Mind Association

The Very Idea of a Synthetic-Apriori Author(s): Norwood Russell Hanson Reviewed work(s): Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 71, No. 284 (Oct., 1962), pp. 521-524 Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2251891 . Accessed: 14/08/2012 01:52
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VII.-DISCUSSIONS THE VERY IDEA OF A SYNTHETIC-APRIORI

THE class of propositions is often trisected as follows: the analytic, the synthetic, and the synthetic-apriori. The status of this third entry is in perennial dispute. Is any proposition correctly labeled ' synthetic-apriori' ? Or is this very label somehow nonsensical? Perhaps the expression ' P is a synthetic-apriori proposition '.makes sense, but is never true since there is no suitable value for the variable P. These questions require re-orientation. The thesis of what follows is that ' synthetic-apriori ' does not label a type of proposition at all. .Two quite different things are characterized by this designation. Moreover, the idea of a proposition which is at once synthetic in structure, yet justified apriori is not inconsistent. It is just that, as a matter of fact, perhaps there are no synthetic-apriori propositions. Consider the bisection of the class of all propositions along the line 'analytic-synthetic '. P is analytic if, and only if, its negation is of the form (or leads to something of the form) Q. - Q. Analytic propositions are thus non-obvious tautologies; their tautological character can be revealed by definitional transformations. However, a synthetic proposition is such that its negation, ' P, is not of the form (nor does it entail anything of the form) Q. ' Q. This division is exclusive and exhaustive. The negation of any proposition must be such that it is either of the form Q. ' Q (or entails something thus formed),-or its negation is not of this form (nor entails anything thus formed). It apparently follows from this that analytic propositions cannot but be true. Their negations are self-contradictory, i.e. entail any proposition whatever. And synthetic propositions, since they have equally well-formed and otherwise meaningful negations, must be adjudged true only in virtue of contingent matters of fact. The knife called ' apriori-aposteriori ', however, cuts the class of propositions through quite a different stratum. To characterize a proposition as ' apriori ' is to say nothing whatever about its formal structure, or the structure of its negation, or consequences derivable therefrom. It is, rather, to remark the mode whereby the truth of the proposition is discovered. A proposition is apriori if its truth is established without recourse to any possible experience (past, present, or future). A proposition is aposteriori if, in order to justify its truth, reflexion alone is insufficient. Some appeal to some experience is required. No detailed defence should be required for wishing to distinguish (1) characterizing the structure of propositions (and their consequences), from (2) characterizing the mode of justification of propositions (and their consequences). One can discuss the analyticity or non-analyticity of P without considering what appeals must be made to establish P's truth. (The third paragraph of this paper does 521

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just tliis!) The analyticity-non-analyticityquestion is settled by entertaining ' P, tracingits implications,and finding(ornot finding) something of the form Q. Q. This kind of enquiry is neutral P is established. concerninghow P is established-or even whether Analytic-synthetic, therefore, divides types of propositional however, divides types of proposistructures. Apriori-aposteriori, tional justifications. These are quite different. Suppose one identified 'analytic' with ' apriori',.e. gave these terms preciselythe same meaning. Only then could the designation ' synthetic-apriori' be a contradictionin terms. But, for reasons given above, there are no groundsfor this identification. Indeed, it is difficultto see that any judgment concerningthe justificationof a propositionfollows logicallyfrom a decision as to its analyticity or non-analyticity. The dichotomiesare that different. Many levelheaded philosophershave thought peculiar the very propositions. In what wouldthis peculiarity idea of synthetic-apriori above are calculatedto suggest that the consist? The considerations peculiaritycannotresidein the fact that this idea is itself inconsistent. that a proposition whose negation is How does one demonstrate consistent cannot be justified without recourseto experience? To have learned that a proposition'snegation is structured this way rather than that entails nothing about its mode of justification. Not directly. Crudelyput, learning that a propositionis justified aposterioriis to learn somethingin additionto the fact that its negation is consistent. The idea of a propositionbeing synthetic does not, by itself, rule out the possibility of its justificationapriori. Above all, ' synthetic-apriori' does not designate a new category of proposition. Synthetic-apriori propositions(if such there are) are synthetic propositions; propositionswhose negations are consistent, and entail nothing inconsistent. This much alone does not mean that there are synthetic-aprioripropositions. It suggests, however, that the claim that there couldn'tbe synthetic-aprioripropositions may be ill-founded,unless based on much broader,and hence more arguable,philosophicalconsiderations. Perhapsthere is not one unproposition'. questionablecandidatefor the status 'synthetic-apriori of logic. But this may just be a matter of fact, and not a consequence Let us ask how, in fact, analytic propositionsare justified. We know that P is analytic if and only if its negation is inconsistent (or entails what is inconsistent). Hence, demonstrating that P is analytic requiresdoing the same things as to show that P is forever true. Since its negation is self-contradictory,it could not but be true-a fact we learnfromlogicalmanipulation,not from experience. Even so, since the consequencesof this distinction will bear down heavily in the case of synthetic propositions, I must insist that P's analyticity is not the same as establishingthat P demonstrating couldnot befalse. The operationsof both proceduresmay be identical-but the ends are different. To say that a propositionis analytic is not to say just that it is

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forever and always true. That P is forevertrue follows from (but is not identical with) the fact that P's negation is self-contradictory. Confusionsresult from failing to make this distinction. Thus, when analytic propositionsare said to be those which areforever true and couldn'tbe false, the idea of analyticity collapsesinto that of invulnerability. Thus the class of analytic propositions becomes populated with all sorts of propositions which, although felt to be certainly true, lack self-contradictory negations. Certain physical principles,religious utterances, and even some moral preas analytic solely on the groundsthat cepts have been characterized they are invulnerableto disconfirmation. But this locates an accidental feature of analyticity as its definingcharacteristic. Of course analytically true propositions are invulnerable to disconfirmation. 'This is becausetheir negations are self-contradictory. So questions about whetherP is analytic remaindistinct fromquestionsconcerning how P is established. I provethe formerby revealinginconsistencies in ' P, or in its consequences. The latter issue involves arguing from the fact that - P (or one of its consequences)is inconsistent to the conclusionthat thereforeP must be forevertrue. The second undertakingis differentfrom, indeed presupposes,the first. This distinction becomes critical with synthetic propositions,and for the point of this paper. When I have establishedthat a proposition is synthetic I have only establishedthat its negationis consistent. This is done by almost purely logical means. Justifying the truth of the propositionis quite differentin this case. For,'a proposition may be synthetic whether true or false. P is synthetic if ' P is consistentas well as P, of course. One must add this to block calling a contradiction,whose negation is consistent, 'synthetic'. Establishing P's truth requiressomethingelse to be done. What? It remainsto be shownto me that whatelse must be done to establish P's truth can be read off simply and directly from the fact that P is consistent. But what is logically wrong with the idea that the class of non-contradictorypropositionshaving consistent negations (i.e. synthetic propositions) divides into those whose truth is justified without recourse to experience (i.e. apriori), and those whosetruth is justifiedonly by recourseto experience(i.e.aposteriori)? To rule out the formerpossibility is simply to shout (without giving reasons)one of the centraldogmasof empiricism,which latter, I need hardlyremark,is not a set of deductiveprinciples. 'But since this is just what is at issue (i.e. does 'synthetic-apriori proposition' make sense), the matter thus put need not be pursued. I have no clear notion of what it would be like to justify by reflection alone the truth of P when - P is consistent. But this may be only a fact about me. I cannot see how of two equally consistent alternative propositions (P and ' P), reflection alone will determinewhich describesthe facts. But to say this does not prove that there cannot be synthetic-aprioripropositions. I have but softly expressedan article of the empiricist'sfaith, to wit, that as a workinghypothesis,it seemsunlikelythat any genuinecandidates for synthetic-aprioritywill be forthcoming. This conjecture is not
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justifiable by logic alone. And logic alone cannot demolish a nonempiricists'position. This discussionmust not be allowed to involve a host of propositions which are at once synthetic (i.e. having consistent negations) and are yet inconceivably false. It is perhaps invulnerably true that I cannot be in two places at once, that I am now consciousand typing out these words, that there cannot be a perpetual motion machine, etc. But while these are both invulnerablytrue and also synthetic in form, such propositionswill not serve as candidatesfor synthetic apriority. Their invulnerabilityresults not so much from a direct, non-experimentaldemonstrationof their truth, but rather from an implicit, yet far-flungreferenceto entire systemsof empirical knowledgewhose very pattern depends upon assumingthe truth of such statements. The invulnerability of a 'genuine syntheticaprioristatement ' cannot consist simply in pointing out the disastrous systematic consequencesof entertainingthe negation to such a proposition. The credentials of such a spectacular propositional entity must be set out directlyby reflectionon the assertionsmade by P. P and by Of propositions which are systematically invulnerable-yet-synthetic, there are many examples at the philosopher'stongue-tip. Of propositionswhose negations are consistent, but yet whose truth will be apparent to anyone who understandsthem-I cannot think of one singleexample. But this impliesnothing of logicalimportance about the idea of a synthetic-aprioriproposition. No mere fact about what I, or anyone, can or cannot do would have such an implication. The situation, then, is this: that of all known non-contradictory propositionswhose negations are consistent,it is factually true that they are establishedby recourseto experience. In other words,that they are contingent is (in a sense) a factual tiuth about such propositions. That they are synthetic is a necessary truth. That certain claims are formally structuredsuch that their negationsare inconsistent is a claim which, if true at all, could not but be true. But that theirjustificationsare contingentupon experienceis a claim of a different kind. This is just a matter of fact. It may be said to describe only the 'explored regions' of the modes of justificationfor synthetic propositions. In itself it containsno argument against a propositionwith a consistent negation being justified in some different, possibly non-experiential manner. We do know to be justifiedwithout recourseto what it is like for somepropositions experience. With analytic propositionswe know why such recourse is needless. We are not in the same position concerningsynthetic propositions. We may not in fact, know how a propositionwith a consistent negation could be justifiedwithout recourseto experience. But, short of reiterating the empiricist's manifesto (again without logically binding reasons), I know of no strict argument for ruling out the very idea of a synthetic-apriori.

IndianaUniversity

HANSON RUSSELL NORWOOD