Overview

Public
•
Hearing
U.S. Cour

Team 3
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Briefing Intent

• Review hearing purpose & agenda

• Explain the staff investigation

- Clarify "big questions"
- Highlight staff findings
- Explain the lines of inquiry
- Clarify "redlines"

• Clarify desired outcomes

• Answer your questions

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 Hearing Overview

Purpose: Investigate the formulation and conduct of U.S.

counterterrorism
5 _ _« .*?__ «_•
policy, with
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particular
' ****** •
emphasis on the
1—— — •_:___ .•._
sriod from the August 7,1998
—
embassy bombings to
September 11, 2001

Issue: What options did senior officials consider and what

choices did they make before September 11, 2001?

Importance: Understand how senior officials from the

past two administrations handled the most pressing
national security threat to our country

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Topics & Witnesses

DIPLOMACY
• Madeleine Albright
• Colin Powell

THE MILITARY
• William Cohen
• Donald Rumsfeld

CLANDESTINE & COVERT ACTION

• George Tenet
NATIONAL POLICY COORDINATION
• Samuel Berger
• Richard Clarke
• Richard Armitage (WH Witness)

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 Diplomacy:
The Big Questions

What was the State Department's diplomatic strategy

for ending the Afghan safe haven for al Qaeda before
9/11?

When did key foreign policy decisions arise such as

Imposing sanctions on the Taliban? What factors
influenced senior officials in making them?

What challenges had to be overcome in leveraging

influential states such as Pakistan, the UAE, Sauc
Arabia, and Sudan in fighting al Qaeda terrorists? What
diplomatic efforts were undertaken before 9/11?

What lessons can we ascertain about the limits of

diplomacy as an instrument of U.S. counterterrorism
policy?
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Diplomacy:
Staff Findings
U.S. officials employed a range of measures to pressure the
Taliban to cease harboring Bin Ladin. However, the
Taliban held firm both before or after 9/11.

U.S. officials pressed Pakistan to demand the Taliban hand

over bin Ladin, or failing that, to cut off its support to the
Taliban. However, Pakistan did not alter its ties with the
Taliban until after 9/11.

The United States pressed the UAE to break ties with the
Taliban and enforce Security Council sanctions. However,
these efforts achieved little before 9/11.

Saudi Arabia worked closely with us to end the Afghan safe

haven for Bin Ladin. However, before 9/11 we could not
get adequate cooperation on sharing intelligence and
disrupting finances of the al Qaeda organization.

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 Diplomacy:
Lines of Inquiry & "Red Lines"
Lines of Inquiry
• Strategy; How did the diplomatic strategy against al Qaeda
terrorists change after the embassy bombings of August 7, 1998?
• Key Decisions: What factors influenced State Department
thinking on key foreign policy decjsions, such as containing the
influence of the Taliban in the region?
• Taliban: How did we pressure the Taliban to hand over Bin
Ladin?
• Pakistan: What efforts were taken to enlist Pakistan's support for
pressuring the Taliban to expel bin Ladin, or cutting its ties?
Saudi Arabia; How well did Saudi Arabia cooperate with us in
jring th
pressuring the ~ "'
Taliban . . . . .off support. for
or cutting - al
. Qaeda?
- . _
mlts of Diplomacy: At what point was it clear that diplomacy
H
alone would not end the Afghan safe haven for Bin Ladin?
• Hindsight; What forms of diplomatic pressure the United States
did not use before 9/11 that, in hindsight, should have?
Red Lines
. Criticism of allies
• Private sensitive discussions of friendly foreign officials
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The Military:
The Big Questions
What were the Pentagon's military strategies and plans for
defending the nation against the al Qaeda threat before
9/11?

When did key decisions arise? What factors influenced

senior officials regarding the use of U.S. military force
against the al Qaeda threat in Afghanistan?

What military operations were conducted (or set aside) to

defend the nation against the growing threat of al Qaeda
before 9/11?

What lessons can we ascertain about the U.S. military as

an instrument of U.S. counterterrorism policy?

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 The Military:
Staff Findings
From August 1998 until after 9/11, the U.S. mijitary did not
conduct operations against al Qaeda in Afghanistan.
The Pentagon prepared options to use force in Afghanistan,
however operational and policy considerations led to
reliance on the "default option of cruise missile strikes.
Military officials were reluctant to conduct Special
Operations in Afghanistan due to its difficult operational
conditions.
Senior officials set aside cruise missile strikes against bin
Ladin on three occasions due to lack of suitable
intelligence, unacceptable collateral damage, and other
unwelcome consequences for U.S. interests in the region.
The consensus of U.S. officials is that a large-scale military
invasion of Afghanistan did not have the support of either
the Congress or the American people before 9/11.
After the attack on the USSCole, neither administration
ordered a military response against al Qaeda.

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The Military:
Lines of Inquiry & "Red Lines II

Lines of Inquiry
• Strategy: What was the Pentagon's military strategy to defeat
the al Qaeda terrorist threat before 9/11?
• Kev Decisions: What factors influenced senior officials on using
force, including criticism of the cruise missile attacks of August
20,1998? Why was there no response following the USS Cole?
• Military Planning: What was the state of military planning to
conduct military operations in Afghanistan before 9/11 to
support the administration's policy to destroy al Qaeda?
• Actionable Intelligence: Why was this an recurring problem?
What actions did the military take to get the intelligence needed
for conducting a stand-off attack against bin Ladin?
• Reluctance: Why was the Pentagon reluctant to use Special
Forces to destroy al Qaeda in Afghanistan?
• Support to Diplomacy: What efforts did the military take to
strengthen the credibility of the threat against the Taliban?

Red Lines
• Specific capabilities and deployments of military forces
• Current intelligence and jnlJJiii^gHfft^tions against al Qaeda
 Clandestine & Covert Action:
The Big Questions
How did the CIA implement U.S. counterterrorism policy through
the conduct of clandestine and covert action programs against
Bin Ladin in Afghanistan before 9/11?

What clandestine and covert action strategies and plans to attack

Bin Ladin and his lieutenants did the CIA develop before
9/11? Were they implemented, and if so to what effect?

Did the CIA have the authorities to effectively attack Bin Ladin
and al Qaeda?

Did the CIA have the capabilities to effectively attack Bin Ladin
and al Qaeda?

What lessons can we draw about the DCI's role as a policy

advisor and the effectiveness of covert action as an instrument of
U.S. counterterrorism

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Clandestine & Covert Action:

Staff Findings
The CIA attacked al Qaeda globally and focused on pursuing Bin
Ladin specifically as early as 1996. The CIA did more than any
other agency to bring the fight to al Qaeda before 9/11.
Although the CIA developed successive covert action programs
against Bin Ladin in Afghanistan using various proxy groups, these
efforts were not fruitful.
Problems hindering effective covert action included unreliable
proxies, risks to innocents, and confusion about the authorities to
take extreme action.
An inability to provide 'actionable intelligence' hindered
policymakers' efforts to use the U.S. military effectively in
Afghanistan.
The recon Predator offered a new capability to help solve the
actionable intelligence problem. However, after initial flight in the
fall of 2000, the recon Predator did not fly in Afghanistan until
after 9/11.
The armed Predator was not technically ready for operations in
Afghanistan until a few weeks after 9/11.
Covert action had operational limitations and was not a "silver
bullet". It could not defeat al Qaeda alone.
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 Clandestine & Covert Action:
Lines of Inquiry & "Red Lines"
Lines of Inquiry
• Strategy; How did CIA's covert action strategy for attacking Bin
Ladin and al Qaeda in Afghanistan evolve before 9/11?
• Authorities: Did CIA have the authorities it needed & wanted in
order to go after Bin Ladin and al Qaeda in Afghanistan?
• Capabilities: What were the practical limitations of relying on
proxies in Afghanistan, and how were these conveyed higher?
• Missed Opportunities: Were there missed opportunities to get
Bin Ladin? When and why?
• The Predator: Why did CIA officials resist resuming recon
Predator flights before 9/11?

Red Lines
• Open discussion of capture vs. kill authorities
• Operational details of covert action programs
• Problems in current bilateral relations
• Revealing sources and methods
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National Policy Coordination:

The Big Questions
• How did senior officials view the gravity of the threat posed by al
Qaeda to the United States before 9/11?

• What strategies were implemented by senior officials for

combating the threat of al Qaeda terrorism? How were the
instruments of power focused to achieve policy aims?

• What were the key policy decisions before 9/11? What factors
influenced senior officials in making them?

• What interagency planning and coordinating mechanisms were

relied upon By senior officials to guide agency efforts?

• How well postured and resourced were key departments and

agencies in order to combat the al Qaeda threat?

• What lessons can we ascertain for the future?

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 National Policy Coordination:
Staff Findings
The national coordinator for counterterrorism understood
the gravity of the al Qaeda threat to the U.S. and spurred
several initiatives to combat terrorism in the government.
Plan Delenda, prepared by the national coordinator, was a
national strategy to eliminate the Bin Ladin threat.
Although never formally adopted, it guided the national
coordinator's efforts to destroy al Qaeda before 9/11.
The Clinton administration relied on a "Small Group" of
cabinet principals to formulate national policy.
The Millennium celebration marked a dramatic increase in
threat warnings in December 1999 and exceptional
national policy coordination and information-sharing.
Neither administration responded to the Cole attack.
The Bush administration relied on the Deputies Committee
to formulate national policy on counterterrorism.
Bush administration principals first met on September 4,
2001 to approve a three-year strategy to destroy al Qaeda.
Counterterrorism funding grew in the years before 9/11
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National Policy Coordination:

Lines of Inquiry & "Red Lines"
Lines of Inquiry
• Threat Assessment: When did senior officials grasp the gravity of
the al Qaeda threat to the United States?
• Strategy: How did Plan Delenda shape national counterterrorism
strategy of both administrations?
• Key Decisions: What were the factors that influenced senior
officials in making key decisions on fighting al Qaeda including
covert action, the use of military force, the Predator, etc?
• National Coordinator: What factors were important to creating
an effective role for combating terrorism?
• Interaaency Mechanisms: How was did each administration
organize interagency coordinating mechanisms to integrated
agency efforts.
• Agency Capabilities: What are the limitations in the capabilities
of USG agencies in fighting terrorism?

Red Lines
• Private advice to the President
• Specific discussions of covert action
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 Desired Outcomes

The American public is better informed about how

senior officials of both administrations dealt with
this emerging threat to our national security

Commissioners are able to:

• Understand how U.S. counterterrorism policy

was formed and implemented before
September 11

• Formulate recommendations for U.S.

counterterrorism policy and strategy to make
America safer and more secure
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