Emil Krner and the Prussianization of the Chilean Army: Origins, Process, and Consequences, 1885-1920 Author(s): Frederick

M. Nunn Source: The Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 50, No. 2 (May, 1970), pp. 300-322 Published by: Duke University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2513028 . Accessed: 19/08/2013 17:33
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Emil Korner and the Prussianization of the Chilean Army: Origins, Process, and Consequences, 1885-1920
FREDERICK M. NUNN*

IN1885 the ChileangovernmentappointedCaptainEmil

K6rner of the Imperial German Army to train its officers. When K6rner arrived in Chile he found an experienced officer corps composed of veterans from the War of the Pacific and the Indian campaigns in Araucania. They were men who took pride in being the heirs of Bernardo O'Higgins and Manuel Bulnes, but they had little experience in the rigors of the classroom. Chile wanted a modern professional army; K6rner molded one; and when he retired in 1910, he left behind the best equipped land fighting force and the best educated officer corps in Latin America. But by the time K6rner died, ten years later, that same army found itself enmeshed in politics, a professional organization within an anachronistic political and social order and almost a distinct political institution. Only two years before obtaining Kiirner's services, Chile emerged victorious from the War of the Pacific. Established as the dominant state on the Pacific coast of South America, she faced potential enemies on each of her three borders. To the north and northeast Peru smarted from the loss of Tarapaca, Tacna, and Arica; Bolivia became a land-locked nation with the Chilean annexation of Antofagasta; and across the Andes, Argentina, always suspicious, viewed the territorial cessions with envious concern.' Chile 's victory in the War of the Pacific merely heightened the need for a modern, powerful fighting machine and for increased sea power. But South American "-power politics" was not the sole reason
*The author is Associate Professor of History at Portland State University. Grants from the Henry L. and Grace Doherty Foundation and the Portland State University Faculty Committee on Research and Publication made possible the research for this article. ' See Robert N. Burr, By Reason or Force: Chile and the Balancing of Power in South America, 1830-1905 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1965), Chapter 10, "Toward an Armed Peace," 167-192; and Arturo Ahumada, El ej6rcito y la revoluci6n del 5 de septiembre, 1924: Reminiscencias (Santiago, 1931), 1.

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for the Chilean military build-up of the late nineteenth century. Historians, overemphasizing this factor, may have obscured the true role of the army and (to a lesser extent) the navy in Chilean history. In 1904 a Costa Rican major studying in Santiago cited certain factors, endemic to Chile, which should be carefully considered when viewing the Prussianization of the Chilean army. In the beginning, war created and maintained the national identity, as the Chileans defeated the Spaniards, carried the campaign to Peru, and then eliminated the confederation of Peru and Bolivia in 1837. When Chile's position and integrity were menaced again in 1879, war made her preeminent on the west coast of South America.2 Despite the relegation of the armed forces to a nonpolitical role after 1831, military might (for external use) was traditional in Chile. During the nineteenth century, Chilean military men had great prestige; they earned it. Added to international exigencies and national tradition, practical necessity required further militarization. The blood bath of 18791883 sharply reduced the number of professional officers. "In the smoke of battle" their places were taken by new men, many of them trained only in the field and lacking an esprit de corps.3 High-ranking Chilean army officers pressed the government for extensive reforms in organization and training soon after hostilities ceased. In fact, even before that time General Emilio Sotomayor proposed to the government that it obtain an instructor in Germany.4 Sotomayor was then director of the military school; he had served in the battles of Chorrillos and Miraflores; and he was convinced that the army needed drastic reforms if it were to remain capable of defending the nation's interests.5 Further, by 1885 the existence of a professional, educated army was an established if poorly observed tradition. In 1817 Bernardo O'Higgins founded the Military School, the oldest such national institution in Latin America. However, it did not function effectively during the troubled times between the fall of O 'Higgins in 1823 and the Battle of Lircay seven years later, in which the Conservatives defeated the Liberals and assumed complete control of polities.6
2 Gerardo ZAiiga Montfifar, El ejercito de Chile: Impresiones y apuntes (Santiago, 1904), 20-29. s Gustavo Walker Martinez, Estudios militates (Santiago, 1901), 171. 'Chile: Estado Mayor Jeneral del Ejercito, La guerra civil de 1891: Relaci6n hist6rica militar, Vol. I: La campana del norte (Santiago, 1917), 12. 6 See Francisco Javier Diaz Valderrama, A prop6sito de nuestra politica militar (Santiago, 1938), 52-53. 6 The original Military School functioned until 1819, when it closed for lack

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Diego Portales, the eminence grise of Chilean conservatism in the 1830s, undertook to remove the military organization from politics. He purged or exiled officers who had sided with the Liberal faction in the civil conflict of 1830 and some Conservatives whose loyalty to the new government of President Joaquin Prieto was questionable. Well aware of the army's potential threat to civilian control of politics, Portales also set up a civil militia as a counterpoise to ambitious officers.7 While he directed Chilean affairs, the militia performed this function.8 Portales himself commanded a militia infantry batallion quartered in La Moneda, the presidential palace, and paraded in uniform with the group on festive occasions. After Portales' assassination in 1837 the exclusion of the army from politics continued, except for short-lived revolts in 1851 and 1859. The Military School continued to function, as did the militia. The forty-year period between the death of Portales and the final confrontation with Peru and Bolivia was one of great progress in Chile. Kept busy externally by the war of 1837-1839 and by sporadic Indian uprisings on the southern frontier, the army eschewed political activities. At the end of the War of the Pacific, however, military education was antiquated;9 organization and ordinances had changed little since the days of O 'Higgins; organically the Chilean Army was essentially the same as the forces which had struggled for independence. By 1885 tradition, discipline, and experience were not enough for Chile's needs.10 The government, therefore, turned for inspiration to Germany, the military titan of Europe. President Domingo Santa Maria instructed Guillermo Matta, head of the Chilean legation in Germany, to find a qualified officer who
of funds. Thereafter it operated intermittently until President Manuel Bulnes rechartered it by decree on October 6, 1842. Las fuerzas armadas de Chile: Album Historic (Santiago, 1930), 680-682; Fabio Galdamez Lastra, Bistoria militar de Chile: Estudio critics de la campaiia de 1838-1839 (Santiago, 1910), 37-40. 7 A form of militia, the Civil Guard, existed from 1810 to 1814. A new militia was created in 1825, but like the Military School it proved inoperable. For a succinct description of the army and militia before O 'Higgins see Diaz, A prop6sito, 5-10. 'Francisco Antonio Encina, Jistoria de Chile desde la prehistoria hasta 1891 (20 vols., Santiago, 1940-1952), IX, 549-550; Jorge Boonen Rivera, Participaci6n del ejercito en el desarrollo y progress del pais (Santiago, 1917), 31; Galdamez, Historia militar, 37-40. 9 At that time Spanish translations of 1817 French manuals were still in use. By 1887 translations of current French infantry and cavalry manuals were used. These manuals and Chilean attempts to write others were soundly criticized in Jorge Boonen Rivera, Estudio sobre el reglamento para la maniobra de infanteria, adoptado por decreto det 1? de julio de 1890 (Santiago, 1890). 10 See Indalicio Tellez, Recuerdos militares (Santiago, 1949), 13-14.

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might be engaged as military instructor, and Matta selected K6rner.1 Actually Kbrner was Matta 's second choice, for his first selection, Major Clemens Meckl had already accepted a position with the Japanese army.'2 In August 1885 K6rner agreed "to serve in the Military School . . . as professor in artillery, infantry, cartography, and military history and tactics. "13 The salary agreed upon was 12,000 marks a year, payable in Chilean gold.'4 Emil K6rner, the man who remade the Chilean Army, was born in Wegwitz, Saxony, on October 10, 1846, and educated in Halle an der Saale. He received a degree in humanities in 1866 and entered an infantry regiment during the Austrian campaign of that year. One year later he entered the military school in Hanover. He was promoted to second lieutenant in 1868 and then entered the German Artillery and Engineer School in Berlin (Charlottenburg). During the Franco-Prussian War Kbrner participated in the key battles of W6rth (August 4, 1870) and Sedan (September 1, 1870) and in the final advance on Paris. For his actions he received the Iron Cross, Second Class. At the end of the war K6rner reentered the Artillery and Engineer School. In 1875 he was promoted to lieutenant and the following year graduated from the War Academy (Kriegsakademie). During 1877 and 1878 Kbrner served in Italy, Spain, and Africa. In 1881 he was promoted to captain and one year later joined the faculty at Charlottenburg,15 a post which he still held when he was approached by the Chilean government. K6rner assumed his new duties early in 1886 with the rank of lieutenant colonel and the title of instructor and subdirector of the
" Armando Donoso, Recuerdos de cincuenta aiios (Santiago, 1947), 372. Donoso obtained information on K6rner from General Boonen. See also Francisco Javier Diaz Valderrama, Cuarenta aios de instruction military alemana en Chile (Santiago, 1926), 25. 12 See Major General Tsunekichi Kono, "The Japanese Army, " in Inazo Nitobe (ed.), Western Influences in Modern Japan: A Series of Papers on Cultural Relations (Chicago, 1931), 393. 18 Edmundo Gonzalez Salinas, " General de division Emilio Korner Henze" (memorandum prepared for the writer by the Chief of the Historical Section, General Staff, Army of Chile, Santiago, 1962), 1. In all official Chilean military sources K6rner 's name is Castilianized. 14 Donoso, Recuerdos, 372. General Boonen told Donoso that several days later the Japanese government offered KRrner ?2000 yearly and 'muchas gangas ' to come to Japan. K6rner refused the offer because Chile 's military proficiency in the War of the Pacific had impressed him greatly. 15 Zfiiiiga, El ejercito de Chile, 71; Diaz, Cuarenta anos, 35-36; Donoso, Recuerdos, 372; Gonza'lez, Karner, 1. Korner taught military history and tactics, and weapons science at Charlottenburg.

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Military School. He immediately began to plan the organization of Chile's own Kriegsakademie. The Chilean government officially founded the War Academy on September 9, 1886, only thirteen months after Kdrner had agreed to serve in Chile. The government created the Academy for the purpose of "elevating, as much as possible, the level of technical and scientific instruction of army officers, in order that they may be able, in case of war, to utilize the advantages of new methods of combat and modern armaments in use today. "'16 In its first years the War Academy offered a three-year program. The first-year class studied tactics, fortification, cartography, ballistics, military history, geography, military science, inorganic chemistry, physics, a choice of either mathematics or world history, and German. The second-year curriculum consisted of further training in tactics, fortification, cartography, geography, military science, physics, chemistry, mathematics or world history, and German, plus topography and war games. The third year consisted of Chilean military history, war games, Latin American military geography, hygiene, international law, general staff service, either mathematics or world history, and German.17 The first class (originally limited to fifteen select officers) began its courses on June 15, 1887, under the supervision of the Academy's first director, Brigidier General Marco A. Arriagada. After graduation in 1890 five of its members went to Europe for further study. This was an auspicious beginning, but as early as 1889 K6rner advocated further reforms in military training. When he prepared a statement that year for the government, he lamented the lack of resources available for the older Military School which necessitated " an exaggerated economy in expenses for maintenance of the personnel, as well as books and teaching material."'18 He deplored the poor training in languages, sciences, and natural history, which he blamed on inadequate facilities and equipment. He further criticized the curriculum of the military school because it was not integratedi.e., because students prepared for the infantry, artillery, or cavalry did not learn enough about the other branches to provide the proper coordination in time of war. Even the examination schedule received
16 See the Decreto Orgdnico of September 9, 1886, cited in Reselia hist6rica de la academia de guerra, 1886-1936 (Santiago, 1936), 7-12. 17 Reselia hist6rica, 9-10. See also Reglamento orgdnico de la Academia de Guerra, cited in Ziiffiga, El ejercito de Chile, 167-177. 18 Emilio Kirner, Informe pasado por el primer sub-director de la escuela militar sr. don. Emilio Kerner en febrero de 1889 (Santiago, 1904), 4.

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Kbrner's scrutiny. He wrote that year-end examinations were not enough, for they proved only the students' ability to apply themselves during the several weeks prior to exams and not during the rest of the year.'9 The Military School, then, needed reform before it could turn out the sort of cadets qualified for the new War Academy.20 By 1889 K6rner was planning wide-ranging programs to Prussianize the Chilean Army.2' What enabled him to pursue his goal unfettered was the civil war of 1891, in which he served the revolutionary cause and rose to the rank of brigadier general. Chile's political convulsion of 1891 opened a new era in which the political system set up by Portales in the Constitution of 1833 was replaced by a poor copy of the British parliamentary system. The strong chief executive of 1833 had given way to a balance between executive and legislature during the second half of the nineteenth century and would not be restored constitutionally until 1925. The conflict of 1891 also created a situation more favorable to the Prussianization of the Chilean army. On January 1, 1891, parliamentary leaders challenged the executive branch and, supported by conservative navy chiefs, pronounced against Santa Maria's successor, President Jose Manual Balmaceda.22 Though the bulk of the army remained loyal to Balmaceda, Kbrner and his followers did not.23 Balmaceda formally dismissed Korner from his position, and the German, accompanied by other dissenting officers, sailed north on May 9, 1891, to join the congressional forces in Iquique, the revolutionary capital. According to General Francisco Diaz, K6rner fully appreciated that a congressional victory would facilitate the reform of the army and joined the revolutionary forces, not because of political ideas, but to open new military horizons and to lead those who had been his students.24 In less than six months
19 20 21

K6rner, Informe, 5-7.

See Ibid., 8-9.

See Alberto Lara E., Los oficiales alemanes en Chile: Influencia que ejercieron con sus lecciones en la instrucci6n, y alto prestigio que el ejercito de Chile hla alcanzado (Santiago, 1929), 3-4. See also Jorge Boonen Rivera, Estudio sobre la reorganizaci6n i planta del eje'rcito (Santiago, 1888). "2 Burr notes Balmaceda 's interest in a powerful army, but significantly emphasizes Balmaceda 's " overriding interest, ' the creation of a powerful navy; By Reason or Force, 176-178. On this last point see Luis Langlois, Influencia del poder naval en la historia de Chile, desde 1810 a 1910 (Valparaiso, 1911), 230. 28 One explanation for K6rner 's action is that put forth by Chilean socialist Julio Cesar Jobet in " El nacionalismo creador de Jose Manuel Balmaceda, " Combate (San Jose, Costa Rica), IV, no. 23 (July-August 1962), 60. Jobet states that Korner objected to Balmaceda 's drive to limit the size of the standing army. See also Diaz, A pr6posito, 53. a Diaz, Cuarenta aijos, 37. According to another writer Kirner also realized

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K6rner trained an army of 10,000 officers and troops which ultimately defeated the regular army.25 K6rner served as secretary general of the congressional general staff under its chief, Colonel Adolfo Holley, and exercised the real power in the army. The devotion of his students, the efficiency of his training methods, and his vast knowledge of modern military science made him the key to victory in the civil war.26 The rebel army attracted many recently Prussianized junior officers, who defected from the government, as well as conservative senior officers whose social and political ideas were more in keeping with those of the congressional leaders. Thus in 1891 the Chilean army was split between the old and the new, between those who subscribed to K6rner's ideas and those who did not. The congressional Junta of Government established its base of operations at Iquique, and here K6rner assumed full responsibility for the training of recruits, conscripts, and a number of Bolivian mercenaries. By August the junta and its army staff had decided to strike at Valparaiso. K6rner, now a lieutenant colonel and chief of staff, directed the campaign, which culminated with the battles of Concon (August 21) and Placilla (August 28) and the fall of the central government.27 On the cessation of hostilities in 1891 K6rner set out to implement Prussianization as he conceived it. The immediate problem facing the victors was what to do with officers of the defeated Balmaceda's army. This problem was resolved in several ways. A decree of September 14, 1891, gave to Colonel Estanislao del Canto, commander in
that he could better apply modern tactics and strategy to an army of his own making by joining the congressional forces. Arturo Alessandri Palma, Revolucion de 1891: Mi actuaei6n (Santiago, 1950), 183. The fact that K6rner was a German and that the German government tacitly supported the congressional rebels is of significance. The much maligned Patrick Egan, United States minister to Chile during the 1891 conflict and a Balmaceda defender, reported to Washington on German sympathy with the rebel cause. Department of State, Despatches Received by the Department of State from United States Ministers to Chile (1823-1906), Egan to Blaine, March 17, 1891 (#143), and Egan to Blaine, April 23, 1891 (#154). The German envoy Baron von Gutschinidt expressed views most favorable to the congressional party. See the letter of Dccember 1890 from Gutschmidt to Chancellor Leo von Caprivi in Los acontecimientos en Chile: Documentos publicados por la cancilleria alemana (Santiago, 1892), 3-5. 25 Ahumada, El ejercito y la revoluci6n, 2. See also Gonzalez, Kirner, 1; and Diaz, Cuarenta aflos, 37. 26 Estado Mayor, La guerra civil, 649-650; Zfifiga, El ejercito de Chile, 72. 27 Kbrner assumed the role of chief of staff during the final southern expedition. Carlos Rojas Arancibia (ed.), Memordndum de la guerra civil de 1891 (Santiago, 1892), 289.

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chief of the congressional army, the power to prosecute any officers from captains to generals who had served the Balmaceda government at any time during 1891.28 That same day Canto named a four-man court martial to try the accused. Balmacedista officers were divided into four groups: 1) those who were guilty of nothing more than having served in the army; 2) those accused of war crimes or breaches of civil law; 3) those who had committed war crimes under orders; and 4) those who, failing to appear, were tried in absentia. A second official decree of September 14 stated that only those who had joined the congressional army or who had at least refused to serve under Balmaceda would be allowed to continue in service.29 In this way, high-ranking Balmacedista officers were to be purged, clearing the path for K6rner 's Prussianized professionals. In October, 118 Balmacedista captains went on trial for treason by virtue of the fact that they had obeyed commands of a man who had ceased to be president for his violations of the constitution.30 The accused based their defense on loyalty to the president as commander in chief and on the apolitical nature of the army, established by the constitution, but they were not allowed to testify or to obtain legal advice. All but two were removed from service for a period of six years and were denied the right to hold public office as citizens for an equal period.3' Some who escaped this harsh verdict at first were retried later and found guilty. At the end of 1891 Brigidier General Emil KCrner became chief of the General Staff.32 The following year he returned to his original mission and served as professor of applied tactics and military geography in the War Academy as well as heading the General Staff. He filled both positions until April 1894, when he went to Europe to supervise completion and shipment of coastal artillery batteries being built by the Krupp armaments factory in Essen.
28
29

Ibid., 367-368.

Ibid., 369. See Para la 7historia: Algunas piezas del proceso seguido a 118 capitanes del ejercito de Chile por el tribunal militar, 2 de noviembre de 1891 (Santiago, 1891), 6. 31 Algunas piezas, 35. Majors, lieutenant colonels, colonels, and generals received similar, if not harsher punishment. Nevertheless, some senior Balmacedista officers, particularly those near the end of their careers, were allowed to retire with pensions. See Jose M. Barcelo Lira, "La evolucion del ej6rcito de Chile desde la occupaci6n del territorio araucano hasta nuestros dias, " Memorial del Ejercito de Chile, Ano XXVIII, ler Semestre (March-April 1935), 202. 32 Korner was promoted on November 12. Memoria del ministerio de guerra presentada al congreso national en 1892 (Santiago, 1892), 296.
30

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Korner returned to Chile in October 1895, resumed his post as chief of staff, and on November 1 was promoted to division general.33 With him came thirty-six German officers, who were to play key roles in the Prussianization of the Chilean army.34 Lieutenant Colonel Wilhelm Ekdahl directed the War Academy from 1904 to 1907 after having served on its faculty for nine years. Majors Edward Banza and Carl Zimmermann taught at the War Academy. Captain Gunther von Below taught at the Military School, as did Majors Alfred Schdnmeyer and Herman von Bieberstein. Three Germans and an Irish colonel, Robert O'Grady, served in the War Ministry's Fortification Section; two Germans served in the Technical Section; two served on the Chilean armaments commission and one on the General Staff. Two Germans were instructors in ballistics at the Artillery School; four served in the Escuela de Clases, an institution for the training of non-commissioned officers. Two had staff positions in provincial garrisons. One German was a member of the presidential cavalry escort; three served in cavalry regiments, four in infantry regiments, three in the artillery, and one in the engineers.35 Two years later twenty-seven more Germans came to Chile. As the German officers began to arrive in Chile, the first of many Chilean officers went to Germany for further training. Until the end of World War I these men studied with distinction at Charlottenburg and served with the elite Imperial Guard.36 After returning to Chile many of these Prussianized Chileans distinguished themselves in military and other government service, becoming the nucleus of a Chilean army elite. Led by General Carlos Ibaniez del Campo (who attended the Academy but did not study in Europe), this elite involved the army in politics from 1924 until 1932. All important military positions and many political positions during that time were held by graduates of the War Academy or by Prussianized officers. Prominent among these foreign-trained soldiers were Colonel Arturo Ahumada Bascunan, General Juan Pablo Bennett Argandofia, General Bartolome Blanche Espejo, and Colonel Marmaduke Grove Vallejo. During the first thirty years of this century Chilean army officers also studied in Italy, Austria, Belgium, France, and Spain37 and
de guerra, 1895-1896, 306. Four were of non-German origin. 85 A list of officers and their regiments is given in Zuifiiga, El ej6rcito de Chile, 57-60. A majority of the officers who came to Chile with K6rner in 1895 rereturned to Germany after two years of service. " Lara, Los oficiales alemanes, 14-16. Several Chileans spent the World War I years as "unofficial observers" in Germany and France. "7 For example, in 1906 Lieutenant Juan Carlos P6rez Ruiz Tagle entered
84

8 Memoria del ministerio

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served as advisers or observers in Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Ecuador, Bolivia, Colombia, and El Salvador. From 1895 to 1910 some fifty Chileans went abroad to study, and during the next two decades that number was nearly doubled.38 Army officers at the War Academy learned more than pure military science from German instructors. Similarly those who studied in Europe were profoundly impressed with what they saw outside Chile and away from the classroom. According to one alumnus of the War Academy, the German instructors stressed etiquette and proper conduct to their students. This, he thought, helped to raise the Chilean army from a simple fighting force to a distinguished institution with elan and esprit de corps.39 It was K6rner's hope, in fact, to mold the Chilean army as far as possible into a replica of the Prussian army.40 He met little resistance in his attempt, for Germans were popular in Chile, both with the people and with the government. In the past century German immigrants had contributed much to Chilean economic expansion; the German government had supported the congressional forces in the recent civil war; and German trade and investment were important. Furthermore, K6rner himself was immensely popular. The chief resistance to K6rner's plans after the civil war came from senior and older officers who feared for their prestige and position or who simply objected to outside influence in the army.4' Obviously he gained support for his programs from the junior officers, educated at the War Academy, sent abroad, and appointed to staff or instructional positions. But complaints from senior officers went unheard, especially while the government was anxious about the possibility of border conflict with Argentina. One of Kbrner 's primary concerns was the education of conscripts in army-run schools. In 1895 he wrote: "The role of these schools is quite important when one takes into consideration the large number of individuals who arrive at the barracks without knowing
the Spanish General Staff School. In 1918 Lieutenant Aquiles Vergara Vicufia studied at the same institution (in a letter to the writer from Major Juan Gomez Trujillo, Escuela del Estado Mayor, Madrid, November 2, 1967). 38 Reseia hist6rica, 44-322, passim. Until the end of World War I the vast majority went to Germany. Jecuerdos, 48-49, 53. S T6lez, O Lara, Los oficiales alemanes, 3-4. "Barcel6, "La evolution del ejercito de Chile," 203-209. Walker Martinez said that Prussianization had divided the officer corps into three distinct groups by the end of the century: a young progressive group, an older more conservative bloc, and a third class of hangers-on who owed their position to seniority or influence and nothing more. Estudios, 174-175.

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how to read or write, and the difficulty of making a good soldier out of a man who is illiterate. "42 He believed that soldiers and officers should be well educated, and when a law for universal military training was passed in 1900, his goal was within reach. In the opinion of General Boonen, military education provided lower class Chilean men with a reason to love their country, to participate in its political, social, and economic life in a more meaningful way, and to learn thrift by saving a portion of their pay.43 By the end of the nine teenth century the Chilean army numbered 6,000 men in active service and reputedly had a trained reserve force of 100,000.44 This late century military build-up was partially responsible for peaceful resolution of the frontier question with Argentina in 1899. Between his return to Chile in 1895 and a second trip to Europe in 1900 Kb~rnerdeveloped the instructional programs and formalized the theories that made Chilean officers and troops the best trained, most literate, and generally the most prestigious in Latin America. Basic to these programs was the continued presence of a European instructional staff-primarily German, of course. In 1897, when the second German mission arrived, K6rner wrote in his preface to the Memoria del ministerio de guerra :45 I must not forget here the part played by foreign instructor-officers, who in the space of little more than a year have resided among us and have cooperatedeffectively and intelligently in this work of progress. The desire and the intention of the governmentin soliciting their participationhave been realized. . . . The majority of these officershave completedtheir contracts and have returned, or are preparing to do so, to their homeland; but the government,desirous of consolidating and strengtheningtheir teachings in our army, has made new contracts with some of them [and with others] which will assure for a few more years the availability of their services.
del ministerio de guerra, 1895-1896, 13-14. Cited in Gonzalez, K:rner, 2-3. 44 Diaz, Cuarenta aiios, 18. Yet the official War Ministry publication claimed only 49,618 trained officers and troops in pleading its case for obligatory military service. Memoria del ministerio de guerra, 1899. This was the largest number of reserves ever available in Chile. Reserve strength on the eve of the War of the Pacific was roughly half of the 1899 figure. The Portalian reserve-militia force contained 25,000 men in the 1830s. At the height of its strength the colonial militia had 14,279 trained members. Reyno de Chile: Estado inilitar en el aio 1792, Archivo General de Indias, Audiencia de Chile, legajo 206. In little more than a century, then, reserve-militia strength increased from less than 15,000 to nearly 50,000. Diaz ' figure of 100,000 is too high for trained reserves. Total population increase during the same period was over 500% (from approximately 500,000 in 1800 to 3,250,000 in 1907). In relation to total male population a 50,000 man reserve force in 1899 was really a smaller percentage of men than a 25,000 reserve-militia in 1835 or a 15,000 man militia in 1792. " Memoria del ministerio de guerra, 1896-1897, vi. Brackets mine.
42Memoria
4

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Kirner also stated his belief that German language instruction was prerequisite to the study of military science and to the preparation of staff officers for advanced study in Germany.46 Enjoying almost boundless prestige, he did not limit his comments to the instructional sphere. He constantly reminded the government that salaries were neither high enough nor equitable, especially in the case of staff officers, who had more responsibilities than line officers of the same rank but received less.47 Clearly Kirner was championing the cause of the incipient modern army elite. In 1899 he proposed a scheme to streamline the army's administration. Under his plan the inspector general would be directly under the War Minister and would assume tighter control of all army branches through the staff of each service-infantry, cavalry, artillery, engineers, instruction, sanitary service, quartermaster corps, and armories. Kbrner wanted each branch to have a separate staff, closely supervised by the general staff in an efficient patterned administration.48 This reorganization scheme was the model for the army reforms of 1906 discussed below. As if K6rner's authority were not wide enough, in 1900 he was given two new projects. On February 7 the government commissioned him to go to Europe, study systems of obligatory military service, and prepare military ordinance reforms, the first since about 1839. He was also charged with the elaboration of a plan for the distribution and colonization of government-owned lands in the Lake Villa Rica area, "a measure destined to foment national progress and.., a personal tribute to [his] talent."49 Further testimony to K6rner's prestige was the reception he received when he returned from Europe. On April 8, 1901, accompanied by the army and navy high command, government officials, members of congress, clergymen, and approximately ten thousand citizens, he was "dragged along through the streets almost violently in the arms of that crowd that acclaimed him as a favorite son, loved and admired."50 Following his return Kbrner spent only nineteen months in Chile before he received a new commission in Europe, this time to study the comparative administration of European armies.51
46 Ibid., ix.

Ibid., 40-41. Memoria del ininisterio de guerra, 1899, 11-17. 4M1emoria del ministerio de guerra, 1900, ix. " Gonzalez, Kgrner, 3. On returning to Chile in 1901 K6rner reassumed duties as chief of the General Staff. Zuiiiga, El ejercito de Chile, 73. 51 See Memoria del ministerio de guerra, 1.903, 23.
47

48

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In May 1904 he returned to become inspector general, the highest post in the army hierarchy.52 At about this point the consequences of Prussianization began to manifest themselves. For one thing, the Chilean obligatory military service law left much to be desired. In theory it was designed to prevent a professional soldier class which might lead to praetorianism, and to provide masses of trained fighting men while educating and "civilizing" lower-class men in the ranks. The practice was a disappointing failure, because it was too easy for young Chileans of means and influence to avoid conscription. Only lower-class Chileans actually saw compulsory military service, and the education which they received did them little good upon their return to civilian life. K6rner himself made this point in the pivotal year 1906.53 On May 12 of that year Chile adopted a reform program intended to make the military organization a creole copy of the Imperial German Army. K6rner had proposed this reform seven years earlier, but it soon proved disappointing to him and his followers. The administrative reorganization reduced the powers of the inspector general and increased those held by division commanders. This decentralization was supposed to make administration more efficient and flexible but did not. Consequently the administration of the War Ministry was also decentralized and a German-style general staff created for planning and coordination.54 The government might create new administrative units on the order of the German army, but it soon found that there were not enough qualified officers to serve as administrators. Divisions functioned with skeleton staffs.55 Younger officers, lacking experience but pressed into higher administrative ranks, clashed with superiors whom they considered unfit to serve because they lacked German training.56
Zuiniga, El ejercito de Chile, 7. Memoria del ministerio de guerra, 1905, 6. "In Memoria del ministerio de guerra, 1906, 13. A further criticism of the obligatory military service system was that because of social and political prejudices many veterans who had the right to equal opportunity in public employment could not secure a position on leaving the army. " Carlos Saez Morales, Recuerdos de un soldado. Vol. I: El ejdrcito y la politica (Santiago, 1933), 27-28; Alberto Lara E., El estado mayor general del ejercito chileno: Su actual organizaci6n, doctrina, servicio, funcionamiento y metodos de trabajo. Responden todas esas condiciones a las similares de los estados mayores de ejereitos modelos? I Cual serd la forma que convendria efectuar? (Santiago, 1924), 3. " Tellez, Recuerdos, 225; Memoria del ministerio de guerra, 1906, 20; and 1907, 9-10. " Memoria del ministerio de guerra, 1907, 10. Kbrner himself criticized this situation in his capacity as Inspector General. See "'Memoria de la inspecci6n general del ejercito," Memoria del ministerio de guerra, 1908, 43-64, passim.
5

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The hasty reorganization also created havoc in the War Ministry, for when division commanders found that they could not deal with all problems, they bombarded the Ministry with requests for solutions.57 In the crush to fill all administrative positions, political pressure was used, so that friends of high-ranking civilians or officers got coveted posts, while those without connections did not. In the haste to fill up the skeleton divisions, too many untrained subalterns commanded new, untrained troops.58 One officer later wrote that the changeover of 1906 was outright adoption when it should have adaptation and that the government was at fault for basing a peacetime reform on extreme wartime needs, rather than on the country's financial and manpower capabilities.59 Twenty years after he had begun the task of Prussianization K6rner saw it carried to the extreme in 1906. During the last four years before his retirement in 1910 he was no longer overseer of Prussianization, for the reforms of 1906 had limited his power as inspector general. Nevertheless, he continued to be an influence on the officers who had trained under him or in his system. In his 1908 report to congress he pointed out that politically influential but poorly trained officers in important positions would endanger discipline and morale: "The ease of jumping in rank predisposes the favored one to become restless in a short time, and if his aspirations to be promoted even further are not satisfied, his energy and his enthusiasm diminish, no doubt justifiably."60 In 1910 the War Ministry's official report to congress supported K6rner's complaint that there were not enough trained and experienced officers to fill posts created by the 1906 reforms. The 1910 report called for changes in the promotion system (which was still based on 1890 legislation) as a solution to the problem of unfit or " political" officers in key positions.6' Two years later the Ministry 's report repeated this view and disapproved outright adoption of the German model for Chilean army organization.62 Even from the standpoint of the German trained professional officer the reforms of 1906 were singularly unsuccessful. Despite a
57 Saez, Recuerdos, I, 29-30; Francisco Javier Diaz Valderrama, Las escuelas militares de Francia i Alemania en relaci6n con la reorganizaci6n de las nuestras (Santiago, 1939), 13. 68 See Te'llez, Recuerdos, 223-224; Saez, Recuerdos, I, 29; Memoria del ministerio de guerra, 1909, 4. 6 T1llez, Becuerdos, 217, 220. 60 Memoria del ministerio de guerra, 1908, 46. 61 Memoria del ministerio de guerra, 1910, 4, 9. 62 Memoria del ministerio de guerra, 1912, 8.

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superficial glitter, the Chilean army was Prussianized beyond the capacities of the nation and suffered from serious internal problems. From the official point of view these were structural and administrative; as the government with its anachronistic parliamentary system creaked on, the complaints of military men became a blend of professional grievances and political interest. Even before K6rner retired the army had become a "state within the state." But German influences did not stop with Chile. They extended to officers of other Latin American armies trained at the Military School at Santiago; and the Chilean army carried "second generation" Prussianization directly to El Salvador, Ecuador, and Colombia. In the latter two cases the Chilean government was motivated by a desire for friends in the power structure of the Pacific coast. In 1903 the government of El Salvador requested a Chilean military mission to improve army instruction. On September 4 Chile designated Captains Juan Pablo Bennett (as chief) and Francisco Lagreze and Lieutenants Julio Salinas, Armando Llanos, and Carlos Ibafiez to staff the mission. The Chilean mission stayed in El Salvador for six years.63 At the same time, three Chilean officers were also sent to Ecuador as army instructors, Captain Estanislao Garcia Huidobro and Lieutenants Arturo Montecinos and Luis Negrete. Three Chilean army captains had already been acting as advisors in Ecuador for nearly a year and helped an Ecuadoran officer, Major Luis Cabrera, to write a new military code in 1902.64 In 1907 General Rafael Reyes, the president of Colombia, reopened the military school which had been closed during the civil war of 1899-1902 and on six other occasions in the past century. Reyes wanted the Colombian army to be led by apolitical professional officers and chose the Chilean army as his model because of its reputed success with German training. Captains Arturo Ahumada and Diego Guillen composed the first Chilean mission to Colombia as director and subdirector of that country's Military School.65 Little information exists in Chile on the first experiment, since the
63 Edcmundo Gonzalez Salinas, " Misiones chilenas en el extranjero'" (unpublished article in possession of the author, Biblioteca del Estado Mayor del Ej6rcito, Santiago, 1960), passim. For a personal account of Carlos Ibdfiez' career in El Salvador see Luis Correa Prieto, El president Ibainez, la politico y los politicos: Apuntes para la historia (Santiago, 1962), 45-52. 64 Luis Cabrera, Ernesto Medina, Luis A. Bravo, and Julio Franzani, Misi6n military chilena en el Ecuador: Proyecto de ley orgdnica military (Quito, 1902). This document included a dramatic plea for non-interference by civilians in army matters. 6 See 1907-1957: 50 anlos de la escuela military (Bogota, 1957), 42-43, 73-74.

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personal account of Carlos Ibaiiez does not deal with the actual workings of the mission. The project for an Ecuadoran military code submitted by Cabrera, Medina, Bravo, and Franzani, extending to 263 pages, shows the same thoroughness with which Kbrner and his subordinates went about their duties in Chile. Submitted to War Minister Flavio Alfaro on June 27, 1902, it dealt with organization of all branches and auxiliary services, administration, promotion, retirement, pensions, wartime mobilization, instruction, and frontier defense.66 True to Chilean form, it stressed the army's separation from politics and personal control. The work of Chilean army officers serving in Colombia was no less thorough. Ahumada and Guillen, both of whom had studied in Germany, applied their training in all spheres, but concentrated on the professionalization of cadets and the creation of courses to build a modern officer corps from the bottom up. Model groups of artillery and infantry were created to function as cadres for the new Colombian army. In 1909 Majors Pedro Charpin and Francisco Javier Diaz replaced Ahumada and Guillen. This second Chilean mission to Colombia opened a new staff and specialty school, the Escuela Superior de Guerra, which graduated thirty-seven Colombian officers within a year.67 In 1912 a third Chilean mission was organized, consisting of Colonel Washington Montero (who organized the first large-scale army maneuvers in Colombia) and Captains Pedro Vignola and Manuel Aguirre. The next year Captain Carlos Saez Morales began a twoyear tour of duty in Bogota.68 Salvadorans, Ecuadorans, and Colombians, then, looked to the Chileans as Chileans had looked to the Germans years before. While some of the Prussianized Chilean army officers went abroad to train other Latin American armies, others stayed home to form pressure groups and influence the Chilean government. The army had long resented meddling politicians, the cumbersome parliamentarism, and the government's inability to find long-range solutions to social and economic problems. This inability forced the army to improvise short-range solutions, as when it used force in putting down numerous strikes during the first twenty years of this century. In 1907 a group of army officers in Santiago organized a secret lodge, the Liga Militar. Liga members, exasperated at a government which they considered " disorganized and undisciplined, " swore under
"See especially 1-18, 44-46. " 50 aios de la escuela military, 101. OB Ibid., 104.

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oath "to work for the progress of the army. "69 Their primary objectives were professional-new promotion, salary, and retirement systems for army officers-and the Liga undoubtedly owed its creation to the effects of Prussianization, especially the reforms of 1906. According to a contemporary member of Chile's officer corps, the Liga blamed civilian political disorganization for the army's problems70 By 1910 the Liga was nationwide. Ram.6n Barros Luco, who assumed the presidency on the death of Pedro Montt in that year, knew of its existence, but did nothing about it. In the same year the Club Militar opened its doors in Santiago. This national social center for army officers became the seat of Liga activities and made Santiago the preferred location for politically minded officers during the next two decades.71 Liga leaders had expected an extraordinary number of promotions in 1910, Chile's centennial year. Their hopes were not met; in addition to normal service promotions only a few extra naval officers rose in rank. The frustrated army leaders planned a demonstration during the September 1910 centennial celebration and cancelled it only because they feared that foreign representatives present for the festivities would leave Chile with bad impressions.72 Secret meetings of the Liga continued into 1911, and members throughout the country were regularly informed by word of mouth on the discussions in Santiago. At this time the Liga began overt contacts with civilians, marking the first step of the modern Chilean Army toward political deliberation. The Liga sounded out two influential civilians on the idea of heading a military movement, Emilio Rodriguez Mendoza, the diplomat and author, and Gonzalo Bulnes, son of President Manuel Bulnes and historian of the War of the Pacific. Rodriguez refused, but Bulnes met with Liga members during the second half of 1911. At a private banquet held by Liga members during the independence festivities in September 1911 Bulnes was the only civilian present.73 Late in the year the Liga began to plan a coup d'e'tat for the coming year, but
See Slez, Recuerdos, I, 37; Emilio Rodriguez Mendoza, Como si fuera ahora (Santiago, 1929), 221. 1910 the Liga Militar had refined its objectives in the promotion, 70 By salary, and retirement sphere to make them "in keeping with the times" and expanded its interests to include administrative, organizational, and instructoral changes, and more coordination with the navy. Ahumada, El ej6rcito y la revoluci6n, 23-24. 71 During the 1924-1927 period its board of directors, made up of army elite members, helped engineer the political rise of Carlos Ibalfiez del Campo. 72 Ahumada, El ej6rcito y la revoluci6n, 21-23. " Rodriguez, Como si fuera ahora, 235-248, passim.

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this clear violation of professional canons caused many troop commanders to withdraw their support.74 Nevertheless the Liga went ahead with plans for a golpe in January 1912.75 The plot called for commanders of the Santiago garrison and Bulnes to inform Barros Luco that he would be deposed unless he named a new independent cabinet and took action in a number of areas. *Thesewere corruption (which army officers blamed on the oligarchy), public education, the court system, health and sanitation, labor legislation, crime, the Tacna-Arica question, economic cooperation with other Latin American countries, and new congressional elections based on revised electoral registries.76 The Liga was prepared to impose Bulnes as provisional president, but did not contemplate a military cabinet or dictatorship. At the last minute, however, Bulnes refused to be a party to a coup d'e'tat, and the Liga dissolved soon after. Although the coup failed, the plotting demonstrated that parliamentary government and Prussianization did not mix. Disorderly polities in the face of serious national problems was not consistent with the orderly conduct of army affairs. Interference in army affairs by influential politicians-an ever-changing group because of ministerial instability and electoral irregularities-angered young Prussianized professionals. These men recognized the Chilean civil-military relationship for what it was: a dichotomy between a modern military organization and "a political system that had become the negation of the harmonious and progressive movement of a society. "77 But not until 1919 would this civil-military dichotomy present a serious problem to the parliamentary regime. The dissolution of the Liga Militar ended overt political action by army officers for the next seven years, but it did not end the army's concern over politics, social and economic problems, and what certain
7' Ahumada, El ejercito y la revoluci6n, 24-25. At this time Major Ahumada was second in command at the Military School. He refused to lead the cadet corps in any coup. 7 Encouraged no doubt by strong civilian opposition to the Barros Luco government and unsubstantiated rumors of a politically oriented Liga Naval based in Valparaiso. See Renato Valdes, Tres cartas con un pr6logo y un epilogo (Santiago, 1932), 8; Ricardo Donoso, Desarrollo politico y social de Chile desde la constituci6n de 1833 (Santiago, 1942), 112-113. 76 Valde's, Tres cartas, 8-9, 250-251; Francisco Frias Valenzuela, Historia de Chile. Vol. IV: La repitblica (Santiago, 1949), 333-334. "Rodriguez, Como si fuera ahora, 213-214, 216-217. Rodriguez made a special point of speculating on the socio-political attitudes of young Chilean officers who studied in European army schools then returned to Chile, a country that did not "live in the present." See also Vald6s, Tres cartas, 10-14.

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officers considered to be national backwardness.78 During this period army men did not hesitate to express their opinions on civil-military relations and national issues in writing. In an official monograph of 1914 Captain Alberto Munfoz Figueroa scored Chilean society as anachronistic and regressive. Too many lazy would-be aristocrats entered the army, he wrote, so they would not have to work hard to make a living.79 He called Prussianization an impossibility for Chile because of extreme social stratification and ignorance on the part of the lower classes, from which recruits and conscripts were drawn. He devoted nearly half of the 104-page study to a call for better education of the common Chilean by military teachers. In essence Munioz believed that if the state could not educate its citizens, the army should do so.80 In another article of the same year, Major Anibal Riquelme agreed with Munoz, but went further when he placed direct blame for national problems on the unstable parliamentary system. Riquelme argued that the government should consult the high command of the armed forces not only on national defense and foreign relations but on all other matters of importance. He closed by calling for a more powerful presidency-a clear application of military values to civilian problems.81 Between 1900 and 1915 the Chilean Army tripled; by the latter date it numbered 17,044 troops and 833 officers.82 This increase created many problems. Chile's economic difficulties after World War I heightened army interest in social conditions and politics. In 1917 General Manuel Moore Bravo of the high command chided the government of President Juan Luis Sanfuentes (1915-1920) for political meddling with the army's promotion system and for failing to ameliorate the conditions of the Chilean masses. He instructed his officers to judge subordinates and leaders only on intellectual and moral grounds, since other criteria such as family background or connections would be unjust. Moore referred specifically to the use of political influence by incompetent officers to get promotions83 A prizewinning essay written by Captain Domingo Teran in 1917 blamed antiquated promotion and salary scales on the government's habit of
78 Te1lez stated, however, that the Liga continued to exist for at least three more years. Recuerdos, 245. (Santiago, 1914), 10-11. 7 El problerma de nuestra educaci6n militar 80 Ibid., 10-60, passim. 81 Anibal Riquelme, IIRelacion que debe existir entre la politica de un estado i el alto comando del ejercito," Memorial del estado mayor del ejercito de Chile, Cuaderno IX, Afno IX (September 10, 1914), 638-650, passim. 82 Government of Chile, Chile (Santiago, 1915), 107-108. 83 Manuel Moore Brava, Instrucciones para el desarrollo de las virtudes militares del cuerpo de oficiales de la IV division del ej6rcito (Valdivia, 1917), 6-24.

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taking the army for granted. He criticized obligatory military service as prejudicial to the lower classes, because sons of influential families could escape it. For this reason, he wrote, Chileans did not respect their army. Terdn 's essay betrayed a growing feeling among officers that government and society were "antimilitary. " 84 The developing army hostility toward parliamentary democracy crystallized in 1919. At that time the government was paralyzed by the collapse of Chile's nitrate industry, rising unemployment, inflation, and widespread labor agitation. Chile faced its worst crisis since 1891. The crisis came to involve the military in March 1919, when four admirals were removed from service because of alleged plotting against the government.85 At the same time, General Guillermo Armstrong Ramirez held several meetings with officers of the Santiago garrison to discuss the legislative needs of the army. Armstrong, General Manuel Moore, and several colonels and lieutenant colonels decided to form a secret organization which would offer its services to maintain order and prevent social upheaval, if necessary, through force. By mid-April the Sociedad del Eje'rcito de Regeneracion was a functioning secret lodge, and the so-called Conspiracy of 1919 was afoot. Before the month was out, President Sanfuentes ordered Armstrong and Moore placed under surveillance, for he expected an uprising on May Day. But order was maintained, and the Sociedad did not offer its services. Nevertheless, the two generals were asked for their resignations on the grounds that they had planned to overthrow the government.86 They explained that there had been no true plot and that the army only wished to demonstrate its willingness to cooperate in avoiding civil strife.87 On May 10 Armstrong answered accusations of treason in a declaration to the press. "The object of the exchange of ideas between various high ranking officers," he said, "consisted solely in ascertaining how, in a given moment of Coin84 Domingo L. Teran, Tema militar: Trabajo premiado en el concurso literario del club military (Santiago, 1917), 5-11. Teran was hypersensitive. The average Chilean still had great respect for the army because of its role in territorial expansion and because of its advanced status in Latin America. See Department of State Files, 825.00/117, Shea to Lansing, September 3, 1918. Hereafter cited as DSF. In early 1919 the editors of El Mercurio 85 El Mercurio, March 4, 1919. supported new promotion and salary laws for the military. See especially articles in the editions of April 27, April 29, May 1, and May 14, 1919. Walker Valdez, jdevoluci6n? La verdad sobre el motim military 88 Alejandro (Santiago, 1919), 18. 87 Columbano Millas R., Los secrets que divulga en secretario privado de los ministros de guerra (Santiago, 1923), 153.

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munist danger, we would be able to sustain the authority of the executive power and avoid revolution from below."88 But within days evidence of further moves by army officers deepened the crisis. The government uncovered a secret Junta Militar, a version of the Spanish Military Defense Juntas, which knew of Armstrong's measures, supported them, and planned to demand congressional action on a number of pending social and economic bills.89 Further, it was rumored that the prominent Liberal Senator Arturo Alessandri Palma had attended meetings of the junta and had agreed to act as civilian head of the movement.90 Government, press, and public treated the Armstrong-Moore affair and the junta as one massive plot, and army officers involved in either of them went on trial for treason. Through their testimony the extent of the conspiracy became public knowledge. Fifty army officers and four naval officers were directly implicated in the plotting, though not all were found guilty. While both the junta and the Sociedad proposed merely to offer support to the president, the public was shocked at statements and testimony on what would be done if Sanfuentes refused the offer. Junteros stated that their ultimate alternatives were replacement of all provincial officials with army officers, deposition of Sanfuentes, and proclamation of Alessandri as provisional president. In addition, those on trial demanded legislation in the areas of social, economic, and military reform, with heavy emphasis on the last.9' The conspiracy of 1919 had two parts. The loose-structured Sociedad led by Armstrong and Moore stressed form rather than content in its desire to fortify the chief executive. The Santiago-based
88 El Mercurio, May 10, 1919. Armstrong 's protestations were substantiated in Walker Valdez, giRevoluci6n?, 65; Millas, Los secretos, 152; and Roman Calvo, El Motin Militar: Anotaciones del dietario de una rnosca (Santiago, n.d.), 3. El Mercurio, 8 Armstrong and Moore denied any connection with the junta. May 15, 1919. Their interests were hardly as far reaching as those of the junteros. 90 Millas, Los secretos, 157; Sdez, Recuerdos, I, 45-48; Ricardo Donoso, Alessandri, agitador y demoledor: Cincuenta aios de historia political de Chile (2 vols., Mexico, D. F., 1952, 1954), I, 227; See also Walker Valdez, iRevoluci6n?, 35-39, 78-81. Walker Valdez stated that Alessandri met frequently with junta leaders to familiarize himself with military problems. The leader of the junta, Major Bernardo G6mez Solar, was a close friend of Alessandri. 91 Walker Valdez, jlevolucion?, 64-65, 115; El Mercurio, May 10, May 11, and May 15, 1919. The constitution of the Junta Militar written by Lieutenant Colonel Julio CUsar del Canto stressed reinforcement of presidential power and production of legislation. Armstrong consistently disavowed any personal political ambitions, but he did call publicly for currency stabilization and commodity pr-ice controls. DSF, 825.00/122, Robbins to Lansing, May 13, 1919.

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junta was committed to the same principle, but appended a prospectus of social and economic legislation. The two groups were hindered by the refusal of numerous troop commanders to join them, both in Santiago and in the provinces. The division weakened the conspiracy, for neither group was sufficiently large or well organized to control the army. Over a year later a special tribunal passed and imposed sentences on all those found guilty of participation in the Sociedad or the junta.92 During that year three events occurred which affected the Prussian influences on the Chilean army. First, Emil Kdrner died. Although in retirement since 1910, he had continued to serve as an example and symbol for his former colleagues and students. Second, the events of 1918 proved the German army to be composed of mortals. It ceased to be the sole official model for Chilean officers, and its reverses in Europe tarnished the image of the Chilean army as Latin America 's outstanding military organization.93 Third, the presidential election of 1920, contested by Arturo Alessandri of the Liberal Alliance and Luis Barros Bogonfo of the rightist National Union, created political tension. This was heightened when a coup in Bolivia established an aggressive government bent on regaining access to the Pacific, and rumors spread of Peruvian troops massed on the border. These events, critical to Chile's security, caused the Sanfuentes government to mobilize the army for defense of the Atacama frontiers. The mobilization of 1920 came while the results of the election were still in doubt and looked to many like an effort to disperse proAlessandri officers and troops on a trumped-up pretext. The mobilization was a tactical and logistical disaster. There was no danger of invasion from either Peru or Bolivia, for the governments of both countries hastily assured the Sanfuentes regime that they had no intention of making war. But it is not likely that the mobilized army could have defended Chile effectively, had the need existed94 -a sorry climax to the extensive and highly touted program of German-style military reform. The creation of a modern army in Chile had serious long-range consequences, both professional and national. Prussianization set am92 Sentences ranged from immediate retirement to confinement or banishment for periods from ten months to four years. Twenty-seven of the conspirators were retired; only six officers were acquitted. El Diario Ilustrado, August 4, 1920. 98 Nevertheless students from Mexico, Ecuador, Venezuela, Colombia, Paraguay, and Uruguay continued to study in Santiago, many on scholarships. 9 For documentary information on the mobilization of 1920 see the official Llamada movilizaci6n de 1920: Antecedentes y documentos (Santiago, 1923).

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bitious professional officers against their superiors, against their incompetent colleagues, and against politicians who meddled in army affairs or who failed to support the military's legislative requests. Prussianization created an army elite which magnified its role in Chilean society and politics during the second decade of this century. The aping of the Prussian army became a curse for government and military alike when officers began to challenge the traditional power structure from 1907 forward. As long as that structure remained outwardly solid the army was kept in its place. But the shattering experiences of 1919 and 1920 ended one chapter in Chilean civilmilitary relations and prepared for another, even more dramatic-the outright military intervention and domination from 1924 to 1932 by those who had shared in the experience of Prussianization.

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