Research Report
A STRATEGIC ESTIMATE FOR THE
DI
ELECTI
ASIA-PACIFIC REGION
92 12 23 053
Air University BaseS lbil Air Force MntdSaxwell atwesl Force UntdM
?utcd AppO=dForfii DAsfaUbO UtInIa
Aae
Professor:
Dr.
J.
Richard Walsh
Acoa"91j F~or
ALABAMA
NTT?
AVIv "!
it? Codes
--
I.
Recent
the old
States'
strategy focused
communism.
new role in
the world in
Within the broader community of nations, we see our own role clearly. We must not only protect our citizens and our interests but help create a new world in which our fundamental values not only survive but flourish. (38:v) These fundamental values form the basis for the global
components of U.S. a.
Major 'Components of National Security Strategy (1) Global Components. The global components of U.S.
national security strategy and their underlying aims are: a. The survival of the United States as a free independent nation, with its fundamental values in tact and institutions and people secure. and its
b. A healthy and growing economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home and abroad. c. relations with allies d. economic freedom, (38:3-4) (2) policy Healthy, cooperative and and friendly nations. politically vigorous
A stable and secure world, where political and human rights and democratic institutions flourish. The United States pursues a the
of peaceful
and bilateral
relationships in
Asia-Pacific region which entails: paragraph id. (a) below. (b) the region; Maintaining the military alliances outlined in
Actively promoting
Seeking to reduce the U.S.' $41 billion trade (c) imbalance with Japan by gaining full access to the Japanese market; to fields environment; (d) like Working to expand the U.S.- Japanese partnership and the relief, non-proliferation, refugee the continued (ROK); economic
committed to (e) Remaining growth and security of the Republic of Korea Seeking appropriate (f) with the People's Republic of China (PRC); (g) Fostering between Taiwan and the PRC;
contact
(h) Seeking a resolution of the conflict under the auspices of the U.N.; and authority relations. b. and (i) Promoting professionalism, in for human rights respect
Major Components of National Military Strategy (1) Global components. August 1990 sees in The new defense strategy President the major threat facing the U.S. either Europe or the Pacific, The goal
Bush as
announced in a major
rather than a short-warning, of its to this allies defeat new strategy remains and interests. aggression on
war
to deter aggression
U.S.
interests. are:
The
fundamental
(a) Survivable and highly capable and defense forces to deter war;
strategic offense
(b) Forward presence in key areas to promote regional response and capability for crisis and provide an initial stability escalation control; to responding threatening U.S. of effectively forces capable Conventional (c) and contingencies regional crises short-notice interests; and
(d) Capacity to reconstitute a larger force structure if the nation once again is faced with the threat of a massive conflict. (11:5)
Our strategy demands we be able to move men and scene of a crisis at a pace and To do this, our (38:29) in
lanes and
access to
through maritime
military strategy continues to stress equitable, agreements to reduce military threats, relationships, (11:5)
arms control
inject greater
proliferation df nuclear,
the missiles that deliver them, Alliances critical to our and other
partnerships
are
Alliances
reasons, treaties
alliances in
the
Asia-Pacific
in
World,
integrate We do
actions
counteracting Powerful
local violence and promoting nation-building. drug cartels threaten the economy, institutions of the regions in drugs to the ecology,
(11:5-6) political
United States
associated
instability, to
illegal drugs
this
continue
As a result,
trafficking,
national security mission of the Department of Defense. Our sec-,rity our ability into a it in the future depends, as it has in
to quickly
technological
advances been
weapons systems in
to overcome numerical shortages and to reduce the risk to American The spread of advanced technology weapons systems will surely det~rrent value of our forces -unless we act -and our competitive edge now to maintain our
lives.
erode the in
warfare
decisively
maintain
capacity in to
the United States to provide and sustain modern equipment expansion of our armed forces should the need
support a rapid
occur. (2) military Regional components. in the The principal elements have been of our forward
strategy
overseas bases,
Our forward
units required;
allow allies
current U.S.
force levels
in
the
Pacific are
eing ur
made in allies as In
light of reduced tensions and improved capabilities of a result of political self-confidence we announced our the region. and economic a
withdrawal one to
forces in
phase, personnel
three years,
consists of
from Korea;
military
24:12)
imeframe as the situation warrants. For the foreseeable future, hroughout the awaii. region is we plan to maintain maritime forces forces in Korea, Japan and
and land-based
Our joal
a leading to change in
a supporting deployment
Korea.
ccess
the region,
lexibility and speed of n naval capabilities, apable 38:31) c. Other a National of providing
response.
Sources
and
security Our
ssistance is
vital instrument
policy.
international
11 peaceful
assistance
activities
such
as
grant
aid,
foreign
Seven of
(ANZUS) States Australia-New Zealand-United (1) The Relations strong allies. U.S. remain (Australia and the Treaty. New of because are strained U.S. and the New Zealand between Zealand's barring of nuclear equipped or powered weapons systems.) The Mutual Defense (2) and the Republic of Korea. Treaty Between the United States
(3) The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States and Japan. (Japan's only defense treaty.) Treaty between the (4) ' The Mutual Defense and the Republic of the Philippines. remains in Asia Collective Defense (5) The Southeast effect on a bilateral basis with Thailand.) of Free Association with the Free Association with the United States Treaty (which
Republic of Federated
Singapore, decided
Thailand and the Philippines, to engage member states in (4:24). For the most by
defense cooperation
atrengthening the existing network of bilateral defense ties. The kustralia, Five Power Malaysia, Defence New Arrangement, Zealand and consisting of
Britain,
Singapore,
serves The
primarily to arrangement
participating countries.
iecurity network in
Southeast Asia.
(45:8)
Theater Strategic Situation. a. !overs quare Characteristics half the miles; 17 of the Theater. an PACOM's theater of operations area of more time zones; than 100 million and touches 40
world's 24
(57:74)
theater can be broken into various sub-regions on the basis geography, four cultures and language. when South The area is frequently issues:
sub-regions
discussing Asia;
security
of China, Asia
consists of Singapore,
Thailand,
Indonesia,
'hilippines. ri Lanka,
comprised of India,
Pakistan,
Bangladesh,
Burma,
and Bhutan.
seven
ussia,
Japan,
of these countries
(U.S.,
China,
nuclear weapons and major conventional the U.S. and allies systems. and the some
forces in
most sophisticated
area
shows
tangible
signs of forces
tension
reduction. and a
The peace
from Cambodia
signed in
nuclear weapons 7
inspections and
armed forces
by one
Soviets subsequently reduced their forces Mongolia and in Vietnam. the (52:13)
along the
border in of the
outcome
fragmentation of
Lnknown, of its
Russia recently
announced an overall
loctrine As
changes,
the
potential for
conflict is
the continuing standoff on the Korean and dissidence suppression/counterand Indonesia. between
Cambodia, on
Territories;
Vietnamese,
Malaysian
and
ilipino forces.
,n easing ethnic tensions and historic antagonisms than on diplomatic rocedures. The greatest immediate threat orth Korea's nuclear weapons to regional security, development program. however, The is
U.S.
stimates the Koreans will have a nuclear device o size) CUD-C by by 1994 and the a nuclear
mid-to-late
1990s.
called on facilities by
North Korea
to allow
of its
the U.S.
make the Korean Peninsula nuclear free. alemate. tual eated In March 1992, their North and
This may
inspections of a
June 1992
joint commission
plans for
(33:14A)
In addition,
e North Korean delegation to the IAEA said EA inspections to begin in In clear clear 1985, Free June. (33:14A)
Pacific declared
free zone.
clear weapons.
permitted to determine
ansit by ships which may be nuclear armed. d China signed protocols not to use, the zone. The U.S. declared it test,
The former Soviet Union or base nuclear weapons the intent of the
will follow
NFZT protocols,
The proliferation of nuclear, d the missiles to deliver them ncern. By the year 2000,
as many
ald have nuclear weapons, n could possess king steps to =lude: aq, Israel, North is
a biological weapons capability. develop nuclear Libya, Kore", Brazil, weapons or who Argentina, South
Nations them
have acquired
Pakistan, In
Iran,
Taiwan,
India.
dition, it
France,
Britain,
that Soviet
highest bidder in
rtermath of the breakup of the Soviet Union. Lssile system capabilities are 20
Third
nations will have their own ballistic 35:24) Half of these governments (15:16)
(27:65;
Lssiles with a range of 5,000 miles or more. c. Global Implications. (1) iture will :onomic nflict. and Conditions and be maintaining territorial circumstances.
A key
task
for the
home to some
)st economically and politically icludes some 6f the the earth. last
dynamic societies.
traditional
Although
superpower
diminishing,
-aditional regional
Donald Zagoria described four post-Cold War international iich are visible in First is a in the area. (58) in political alignments.
transformation Eastern
The
Europe and the former Soviet evidence affected. of this The trend.
former
Soviet
with South It
Korea,
while
cooling relations
.th Vietnam and North Korea. kd Japan. )rmal ties )rmer )t to China opened a
also began new dialogues with China Korea and began the
Most dramatically,
confrontation
kterests or The
second
10
power that
of military
power.
is is
or military
wealth to
and power.
market Korea,
recognition of this
muscles as
Minister Kiichi
Miyazawa's comments
summit of said
future U.N.
or he couldn't'guarantee
international
affairs.
Throughout the
region,
second-
and third-
Most recent and striking was Russian President Boris Yeltsin's appeal for economic last (2:1A) The communism. completely radically fourth trend It is a result of the spectacular collapse of aid at the recent world leaders summit: the world has "This is the
to know that."
seems likely now that communism will either disappear 21st century, or as in Eastern Europe, be so
by the
transformed in
will be the
countries in
11
(2)
Influences.
The
influence how
Japanese occupation of the region during World War on the region; both in terms
the
expansionism in
rest of the area. (b) of bilateral The lack of a widely agreed upon threat, multilateral security agreements, a history and the
versus
proliferation of arms in
control agreements unlikely. (c) and a perception Growing of unfair U.S. concern about its trade imbalance to tensions South
may lead
and countries in
particularly Japan,
of the China,
generational
leadership that
Singapore, ability
Vietnam and Indonesia. our power will able to deploy region where where and infraAs our and
substantial
parts
equipment
not always
feasible, crisis)
theater, and
--
sustaining where
possible
(38:29)
12
f.
Command,
Control,
The smaller,
highly mobile
U.S.
for
the 1990s
will (C3)
require systems
Desert Storm
demonstrated,
communications.
systems
insurgencies,
narcotics trafficking,
may rely on augmentation by commercial allied and of communications communications threats including to support U.S. will be
systems
wide array
physical attack,
exploitation,
deception,
and nuclear effects. The U.S. Pacific Command contained In one accord Army
Personnel Estimate.
approximately 383,000 men and women with the division South battle Secretary of Defense's
and one or two Air Force and one one Force or two
fighter wings will be deployed in fighter wings, Group, Japan. one carrier Marine
Korea; group,
Air Force
Marine will
and one
Expeditionary consist of
Reinforcements Hawaii, an
(22:19)
Strategic Concepts. a. Military Dimensions. (1) Nuclear, chemical and biological. The U.S. seeks to the
deter United
nuclear conflict.
however,
goals.
the U.S.
the
ability The
to respond U.S.
appropriately to
any level
of aggression.
(43:51)
warfare capabilities.
artillery in
and is
drawing global,
verifiable
chemical
warfare ban
chemical
but effective.(40:11-14,
forces provide
positioning,
and timely
surveillance to U.S.
on a worldwide basis.
During peacetime
forces,
to communicate with
thousands of routine
and navigation,
and
forces worldwide. Conventional. rests on U.S. national military strategy at the deterrence,
presence, if
would be prohibitively
expensive, superior
not impossible,
level of
military presence
the
14
therefore,
and the
Our strategy also requires a strong amphibious capability and CONUS-based reinforcement (4) Low-intensi+y military and capability. The global will spread enable of a
conflict.
sophisticated
dual-use
technologies
growing number of regional porers to arm themselves with capabilities that in U.S. the past were reservcd only for the superpowers. be able to couiter these threats with (44:5) The
must
and the
prospect of a
be trained and
insurgencies,
peacekeeping
Success in
this area
will depend on maintaining a strong alliance structure; superiority; be used in and specially tailored military
technological
routinely as To
the maximum
existing
policies
(54:3-57,3-58)
Implementation and
execution of
otherwise
provided
agreements
assignments servicing.
or cross
15
defense alliances;
defend themselves against external aggression, terrorism, and narcotics trafficking; and helps advance supports
subversion,
elected
governments
democratic (43:10) In
illegal drugs.
provide: $5
$20 million
assistance
to support
government was
Thailand.
Host-nation support. in
seek the
out of Seoul
and an increase
of the costs We
maintaining
interoperability from
weapons
the U.S.,
increasing technology
consultative process.
b.
Diplomatic Dimensions.
The U.S.
is
committed to maintaining
visible,
credible presence
in
the
through (28:1A)
forward deployed
heritages; goals
through
operations,
disaster
nation-building
assistance,
humanitarian
assistance,
contacts and
assistance program.
the effectiveness
clearly translating foreign policy objectives into clear, military tasks. c. (44:13) The United States is
international
strengthen
institutions; of developing
The U.S.
presence here sets the stage of our economic involvement With a total two-way transPacific trade
the region.
almost 50% more than our transAtlantic trade, own best interests to help preserve peace
the region.
(3:5)
17
d.
Sociopsychological
Dimensions.
The Sociopsychological
aspect
strategy deals with the combined psychological political, Psychological economic, operations ideological, (PSYOP) is and
effects of military
activity used by
military commanders in
to influence
objectives.
PSYOP
may be on
an integral
operations
basis
attain mission
objectives.
N/A
4.
Specific
Courses of
Action.
The
1990s as it
will be
decade of of
transition for the Asia-Pacific region, the world. the U.S. region. I'll begin this section
action the
then outline a series of specific courses of action for on the first-hand experience I gained from my
to these countries and independent research. Courses of Action. The following courses
Multilateral
of action have regional or multi-national (1) to ban chemical arms Arms control. weapons on
The U.S.
increased
Vienna in in
encourage
participation
Nuclear Non
Treaty facilitate
(India)
(44:12);
and on
its
1991
consultation tension or
aggravates
booming in
Singapore, Post
Taiwan,
Brunei Smith in
correspondent of future
fears
North Korea,
Europe;
a dilemma.
one hand,
demand last
good news for American defense contractors who $3.2 billion in arms to the region and are President Bush last Fall in the
international
recognition of the fact the world's five primary arms merchants-US, France, China, the former Soviet Union, and
billions its
countries
members of
the midst of negotiations to exchange The talks are prior to stalled by shipment insistence
contracts. weapons
refusal
contracts
interdiction)
and by its
missiles should
than
fighter aircraft.
(51:1,10,15.)
19
critical
systems, of
components weapons of
and mass
and in
the
expected add
proliferation
the region
(39:91;
Increase Access to
Overseas Facilities.
operations
and periods
DISCUSSION:
November
Singapore agreed to permit US at its Sembawang Port and U.S. the Paya Lebar Airport.
month-long deployments to
allowed to use Malaysia's Lumut naval base (1:25) Negotiations for and Brunei; U.S.
on with Thailand
are hopeful they will produce accords. (3) Broaden ASEAN's Security Role. military nations. limiting exchanges, In addition,
should
seek
to expand
exercises ASEAN's
nuclear proliferation
DISCUSSION: engage
ASEAN members agreed to "seek avenues to new areas of cooperation in security have ever
member (4:24)
matters".
This was
the first
explicitly discussed security matters either among themselves or with non-member countries. in U.S. the region and are (4:25) For (4:24) Most ASEAN nations favor increased U.S. presence
interested in
these reasons,
forces
increased access
(see above)
willing to
increase the
20
their
participation David E.
in
joint
military
exercises.
according Chiefs
Jeremiah,
vice chairman
between
will
support
prevent weapons in
of chemical,
biological
and nuclear
(4)
Continue
to refuse
to
sign
the South
Pacific
Nuclear
Free
Zone Treaty
(SPNFZT).
and
The
U.S.
should
continue to
the region a
other attempts
to make it
would put
on the The
the region.
DISCUSSION: free
and to it
also said
Additional aircraft
hamper U.S.
and deterrent
capability
(5)
oppose naval arms
The U.S.
in
should continue to
the Asian-Pacific. dependent on
discussions to be a
DISCUSSION:
The U.S.
maritime power,
its
ability
to use the seas and international waterways for access to markets in and to move its forces quickly and without
overseas
restriction forces in
support of U.S.
the Asia-Pacific
respond to
21
forces,
naval
restrictions
limit protect
our ability
to
obligations
and to otherwise
our national
b.
Country Recommendations. (1) Japan. U.S. in is their crucial and Japanese belief military and civilian relationship stability and are
are
unambiguous
the security
to future peace,
(8:38)
the U.S.
national
and support these goals. Partnership. equal partner The U.S. in should do
all
it
can
to
treat
international
affairs
into positions of greater responsibility in DISCUSSION: world affairs Japan sees an increasing role (16:10) and would like to be expressed for the in In a
the international
Japanese Diet
mentioned
addition,
Japan
expressed
growing
permanent member of the UN Security Council. actively support this goal. The Japanese affairs. are already Japan of the playing pledged (and
The U.S.
should
role
in
of $13 nation.
support
Gulf War,
more than
any other
60% of that
devoted
aid to Russia in in
(10:37)
package being discussed by G-7 nations now. in support of the UN's to of the Kent consider
contributing as
billion.
Japan's image
Samurai warriors
Japanese rarely
efforts.
contributions to finance the Gulf War: Japan's huge contributions were going unrecognized, and Japan remained an outsider in a New World Order dominated once again The economic alliance. trans-Atlantic by a revitalized had as Yoichi Funabashi succinctly put it, superpower Japan, one machine -"merely an automatic teller been exposed as Not only cash." dispensing the that needed a kick before that, but it seemed to the Japanese that few Americans seemed function in a legitimate cash-dispensing was to admit that even as they demanded large amounts of cash to world affairs, fulfill unilaterally determined objectives. (10:36) The Japanese have a legitimate complaint. policy of "global partn3rship" The U.S. (9) should give it can
Japan's contributions
to international
receive the
recognition they deserve. (b) U.S. should actively DISCUSSION: (MOFA) Support Northern Territories Return. The to
Japan. Affairs
Ozawa of the Japanese Ministry $2.5 billion aid package to expressed hope further
linked Japan's
summer
to Japan.
should privately and publicly declare islands to Japan and be willing to program for Russia to this
(c)
Decrease U.S.
Presence
on Okinawa.
The U.S.
23
should consolidate
its
military
activities
auch land to the Okinawans as soon as possible. ias 47 installations on the Island of Okinawa.
MOFA's
)zawa said there was strong sentiment to return facilities knd limit ie night-landing and low-level was becoming increasingly flying by U.S. difficult
added it
for the
;overnment to put
off these requests and indicated expectations were would be returned on May 20, (41) of its Facilities In its April on 1992, the 20th
facilities
Adjustment
aiL was the return of "property to improve civil-military (3:10-11) Contrary to USFJ expectations (37), the U.S. the
,elations".
campaign for
program.
IISCUSSION: eed
defense budget and an election year may put the $41 billion GPALS
to shore
economy
Second,
the GPALS program seems tailor-made for Japan's and foreign policy. was In fact, Japanese U.S.
constitution (JDA)
Agency
officials involvement
said Japan in
GPALS now.
(20)
Japan's
24
aversion to nuclear attack and growing to ballistic Japanese clearly the missile interest
awareness
of it (18)
technical
resources Ed Hind
according
Embassy in GPALS
Defense Attache's
major participation
FSX
program;
notably in
it
would be
program both
countries
were
actively interested
pursuing and it
to sharing technology,
strengths needed to field the system. (e) U.S. Encourage Japanese Force Improvements. The
must continue to press the Japanese for force improvements which their ability to perform agreed upon roles. Japan to ability DISCUSSION: territorial sea lanes The
continue to encourage
defense to
Japanese
the U.S.
the way side as a result of defense cuts reflecting people". (20) (2) Korea. General Colin in March L. Powell,
Chairman
of the
testified (ROK)
1991 he believes the people lot more of action for their own
Korea The
"can do a
defense". belief,
reflect this
Transition the
U.S.
U.S.
currently
performed
by the U.S.
which can
DISCUSSION:
U.S.
from
a leading to a supporting role by transferring greater responsibility to the South Koreans for combined operations. A ROK General has been
appointed to head the UN side of the Armistice commission; assumed responsibility for guarding the in October to 1991 (26:23); the and in March
ROK troops
PanmunJom armistice compound 1992 the U.S. and South Korea from U.S. to
agreed
transfer
Pipeline
North
Korea agrees
should seriously consider transferring the leadership of the Command to a Korean general. This act, perhaps
intent to assume
a supporting role on the Korean Peninsula. (b) continue to press maintaining U.S. maintaining (7:477) be U.S. Host Nation
Support.
The
U.S.
should of of
to be
(The cost of the 2nd Infantry Division alone is The ROK pledged $180
1995 amount represents one-half of the won-based costs of maintaining U.S. forces in country. (48) by 1995, In contrast, Japan currently pays $3
The South Koreans have agreed to pay $3 billion to move (the value of the land is there is estimated at *10
billion).
though,
increased
ROK contributions.
26
(c)
Encourage
Confidence
Building
Measures.
The
U.S.
should
continue
to
encourage
confidence
building
measures the
between
North and
Affairs, the
created by
support
dialogue. (52:247)
building measures consistent with this Japan, China, Russia and the U.S.
influence
North
Korea to
General
RisCassi,
Forces Korea,
says the
arrayed
unequivocally for attack". might within 35 miles of the South Koreans. the forced problem.
ROK Ministry of
some way for families to visit a humanitarian gesture negotiation China, the process U.S. and
between the two Koreas. the two exercises Koreas could in all
Finally, agree
Russia,
Japan, each
to notify
other of
military This
observers to attend.
(24:22)
seemingly small measure would bring military forces into regular contact dialogue. with each other and offer
another avenue
27
Halt
Program.
The
to aggressively Proliferation
inspections of A
known and suspected nuclear of the U.S. has been and was
facilities. to halt
nuclear
program. by June In
a major
addition, to
the
North Koreans
are expected
their willingness
allow IAEA
inspections this
month.
(e) its the phased withdrawal of North Korean threat. of forces from
its forces
U.S.
Troop Cuts.
The U.S.
withdrawal
would cut
the Asian-Pacific.
Korea 6,000 to 36,000
announced
it
in
end of
1992 and
people as part
RisCassi intention
recent
Congressional
testimony
remove nuclear
additional
troops until
questions
(36)
about the
North Korean
5.
Decisions.
U.S.
presence
the Asian-Pacific
Bush acknowledged
We will maintain a visible, credible presence in the Asia-Pacific region with our forward deployed forces, and through bilateral defense arrangements with nations of the region." (28:14A)
28
He added: presence as The United States does not maintain our security Your security and your prosperity serve some act of charity. our interests because you can better help build a more stable, more prosperous world. (55:7) Thus, allies' a continued US presence in the region serves both our
Admiral
Larson sums it
up this way:
Two key factors are needed to maintain security and stability Economic economic growth and U.S. presence. in the region: growth will enable our friends to assume a larger responsibilOur presence protects the sea lanes ity for their defense. as a honest our role reinforces vital to expanding trade, the need tensions and reduces broker to help avoid regional their military capability in to expand Asian countries for ways which might be destabilizing. (31:4) This does not mean, however, that US policy in Adjustments to the Asia-Pacific our bi-lateral The
remain static.
simple truth is
this paper recognize this truth and to protect its in vital interests
the U.S.
the region.
29
1.
ASIAWEEK,
January 17,
1992,
2.
"Arms cuts win support at historic summit," Advertiser, 1 February 1992, pp. 1,14A.
The Montgomery
3.
Rim: Report to the Asian Pacific Framework for A Strategic of Congress. Washington: Office of the Assistant Secretary Defense for International Security Affairs, April 1990. "A Stride Forward," ASIAWEEK, February 7, 1992, pp.
23
4. 5. 6.
25
. U.S.
Auster, Bruce and Jim Ompoco . "The long goodbye in News & World Report, January 13, 1992, pp. 37.
Asia?",
Partners In a "The US and Japan: Global JAmes A. III. Baker, pp. 841November 18, 1991, Pacific Community," Dispatch, 846. Washington: U.S. Department of State. Bandow, Doug. "Leaving Korea." -II, US Pacific Command AL: Air War College, 1991. Bush, In Associate Programs -- Volume Maxwell AFB, WS 625, pp. 48-54,
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8.
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