Cases in Persons and Family Relations (Assigned by Atty. Bolivar)

Article 2 TAADA VS. TUVERA Case Digest TAADA VS.
TUVERA FACTS: Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation and administrative orders. Respondents, through the Solicitor General would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that the petitioner are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged nonpublication of the presidential issuances in question. Respondent further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of the law where the law themselves provides for their own effectivity dates. ISSUES: Whether the presidential decrees in question which contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity?
RULING: Publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date, for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the 15th day following its publication, but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect. Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The publication of all presidential issuances of a public nature or of general applicability is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose burdens on the people, such as tax revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concern. The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect.
Note: This is not my personal belonging; instead theyre just compilation of materials available online.
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. petitioner, vs. HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, as Secretary of the Department of Labor & Employment, and JOSE N. SARMIENTO, as Administrator of the PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, respondents. [G.R. No. 101279. August 6, 1992.] FACTS: DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department Order No. 16 Series of 1991 temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong. As a result of the department order DOLE, through the POEA took over the business of deploying Hong Kong bound workers. The petitioner, PASEI, the largest organization of private employment and recruitment agencies duly licensed and authorized by the POEA to engage in the business of obtaining overseas employment for Filipino land-based workers filed a petition for prohibition to annul the aforementioned order and to prohibit implementation. ISSUES: 1. whether or not respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars; 2. whether or not the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the Constitution, are unreasonable, unfair and oppressive; and 3. whether or not the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the National Administrative Register were not complied with. HELD: FIRST, the respondents acted well within in their authority and did not commit grave abuse of discretion. This is because Article 36 (LC) clearly grants the Labor Secretary to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities, to wit: Art. 36. Regulatory Power. The Secretary of Labor shall have the power to restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement
activities of all agencies within the coverage of this title [Regulation of Recruitment and Placement Activities] and is hereby authorized to issue orders and promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions of this title. SECOND, the vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative bodies is constitutional. It is necessitated by the growing complexities of the modern society. THIRD, the orders and circulars issued are however, invalid and unenforceable. The reason is the lack of proper publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Registrar as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code to wit: Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazatte, unless it is otherwise provided; Article 5 of the Labor Code to wit: Art. 5. Rules and Regulations. The Department of Labor and other government agencies charged with the administration and enforcement of this Code or any of its parts shall promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations. Such rules and regulations shall become effective fifteen (15) days after announcement of their adoption in newspapers of general circulation; and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 which provide: Sec. 3. Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center, three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons. (Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.) Sec. 4. Effectivity. In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above
provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by them. (Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987). Prohibition granted.
People v. Godoy 250 SCRA 676, 732 (1995)G.R. Nos. 115908-09Facts: Accusedappellant Danny Godoy was charged in two separate filings before th eRegional Trial Court, for Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch 47, with rape andkidnapping with serious illegal detention of 17-year-old Mia Taha. Issue: Whether or not, if found guilty, accused-appellant Godoy will be subject to death penaltyimposed by Republic Act No. 7659 Held: Yes, since Republic Act No. 7659 which reimposed t he death penalty on certainheinous crimes took eff ect on December 31, 1993, that is, fifteen days afte r i t s publication in the December 16, 1993 issues of the Manila Bulletin, Philippine Star,Malaya and Philippine Times Journal and not on January 1, 1994 as is sometimesmisinterpreted.
Philippine Veterans Bank Employees Union vs Vega GSIS v. Commission on Audit 301 SCRA 731, 736 (1999) G.R. No. 125982 Facts: The case before the Court is a special civil action of certiorari seeking to review the decision of the Commission on Audit that affirmed the ruling of Corporate Auditor Mariano C. Gaborne disallowing in audit the payment of death benefits in the amount of P43,107.19, to the heirs of the late Brig. General Arturo T. Asuncion, who died on November 16, 1987, in a helicopter crash, for the reason that a reserve officer like him of the Armed Forces of the Philippines was not at that time a compulsory member of the Government Service Insurance System. In 1985, Central Bank of the Philippines filed a petition for assistance in the liquidation of the Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB), in the RTC of Manila Branch 39. Thereafter, the PVB employees union herein petitioner filed claim for accrued and unpaid employee wages and benefits. On January 2, 1992, RA 7169 (An Act to Rehabilitate the PVB) which was signed into law by Pres. Corazon Aquino and which was published in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992. Thereafter, petitioners filed with the labor tribunals their residual Issue: Whether or not the heirs of Brig. General Asuncion should receive payment of death benefits claims for benefits and for reinstatement upon reopening of the bank. In May 1992, Central Bank issued a certificate of authority allowing the PVB to reopen despite the late mandate for rehabilitation and Held: Yes, since E. O. No. 79 is effective fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette, or on January 7, 1987. At that time, the late General Asuncion was a reserve officer who had rendered a total of ten (10) years of continuous active duty service commission in the AFP. Hence, he was compulsorily covered as a member of the GSIS on the date he died on November 15, 1987, in line of duty in a helicopter crash. Consequently, his heirs are entitled to payment of death benefits. reopening, respondent Judge Vega continued with the liquidation proceedings of the bank alleging further that RA 7169 became effective only on March 10, 1992 or 15 days after its publication in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7169 became effective on January 2, 1992. 360 scra 32
HELD: The Supreme Court upheld that while as a rule laws take effect after 15 days following completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, the legislature has the authority to provide for exceptions as indicated in the clause unless otherwise provided. Citing Tanada vs Tuvera, this clause refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication, which cannot in any event be omitted. The reason is that such omission would affect due process in so far as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it.
FARINAS v THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FACTS:
A petition was
filed
seeking
the
Court
to declareunconstitutional Section 14 of RA 9006 or The Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections Through Fair Election Practices as it repealed Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code mandating the ipso jure resignation from public office of one who filed his certificate of candidacy, except for President and Vice-President.
It is the petitioners contention that the repeal of Section 67 is a rider on the said law, the same embracing more than one subject, inconsistent to what the constitution mandates. Further, it violated the equal protection clause since the said law didnt repeal provision relating to appointive officials. Appointive officials would still be
considered ipso jure resigned upon filing of their respective certificates of candidacy.
The
repeal
of
Section
67
is
not
violative
of
the equal
protection clause. Equal protection is not absolute especially if the classification is reasonable. There is reasonable classification
HELD: between an elective official and an appointive one. The former Section 14 is not a rider. The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding, to the other provisions of the contested law, which deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda, doesnt violate the one subject- one title rule. The Court has held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in its title, may contain anynumber of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and they may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject. occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority. Another substantial distinction is that by law, appointed officials are prohibited from engaging in partisan political activity or take part in any election except to vote.
De Roy vs Court of Appeals 157 scra 766
consistently reiterated and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions and in such publications as the SCRA and law journals.
The firewall of a burned out building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of the private respondents resulting in injuries to private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do. In the RTC, petitioners were found guilty of gross negligence. On the last day of the 15 days period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was again denied. The Supreme Court finds that Court of Appeal did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid down in Habulayas vs Japzon. Counsel for petitioner contends that the said case should not be applied non-publication in the Official Gazette. ISSUE: Whether or not Supreme Court decisions must be published in the Official Gazette before they can be binding. HELD: There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decision in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified,
ARTICLE 6
the transcript of his records in defendant Arellano University. Plaintiff petitioned the latter to issue to him the needed transcripts. The defendant refused until after he paid back the P1,003.87 which defendant refunded him. As he could not take the bar examination without those transcripts, plaintiff paid to defendant the said sum under protest. Emeterio Cui vs. Arellano University G.R. No. 15172 May 30, 1961 ISSUE: Whether the provision of the contract between plaintiff and defendant, whereby the former waived his right to transfer to another school without refunding to the latter the equivalent of his scholarship in cash, is valid or not. HELD: Memorandum No. 38 issued by the Director of Private Schools provides that When students are given full or partial scholarship, it is understood that such scholarship are merited and earned. The amount in tuition and other fees corresponding to These scholarship should not be subsequently charged to recipient students when they decide to quit school or to transfer to another institution. Scholarship should not be offered merely to attract and keep students in a school. Memorandum No. 38 merely incorporates a sound principle of public policy. The defendant uses the scholarship as a business scheme designed to increase the business potential of an education institution. Thus conceived it is not only inconsistent with sound policy but also good morals. The practice of awarding scholarship to attract students and keep them in school is not Good custom nor has it received some kind of social and practical confirmation except in some private institution as in Arellano University. Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and another one shall be entered sentencing the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P1,033.87, with interest thereon at the legal rate from September 1, 1954, date of the institution of this case, as well as the costs, and dismissing the defendants counterclaim. It is so ordered.
FACTS: Before the school year 1948-1949 Emeterio Cui took up preparatory law course in the Arellano University. After Finishing his preparatory law course plaintiff enrolled in the College of Law of the defendant from school year 1948-1949. Plaintiff finished his law studies in the defendant university up to and including the first semester of the fourt year. During all the school years in which plaintiff was studying law in defendant law college, Francisco R. Capistrano, brother of mother of plaintiff, was the dean of college of law and legal counsel of the defendant university. Plaintiff enrolled for last semester of his law studies in the defendant university but failed to pay tuition fees because his uncle Dean Francisco R. Capistrano, having severed his connection with defendant and having accepted the deanship and chancellorship of the college of law of the Abad Santos University graduating from the college of law of the latter university. Plaintiff, during all the time he has studying law in Defendant University was awarded scholarship grants, for scholastic merit, so that his semestral tuition fees were retured to him after the end of semester and when his scholarship grants were awarded to him. The whole amount of tuition fess paid by the plaintiff to defendant and refunded to him by the latter from the first semester up to and including the first semester of his last year in college of law or the fourth year, is in total P1,003.87. After Graduating in law from Abad Santos University he applied to take the bar examination. To secure permission to take the bar, he needed
Article 8 People vs. Jabinal GR No. L-30061 (February 27, 1974)
RULING: Decisions of this Court, under Article 8 of the New Civil Code states that Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system . The settl ed rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of legal maxim legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet" the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. Appellant was appointed as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and Lucero under which no criminal liability would attach to his possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a license and permit therefor, appellant must be absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable. The appellant was acquitted.
FACTS: Jabinal was found guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition. The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the ammunition described in the complaint, without the requisite license or permit. He, however, claimed to be entitled to exoneration because, although he had no license or permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried with them the authority to possess and carry the firearm in question. The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-mentioned appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent, with authority to possess the firearm subject matter of the prosecution, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Courts decision in People vs. Macarandang(1959) and People vs. Lucero(1958) and not on the basis of the latest reversal and abandonment in People vs. Mapa (1967). ISSUE: Whether or not appellant should be acquitted on the basis of the courts rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the complete reversal of the MAcarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa.
in California and the conflict rule for Californians domiciled outside ARTICLE 16 of California. Christensen being domiciled in the Philippines, the law of his domicile must be followed. The case was remanded to the Aznar vs Garcia 7 scra 95 Nationality Principle Internal and Conflict Rule Edward Christensen was born in New York but he migrated to California where he resided for a period of 9 years. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until his death. In his will, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen (legitimate), as his only heir, but left a legacy sum of money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia (illegitimate). Counsel for Helen claims that under Article 16, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code, California law should be applied; that under California law, the matter is referred back to the law of the domicile. On the other hand, counsel for Maria, averred that the national law of the deceased must apply, illegitimate children not being entitled to anything under California law. ISSUE: Whether or not the national law of the deceased should be applied in determining the successional rights of his heirs. HELD: The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said in effect that there are two rules in California on the matter; the internal law which applies to Californians domiciled lower court for further proceedings the determination of the successional rights under Philippine law only
Bellis vs Bellis 20 scra 358 Nationality Principle Amos Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas, and of the United States. By his first wife whom he divorced he had five legitimate children, by his second wife, who survived him, he had three legitimate children, and three illegitimate children. Before he died, he made two wills, one disposing of his Texas properties and the other disposing his Philippine properties. In both wills, his illegitimate children were not given anything. The illegitimate children opposed the will on the ground that they have been deprived of their legitimes to which they should be entitled, if Philippine law were to be applied. ISSUE: Whether or not the national law of the deceased should determine the successional rights of the illegitimate children. HELD: The Supreme Court held that the said children are not entitled to their legitimes under the Texas Law, being the national law of the deceased, there are no legitimes.
Minciano vs. Brimo 50 Phil. 867, November 1, 1924 Facts: Joseph G. Brimo, a citizen of Turkey, died and left a partition of the estate. Juan Miciano, the judicial administrator of the estate left filed a scheme of partition. However, Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. Brimos opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph Brimos will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation of Article 10 of the Civil Code. Issue: Whether or not the national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary disposition. Held: Joseph Brimo, a Turkish citizen , though he declared in his will that Philippine laws must govern the disposition of his estate; however, it must not prejudice the heir or legatee of the testator. Therefore, the testators national law must govern in accordance with Article 10 of the Civil Code
CIVIL PERSONALITY
Geluz vs CA
ARTICLE 40
Facts: Nita Villanueva had 3 abortions done by the same doctor, Geluz. Husband Oscar Lazo sued Geluz on the 3rd abortion (2 mo.),
Minciano vs. Brimo 50 Phil. 867, November 1, 1924 Facts: Joseph G. Brimo, a citizen of Turkey, died and left a partition of the estate. Juan Miciano, the judicial administrator of the estate left filed a scheme of partition. However, Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. Brimos opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph Brimos will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation of Article 10 of the Civil Code. Issue: Whether or not the national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary disposition. Held: Joseph Brimo, a Turkish citizen , though he declared in his will that Philippine laws must govern the disposition of his estate; however, it must not prejudice the heir or legatee of the testator. Therefore, the testators national law must govern in accordance with Article 10 of the Civil Code
seeking damages. CA sustained claim of Lazo for P3,000. Issue: Whether or not the husband can claim damages from the abortionist. Held: No, he cannot. Award for death of a person does not cover unborn fetus because it is still not vested with legal personality. According to Article 40, birth determines personality. In this case, the fetus does not yet possess a personality to speak of because it was aborted in utero. The child should be born before the parents can seek any recovery for damages. Action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured. There could be no action for such damages that can be instituted on behalf of the unbord child for the injuries it received because it lacked juridical personality. Moral damages cannot also be recovered because the wife willingly sought the abortion, and the husband did not further investigate on the causes of the abortion.
People VS Felie
ARTICLE 43
Facts: Herein accused Fernando Felipe was convicted by the lower court of the crime of rape committed by him against his niece-in-law Ruth Pancho. As a result of the incident the victim got pregnant, who was then 25 years old. When the accused appealed his case, one of his defenses was the fact that the victims child was born on March 13, 1972 and that the victim could not have been raped on July 9, 1971 because there are only 247 days between these dates. Accused claimed that thenormal period of gestation is 280 days and the Civil Code considers 300 days as the length of uterine development of a child. Issue: Whether or not the victims child is considered a normal child. Held: Yes, the victims child was normal. As aptly contended by theSolicitor General in his brief, "a child born 8 months and seven days after conception is considered normal. ...; that in certain instances the Civil Code considers 300 days as the length of the uterinedevelopment of a child, but by providing that a premature child is one which has an intra-uterine life of less than seven months (Art. 41, Civil Code) the Code impliedly recognizes that a child which had an intra-uterine life of 8 months, as in the case at bar, is a normal child."
JOAQUIN VS. NAVARRO Facts: Feb. 6, 1945: battle of liberation of Manila, Joaquin Navarro, Sr., 70, wife Angela Joaquin, 67, daughters Pilar (32-33), Concepcion, and Natividad (23-25), son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., 30 and his wife Adela Conde sought refuge on the ground floor of German Club Building. Building was set on fire and Japanese started shooting hitting the three daughters who fell. Sr. decided to leave building. His wife didnt want to leave so he left with his son, his sons wife and neighbor Francisco Lopez . As they came out, Jr. was hit and fell on the ground the rest lay flat on the ground to avoid bullets. German Club collapsed trapping may people presumably including Angela Joaquin. Sr., Adela and Francisco sought refuge in an air raid shelter where they hid for three days. Feb. 10, 1945: on their way to St.Theresa Academy, they met Japanese patrols, Sr. and Adela were hit and killed. Trial Court ruled that Angela Joaquin outlived her son while Court of Appeals ruled that son outlived his mother. Issue: Order of death of Angela Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. Held: Reversed.Art. 43 civil code: Whenever a doubt arises as to which was the first to die of the two or morepersons who would inherit one from the other, the person who alleges prior death of either must provethe allegation; in the absence of proof the presumption shall be that they died at the same time and no transmission of rights from one to the other shall take place. In light of the conditions painted by FL, a fair inference can be arrived at that JN Jr died before his mother. The presumption that
AJ died before her son was based on speculations, not evidence. Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence by which civil cases are decided, this inference should prevail. Evidence of survivorship may be (1) direct (2) indirect (3) circumstantial or (4) inferential. Art. 43 Speaks about resolving doubt when 2 or more persons are called to succeed each other as to which of them died first. In the Civil Code, in the absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at the same time, and there shall be no transmission of rights from one to another. In the Rules of Court, in cases of calamity, there is a hierarchy of survivorship.
FAMILY CODE
ARTICLES 1-7
Balogbog vs. CA GR No. 83598, March 7, 1997
FACTS:
Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog filed an action for partition and accounting against their Aunt Leoncia and Uncle Gaudioso for partition and accounting of their grandparents estate at the Court of First Instance of Cebu City which was granted by the latter. Leoncia and Gaudioso appealed to the Court of Appeals but the latter affirmed the lower courts decision.
Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arnibal died intestate in 1951 and 1961 respectively. They have three children, Leoncia, Gaudioso and Gavino, their older brother who died in 1935. Ramoncito and Generoso was claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas and that, as such they were entitled to the one-third share in the estate of their grandparents. However, Leoncia and Gaudioso claimed they are not aware that their brother has 2 sons and that he was married. They started to question the validity of the marriage between their brother Gavino and Catalina despite how Gaudioso himself admitted during a police investigation proceeding that indeed Ramonito is his nephew as the latter is the son of his elder brother Gavino.
wife and that they have three children. Catalina herself testified that she was handed a receipt presumably the marriage certificate by Fr. Jomao-as but it was burned during the war.
On the other hand,Leoncia claimed that her brother Gavino died single at the family residence in Asturias. She obtained a certificate from the local Civil Registrar of Asturias to the effect that the office did not have a record of the names of Gavino and Catalina which was prepared by Assistant Municipal Treasurer Juan Maranga who testified in the hearing as well.
Leoncia and Gaudioso contended that the marriage of Gavino and Catalina should have been proven in accordance with Arts. 53 and 54
In the efforts of Ramoncito and Generoso to prove the validity of their parents marriage, they presented Priscilo Trazo, 81 years old then mayor of Asturias from 1928 to 1934 and Matias Pogoy who both testified that he knew Gavino and Catalina to be husband and
of the Civil Code of 1889 because this was the law in force at the time of the alleged marriage was celebrated.
Art. 53 provides that marriages celebrated under the Civil Code of 1889 should be proven only by a certified copy of the memorandum in the Civil Registry, unless the books thereof have not been kept or have been lost, or unless they are questioned in the courts, in which case any other proof, such as that of the continuous possession by parents of the status of husband and wife, may be considered, provided that the registration of the birth of their children as their legitimate children is also submitted in evidence. The court further states that Arts. 42 to 107 of the Civil Code of 889 of Spain did not take effect, having been suspended by the Governor General of the Philippines shortly after the extension of that code of this country. Therefore, Arts. 53 and 54 never came into force. Since this case was brought in the lower court in 1968, the existence of the marriage must be determined in accordance with the present Civil Code, which repealed the provisions of the former Civil Code, except as they related to vested rights, and the rules of evidence. Under the ISSUE: Whether or not Gavino and Catalinas marriage is valid. Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting themselves as husband and wife are legally married. HELD: Albeit, a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court and Court of Appeals in rendering Gavino and Catalinas marriage as valid and thus entitle Ramonito and Generoso one third of their grandparents estate. marriage, failure to present it would not mean that marriage did not take place. Other evidence may be presented where in this case evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove the marriage of Gavino and Catalina in 1929, that
they have three children, one of whom, Petronilo, died at the age of six and that they are recognized by Gavinos family and by the public as the legitimate children of Gavino.
Republic vs. Court of Appeals The case:
The facts: On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court judge of Pasay City. The marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of Castros parents. The marriage contract states that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in the name of the contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila. The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife. Thus, it was only in March 1971, when Castro discovered she was pregnant that the couple decided to live together. Their cohabitation only lasted for four months and then the couple parted ways. The baby was adopted by Castros brother, with the consent of Cardenas. It was then discovered that there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the celebration of their marriage as confirmed by a certification from the Civil Register of Pasig, Metro Manila. Her husband was duly served with notice of the proceedings and a copy of the petition but he chose to ignore it, thus, he was properly declared in default. The trial court denied her petition on the ground that the certification was inadequate to establish the alleged non-issuance of a marriage license prior to the celebration of the marriage of the contracting parties. The appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines now assailed the decision of the appellate court and posits that the certification of the local civil registrar of due search and inability to find a record or entry to the effect that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued to the parties is not adequate to prove its non-issuance. The Issue: Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence presented
by private respondent are sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration of the marriage or private respondent to Edwin Cardenas? Held: The subject marriage is one of those commonly known as a secret marriage, ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of the contracting parties. At the time the marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing marital relations was the New Civil Code which provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by a local civil registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage void ab initio. The certification of due search and inability to find issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to section 29, rule 132 of the rules of court, a certificate of due search and inability to find sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license no. 3196182 to the contracting parties. There was absolutely no evidence on record to show that there was collusion between private respondent and her husband Cardenas. It is noteworthy to mention that the finding of the appellate court that the marriage between the contracting parties is null and void for lack of marriage license does not discount that fact that indeed, a spurious marriage license, purporting to be issued by the civil registrar of Pasig, may have been presented by Cardenas to the solemnizing officer. This court holds that under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license. The petition is Denied there being no showing of any reversible error committed by respondent appellate court.
A.C. No. 4431 June 19, 1997 PRISCILLA CASTILLO VDA. DE MIJARES, complainant, vs. JUSTICE ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ (Retired), respondent. Facts; Respondent a Justice of the Court of Appeals was charged with Bigamy by complainant and is being recommended for suspension from practice of law. Priscilla Castillo vda de Mijares and Justice Onofre Villaluz married each other pending the court's decision on the former's marriage. However, their relationship was shortlived as right after the marriage, the complainant left their would-be-honeymoon place after some unbearable utterances made by the respondent. Several months after, the complainant learned that respondent a subsequently married a certain Lydia Geraldez, thus, the basis of this complaint.
Issue; WON Ret. Justice Onofre A. Villaluz be suspended from his practice of law. Ruling; Citing Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Supreme Court found the respondent engaging in an unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceiful conduct and recommends SUSPENSION with the specific WARNING that a more severe penalty shall be imposed should he commit the same or a similar offense hereafter.
Cosca vs. Palaypayon 237 SCRA 249
Sammy Bocaya & Gina Bismonte. As a consequence, the marriage contracts of the following couples did not reflect any marriage license number. In addition, Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts
FACTS:
and did not indicate the date of solemnization reasoning out that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the
The following are the complainants: Juvy N. Cosca (Stenographer 1), Edmundo B. Peralta (Interpreter 1), Ramon C. Sambo (Clerk II) and Apollo Villamora (Process Server). Respondents are Judge Lucio Palaypayon Jr., the presiding judge, and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy, clerk of court II. All work in MTC-Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
parties which happens usually several days after the marriage ceremony.
Palaypayon contends that marriage between Abellano & Edralin falls under Article 34 of the Civil Code thus exempted from the marriage license requirement. According to him, he gave strict instructions to
Complainants alleged that Palaypayon solemnized marriages even without the requisite of a marriage license. Hence, the following couples were able to get married just by paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy: Alano P. Abellano & Nelly Edralin; Francisco Selpo & Julieta Carrido; Eddie Terrobias & Maria Gacer; Renato Gamay & Maricris Belga; Arsenio Sabater & Margarita Nacario;
complainant Sambo to furnish the couple copy of the marriage contract and to file the same with the civil registrar but the latter failed to do so. In order to solve the problem, the spouses subsequently formalized the marriage by securing a marriage license and executing their marriage contract, a copy of which was then filed with the civil registrar. The other five marriages were not illegally
solemnized because Palaypayon did not sign their marriage contracts and the date and place of marriage are not included. It was alleged that copies of these marriage contracts are in the custody of complainant Sambo. The alleged marriage of Selpo & Carrido, Terrobias & Gacer, Gamay & Belga, Sabater & Nacario were not celebrated by him since he refused to solemnize them in the absence of a marriage license and that the marriage of Bocaya & Bismonte was celebrated even without the requisite license due to the insistence of the parties to avoid embarrassment with the guests which he again did not sign the marriage contract.
HELD:
Bocaya & Besmontes marriage was solemnized without a marriage license along with the other couples. The testimonies of Bocay and Pompeo Ariola including the photographs taken showed that it was really Judge Palaypayon who solemnized their marriage. Bocaya declared that they were advised by judge to return after 10 days after the solemnization and bring with them their marriage license. They already started living together as husband and wife even without the formal requisite. With respect to the photographs, judge explained that it was a simulated solemnization of marriage and not a real one.
An illegal solemnization of marriage was charged against the respondents.
However, considering that there were pictures from the start of the wedding ceremony up to the signing of the marriage certificates in front of him. The court held that it is hard to believe that it was
ISSUE: Whether the marriage solemnized by Judge Palaypayon were valid.
simulated.
On the other hand, Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized marriage between Abellano & Edralin and claimed it was under Article 34 of the Civil Code so the marriage license was dispensed with considering that the contracting parties executed a joint affidavit that they have been living together as husband and wife for almost 6 years already. However, it was shown in the marriage contract that Abellano was only 18 yrs 2months and 7 days old. If he and Edralin had been living together for 6 years already before they got married as what is stated in the joint affidavit, Abellano must have been less than 13 years old when they started living together which is hard to believe. Palaypayon should have been aware, as it is his duty to ascertain the qualification of the contracting parties who might have executed a false joint affidavit in order to avoid the marriage license requirement.
void ab initio whereas an irregularity in the formal requisite shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally, and administratively liable.
Article 4 of the Family Code pertinently provides that in the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage
Araes vs. Judge Occiano A.M. No. MTJ-02-1309 April 11, 2002 Facts: Petitioner Mercedita Mata charged respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law, via a sworn Letter-Complaint, for solemnizing the marriage between petitioner and her late groom (Ret.) Commodore Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license, among others. Since the marriage is a nullity, petitioners right, upon Orobias death, to inherit the vast properties left by Orobia was not recognized. Petitioner was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia. Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent for his illegal acts and unethical misrepresentations, which caused her so much hardships, embarrassment and sufferings. The case was referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to the Office of the Court Administrator, which required the respondent to comment on the complaint. Respondent averred, among others, that before starting the ceremony, he examined the documents submitted to him by the petitioner and he discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage license so he refused to solemnize the marriage. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of the provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. After the solemnization, respondent reiterated the need for the marriage license and admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured the respondent that they would give the license to him, but they never did. He attributed the hardships and embarrassment petitioner suffered as due to her own fault and negligence.
Issue: Whether or not respondents guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a marriage license and outside his territorial jurisdiction. Ruling: Respondent judge should be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license. In People vs. Lara, the Supreme Court held that a marriage, which preceded the issuance of the marriage license, is void, and that subsequent issuance of such license cannot render or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to conduct marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of the petitioner. Judges, who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.
HELD: Domagtoys defense is not tenable and he did display gross NAVARRO VS. DOMAGTOY 259 SCRA 129 ignorance of the law. Tagadan did not institute a summary
proceeding for the declaration of his first wifes presumptive death. FACTS: Navarro is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. He has submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law. First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife. Domagtoy claimed that he merely relied on an affidavit acknowledged before him attesting that Tagadans wife has been absent for seven years. The said affidavit was alleged to have been sworn to before another judge. Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his courts jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Domagtoy counters that he solemnized the marriage outside of his jurisdiction upon the request of the parties. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ihis former wife. Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of Domagtoy to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. On the second issue, the request to hold the wedding outside Domagtoys jurisdiction was only done by one party, the bride NOT by both parties. More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the authority of the solemnizing officer. Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, any incumbent member of the judiciary within the courts jurisdiction. Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Noncompliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage. ISSUE: Whether or not Domagtoy acted without jurisdiction.
reason. There is no special law in the country governing sex Silverio v. Republic GR No. 174689 October 22, 2007 The Court said that the change in gender sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences, Facts: Rommel Silverio filed a petition for the change of his gender and first name in his birth certificate to facilitate his marriage with his fianc. A year before, Silverio has underwent sex re-assignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. In his petition, he wants to change his first name from Rommel to Mely. i.e., substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations and substantially affect the public policy in relation to women in laws such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women, certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code, etc. reassignment and its effect. This is fatal to petitioners cause.
Issue: Should the court allow the change of name?
Held: No. The SC said that considering that there is no law recognizing sex re-assignment, the determination of a persons sex at the time of birth, if not attended by error, is immutable. It held that while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that
REPUBLIC VS CAGANDAHAN FACTS: Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from Jennifer B. Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from female to male. It appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is suffering from Congenital Adrenal
HELD: The contention of the Office of the Solicitor General that the petition is fatally defective because it failed to implead the local civil registrar as well as all persons who have or claim any interest therein is not without merit. However, it must be stressed that private respondent furnished the local civil registrar a copy of the petition, the order to publish on December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or processes in the course of the proceedings. In which case, the Supreme Court ruled that there is substantial compliance of the provisions of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that the determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue which in this case should be dealt with utmost care in view of the delicate facts present in this case. In deciding the case, the Supreme Court brings forth the need to elaborate the term intersexuality which is the condition or let us say a disorder that respondent is undergoing. INTERSEXUALITY applies to human beings who cannot be classified as either male or female. It is the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex
Hyperplasia which is a rare medical condition where afflicted persons possess both male and female characteristics. Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with secondary male characteristics. To further her petition, Cagandahan presented in court the medical certificate evidencing that she is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital, who, in addition, explained that Cagandahan genetically is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally, thus has organs of both male and female. The lower court d ecided in her favor but the Office of the Solicitor General appealed before the Supreme Court invoking that the same was a violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because the said petition did not implead the local civil registrar. ISSUE: The issue in this case is the validity of the change of sex or gender and name of respondent as ruled by the lower court.
characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively male nor female. It is said that an organism with intersex may have biological characteristics of both male and female sexes. In view of the
foregoing,
the
highest
tribunal
of
the
land
consider
the
gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of
compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself
his sexual development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an incompetent and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Supreme Court affirmed as valid and justified the respondents position and his personal judgment of being a male.
fundamentally negates such rigid classification. That is, Philippine courts must render judgment based on law and the evidence presented. In the instant case, there is no denying that evidence points that respondent is male. In determining respondent to be a female, there is no basis for a change in the birth certificate entry for gender. The Supreme Court held that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed. The Court will not consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this
Through the hearing she alsostated that Arturo was a Filipino at the time she obtained the divorce. Implying the shewas no longer a ARTICLE 26 Filipino citizen. The Trial court disregarded the respondents statement. The Quita vs Court of Appeals December 22, 1998 Fact of the Case: Fe D. Quita, the petitioner, and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married inthe Philippines on May 18, 1941. They got divorce in San Francisco on July 23, 1954.Both of them remarried another person. Arturo remarried Bladina Dandan, the net hereditary estatewas ordered in favor the Fe D. Quita and Ruperto, the brother of Arturo. Blandina and thePadlan children moved for reconsideration. On February 15, 1988 partial
reconsiderationwas granted declaring the Padlan children, with the exception of Alexis, entitled to one-half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and the other half to Fe Quita.Private respondent was not declared an heir for her marriage to Arturo was declared voidsince it was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner.Blandina and her children appeal to the Court of Appeals thatthe case was decidedwithout a hearing in violation of the Rules of Court. Issue: (1) Whether or not Blandinas marriage to Arturo void ab initio. (2) Whether or not Fe D. Quita be declared the primary beneficiary as surviving spouse of Arturo. Held: No. The marriage of Blandina and Arturo is not void. The citizenship of Fe D.Quita at the time of their divorce is relevant to
respondentherewith. They were blessed with six children. On April 16, 1972, when Arturo died, the trial court was set to declared as to whowill be the intestate heirs. The trial court invoking Tenchavez vs Escano case held thatthe divorce acquired by the petitioner is not recognized in our country. Private
respondentstressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in VanDorn v. Rommillo Jr that aliens who obtain divorce abroad are recognized in thePhilippnes provided they are valid according to their national law. The petitioner
herselfanswered that she was an American citizen since 1954.
this case. The divorce is valid here sinceshe was already an alien at the time she obtained divorce, and such is valid in theircountrys national law. Thus, Fe D. Quita is no longer recognized as a wife of Arturo. She cannot be the primary beneficiary or will be recognized as surviving spouse of Arturo.
Garcia vs. Recio G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001 Facts: Article 26; The respondent, Rederick Recio, a Filipino was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Rizal in 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. In 1989, the Australian family court issued a decree of divorce supposedly dissolving the marriage. In 1992, respondent acquired Australian citizenship. In 1994, he married Grace Garcia, a Filipina, herein petitioner, inCabanatuan City. In their application for marriage license, respondent was declared as single and Filipino. Since October 1995, they lived separately, and in 1996 while in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided. In 1998, petitioner filed Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy, claiming that she learned of the respondents former marriage only in November. On the other hand, respondent claims that he told petitioner of his prior marriage in 1993, before they were married. Respondent also contended that his first marriage was dissolved by a divorce a decree obtained in Australia in 1989 and hence, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994. The trial court declared that the first marriage was dissolved on the ground of the divorce issued in Australia as valid and recognized in the Philippines. Hence, this petition was forwarded before the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not respondent has legal capacity to marry Grace Garcia. Ruling: In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a
subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. A divorce obtained abroad by two aliens, may be recognized in thePhilippines, provided it is consistent with their respective laws. Therefore, before our courts can recognize a foreign divorce, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. In this case, the divorce decree between the respondent and Samson appears to be authentic, issued by an Australian family court. Although, appearance is not sufficient, and compliance with the rules on evidence regarding alleged foreign laws must be demonstrated, the decree was admitted on account of petitioners failure to object properly because he objected to the fact that it was not registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City, not to its admissibility. Respondent claims that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted as evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law. Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes, still restrict remarriage. Respondent also failed to produce sufficient evidence showing the foreign law governing his status. Together with other evidences submitted, they dont absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry.
Republic vs Orbecido III Article 26 of the Family Code Divorce On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Laman, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido. In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California. Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Par 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic through the Office of the Solicitor General sought reconsideration but it was denied. ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Art 26 of the FC. HELD: In view of the foregoing, the SC states the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows: 1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remar ry. However, since Cipriano was not able to prove as fact his wifes naturalization he is still barred from remarrying.
Wolfgang Roehr vs. Maria Carmen Rodriguez & Hon. Judge Guevarra-Salonga; GR 142820 Facts: Roehr, German Citizen, and Rodriguez, Filipino, were married in Germany. The same was subsequently ratified in Negros Occidental. They had 2 children. Rodriguez filed a petition for decree of nullity of marriage at the RTC-Makati. Roehr, however, obtained a decree of divorce from the CFI of Hamburg, Germany. Roehr thus fied a motion to dismiss the petition for declation of nullity of marriage on the ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the same as a divorce decree had already been promulgated. Judge Guevarra-Salonga recognized the divorce decree, however, ordered that its court shall determine still the issue regarding the custody of the 2 children and the settlement of property relations of the parties. Issue: WON the RTC/Phil. Courts has/have jurisdiction to pass upon matters that spring from a divorce decree obtained abroad. Held: Yes. As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, must still be determined by our courts.23 Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so. In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity to challenge the judgment of the German court so that there is basis for declaring that judgment as res judicata with regard to the rights of petitioner to have parental custody of their two children.
Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, care, support and education mindful of the best interests of the children. With regard to the property relations, given the factual admission by the parties in their pleadings that there is no property to be accounted for, respondent judge has no basis to assert jurisdiction in this case to resolve a matter no longer deemed in controversy.
SAN LUIS V. SAN LUISFebruary 6, 2007 (UnderPropertyRegimesofUnionsWithoutMarriage) Twoconsolidatedcases: EdgarSanLuisv.FelicidadSanLuis,RodolfoSanLuisv.FelicidadSanLuisBackground:The caseinvolvesthesettlementoftheestateofFelicisimoSanLuis.DuringhislifetimeFelicisimo contractedthreemarriages.Fromthefirstmarriagecontractedin1942hehadsixchildren, twoofwhomarethepetitionersinthiscase.Hisfirstwifediedin1963andhissecondmarriage toanAmericancitizenendedinthewifegettingadivorcein1971.In1974Felicismomarried Felicidad,therespondentinthiscase,intheUSA.Theyhadnochildrenbutlivedtogetherfor18 yearsuntilFelicismodiedin1992.AfterFelicisimosdeath,Felicidadsoughtthedissolutionof theirconjugalpartnershipassetsandfiledapetitionforlettersofadministration.Thechildrenof FelicisimofromhisfirstmarriageopposedthisonthegroundsthatFelicidadisonlyamistress, thesecondmarriagetotheAmericanwifesubsisting.ThepetitionersclaimedthatArticle26, Paragraph2oftheFamilyCodecannotbegivenretroactiveeffecttovalidatethebigamous marriagebecauseitwouldimpairthevestedrightsofFelicisimoslegitimatechildren(Article 256oftheFamilyCode).Issue/Held/Ratio: DoestherespondentFelicidadhavelegalcapacitytofilethepetitionforlettersof administration? YES.Even if the Court does not apply Article 26, Par. 2 of the Family Code, there is sufficient jurisprudentialbasisinthecaseof VanDornv.Romillo,Jr. [oonalangkungdiniyomaalalaito,guys]whereitwasheldthataFilipinospouseshouldno longerbeconsideredmarriedifthealienspousevalidlyobtainsadivorceoutsideofthe Philippines.[RememberthatinVanDorntheCourtappliedthenationalityprincipleinArticle 15oftheCivilCode]Indeed,incaseslikeQuitav.DandanandRepublicv.OrbecidoIII[again, kungdiniyomaalala,oonalang,haha]itwaspointedoutthatPar.2,Article26oftheFamily CodetracesitsoriginstotherulinginVanDorn. However, sinceFelicidadfailedtopresentthenecessaryevidencetoprovethedivorcedecree(recallGarcia v.Recio:copyofthelaw,finaldecreeofabsolutedivorce)aswellashermarriagesolemnizedin California,thecaseisremandedtothetrialcourtforfurtherreceptionofevidence. Ev enassumingthatFelicisimowasnotcapacitatedtomarryFelicidad ,Felicidadstillhaslegalpersonalitytofilethepetitionforlettersofadministration,asshemaybe consideredtheco-ownerofthepropertiesthatwereacquiredthroughtheirjointeffortsduring theircohabitation.Sec.2,Rule79provides(inpart)thatapetitionforlettersofadministration mustbefiledbyan
interested person. FelicidadqualifiesasaninterestedpersonwithdirectinterestintheestateofFelicisimoby virtueoftheir18-yearcohabitation.Ifsheprovesthevalidityofthedivorcebutfailstoproveher marriage,shemaybeconsideredaco-ownerunderArticle144oftheCivilCode.Ifshefailsto provethevalidityofboththedivorceandthemarriage,Article148oftheFamilyCodewould apply.Article148statesthatcoupleswhoareincapacitatedtomarrybutstilllivetogetheras husbandandwifehaveco-ownershipover propertiesacquiredduringtheircohabitationin proportiontotheirrespectivecontributions.*Note:Thereisanotherissueraisedhere,butI dontthinkMaamwillcareaboutit.Felicidadfiledthepetitionforlettersofadministrationin Makati.PetitionersclaimeditshouldhavebeenfiledinLaguna,wherethedeceasedwas governor,interpretingresidenceasdomicile.TheSCdidnotupholdthis,interpreting residesinSec.1,Rule73oftheRulesofCourttomeanactualorphysicalhabitationof aperson,notlegalresidenceordomicile
ARTICLE 34 BORJA-MANZANO V. SANCHEZ (Voidable Marriage) Herminia Borja-Mariano was married to the late David Manzano on May 21, 1966. They had four children. However, on March 22, 1993, David contracted another marriage with Luzviminda Payao before Infanta, Pangasinan MTC Judge Roque Sanchez. During that time, Payao was also married to Domingo Relos. Payao and David issued an affidavit stating that they were both married however due to incessant quarrels, they both left their families and they no longer communicated with them. They have lived together as husband & wife for 7 years. Judge agreed to solemnize the marriage. Herminia filed charges of gross ignorance of the law against Sanchez. ISSUE: WON David Manzanos marriage with Payao is valid? HELD: NO. Sanchez fined P20,000.00 RATIO: 1. FC Art. 34: legal ratification of marital cohabitation exempts a couple from obtaining a marriage license but the ff requisites must be present: a. b. c. lived together as husband & wife for at least five years no legal impediment to marry each other fact of absence of legal impediment must be present at time of
marriage
d.
affidavit stating that theyve been living together for at least 5
Nial vs. Bayadog 328 SCRA 122 Facts: Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Pepito resulting to her death on April 24, 1985 shot Teodulfa. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 24, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Bayadog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least 5 years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. After Pepitos death on February 19, 1997, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. Issue: What nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code (now Article 34 of the Family Code) to warrant the counting of the 5-year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license. Ruling: The 5-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity-meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity is unbroken. Any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void, subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. In this case, at the time Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least 5 years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about 20 months had elapsed. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with
years & without legal impediments e. solemnizing officer should execute sworn statement that he
ascertained qualifications of contracting parties. 2. None of requisites were present. They declared that they were separated but judge still solemnized marriage. Mere separation and free & voluntary cohabitation with another person do not dissolve the marriage tie. Cohabitation for at least five years exempts them from the marriage license but it does not free them of their legal impediment to contract a subsequent marriage. 3. Marriage was void & bigamous. Judge displayed gross ignorance of the law.
respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there is was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as husband and wife. Having determined that the second marriage involve in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.
ARTICLE 35
SERMONIA, vs. CA G.R. No. 109454 June 14, 1994 FACTS: On 26 May 1992, petitioner Jose C. Sermonia was charged with bigamy before the RTC of Pasig, Br. 151, for contracting marriage with Ma. Lourdes Unson on 15 February 1975 while his prior marriage to Virginia C. Nievera remained valid and subsisting. Petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that his criminal liability for bigamy has been extinguished by prescription. In the order of 1 October 1992, respondent judge denied the motion to quash. On 27 October 1992, he likewise denied the motion to reconsider his order of denial. Petitioner challenged the above orders before the Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari and prohibition. In the assailed decision of 21 January 1993, his petition was dismissed for lack of merit. In this recourse, petitioner contends that his criminal liability for bigamy has been obliterated by prescription. He avers that since the second marriage contract was duly registered with the Office of the Civil Registrar in 1975, such fact of registration makes it a matter of public record and thus constitutes notice to the whole world. The offended party therefore is considered to have had constructive notice of the subsequent marriage as of 1975; hence, prescription commenced to run on the day the marriage contract was registered. For this reason, the corresponding information for bigamy should have been filed on or before 1990 and not only in 1992. On the other hand, the prosecution maintains that the prescriptive period does not begin from the commission of the crime but from the time of discovery by complainant which was in July 1991. ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution of Jose C. Sermonia for bigamy has already prescribed.
HELD: No. The non-application to the crime of bigamy of the principle of constructive notice is not contrary to the well entrenched policy that penal laws should be construed liberally in favor of the accused. To compute the prescriptive period for the offense of bigamy from registration thereof would amount to almost absolving the offenders thereof for liability therefor. While the celebration of the bigamous marriage may be said to be open and made of public record by its registration, the offender however is not truthful as he conceals from the officiating authority and those concerned the existence of his previous subsisting marriage. He does not reveal to them that he is still a married person. He likewise conceals from his legitimate spouse his bigamous marriage. And for these, he contracts the bigamous marriage in a place where he is not known to be still a married person. And such a place may be anywhere, under which circumstance, the discovery of the bigamous marriage is rendered quite difficult and would take time. It is therefore reasonable that the prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy should be counted only from the day on which the said crime was discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agency.
Santos vs. Ca G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995 FACTS: Plaintiff Leouel Santos married defendant Julia Bedia on September 20, 1986. On May 18 1988, Julia left for the U.S. She did not communicate with Leouel and did not return to the country. In 1991, Leoul filed with the RTC of Negros Oriental, a complaint for voiding the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The RTC dismissed the complaint and the CA affirmed the dismissal. ISSUE: Does the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for more than five years constitute psychological incapacity? RULING: No, the failure of Julia to return home or to communicate with her husband Leouel for more than five years does not constitute psychological incapacity. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) GRAVITY (b) JURIDICAL ANTECEDENCE (c) INCURABILITY Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Art. 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.
Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem. PETITION IS DENIED
CHING MIN TSOI VS CA 266 SCRA 324 FACTS: Private respondent Gina Loi and petitioner Chi Ming Tsoi were married at the Manila Cathedral on May 22, 1988. Contrary to Ginas expectations that the newlyweds were to enjoy making love or having sexual intercourse with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep. No sexual intercourse occurred during their first night, second, third and fourth night. From May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989, they slept together in the same room and on the same bed but during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. A case was then filed to declare the annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Gina alleged that Chi Ming was impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show him his penis (clinically found to be only 3 inches and 1 cm. when erect). Defendant admitted that no sexual contact was ever made and according to him everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caressed her private parts she always removed his hands. ISSUE: Is the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner a psychological incapacity ?[i] HELD: If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless
and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity. Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is To procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage. Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity. While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the sponta neous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order. Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say I could not have cared less. This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.
Republic vs. CA and Molina, 268 SCRA 198G.R. no. 108763, 13 February 1997 Facts:On 14 April 1985, plaintiff Roridel Molina married defendantReynaldo Molina which union bore a son. After a year of m a r r i a g e , R e y n a l d o s h o w e d s i g n s o f i m m a t u r i t y a n d irrespon sibility as a husband and father as he p r e f e r r e d t o spend more time with his friends, depended on his parentsfor support, and was never honest with Roridel in regard totheir finances resulting in frequent quarrels between them.The RTCLa Trinidad, Benguet granted Roridels petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage which was a f f i r m e d b y the CA .I s s u e : W h e t h e r o r n o t i r r e c o n c i l a b l e d i f f e r e n c e s a n d c o n f l i c t i n g perso nalities constitute psychological incapacity. Ruling:No. The Supreme Court ruled that i r r e c o n c i l a b l e d i f f e r e n c e s and conflicting personalities do not constitute psychologicalincapacity. It laid down the following guidelines in applyingArticle 36 of the family Code: (a) plaintiff has the burden of proof; (b0 root cause must be medically/clinically identified,alleged in the complaint; sufficiently proven by experts, andclearly explained in the decision; (c) incapacity must exist atthe time of marriage; (d) it must be incurable; (e) its gravitydisables essential marital obligations; (f) as enumerated inA r t i c l e s 6 8 - 7 1 , 2 2 0 , 2 2 1 a n d 2 2 5 o f t h e F a m i l y C o d e ; ( g ) Interpretation o f t h e n a t i o n a l A p p e l l a t e M a t r i m o n i a l T r i b u n a l of the
catholic Church should be given great respect; and (h)P r o s e c u t i o n a n d S o l i c i t o r G e n e r a l m u s t a p p e a r a s c o u n s e l for the state.Judgment reversed and set aside.
Lucita E. Hernandez vs. CA and Mario Hernandez , 320 SCRA 76,
Facts:
On 1 January 1981, Lucita Estrella married Mario Hernandez, and they begot three children. On 10 July 1992, Lucita filed a petition for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. She alleged that from the time of their marriage, Mario failed to perform his obligations to support the family, devoting most of his time drinking, had affairs with many women, and cohabiting with another woman with whom he had an illegitimate child, and finally abandoning her and the family. The RTC-Tagaytay City dismissed the petition which was affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not Marios habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity/perversion and family abandonment constitute psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that the aforementioned acts do not by themselves constitute grounds for psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make Mario completely unable to discharge his essential marital obligations, and not merely due to his youth and self-conscious feelings of being handsome.
Judgment affirmed.
Marcos vs. Marcos G.R. No. 136490, 19 October 2000 (3rd Division)
2. No. the Supreme Court ruled that examination by physician or psychologist is not a condition sine gua non for the declaration of psychological incapacity.
Facts:
Plaintiff Brenda Marcos and defendant Wilson Marcos were married twice on 6 September 1982 and on 8 May 1983. They had five children. Brenda filed a case for nullity of the marriage for psychological incapacity, alleging that Wilson failed to provide material support to the family and had resorted to physical abuse and abandonment. The RTC declared their marriage null and void under article 36 of the Family Code. However, the Court of appeals reversed the said decision.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented in this case show psychological incapacity.
2. Whether or not personal medical or psychological examination of Wilson by a physician is a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity.
Ruling:
1. No. Although the Supreme Court is sufficiently convinced that Wilson failed to provide material support and resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to psychological incapacity.
PESCA V PESCA 356 SCRA 588 APRIL 17, 2001 FACTS: Submitted for review is the decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 27 May 1998, in C.A. G.R. CV. No. 52374, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Caloocan City, Branch 130, which has declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent to be null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent. March 3, 1975 Lorna Pesca (petitioner) and Zosimo Pesca (respondent) were in Bacolod and had 3 children. As a seaman, he did not often stay with petitioner. In 1988 respondent showed signs of immaturity, cruelty, was a habitual drinker November 19, 1992 petitioner left with her children due to his cruel behavior but returned and gave Zosimo a second chance. March 22, 1994 respondent assaulted petitioner so petitioner decidedly to leave Zosimo. Petitioner filed for annulment, invoking psychological incapacity as grounds April 25, 1994 summons were served on respondent but he failed to file an answer within reglamentary period. August 3, 1994 prosecutor submitted report that no collusion exists between both parties January 11, 1995 respondent filed an answer denying psychological incapacity November 15, 1995 RTC granted nullity of marriage but CA reversed the decision on the basis that petitioner has not sufficiently established the grounds for psychological incapacity: gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability ISSUE: Whether Zosimo Pescas actions constitute psychological incapacity HELD: DENIED. Petitioner failed to establish proof that respondent showed signs of mental incapacity that would cause him to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenant provided in Art. 68 of the Family Code. The "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows
the settled legal maxim that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non respicit." The phrase "psychological incapacity ," borrowed from Canon law, is an entirely novel provision in our statute books, and, until the relatively recent enactment of the Family Code, the concept has escaped jurisprudential attention. It is in Santos when, for the first time, the Court has given life to the term. Molina, that followed, has additionally provided procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in trying cases for annulment of marriages grounded on psychological incapacity. Molina has strengthened, not overturned, Santos. At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological incapacity.
SIAYNGCO V SIAYNGCO 441 SCRA 422 OCTOBER 27, 2004 FACTS: A petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 01 July 2003, reversing the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 102, Quezon City, dated 31 January 2001, which dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by respondent herein Judge Manuel Siayngco August 11, 1973 Juanita Carating (petitioner) married Manuel Siayngco (respondent) civil rites and church on June 27, 1973. Adopted baby boy September 25, 1997 respondent filed for declaration of nullity based on Art 36; petitioner was over domineering, selfish, volatile, nagger and trivial. No respect for his position as judge. This is rooted in her deep-seated resentment from lack of love and appreciation from her parents According to petitioner, respondent is lying because he wants to be with his paramour Respondent presented Dr Valentina Garcia (psychiatrist); from her psychiatric evaluation, both had narcissistic psychological repertoire (along with their other maladaptive traits), failed to adequately empathize (or to be responsive and sensitive) to each others needs and feelings Based on the psychiatric report of Dr Eduardo Maaba, petitioner is psychologically capacitated to comply with essential marital obligations January 31, 2001 RTC denied petition for nullity based on insufficient evidence July 1, 2003 CA reversed RTC decision based on psychiatric report of Dr Garcia that both are psychologically incapacitated and on the case of Chi Ming Tsoi v CA ISSUE: Whether root cause of psychological incapacity was identified based on Molina guideline #2 HELD: Based on the report of Dr. Garcia as well as from the testimonies of the parties and their witnesses is that the only essential marital obligation which respondent Manuel was not able
to fulfill, if any, is the obligation of fidelity. Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that respondent Manuels unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality which makes him completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state and not merely due to his ardent wish to have a child of his own flesh and blood. Respondent failed to prove that his wifes behavior and actions are grave psychological maladies that paralyze her from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. Neither is there any showing that these "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. In fact, Dr. Maaba, whose expertise as a psychiatrist was admitted by respondent Manuel, reported that petitioner was psychologically capacitated to comply with the basic and essential obligations of marriage. Dr. Garcias report does not even mention that petitioner is psychologically incapacitated. PETITION GRANTED. CA DECISION WAS REVERSED
to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; or when there is a misappreciation of facts, which are unavailing in the instant case. FERRARIS V FERRARIS G.R. NO. 162368 JULY 17, 2006 FACTS: This resolves the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Ma. Armida Perez-Ferraris of the Resolution dated June 9, 2004 denying the petition for review on certiorari of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated April 30, 2003 and February 24, 2004, respectively, for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error. February 20, 2001 Pasig RTC denied the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by the petitioner on the grounds that epilepsy does not amount to psychological incapacity and evidence on record was insufficient to prove infidelity. Motion for reconsideration was denied on April 20, 2001 CA affirmed in toto the judgment of RTC; it held that the evidence on record did not convincingly establish that respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity or that his "defects" were incurable and already present at the inception of the marriage.4 The Court of Appeals also found that Dr. Dayan's testimony failed to establish the substance of respondent's psychological incapacity; that she failed to explain how she arrived at the conclusion that the respondent has a mixed personality disorder; that she failed to clearly demonstrate that there was a natal or supervening disabling factor or an adverse integral element in respondent's character that effectively incapacitated him from accepting and complying with the essential marital obligations. ISSUE: Whether CA erred affirming RTC decision in denying petition for annulment on the account of insufficient evidence HELD: It is a well-established principle that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court, save for the most compelling and cogent reasons, like when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions of the parties to the case, or fail There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Respondent's alleged mixed personality disorder, the "leaving-thehouse" attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Article 36 should not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes manifest themselves. Neither it is to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. PETITION DENIED WITH FINALITY
ANTONIO V REYES G.R. NO. 155800 MARCH 10, 2005 FACTS: Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 29 November 2001 and 24 October 2002. The Court of Appeals had reversed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati declaring the marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent), null and void Decembher 6, 1990 petitioner and respondent were married in Pasig and had a child who died 5 months after birth March 8, 1993 petitioner filed for declaration of nullity based on Art. 36, alleging that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with essential marital obligations, incapacity existed at the time of the marriage and exists up to the present Petitioner alleged that respondent is a pathological liar who lied about everything Petitioner presented Dr Dante Abcede (psychiatrist) and Dr Arnulfo Lopez (clinical psychologist); based on their tests, respondents constant lying was pathological or abnormal. This undermined the basic relationship of the marriage. Respondent denied all allegations; presented Dr Antonio Efren Reyes (psychiatrist) who tested respondent and found her to be psychologically capacitated to perform marital duties Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes as (i) he was not the one who administered and interpreted respondents psychological evaluation, and (ii) he made use of only one instrument called CPRS which was not reliable because a good liar can fake the results of such test Church annulled marriage due to lack of discretion on both parties but CA reversed decision on the insufficiency of evidence provided ISSUE: Whether evidences presented by petitioner are sufficient to prove psychological incapacity of respondent
HELD: In understanding Art 36, the preference of the revision committee was for "the judge to interpret the provision on a caseto-case basis, guided by experience, in the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law." Each case must be judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. Petitioner was able to sufficiently prove the psychological incapacity of his spouse (witnesses, experts, etc). The root cause of respondents psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial courts decision. The initiatory complaint alleged that respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior "of peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories, etc. Respondents psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and even before the celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious characters well before she married petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark about her natural childs real parentage as she only confessed when the latter had found out the truth after their marriage. Also, The gravity of respondents psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage of the parties was annulled by the Catholic Church. However, although Dr Abcede did not comment on the incurability of respondents illness, the SC ruled that each case is to be tried based on the merits of the facts presented and not just juridical precedence. PETITION GRANTED, MARRIAGED NULL AND VOID
ZAMORA V CA G.R. 141917 FEBRUARY 7, 2007 FACTS: This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to annul and set aside the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated August 5, 1999 and January 24, 2000 in CAG.R. CV No. 53525, entitled "Bernardino S. Zamora v. Norma Mercado Zamora," which affirmed the dismissal of a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage. June 4, 1070 Petitioner Bernardino Zamora married Norma Mercado in City; did not have any child. In 1972, Norma went to the US to work as a nurse; left in 1974 again. In 1989, she was already a US citizen Petitioner filed for declaration of nullity of marriage, alleging that Norma was horrified at the mere idea of having children and also abandoned him when she left for the US Norma denied that she refused to have a child, alleging that petitioner was unfaithful and had two affairs with different women and had children with them. June 22, 1995 RTC denied Bernardinos petition citing that there is no evidence of psychological incapacity on Norma (no gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability) August 5, 1999 CA affirmed RTC decision citing Molina and Santos guidelines ISSUE: Whether or not refusal to have children and abandonment constitutes psychological incapacity; Whether or not the presentation of psychologists and/or psychiatrists is still desirable, if evidence in this case already shows the psychological incapacity of private respondent HELD: Molina and Santos cases did not mention the necessity of the presentation of expert opinion. What is important, as in Marcos v Marcos, is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the condition of psychological incapacity. Likewise, Section 2(d) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, which took effect on March 15, 2003, states:
(d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration. The rule is that the facts alleged in the petition and the evidence presented, considered in totality, should be sufficient to convince the court of the psychological incapacity of the party concerned. Petitioner, however, failed to substantiate his allegation that private respondent is psychologically incapacitated. His allegations relating to her refusal to cohabit with him and to bear a child was strongly disputed. DENIED.
with one Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting is bigamous. As such, ARTICLES 40-41 Domingo vs. CA 226 SCRA 572 Facts: Delia Domingo, private respondent, filed a petition before RTC of Pasig for the declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property against Roberto Domingo, petitioner. She alleged that they were married at Carmona, Cavite with evidences of marriage certificate and marriage license, unknown to her, petitioner had a previous marriage with Emerlina dela Paz which is still valid and existing. She came to know the prior marriage when Emerlina sued them for bigamy. She prays that their marriage be declared null and void and, as a consequence, to declare that she is the exclusive owner of all properties she acquired during the marriage and to recover them from him. Roberto moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the marriage being void ab initio, the petition of declaration of nullity is unnecessary. It added that private respondent has no property which in his possession. Issue: Whether or not respondent may claim for the declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property against petitioner on the ground of bigamy. Ruling: There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent celebrated while the former's previous marriage it is from the beginning. Petitioner himself does not dispute the absolute nullity of their marriage. The Court had ruled that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void, bigamous marriage. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the regime of property relations governing them. It stands to reason that the lower court before whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions regarding the couple's properties.
Imelda Marbella-Bobis (petitioner), vs. Isagani D. Bobis (respondent)
Whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a question to a criminal case for bigamy
Facts: Respondent was married to the petitioner on January 25,
RULING No, respondents subsequent declaration of nullity of a
1996. Unknown to the petitioner, her other half has contracted his previous marriage constitutes a question to a criminal case for first marriage with a Maria Dulce B. Javier on October 21, 1985 and bigamy. During the time when he contracted his second marriage, he has not been nullified. The respondent once again entered into was considered already considered as a married man even if it was a marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez. A case of bigamy was marriage without a marriage license. Article 40 of the Family Code, filed against the respondent on the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, which has already been promulgateSd on his second marriage, consequently he initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a before the respondent could have married for the second time. license. Respondent has filed a motion to suspend the trial and has Whether or not the first marriage was void for lack of a license is a been granted. Petitioner filed for a motion for reconsideration but matter of defense because there is still no declaration of its nullity at has been denied. the time the second marriage was contracted. It is not for the parties, especially the accused to determine if his first marriage was null or ISSUE: void, but of a court. The respondents clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage in order to escape the bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void
and that the subsequent marriage is also void due to the absence of judicial declaration of nullity of the first. Thus, the decision in the civil action has been reversed and may proceed with the criminal case. TERRE V. TERRE (Voidable Marriage) Dorothy Terre first met Jordan Terre when they were 4th year high school classmates in Cadiz City High School. She was then married to Merlito Bercenilla. Jordan courted her and this continued when they moved to Manila to pursue their education. Jordan, then a freshman law student, told Dorothy that her marriage with Bercenilla was void ab initio because they are first cousins. Believing in Jordan and with the consent of her mother and ex-in-laws, she married Jordan on June 14, 1977. Jordan wrote single as Dorothys civil status despit e latters protests. Jordan said it didnt matter because marriage was void to begin with. After their marriage, Dorothy supported Jordan because he was still studying then. They had a son, Jason, who was born on June 25, 1981. Shortly after she gave birth, Jordan disappeared. She learned that he married Vilma Malicdem. Dorothy filed charges for abandonment of minor, bigamy and grossly immoral conduct. Jordan was already a member of the Bar then. Jordan claimed that he was unaware of Dorothys first marriage and that she sent her out of the house when he confronted her about it. He contracted the second marriage, believing that his marriage to Dorothy was void ab initio because of her prior subsisting marriage. ISSUE: WON a judicial declaration of nullity is needed to enter into a subsequent marriage? HELD: Yes. Jordan Terre disbarred. RATIO: 1. Jordan failed to rebut evidence presented by Dorothy. 2. As a law student, he should have known that even if Dorothys first marriage was void ab initio, she still needed a judicial declaration before she can contract another marriage. (GOMEZ V. LIPANA; FC ART. 40) 3. Jordan has displayed a deeply flawed moral character. Dorothy supported him, he got her pregnant then he abandoned her. He made
a mockery of the institution of marriage. Thus, not worthy to be a member of the Bar.
ATIENZA V. BRILLANTES [243 SCRA 32 (1995)] F: This is an administrative complaint filed by Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety against J. Brillantes, Presiding Judge of MTC, Mla. It was alleged in the complaint that Brillantes has been cohabiting w/ Yolanda De Castro (w/ whom Atienza had 2 children) when he (Brillantes) was already married to one Zenaida Ongkiko w/ whom he has 5 children. xxx Resp. denies having been married to Ongkiko, although he admits having 5 children w/ her. He alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony, the same was not valid for lack of marriage license. The second marriage bet. the two also lacked the required license. He claims that when he married De Castro in LA, California, he believed, in all GF and for all legal intents and purposes, that he was single bec. his first marriage was solemnized w/o a license. HELD: Under the FC, there must be a judicial decl. of the nullity of a previous marriage bef. a party thereto can enter into a 2nd marriage. (Art. 40.) Art. 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the FC regardless of the date of the first marriage. Said art. is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance w/ the NCC or other laws." (Art. 256, FC.) This is particularly true w/ Art. 40 w/c is a rule of procedure. Resp. has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Art. 40 to his case. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws
Mercado vs. Tan 337 SCRA 122
HELD:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary FACTS: before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial Dr. Vicent Mercado was previously married with Thelma Oliva in 1976 before he contracted marriage with Consuelo Tan in 1991 which the latter claims she did not know. Tan filed bigamy against Mercado and after a month the latter filed an action for declaration of nullity of marriage against Oliva. The decision in 1993 declared marriage between Mercado and Oliva null and void. In the case at bar, Mercado only filed the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Oliva right after Tan filed bigamy case. Hence, by then, the crime had already been consummated. He contracted second marriage without the judicial declaration of the nullity. The ISSUE: Whether Mercado committed bigamy in spite of filing the declaration of nullity of the former marriage. fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge. declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statute as void.
CALISTERIO v. CALISTERIO April 6, 2000 (GR No. 136467)
decision.
ISSUE: FACTS: Marietta is the wife of the deceased, Teoderico Calisterio. 13 January 1946, petitioner was married to James William Bounds 11 February 1947, James Bounds disappeared without a trace 08 May 1958, after 11 years, Teodorico and Marietta were married without Marietta having priorly secured a court declaration that James was presumptively dead 24 April 1992, Teodorico Calisterio died intestate 09 October 1992, prespondent Antonia Armas y Calisterio, a surviving sister of deceased, claiming that she is the sole surviving heir of Teodorico Calisterio, and alleging that the marriage between the latter and respondent being allegedly bigamous and thereby null and void The RTC ruled in favour of Antonia, but the CA reversed the HELD: Yes. The law in force at the time of their marriage was the Civil Code, not the Family Code which took effect only on 03 August 1988. Article 256 of the Family Code 5 itself limited its retroactive governance only to cases where it thereby would not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. Article 83 of the New Civil Code which provides: Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless: WON the marriage between deceased Teoderico C. And Marietta C. is valid.
1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or 2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the Morigo vs. People of the Philippines time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court Facts: Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, for a period of four years. After school year, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other. In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange of letters, they became sweethearts. In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they maintained constant communication. In 1990, Unlike in the Family Code, the New Civil Code does not necessitate a judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse as long as the prescribed period of absence is met. On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a petition for divorce against appellant which was granted by the court. Appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago at Tagbilaran City. Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married. Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind. G. R. No. 145226 February 6, 2004
Lucio filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. The complaint seeks among others, the declaration of nullity of Lucios marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place. Appellant was charged with Bigamy in information filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran City, with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.
judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statutes as "void."
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no
Lucio Morigo moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for reconsideration by the prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case, Lucio pleaded not guilty to the charge.
semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which Lucio might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage. The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor
Issue: Whether or not Lucio Morigo committed bigamy even with his defense of good faith.
of the presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case, Supreme Court held that petitioner has not committed bigamy and that it need not tarry on
Ruling: A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such
the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.
Republic vs. Nolasco, GR No. 94053 Presumptive Death On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Court of Antique, Branch 10, a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker, invoking Article 41 of the Family Code. The petition prayed that respondents wife be declared presumptively dead o r, in the alternative, that the marriage be declared null and void.
sent to his missing spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England, the address of the bar where he and Janet Monica first met, were all returned to him. He also claimed that he inquired from among friends but they too had no news of Janet Monica.
On cross-examination, respondent stated that he had lived with and later married Janet Monica Parker despite his lack of knowledge as to her family background. He insisted that his wife continued to
Respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and that he had first met Janet Monica Parker, a in a bar in England. On 15 January 1982, respondent married Janet Monica Parker in San Jose, Antique.
refuse to give him such information even after they were married. He also testified that he did not report the matter of Janet Monicas disappearance to the Philippine government authorities.
After the marriage celebration, he obtained another employment contract as a seaman and left his wife with his parents in San Jose, Antique. Sometime in January 1983, while working overseas, respondent received a letter from his mother informing him that Janet Monica had given birth to his son. The same letter informed him that Janet Monica had left Antique.
The trial court granted Nolascos petition in a Judgment dated 12 October 1988. The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition through the Provincial Prosecutor of Antique who had been deputized to assist the Solicitor-General in the instant case. The Republic argued, first, that Nolasco did not possess a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, 2 and second, Nolascos attempt to have
His efforts to look for her himself whenever his ship docked in England proved fruitless. He also stated that all the letters he had
his marriage annulled in the same proceeding was a cunning attempt to circumvent the law on marriage.
family
and
an
inviolable
social
institution
whose
nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property
ISSUE: Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.
relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
Note: While the Court understands the need of respondents young HELD: In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the wellfounded belief required by law that his absent wife was already dead that would sustain the issuance of a court order declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead. son, Gerry Nolasco, for maternal care, still the requirements of the law must prevail. Since respondent failed to satisfy the clear requirements of the law, his petition for a judicial declaration of presumptive death must be denied. Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution The Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming t he trial courts decidion declaring that Parkera presumptive death is reversed, both decisions were nullified and set aside with costs against the respondent. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution Article 149 of the Family Code
The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects. Consequently,
BASIS: Article 1 of the Family Code Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the
family relations are governed by law and no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect.
Republic vs. CA GR No. 159614, December 9, 2005 FACTS:
inquiries from his parents-in-law about Lea's whereabouts considering that Lea's father was the owner of Radio DYMS. He did report and seek help of the local police authorities and NBI to locate Lea but he did so only after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss his petition in RTC.
Alan Alegro, the petitioner, was married with Lea in January 1995. Lea arrived home late in February 1995 and Alan told her that if she enjoys life of a single person, it will be better for her to go back to her parents. Lea left after that fight. Allan checked if she went to her parents house but was not there and even inquired to her friends. He went back to the parents-in-laws house and learned that Lea had been to their house but left without notice. He then sought help from the Barangay Captain. For sometime, Alan decided to work as parttime taxi driver and during his free time he would look for Lea in the malls. In June 2001, Alan reported Leas disappearance to the local police station and an alarm notice was issued. He also reported the disappearance in NBI on July 2001. Alan filed a petition in March 2001 for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife.
ISSUE: Whether Alan has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.
HELD:
The court ruled that Alan failed to prove that he has a well-founded belief, before he filed his petition with RTC, that his spouse was dead. He failed to present a witness other than the Barangay Captain. He even failed to present those friends of Lea which he inquired to corroborate his testimony. He also failed to make inquiries from his parents-in-law regarding Leas whereabouts before filing his petition in the RTC. It could have enhanced his credibility had he made
ARTICLE 48 LLAVE V. REPUBLIC TUASONvsCOURTOFAPPEALSFACTS Maria Tuason and Emilio Tuason were a married in 1972 and this relationship producedchildren. Maria now claims that Emilio manifested psychological incapacity through violencecausing her physical injuries and drug use which causes him a suspended penalty. Maria thenfiled a petition for annulment by reason of this. Tuason responded with denial stating that their relationship was lived in harmony until some differences manifested themselves. The marriagewas annulled and eventually Maria filed for administration of conjugal properties which Emilioopposed. His counsel asked the court to have the hearing moved because the counsel was out of the country. On the day of the hearing Emilio failed to show up and so he was declared to havewaived his right to present evidence. The court declared the marriage null and void. Maria thenfiled a Motion for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Adjudication to Plaintiff of the Conjugal Properties which was eventually contested by Emilio and he later on filed for relief from the decision of the court. This was denied and the CA affirmed this decision. ISSUE Whether or not Emilio may claim for relief from the judgment of the CA RULING The court ruled in the negative. It is necessary when attempting to have a final judgmentset aside to be justified by fraud, accident or mistake. In this case it was the negligence of petitioner which caused his failure to present evidence. He claims that it was for medical reasonsthat he was not able to make it to the hearing but failure to notify counsel is not the fault of thecourt. He was given the chance to be in court but he negligently threw away this chance. Hecannot blame the court for this because said decision was well within due process of law. Thismeans, he cannot claim relief from judgment. G.R. No. 169766, [March 30, 2011] PROCEDURAL HISTORY: This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decisiondated
August 17, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762 and its subsequent Resolution dated September 13, 2005, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 89 declaring petitioner Estrellita JulianoLlave s (Estrellita) marriage to Sen. Mamintal A.J. Tamano (Sen. Tamano) as void ab initio. FACTS: Around 11 months before his death, Sen.
TamanomarriedEstrellita twice initially under the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City and, subsequently, under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993. In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano s civil status was indicated as divorced. Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamano s wife, and upon his death, his widow. On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in
their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamano s legitimate children with Zorayda, filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint alleged that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this marriage remained subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993. ISSUE: Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous. HELD: Yes. The civil code governs the marriage of Zoraydaand late Sen. Tamano; their marriage was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano s subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio. RATIO: The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force governing marriage relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any given time. Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except during the effectivity of Republic Act No. 394 which was not availed of during its effectivity.
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano s prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed by way of divorceunder PD 1083, the law that codified Muslim personallaws. However, PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines. But Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites. HELD: The petition is DENIED.
DIO V. DIO
On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent, citing psychological incapacity
G.R. No. 178044, [January 19, 2011] under Article 36 of the Family Code. DOCTRINE: Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag) submitted a psychological report Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties. In this case, petitioners marriage to The trial court granted the petition on the ground that respondent respondent was declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidationof marital obligations at the time of the celebration of the marriage and properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the declared their marriage void ab initio. It ordered that a decree of rules on co-ownership. absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued upon compliance FACTS: with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code. establishing that respondent was suffering fromNarcissistic
Personality Disorder which was incurable and deeply ingrained in her system since her early formative years.
Alain M. Dio (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Dio(respondent) got married on 14 January 1998 before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Pias City.
Trial court, upon motion for partial reconsideration of petitioner, modified its decision holding that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall be issued afterliquidation, partition and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
RATIO:
The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC that in a void marriage, ISSUE: regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article Whether the trial court erred when it ordered that adecree of 148 of the Family Code. Article 147 of the Family Code applies absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any partition, and distribution of the parties proper ties under Article 147 impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless of the Family Code. void, such as petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court. HELD: For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements Yes. The trial courts decision is affirmed with modification. Decree of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be issued upon finality of the 1. trial courts decision without waiting for the liquidation, partition, 2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the 3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is Family Code. void. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other; must be present:
All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and respondent.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to
The trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the marriage shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family the liquidation of the properties of the parties. Code. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule provides: In both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed either by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains unless the parties agree to a complete separation Sec. 19. Decision. (1) If the court renders a decision granting the of property in a marriage settlement entered into before the petition, it shall declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or marriage. Since the property relations of the parties is governed by decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and before a decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the case Distribution of Properties. for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code
because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on coownership.
In this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidationof properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. The rules on coownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on coownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, [p]artition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x. It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage

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