Page 1 of 1

Kevin Scheid

From: Jamie Gorelick

Sent: Thursday, May 27, 2004 12:51 PM
To: Kevin Scheid
Subject: FW: Document attached: Nat'l Intel Reform #9v2.doc

—Original Message
From: Gorelick, Jamie
Sent: Thursday, May 27, 2004 1:31 PM
To: Kevin Scheid (E-mail)
Subject: Document attached: Nat'l Intel Reform #9v2.doc

Kevin --

As you can see from the attached, I made some changes. You need not accept them all but, at a minimum, we
need:

\- Total clarity on the authorities of the DNI (which we should so name for convenience sake).
\. Total clarity on the authorities remaining in other agencies
\. You need to say something about how the SecDef maintains access to tactical military intelligence - this is
the key criticism of the DNI concept
4. We should not be consistent in establishing responsibilities and setting substantive goals; therefore I took
out the HUMINT piece which should go elsewhere in our recommendations.
5. Make sure the roles of the intell offices of other agencies (like INR) is clear. Is there any other collection
out there that is not under the DNI; need to make clear that they get all info and therefore can do
competing analyses - does CIA still have analytic function?
6. Have we taken all known criticism of this proposal and integrated responses?

Call to discuss if you have questions/comments.

Jamie
Jamie S. Gorelick
Wilmer Cutler Pickering LLP
2445 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037
202.663.6500

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5/27/2004
 National Intelligence Reforms

The attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 exposed severe shortcomings in our
intelligence capabilities. We did not have effective access in countries where we have no official
presence; we were unable to penetrate hard targets like terrorist organizations operating abroad
or cells established in the United States.
Our investigations have confirmed,dysfunctions in our national security intelligence Deleted: grave
establishment. They are of two kinds, structural and cultural.
The structural problems are the simplest to understand and their remedies straightforward. The
government agencies charged with foreign and domestic intelligence are the creatures of a
different age with laws, regulations and organization fashioned for external wars and internal
threats of the last century where strict separation of foreign and domestic activities was desired.
Deleted: sweeping
That legacy of nation-state focus, legislated walls and compartmentalized information cannot
deal with the kinds of transnational threats operating seamlessly at home and abroad with speed , Deleted:
and agility. Our most senior intelligence officials do not have authorities, access and Formatted: Bullets and Numbering
accountability to do what is expected of them. Nor do they have the power to make the great Deleted: Organize
organizational changes necessary to correct these problems. Deleted: - into a new structure where
responsibility, authority and
L_The Commission therefore recommends specific T organizational changes,, "/' accountability for the collection, analysis
and dissemination of intelligence are
1. Authority and accountability for the collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence aligned under one official.
should be aligned under one official - a Director of National Intelligence - with budget Deleted:'
policy and organizational (Kevin — list here the actual responsibilities] responsibility for,the Deleted: <#>Array these agencies
national intelligence agencies - CIA, NSA, NGA, NRO, and the FBI's around national security missions, not
collection capabilities, and appoint
counterterrorism/counterintelligence elements (hereinafter the"National Security Intelligence senior, experienced officials from
Service")^. The Department of Defense would continue to have [describe the throughout the government to head these
missions (e.g., transnational terrorism,
responsibilities] for [POD agencies], as would the Department of Justice and the FBI for the weapons of mass destruction
National Security Intelligence Service. proliferation, China, Russia, etc.)U
Deleted: Appoint an official separate
2. To better integrate the work of each of these agencies, a senior official analogous to a from the head of the CIA to lead this new
combatant commander would direct for the DNI the work of these agencies in furtherance of structure with
each of the critical national security missions (e.g.. transnational terrorism, weapons of mass I Deleted:; mis official will
destruction proliferation. China, Russia, etc.1. In this way, the work of the intelligence I Deleted; nominees
community will be organized by mission, not capability. [Deleted; He/she

3. TThe DNI would have, a small executive staff, the authority to, recommend to the President the ; I Deleted: will
individuals, to be appointed as the directors of the national agencies and the leaders of the Deleted: <#>Strengthen human source
intelligence overseas through a 36-month
national mission areas: the authority to establish uniform policies for personnel, technology, phased national strategy to deploy a
budgeting, etc.: the authority to allocate among the agencies the single appropriation that thousand case officers to operate under
non-official cover that can facilitate
would be made for national intelligence. The DN^woul^be the President's senior greater access to those that can more
intelligence advisor, and be held accountable for integrating the intelligence agencies into a effectively address transnational threats
than is accomplished through official
fully integrated, global network. cover. H
Establish within the Federal Bureau of
4. ,The National Security Intelligence Service will be responsible for the intelligence missions of- Investigation a
the Bureau, in particular counterterrorism and counterintelligence. NSIS would report T to the [ Formatted: Bullets and Numbering
Director of the FBI [for XXX purposes] and tothe DNI [tor YYY purposes! i Deleted: be responsible
[ Deleted: head of national intelligence
5. The DNI would appoint one official responsible for rationalizing the multiple personnel Deleted: A
systems across the national intelligence agencies and for creating; incentives for working i Deleted: to create
across agencies on thejnational security missions, Deleted:, such as transnational
terrorism
6. The DNI would appoint one official responsible for improving^nformation sharing while
Formatted: Bullets and Numbering
maintaining security. This official would set standards and establish protocols ^br the
Deleted: improve
efficient sharing of information and would have the mandate to change the security culture
from one of restricting information because of a "need to know" to on that creates incentives Deleted:
for the "need to share." [ Deleted: by appointing one official to
i set
7. The DNI would appoint a Chief Financial Officer for national intelligence responsible for i Deleted: and be responsible
strengthening, Financial controls and accountability across, the national intelligence agencies, [ Deleted: Strengthen
and managing the Appropriation for national intelligence,. Deleted: of ""~~~
8. The DNI would ensurejprovidingjull access to information collected by the national to Deleted: - CIA, NSA, NGA, NRO and
the FBI's counterterrorism/
thejntelligence entities of the Departments of State, Treasury, Defense, Energy and counterintelligence elements -
Homeland Security
Deleted: by establishing one
9. The DNI would establish an Executive Research Service to collect and analyze openly Deleted: and appointing an official a
available information and to facilitate the availability of outside experts to advise the Chief Financial Officer for national
intelligence.
government through independent analysis of pressing national security challenges.
Deleted: Strengthen
Deleted: competitive analysis by
ensuring the independence of and
To implement its recommendations, the Commission urges the President to immediately
Deleted: collection by the
establish, through Executive Order, an, Intelligence Transition Task Force to develop legislation
Deleted: departmental
and implement the reforms. ,The Task Force would be responsible for the following:
i Deleted:
1) Drafting legislation and/or an Executive Order to implement the reforms through the FY I Deleted: eighteen-month
2005 Intelligence Authorization Act,; Deleted: The Task Force should
include selected commissioners from the
9/11 and Iraq commissions and a staff
2) Develop a detailed strategy and timeline for implementing the reforms within 12 months selected from the law enforcement and
of passage of the legislation; and intelligence communities. The Task
Force should report to the President
through an advisory board consisting of
3) Report regularly to the Presidenjto resolve any conflicts,. the White House Chief of Staff, the
National Security Advisor, and the
Chairman of the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board. H
Deleted: prior to September 30,J004 j
Deleted: board ]
Deleted: or to elevate institutional
resistance to the reforms requiring the
attention of the President
 Page 1 of2

Kevin Scheid

From: Jamie Gorelick

Sent: Thursday, May 27, 2004 8:31 PM
To: Kevin Scheid
Cc: Jamie Gorelick
Subject: RE: Revised Intel Reforms

Kevin --

Nice work. Much Improved.

A few suggestions:

• In first sub-bullet of point one, list DNI's sources of authority -- budget, personnel, etc. -- before you state
what you are leaving elsewhere. Otherwise, you're "burying the lead".
• When you describe the intelligence entities, you need to say there that they have access to the DNI
agencies' output, but produce their own analysis (though it is redundant of later point).
• When you describe DOD authorities in first sub-bullet, you need to describe its role re the current DOD
intell agencies (e.g. NRO). You need to be explicit that DOD would continue to maintain operational
responsibility (again, Deutch had very specific language which he felt would be clearly understood to leave
responsibility for things like launching rockets in DoD, unless you have decided on some other plan; this
needs to be explicit).
• Also, do you acknowledge that there are some places where national intelligence and tactical military
intelligence overlap? If so, how do you address this?
• Point 2 needs to be powers of the DNI (currently third).
• Point 3 (currently 2), I would prefer to use the word "organize" than "array" as I am not sure what the latter
means. Also, we need to be clear that there is a leader for each mission and that the missions will iterate.
I would say: "Organize the national intelligence agencies around missions, not collection capabilities,
much as the Goldwater-Nichols legislation organized the Defense Department around missions in 1986."
• I would edit the rest of that sentence to say after "direct, for the DNI," "the work of each of the mission
areas (e.g ). These missions would be expected to change pyer time as the national...securityjnteresls of
the cpuntry change.
• I would prefer not to ask for our commission to be represented on the Task Force as it sounds as if we are
looking to extend our life. I would be interested in your thinking as to why we should and why we should
specify who the advisory board is.

This is just about in shape to get it around to the group. If that could happen before the weekend, that would be
great. I'm around tomorrow if you want to talk.

Thanks for your work on this.

Jamie

Original Message
From: Kevin Scheid [mailto:kscheid@9-llcommission.gov]
Sent: Thursday, May 27, 2004 5:58 PM
To: Gorelick, Jamie
Subject: Revised Intel Reforms

Jamie,

5/28/2004
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I have incorporated all your suggestions, but I haven't taken all of your line-in line-out changes. See if this
version addresses your concerns and then I'll circulate it among the lunch bunch.

Thanks.

Kevin

5/28/2004