Necessity ofLaw andLaw
Restoring Order in Somalia
and Order in Somalia

Question 5 on
consensus poseshowa broader challenge—if
to engineer it is necessary
the stabili- Southeast to restore
Asia. lawMany
and order in Somalia,
observers how
credit
can that goal be achieved? There
zation and reconstruction of Somalia, with is an absence of international consensus for how
these efforts with reducing the incidence to engineer the
stabilization
some analysts andsoreconstruction
discouraged of Somalia,
that they are with some analyststhroughout
of piracy so discouragedthe thatAsia-Pacific,
they are
doubtful the country can be stabilized any time soon. The
doubtful the country can be stabilized any and these efforts have knit the elusive quest for crafting a “Somalia
nations
policy,” has persisted since the collapse
time soon. The elusive quest for crafting a of the country in 1991. Although neither
together in a regional counter-piracy com- the United
States nor other nations have successfully implemented a coherent approach for revitalizing the
“Somalia policy” has persisted since the munity. Asian counter-piracy cooperation
country, the issue of piracy has attracted greater public attention toward the plight of Somalia.
collapse of the country in 1991. Although has emerged from three mutually support-
On April 23 2009, thirty nations participated in a UN meeting in Brussels and developed a $250
neither the United States nor other nations ing initiatives. First, under the leadership
million plan to rebuild stability in the fractured state. Strengthening regional maritime security in
have
ordersuccessfully
to reduce piracy implemented
was among the a coherent
top concernsofatJapan in 2004,The
the conference. sixteen nations signed
international
approach
communityfor hasrevitalizing the adversity
a chance to turn country, into the opportunity
the “Regional Agreement
and perhaps try to bringon someCombating
issue
measureof piracy
of law andhas order
attracted
to thegreater
country. public
Most NWC Piracy and Armed
Workshop experts Robbery”
agreed that (ReCAAP).
restoring
2

attention toward was

order in Puntland the essential
plight oftoSomalia.
curb piracy,On andReCAAP
it remainsistothe be first
seen treaty
whether dedicated
the donor’s solely
April 23, 2009,
conference thirtya nations
will make participated
positive and marked difference.to combating piracy. The treaty established
in a UN meeting in Brussels and developed an organization that operates an advanced
a $250 million plan to rebuild stability in information fusion and sharing center in
II. Regional Responses
the fractured state. Strengthening regional Singapore. The Information Sharing Centre
maritime security in order to reduce piracy (ISC) helps individual nations take action to
During the past five years, a large
was among the top concerns at the confer- group of Asian states have
avoid piracycome together
attacks, and totocooperate
respondinmore order
to counter piracy in the Straits
ence. The international community has a of Malacca and Singapore and throughout Southeast
effectively to piracy when it occurs. Sec- Asia. Many
observers credit these efforts with
chance to turn adversity into opportunity reducing the incidence of piracy in
ond, beginning throughout
2005, more the Asia-Pacific,
than twenty-
and these efforts have knit the nations together in a regional counter-piracy community. Asian
and perhaps try to bring some measure of five states that regularly use the Straits of
counter-piracy cooperation has emerged from three mutually-supporting initiatives. First, under
law and order to the country. Most NWC Malacca and Singapore, including the large
the leadership of Japan in 2004, sixteen nations signed the “Regional Agreement on Combating
Workshop experts agreed that restoring trading nations of China, Japan, the United
Piracy and Armed Robbery” (ReCAAP).2 ReCAAP is the first treaty dedicated solely to
order in Puntland was essential to curb
combating piracy. The treaty established an organization States and Korea, began
that operates meeting
an advanced with the
information
piracy, andsharing
fusion and it remains
centertoinbe seen whether
Singapore. littoralSharing
The Information states Centre
of Malaysia,
(ISC) helpsIndonesia
individual and
the donors’
nations conference
take action to avoidwill make
piracy a posi-
attacks, and to Singapore
respond more toeffectively
develop atocombined
piracy whenframe- it
tive and marked difference. work for improving
occurs. Second, beginning in 2005, more than twenty-five states that regularly use the maritime safety in the
Straits of
Malacca and Singapore, including the large trading nations of China, Japan, the United States by
Straits. The meetings were sponsored
3

II. Korea, began meeting with the littoral states ofthe

and Regional International
Malaysia, Indonesia,Maritime Organization,
and Singapore to
the UN specialized
develop a combined framework for improving maritime safety in the Straits. The meetings were agency
3 for maritime
Responses matters and shipping regulation located
2 in London. After several years, the user
The sixteen countries were the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, the Kingdom of Cambodia,
During theRepublic
the People’s past five years,thea Republic
of China, large group
of India,ofthe Republic
nationsof and littoral
Indonesia, states
Japan, signed
the Republic of the
Korea,“Co-
the
Asian statesDemocratic
Lao People’s have come together
Republic, to cooper-
Malaysia, the Union of operative
Myanmar, theMechanism,” an agreement
Republic of the Philippines, that
the Republic
of Singapore,
ate in orderthe toDemocratic Socialistin
counter piracy Republic of Sri Lanka,
the Straits the Kingdom
enables userofstates
Thailand,
tothehelp
Socialist Republic
littoral of
states
Viet Nam.
of
3 Malacca and Singapore and throughout develop maritime security capacity for
Kuala Lumpur Meeting on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore: Enhancing Safety, Security, and Environmental
2
Protection, Sept. 18–20, 2006, Kuala Lumpur Statement on Enhancement on Safety, Security and Environmental
The sixteen countries were the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, the Kingdom of Cambodia, the People’s Republic of
China, the Republic of India, the Republic of Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, the
. of Myanmar, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore, the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, the Kingdom of
Union
Thailand, the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam.
3
Kuala Lumpur Meeting on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore: Enhancing Safety, Security, and Environmental Protection, Sept. 18–20, 2006,
6 Kuala Lumpur Statement on Enhancement on Safety, Security and Environmental Protection in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, IMO Doc.
KUL 1/4 (Sept. 20, 2006), available at http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D15677/kualalumpurstatement.pdf.
littoral states develop maritime security capacity for better management of the straits.4 Third, the
three littoral states along the Straits of Malacca and Singapore also began coordinating surface
and air patrols throughout the straits in order to improve security in the area. Recently Thailand Page | 8
has joined the efforts. The NWC Workshop experts considered whether these three East Asian
initiatives could be transplanted successfully to East Africa. Although the benefits of doing so
were potentially significant, the responses represented in Figure 6 indicate that the experts were
betterdivided
quite management of the straits.
on the feasibility
4
Third, the but
of transplanting evenmodel
“Asian” they face a startling lack
of counter-piracy of gover-
cooperation
sponsored by
the international the International
three littoralinstitutions
states along Maritime
theHorn Organization,
Straits of nance,the UN specialized
security agency for maritime
and to the of Africa. Thirteen experts and bureaucratic
disagreed or strongly capacity.
matters
Malaccaand and shipping
Singaporeregulation locatedcoordi-
also began in London. Afterregionseveralisyears, the user nationsdynamic,
and
disagreed that the Asian initiatives were a suitable Themodel for East not economically
Africa.
littoral states signed the “Cooperative Mechanism,” an agreement that enables user states to help
nating surface and air patrols throughout like East Asia. Consequently, the area
littoral states develop maritime security capacity for better management of the straits.4 Third, the
the straits
The responses in order
to piracy to improve security suffers1from a low 2 tax coordinating
base,
3 low4penetration 5
three littoral states alongintheAsia are aofmodel
Straits Malaccathatand
can Singapore also began surface
in transplanted
be the area. Recently to the HornThailand
of Africa.has joined of technology
Strongly and difficulty
Disagree Neutral in integrating
Agree Strongly
and air patrols throughout the straits in order to improve security in the area. Recently Thailand Page | 8
the efforts. The NWC Workshop experts
has joined the efforts. The NWC Workshop expertscitizenry Disagree
considered from different backgrounds.
whether these three East Asian Agree
considered
Number of whether
experts these
responding three
in East
each Asian
column. 4 9
initiatives could be transplanted successfully to East Africa. Although the benefits of doing so 7 11 1
initiatives
Figure
were 6: could
potentially be transplanted
Transplanting
significant, thethe success-
“Asian”
responses Similarly,
in Figurenearly
Counter-piracy
represented 6 Model
indicateall toofEast
that theexperts
the discussants
Africa were
fully to East Africa. Although the benefits disagreed or strongly
quite divided on the feasibility of transplanting the “Asian” model of counter-piracy cooperation disagreed that no
of doing
Figure
and so were
7 show
international potentially
thatinstitutions significant,
the expertstowere nearly
the Horn the
Africa.modifications
ofunanimous, however,
Thirteen expertsinwould
rejecting
disagreedbetherequired
ornotion
strongly even
that no if
responses
key differences
disagreed represented
that exist
the in Figure
between
Asian piracy
initiatives 6off
wereindicate
the the
coast of
a suitable “Asian”
Somalia
model andmodel
for East piracy
Africa. of
infighting
Southeastpiracy
Asia. could
Somalia has been characterized as a “failed state,” embroiled in crime, ethnic and tribal conflict,
endemic
The corruption
responses and in
to piracy a suffering
Asia are from
a model a woeful lack of 1effective governance,
that can 2 3 predictability
4 5
and the rule of law. The social
be transplanted to the Horn of Africa. fabric and governance of the country is in disrepair.
Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree The Strongly
neighboring nations of East Africa are comparatively more Disagreefunctional, but still even they face a
Agree
startling lack of governance, security
Number of experts responding in each column. and bureaucratic capacity.
4 The 9 region is
7 not economically
11 1
dynamic, like East Asia. Consequently, the area suffers from a low tax base, low penetration of
Figure 6: Transplanting the “Asian”
Figure 6: Transplanting the “Asian”Counter-piracy
Counter-piracy Model
technology and difficulty in integrating the citizenry from different backgrounds.
Modelto Eastto East Africa
Africa

Figure 7 show that the experts were nearly unanimous, however, in rejecting the notion that no
There are no key differences between countering 1 2 3 4 5
key differences exist between piracy off the coast of Somalia and piracy in Southeast Asia.
piracy in the Horn of Africa and countering piracy in Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly
Somalia has been characterized as a “failed state,” embroiled in crime, ethnic and tribal conflict,
Southeast Asia. Disagree Agree
endemic corruption and a suffering from a woeful lack of effective governance, predictability
Number
and of experts
the rule of law.responding in eachand
The social fabric column.
governance of the 17 country13is in disrepair.
0 1
The 1
Figure 7: Key
neighboring nationsDifferences
Figureof 7: KeyAfrica
East between
Differences thethe
between Horn
are comparatively Horn of Africa
of Africa
more andand
functional, Southeast
Southeast
but Asia
still Asia
even they face a
startling lack of governance, security and bureaucratic capacity. The region is not economically
that the experts
dynamic, like EastwereAsia.quite divided on
Consequently, the the be transplanted
area suffers from a low tax tobase,
Africa.
low Clearly, if East
penetration of
feasibility and
technology of difficulty
transplanting the “Asian”
in integrating the citizenryAsian
from approaches and institutions are to
different backgrounds.
model of counter-piracy cooperation and be adopted in East Africa, they will have
There are no key differences between countering to be tailored
international institutions to the Horn of Af- 1 to2meet local3 conditions.
4 5The
rica. Thirteen
piracy in the Hornexperts disagreed
of Africa or strongly
and countering piracy results in Figure
in Strongly Disagree 8 nearly
Neutralperfectly repli-
Agree Strongly
disagreedAsia.
Southeast that the Asian initiatives were a cateDisagree
those in Figure 7, and only oneAgree expert
suitableof
Number model
experts forresponding
East Africa. in each column. suggested 17 that13 no modification
0 1 would
1
Protection in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, IMO Doc. KUL 1/4,
be needed (Sept. 20,
for and2006), available
transplanting at
Figure 7: Key includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D15677/
http://www.imo.org/ Differences between the Horn Southeastthe
ofkualalumpurstatement.pdf.
Africa Asia“Asian
4Figure 7 shows that the experts were nearly model” to the Horn of Africa.
The Singapore meeting also recognized the contributions of the straits states in the development of Malacca Strait
unanimous,
security however, in rejecting the no-
initiatives.
tion that no key differences exist between
.piracy off the coast of Somalia and piracy in
III. Diplomatic
Southeast Asia. Somalia is a “failed state,” Responses
embroiled in crime, ethnic and tribal con-
flict, endemic corruption and a suffering Given that it is unlikely that quick progress
from a woeful lack of effective governance, can be made in changing the fundamental
predictability
Protection and the
in the Straits rule ofand
of Malacca law. The social
Singapore, IMO Doc.conditions that
KUL 1/4, (Sept. 20, are
2006),abetting
available atpiracy, the
http://www.imo.org/ includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D15677/ kualalumpurstatement.pdf.
fabric and governance of the country are in immediate focus must be on containing it
4
The Singapore meeting also recognized the contributions of the straits states in the development of Malacca Strait
disrepair. The neighboring nations of East
security initiatives.
and taking cost-effective measures to re-
Africa are comparatively more functional, duce or manage the risk. The international
. The Singapore meeting also recognized the contributions of the straits states in the development of Malacca Strait security initiatives.
4
7
 piracy could be transplanted to Africa, they disagreed or strongly disagreed that no modifications
would be required. Clearly, if East Asian approaches and institutions were to be adopted in East
Africa, they would have to be tailored to meet local conditions. The results in Figure 8 nearly
perfectly replicate those in Figure 7, and only one expert suggested that no modification would
be needed for transplanting the “Asian model” to the Horn of Africa. Page | 9

No modifications of the approaches in Asia would be 1 2 3 4 5

needed for countering piracy in the Horn of Africa. Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly
Disagree Agree
Number of experts responding in each column. 18 13 0 1 0
Figure 8: No Modification of Asianof Approaches
Figure 8: No Modification Asian ApproachesNeeded
Needed forfor Somalia
Somalia

III. Diplomatic
In the Responses
90 days from November 2008
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of
Somalia (“Contact Group”) and a regional
through
Given January
that it is 2009,
unlikely that greatercan be nonbinding
quickaprogress
counter-piracy agreement, the
made in changing the fundamental conditions
Djibouti Code of Conduct. With a view
number
that are abettingof piracy,
positive developments
the immediate focus must be on containing it and taking cost-effective
toward building on this progress, the
measures to reduce or manage
occurred in international counter- the risk. The international community already has achieved
significant diplomatic success in countering piracy.experts were asked to consider how much
piracy law and diplomacy than had responsibility various global actors had
Inunfolded
the 90 daysinfrom the November
previous 2008 90 years.
through January for 2009,
addressing
a greaterthe problem
number of piracy off
of positive
the coast of Somalia.
developments occurred in international counter-piracy law and diplomacy than had unfolded Among the choicesin
were regional states,
the previous 90 years. The recent efforts include development of the previously mentioned UN the shipping indus-
community alreadyReport—plus
study—the Nairobi has achievedtwo UN Securitytry
significant and flag
Council states, under
resolutions or thechapter
nations VIIwith the
of the
diplomatic success in countering
UN charter (authorizing states to takepiracy.
“all necessarylargest number
measures”), of registered
two bilateral vessels at
agreements
between the United States and the United Kingdomrisk from
on the onepiracy
hand andattack.
Kenya,The aggregated
on the other, to
The recent
facilitate efforts
transfer of include
detained development of scores
pirates from warships arein presented
to courts in Figure
Mombasa, creation of a9,UNwith a
the previously
Contact Group onmentioned
Piracy off the UNCoast of Somalia score
study—the of 1Group)
(“Contact indicating a low nonbinding
and a regional responsibil-
Nairobi Report—plus
counter-piracy agreement, two UN Security
the Djibouti ity andWith
Code of Conduct. a score
a viewoftoward
100 indicating
building on athishigh
progress, resolutions
Council the experts were underasked to consider
chapter VII ofhow much responsibility various global actors had
responsibility.
for addressing the problem of piracy
the UN charter (authorizing states to take off the coast of Somalia. Among the choices were regional
states,necessary
“all the shipping industry andtwo
measures”), flag states, or the nations
bilateral with theinlargest
Interestingly, Figure number of registered
9 the average score
vessels at risk from piracy attack. The aggregated scores are
agreements between the United States among the Workshop experts for placingpresented in Figure 9, with a score
of 1 Interestingly,
and indicating
the United a in
low responsibility
figure
Kingdom, onand
9 the average a score
score
the among
one of 100
the indicatingexperts
Workshop
responsibility a high responsibility.
for
with placing
regional states, the
responsibility with regional states, the shipping industry and flag states was fairly similar,
hand, and Kenya, on the other, to facilitate shipping industry and flag states was
ranging from an average of 60 to 65.
transfer of detained pirates from warships fairly similar, ranging from an average of
to courts in Mombasa, creation of a UN 60 to 65. Page | 10

Figure 9: Responsibility for Countering

Figure 9: Responsibility Piracy
for Countering ininthe
Piracy theHorn
Horn ofof Africa
Africa

8 The Workshop experts also were asked to score the importance of various international
institutions in countering maritime piracy off the Horn of Africa. The experts each assigned a
value to the relative importance of the particular international institution for addressing the
problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia. Figure 10 illustrates the scores, which are explained
 Figure 9: Responsibility for Countering Piracy in the Horn of Africa
The Workshop experts also were asked to score the importance of various international
institutions in countering maritime piracy off the Horn of Africa. The experts each assigned a
value to the relative importance of the particular international institution for addressing the
problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia. Figure 10 illustrates the scores, which are explained
on the next page.

Figure 10: Importance

Figure of
10:International Organizations
Importance of International Organizations

The Workshop experts also were asked to underway were well integrated with the
.
score the importance of various interna- naval efforts to suppress piracy. Figure 11
tional institutions in countering maritime indicates that there was not widespread
piracy off the Horn of Africa. The experts agreement among the experts on whether
each assigned a value to the relative im- diplomatic efforts were well integrated
portance of the particular international with operational naval activities, with two
institution for addressing the problem of or more participants selecting each of the
piracy off the coast of Somalia. Figure 10 five possible responses.
illustrates the scores.
In addition to responding to these ques-
A value of 1 means that the institution tions, the experts were able to provide
has no importance, whereas a score of recommendations on other diplomatic
100 means that the institution is of critical initiatives that might offer some promise.
importance. Figure
A value of 1 meant that10thedisplays
institutionthat
had nothe It was whereas
importance, noted that the Djibouti
a score Code
of 100 meant ofthe
that Con-
average
institutionscores
was ofof importance
critical for counter-
importance. duct was
Figure 10 displays that athe
nonbinding
average scoresinstrument, and that
of importance
for counter-piracy
piracy of the United
of the United NationsNations Security Council
Security the Arabtopped
andthe list at states
African 78. Second, with an
that negotiated
average score
Council toppedof 68,
thewas
listthe International
at 78. Maritimethe
Second, with Organization.
agreementThe European
should make Union bindingPage | 11
it awas
scored
an third. score of 68, was the Interna-
average treaty. Furthermore, states from outside
tional Maritime Organization. The Euro- the area should be encouraged to provide
The Workshop also considered
pean Union was scored third. the question of whether the diplomatic
maritime securityefforts underway
capacity were in
assistance
well integrated with the naval efforts to suppress piracy. Figure 11 indicates that there
the form of training, communications, was not
widespread agreement among the experts on whether diplomatic efforts were well integrated
The Workshop also considered the ques- small boats and security infrastructure to
with operational naval activities, with two or more participants selecting each of the five possible
tion of whether the diplomatic efforts
responses.
the nations of the Horn of Africa. Just as

Diplomatic efforts and naval efforts are well 1 2 3 4 5

integrated. Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly
Disagree Agree
Number of experts responding in each column. 2 8 11 8 4
Figure 11: Integrating Diplomatic
Figure andDiplomatic
11: Integrating Naval Efforts
and Naval Efforts

In addition to responding to these questions, the experts were able to provide recommendations
on other diplomatic initiatives that might offer some promise. It was noted that the Djibouti Code 9
of Conduct was a nonbinding instrument, and that the Arab and African states that negotiated the
agreement should make it a binding treaty. Furthermore, states from outside the area should be
encouraged to provide maritime security capacity assistance in the form of training,
 Japan provided leadership in construction implement a counter-piracy “rewards for
of a regional counter-piracy center in Sin- justice” program that helps to identify and
gapore, one or more nations should assist apprehend the leading offenders.
the regional states in the construction and
operation of a regional maritime security
coordination center.
IV. Operational
Coordination
The UN Security Council should consider
should implement
additional a counter-piracy
authorization “rewards
for naval for justice”
forces Somalia program
has thethatlongest
helps tocoastline
identify and
in Africa
eventually apprehend the leading offenders.
operating in the area to seize the accoutre- and there are over 2 million square miles
ments of piracy, such as high horsepower of water at risk of piracy, complicating
IV. Operational Coordination
outboard motors mounted on the stern naval strategy. The experts were divided
of Somali skiffs. One method of enabling on whether the world’s naval forces were Page | 12
this strategy would be for the UN Security
Somalia has the longest coastline in Africa and there effective
are overin2 addressing
million squarepiracy
miles in
of the Horn
water at
Council
risk to declare
of piracy, a specifically
complicating tailored
naval strategy. of Africa.
The experts Not one
were divided on expert
whetherstrongly
the world’sagreed
naval forces
maritime were effective
exclusion in addressing
zone adjacent to thepiracy
So- in that
the Horn of Africa.
the world’s Not forces
naval one expert strongly
are effectively
agreed that the world’s
malia coastline, naval forces
forbidding the useareofeffectively
large addressing the
addressing theissue
issueofofmaritime
maritime piracy off off
piracy
the coast of Somalia (Figure 12).
outboard motors throughout Somalia’s the coast of Somalia (Figure 12).

The world’s naval forces are effectively addressing 1 2 3 4 5

the issue of maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia. Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly
Disagree Agree
Number of experts responding in each column. 3 13 4 10 0
Figure 12: World’s Naval
Figure Forces
12: World’s Effectively
Naval Addressing
Forces Effectively Addressing Piracy
Piracy

exclusive iteconomic
Moreover, is unlikelyzone.
that theFishermen
deployment and Moreover,
of large numbers of it iswarships
unlikelyfrom
thatdistant
the deployment
states into
the areacivil
other is sustainable.
traffic have Many of the
little nations that have
justification sent warships
of large numbers areofunaccustomed
warships from to distant
operating far from home
for high-powered watersmotors,
outboard and without
which logistical support
states into intheunfamiliar
area is regions.
sustainable. Many
Furthermore,
propel the smallit is notand
clear fast
that such
piratea large area can
skiffs, of realistically
the nationsbethat patrolled,
have sentevenwarships
by a large are
multinational
enabling them force. It would take
to overtake largemore than 60 warships
merchant to providetoanoperating
unaccustomed effective presence
far from home
throughout just a single narrow
vessels. By banning the use of such highvessel transit corridor.
waters and without logistical supportarein
Until other more effective approaches
developed and begin to show
horsepower engines, the internationalprogress, however, there is no immediate
unfamiliar regions.substitute for operational
Furthermore, it is not
patrols by major maritime powers.
community can reduce the availability of In fact, Figure 13 indicates that a majority of Workshop
clear that such a large area can realistically
experts—18
the means of outpirate
of 22—either
attack.agreed
Such or strongly agreed
engines that out-of-area
be patrolled, even bynaval forces
a large should be
multinational
doing even
should be more
subjectto counter
to seizurepiracy.
and destruc- force. It would take more than 60 warships
tion on sight by the international naval to provide an effective presence throughout
The out-of-area
forces operating naval forces
in the area.should be doing morejust 1
in a single 2
narrow 3 transit
vessel 4 corridor.
5
countering piracy. Until other Disagree
Strongly Neutralapproaches
more effective Agree Stronglyare
The Contact Group should adopt a means Disagree
developed and begin to show progress, Agree
Number of experts
of decoupling responding
the Somali piracyin each
gangscolumn.
from however, 2 there 2is no immediate
8 16 substitute
2
Figure
the tribal13:
andOut-of-area
social structure Naval
of theForces
countryShould Be Doing More
for operational patrols by major maritime
through targeted aid and increased support powers. In fact, Figure 13 indicates that a
to alternative centers of authority inside the majority of Workshop experts—18 out of
country. The donors’ conference is a first 22—either agreed or strongly agreed that
step toward realizing this approach. Fur- out-of-area naval forces should be doing
thermore, the international community, pos- even more to counter piracy.
10 sibly working through INTERPOL, should
 throughout just a single narrow vessel transit corridor. Until other more effective approaches are
developed and begin to show progress, however, there is no immediate substitute for operational
patrols by major maritime powers. In fact, Figure 13 indicates that a majority of Workshop
experts—18 out of 22—either agreed or strongly agreed that out-of-area naval forces should be
doing even more to counter piracy.

The out-of-area naval forces should be doing more in 1 2 3 4 5

countering piracy. Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly
Disagree Agree
Number of experts responding in each column. 2 2 8 16 2
Figure 13: Out-of-area Naval
Figure 13: Forces
Out-of-area Should
Naval Be Doing
Forces Should More
Be Doing More

warship requirements and serve as a

The Workshop experts narrated additional
.
operational options that might be imple-
mented, and these include the use of:
• Deception. “Q-ships”—warships dis-
guised as civil merchant shipping.
• Land strike. The use of armed force
against safe havens and logistics activi-
ties on the shore. Land strikes against
identified pirate staging areas would
be difficult to conduct and likely ignite
anti-western reaction and inflame Mus-
lim passion—making the cure worse
than the disease.
• Blockade. Monitor the entrance and
egress of shipping into and out of So-
malia in order to cut pirates off from
their bases on land.
• Embargo. Prevent the introduction, by
land, sea or air, of weapons, communi-
cations devices and other equipment
destined for use by pirate gangs.
• Tailored Exclusion Zone. Use naval
forces to prevent the use of certain items
or devices, such as high horsepower
outboard motors, in designated areas,
such as Somalia’s exclusive economic
zone.
• Unmanned Systems. Greater use of
unmanned systems for detection and
monitoring of piracy activity may reduce
force multiplier for intelligence, sur-
veillance and reconnaissance.
• Smaller Warships. Employment of
smaller warships, such as patrol craft
and corvettes, should be embraced over
the long term, making the task of com-
bating piracy more efficient. Maritime
powers should develop simultaneously
regional coastal maritime security
capacity, complementing or eventually
replacing the foreign presence.
• Regional Coordination. In the near
term, there is a need to identify a
single contact point for vessels fac-
ing an immediate threat, such as UK
Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO)
Dubai. Over the long term, creation of
a regional maritime security coordina-
tion center to fuse intelligence and
share information is essential to shift
responsibility toward regional states.
This presents an opportunity for re-
gional states dependent on the safety
of freedom of navigation in the Horn
of Africa—specifically Egypt, Saudi
Arabia and the Gulf states—to provide
funding and training for such a center.
• Somali Coast Guard. Development of
a Somali coastal force is a necessary,
but long-term, proposition.
11
 V. Focus on Somalia
Regional and maritime action is required
to contend with the challenge so long as
pirates enjoy sustained sanctuary in So-
malia. The last time the international com-
munity took military action to change the
situation in Somalia, it did not go well.
• Governance. It is unclear whether a
stronger central government or stron-
ger clan system would yield greater
stability and governance. The dichoto-
my implicates all of the promise—and
difficulty—experienced in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
• Somali Development. Providing
greater development assistance to So-
mali clan elders who may have some
influence in reducing piracy.
• Piracy Financing. Explore the poten-
tial for disrupting the piracy financing
and ransom system through coordi-
nated banking security.

VI. Industry &

Shipping Security
The international civil shipping industry
will have to take additional steps to en-
sure the safety of merchant shipping in
the area of greatest risk. Merchant ships
VI. Industry & Shipping Security should continue to broaden their defensive
responses, to include passive measures
such
The international civil shipping industry will have to takeasadditional
barbed wire
steps around
to ensurethe
the lifelines,
safety of
and ships
merchant shipping in the area of greatest risk. Merchant consider employment
should of organic
continue to broaden their or Page | 15
defensive responses, to include passive measures such as barbed
contract wire security
vessel around theonlifelines
boardand some
consider employment of organic or contract vessel security on board some ships, such
ships, such as dredgers and barges or as
dredgers and barges or those carrying sensitive cargo.
those carrying sensitive cargo.

Counter-piracy approaches by the private sector 1 2 3 4 5

appear to align well with the threat assessment we Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly
heard this morning. Disagree Agree
Number of experts responding in each column. 0 3 9 16 4
Figure 14: Private SectorFigure
Approaches
14: Private Sector Approaches

12
VII. The U.S. VIII. Conclusion
Government The depth of discussion and variety and
originality of the discourse, conducted
In considering the U.S. interagency
in a non-attribution environment, were
process, the experts had mixed views on
productive. The seizure of the Maersk Ala-
whether the disparate departments and
bama, in particular, has elicited numerous
agencies were working together success-
commentators who suggest meaningless
fully to address Somali piracy, with more
prescriptions, such as “time to get tough,”
experts characterizing the level of success
or “we have to change the risk-reward cal-
as neutral or successful.
culus” of the pirates. Ultimately, everyone
agrees that the best solution is for a restora-
Finally, the majority of experts believed
tion of law and order to develop within the
that the interagency community was work-
country of Somalia, but neither the inter-
ing well to counter piracy.
national community nor the United States
VII. The U.S. Government
The finding in Figure 16 is particularly
has been able to devise such an outcome.
The much harder questions lie behind
encouraging since the experts also rejected
In considering the U.S. interagency process, the experts thosehad mixedand
slogans, views on whether
require patientlythe think-
VII. The U.S. Government
the idea
that more
had to
that there
be overcome
were no impediments
disparate departments and agencies were working together
in order to facili-
ing throughsuccessfully
specifictoalternative
address Somali piracy,
courses of
with experts characterizing the level of success as neutral or successful.
action based on an accurate picture of the Page | 16
VII. The U.S. Government
tate interagency cooperation.
In considering the U.S. interagency process, the experts causes hadand motivators
mixed of Somali
views on whether the piracy.
Within thedepartments
disparate US government, the interagency
and agencies were working together
Furthermore, 2 to
1 successfully
the 3
address
Workshop 4 illustrated
Somali 5
piracy,
community
with
In considering is working
more experts U.S. together
the characterizing
interagency successfully
theprocess, to
level of the
success Strongly
as
experts neutral
had Disagree
or
mixed Neutral
successful.
views on Agree
whether theStrongly
that no single solution will solve the prob- Page | 16
counter
disparatepiracy.
departments and agencies were working together lemDisagree successfully
of Somali piracy. to address is theAgree
If thereSomali piracy,
desire
with more
Number
Within ofexperts
the experts
US characterizing
responding
government, the
eachlevel
theininteragency of success
column. as neutral
1 or successful.
52 83 10
to find progress in adversity, the rampant 4 05 Page | 16
community is working together successfully
Figure 15: The Success of the U.S. Interagency Process to Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly
counter
Within thepiracy.
US government, the interagency Disagree
1 2 3 4 Agree
5
community is working together successfully to Strongly Disagree
Finally, the majority experts believed that the interagency community was working well to 0
Number of experts responding in each column. 1 5 Neutral
8 Agree
10 Strongly
counter piracy.
Figurepiracy.
counter 15: The Success of the U.S. Interagency Disagree
Process Agree
Number of experts responding in each column. 1 5 8 10 0
Figurethe
Within
Finally, 15:
the US The Success
government,
majority experts of15:
the
Figure theTheU.S.
interagency
believed that Interagency
the
Success ofinteragency Process
1community
the U.S. Interagency 2 was working
Process 3 4 to 5
well
community
counter piracy.is working together well to counter Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly
Finally, the majority experts believed that the interagency community was working well toAgree
piracy. Disagree
counterthe
Number
Within piracy.
of US
experts responding
government, theininteragency
each column. 01 32 53 16 4 05
community
Figure 16:isTheworking together well
Interagency to counter Works
Community Strongly
WellDisagree Neutral Agree Strongly
piracy.
Within the US government, the interagency Disagree
1 2 3 4 Agree
5
community
Number
The is
in working
of experts
finding 16together
responding
figure inwell
each
is particularly tocolumn.
counter
encouraging Strongly
since the Disagree
0 experts 3 alsoNeutral5
rejected Agree
16idea
the Strongly
0
that
piracy.
Figure
there were 16:no The Interagency
impediments hadCommunity
that 16:
Figure to be
The overcome
Interagency Disagree
Works
in orderWell
Community to facilitate
Works Well interagency Agree
Number of experts responding in each column.
cooperation. 0 3 5 16 0
Figure
The finding16:inThe Interagency
figure 16 is particularly Community
encouragingWorks since the Well
experts also rejected the idea that
There are no
there were noimpediments
impedimentstothat UShadgovernment efforts in order
to be overcome 1 to facilitate
2 3
interagency 4 5
to achieve
findinginteragency
cooperation.
The in figure 16cooperation.
is particularly encouraging since Strongly Disagree
the experts alsoNeutral
rejectedAgree
the idea Strongly
that
there were no impediments that had to be overcome inDisagree order to facilitate interagency Agree
cooperation.
Number
There areofnoexperts responding
impediments to US in government
each column.efforts 31 16
2 43 14 15
to achieve
Figure interagency
17: Interagency cooperation.
Impediments Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly
Figure 17: Interagency Impediments
There are no impediments to US government efforts Disagree 1 2 3 4 Agree
5
to achieve
Number ofinteragency cooperation.
experts responding in each column. Strongly
3 Disagree
16 Neutral 4 Agree 1 Strongly1
VIII. Conclusion
Number of experts responding in each column. Disagree Agree 13
Number
Figure of 17:experts respondingImpediments
Interagency in each column. 3 16 4 1 1
The depth of discussion and variety
Number of experts responding in each column. and originality of the discussion, conducted in a non-
attribution environment, was much more productive than typical analysis of the problem. The
 piracy off the coast of Somalia, stretching
from the seizure of the very large crude
carrier Sirius Star in November 2008 to
the capture of the Maersk Alabama in April
2009, has focused world attention on an
often ignored corner of the globe. One of
the most promising courses of action is to
build the rule of law and capacity for gov-
ernance and the maintenance of security
throughout the region. All of the regional
states, and Somalia in particular, would
benefit from increased security assistance
and, just as importantly, development of
long-lasting governance, economic and
security partnerships with neighbors,
friends and allies. Operationally, the threat
of piracy has presented the first—and by
any measure successful—test of the con-
cept of a spontaneous Global Maritime
Partnership (GMP) and a validation of the
Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea-
power.5 The follow-through, moving from
coordination among the larger out-of-area
naval forces and toward regional efforts
and local capacity-building, requires com-
mitment, generous resources and political
will in East Africa and throughout the
globe.
5
James Kraska and Brian Wilson, The Co-operative Strategy and the Pirates of the Gulf of Aden, The RUSI Journal 74–81 (April 2009).
14
Participants and
Credits
The Workshop was comprised of partici-
pants from South and East Asia, Europe
and the United States. The participants rep-
resented a variety of eclectic professional
experiences, including international law
attorneys, advisers in the areas of oceans
policy, irregular maritime warfare and
maritime piracy from several continents,
representatives of the international civil
shipping industry and maritime piracy and
naval experts from academic and policy
research institutions. A list of the workshop
participants, an agenda for the workshop
and selected briefs presented may be found
on the Internet website of the International
Law Department, Naval War College, at
http://www.usnwc.edu/cnws/ild/ild
.aspx.
Special thanks to CDR Sandra

Selman, USCG, and Mr. Lawrence

Modisett for their valuable roles

in conducting the Workshop. The

International Law Department is

thankful to Dr. Stephen Downes-

Martin for his generous assistance

in analyzing the data, to Charlene

Bary-Ingerson for operating the

Decision Support Center during the

event and to Jayne Van Petten for

arranging the travel for the Work-

shop participants.

15
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