Asia Policy 16 July2013

asia policy number 16 july 2013
Contents
u
roundtable
Himalayan Water Security: The Challenges for South and Southeast Asia
introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 asia s unstable water tower: the politics, economics, and ecology of himalayan water projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Kenneth Pomeranz
china s upstream advantage in the great himalayan watershed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Jennifer L. Turner, Susan Chan Shifflett, and Robert Batten
melting the geopolitical ice in south asia . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Robert G. Wirsing
himalayan water security: a south asian perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Tushaar Shah and Mark Giordano
hydropower dams on the mekong: old dreams, new dangers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Richard P. Cronin
climate change and water security in the himalayan region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Richard Matthew
securing the himalayas as the water tower of asia: an environmental perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Jayanta Bandyopadhyay
policy essay
a new type of major-power relationship: seeking a durable foundation for u.s.-china ties . . . . . 51
David M. Lampton This essay considers recent calls for a new major-power relationship between the U.S. and China and examines concrete steps that both countries could take to pursue such a relationship.
articles
china s transition to a more credible nuclear deterrent: implications and challenges for the united states . . . . 69
Michael S. Chase This article examines the modernization of Chinas nuclear missile force and assesses the implications for the U.S.
expanding contacts to enhance durability: a strategy for improving u.s.-china military-to-military relations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Scott W. Harold This article examines U.S.-China military-to-military relations and outlines a strategy for improving ties by expanding contacts across a range of functional areas.
policy succession and the next cross-strait crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139

Bruce Gilley This article argues that Chinas policy on Taiwan is likely to evolve toward political engagement as a result of the multiple actions of policy actors rather than politicians on both sides.
book review roundtable
Alexander Cooleys Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in Central Asia
central asia as a case study for a multipolar world . . . 162

Marlene Laruelle
how to suborn great powers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164

James Sherr
winners and losers of strategic games in central asia. . 167

Mamuka Tsereteli
old games, new rules? great powers in the new central asia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
Kathryn Stoner
why washington needs to integrate the new silk road with the pivot to asia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
Andrew C. Kuchins
domestic challenges, international opportunities: understanding security cooperation in central asia . . . 179
Erica Marat
the rules of central asia s games are changing . . . . . 181

S. Enders Wimbush
can we change the rules? external actors and central asia beyond 2014. . . . . . . 185
Alexander Cooley
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asia policy, number 16 ( july 2013 ) , 150

roundtable
Himalayan Water Security: The Challenges for South and Southeast Asia
Kenneth Pomeranz Jennifer L. Turner, Susan Chan Shifflett, and Robert Batten Robert G. Wirsing Tushaar Shah and Mark Giordano Richard P. Cronin Richard Matthew Jayanta Bandyopadhyay
The National Bureau of Asian Research, Seattle, Washington
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Introduction
he scramble for control of natural resources to support economic and population growth, combined with the uncertain effects of climate change on the Tibetan Plateau, is raising tensions in Asia over Himalayan water resources. Ten of the regions largest and longest rivers (the Amu Darya, Brahmaputra, Ganges, Indus, Irrawaddy, Mekong, Salween, Tarim, Yangtze, and Yellow) originate in the Himalayas (see Figure 1). These rivers help provide water, food, and energy for nearly 4 billion people in China and across South and Southeast Asianearly half of the worlds population. However, depletion and diversion of these transborder resources to meet growing industrial, agricultural, and urban demands have the potential to trigger far-reaching economic, social, and environmental challenges.
FIGURE 1 Major Himalayan Rivers

MONGOLIA
UZBEKISTAN KYRGYZSTAN TAJIKISTAN
Tarim
MENISTAN
Amu Darya Yellow
AFGHANISTAN
Indus Brahmaputra
NEPAL
CHINA
Yangtze
PAKISTAN
Ganges
BHUTAN
INDIA
TAIWAN MYANMAR BANGLADESH
Mekong
LAOS
Irrawaddy
Salween
THAILAND CAMBODIA VIETNAM PHILIPPINES
SRI LANKA BRUNEI M A L A Y S I A SINGAPORE
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roundtable himalayan water security
The lack of comprehensive and effective regional frameworks for cooperation hinders sustainable management of these waterways. China, which controls the headwaters of these rivers, has an enormous need for Himalayan water to satisfy economic and energy demands but has little incentive to participate in formal water-sharing and water-management agreements with its neighbors. Chinas dam-building and water-diversion projects are a source of major concern to the countries downstream, which often complain about Beijings lack of transparency and reluctance to share information. Although managing water-sharing relations with China might be the most prominent challenge, cooperation is not much easier at the middle and lower reaches of the rivers. Collaboration in South and Southeast Asia is frequently frustrated by competing national interests, economic priorities, political disputes, and weak regional organizations. In addition to the environmental impacts of man-made diversion projects and unsustainable freshwater usage, there is also inadequate cooperation on scientific research to understand and prepare for the effects of climate change on the regions water supplies. This Asia Policy roundtable contains seven essays that discuss the challenges and implications of water security in Asia and recommend steps that both upstream and downstream countries could take to better manage the regions shared water resources.
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Asias Unstable Water Tower: The Politics, Economics, and Ecology of Himalayan Water Projects Kenneth Pomeranz
sias ten largest rivers by volumeincluding the Yangtze, Mekong, Brahmaputra (which becomes part of the Ganges), and Indusoriginate in the Himalayas or on the Tibetan Plateau and collectively serve 47% of the worlds population. Inadequate or unreliable water supplies pose serious and worsening problems in all the countries along these rivers, as do energy shortages. To varying degrees, these issues threaten domestic stability throughout the region, leading countries to build dams to control water flows and generate hydroelectric power. Such projects not only pose significant environmental risks but create international tension over watersharing on transborder rivers. Furthermore, nine of Asias ten largest rivers begin in China, which has no water-sharing agreements with downstream countries; in some cases, the downstream countries also have no agreements with countries further downstream. Even the sharing of hydrological data is spotty. That China, as the upstream country, is increasingly capable of undertaking projects that would address its needs at the expense of its downstream neighbors makes the situation even more tense. While China has promised to be mindful of other countries interests, it continues to make decisions unilaterally and often secretly. Climate change, which is likely to reduce the water supply at the source of many Himalayan rivers, will only magnify these disputes and probably make any solution that guarantees specific amounts of water or parts of a joint river to specific countries unfeasible. This essay discusses the implications of Chinas dam-building projects within the Himalayan watershed, as well as one possible project that Beijing denies planning but which its neighbors fear. The next section then describes possible solutions to current and future water disputes. The essay argues that the combination of immediate problems and longer-range threats requires, at the very least, three developments. First, more must be done to share basic data, both about hydrology and about planned projects.
kenneth pomeranzis University Professor of modern Chinese history at the University of

Chicago. He can be reached at <kpomeranz1@uchicago.edu>.
u This essay is partially adapted from the authors chapter in the forthcoming volume New Security Challenges in Asia, ed. Michael Wills and Robert M. Hathaway (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press/Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013).
note
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Second, steps must be taken to institutionalize at least some cooperation in the exploitation of these riverseither through multinational organizations or bilateral arrangements (e.g., joint ownership of hydroelectric dams). Third, all countries will need to undertake domestic efforts to manage water demand and reduce waste in ways that lessen dependence on water supplies to deal with future needs. It is particularly important that China implement these changes, since such efforts represent the best option for Beijing to credibly reassure its neighbors that it will not preempt the flow of rivers that begin in Chinese territory. Fortunately, waste reduction and recycling efforts are also likely to offer China more water security per dollar spent, and at less risk, than the mega-projects that its neighbors fear.
China, Its Neighbors, and the Implications of Dam-building

Increasingly, Chinas prospects for continued economic growth are threatened by shortages of clean water and rising energy demand. The country has barely a quarter of the global per capita water supply, and decades of emphasis on raising agricultural yields by extending irrigation (often inefficiently), weak enforcement of pollution controls, and economic arrangements that fail to reward conservation have exacerbated the situation. Massive exploitation of underground aquifers since the 1950s masked these problems temporarily, but the countrys groundwater is being rapidly depleted. In addition, China, and the world, need alternatives to fossil fuel in order to power this economic growth. Descending from the worlds highest mountains, Himalayan water offers enormous, and still largely unexploited, hydropower potential. With water and energy pressures mounting while its engineering and financing capabilities grow, it is not surprising that China is undertaking numerous water projects in Tibet and adjacent provinces: these include recent or ongoing projects on the Chinese portions of the Indus, Sutlej, Brahmaputra, Salween, Irrawaddy, and Mekong. Although China insists that none of these projects will have adverse effects on any downstream country, this is nearly impossible to ensure, even with complete transparency. Under the current circumstances, downstream countries anxieties continue to grow. Lurking in the background is a possibility much more threatening than any current dam: that Beijing will eventually divert huge amounts of water from international rivers that start in Tibet to address chronic water shortages in northern Chinas Yellow and Hai river basins. Such a diversion has been discussed for years. Its chief public promoter, Guo Kai, is a retired
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engineer and army general. The idea also has support from a number of senior military officers, as well as within the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and was the subject of a much-discussed book in 2006 called Tibets Waters Will Save China. The Ministry of Water Resources has publicly rejected the idea as too technically complex, environmentally risky, and dangerous to Chinas foreign relations. Significant numbers of other Chinese activists have also opposed it, pointing to the unpredictable consequences of mega-projects and problems that have arisen from earlier ones. But for many of the countries downstream, this is not enough to provide firm reassurance. Among other issues, they note that China still has years of work remaining on an enormous diversion that will move some of the Yangtzes water northward (the most expensive construction project in history), and that the tapping of international rivers would likely make use of tunnels from that projects third, western prong (which has not yet begun). That no further project was included in the current five-year plan is thus not terribly significant. Indeed, the South-North Water Diversion plan, whether it succeeds or fails, could be a prelude to a larger diversion scheme. If it succeeds, the project would build confidence in such solutions and provide much of the infrastructure on which future diversion schemes could piggyback. On the other hand, if the project failsfor instance, if it turns out that the Yangtze cannot spare enough water to solve the norths problems, as many think is likelyexpanding the project by tapping into rivers that currently flow out of the country might become very tempting. Thus, water politics combine conflicts that are already established, but probably manageable, with fears of much greater future conflicts. Without established institutions for cross-border water management, current problems breed distrust that inhibits progress on future issues, while unresolved long-term issues make it harder to address immediate problems. It does not help, of course, that the downstream countries have their own water problems. India and Pakistan are even more water-stressed than China, and both are heavily dependent on irrigated agriculture supported by increasingly decrepit infrastructure. Bangladesh and the mainland countries of Southeast Asia have enough water on average but are nonetheless vulnerable to even modest changes upstream, in part because the flow of their rivers fluctuates enormously over the course of the year. If, for instance, a hydropower dam on the Yarlung Tsangpo (the upper Brahmaputra) retained some water in the early spring, when flow through its turbines might otherwise be inadequate, that could create temporary problems in India and Bangladesh just when
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newly planted crops need water. Any changes in the seasonal rhythms of the Mekong have serious implications for the worlds largest freshwater fishery, which is crucial to Vietnam and Cambodia; and changes in river flow could increase saltwater invasion at the mouths of several rivers, with serious consequences for delta agricultures. The downstream countries on the Lancang/Mekong (Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam) claim that such problems are already occurring as a result of Chinese dams on the Lancangand several more such dams are in progress. Meanwhile, many downstream countries are planning their own dams on these same rivers. In many cases, they offer fewer benefits than upstream dams, and similar risks, but seem likely to proceed anyway because they represent the only way that downstream counties can be assured of capturing any of the benefits of dam-building.
Water Problems and Solutions

The status quo is unsatisfactory: shortages of clean water have already created local public health crises in all of these countries and could seriously imperil food security in several states. But new projects bring their own dangers. Large-scale dams in seismically active areas could fail catastrophically, or have huge unforeseen consequences, even if they succeed in engineering terms. Dams in Yunnan and eastern Tibet pose threats to important biodiversity hotspots. Potential conflicts over water resources have led some politicians and journalists to predict water wars, particularly among China, India, and Pakistan, and to advocate accelerated construction of water projects in order to preempt other nations plans. Meanwhile, climate change further complicates matters. Himalayan glaciers are shrinking rapidly, and there is evidence for a more general drying-out of the Tibetan Plateau; this could mean that the margin for errorand compromiseon multinational rivers originating there will narrow even faster than expected. Meanwhile, nobody knows for sure what climate change will do to the South Asian and East/Southeast Asian monsoons. It seems likely, however, that greater water storage capacity will be required to cope with increasingly erratic weather. After many years of undertaking the worlds largest dam-building effort, China can store about 2,200 cubic meters (m3) of water per inhabitant. This is in contrast to the over 5,000 m3 of water storage per inhabitant in the United States and
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Australia (rich countries that, like China, have large arid areas of land) and the official figures of a mere 200 m3 in India and 150 m3 in Pakistan.1 Even from a purely technical and apolitical standpoint, there is no straightforward solution to these problems. That China, with the advantage of being upstream, also has the greatest engineering capacity, ability to finance large projects, and probably the least need to accommodate internal dissent makes it even harder to ensure that the interests of weaker parties are considered. But some useful steps do seem possible. More international data-sharing would be a good start. It has, for instance, been impossible to either verify or firmly reject Southeast Asian claims that Chinese construction has exacerbated recent droughts and fishery problems. Chinas recent rejection of Indian requests to expand the exchange of hydrological data on the Yarlung Tsangpo/Brahmaputra currently the two countries exchange limited data, and only during flood seasondoes not help that situation.2 If, as China has stated, both the dams currently under construction on that river and those planned for the future are purely run-of-the-river projects, with no storage or diversion capacity, making it easier to verify this would be beneficial.3 Tensions between India and Bangladesh over the Brahmaputra-Ganges river system have eased considerably since India, the upstream country, began providing more data. This has led to discussions between the two countries over joint ownership of a number of dams and suggests that greater transparency might have similar benefits elsewhere. If large hydroelectric dams are going to be built on the international rivers that begin in China, upstream sites will oftenthough not alwaysoffer the best ratio between power generated, people displaced, and environmental risk. Consequently, projects within China in which downstream countries have a stake would probably be better than each country going it alone.
1 Michael Specter, The Last Drop: Confronting the Possibility of a Global Catastrophe, New Yorker,
October 23, 2006 u http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/10/23/061023fa_fact1; John Briscoe and R.P.S. Malik, Indias Water Economy: Bracing for a Turbulent Future (Washington, D.C.: World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2006), 30 u https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/ handle/10986/7238/443760PUB0IN0W1Box0327398B01PUBLIC1.pdf?sequence=1; and John Briscoe and Usman Qamar, Pakistans Water Economy: Running Dry (Washington, D.C.: World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2006), 56. 2013 u http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/china-spikes-indias-proposal-for-jointmechanism-on-brahmaputra/article4627285.ece.
2 See China Spikes Indias Proposal for Joint Mechanism on the Brahmaputra, Hindu, April 17,
3 It did not help that when the first of these dams was acknowledged in November 2010, the
English and Chinese versions of the story from Chinas official Xinhua news agency differed on this crucial point, though so far no evidence has surfaced to contradict the more reassuring English version of the text.
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At the same time, however, China and India must also address what appears to be a systemic bias in favor of mega-projects, even when these projects are not particularly good solutions to pressing problems. It is hard to believe, for instance, that the $65 billion to be spent on Chinas south-north water transfer (assuming no cost overruns) could not do more to alleviate shortages if it were spent on pollution control (allowing greater re-use), more efficient irrigation, and mundane but useful measures such as fixing millions of leaky faucets. Such efforts would certainly involve less risk of unwelcome surprises. China has done a great deal to reduce water waste, but much more is possible. In India and Pakistan, constructing water-control facilities has been so consistently prioritized over proper maintenance that World Bank reports describe both countries as following a build/neglect/rebuild philosophy of public works. 4 For obvious reasons, spectacular projects that expand water supply do more to make careers and build political support than many small-scale efforts that reduce unproductive demand, but the latter are probably more dependable solutions, especially given increasing uncertainty about how much water will fall and evaporate in specific locations. They are also, at least in theory, easier to manage democratically. Last, the critical issue of food security links domestic questions about controlling water demand and waste with international ones, thereby involving outside countries like the United States. Since agriculture continues to dominate water use in all these countries (close to 70% in China and 90% in India), it must be the source of most water savings. But while some such efforts would not reduce farm output, others likely would: for instance, any effort that relied in part on raising water prices (as has already happened to some extent) would inevitably cause some economically marginal crop production to cease. Meanwhile, food demand will continue to grow, especially if, as expected, increasingly prosperous people demand diets with more protein. This raises crucial questions about whether the hard-won self-sufficiency of China and India in basic foodstuffs is sustainableor even necessarily desirablegiven their unfavorable ratios of land and water to population. Probably nobody would like a world in which such huge countries became heavily import-dependent; and the accelerated displacement of farmers would exacerbate already difficult social questions,
4 On Pakistan, see World Bank, Better Management of Indus Basin Waters: Strategic Issues and
Challenges, January 2006, 2; on India, see Briscoe and Malik, Indias Water Economy, 55 u https:// openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/7238/443760PUB0IN0W1Box0327398B0 1PUBLIC1.pdf?sequence=1.
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even if enough food could be purchased abroad to replace the production that would be lost as more people quit farming. Thus, transfers of watersaving technologies are most likely a better long-term palliative for water shortages than greater imports of food. But if less nationalistic attitudes toward transborder rivers must be nurtured, and starting this process must involve restraining agricultural water use, guarantees that food imports will be available if needed could help backstop unpopular decisions. While only a small part of any solution to Asias water crises, such guarantees might, at the margin, provide incentives to increase regional cooperation; and regional cooperation on these issues cannot wait much longer.
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Chinas Upstream Advantage in the Great Himalayan Watershed Jennifer L. Turner, Susan Chan Shifflett, and Robert Batten
he four-character Chinese idiom benefiting from the gifts of nature (de tian du hou) captures Chinas riparian advantage in the great Himalayan watershed. In Mother Natures luck of the draw, China is the big winner; many of the largest rivers in the Himalayan watershed originate in the glaciers of Tibet. The Yellow, Yangtze, Mekong, Brahmaputra, Salween, Sutlej, and Indus rivers provide water to 1.5 billion people from the mountains in Tibet down to deltas in Bangladesh, China, India, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Vietnam. As the upstream power, China has the ability to control the quality and flow of water that reaches its downstream neighbors. The confluence of three factorsChinas increasing demand for hydroelectric power, water scarcity, and the transboundary nature of riversare raising tensions in the great Himalayan watershed. Chinas hunger for energy to build cities and fuel industries, while at the same time reducing greenhouse gas emissions, has sparked a new wave of planning for dozens of mega-dams along the mainstreams of these transboundary rivers. Yet Beijings lack of transparency about its dam-building projects and disinterest in formally cooperating or engaging with the lower riparian states in multilateral forums frustrate its downstream neighbors, which notably are also damming the same rivers for electricity generation. The region desperately needs institutionalized water-sharing agreements and practices because countries are increasingly overdeveloping and wasting scarce freshwater resources. This overuse is occurring against the backdrop of climate changes unknown effects on the Himalayan river basins. The key challenge to the regions water-sharing efforts is the acute power imbalance between China and its neighborsChina not only controls the headwaters of these rivers but is also the most powerful state in the region, economically and militarily.
jennifer l. turner is the Director of the China Environment Forum at the Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. She can be reached at <jennifer.turner@wilsoncenter.org>.
susan chan shifflett is a Program Associate at the China Environment Forum at the
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. She can be reached at <susan.shifflett@wilsoncenter.org>.
robert batten is a Summer Research Assistant at the China Environment Forum at the
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. He can be reached at <robbatten@vermontlaw.edu>.
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Thus, Beijing has little incentive to enter into formal cooperative water agreements with its weaker downstream neighbors. This essay first discusses how Chinas rising demand for both energy and freshwater are driving the dam-building projects that endanger the flow and water quality of rivers feeding the downstream countries of South and Southeast Asia. It then considers how Chinas aversion to formal water-sharing agreements is frustrating its neighbors. Although no entity can force China to cooperate, more could be done to fill the information gap on the broader costs of dam building. The essay concludes by proposing a carrot and stick approach that would encourage Chinese policymakers to sustainably develop the upstream watersnot simply to benefit downstream countries but to protect Chinas own water security.
The Ripple Effect of Chinas Water Needs

The domestic implications of Chinas energy demand. Chinas voracious appetite for energy continues to grow. The International Energy Agency forecasts that the countrys energy demand will rise by 60% from 2012 to 2035.1 As smog increasingly blankets Chinese cities, Chinese citizens are demanding more aggressive action from the government to clean the air. Beijing has set targets to secure 15% of the countrys energy from nonfossil fuel sources by 2020, with 9% projected to come from hydroelectric power. In particular, Chinese leaders recognize the need to move away from coal, which currently supplies 70% of the countrys electricity. To reach this goal, China will need to double its output of hydroelectric power.2 This demand for hydroelectric power as an alternative to coal is problematic because China is a water-stressed nation. Although water is abundant in absolute terms, the countrys per capita freshwater resources are only 2,093 cubic meters, one-quarter of the global average. 3 According to a survey released by the Chinese Ministry of Water Resources in March 2013, an alarming 23,000 rivers in the country have disappeared entirely in just the past 60 years.4 Rapid urbanization and industrialization have
1 See World Energy Outlook 2012, International Energy Agency, 2012 u http://www.iea.org/
publications/freepublications/publication/English.pdf.
2 Renee Cho, The Push to Dam Chinas Rivers, State of the Planet, web log, Earth Institute, May 19,
2011 u http://blogs.ei.columbia.edu/2011/05/19/the-push-to-dam-china%e2%80%99s-rivers/. Indicators, World Bank u http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ER.H2O.INTR.PC.
3 Renewable Internal Freshwater Resources Per Capita (Cubic Meters), World Development 4 Andrew Jacobs, Plans to Harness Chinese Rivers Power Threaten a Region, New York Times,
May 4, 2013 u http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/world/asia/plans-to-harness-chinas-nu-riverthreaten-a-region.html.
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only accentuated this water scarcity. By 2025, an estimated 350 million peopleroughly equivalent to the entire U.S. populationwill be added to Chinas urban population.5 Not only are massive amounts of resources required to build cities, but urbanites consume more energy. Furthermore, both energy production and agriculture are highly water-intensive in China: coal production, for example, accounts for 20% of the nations water use, and agriculture constitutes 65%.6 To meet the hydropower goals of the twelfth five-year plan, the central government has set a target of constructing 60 medium and large dams by 2016, primarily focused on rivers flowing out of the Himalayas into South and Southeast Asia. Given that the melt water from the 50,000 glaciers situated in the Hindu Kush and Himalayan mountain ranges fill the aquifers and water tables of the river basins throughout the region, the proposed dams threaten the water security of downstream nations and increase tension with China. Southeast Asias downstream lament. China began building the first series of dams on the Mekong River in 1986. Since then, Chinese dams have lowered water levels, disrupted sediment flows, and damaged the health of fisheries in Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. In Thailand, fishermen along the border with Laos have reported that the river has become unpredictable since China began upstream dam construction.7 Likewise, dams have had a significant impact on downstream agriculture. The Mekong River Delta, for example, supplies water for 50% of Vietnams rice crop, which provides 16% of the countrys annual GDP. 8 During a severe drought in 2011, lower Mekong conservationists claimed that China was not releasing enough water, worsening drought conditions.9 According to Ed Grumbine, a biodiversity specialist at Chinas Kunming Institute of Botany, there will be significant impacts from the cumulative
5 See Mekong/Lancang River, International Rivers u http://www.internationalrivers.org/
campaigns/mekong-lancang-river.
6 Julian Wong, Chinas New Water Efficiency Targets (and Implications for Food
and Energy), Green Leap Forward u http://greenleapforward.com/2009/02/17/ chinas-new-water-efficiency-targets-and-implications-for-food-and-energy. October 26, 2010 u http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-26/china-hydropower-dams-inmekong-river-give-shocks-to-60-million.html.
7 Yoolim Lee, China Hydropower Dams in Mekong River Give Shocks to 60 Million, Bloomberg,
8 Richard Cronin and Timothy Hamlin, Mekong Turning Point: Shared River for a Shared
Future, Stimson Center, January 2012 u http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/ SRSF_Web_2.pdf. chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-03/31/content_9664697.html.
9 China Denies Dams Worsen Drought in Mekong Basin, China Daily, March 31,2010 u http://www.
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operation of Chinas hydropower dams.10 The leaders of several Southeast Asian countries have protested Chinas dismissal of the alleged negative downstream effects from its dam-building activities. On the sidelines of the 2012 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Russia, for example, Vietnamese president Truong Tan Sang alluded to this issue, stating that dam construction and stream adjustments by some countries in upstream rivers constitute a growing concern for many countries and implicitly impinge on relations between relevant countries.11 Likewise, the former Cambodian minister for transport and public works, Khy Tanglim, once commented that Chinese leaders will work for their own country. We are downstream, so we suffer all the negative consequences. If there is no more water for us, no more fish, no more vegetation, this is a big disaster.12 To address water security, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam created the intergovernmental Mekong River Commission (MRC) in 1995 to jointly develop their shared water resources. China became a dialogue partner of the MRC in 1996, but officials have refused to sign the Mekong Agreement to become a full-fledged member. Southeast Asian countries continue to urge China to participate fully in the MRC. Even though a 2010 MRC agreement commits China to sending water-level data from its Jinghong and Manwan dams, Beijing refuses to release key data on water quality, pollution, and irrigation usage. Chinas full membership would create a forum in which these states could more effectively advocate for their water rights and pressure Beijing to more seriously consider the downstream implications of dam development. Anger in South Asia. Thus far, China has proposed seven dams on the main channel of the Brahmaputra River, the lifeline for farmers in India and Bangladesh. China recently approved construction of three new hydropower dams on the middle reaches of the river, ending a two-year freeze on new projects amid concerns from India and environmental groups. The State Councils energy strategy for the twelfth five-year plan period (201115) stated that the government will push forward vigorously the hydropower base construction on the middle reaches of the Brahmaputra.
10 Daniel Schearf, Laos Dam Project Tests Credibility of Mekong River Commission, Voice of
America, January 14, 2013 u http://www.voanews.com/content/laos-dam-project-tests-credibilityof-mekong-river-commission/1583790.html. Radio Free Asia, September 30, 2012 u http://www.rfa.org/english/commentaries/east-asia-beat/ mekong-09302012160353.html. on Energy Technologies (Bangkok: UNESCO Bangkok), 2011, 98 u http://unesdoc.unesco.org/ images/0019/001906/190650e.pdf.
11 Truong Tan Sang, quoted in Parameswaran Ponnudurai, Water Wars Feared Over Mekong,
12 Raine Boonlang et al., Representation and Decision-Making in Environment Planning with Emphasis
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China insists that the dams it is building are run of the river, which operate on the flow of the river without modifying upstream storage, but New Delhi harbors fears that Beijing may eventually divert additional water from transboundary rivers to its dry northern regions to supply the centers of Chinas coal and grain production. The plan is allegedly part of the proposed western route of the South-North Water Transfer Project, which is scheduled for completion by 2050.13 The projects east and central canals are already in progress, and all three routes will move nearly 36 billion cubic meters of water per year from the Yangtze River in southern China to the Yellow River Basin in the arid northern part of the country.14 Chinese officials and analysts have downplayed the likelihood of the western diversion due to the difficult terrain and associated technical challenges. Despite this reassurance, angry Indian politicians and activists have galvanized public opposition. To moderate the escalating political tension, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of India issued a statement on August 4, 2011, stating that Chinese leaders had assured him that no such plans were imminent. Although China does provide limited hydrological and flood data to India through a memorandum of understanding renewed in May 2012, Singh has emphasized the need for a joint mechanism for sharing information on transboundary projects. China is currently the only country with which India shares a major transboundary river without a formal water-sharing agreement. The Indian leaderships opposition to Chinas dams could also stem from concerns that these projects threaten Indias own expansive hydropower development plans in the Himalayan Basin, where nearly 300 dams are planned on the Brahmaputra, Ganges, and Indus rivers. These dams, which could help double the countrys hydropower by 2030 and stabilize the power supply, highlight how water serves the energy sector in India as well as China.15
13 See South-North Water Transfer Project, International Rivers website u http://www.
internationalrivers.org/campaigns/south-north-water-transfer-project.
14 Aaron Jaffe and Keith Schneider, A Dry and Anxious North Awaits Chinas Giant Unproven Water
Transport Scheme, Circle of Blue, March 1, 2011 u http://www.circleofblue.org/waternews/2011/ world/a-dry-and-anxious-north-awaits-china%E2%80%99s-giant-unproven-water-transport-scheme.
15 Tim Newcomb, Will Himalayan Dams Solve Indias Energy Woes? Popular Mechanics,
January 15, 2013 u http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/energy/hydropower-geothermal/ will-himalayan-dams-solve-indias-energy-woes-14982175.
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The Need for Formal Cooperation

In addition to Chinas lack of transparency, its resistance to entering into formal water-sharing agreements frustrates the lower riparian states. Thus far, Chinas gestures toward water cooperation have been mainly rhetorical. Since 1997, China has declined to sign a UN water-sharing treaty that would apply to the thirteen major transnational rivers within its territory.Instead, China has consistently preferred to negotiate with countries bilaterally rather than multilaterally, thus allowing itself maximum maneuverability and facilitating Beijings preference for informal agreements. China does not have a single water-sharing treaty with any of its neighboring countries. Accentuated by the unpredictable effects of climate change, Chinas disinterest in binding agreements has increased friction between Chinas and its riparian neighbors. The lower riparian states are partly to blame for this situation. China has every incentive to deal with countries bilaterally because infighting among member states has politically weakened the regional institutions of Southeast and South Asianamely, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Because ASEAN operates by consensus, the political and socioeconomic diversity of its member states inherently undermines the organizations effectiveness. ASEANs ten countriesBrunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnamare rarely able to find common ground on a wide range of issues, including climate change and water security. By comparison, SAARC, which comprises Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, makes ASEAN look like a harmonious family. Specifically, strong mistrust between India and Pakistan has rendered the institution feckless. Without a united front, regional institutions such as ASEAN and SAARC cannot properly mobilize their political capital, thus weakening their ability to bring China to the negotiating table.
Solutions
To mitigate major conflicts over water originating in the Himalayas, China must reconsider the implications of its dam-development policies, both within and outside its borders. To do this, China will need to increase the transparency and rigor of environmental and social impact assessments prior to project construction. Other Asian countries also have a role to play, as they must put aside bilateral disputes, increase
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energy efficiency at home, and seek a unified stance toward Chinese dam development upstream. Although little is known about the long-term impacts of climate change on the Himalayan watershed, there are clear signs that water levels are dropping. Thus, it is vital that the region agrees on frameworks for water sharing and significantly improves efficiency in water and energy management. Within its borders, Chinas push to expand energy efficiency initiatives; make coal use more costly through consumption caps, trading, and taxes; and increase wind and solar energy development will help lessen the pressure on water resources from energy demands. Chinese policymakers also need to enforce existing targets and laws that aim to better manage water. Improving efficiency entails fostering a better understanding of the water-energy-food nexus and creating national consciousness of water and energy conservation through better enforced regulations and public awareness campaigns. Internationally, China needs to show greater engagement in multilateral venues. For example, it could join the MRC as a full-fledged member rather than remaining a dialogue partner that only participates when advantageous. In South Asia, it is time for China to sign a water treaty with India. To build trust, Beijing also needs to make a greater effort to improve transparency in data-sharing and inform downstream neighbors of its dam-construction plans. In addition, China should take the lead in widening regional discussions about water security beyond hydroelectric power to include renewable forms of energy such as solar and wind. As an upstream country, it is not necessarily in Chinas best interest to cooperate on these issues, and in the near term Beijing is unlikely to formally enter into any water-sharing agreements. If countries hope to engage with China, they will need to utilize a carrot and stick approach. The carrot will require initiatives that clearly demonstrate the economic benefits of responsible dam planning. There are many short-term studies and exchange programs targeting the Mekong and other rivers in the Himalayan Basin, yet few deeply engage Chinese researchers, hydropower companies, banks, and NGOs. The key to promoting sustainable development of the rivers is to broaden engagement with these stakeholders. This will require introducing biodiversity and water security as compelling factors in the economic calculus of dam building. For example, concern for their global reputation has led some Chinese hydropower companies to start adopting the Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Protocol, an enhanced sustainability assessment tool used to guide performance of hydropower companies. On the stick side,
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regional organizations such as ASEAN and SAARC must put their bilateral agendas on the backburner to be cohesive multilaterally. Pressure will need to come from inside China as well. Chinese citizens and civil society groups should continue to press companies and the government for greater transparency using open information tools. Chinese citizens, NGOs, and the news media have recently demonstrated that they can effectively pressure the government to improve environmental protection. When smog blanketed Beijing and much of northern China in December 2012 and early 2013, Chinese citizens broadcast their frustration widely on social media. Some Chinese NGOs even rented out personal airquality monitors to have citizens post the registered hazardous readings online alongside official government air-quality reports that listed the air pollution as fair or moderate. The Chinese media was also highly critical of the governments failure to lessen the choking pollution. The criticism online and harsh news media reporting prompted the government to make policy changes that included expanded monitoring and reporting of air pollutants, stricter targets for cutting coal use, and more stringent autoemission standards. Thus, there appears to be an avenue for civic action, within bounds, to affect policy. Nascent public-interest lawsuits against polluters are also opening new doors for citizens, lawyers, and NGOs to strengthen environmental law enforcement. Currently, the way in which water is being used outpaces natural replenishment rates. The United Nations has declared this year the international year of water cooperation. It is time for China to take the lead before its regional relationships run dry. Chinese policymakers need to remember that if they hope to carve out a harmonious regional environment that is ideal for further economic development, China needs to be a good neighbor.
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Melting the Geopolitical Ice in South Asia Robert G. Wirsing
o one doubts that the six mainland states of the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC)Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, and Pakistanharbor an abundance of varied water-resource problems, with a steadily mounting scarcity of freshwater ranking high among them. Because the South Asian region is laced with an array of transboundary rivers vital to the economies of these states, few doubt either that these problems have a geopolitical dimension. There has been vigorous argument about the scale and intensity of this dimension, fed to some extent by mass mediaprovoked alarm over the imminence of water wars. While some skepticism is unquestionably warranted in this regard, the weight of informed opinion today, encouraged by a stream of sober warnings from both official and unofficial sources, recognizes that there is a clear and present danger of serious interstate tension caused by transboundary water disputes. Adding immeasurably to the urgency and uncertainty of deliberations on the regions water circumstances are two further developments: the longer-term and clearly menacing consequences of climate change, and the shorter-term and worrisomely quickening pace of Chinas dam construction on transboundary rivers shared with South Asia. Under these circumstances, no wonder that many water experts are questioning whether South Asia has in place bilateral and multilateral frameworks adequate to the task of managing the regions increasing water insecurity. The record of interstate relations in this region over the past few decades offers meager assurance in this regard, but there are recent signs that governments are awakening both to the dangers of water insecurity and to the need for interstate cooperation in coping with them.
The Scarcity of Water in South Asia

Even a limited sampling of recent expert studies leaves practically no room for doubt about the magnitude of the regions problem of freshwater scarcity. A 2009 study by the 2030 Water Resources Group estimated, for
robert g. wirsing is Professor of Government and Chair of Faculty at Georgetown Universitys

School of Foreign Service at Qatar. His latest book (co-authored) is International Conflict over Water Resources in Himalayan Asia (2013). He can be reached at <rgw22@georgetown.edu>.
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example, that demand for freshwater by 2030 in vastly more populous and urbanized India would grow to almost 1.5 trillion cubic metersabout double its current water supply. As a result, the group observed, most of Indias river basins could face severe deficit by 2030 unless concerted action is taken.1 A comprehensive 2013 tri-nation study of the water resources of the Indus Basin gave a similarly dire forecast. With Indias population expected to approach 1.7 billion by 2050, and Pakistans likely to reach nearly 275 million by the same date, the annual availability of renewable water per capita across the basin (with a total population by then of about 383 million) could dip below 750 cubic metersan internationally recognized threshold for severe water scarcity.2 Water resource conditions in the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna Basinthe worlds second-largest riverine drainage basindiffer significantly from those found in the Indus Basin but are also largely discomforting. Admittedly, a major recent study of water scarcity in Bangladesh contains some encouraging news. Examining meteorological data gathered from the 1940s to the present, the study finds that annual rainfall totals have held fairly constant. It also reports that only on one of the three major transboundary rivers for which data was collectedthe Padma/Gangeshave changes in upstream hydrological patterns (such as rainfall, glacial melt, and water drawing or diversion) caused significant variation over time in dry season flow. However, given the importance of that river to southwestern Bangladesh, the studys finding of a more than 20% decline in the dry season flow since 1960 holds extremely serious consequences for the countrys groundwater recharge and agricultural productivity.3 What this studys findings highlight is Bangladeshs exceptionally unfavorable freshwater dependency ratio. The country draws an estimated 91.4% of its surface water from 57 out-of-country rivers feeding into it (primarily from India and China). In other words, decisions made by
1 2030 Water Resources Group, Charting Our Water Future: Economic Frameworks to Inform
Decision-Making, 2009, 10 u http://www.mckinsey.com/App_Media/Reports/Water/Charting_ Our_Water_Future_Full_Report_001.pdf. Water Research, Data Sharing, and Policy Coordination (Observer Research Foundation, Stimson Center, and Sustainable Development Policy Institute, 2013), 18, available at http://www.stimson. org/books-reports/connecting-the-drops. Kolas et al., Water Scarcity in Bangladesh: Transboundary Rivers, Conflict and Cooperation, Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), PRIO Report, 2013, 4754 u http://www.prio.no/ publications/waterscarcity.
2 Indus Basin Working Group, Connecting the Drops: An Indus Basin Roadmap for Cross-Border
3 Kristian Hoelscher, Trends in Rainfall and River Flows: Changing Ground Realities? in Ashild
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neighboring governments upriver about extraction and diversion are bound to have a major impact on future water security in Bangladesh, which is expected to grow from an estimated population of 161 million in 2012 to over 194 million in 2050. Extensive dam-building activity on the mainstreams and tributaries of the Ganges, Teesta, and Meghna rivers (by India) and on the Brahmaputra River (by China and India) inevitably exacerbates the extreme vulnerability of Bangladeshs water dependence and could very well negate whatever improvements Dhaka makes in domestic water management.
The Uncertainty Wrought by Climate Change

There is considerable uncertainty about the pace of climate change, a likely villain in the regions unfolding water insecurity drama. In May 2013 the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) reported that heat-trapping carbon dioxide gas had reached an average daily level in the atmosphere above 400 parts per milliona concentration not witnessed on earth for over three million years and an ominous warning that if global efforts continue to falter, the effects of climate change may become irreversible.4 However, another scientific report released within days of the NOAA report claimed that the most extreme rates of warming predicted by some models appeared increasingly less likely.5 Regardless of whether the consequences of climate change come quickly or not, there is a very strong consensus among climate scientists that the changeshigher temperatures, desertification, extreme weather events, erratic monsoons, rising sea levels, and glacial meltwill come eventually and will strike South Asia at least as harshly as any other region in the world. Taking glacial melt as an example, one of the most sober and careful studies done thus far of Himalayan glaciers maintains that the Hindu KushHimalayan (HKH) regions climate is undoubtedly changing, and that the livelihoods of over a billion people dependent on the major river systems with headwaters in this region are bound to be affected. The study concedes that many uncertainties remain about the precise causes and effects of glacial melt, as well as that important subregional variations exist in the rate at which glacial melt is occurring. Nevertheless, it declares unequivocally that scientific evidence indicates that glaciers in the HKH region are retreating at rates comparable to those
4 Justin Gillis, Heat-Trapping Gas Passes Milestone, Raising Fears, New York Times, May 10, 2013. 5 Alister Doyle, Extreme Global Warming Seen Further Away than Previously Thought, Reuters,
May 20, 2013.
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in other parts of the world, and confirms that the rate has accelerated in the past century.6 The study concludes that some parts of the climate science community believe that the social effects of climate change are already more extensive than previously thought or recognized, and are mounting more quickly and more extensively than predicted.7
The Implications of Dam Building

Uncertainty, although of a quite different sort, also prevails in regard to Chinas dam-building activities on the Brahmaputra (called the Yarlung Tsangpo in China), the principal river that China shares with its South Asian neighbors. Already China has built a dozen or more dams in the vast Tibetan Plateau on tributaries of the Brahmaputra; and sometime in 2014 the 510-megawatt Zangmu Hydroelectric Project is expected to be completed. The project is the first of four in a cascade of now formally approved major dams on the rivers mainstream. Beijing claims that these are all run of the river dams that have minimal water storage capacity and are thus unlikely to have any significant impact on downstream coriparians. China also claims that it has no plans to divert water from the Brahmaputra and will always take into account the interests of downstream countries. 8 Other observers, however, argue that Chinas dam construction on the Brahmaputra has significant strategic implications and that the countrys leadership is entirely indifferent to the downstream impact of its dams. Foremost among these critics is Brahma Chellaney, who is based in New Delhi and is the author of Water: Asias New Battleground. Chellaney argues that by having its hand on Asias water tap, China is therefore acquiring tremendous leverage over its neighbours behaviour.9 China now owns more large dams than the rest of the world combined but does not have a single water-sharing treaty with a neighboring state. If its plans for the Brahmaputra follow the pattern adopted on other transboundary rivers,
6 Committee on Himalayan Glaciers, Hydrology, Climate Change, and Implications for Water
Security et al., Himalayan Glaciers: Climate Change, Water Resources, and Water Security (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2012).
7 Ibid., 102. 8 We Will Consider Interests of Downstream Countries, Says China, Hindu, January 31, 2013
http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/we-will-consider-interests-of-downstreamcountries-says-china/article4361993.ece.
u
9 Brahma Chellaney, Water Is the New Weapon in Beijings Armoury, Financial Times, August 30, 2011.
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Chellaney predicts that China will proceed to build a series of ever-larger dams right up to the border with India.10 Other observers see the situation differently, arguing that Chinas dam-building activity is motivated overwhelmingly by the clear-headed recognition that the countrys future political and social stability are heavily dependent on continued economic growth, which is, in turn, equally dependent on overcoming the countrys mounting water and energy scarcities. China is not a water predator, in other words; its dam-building spree has more to do with the need to power its energy-intensive economy, than with any policy of weaponisation in order to assert a hegemonic role in the region.11
Melting the Ice? Prospects for Regional Cooperation

Whatever its motivation, Beijings consistently unilateral approach to dam construction on transboundary riversnamely, its opacity in regard to future plans and strict avoidance of institutionalized water cooperationjustifiably alarms its co-riparians. There is no sign yet of any change in this approach. In April 2013, China rejected a proposal by India to create a new mechanismfor example, a water commission, an intergovernmental dialogue, or a formal treatyfor dealing with water issues between the two countries.12 For extremely water-dependent Bangladesh, this is an undeniably dire matter; but India, too, finds little comfort in its relatively advantageous water dependency ratio (about 30.5%). Even though as much as 70% of the Brahmaputras flow within India comes from below the Sino-Indian border, owing to the northeastern regions extraordinarily heavy monsoon rains, the fact remains that the monsoon season is brief and India possesses very modest water storage capacity. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization, a fair estimate of water resources available for use to a country should include figures of dry
10 Brahma Chellaney, Chinas Great Water Wall: Damming Downstream Flow to Neighbors Could
Trigger Water Wars, Washington Times, April 8, 2013.
11 Pau Khan Khup Hangzo, Transboundary Rivers in the Hindu Kush-Himalaya (HKH) Region:
Beyond the Water as Weapon Rhetoric, Centre for Nontraditional Security (NTS) Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTS Insight, September 2012.
12 China Spikes Indias Proposal for Joint Mechanism on Brahmaputra, Hindu, April 17, 2013 u
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/china-spikes-indias-proposal-for-joint-mechanism-onbrahmaputra/article4627285.ece.
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season low flow,13 and such an estimate would yield a less sanguine reading of Chinas ability to leverage its control of the Brahmaputras waters. Chinas apparent reluctance to move in the direction of water transparency and joint mechanisms of water management is a formidable roadblock to regional cooperation on water security. Yet there are fairly strong signs that South Asian governments themselves are increasingly inclined to cooperate on this issue. In April 2013, Nepal, India, and Bangladesh forged an important agreement to jointly exploit hydropower and manage water resources for mutual advantage, especially in the Ganges River Basin.14 Likewise, the Bangladeshi prime minister Sheikh Hasina plans to visit New Delhi in December 2013 for a renewed effort to forge a water-sharing agreement over the Teesta River. The initiative was dealt a near-fatal blow in September 2011 when the chief minister of West Bengal pulled out of the treaty-making exercise at the last minute. Domestic politics in both countriesincluding pressures on Bangladeshi leaders not to appear subservient to New Delhi and pressures on Manmohan Singh not to rush into a controversial agreement before Indias national elections in 2014ensures that inking a final draft will not be easy. With respect to cooperation between India and Pakistan on water security, the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) has survived over a half century, including the weathering of two major tests of its meticulously drawn conflict-resolution provisions. The first test concerned Indias Baglihar Hydroelectric Project on the Chenab River in disputed Kashmir. In 2007 an appointed neutral expert granted New Delhi most of what it wanted, including extensive drawdown provisions for flushing silt. The second dispute, still in progress, is over Indias Kishanganga Hydroelectric Project on a tributary of the Jhelum River, also in Kashmir. In February 2013 the Court of Arbitration in the Hague issued a partial ruling allowing India to proceed with construction of the dam, which will divert water from the Kishanganga River (called the Neelum River in Pakistan) to another tributary of the Jhelum. Of great importance, however, the court ruled that drawdown sediment flushing below the dead-storage level in the dam violates the IWT and that India, if it wishes to complete the project, must redesign the dam. Additionally, the court postponed until December 2013
13 General Summary Asia: Water Resources, Food and Agriculture Organization, AQUASTAT u
http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/countries_regions/asia/print3.stm.
14 Sujay Mehdudia, Nepal, India & Bangladesh to Make Most of Ganga Water, Hydropower,
Hindu, April 15, 2013 u http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/south-asia/nepal-indiabangladesh-to-make-most-of-ganga-water-hydropower/article4617600.ece.
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a decision on the dams minimum flow in downstream Pakistan during the dry season, a stipulation uniquely protective of the riverine environment and also indicative that India may have won the battle to build the dam but lost the war over the type of dam it can build.15 One may hope that the Court of Arbitrations decision will cause Indian and Pakistani leaders to consider adopting a new approach to management of the Indus Basins water resources that would regard water as a collective resource for the improvement of the entire region.16 Similarly, in the wake of media reports that Indian expertise has been offered to Afghanistan to help in building as many as twelve hydropower projects on the Kabul River, which is a troubling prospect from Pakistans perspective, one may hope that Afghan and Pakistani leaders will give thought to an IWT-like agreement for this east-flowing tributary of the Indus.17 Developments of these sorts, if they happen, would signal the longawaited andunlike glacial melt in the Himalayasentirely welcome melting of the geopolitical ice in South Asia. Even if we choose to disregard warnings that the region is increasingly at risk of interstate water wars, the unmistakable signs of rapidly growing water insecurity leave no room for business as usual complacency. Replacing deeply ingrained habits of unilateral action with cooperative bilateral and multilateral water-sharing initiatives will undoubtedly prove daunting. But ensuring a decent existence for the hundreds of millions of people dependent on the Himalayan regions transboundary river waters demands no less.
15 John Briscoe, Winning the Battle But Losing the War, Hindu, February 22, 2013 u http://www.
thehindu.com/opinion/lead/winning-the-battle-but-losing-the-war/article4439676.ece. acus.org/print/75408.
16 Leaders Call for Modernizing Indus Water Treaty, Atlantic Council, April 3, 2013 u http://www. 17 Khalid Mustafa, India to Help Afghanistan Build 12 Dams on Kabul River, News International,
May 12, 2011 u http://www.thenews.com.pk/PrintEdition.aspx?ID=5933&Cat=13&dt; and Gitanjali Bakshi, Michael Kugelman, and Ahmad Rafay Alam, Bridge Over Troubled Waters, Times of India, December 8, 2011 u http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-12-08/ edit-page/30486468_1_dams-indus-water-treaty-water-security.
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Himalayan Water Security: A South Asian Perspective Tushaar Shah and Mark Giordano
outh Asia has emerged during recent decades as a major theater of tension and conflict around shared rivers. The region is made up of predominantly rural, poor, and agrarian societies. While in recent years India has been showcased as an emerging economic power, the benefits of Indian economic growth have mainly been concentrated in the southern and western areas. Rural populations in eastern India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Bangladesh continue to have a high concentration of poverty. Persistent agrarian poverty has heightened tension over shared rivers. Concern is also growing among South Asian states that Chinas quietly but rapidly expanding dam-building activity in the Himalayan region will increase political tensions in South Asia, potentially leading to conflict. This essay explores the myriad sources of water-related tensions between India and Pakistan in the Indus Basin and between India and Nepal and Bangladesh in the Ganges Basin. The essay first reviews the nature and sources of tensions among these South Asian neighbors. It then discusses newly emerging concerns about the potential impact of Chinese activities in Tibet on the lower riparian states in South Asia.
The Importance of Water Sharing

Although water wars rarely, if ever, take place between nation-states, water can play an important role in broader political conflict and tensions. Few regions in the world are home to as much interstate tension as South Asia. Pakistan and India were born out of war, and relations are still strained today with even simple transport and trade links severely restricted. Despite the fact that India helped Bangladesh gain its independence, the two countries still have problems, including sharing the waters of the Ganges, Teesta, and other rivers. Overarching all these disputes is the perception of India as the regional hegemon. Indias actions on water issues are thus often viewed by its neighbors with suspicion. Adding ominously to this mix is Chinas growing use of eastern Himalayan waters.
tushaar shah is a Senior Fellow at the International Water Management Institute in Colombo. He
can be reached at <t.shah@cgiar.org>.
mark giordano is Principal Researcher and Leader of Water and Society Research at the International
Water Management Institute in Colombo. He can be reached at <mark.giordano@cgiar.org>.
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Despite these tensions, water forces the nations of South Asia to interact with each other. Nearly all the water in Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Bhutan comes from a river shared with at least one other South Asian state. Even in India, where the large Deccan Plateau is hydrologically removed from the rest of the subcontinent, over 30% of water resources are shared. This water is crucial for lives and livelihoods in South Asia. The region is among the most populated in the world, with densities ranging from less than 300 people per square kilometer in the west of South Asia to over 1,000 in Indian Bihar and Bangladesh. While India has been recognized as an emerging economic power, it, like the region as a whole, remains predominantly rural, poor, and agrarian. The Ganges-BrahmaputraMeghna Basin covering eastern India, Nepal, and Bangladesh has been dubbed South Asias poverty square, with substantially more people below the dollar-per-day poverty line than in all the countries of sub-Saharan Africa combined.1 The fruits of much of South Asias growth have been in southern and western Indian towns and citiesthose generally not supplied by transboundary waters.
Obstacles to Water Sharing

Challenges in the west. When India and Pakistan were formed in 1947, the new boundary cut across long-established irrigation systems and the Indus tributaries that fed them. In 1960 the World Bank facilitated the signing of the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) between the two countries, under which India, as the upper riparian, ceded 80% of Indus waters to Pakistan (approximately 220 billion cubic meters) and kept the remaining 20% for its northwestern plains. While substantial tensions remain, the IWT has survived half a century and three wars between the neighbors. Islamabad remains understandably concerned that New Delhi might use water as a political tool and has challenged every move by India to undertake even IWT-approved run-of-the-river hydropower generation projects. These use flowing water merely to run turbines without reducing supplies to downstream users. General Ashfaq Kayani of Pakistan has often cited water as the justification for his India-centric military stance.2 In India, too, there is growing doubt, especially in Jammu and Kashmir, about former prime minister Jawaharlal Nehrus generosity in committing, for all time to come,
1 World Bank, World Development Indicators 2009 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2009). 2 Unquenchable Thirst, Economist, November 19, 2011 u http://www.economist.com/
node/21538687.
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the bulk of the Indus water to Pakistan when Indias own northwest remains perennially parched. India is also frustrated because, as a lower riparian on the Brahmaputra River, it has received nowhere near the same considerate response from its upper riparian neighbor, China. The problem in the east. Whereas the primary water issue in the west is scarcity, in the east it is abundance. Controlling the 380 billion cubic meters of annual flood flow in the Ganges River Basin presents a unique opportunity for hydropower generation in Nepal and flood control in Indian Bihar and Bangladesh. The technical problem for India and Bangladesh is that the flat plains of the lower Ganges Basin offer no sites for storing water. Dams in Nepal could yield an astounding 40 gigawatts of hydropower (57 times the countrys current hydropower capacity) and provide flood control to the lower riparian states but are a cause for environmental, social, and political concern. For example, agreements signed by Nepal and India during the mid-1950s on the Kosi and Gandak tributaries to promote goodwill instead strained the relationship between the two countries because of issues related to compensation for land. This strain was not fully mended even after rewriting the agreements a decade later to address Nepali concerns. While some progress has been made, much more could be done if Nepals national politics were to stabilize and New Delhi could assuage fears that dam construction might infringe on Nepali sovereignty and primarily benefit India. India now takes much pride in what it views as a win-win collaboration with Bhutan on hydropower generation. Bhutan now earns over 60% of its rapidly growing GDP from hydropower sales to India.3 Similar collaboration with Nepal could produce comparable benefits, and the two countries have created the Nepal-India Joint Ministerial Level Commission on Water Resources. However, early cooperation between India and Bhutan rested on an agreement to let India guide Bhutanese foreign and defense affairs. Addressing the real or perceived threat to sovereignty will be necessary for water cooperation to become politically viable in Nepal. As the lowest riparian state in the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna Basin, Bangladesh is most susceptible to flooding. Yet even in one of the worlds most water-endowed countries, water scarcity has emerged as a prime concern in the dry season. When India constructed the Farakka Barrage to divert a portion of the Ganges waters to a Calcutta port, tensions built
3 Sara Sidner, Bhutans Moving Gold: How Water Is Powering the Country, CNN, November 7,
2011 u http://www.cnn.com/2011/11/07/world/asia/bhutan-green-energy.
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up in Bangladesh and created political upheaval. Under a 1996 treaty, India has promised minimum low-season flows from the Farakka Barrage to Bangladesh. While the accord at least establishes a mechanism for sharing water and resolving disputes, Indias actual track record has caused Bangladesh considerable heartburnyet another sign of a smaller countrys mistrust of the regional power. In September 2011, Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh tried to make a similar commitment to Bangladesh on the Teesta tributary. However, the newly elected chief minister of West Bengal, Mamata Banerji, nipped the proposed Teesta accord in the bud at the last moment, greatly embarrassing the Indian prime minister. China. The elephant in the South Asian drawing room, however, is China, which possesses territorial control over the vast Tibetan Plateau, the worlds largest repository of freshwater. Unhindered by the dense human populations found elsewhere within its own borders, China has embarked on mammoth water projects on the plateau. This aggressive dam building has already made the downstream riparians in Southeast AsiaVietnam, Laos, Thailand, and Cambodianervous. While continuing to build more dams upstream on the Mekong and Salween rivers, China is also now working on very large hydroelectric and river-diversion schemes on the Yarlung Tsangpo River, known as the Brahmaputra River in India. Beijing reveals little about its current and future projects. According to observers, however, China has already constructed 10 dams on tributaries of the upper Brahmaputra, with 3 more under construction at Dagu, Jiacha, and Jiexu. It is also constructing a 510-megawatt dam at Zangmu as part of a plan to build 28 dams on the Brahmaputra before the river enters India. Most worrisome for New Delhi is a gigantic 38-gigawatt hydropower project that China is planning at the great bend at Motuo, where the Brahmaputra drops 2,500 meters into India. Unlike all the co-riparians in South Asia, who have some mechanisms in place for discussing and negotiating water issues, China refuses to discuss such mechanisms. Despite high-level Indian officials having repeatedly raised their concerns about Chinese dam building on the Brahmaputra and its possible impacts on India, Beijing has refused to participate in an intergovernmental dialogue, a joint water commission, or a forum to discuss the creation of a treaty to deal with the water issues between the two countries. As the upper riparian state, China has in the past even refused to provide flood alerts or warn India about water releases from dams. In June 2000 a breach in an upstream dam in Tibet raised the Brahmaputras water levels in Arunachal Pradesh by a massive 30 meters, leaving 26 dead
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and 35,000 homeless. This damage could have been contained if China had alerted India. Instead, Beijing refused to even acknowledge the dam burst for months after the event. Similar unannounced releases of excess water by China also caused flash floods in Himachal Pradesh in 2000, 2001, and 2005. Bangladesh, as the lowest riparian state on the Brahmaputra, will bear the brunt of dam building by China in Tibet (and India in Arunachal Pradesh) but has even less influence than India in this runaway appropriation and development of the rivers vast potential.
What Could the Future Hold?

One major obstacle to improved transboundary water governance within South Asia is political fluidity. None of the South Asian co-riparians, India included, have strong, stable, and confident governments capable of taking a long-term, diplomatic view of opportunities as well as threats. A second problem is strident nationalism, coupled with fears of India as a hegemon. A case in point is Indias construction on a 2.9-hectare piece of Nepalese territory in the border town of Tanakpur. Under the agreement, India offered Nepal irrigation for 5,000 hectare and 20 megawatts of power per year as compensation. But the Nepali opposition used the small incident to bring down the government. This in turn led to a drastic amendment to Nepals constitution requiring a two-thirds majority in the parliament to sign any water treaty with India. A related barrier to cooperation has been the difficulty in disentangling water disputes from other bilateral problems and disassociating them from national political struggles. Discussions on water security between India and Bangladesh are influenced by issues such as the Bangladeshi migrant influx in Indias northeast, Chakma refugees, porous borders, and insurgent groups in Indias northeast. The Teesta accord mentioned earlier would have been highly favorable to Bangladesh and was offered to earn Dhakas support in clamping down on two of the most lethal insurgent groups in Indias northeastern region that operate out of Bangladesh. Yet, as mentioned above, the treaty was aborted because of state politics within India. Negotiations between India and Pakistan on water security are obviously colored by the broader territorial dispute in Kashmir and long-standing distrust, while Nepals insecurities as a land-locked state dependent on India for trade and transit play a major role in its discussions with India. All three countriesBangladesh, Pakistan, and Nepalshare in common a distrust and touchiness about India as the regional hegemon.
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India, in turn, is frustrated in its attempts to reason with China, which exercises control over and has ambitious plans for the headwaters of all the rivers that flow into the subcontinent. What can be done? Within South Asia, the overall improvement of bilateral relations would be a major step toward the improvement of water security. But since water security could also be a catalyst for cooperation, it may be prudent to find ways to build initial cooperation in this area as a step in solving other problems. Smarter internal politics will also be required to ensure that the central decisions of transboundary diplomacy have broader domestic support and do not turn into political tools. One positive development is the growing popularity of Track 2 discussions at civil society levels, where nongovernment players, with no power or role in governmentlevel negotiations, offer open forums to air grievances and explore solutions before they become political. On the surface at least, bringing China to the table appears to be one of the most vexing obstacles to water security in the Himalayan region. There are signs, however, that the time for change may be here. China is already Indias largest trading partner, and their trade continues to grow. Harming this relationship would be economically disastrous for both countries. Li Keqiang just made India his first foreign visit as Chinese prime minister, with the stated purpose of building mutual trust and cooperation. Growing trade and economic interdependence in the Himalayan region may offer the best chance for a win-win resolution of regional water issues.
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Hydropower Dams on the Mekong: Old Dreams, New Dangers Richard P. Cronin
oday, the Mekong River Basin is on the edge of a two-pronged calamity as a result of both the long-term and near-term actions of humans and governments. Of the two, short-term actions such as deforestation, the unsustainable consumption of groundwater, and the construction of large silt-trapping dams are having a far more immediate impact than global warming, sea-level rise, and the greater frequency of violent weather events. These near-term actions of governmentsespecially the construction of massive cascades of large dams on the Mekong mainstream and major tributariesare accelerating and magnifying the now inevitable long-term effects of global warming and climate change, especially sea-level rise. The current threat to the life-giving ecology of the worlds most productive freshwater fishery stems from long-standing dreams of exploiting the rivers valuable forests, minerals, rich alluvial deposits, and hydropower potential as a basis for economic development and industrialization. Because of the unavoidable trade-offs among energy, food security (fishing and agriculture), and other uses of water, these dreams may be not only unattainable without a cooperative, basin-wide approach but also a significant source of danger to regional peace and stability. As part of its multibillion-dollar go west development program, China has set its course to fully exploit the huge hydropower potential of the upper Mekong River, which it calls the Lancang, without any consideration for the interests and concerns of its downstream neighbors. Beijing regards the upper Mekong as its national river and treats information on development plans, operational matters, and even the level of its reservoirs as national security secrets. The downstream impact of Chinas dams in Yunnan Province on the lower, Southeast Asian half of the river can hardly be overestimated. Despite the recently accelerating pace of GDP growth throughout the river basin, tens of millions of people, mainly in Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnams Mekong Delta, still depend on the rivers natural bounty for much of their food and livelihoods. The reservoirs of Chinas Yunnan dams, two of which are among the worlds largest, together have the capacity to store at least
richard p. cronin is Director of the Stimson Centers Southeast Asia Program and Mekong
Policy Project. The views expressed here are his own and do not necessarily represent those of the Stimson Center. He can be reached at <rcronin@stimson.org>.
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half the average annual discharge of the upper Mekong. In addition to significantly changing the rivers hydrology, the dam cascade will trap an estimated 80% of the historical load of nutrient-rich silt flowing from China, thereby reducing the fertility of the soil downstream and contributing to the intrusion of seawater into the Mekong Delta.1 Although the governments of the most vulnerable lower Mekong countries are increasingly aware of the threat posed by Chinas Yunnan cascade, they have yet to show the political will to curb even their own mismanagement of water, let alone make a serious effort to influence Beijing. Vietnam has long been constructing large dams on major tributaries of the Mekong in the Central Highlands. Cambodia is allowing the rampant destruction of its forests for dams and plantation agriculture. The Mekong Basin countries equities in terms of trade, investment, and infrastructure loans are such that they are reluctant to openly challenge Beijing, especially when different levels of the Chinese government have made clear that downstream criticism will not deter China from pursuing its goals.
Revived Plans for Dams on the Lower Mekong

Even more consequential than the impact of the Chinese dams on the rivers flow and sediment loads, the massive water storage capacity behind two of the dams (Xiaowan and Nuozhadu) has enabled the revival of a plan dating from the Cold War era for damming the lower Mekong. Nine of the dams would be constructed by commercial developers on the Lao (seven) and Lao-Thai (two) stretches of the mainstream, with two more in Cambodia. All but one of the planned dams would be large, ranging from 38 to 68 meters high, but with comparatively small reservoir storage capacity. The dams will decimate hundreds of species of fish consumed as food that migrate long distances to spawn and will trap additional silt from the already reduced flow from China. Building the lower Mekong dams will also create a new and potentially very costly dependency on Beijing. Unless China releases enough water in the dry season, most, if not all, of the proposed dams would not be able to generate power during the driest months of the year. In light of Chinas growing water crisis and the impact of climate change, it is not out of the
1 International Centre for Environmental Management (ICEM), Strategic Environmental
Assessment of Hydropower on the Mekong Mainstream: Final Report, October 2010, 69 u http://www.mrcmekong.org/about-the-mrc/programmes/initiative-on-sustainable-hydropower/ strategic-environmental-assessment-of-mainstream-dams.
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question that at some point in the future Beijing could revalue the waterenergy trade-off and withhold water to satisfy other higher priority needs. The proposed lower Mekong dams are all commercial projects that will be built, owned, and operated mostly by Thai and Chinese companies for 2025 years, with Thailands state-owned electric utility as the main customer. The planned Lao dams have created a storm of controversy involving not only environmental and human rights organizations and local civil society groups but also strong opposition from the Vietnamese and Cambodian governments.2
Inadequate Institutional Frameworks for Water Cooperation in the Mekong Basin

Efforts to promote cooperative and sustainable management of water resources have been stymied by two sets of problems. One set is political and psychologicaljealous guarding of recently recovered sovereignty, vast differences of economic development and military power, and geography (upstream versus downstream locations). The other is the practical impossibility of equitably dividing and developing a shared water resource whose immense productivity of aquatic life and agricultural bounty is dependent on the maintenance of a signature flood-pulse hydrology that has evolved over millions of years. The Mekong River Commission (MRC), headquartered in Vientiane, Laos, provides an institutional architecture for cooperative water management but does not have any decision-making authority of its own. Rather, the MRC secretariat works under the authority of the national Mekong committees of Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam. These committees, in turn, are chaired by officials from the ministries of natural resources and environmentamong the weakest ministries in every one of the governments. The Xayaburi Dam in northern Laos, which will sell 95% of its output to Thailand, provided the first test of the MRCs Procedures for Notification, Prior Consultation and Agreement (PNPCA). The outcome was regarded as disappointing at best and a debacle by its local and international critics. Initially, at an MRC meeting in April 2011, following the end of the six-month review period prescribed by the PNCPA, Vietnam and
2 Although its opposition to the Lao dams seems inconsistent, the Cambodian government has not
made a final decision about a proposed dam at the Sambor. That decision could be influenced by what happens upstream in Laos.
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Cambodia (and Thailand, temporarily) balked at accepting the project out of concern about the downstream impact on fisheries, sediment trapping, and livelihoods. These and other serious risks and uncertainties about mainstream dams had been raised by a strategic environmental review that had been carried out by expert consultants for the MRC and released in October 2010.3 In May 2011 the Lao government agreed to suspend the project to allow further studies because of strong opposition from the governments of Vietnam and Cambodia, in addition to civil society opposition in those countries and Thailand. Because work on site preparation had continued without interruption, it came as little surprise when, with strong Thai backing, the Lao government announced in November 2012 that the project would go ahead. The governments claims that downstream objections had been addressed by some still undocumented engineering changes met with strong disavowals from relevant Vietnamese and Cambodian officials. The outcome raised a fundamental question about the future of the MRC and the prospects for cooperative water development and management. Another framework for Mekong Basin cooperation, the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) was initiated by the Asian Development Bank at the end of the Cambodian civil war in 1992. Comprising all six Mekong countries, 4 the GMS is a multibillion-dollar infrastructure development project that is building corridors with improved roads, bridges, and railroads and a regional electrical grid linking the major cities of the Lower Mekong Basin to each other and to Kunming, the capital and economic hub of Chinas Yunnan Province. Unfortunately, cooperative management of the river that gives the region its name is not part of the GMS agenda. China and some of the lower Mekong countries are happy to have improved transportation links but have not wanted to give up one iota of sovereignty when it comes to their stretches of the river.
The Obama Administrations Lower Mekong Initiative

In early 2009 the Obama administrations decision to launch the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) reflected Washingtons serious concern about the uncertain future of cooperative water management in the Lower Mekong Basin, as well as about the growing geopolitical influence of China. The LMI
3 ICEM, Strategic Environmental Assessment of Hydropower on the Mekong Mainstream. 4 The Greater Mekong Subregion comprises Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam, and
China (Yunnan Province and the Guangxi Autonomous Region).
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drew on the United States ability to convene countries to promote capacitybuilding. Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam, and subsequently Myanmar embraced the opportunity to diversify their sources of diplomatic and development support. The LMI was never intended to become another framework for regional cooperation, and its funding averages only about $200 million a year. However, the initiative complements the MRC in two ways. First, the MRC countries and Myanmar each accepted responsibility for one (or in Thailands case, two) of the LMI pillars, which include education, health, environment and water resources management, and regional connectivity. These meetings involve different ministries, as appropriate to the particular pillar under discussion, whereas the MRC involves only the ministries of natural resources and the environment. Second, the LMI requires higherlevel political engagement because of the United States role.5 In the Mekong region, the LMI is the most significant nonmilitary element of the Obama administrations decision to rebalance U.S. military assets to Asia and the western Pacific.
Last Chance for Cooperative Water Development in the Lower Mekong Basin
Growing contention over constructing mainstream dams on the lower Mekong is creating new divisions in a region still recovering from decades of bitter conflict and threatening the very idea of a shared river for a shared future. Thus far, Laos has placed its goal of becoming the battery of Southeast Asia above its commitment to the letter and spirit of the 1995 Mekong Agreement and the PNPCA process. Likewise, Thailand, under the strongly pro-business government of Yingluck Shinawatra, has put the goal of diversifying its sources of energy over its interest in supporting multilateral cooperation among the MRC countries, instead emphasizing bilateral relations. In the case of Laos, the government has announced its decision to go ahead with two more dams: Pak Beng in the north and Don Sahong at Khone Falls on the border with Cambodia. The Lao government has said that it will submit the Pak Beng Dam to a PNPCA review but not the Don Sahong Dam. The latter dam, though not spanning the entire river,
5 The Obama administration also counts the twelve-country Trans-Pacific Partnership as an
important nonmilitary aspect of its rebalancing toward Asia, especially given Vietnams participation. The negotiations, however, were not initiated by the United States and also include four Western Hemisphere members (Canada, Chile, Mexico, and Peru).
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will block the most important channel through the falls for fish migration. Unless the MRC is able to carry out a more effective PNPCA review of both projects, and Laos is more responsive to downstream countries, tensions will continue to rise. One possibility to bridge the current divide would be negotiating a consensus agreement on the maximum acceptable transboundary impact of mainstream damsa kind of Mekong standard. Data gathered by the now uncertain follow-up study to the 2010 Strategic Environmental Assessment would be used to identify metrics for assessing the transboundary impacts of individual dams and the cumulative impacts of alternative scenarios for multi-dam cascades. The underlying objective of such an agreement would be to ensure that development of the lower Mekongs hydropower potential occurs in a coordinated and equitable fashion that maximizes the benefits and minimizes the transboundary costs of any configuration of dams. Such an agreement would not be without precedent. The 1995 Mekong Agreement already requires that mainstream diversions do not interfere with acceptable natural minimum dry-season flows and flood season reverse flows into the Tonle Sap. The sine qua non of more coherent, equitable, and sustainable hydropower development would be the construction of a power grid in the Lower Mekong Basin. A grid linking the four MRC countries (and theoretically even Myanmar and China) would make it possible to confine dam construction to northern Laos, where the river is narrower and fisheries are less important, and avoid the much greater impact on fisheries and agriculture from dams in southern Laos and Cambodia. Any national or regional power deficits could be made up by a combination of conservation measuresfor which there currently is great scope, especially in Thailand and other energy sources. The Strategic Environmental Assessment estimated that if all of the planned mainstream dams were built, they would only satisfy 6%8% of the estimated power demand in the Lower Mekong Basin by 2025the equivalent of one years increase in demand from 2015 to 2025and that Laos would gain about 70% of the total power benefit (mainly revenues and avoided thermal power costs) of the eleven dams. 6
6 For the purposes of calculating the total projected electric power output, the strategic
environmental review also included a twelfth project that is a water diversion, not a dam. All the environmental, socioeconomic, and other impacts identified by the environmental review were calculated on the basis of eight Chinese dams and eleven lower Mekong dams. See ICEM, Strategic Environmental Assessment of Hydropower on the Mekong Mainstream, 1112.
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Cambodia, which now depends almost totally on diesel-fueled generators, could purchase power from the grid. Ultimately, neither the MRC nor the GMS can effectively promote cooperation on sustainable development without the requisite political will. Unwittingly, the tendency of the four MRC countries thus far to prioritize one kind of national interest over their broader shared interest in regional cooperation may jeopardize a more important but insufficiently recognized interest in regional peace and stability.
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Climate Change and Water Security in the Himalayan Region Richard Matthew
he hydrological system of the Himalayan region, upon which some 1.5 billion people depend, is under enormous stress.1 Expected changes in water availability could threaten the regions agricultural economies, place pressure on rapidly growing urban areas, impose constraints on economic development, amplify and introduce public health challenges, compel governments to use scarce funds to manage disasters, and contribute to corruption, institutional breakdown, and violent conflict on different scales. Policies are needed that bring the countries in this turbulent region together to address the factors causing water stress, ensure that new sources of water stress do not emerge or grow too large, and manage the mounting social effects of this problem.
Causes of Water Stress

Water stress typically refers to a decline in the annual supply of blue water measured on a per capita, or per hectare of arable land, basis and then compared with a global average or with local and projected demand. Water stress often manifests as scarcity, drought, and flooding. Population growth contributes to this problem, but it is the product of many other forces as well, most notably climate change. 2 According to the 2007 reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the mean temperature of the planet is increasing, ice sheets and mountain glaciers are melting, sea levels are rising, the planets mid-latitudes are becoming drier, the high and low latitudes are becoming wetter, and the frequency and intensity of floods, droughts, and wildfires are increasing. 3
richard matthew is Professor of International and Environmental Politics in the Schools of
Social Ecology and Social Science and founding Director of the Center for Unconventional Security Affairs at the University of CaliforniaIrvine. He can be reached at <rmatthew@uci.edu>.
1 I use the term Himalayan region to represent the area encompassing the large, young mountain
ranges of Asiathe Karakoram, Himalayan, and Hindu Kushthat run from Afghanistan through Pakistan and India to China along with the Tibetan Plateau and the Indian subcontinent, which are separated by these mountain ranges and which depend on water flowing from them. Environmental Politics in China, India, and Southeast Asia, Asia-Pacific Journal, no. 29 (2009). eds., Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) u http://www.ipcc.ch/ publications_and_data/ar4/wg1/en/contents.html.
2 Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Himalayan Watershed: Water Shortages, Mega-Projects and
3 S. Solomon, D. Qin, M. Manning, Z. Chen, M. Marquis, K.B. Averyt, M. Tignor, and H.L. Miller,
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By virtue of its geography, the Himalayan region is particularly vulnerable to the impact of climate change. The rise in mean temperature here has been higher than the global average, and this trend is expected to continue. Glacial retreat is occurring very quickly in the eastern and central Himalayas, and at high elevations this is expected to translate into a significant reduction of stream flow. At lower elevations, climate change is likely to affect the timing, location, and volume of the monsoon in significant ways. While there is much uncertainty, the evidence compiled to date describes a region at the forefront of global climate change. Second, according to recent analysis of satellite data measuring fluctuations in gravitational force on the earths surface, both the South Asian subcontinent and the Tibetan Plateau, which the Himalayan, Hindu Kush, and Karakoram mountain ranges divide, are losing groundwater. While climate change might affect the replenishment of some stocks of groundwater, or lead to their contamination due to salt intrusion from rising sea levels, groundwater loss is due mainly to overuse for irrigation. This is a classic tragedy of the commons scenario, in which the small-scale unsustainable actions of individuals aggregate into enormous collective losses. Pakistan, for example, which is a very arid country, depends on groundwater for more than 50% of its irrigation and is especially sensitive to this trend. 4 Third, and further complicating matters, in recent years countries on both sides of the Himalayas have developed plans for hundreds of new dams, mainly for hydroelectric power but also as reservoirs to hedge against drought.5 All of Asias major riversincluding the Brahmaputra, Ganges, Indus, Irrawaddy, Mekong, Salween, Yangzte, and Yelloworiginate in these mountains, and most of them begin across the Chinese border in Tibet. They represent enormous hydroelectric power potential, but large dams invariably impose large social and environmental costsharnessing sacred waters, displacing people, affecting river and silt flows, and destroying habitats. Some analysts are concerned that the impacts of climate change on water have not been factored sufficiently into dam design. For example, dams may be damaged by outburst floods from glacial lakes or suffer higher than normal rates of evaporation from reservoirs due to warmer
4 Simi Kamal, Use of Water for Agriculture in Pakistan: Experiences and Challenges (presentation
at the Conference on the Future of Water for Food, University of Nebraska, Lincoln, May 35, 2009) u http://research.unl.edu/events/futureofwater/ppt/SKNebraska.pdf.
5 M. Tajuddin Sikder and K. Maudood Elahi, Environmental Degradation and Global Warming
Consequences of Himalayan Mega Dams: A Review, American Journal of Environmental Protection 2, no. 1 (2013): 19.
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temperatures. Because they are cheap to operate, dams tend to provide a handsome rate of return for many years, but climate change could dramatically subvert this calculation. Other analysts worry that China may have a hidden agenda insofar as the regions water resources are concerned. One well-known claim, for example, is that if China builds a dam on the Yarlung Tsangpo River in Tibet, Beijing will divert this water to the planned South-North Water Diversion Project. This is water that currently flows into the Brahmaputra River and is crucial to its health, as well as to the water resources of South Asia.
Outlook for Water Security in the Himalayan Region and Opportunities for Cooperation
Climate change, unsustainable groundwater use, and plans for hundreds of new dams combine to create a deeply alarming picture of dramatic hydrological change. In the worst-case scenarios the social consequences are devastating. The six main countries of this region are already overrepresented on Maplecrofts Natural Disasters Risk Index (Pakistan is 4th, India is 11th, China is 12th, and Afghanistan is 15th) and the Fund for Peaces Failed States Index (Afghanistan is 6th, Pakistan is 13th, and Nepal is 27th).6 Recent studies, such as the National Academy of Sciences 2012 report Himalayan Glaciers: Climate Change, Water Resources, and Water Security, envision changes in water availability leading to population displacement, agricultural and fishing losses, disease outbreaks, and conflict that could become violent and spill over state boundaries.7 These effects are expected to be especially severe for downstream countriesi.e., all countries other than China. Some effects are already clear. For example, dams in India already affect the flow of silt into Bangladesh. This silt is critical to maintaining the Sundarbans as a forest barrier against flooding; as silting declines, flooding worsens and the human costs mount. Of course, many effects are not certain. Variables that are hard to model, such as changing cloud cover, could have a dramatic and unforeseen effect on the regions hydrology. Human adaptiveness and ingenuity might prove sufficiently agile so as to target and avoid worst-case outcomes. But current trends provide no basis for policy complacency. The arid areas of the
6 Asia Most at Risk from Natural Disasters, IRIN, May 10, 2010 u http://www.irinnews.org/
report/89305; and Failed State Index, Foreign Policy and Fund For Peace, 2012 u http://www. foreignpolicy.com/failed_states_index_2012_interactive. Security (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2012).
7 See National Research Council, Himalayan Glaciers: Climate Change, Water Resources, and Water
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region are becoming drier, mean temperature is rising faster than the global average, flooding is becoming more frequent and intense, many glaciers are shrinking, and the monsoon is changing in terms of timing, location, and intensity. Unfortunately, while water connects the fates of some one and a half billion people in the region, and in theory could unify them around a common agenda, history and politics divide them, and these divisions run deep. In the 21st century alone, for example, violent conflict has plagued Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burma, India, Kashmir, Pakistan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. Still, the Himalayan hydrological system begs for strong regional management institutions. The great rivers that originate in Tibet and Kashmir flow into Afghanistan, Bhutan, China, India, Nepal and Pakistan Some of this flow moves farther south as the Mekong River system into Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam. Unfortunately, cooperation among these countries has been largely ceremonial and ineffective. There is little to build upon in this regard. There are many ways to think about the prospects for cooperation. Considerable research has focused on the importance of a great power, or a hegemon, that is willing to lead and provide much of the funding for cooperation. In this case, the only viable contender is India, but New Delhi has tense relationships with all of Indias border countries and no particular status in Southeast Asia, has not yet found a compelling way to align national and regional interests, and faces considerable domestic challenges as the country seeks to improve the living standards of roughly 400 million people. Absent a hegemonic power, cooperation can be very difficult to establish and maintain. In this case, there is a large number of actors, some of which have very little interaction with each other. Furthermore, the benefits of cooperation, at least in the short term, are not entirely clear and may be a long time in coming. These are conditions that tend to mitigate against high levels of cooperation. Without the familiar conditions that enable and reinforce regional cooperation, it is perhaps not surprising that existing institutions, such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), have done little in the sphere of water management. SAARC, for example, has produced a report on the regions environmental challenges, established a few technical and management committees, and adopted the Thimphu Statement on Climate Changemodest actions with little tangible effect. It may be particularly handicapped as a consensus-based organization that avoids the many contentious areas of bilateral conflict, such as the reform
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of the Indus River Treaty between Pakistan and India. SAARC also cannot build on achievements in economic or security integration, which are often the first issues to mobilize regional attention and cooperation, because these have been modest. Although moving from the status quo to effective regional cooperation may not be a quick process, there is an obvious next step that should be taken. Weather, topography, and borders have made the Himalayan region a very difficult one to study. Many questions remain about how this unique area has managed warming in the past and how exactly climate change is playing out today. Better data is critical to agenda setting and policy formulation, as well as to infrastructure design and social adaptation. In this regard, the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development, located in Kathmandu, currently brings together eight countries of the region to carry out research and share knowledge. 8 The organization offers a platform for expanding regional hydrological science that should be carefully built up. Expanding the regions epistemic community of scientists may generate a shared understanding of the fundamental characteristics of growing water stress and a shared commitment to finding efficient, effective, and equitable solutions. It might also encourage transparency in other areas, such as dam construction, where imperfect information and mistrust kindle tension. The United States can support the buildup of scientific cooperation, share its experiences with regional cooperation, and use its great technical and diplomatic resources to encourage more productive political relationships. The recent National Research Council report Himalayan Glaciers: Climate Change, Water Resources and Water Security (2012) is a good example of how the U.S. scientific community can collaborate with local scientists and hence assist in understanding the regions water stress.9 Though limited in many ways, the role of the United States might be expanded if it were to deepen its physical presence in the region. Some obvious strategies would be to encourage American students to study abroad, especially in China and India; support university-based research collaboration; and promote social enterprises that have U.S. participation and are addressing important regional issues such as the use of inefficient cook stoves, which add vast quantities of black carbon into the regions air.
8 The eight SAARC members are Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan,
and Sri Lanka.
9 Committee on Himalayan Glaciers, Hydrology, Climate Change, and Implications for Water
Security et al., Himalayan Glaciers: Climate Change, Water Resources, and Water Security (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2012).
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Ultimately, however, reducing water stress in the Himalayan region will depend on the foresight and commitment of key regional countries like China, India, and Pakistan. Scientific collaboration can nurture this process, but political and private sector leadership needs to be mobilized soon. The region is tracking toward a worst-case scenario of lower agricultural yields, more frequent and intense natural disasters, population displacement, public health setbacks, and conflict over access to water resources. Unfortunately, attempts at regional cooperation, such as SAARC, provide little basis for optimism. At this point, it is not clear that China, India, and Pakistan can overcome political differences that have persisted since the 1947 partition and find fair and effective solutions to their shared water challenges. Kashmir, the site of violent conflict in 1947, 1965, and 1999, would be a good problem to resolve quickly, building trust and laying the foundations for tackling larger issues. A beautiful valley with a polarized population, rapidly degrading freshwater, chronic turmoil, contested borders, and competing visions of what its future should be, perhaps Kashmir could be granted independence or redefined as an international peace park with a high level of political autonomy. Trapped by three immovable giants, however, it seems sadly destined to experience more human and ecological violence in the years ahead. Still, a conference scheduled for mid-2013 in Islamabad will bring the various parties together, and perhaps some good news will emerge from that meeting.
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Securing the Himalayas as the Water Tower of Asia: An Environmental Perspective Jayanta Bandyopadhyay
he crucial role of mountains as the creators and providers of large volumes of freshwater and as the natural storage site of this vital ecosystem service attracted the special attention of world leaders after the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in 1992.1 This essay addresses the role of the Himalayas as the provider of crucial freshwater supplies to a larger number of people than any other mountain range in the world. The essay first describes the eco-hydrology of the Himalayan region, and then turns to examine the role of the Himalayan rivers in Asias economic and demographic growth. It concludes by analyzing the ecological imperative of sustaining the Himalayan waters.
Himalayan Waters: An Eco-hydrological Background

In terms of the number of people who depend on such water towers for their survival and well-being, the Himalayas are the most important. The Himalayan region, encompassing the Hindu Kush mountains and the Tibetan Plateau, spans an area of more than 4.3 million square kilometers spread across Afghanistan, Bhutan, China, India, Myanmar, Nepal, and Pakistan. The region stores more snow and ice than anywhere else in the world outside the two poles and thus is popularly known as the third pole.2 Containing the highest mountains of the world, the Himalayas act as a great barrier to global atmospheric circulation. The Indian summer monsoon and the East Asian monsoon interact in this environment to provide a large portion of the water supply of Asia. Ten major rivers emerge from the Himalayan region, making it a crucial ecological buffer. These rivers include the Yellow and Yangtze, which emerge from the
jayanta bandyopadhyay i s an Adviser for Ecosystems for Life at the International Union for
Conservation of Nature in New Delhi and a Fellow with the India China Institute at the New School in New York. He can be reached at <jayanta@iimcal.ac.in>.
1 For further discussion of the role of mountains as the water towers of the world in the global
freshwater supply, see Jayanta Bandyopadhyay, Water Towers of the World, People and the Planet: People and Mountains, Pinnacles of Diversity 5, no. 1 (1996) u http://lib.icimod.org/record/9992/ files/297.pdf. Foundation (ICIMOD) u http://www.icimod.org/?q=3487.
2 See What Is the Third Pole? International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development
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Qinghai Plateau and provide water to densely populated parts of the north China plain; the Mekong, Salween, and Irrawaddy, which flow southward from Tibet into Southeast Asia; the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna, which drains large areas both north and south of the Himalayas and provides about two-thirds of the total annual river flow for India; and the Indus, which is the lifeline of Pakistan. The scale of the ecosystem services that the Himalayas provide is almost without parallel in human history. The Himalayan river basins are home to about 1.3 billion people and supply water, food, and energy to more than 3 billion people.3 Human intervention in the flow of these rivers must be based on adequate knowledge of three vital constituents of the Himalayan riverswater flow, sediment load, and energy potential. Since a large amount of the precipitation in the high mountain areas is stored in snow cover and glaciers, there are natural delays in the outflow of the melt water. In this way the Himalayan rivers provide crucial water supplies during dry periods. While the importance of high sediment loads in the eco-hydrology of the Himalayan rivers is well-known, knowledge of the amount of sediment carried and its role in the rivers morphological dynamics is still at a rudimentary stage. Despite early research on the geological denudation of the Himalayas and the expansion of the Bengal deep-sea fan at the end of the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna Basin, 4 accurate information on the generation, transportation, and final deposition of sediment from the Himalayas is difficult to find. In addition, only recently have attempts been undertaken to quantify the amounts of water produced by the Himalayas. Bodo Bookhagen and Douglas Burbank have developed a hydrological budget and established an important correlation between precipitation and run-off in 27 Himalayan rivers of South Asia, starting from the Yarlung Tsangpo in the east to the Indus in the west.5 The relative contributions of rainfall, snow melt, and glacier meltthe three factors that constitute the river flowsvary significantly from the eastern extreme of the Himalayas to the western. For example, Yarlung Tsangpo in the eastern part of the region receives about 34% of its flow from snow and glacier melt, while the Indus in the west depends on melt for 66% of its flow.6
3 What Is the Third Pole? 4 Joseph R. Curray and David G. Moore, Growth of the Bengal Deep-Sea Fan and Denudation in
the Himalayas, Geological Society of America Bulletin 82, no. 3 (1971): 56372.
5 Bodo Bookhagen and Douglas W. Burbank, Towards a Complete Himalayan Hydrological Budget:
Spatiotemporal Distribution of Snowmelt and Rainfall and Their Impact on River Discharge, Journal of Geophysical Research: Earth Surface 115, no. F3 (2010).
6 Bookhagen and Burbank, Towards a Complete Himalayan Hydrological Budget.
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Himalayan Waters as Input for the Asian Economic Growth

While irrigation remains the principal form of water use in Asia, in recent decades the Himalayan rivers have also helped power the regions high rates of economic growth, particularly in burgeoning urban and industrial parts of China and India. To meet rising demand, governments initially took a business-as-usual approach to augmenting water supply. China has undertaken a large-scale project to transfer water from the Yangtze River in the south to the north, while India began trying to link water-rich rivers with those in drier areas. There are three transfer projects in China, though the third one in the province of Sichuan has not materialized yet. The linking project in India has connected some rivers, but the scale of the transfer is not still very high. The cumulative impact of earlier diversion projects led to lower river flows and quickly caused environmental degradation and the loss of related ecosystem services. Water quantity dwindled and water quality was drastically reduced. For example, one of the two mother rivers in China, the Yellow, dried up and had no ability to flow out to the Bohai Sea for long periods.7 The Ganges, one of Indias mother rivers, is now polluted from almost its glacial roots, despite liberal funding from the Indian government for cleaning it. The situation is similar in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Pakistan. The problem of freshwater scarcity becomes more critical when projected future water requirements are considered. In 2025, water demand in China will reach more than 1,100 billion cubic meters (bcm) in the business as usual approach, while only about 873 bcm of water is presently usable. Similarly, in India there is presently only 1,123 bcm of usable water, while demand is projected to reach 1,180 bcm in 2050. The continued rapid economic growth and improvement in the quality of life in Asia thus depends on sustaining the available supplies of freshwater and innovating a more resource-efficient economic path. This poses a great challenge for water science, engineering, and policy, especially in the regions two largest and economically strongest countries, China and India. The urgency of the above objectives becomes absolutely clear when the potential impacts of global warming and climate change on the flows of the Himalayan rivers are considered. According to the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development,
7 Yanbo Sun, Deng Qun, and Xia Jun The Making of Artificial Floods and Impact Assessment in
Yellow River, in Water Security to Climate Change and Human Activity in East Asia and Pacific Region, ed. Xia Jun and Liu Suxia (Beijing: China Meteorological Press, 2008).
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Mountain systems are particularly sensitive to climate change. The rate of warming in the Third Pole region is significantly higher than the global average, and the rate is higher at higher altitude, suggesting a greater vulnerability of the cryosphere environment to climate change. This trend is expected to continue. Climate change projections suggest that all areas of South Asia are likely to warm by at least 1C by the end of the century, while in some areas the warming could be as high as 3.54C. The life and livelihoods of the people in the Third Pole region is challenged due to climate change, and the stability and prosperity of the region affected by the Third Pole is at risk, which will have implications for all of Asia and for the world. 8
The deeper crisis is that there is still a large gap in scientific knowledge of these processes and their potential implications for Himalayan rivers. The absence of a dependable database for effective climate modeling that fits the micro-climatic details in the Himalayas is a serious problem in need of immediate attention.9 While Lamadrid and MacClune have made a push toward filling this gap, further research into the environmental sustainability of the Himalayan watershed is an urgent prerequisite for sustained economic growth and development in Asia.10
The Environmental Sustainability of the Himalayan Rivers: ARegional Task of Global Significance
The Himalayas offer suitable landforms for storage dams, and the quickly growing water demands of the surrounding plains have led to the rapid building of dams there. The Xiaolangdi Dam on the Yellow River and Bhakra Dam on the Sutlej River, for example, were heralded as great contributors to economic growth in China and India, respectively. With the passage of time, however, the environmental impacts of dams have generated concerns and environmental movements pushing for a new understanding of the role of engineering interventions in the Himalayan rivers. The Three Gorges Dam on Yangtze River in China and the Tehri Dam on the Bhagirathi River in India generated serious concerns over sustainability. High sediment loads have further complicated matters, since separation of the sediment from water becomes a costly engineering challenge.11
8 What Is the Third Pole? 9 Jayanta Bandyopadhyay, Climate Change and Hindu Kush-Himalayan Waters: Knowledge Gaps
and Priorities in Adaptation, Sustainable Mountain Development, no. 56 (2009): 1719.
10 See Lamadrid and MacClune, Climate and Hydrological Modeling. 11 K.G. Ranga Raju, U.C. Kothyari, and M.K. Mittal, State of Art Report on Reservoir Sedimentation
(Roorkee: National Committee on Hydrology, 2010).
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Nevertheless, the Himalayan rivers have continued to be the major focus of dam-building efforts. In future decades, hundreds of hydropower dams are slated to be built on the tributaries of the Brahmaputra on the southern aspect in India and Yarlung Tsangpo in China. This river had not been interfered with until recently, and the extent of the strategic environmental implications are not clearly known. In particular, the proposed structural intervention by China at the Yarlung Tsangpo bend has drawn global media attention to the possibility that the Brahmaputra will dry up downstream in India during the lean season. In reality, the Yarlung Tsangpo is a minor contributor to the total flow of the Brahmaputra. Further, snow and glaciers supply about 34% of its total flow. What is significant in the flow of the Yarlung Tsangpo is not the water but the very large potential for energy generation. A hydropower project at the Yarlung Tsangpo bend would be more attractive for China than a project to physically transfer water. Dams that are being built or planned on the Mekong and Salween rivers require more serious attention with respect to changed flow patterns and reduction in the total flows, if any. In view of the challenge of food security given the large population in Asia, the task of ensuring the environmental sustainability of the Himalayan rivers is of paramount significance. Further, predicting the impact of global warming and climate change on the Himalayan rivers has attained very high priority for Asia as a whole. It is in the broader regional interest, as much as in their own interest, that the countries sharing the Himalayas take early collaborative steps to address these issues before environmental changesin particular, climate changeleaves them fewer options. As larger stakeholders, in terms of both population and scientific capability, China and India must play a central role in creating such a collaboration. There is an immediate need for collaborative research to provide greater clarity about the details of hydro-meteorological processes in the Himalayas. The devastating flood in the Indian Himalayan state of Uttarakhand that occurred in June 2013 and killed thousands of people is a case in point. Further, the task of developing suitable modeling for predicting the impacts of global warming and climate change is equally urgent.12 The controversy over the rate at which the Himalayan glaciers are shrinking
12 T.D. Yao et al., Third Pole Environment, UNESCO-SCOPE-UNEP Policy Briefs, no. 13, June 2011.
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shows the need for high-level scientific research on this topic.13 There actually may be more water in total flowing in the Himalayan rivers as a result of increased rainfall under a warmer climate regime. This would reduce the ability of the mountains to store water naturally in snow and glaciers and there may create new pressure for the construction of additional storage structures. On the one hand, the new climate regime may enhance the existing problem of floods in Himalayan rivers, while also leading to greater sediment generation and transportation. On the other hand, the greater availability of rainfall could be a win-win situation if ecologically sustainable and socially acceptable policies for its storage are put in place. The advancement of science and policies for achieving the goal of sustainability is a global challenge that will need to be achieved through extensive regional collaboration at various levels ranging from water science to hydro-diplomacy. Specifically, this is an opportunity for China and India to establish their credibility as leaders in sustainability science and engineering.
13 V.K. Raina, Himalayan Glaciers: A State-of-Art Review of Glacial Studies, Glacial Retreat and
Climate Change, Indian Ministry of Environment and Forests and the G.B. Pant Institute of Himalayan Environment and Development, November 12, 2009.
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asia policy , number 16 ( july 2013), 5168

policy essay
A New Type of Major-Power Relationship: Seeking a Durable Foundation for U.S.-China Ties
David M. Lampton
david m. lamptonis Professor and Director of China Studies at the
Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. In 2010, he won the inaugural Scalapino Prize awarded by the National Bureau of Asian Research and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Dr. Lamptons latest book is entitled Following the Leader: Ruling China, From Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping (forthcoming in 2014). He can be reached at <dmlampton@jhu.edu>.
u The author wishes to thank the anonymous reviewers of this essay for their suggestions, as well as the Institute of American Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, and its Director Huang Ping, for facilitating interviews in January 2013. A significantly different version of this essay will be published in Chinese by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.
note
keywords:united states; china; foreign policy; major-power relations

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executive summary
This essay considers recent calls for a new major-power relationship between the U.S. and China and examines concrete steps that both countries could take to pursue such a relationship.
main argument
During his trip to Washington, D.C., in February 2012, Xi Jinping called for a new type of relationship between major countries in the 21st century. Over the last year, this vague but potentially useful concept has been generally endorsed by leaders in Washington. The core premises of such a relationship are that major conflict between the U.S. and China is not inevitable, that it would be catastrophic for each country and for the world should it occur, and that the opportunity costs of simple noncooperation on key issues are enormous. This essay argues that features of a new type of relationship based on cooperation include greatly expanding the number and scale of employment-generating enterprises that each country establishes in the other; developing better internal coordination of foreign and security policy in each nation; augmenting crisis-management capabilities; broadening, deepening, and institutionalizing military-to-military cooperation and strategic dialogue; and building economic and security institutions in Asia that include both countries, rather than each side trying to build organizations that exclude the other.
policy implications
Leaders in both the U.S. and China should take the following concrete steps to build a new major-power relationship: Encourage greater employment-generating FDI in each others country and knock down roadblocks to investment, in part by bringing to fruition a bilateral investment treaty Rethink the U.S.-China bilateral dialogue mechanism and appoint a very senior official on each side to be clearly in charge of relationship management Institutionalize and broaden military-to-military cooperation and exchange to all levels and all services and emphasize strategic discussions Improve each sides management of key third-party actors Avoid gratuitous acts that alienate citizens in the other country
lampton a new type of major-power relationship
he phrase a new type of relationship between major countries in the 21st century (xinxing daguo guanxi) is a key and useful concept proposed by then vice-president Xi Jinping in his February 15, 2012, speech in Washington, D.C. Sketching out what he had in mind, Xi said that such a relationship would be characterized by mutual understanding and strategic trust, respecting each others core interests, mutually beneficial cooperation, and enhancing cooperation and coordination in international affairs and on global issues.1 Subsequently, at the fourth U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue in Beijing in May 2012, then president Hu Jintao and state councilor Dai Bingguo proposed to discuss the joint development of a new type of relations between major countries, a call also made by then state councilor and defense minister Liang Guanglie when he visited Washington the same month. Thereafter, at the June 2012 group of twenty (G-20) meeting in Mexico, U.S. president Barack Obama and Hu met, with the Chinese leader reportedly proposing to deepen dialogues, seek win-win cooperation, properly manage frictions, and share global responsibilities.2 Chinas subsequently designated ambassador to the United States, Cui Tiankai, elaborated at length on these themes with Pang Hanzhao in a July 2012 document carried on the Chinese foreign ministrys website and in China International Strategy Review.3 In the current era of President Xi and Premier Li Keqiang, Li responded to a question posed at a National Peoples Congress press conference on March 17, 2013, by saying: I dont believe conflicts between big powers are inevitable. Shared interests often override their disputes.Were willing to construct, together with the Obama Administration, a new type of relationship between big powers.4 As these Chinese statements rolled out, the Obama administration reacted positively in a series of comments made by then secretary of state Hillary Clinton in March 2012 and reportedly by President Obama in June of that same year. A week prior to Premier Lis remarks in March 2013, Tom
1 Xi Jinping (speech at the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations and U.S.-China Business
Council Luncheon, Washington, D.C., February 15, 2012) u http://www.ncuscr.org/programs/ luncheon-honor-vice-president-xi-jinping.
2 Zhang Tuosheng, Developing a New Type of Major Power Relationship between China and the
U.S., China and U.S. Focus, January 4, 2013 u http://www.chinausfocus.com/print.?id=22800. See also Michael S. Chase, Chinas Search for a New Type of Great Power Relationship, Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, September 7, 2012. Era: On China and U.S. Working Together to Build a New-Type Relationship between Major Countries, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), July 20, 2012 u http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t953682.htm. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-03/17/c_132240139.htm.
3 Cui Tiankai and Pang Hanzhao, China-U.S. Relations in Chinas Overall Diplomacy in the New
4 More Opportunities for Sino-U.S. Trade, Investment: Premier, Xinhua, March 17, 2013 u
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Donilon, Obamas national security adviser, summarized the administrations general reaction at some length:
I disagree with the premise put forward by some historians and theorists that a rising power and an established power are somehow destined for conflict. There is nothing preordained about such an outcome. It is not a law of physics, but a series of choices by leaders that lead to great power confrontation. Others have called for containment. We reject that, too. A better outcome is possible. But it falls to both sidesthe United States and Chinato build a new model of relations between an existing power and an emerging one. Xi Jinping and President Obama have both endorsed this goal.5
In the past, Washington has urged Beijing to advance a comprehensive vision of the two nations respective regional and global roles in the era of interdependence and growing Chinese strength, a vision that hopefully can advance cooperation. This Chinese initiative to start a dialogue on a new type of major-power relations is thus a development that Washington should, and seemingly does, welcome. To date, however, the initial suggestions from both countries have predictably focused more on what each side wants the other to do rather than on what China and the United States both must do. This essay aims to move the discussion forward by specifying the economic and security domains in which cooperation needs to be initiated or enhanced and by making specific policy proposals. There is some urgency for concrete thinking because there are worrying developments, both in bilateral relations and in the level of tension in some parts of Asia today. Chinas spring 2013 defense white paper, approved by the highest levels of the Chinese party-state, makes clear the dimensions of the problem:
China still faces multiple and complicated security threats and challenges. Some country [the United States] has strengthened its Asia-Pacific military alliances, expanded its military presence in the region, and frequently makes the situation there tenser. On the issues concerning Chinas territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, some neighboring countries are taking actions that complicate or exacerbate the situation, and Japan is making trouble over the issue of the Diaoyu Islands. The threats posed by three forces, namely, terrorism, separatism and extremism, are on the rise. Changes in the form of war from mechanization to informationization are accelerating. Major powers are vigorously developing new and more sophisticated military technologies so as to ensure that they can
5 Tom Donilon, The United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013 (remarks at the Asia Society, New
York, March 11, 2013).
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maintain strategic superiorities in international competition in such areas as outer space and cyber space.6
At this moment, both sides must reclaim their separate and common destiny from historical determinism. In much of the twentieth century, the reigning deterministic paradigm was the combination of international class struggle ideology and Cold War thinking. Today, an ascendant determinism based on the idea of the inevitability of conflict among major powers is the new intellectual and practical challenge. As one Chinese senior interlocutor put it to me in January 2013, There is the idea of the rising and dominant powers heading off a cliff.
changing a major-power relationship

Two Tigers on a Mountain
The United States and China previously established a new major-power relationship in the 1970s. Equal foresight needs to be demonstrated today. Nonetheless, there is a large distinction to be made between then and now. President Nixon and Chairman Mao, and President Carter and Senior Leader Deng Xiaoping, established a new relationship between powers, but it was still a relationship of the old type, founded in the context of the Cold War and substantially based on common opposition to a third partythe Soviet Union. The relationship was less about what the two nations supported than what they opposed, although the rationale for positive relations broadened considerably thereafter. It was a new relationship between two countries in the context of old Cold War politics. The current era has presented Chinese and American leaders with a challengeto prove wrong the assumption by many in both societies that, as the Chinese saying goes, two tigers cannot live on the same mountain. This theory was given its most powerful recent expression by the theorist John J. Mearsheimer in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.7 Mearsheimer and his intellectual kindred spirits assert that dominance in world affairs equals security; that a rising economic power inevitably will convert its economic strength into hard, military power to achieve dominance and security; and that these actions inevitably create anxiety and counter-pressure from
6 Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, The Diversified Employment of Chinas
Armed Forces (Beijing, April 16, 2013) u http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/201304/16/c_132312681.htm.
7 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001).
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the previously dominant power, which seeks to limit, retard, and perhaps eliminate the capacities of the rising state. Consequently, in times of changing major-power relationships, the international system is full of danger, friction is inevitable, and war is likely. The rising power is resentful of the previously dominant powers suspected or actual resistance and privileges and can become impatient, while the status quo power becomes fearful, taking actions designed to mitigate the challenges on the horizon. Although the interplay among rising and status quo powers is challengingindeed precariousthe strategies for addressing these tensions recommended by offensive realists such as Mearsheimer rarely adequately consider the political and material resources available to achieve or maintain dominance or hegemony, the likelihood of domestic exhaustion in the course of such efforts, and the reaction of others in the international system to such steps. The ultimate irony is that efforts to achieve dominance and hegemony can siphon away resources from domestic needs to such an extent that the very foundations of comprehensive national power are drained from one or both nations.8 Using varied vocabularies, such offensive realist voices can be heard in both the United States and China. If this theory and its permutations are the lenses through which leaders and groups in both societies understand the current character of U.S.-China relations and make decisions, aspirations for cooperation will be a chimera. In the United States, one hears serious voices asserting that Chinas objective is to minimize the U.S. role in Asia. In China, one encounters the almost universal conviction that U.S. policy seeks to contain and retard Chinas growth and frustrate the nations emergence as a strong international actor for the purpose of aborting its national renewal. Conviction, however, can be the enemy of objective reality. China has worked with the United States in regional and global forums, including the East Asia Summit, the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and many other bilateral and multilateral organizations and regimes. As of 201112, the United States was host to about 194,000 Chinese students and scholars. Each country is a massive trade partner of the other, with two-way trade in 2011 surpassing $500 billion for the first time. In retrospect, U.S.-China cooperation during and after the global financial crisis of fall 2008 was impressive. These and other facts do not sustain either countrys worst interpretation of the others motives, interests, or behaviorwithout denying that there are problems, some severe.
8 An excellent piece on the flaws in offensive realist thinking is to be found in Jonathan Kirshner,
The Tragedy of Offensive Realism: Classical Realism and the Rise of China, European Journal of International Relations 18, no. 1 (2012): 53 75.
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The question can be stated quite simply as follows: How can the United States and China move from the current place of mutual mistrust to circumstances that are more stable and productive? It is through both a shared understanding of the strategic foundation of the U.S.-China relationship and the accumulation of modest, positive, and incremental steps that a new type of major-power relationship will be built, if it is to be built at all. Because mistrust is embedded so deeply in intellectual theories, bureaucratic understandings and interests, and popular anxieties, it is likely that a series of positive, incremental moves, rather than a single transformational initiative, will prove to be the most feasible path forward. The goal of finding a new type of major-power relationship is to avoid high levels of U.S.-China conflict and achieve the obvious benefits of cooperation, benefits that also would accrue to the entire global system. The current task is to specify practical steps to move both countries in this direction. In the first place, Washington and Beijing need to jointly undertake this task. Proposals premised on one side making all the accommodations or singly recognizing the error of its ways will fail. The common strategic point of departure needs to be that the United States and China are not, and need not be, adversaries and that more is to be gained from cooperation than conflict, although areas of competition and disagreement will persist and are natural. The common strategic imperative is that both countries need to focus on reforming their own domestic systems and cannot afford the painful, costly, and unnecessary diversion of having the other as an adversary. The American and Chinese people do not desire such conflict, as almost all public opinion polls in both countries make clear.9 Cooperation is especially important given that global economic, environmental, and health challenges are likely to raise security concerns that rival or supplant in importance the traditional security preoccupations of the twentieth century. This perspective must be more forcefully and persuasively articulated to interest groups and the public in both countries. The problem of the moment is that security is turning from being an issue that has bound the United States and China together (initially in common opposition to the Soviet Union and subsequently against terrorism) to one that increasingly divides them. Properly understood, common security remains at the heart of both nations needs, and security can best be advanced through cooperation. In the proposals below, I emphasize more
9 On public opinion, see Benjamin I. Page and Tao Xie, Living with the Dragon: How the American
Public Views the Rise of China (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).
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traditional understandings of security and economic cooperation, but global environmental and health issues also offer critical areas for joint work and bear greatly on both security and economic ties.
The Current Window of Opportunity: Implications of Recent Leadership Transitions

With the recently completed national-level leadership transitions in both Beijing and Washington, there are opportunities for new thinking. As for Beijing, in the wake of the eighteenth Party Congress and the twelfth National Peoples Congress, new foreign policy leaders have emerged, several with deep experience in East Asian regional relations and particularly U.S.China relations. Among these are State Councilor Yang Jiechi, Foreign Minister Wang Yi, and Beijings new ambassador to the United States, Cui Tiankai. Of course, they will be taking policy guidance from Chinas newly appointed senior leaders, including President Xi, who, as explained above, played a significant role in calling for a new type of major-power relationship. Following this transition, the Obama administration sent a strong, positive message to China through the words of Tom Donilons statement that the administration is well positioned to build on our existing relationships with Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang and other top Chinese leaders.10 There have been important changes in personnel on the U.S. side as well, though the full implications will only become clear over time. The combination of a more experienced president and new leadership in both the Department of Defense (now led by former senator Chuck Hagel) and at the Department of State (led by former senator John Kerry) may produce a fresh view of the evolving Asian regional circumstance and U.S.-China relations. Secretaries Kerry and Hagel each have their own significant individual histories, having experienced tumultuous times in Asia in the 1960s. In addition to the Vietnam experiences that shaped Kerry and Hagel, even in the short time since the departure of Secretary Clinton from office, one can see the effects on foreign policy of stringent budget constraints and the draining reality of commitments and interests in the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia. With respect to economic and budgetary realities in the United States, the current chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey, speaking on March 18, 2013, remarked on the implications for U.S. defense strategy: As I stand here today, I dont yet know whether, or if, or how much our
10 Donilon, The United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013.
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defense strategy will change, but I predict it will. Well need to relook at our assumptions, and well need to adjust our ambitions to match our abilities. And that means doing less, but not doing less well.11 These remarks must be viewed against the background of reports that Secretary Hagel has ordered the Pentagon to reconsider a sweeping military strategy that the Obama administration unveiled just last year to determine whether it is still affordable in light of recent budget cuts.12 In addition, during his confirmation hearings, nominee Kerry indicated sensitivity to how China was viewing the United States so-called pivot to Asia:
The Chinese take a look and say, What is the United States doing? [Are] they trying to circle us? Whats going on? And soevery action has its reaction. Itsnot just the law of physics; its the law of politics and diplomacy. I think we have to be thoughtful abouthow we go forward.13
After becoming secretary of state in March, Kerry did closely align himself with the Obama administrations rebalancing policy. But rebalancing as a concept has many dimensions, is less abrupt than the notion of pivot, and affords considerable room for interpretation. While Asia is becoming a region with increasing bearing on the world economy and global security, it also is the case that the United States is a global power with truly global interests and long-standing important relationships elsewhere, not least in Europe. Washington must continually balance its attention in one area with its concerns, interests, opportunities, and ties with other regions. There always will be debate about what the appropriate balance may be. For example, Vice President Biden stated during a trip to Europe in February 2013: Simply put, President Obama and I continue to believe that Europe is the cornerstone of our engagement with the rest of the world and is the catalyst for our global cooperation. Its that basic. Nothing has changed.14 Individually and taken together, these remarks should not be over-interpreted; they are nonetheless important and point to the challenges posed by resources, competing claims, shifting needs, and emergent opportunities.
11 Martin Dempsey, Gulf Roundtable with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin
Dempsey (remarks at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., March 18, 2013). See also Craig Whitlock, Budget Cutting Spurs Hagel to Order Pentagon Review of Year-Old Strategy, Washington Post, March 19, 2013.
12 Whitlock, Budget cutting spurs Hagel. 13 Paul Maley, Carr Defends Kerrys Asia Pivot, Australian, March 20, 2013. 14 Joseph Biden (remarks to the Munich Security Conference, Hotel Bayerischer Hof Munich,
Germany, February 2, 2013).
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Now is a moment in which the potential international and domestic claimants for Washingtons attention and resources are particularly numerous. Internationally, what should be the relative weight assigned to claims for U.S. attention by the carnage in Syria, the Arab-Israeli peace process, Iranian nuclear developments, and the nexus of challenges involving Afghanistan and Pakistan? And this list only covers the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia. Domestically, congressional-executive gridlock has produced a meat-ax approach to budget reductions that has fallen with particular force on defense spending. Further, as the baby-boom generation ages, the added social spending required will mount dramatically. This is not to even mention failing schools and worn infrastructure that will require huge investments. To put it bluntly, as Washington and Beijing contemplate a new relationship, it is unclear that the Obama administration actually has a strategy that creates a sustainable prioritization of world areas, is consistent with U.S. resources, has the durable support of key actors, meets domestic development needs, can win cooperation (or avoid overreaction) from China, and can keep up with rapidly changing circumstances.
what concrete steps could move u.s.-china relations forward?

Both Beijing and Washington must take steps in several domains to build a major-power relationship in the 21st century that is not premised on conflict. Some moves could be made by each nation separately and independently, but they should be parallel and reinforcing; other moves will require explicit bilateral coordination or agreement. After identifying the domains in which action can and should be taken, this essay concludes by discussing how both countries should prioritize their actionsassuming that not every initiative is equally urgent or feasible and that the scarcity of leadership and material resources necessitates choice.
Knitting the Two Societies Together

Washington and Beijing should start by looking at ties between localities in the two countries, given that a relationship rests on a foundation, and a foundation is built at ground level. A central reality of local and national politics in both China and the United States is that citizens care most about their economic and local circumstances, which importantly means employment. In the 1980s, U.S.-Japan relations were not fully stabilized until Japan began to
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intensively develop relations with U.S. localities. This often occurred through Japanese investments in employment-generating enterprises, particularly in the auto industry, which has extensive linkages to many other parts of the U.S. economy. Similarly, concurrent with the improvement of U.S.-China relations in the 1980s and 1990s was the growth in U.S. investment in China that, among other things, created employment opportunities for large numbers of Chinese citizens. U.S FDI in China currently constitutes only about 3%4% of total FDI in the country, which is significant but not high. In 2011, total U.S. FDI in China was $60.5 billion, an 8.2% rise over the preceding year.15 Chinese investment in the United States, while growing rapidly in percentage terms, is still small in absolute terms, reaching only about $6.5 billion in 2012.16 Local leaders and their representatives in the countries respective national capitals will speak and behave in more balanced and moderate ways if they see direct links between the welfare of their localities and bilateral ties. From what I have observed, members of Congress with employment-generating Chinese investment in their districts and states speak and think more moderately with respect to bilateral relations than those without such connections to China. For example, members of Congress who represent mining areas in Minnesota, the tool and die industry in Kentucky, and Silicon Valley in Northern California have seemed more supportive of strong U.S.-China ties when they could point to concrete employment benefits in their respective districts. I suspect that a similar dynamic is at work in China. All this suggests that the United States and China need to multiply and strengthen avenues for economic and other bilateral interdependencies at the local level. This implies strengthening governor-to-governor, municipality-to-municipality, and firm-level interactions between the two countries. Gatherings of U.S. and Chinese governors, for example, should be multiplied. Vehicles to increase interaction between local chambers of commerce in both countries need to be strengthened. Reinforcing such linkages is mutually beneficial and imperative. In a related and reinforcing way, national leaders need to show through their attention and travel schedules that the United States and China have a relationship that is deeper than simply the ties between their capitals
15 The U.S.-China Business Council, Foreign Direct Investment in China, 2013, https://www.
uschina.org/statistics/fdi_cumulative.html. See also Peoples Republic of China: U.S.-China Trade Facts, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Fact Sheet u http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/ china-mongolia-taiwan/peoples-republic-china. FDI in the United States: Q4 2012 Update, Rhodium Group, January 16, 2013 u http://rhg.com/ notes/chinese-fdi-in-the-united-states-q4-2012-update, fig. 1.
16 See Chinese Direct Investment in the United States, 20002012, in Thilo Hanemann, Chinese
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and coastal financial and trade centersthis is a relationship between two societies. President Xi Jinpings decision while vice president to travel to Muscatine, Iowa, was just the right signal to send in 2012. His visit to this quite typical American locality sent the message that he realized that in both continent-sized countries failure to include the heartland in future initiatives will weaken ties. His visit to Muscatine was not so different from the message that his visit to Hebei Province recently carried at home. To a considerable extent, leaders in Washington and Beijing follow the sentiments of their respective heartlands. In both capitals, national leaders should issue a directive to their schedulers of foreign trips that in any trip to the United States or China, respectively, at least one-third of the time should be spent off the coasts of the country. This strategy would have many potential benefits, not least by allowing U.S. and Chinese leaders to see the diversity of views and conditions with which their counterparts must cope. Another advantage is that visiting localities, particularly in the United States, mobilizes the local and regional mass media that bring an entirely different focus to news coverage. Local travel is thus a way to broaden public debate beyond the preoccupations of the national media conglomerates.
Relationship Management at the National Level

National-level leaders in the United States and China are inundated with domestic problems and international challenges. It is quite natural that the urgent issues of today overwhelm the important problems of tomorrow. Yet there is no more important international relationship than that of the United States and China. Bilateral relations work most smoothly when each side clearly designates a very senior leader with overall day-to-day responsibility for ties. There is a strong correlation between prominent and effective relationship managers and progress in bilateral relations. Just looking at the U.S. side, Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Sandy Berger, Robert Zoellick, and Henry Paulson come to mind (and in each instance there were equally strong and capable Chinese counterparts). In some cases, U.S. presidents and their counterparts in senior Chinese leadership have been the relationship managersGeorge H.W. Bush is a good example, as were Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin on the Chinese side. By contrast, in periods where there was a lack of clarity about who was in charge, relationship management was generally less successful. The first term of Bill Clinton may be an example in this regard, while his second term was much more effectively managed. The enemy of productive bilateral relations is the absence of an authoritative voice
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in each society to guide and resolve frictions within and between the U.S. and Chinese systems on a daily basis. With respect to dialogue mechanisms for managing U.S.-China relations, the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) process has not been without its successes. These include deepening strategic dialogue, forcing the two countries administrations to bring together the relationships many stakeholders, and producing the related Asia-Pacific Consultations. However, the S&ED involves too many people, meets too infrequently (even taking into account working groups), and discusses too many topics. The dialogue thus at times seems more concerned with public relations than relationship management. Looking ahead, both countries should place more emphasis on getting the right five people from each side in a room, and doing so more frequently. The two presidents need to meet once or twice a year to discuss both the strategic foundations of the relationship and the practical policies that will drive the countries respective bureaucracies forward. While these recommendations ask a lot of senior leaders in terms of their calendars and attention, if such time is not found, problems will fester and multiply. This is not to say that several phone conversations a year and meetings on the sidelines of multilateral forums are unimportant, but rather that more sustained leadership attention and interaction is required. The foundation for such intensified interaction that was built by Vice President Biden and then vice president Xi through their extended conversations provides a sound basis for progress in this direction. The following discussion will offer recommendations concerning subsets of relationship management at the national level deserving of separate consideration: crisis management, military-to-military ties, and actions that unnecessarily offend large numbers of people in the other countrys society. Crisis management. U.S.-China relations seem accident-prone. Given the increasing number of points at which the two societies touch one another, it is certain that there will be miscalculations, mistakes, and accidents. At the moment, dangers lurk in the East China Sea, and the 1999 accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and the 2001 collision of U.S. and Chinese aircraft near Hainan Province come to mind from the recent past. Moreover, crises can be multilateralthe global financial crisis of 2008 being one example that both sides handled rather well in retrospect. Among the several prerequisites for successful crisis management are two things: first, as early as practicable in a crisis, the most senior leaders need to be in direct contact with each other; second, both leaders should try to slow
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down the action-reaction cycle that often is accelerated by mass media and instantaneous communication. In the past, however, direct communication between senior leadership has been too slow and episodic and the acceleration and amplification of mass media has been too great. Senior leaders thus need to make an effort to speak more to each other and less through the mass media megaphone making threats and demands. This is true in both systems. Military-to-military relations. There has been a pattern to past U.S.-China military-to-military ties in which these linkages are the first to be sacrificed in times of stress and the last element of the relationship to be restored in periods of relaxation and progress. This pattern has characterized the actions of both countries at different times. At the moment, military-to-military ties are on an upswing, but it is likely that stresses will be episodic. The counterproductive pattern of the past should be explicitly rejected by both sides. It often is said that military-to-military ties cannot be insulated from broader political and popular currents, and this certainly is true to an extent. But given that the cost of this linkage is high in terms of growing mistrust, mutual ignorance, and crisis management, leaders in both countries should explain this to their people and make greater effort to insulate bilateral military-to-military relations from the passions of the moment. The essence of the paradigm of major-power conflict is that the stair-step pattern of acquiring ever more hard power is inevitable and zero-sum and that conflict is nearly unavoidable. This paradigm, therefore, puts the U.S. and Chinese security establishments at the very heart of the bilateral problem. The principal way to break free of this dilemma, if there is a way out, is to increase positive interactions between the two countries security establishments across all services and levels. Specifically, this means increasing interaction among junior and midlevel officers, as well as at senior levels, and broadening exchanges beyond foreign area and intelligence establishments. The United States and China also must use their military capacities cooperatively in humanitarian and crisis circumstances, establish common rules of the road for their armed forces, and provide public goods on the high seas, as they are already doing successfully in the Gulf of Aden. Finally, each country must work to better understand how it views both its own security circumstances and doctrines and those of the other country. If the two sides simply see such efforts as covert intelligence operations, the situation will not improve. Avoiding gratuitous, unnecessary offenses. In both societies there are impulses, organizations, and interests leading one country to engage in
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activities that anger large numbers of persons in the other. I have in mind the domains of military, intelligence, and private-sector surveillance. It is the United States position, adopted on a global basis, that international law and practice confer on it (and others) the right to operate beyond twelve miles of all shores in the world, acquiring information or simply plying the seas. This surveillance, however, is deeply disturbing to many Chinese. The twelvemile limit was set in an age when twelve miles was a considerable cushion, which today it is not. Without arguing about whether the twelve-mile limit ought to be reconsidered, wise political leaders should constantly assess whether the ill-feelings generated by these frequent activities are worth the presumed gains. Likewise, actual and suspected cyber activities by individuals and organizations acting in China and directed at the U.S. private sector (in particular) are becoming equally corrosive in the American mind. Tom Donilon, for example, stated publicly on March 11, 2013, that cyber concerns have moved to the forefront of the U.S. agenda.17 U.S. and Chinese leaders need to ask themselves: Are we doing things that simply alienate one society from the other? Are the presumed gains worth the costs? Agreements do not even have to be reached formally; behavior simply needs to change. President Nixons move in 1969 to remove two destroyers from regular patrols of the Taiwan Strait did a great deal to lay the foundation for a dramatic improvement in bilateral relations thereafter. There was no agreement, just wise action. The key point is that each side must find ways to accommodate in some measure the views and sensitivities of the other, not least those of their citizens. Just because one country can do things does not mean that it is in that countrys overall long-term interests to do so.
Third-Party Management
Managing a two-party relationship is hardintroducing third parties increases complexity and risk. By virtue of their respective histories, legacies of the Cold War, and simple geographic locations, the United States and China have valued relationships and local sensitivities that are problematic when dealing with each other. Cuba, Venezuela, and North Korea are neuralgic for the United States; U.S. interactions with Chinas neighbors are sensitive to Beijing, especially on the Korean Peninsula and with Vietnam, not to mention the special case of Taiwan. Sometimes, the divergent interests of U.S and Chinese friends make it difficult for both countries
17 Donilon, The United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013.
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to maintain stability in bilateral relations. On occasion, Washington and Beijing thus need to exert a restraining influence on friends and others whose actions could affect the stability of the U.S.-China relationship. A good example is the restraint President George W. Bush exerted over Taiwans Chen Shui-bian in 2003 and thereafter. To the degree that China has attempted to moderate Pyongyangs behavior from time to time, that is also welcome.18 Friends who refuse to act in ways that are consistent with each countrys respective interests need to be reminded of their broader obligations. Currently, Chinas relations with North Korea and U.S. relations with Japan come to mind. For example, it is unlikely that Washington would have allocated anti-ballistic missile assets so promptly toward Asia (in the process slowing the deployment of Europe-oriented assets) had it not been for North Koreas recent nuclear testing, missile launching, and hyperbolic rhetoric. This dynamic is not one Beijing would prefer to see.
Regional Institutionalization
The Asian approach to conflict management emphasizes the utility of inclusive regional institutions and consultation. Beyond the five U.S. bilateral alliances in the region, which by definition do not include China and which are long-term features of the landscape, there have been tendencies to build economic, security, and other cooperative structures that were not initially conceived as including both China and the United Statesfor example, ASEAN +3, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.19 Gratifyingly, there are also organizations that embrace both nations, such as the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Regional Forum. The strategic objectives of both sides ought to prioritize working toward a higher density of inclusive, rather than exclusive, organizations. In Northeast Asia, for example, if Washington and Beijing could ever move beyond the problems involving Pyongyang, a Northeast Asian security framework would be a good step forward. In the trade arena, the focus ought to be on free-trade arrangements that include both China and the United States, not on frameworks that seem indifferent or opposed to one or the other country being included. Exclusionary examples include Beijing pushing the ASEAN +3 arrangement and the initial tone of the TPP negotiating framework and participants promoted by Washington.
18 China Punishes North Korea for Nuclear Tests, Associated Press, March 23, 2013. 19 With respect to the TPP, the Obama administration has repeatedly said that it does not seek to
preclude Chinese entry at an appropriate time and under appropriate entry conditions in the future.
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thinking about priorities

This essay has identified several relatively concrete steps that can, and should, be taken in pursuit of a new type of major-power relationship between the United States and China. Though material resources are a constraint on pursuing all of the items on this agenda simultaneously, even more limited is the necessary leadership attention and political capital. Priorities must be established. How can we best think about establishing priorities and taking essential first steps? Both human experience and the lessons learned in managing the bilateral relationship over the last 40 or more years suggest that, as Abraham Maslow said, there is a hierarchy of human needs in which individuals, groups, and societies emphasize security over economic needs, and economics over other cultural and self-actualization concerns. Sensible policy priorities will reflect this natural prioritization. This finding suggests that the United States and China ought to tackle the key security and economic issues in the relationship first. Also, there is the happy fact that on the cultural and educational front, the two countries respective societies are sufficiently dynamic that, though the government should be supportive of activities, private and civic energies can be extensively harnessed. Looking at the list of recommendations discussed above, emphasis should be placed on the following three items: 1. The United States and China should improve cooperation and mutual strategic understanding at the pinnacle of their political systems and thicken communications and cooperation between their military establishments. This includes pursuing more effective crisis management and internal foreign policy and security coordination within both countries. 2. The two countries should deepen economic interdependencies between their respective societies, particularly employmentgenerating enterprises among states, provinces, and localities. This means tearing down unnecessary roadblocks to investment and making investments there already more securefor example, through a bilateral investment treaty. 3. The United States and China should build regional and multilateral security and economic structures encompassing both countries and not move toward a balkanized pattern that drives them apart. Under each of these broad headings are a myriad of specific initiatives and cooperative programs that could be either initiated or strengthened if
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they currently exist. Perhaps a good way to start building on this framework is for the leaders of both countries to form a wise person group consisting of influential individuals in both societies who could jointly conceptualize and recommend specific next steps. As one Chinese analyst put it recently: Focus on cooperation, not mutual trust. Mutual trust is based on cooperation. [W]e should have preventive cooperation.20
20 Authors interview with a senior Chinese academic, Beijing, January 16, 2013.
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Chinas Transition to a More Credible Nuclear Deterrent: Implications and Challenges for the United States
Michael S. Chase
michael s. chase is an Associate Professor in the Warfare Analysis and
Research Department at the U.S. Naval War College. The views expressed in this article are the authors own and do not necessarily represent those of the Navy, Department of Defense, or any other U.S. government agency. Dr. Chase can be reached at <michael.chase@usnwc.edu>.
keywords: china; nuclear policy; strategic deterrence; ballistic

missiles; u.s.-china relationship
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executive summary
This article examines the modernization of Chinas nuclear missile force and assesses the implications for the U.S.
main argument
Chinas no first use nuclear policy and assured retaliation strategy have remained relatively constant over the years. Recent doctrinal publications, however, suggest that the countrys nuclear missiles could also help deter conventional strategic attacks. Moreover, China is currently modernizing and expanding its nuclear force with the deployment of road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles and the development of a submarinelaunched ballistic missile to arm its new nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. After decades of reliance on a small and potentially vulnerable strategic deterrent, China is finally achieving the lean and effective nuclear force Chinese strategists believe their country needs to protect its security. As a result of these growing nuclear-deterrence capabilities, nuclear issues will likely assume greater importance in the U.S.-China relationship.
policy implications
Chinas transition to a more secure second-strike capability is likely to contribute to greater strategic stability in the U.S.-China relationship, but Chinas larger and more sophisticated nuclear force will also create challenges for U.S. policymakers. Trying to trump Chinas retaliatory capability through a large-scale missile defense build-up would be costly and counterproductive for the U.S. Instead, Washington should limit missile defenses intended to protect the U.S. homeland to a level appropriate for dealing with the much smaller threat posed by North Korea, and pursue strategic stability with China through mutual deterrence. Washington should also continue pressing for an official U.S.-China dialogue on strategic deterrence, one that encompasses nuclear, space, cyber, and conventional military capabilities.
chasechina s transition to a more credible nuclear deterrent
or many years, Chinas relatively small nuclear force and stated adherence to a policy of no first use (NFU) of nuclear weapons limited its salience in global debates about nuclear issues. However, the countrys growing strategic-deterrence capabilities suggest this will soon change. Indeed, as a result of Chinas transition to a larger and more sophisticated nuclear force, which will be centered on road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) armed with submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), China is likely to become a more important consideration in such discussions. As the countrys strategic-deterrence capabilities grow, nuclear issues appear poised to assume greater significance in the U.S.-China security relationship. The reasons for their increasing importance include heightened U.S. attention to Asia-Pacific security issues, the changing balance of conventional military power in the region, rising tensions over maritime territorial disputes, and the implications of Chinas growing nuclear capabilities for future arms control initiatives.1 Chinas nuclear policy and strategy appear to have remained relatively constant over the years, but recent doctrinal publications suggest that Chinese strategists see a role for nuclear capabilities in deterring certain types of conventional strategic attacks. At the same time, the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) is modernizing its nuclear forces to enhance their survivability, increase their striking power, and counter missile-defense developments. Official Chinese sources indicate that Beijings goal is fielding a lean and effective nuclear force that meets its evolving national security needs.2 China currently maintains the DF-3 intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) and DF-21 and DF-21A medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM) for theater nuclear-deterrence missions. The countrys nuclear ICBM force consists of the older, limited-range DF-4, the silo-based DF-5, and the recently deployed road-mobile DF-31 and DF-31A. According to the U.S. Department of Defense, China is enhancing its silo-based systems, deploying more road-mobile ICBMs, and preparing to take its strategic deterrent to sea
1 See Elbridge A. Colby and Abraham M. Denmark, Nuclear Weapons and U.S.-China Relations: A
Way Forward, Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2013.
2 Jing Zhiyuan, Jianshe jinggan youxiao zhanlue daodan budui wei weihu shijie he anquan gongxian
liliang [Creating a Lean and Effective Strategic Missile Troop Contributing to International Nuclear Security], Zhongguo jundui 6, no. 2 (2010): 47.
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as a new generation of SSBNs enters service with the PLA Navy (PLAN).3 (It should be noted, however, that the new submarines still await their intended armament, the JL-2 SLBM, which remains under development.) In addition, China may be developing a new road-mobile ICBM, possibly capable of carrying multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV).4 The transition to more advanced road-mobile ICBMs and SSBNs is particularly significant in that it provides China with a much more survivable nuclear force. Although the countrys limited nuclear transparency complicates efforts to predict future developments, recent trends offer a reasonable guide to understanding the likely future direction of Chinese nuclear force modernization. In recent years, China has focused on enhancing the survivability and striking power of its strategic deterrent. This suggests that over the next five to ten years, Beijing can be expected to continue shifting to a larger and more survivable nuclear force composed primarily of road-mobile ICBMs and SSBNs. Even as Chinas nuclear force continues to increase in size and sophistication, Beijing is highly unlikely to seek numerical parity with the United States and Russia, even if the U.S. and Russian arsenals fall to numbers well below current levels. According to General Jing Zhiyuan, former commander of the Second Artillery Force (which controls the PLAs strategic missiles), Chinas limited development of nuclear weapons will not compete in quantity with the nuclear superpowers. Instead, Jing writes that Beijing intends to maintain the lowest level of nuclear weapons that is sufficient to safeguard its national security.5 Nonetheless, this statement indicates that China will deploy the forces it perceives as required for an assured retaliation capability, which is likely to entail considerable growth in the size of its nuclear missile force. Indeed, according to the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, the number of Chinese ICBMs capable of reaching the United States probably will more than double by 2025.6 Chinas transition to a more secure second-strike capability will likely contribute to greater strategic stability in the U.S.-China relationship, a goal
3 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples
Republic of China 2012 (Washington, D.C., May 2012); and Ronald L. Burgess Jr., Annual Threat Assessment, statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 16, 2012 u http://www.dia.mil/public-affairs/testimonies/2012-02-16.html. The May 2012 edition of the annual report on Chinese military power and the February 2012 testimony from the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency contain the most recent publicly available assessments by the U.S. government of Chinas nuclear forces.
4 Burgess, Annual Threat Assessment. 5 Jing, Jianshe jinggan youxiao zhanlue daodan budui wei weihu shijie he anquan gongxian liliang. 6 Burgess, Annual Threat Assessment.
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that is emphasized in the most recent U.S. Nuclear Posture Review.7 At the same time, however, Chinas larger and more sophisticated nuclear force will create challenges for the United States. Some scholars have suggested that a more powerful nuclear force could embolden China to behave more aggressively in a regional crisis.8 Even if it does not, Beijings growing nuclear capabilities could still pose other challenges for the United States. In particular, the modernization of the PLAs nuclear force could complicate future arms-control negotiations, while aspects of Chinese doctrine for conducting nuclear-deterrence operations could increase the risk of escalation during a serious crisis or conventional conflict between China and another nuclear power. Trying to trump Chinas nuclear retaliatory capability would be costly and counterproductive. Instead, the United States can best protect its security interests by maintaining its own strategic-deterrence capabilities at an appropriate level and pursuing an enhanced U.S.-China strategic dialogue about nuclear issues, one that will ultimately need to encompass space, cyber, and conventional security issues. This article is divided into three sections:
u
The first section (pp. 7388) examines the evolution of Chinese nuclear policy and Chinas approach to nuclear deterrence. The second section (pp. 8895) assesses Chinas modernization and expansion of its nuclear forces and outlines potential future developments. The third section (pp. 95101) addresses the implications of these trends for the United States and offers specific recommendations for maintaining strategic stability in the U.S.-China relationship as China continues to improve its nuclear capabilities.
chinese nuclear policy and strategy

Any analysis of Chinese nuclear policy and strategy must begin with an assessment of Chinas perception of the international security environment and its implications for the countrys domestic, foreign, and security policies. Since 1985, when Deng Xiaoping declared that the main global strategic trend of the era was peace and development, the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) has seen its external security environment as much more favorable than the one it confronted during the 1960s and 1970s. Indeed, Dengs assessment
7 U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report (Washington, D.C., April 2010). 8 Thomas J. Christensen, The Meaning of the Nuclear Evolution: Chinas Strategic Modernization
and U.S.-China Security Relations, Journal of Strategic Studies 35, no. 4 (2012): 44787.
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represented a reversal of Mao Zedongs focus on war and revolution and signaled a clear departure from Maos insistence that the PLA prepare for early war, major war, and nuclear war. In contrast, Deng suggested that greatpower war was unlikely, and nuclear war even less so, meaning that China could prioritize economic development and the PLA could focus on army building. Beijing continues to characterize peace and development as the keynote of the times, and the international security environment is seen as favorable to Chinas economic development.9 Nonetheless, Chinese analysts view the contemporary international security environment as one that is increasingly complex and presents their country with a variety of challenges.
The Contemporary Security Environment and the Role of Nuclear Weapons

Beijings most recent defense white paper, issued in April 2013, summarizes the international security environment as follows:
Since the beginning of the new century, profound and complex changes have taken place in the world, but peace and development remain the underlying trends of our times. The global trends toward economic globalization and multi-polarity are intensifying, cultural diversity is increasing, and an information society is fast emerging. The balance of international forces is shifting in favor of maintaining world peace, and on the whole the international situation remains peaceful and stable. Meanwhile, however, the world is still far from being tranquil. There are signs of increasing hegemonism, power politics and neo-interventionism.10
Turning to the situation in the Asia-Pacific region, the document proclaims: The Asia-Pacific region has become an increasingly significant stage for world economic development and strategic interaction between major powers. The U.S. is adjusting its Asia-Pacific security strategy, and the regional landscape is undergoing profound changes.11 Specifically, the white paper underscores Beijings concerns that the United States is taking a more active role in regional security issues as it becomes increasingly concerned that Chinas
9 Dengs judgment was seriously debated in 1999 by Chinese leaders following the NATO
intervention in Kosovo and the accidental U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, but the conclusion was that peace and development remained the main theme of the times. Nonetheless, that debate also resulted in greater concerns about U.S. strategic intentions and a consensus in favor of higher defense spending. See David M. Finkelstein, China Reconsiders its National Security: The Great Peace and Development Debate of 1999, CNA Corporation, December 2000. China (PRC), The Diversified Employment of Chinas Armed Forces (Beijing, April 2013), available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-04/16/c_132312681.htm.
10 For the English version, see Information Office of the State Council of the Peoples Republic of
11 Ibid.
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rising economic, political, and military power will challenge U.S. interests. The document also highlights Beijings growing wariness about what many Chinese analysts interpret as Washingtons desire to contain China. In the white papers words, some country has strengthened its Asia-Pacific military alliances, expanded its military presence in the region, and frequently makes the situation there tenser.12 Within this broader context, the statements of Chinese scholars and senior leaders indicate that nuclear weapons continue to play an important role in safeguarding Chinas national security. Specifically, Chinese analysts hold that nuclear weapons are valuable tools for deterring nuclear attack, protecting national security interests, and cementing Chinas great-power status. For example, Wang Zhongchun of the PLAs National Defense University asserts:
Chinas nuclear weapons play multiple strategic roles. First, nuclear weapons hold up Chinas power status and its position as one of the five permanent members of the United Nations [Security Council]. Second, as a retaliatory strategic force, nuclear weapons are an indispensable deterrent to those nuclear states that put China on their nuclear strike lists. Finally, nuclear weapons, as an assassins mace, can be used at a time when Chinas core national security and development interests are fundamentally undermined.13
The statements of senior Chinese leaders are consistent with this assessment. In December 2012, for example, Xi Jinping, newly elevated to general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and chairman of the Central Military Commission, described Chinas strategic missile force as the core strength of Chinas strategic deterrence, the strategic support for the countrys status as a major power, and an important cornerstone safeguarding national security.14
Chinese Views on Nuclear Deterrence

Chinas views on nuclear deterrence and its nuclear policy and strategy have shaped the evolution of its force structure in important ways.15 Although not clearly articulated for many years, Chinas approach has apparently been
12 See Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, The Diversified Employment of Chinas
Armed Forces.
13 Wang Zhongchun, Nuclear Challenges and Chinas Choices, China Security, no. 5 (2007): 61. 14 See Xi Jinping Calls for Powerful Missile Force, Xinhua, December 5, 2012; and Wei Fenghe and
Zhang Haiyang, Nuli jianshe qiangda de xinxihua zhanle daodan budui [Dilligently Build a Powerful, Informatized Strategic Missile Force], Peoples Daily, December 13, 2012. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2007).
15 Jeffrey Lewis, The Minimum Means of Reprisal: Chinas Search for Security in the Nuclear Age
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relatively consistent since its first nuclear test in 1964. This was the case even as Beijing worked toward the development of the assured retaliation capability it desired to deter potential adversaries, principally the Soviet Union and the United States, from using nuclear weapons against China or coercing it with nuclear threats.16 The 2006 defense white paper provided the first official explanation of the PRCs nuclear policy and strategy:
Chinas nuclear strategy is subject to the states nuclear policy and military strategy. Its fundamental goal is to deter other countries from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against China. China remains firmly committed to the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances. It unconditionally undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclearweapon-free zones, and stands for the comprehensive prohibition and complete elimination of nuclear weapons. China upholds the principles of counterattack in self-defense and limited development of nuclear weapons, and aims at building a lean and effective nuclear force capable of meeting national security needs. It endeavors to ensure the security and reliability of its nuclear weapons and maintains a credible nuclear deterrent force. Chinas nuclear force is under the direct command of the Central Military Commission (CMC). China exercises great restraint in developing its nuclear force. It has never entered into and will never enter into a nuclear arms race with any other country.17
Although representing the first official articulation of Chinas nuclear policy and strategy, the 2006 defense white paper reflected a long-standing approach to these issues. Indeed, the main aspects of the nuclear policy and strategy outlined in itincluding the emphasis on deterrence of nuclear attack, no first use of nuclear weapons, highly centralized command and control, and a nuclear force that is lean and effectivecan be traced to earlier publications. One of the most important of these is the 1987 edition of Science of Strategy, an important Chinese military publication by the PLAs Academy of Military Science, which states, Chinas nuclear strategy is defensive in nature, but if an enemy is first to use nuclear weapons, China will resolutely implement a nuclear counter-strike and carry out nuclear retaliation.18 Furthermore, it outlines the mission of the nuclear missile force as follows:
In peacetime, the mission of the Second Artillery is to bring nuclear deterrence into play, so as to deter enemies from launching a nuclear war against China, and to support Chinas peaceful
16 M. Taylor Fravel and Evan S. Medeiros, Chinas Search for Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of
Chinese Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure, International Security 35, no. 2 (2010): 4887. December 2006), available at http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/194421.htm.
17 Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, Chinas National Defense in 2006 (Beijing, 18 Gao Rui, ed., Zhanlexue [The Science of Strategy] (Beijing: Junshi kexue chunbanshe, 1987), 237.
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foreign policy.In wartime, the strategic mission is to prevent conventional war from escalating into nuclear war, and to contain the escalation of nuclear war; andif China suffers the enemys nuclear attackto conduct a nuclear counter-attack, striking the enemys strategic targets and weakening its war potential and strategic attack forces.19
Accordingly, the basic guiding thought of the Second Artillery includes principles such as centralized command, striking after the enemy has struck, close protection, and key-point counterstrikes.20 Perhaps most importantly, Chinas nuclear counterstrike must take effectiveness [youxiaoxing] as the foundation. To achieve this objective, it is necessary to continuously move toward mobile launch and miniaturization developments, further increase the survivability of the strategic missiles, improve their ability to penetrate and their accuracy, and appropriately increase the number of missiles and launch units, and improve operational command and support systems.21 Subsequently, a variety of authoritative publications on missile-force campaigns and nuclear deterrence have shed further light on Chinas nuclear strategy.22 For example, Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, the editors of the 2001 edition of Science of Strategy, divide nuclear-deterrence strategies and postures into three categories: maximum nuclear deterrence, minimum nuclear deterrence, and medium-strength nuclear deterrence (zhongdeng qiangdu heweishe). They indicate that medium-strength nuclear deterrence requires a sufficient and effective nuclear strike force to threaten an opponent by imposing on him unbearable destruction, to a certain extent, so as to attain ones deterrent objective.23 The Chinese concept of effective deterrence, which is based on an assured-retaliation capability that must evolve in response to changes in the offensive and defensive capabilities of potential adversaries, appears most similar to the concept of mediumstrength nuclear deterrence. Indeed, M. Taylor Fravel and Evan S. Medeiros note that this definitionespecially the explicit reference to the concepts of sufficiency and effectivenessstrongly resembles PLA descriptions of Chinas
19 Gao, Zhanlexue, 115. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid., 116. 22 These include Wang Hongqing and Zhang Xingye, eds., Zhanyixue [The Science of Campaigns]
(Beijing: Guofang daxue chubanshe, May 2000); Xue Xinglin, ed., Zhanyi lilun xuexi zhinan [Campaign Theory Study Guide] (Beijing: Guofang daxue chubanshe, 2001); and Zhang Yuliang, ed., Zhanyixue [The Science of Campaigns] (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2006). chunbanshe, 2001), 235.
23 Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, eds., Zhanlexue [The Science of Strategy] (Beijing: Junshi kexue
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own nuclear strategy and is consistent with the concept of deterrence through assured retaliation.24 These newly available sources also address the types of enemy actions that China believes its nuclear capability can help deter. First and foremost, official publications make it clear that the main role for Chinas nuclear weapons is to deter an enemy from launching a nuclear attack or attempting to coerce or intimidate China with nuclear threats. The former deputy commander of the Second Artillery, Zhao Xijun, states that the strategic missile force in particular is a strong shield for maintaining national security because it deters other nuclear powers from threatening to strike China. According to Zhao, anyone who wants to conduct a nuclear strike on China must also sustain a nuclear strike. China has limited strategic missiles, but the consequences of nuclear retaliation are still strong enough to ensure that the enemy would lose more than it would gain.25 The strategic missile force is also an effective means to prevent wars from breaking out, as well as an important weight in containing the escalation of war.26 The major powers often try to threaten or coerce other countries, but they are very cautious about threatening countries that are armed with nuclear weapons. It is important to note that Chinese doctrinal publications such as Science of Second Artillery Campaigns (SSAC) continue to reflect the official NFU policy that is outlined in books, articles, and official documents (e.g., national defense white papers). These publications assume that Second Artillery nuclear forces would launch their weapons only after an enemy first strike. For example, SSAC indicates that Chinese missile forces would have to conduct nuclear counterstrikes after suffering heavy damage from an enemy nuclear attack:
Based on the principle that our country will not be the first to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances, the strategic nuclear forces of the Second Artillery will implement nuclear counterattacks only after the enemy has carried out nuclear attacks against China, and only in accordance with the orders of the supreme command. Therefore, as a whole, nuclear counterattack campaigns will be implemented under nuclear conditions. If the enemy launches nuclear attacks against our country, it will definitely treat the operational positions and nuclear missile weapon systems of the Second Artillery as its key targets. After Second Artillery operational areas suffer such attacks, the battlefield situation becomes very complex and
24 Fravel and Medeiros, Chinas Search for Assured Retaliation, 78. 25 Zhao Xijun, Shezhandaodan weishe zongheng tan [Intimidation Warfare: A Comprehensive
Discussion of Missile Deterrence] (Beijing: Guofang daxue chubanshe, May 2005), 3031.
26 Ibid., 31.
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the environment extremely harsh. Our personnel, weapons and equipment, battle positions, roads and bridges, and reconnaissance, communications, and command and control systems will suffer serious damage and destruction. The nuclear counterattack campaign of the Second Artillery will have to be implemented under very difficult conditions.27
This analysis is consistent with the writings of Chinese scholars who assert that China will continue to adhere to a NFU policy. Yet some of these doctrinal sources suggest that Chinese strategists expect nuclear deterrence not only to prevent an enemy from using nuclear weapons against China, but also to deter certain types of strategic conventional attacks. For example, Zhao suggests that Chinas capability for nuclear retaliation may also deter an enemy from carrying out conventional strikes that could heighten the risk of nuclear escalation.28 SSAC reaches a similar conclusion:
Deterring the escalation of warfare refers primarily to the application of nuclear weapons to carry out active and passive deterrence, in order to prevent a conventional war from escalating into a nuclear war; to prevent the enemy from carrying out a conventional strike against our nuclear facilities and creating nuclear leakage; and to prevent the enemy from causing unbearably tremendous losses to our major, strategic facilities through medium- and high-powered air raids against us. The demonstration of power causes the enemy to dread that the possible consequence of its actions will be that its losses will exceed its gains, thereby causing the enemy to change its plans for risky activities and achieving the goal of restricting the war to a certain scope.29
SSAC and other sources indicate that in a PLA joint campaign against a nuclear-armed adversary, the Second Artillerys nuclear missile force would likely be expected to conduct nuclear-deterrence operations as a backstop to support conventional missile strikes. In such a conflict, China expects that missile forces would operate under conditions that may involve nuclear threats against these units. As SSAC puts it, one of the key characteristics of Second Artillery campaigns is that in future informatized wars, the Second Artillery will conduct operations under nuclear or nuclear deterrence conditions. Specifically, SSAC observes:
The conventional missile strike campaign of the Second Artillery will be implemented under nuclear deterrence conditions. Future wars mainly will be conventional local wars, but the major military
27 Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) Second Artillery Force, Dierpaobing zhanyixue [The Science of
Second Artillery Campaigns] (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 2004), 59.
28 Zhao, Shezhandaodan weishe zongheng tan, 31. 29 PLA Second Artillery Force, Dierpaobing zhanyixue, 27374.
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powers in the world that are armed with nuclear weapons have never pledged that they will not use nuclear weapons first, and in some local wars, they have used nuclear coercion many times. Therefore, when the Second Artillery carries out conventional missile strike campaigns under informatized conditions, it will necessarily be subject to the nuclear coercion of the large nuclear powers. Moreover, among the local conflicts or wars that may break out along Chinas periphery, there is an even greater possibility of nuclear coercion. For this reason, whether it is a nuclear counterstrike campaign or a conventional missile strike campaign, either one will be seriously threatened by nuclear weapons.30
As a result, because future wars will involve conventional operations under nuclear-deterrence conditions, deterrence actions by nuclear missile forces will have a major influence on actual combat operations.31 Furthermore, SSAC maintains that because future joint campaigns will be part of conventional local wars that take place under nuclear-deterrence conditions, they will necessarily involve the deterrence activities of the Second Artillerys nuclear missile units.32 Under such circumstances, the Second Artillerys nuclear missile forces will serve as a powerful backup supporting conventional strength (zhichi changgui liliang de jianqiang houdun).33 While not necessarily implying that China would seriously consider nuclear escalation in response to conventional threats, this analysis does suggest that Beijing would rely on its nuclear retaliatory capability to constrain an adversarys options. As SSAC notes, because of the tremendous destructive power of nuclear warheads, people turn pale at the talk of nuclear weapons (tanhe sebian). Such weapons are thus a strong nuclear backstop for ensuring the status of large countries and a potentially huge resource for deterrence.34 The fear of possible nuclear retaliation is so great that it would cause an adversary to be very cautious, even when fighting a conventional war against China. As a result, a nuclear threat could constrain the enemys options in ways that make it easier for China to conduct conventional military operations:
In local wars under informatized conditions, simply by moderately revealing nuclear strength, it is possible to flexibly use many types of deterrence methods; when the enemy uses informatized conventional air raids to attack us, they cannot help but to
30 PLA Second Artillery Force, Dierpaobing zhanyixue, 59. 31 Zhao, Shezhandaodan weishe zongheng tan, 93. 32 PLA Second Artillery Force, Dierpaobing zhanyixue, 160. 33 Ibid., 122. At the same time, Second Artillery nuclear forces must ensure their survival so that they
can prepare to carry out counterstrikes if ordered to do so.
34 Ibid., 274.
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prudently consider the possibility that they might pay a price that would be very difficult to bear, thus achieving the objective of supporting conventional operations.35
This passage illustrates one of the ways in which the SSAC editors view nuclear weapons as a backstop to support conventional operations.36 Beyond the information that can be gleaned from official military sources, several Chinese scholars have written articles and chapters that attempt to describe and analyze Chinas nuclear policy and strategy. Li Bin of Tsinghua University argues that Chinas nuclear strategy is best characterized as counter nuclear coercion (fan he weiya) rather than minimum deterrence (zuidi heweishe).37 In making this argument, he highlights what he sees as Beijings long-standing emphasis on countering superpower nuclear threats. Li defines coercion as an action intended to force others to yield to oneself. He states that Chinas nuclear strategy is a counter coercion strategy in that it underscores Beijings determination not to yield to a nuclear rival.38 Li also argues that meeting a McNamaralike criterion for unacceptable damage is unnecessary to deter an adversary. On the contrary, he concludes that because of the destructive power of nuclear weapons, the relationship between the psychological effect produced by nuclear weapons and the number of nuclear weapons is not very close.39 Many other Chinese scholars, however, continue to discuss Chinas nuclear strategy in terms of minimum deterrence, even as they point out that its force-structure requirements have changed over time in response to perceived challenges posed by intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); missile defense; and long-range conventional precision-strike capabilities. Shen Dingli of Fudan University argues that Chinas nuclear strategy is a type of minimum deterrence, one that is commensurate with its NFU doctrine.40 Shen highlights what he characterizes as the uniqueness of Chinas approach to nuclear deterrence among the acknowledged nuclear-weapon states, which he attributes in large part to its status as the only permanent member of the UN Security Council that adheres to an NFU policy. Because
35 PLA Second Artillery Force, Dierpaobing zhanyixue, 274. 36 Ibid., 273. 37 Li Bin, Zhongguo hezhanlue bianxi [Understanding Chinas Nuclear Strategy], Shijie jingji yu
zhengzhi, no. 9 (2006): 1622.
38 Li Bin, Chinas Nuclear Strategy (presentation at the Carnegie International Nonproliferation
Conference, Washington, D.C., June 25, 2007).
39 Li, Zhongguo hezhanlue bianxi,1622. 40 Shen Dingli, Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century, China Security, no. 1 (2005): 10.
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its policy and strategy are limited to preparing for nuclear retaliation, China needs fewer nuclear weapons than the other major nuclear powers. It also does not need the highly accurate strike capabilities required to launch a disarming first strike against another nuclear power. In Shens words, for minimum deterrence, one only needs to assure a credible nuclear retaliation so as to deter a first nuclear attack.41 Similarly, according to Teng Jianqun of the China Institute of International Studies, China seeks to maintain a minimum credible deterrence capability by ensuring that the PLA has the capability to retaliate following a nuclear attack. Teng argues that Chinas current nuclear modernization should be seen in this context. In his words, the purpose of [Chinas] current nuclear modernization is first and foremost to guarantee the security and reliability of nuclear weapons in the face of threats, such as the U.S. development and deployment of ballistic missile defenses.42 Sun Xiangli, deputy director of the Arms Control Research Division at the Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics in Beijing, has asserted that Chinas nuclear strategy should be referred to as defensive nuclear deterrence characterized by the policy of NFU. In reaching this conclusion, Sun argues that enduring beliefs about the nature and purpose of nuclear weapons have influenced Chinas strategic calculus and served as a framework for the development of Chinese nuclear forces.43 Chinese leaders and scientists have seen nuclear weapons as basically useful for political reasons and strategic deterrence, rather than as having real tactical or operational utility on the battlefield. They have generally believed that the threshold for the infliction of unacceptable damage is significantly lower than Western strategists have often claimed.44 Sun writes that based on these principles, and according to its economic, technical and geographic conditions, China has developed a limited nuclear force.45 At the same time, he argues that even though China has felt that it only needs a relatively limited
41 Shen, Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century, 12. 42 Teng Jianqun, Chinas Perspectives on Nuclear Deterrence and Disarmament, in Small Nuclear
Forces: Five Perspectives, ed. Malcolm Chalmers, Andrew Somerville, and Andrea Berger (London: Royal United Services Institute, 2011), 49. to Sun, the top decision-making group, headed by Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, framed Chinas nuclear policy. The Chinese leaders who worked out the nations nuclear strategy had a very clear and realistic understanding of the nature and role of nuclear weapons. Chinas own strategic thinking was formed on the basis of such an understanding, which has served as a guideline for the whole development process of Chinas strategic nuclear force.
43 Sun Xiangli, Analysis of Chinas Nuclear Strategy, China Security, no. 1 (2005): 2327. According
44 Ibid., 28. 45 Ibid., 24.
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number of nuclear weapons, these weapons must have a deterrent effect, and a certain number and survival of the nuclear weapons must be guaranteed. Sun explains, In short, the key to having a credible nuclear deterrence is to guarantee an effective nuclear retaliatory capability.46 What is required to do so, however, is subject to change over time:
The main requirement for the nuclear force is to ensure the effectiveness of deterrence under any circumstances: that is, to survive the enemys first strike by maintaining a basic retaliatory capability. Therefore, throughout the development of Chinas nuclear force, great emphasis has been placed on survivability and reliability. Since the 1970s and 1980s, other countries have rapidly improved their precision strike capabilities and have made great progress with their missile defense systems. Correspondingly, Chinas nuclear force has also gradually modernized from the first generation using liquid fuel and fixed silos to the second generation using solid fuel and mobile launching pads with better penetrability. But its purpose remains to insure [sic] an effective nuclear deterrence in the new strategic environment.47
In other words, Sun believes that the number of nuclear weapons China needs is not immutably fixed but is related to challenges to the survivability of the force and its ability to penetrate enemy defenses. Accordingly, an appropriate rule for determining the size of Chinas nuclear force is that it must be able to mount a nuclear strike that can penetrate an enemys missile defense system after surviving a first strike.48 Along similar lines, Chu Shulong and Rong Yu of Tsinghua University have described Chinas nuclear strategy as one of dynamic minimum deterrence.49 They argue that this strategy retains key features of the PRCs traditional approach while adjusting it to keep pace with changes in the security environment and emerging threats. According to Chu and Rong, China has all along adhered to a strategy that may be labeled as minimum deterrence. However, as circumstances are always changing, the content, quantity, quality, and structure of minimum deterrence also must change.50 The approach is not tied to a specific number of nuclear weapons but rather to the capability required to deter powerful countries like the United States and
46 Sun, Analysis of Chinas Nuclear Strategy, 24. Sun asserts that this is in line with Nie Rongzhens
thinking about maintaining a minimal, but credible, capability to launch a retaliatory strike.
47 Ibid. 48 Ibid., 28. 49 Chu Shulong and Rong Yu, China: Dynamic Minimum Deterrence, in The Long Shadow: Nuclear
Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), 16187.
50 Ibid., 166.
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Russia. In short, Chu and Rong assert that the Chinese understanding and practice of the strategy of minimum deterrence is dynamicits features are continually adjusted to meet the changing strategic environment and threat.51 Yao Yunzhu, a senior colonel in the PLA, takes a similar approach in arguing that Chinas nuclear policy has been the most consistent over time of any nuclear power, even as the Second Artillerys force structure has evolved over the years. Yao states that this policy consists of the following key elements: NFU, security assurances to nonnuclear weapon states, limited development of a retaliatory or second-strike capability, opposition to extended nuclear deterrence and the deployment of nuclear weapons on foreign territory, and a commitment to the goal of nuclear disarmament.52 Yao identifies NFU as the most important element of Chinas nuclear policy and asserts that the countrys notorious lack of transparency about its nuclear forces follows from this starting point: For a state adopting a no first use policy and intending not to waste too much money on unusable weapons, dependence on opaqueness to bring about greater deterrent value is a wise choice.53 Yao attributes the consistency of Chinas nuclear policy over time to the conviction that nuclear weapons are valuable only as a deterrent and not for use on the battlefield. She explains that the primary Chinese perception is that nuclear wars are not to be won, but to be prevented. From this perception follows the belief that the effectiveness of deterrence depends not on the possession of large-scale nuclear-attack capabilities but on invulnerability to nuclear strikes. In other words, as Yao argues, China does not need an enormous nuclear arsenal to deter potential adversaries, but its second-strike capability must be credible and survivable in order to have deterrent effect. For Chinese strategists, therefore, the concept of minimum deterrence is a relative one, defined not only by pure numbers, but more importantly by such key criteria as invulnerability of nuclear forces, assurance of retaliation, and credibility of counter-attack.54 Further, Yao notes that in Chinas official documents, lean and effective are the two adjectives used to describe the nuclear arsenal. To keep the arsenal lean, China has to exercise restraint
51 Chu and Rong, China: Dynamic Minimum Deterrence, 161. 52 Yao Yunzhu, Chinese Nuclear Policy and the Future of Minimum Deterrence, Strategic Insights 4,
no. 9 (2005).
53 Yao Yunzhu, Chinas Perspective on Nuclear Deterrence, Air & Space Power Journal 24, no. 1
(2010): 2730 u http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj10/spr10/yao.html.
54 Yao, Chinese Nuclear Policy and the Future of Minimum Deterrence.
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in developing nuclear weapons; to keep the arsenal effective, China has to modernize it to ensure credibility after a first nuclear strike.55
Debating No First Use

One of the main controversies in foreign assessments of Chinese nuclear policy and strategy is centered on the credibility of Chinas NFU policy, which has been debated in China as the security environment and threats to the countrys desired capability for assured retaliation have evolved over the years. In a 2005 article, for example, Shen Dingli argued that Chinas NFU policy was under unprecedented pressure because of advances in military technology, particularly the development of conventional precision-strike capabilities that could threaten Chinese nuclear forces and challenge Chinas core interests with respect to Taiwan. The result was a debate on the NFU policys continued validity under changing circumstances.56 Chinese scholars and strategists have debated the NFU policy not only because of perceived challenges but also in response to the widely reported comments of some of their colleagues. In particular, some scholars have felt compelled to respond to controversial remarks by Major General Zhu Chenghu, whose July 2005 statement that U.S. intervention in a cross-strait conflict might trigger nuclear escalation led some Western observers to doubt the credibility of Chinas NFU policy.57 In response to Zhus comments and the concerns they raised, Chinese scholars have argued that the NFU policy is consistent with Chinas core beliefs about nuclear weapons and continues to serve the countrys interests, whereas abandoning the policy now would entail potentially serious diplomatic and security costs. For example, in an article criticizing Zhus more provocative assertions, Pan Zhenqiang, a retired major general at the PLAs National Defense University, contends that the NFU policy highlights Chinas philosophical belief that nuclear weapons can only be used to serve one purpose, that of retaliation against
55 Yao, Chinas Perspective on Nuclear Deterrence. 56 Shen, Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century, 12. Shen also notes the possibility of chemical
or biological weapons being used against China by a state or nonstate actor as a third potential challenge to the NFU policy, albeit one that may be more theoretical than conventional precision strikes against nuclear forces or serious threats to core national interests. even though they were clearly an expression of his personal views rather than a statement of official policy, see Joseph Kahn, Chinese General Threatens Use of A-Bombs if U.S. Intrudes, New York Times, July 15, 2005; Alexandra Harney, Demetri Sevastopulo, and Edward Alden, Top Chinese General Warns U.S. Over Attack, Financial Times, July 15, 2005; and Danny Gittings, General Zhu Goes Ballistic, Wall Street Journal, July 18, 2005.
57 For media coverage of Zhus most notorious remarks, which sparked a great deal of controversy
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a nuclear attack, pending complete nuclear disarmament.58 Furthermore, he argues that abandoning the NFU policy now would be problematic in several respects. Specifically, it would undermine strategic stability between China and the United States, sabotage Chinas approach to international arms control, damage the countrys international image and reputation, and further complicate regional and cross-strait relations. Similarly, Chu Shulong and Rong Yu assert that Chinas interests are best served by maintaining the NFU policy. They argue that abandoning this policy would increase the risk of escalation in the event of a cross-strait conflict. According to Chu and Rong, if China gave up its NFU policy, instead of buying strategic advantage, the risk of a preemptive U.S. attack would dramatically increase; by retaining it, Chinas nuclear weapons will play their deterrent role more fully.59 Chinese scholars have also suggested that, notwithstanding the NFU policy, any adversary would still need to act cautiously to minimize the risk of nuclear escalation because it would be unsure of whether Beijing would adhere to this policy in a severe crisis. As Shen Dingli acknowledges, in a military contingency, no adversary would fail to prepare for a change in Chinas policy on NFU as this choice is always an option for China. Nonetheless, Shen concludes that the political costs to the Chinese leadership due to such a change would be prohibitive, which acts as a real restraint against Chinas altering its professed position.60 Although Chinese scholars highlight the ways in which the NFU policy is advantageous to China, and Beijing has reaffirmed the policy on numerous occasions, assessments of NFU have gone well beyond debates about its merits and drawbacks. Indeed, some Chinese analysts have considered scenarios under which Beijing might consider departing from its traditional NFU policy. One scenario raises the possibility of nuclear retaliation for conventional strikes on strategic or nuclear targets and facilities, such as Chinas nuclear forces, Beijing and other major cities, nuclear power plants, and major hydroelectric facilities (perhaps a reference to the massive Three Gorges Dam). Another scenario involves Chinese leaders believing that territorial
58 Pan Zhenqiang, Chinas Insistence on No-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons, China Security, no. 1
(2005): 5. Pan argues that, faced with U.S. nuclear blackmail in the 1950s, China had no alternative to developing its own nuclear capability so as to address the real danger of being a target of a nuclear strike. But even so, Beijing vowed that having a nuclear capability would only serve this single purpose.
59 Chu and Rong, China: Dynamic Minimum Deterrence, 177. 60 Shen, Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century, 12.
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integrity is at stake due to serious military setbacks in a conventional conflict, presumably involving intervention by a major power like the United States. Chinese strategists also suggest that there is some ambiguity in determining what constitutes first use by an adversary. As two Chinese authors state, because conventional attacks can in certain cases have effects as devastating as nuclear attacks, definitely establishing whether the adversary has broken the nuclear threshold is not necessarily a straightforward issue. Specifically, they raise the question of whether a conventional attack on a countrys nuclear forces could be considered tantamount to the first use of nuclear weapons: On the surface, this is merely a conventional attack, but in effect, its impact is little different than suffering a nuclear strike and incurring similarly heavy losses. The result could be that the conventional attack would be seen as breaking the nuclear threshold, with the result that the party suffering the attack will find it difficult to refrain from a nuclear counterattack. 61 These statements highlight conditions under which Chinas NFU policy might face considerable pressureor perhaps might not apply if China judges an adversarys actions to be equivalent to a nuclear first strike. Nonetheless, it seems that this debate has ended, at least for now, with a decision to officially maintain the NFU policy. This outcome is reflected by Chinas 2010 defense white paper, which states that China consistently upholds the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, adheres to a self-defensive nuclear strategy, and will never enter into a nuclear arms race with any other country.62 Although Chinas most recent defense white paper, issued in April 2013, does not mention the NFU policy, its references to nuclear deterrence and counterattacks are consistent with NFU. Chinese military commentators assert that the omission of the specific language is the result of a shift in format from comprehensive to thematic white papers, not a change in policy.63 Moreover, since the release of the white paper, Chinese officials have publicly reaffirmed that NFU remains in force.64
61 Rong Yu and Peng Guangqian, Nuclear No-First-Use Revisited, China Security, no. 13 (2009): 85. 62 Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, Chinas National Defense in 2010. 63 On the omission of the NFU language from the most recent white paper, see James M. Acton, Is
China Changing Its Position on Nuclear Weapons? New York Times, April 18, 2013; Yao Yunzhu, China Will Not Change Its Nuclear Policy, U.S.-China Focus, April 22, 2013 u http://www. chinausfocus.com/peace-security/china-will-not-change-its-no-first-use-policy; and M. Taylor Fravel, China Has Not (Yet) Changed its Position on Nuclear Weapons, Diplomat, April 22, 2013 u http:// thediplomat.com/2013/04/22/china-has-not-yet-changed-its-position-on-nuclear-weapons. of the Department of Arms Control and Disarmament of MFA of the Peoples Republic of China at the General Debate in the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference, Geneva, April 22, 2013 u http://papersmart.unmeetings.org/media/1269575/CHINA.pdf.
64 See, for example, Statement by Mr. Pang Sen, Head of the Chinese Delegation, Director-General
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Publications like SSAC and Zhao Xijuns Intimidation Warfare were clearly part of this debate. Yet, now over five years old, they may not represent the last word on the subject. Indeed, Chinese scholars suggest that Beijing would approach the actual decision to authorize the use of nuclear weapons with great caution, and that it would only be made under the most extreme circumstances. Given the immense damage that would be caused, such a decision is only imaginable if core national interests are in peril, such as the survival of the state or nation.65 Nonetheless, as Fravel and Medeiros note, Whether intended or not, the existence of such a debate generates increased ambiguity about the conditions under which China might use nuclear weapons, thereby strengthening Chinas deterrent.66
the modernization of chinas nuclear force

Chinas theater and strategic nuclear-missile force provides the ultimate escalatory or counter-escalatory threat Beijing believes it requires to ensure strategic deterrence and respond to what Chinese authors characterize as the threat of nuclear coercion. China is modernizing its nuclear forces to enhance their survivability, increase their striking power, and counter missile defense developments.67 Beijings goal is to field a lean and effective nuclear force that meets the countrys evolving national security needs.68 This effort has been underway for more than two decades and can be traced back to concerns about the viability of Chinas traditional strategic posture that were first expressed in the mid to late 1980s. Organizationally, the PLA Second Artillery Force is at the center of these efforts. Indeed, the transformation of the Second Artillery, which serves as Chinas strategic missile force, has emerged as one of the centerpieces of Chinese military modernization.69 The forces impressive transformation is underscored by an April 2009 report from the U.S. National Air and Space Intelligence Center. The report concludes that China now has the most active
65 Rong and Peng, Nuclear No-First-Use Revisited, 88. 66 Fravel and Medeiros, Chinas Search for Assured Retaliation, 80. 67 For a recent estimate of Chinas deployed nuclear forces by nongovernmental analysts,
see Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2011, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 67, no. 6 (2011): 8187.
68 Jing, Jianshe jinggan youxiao zhanlue daodan budui wei weihu shijie he anquan gongxian liliang, 47. 69 Although many Western analysts use the term Second Artillery Corps (SAC), China has used the
term Second Artillery Force since the publication of the first biennial defense white paper in 1998. It began using the acronym PLASAF to refer to the Second Artillery Force in the March 2011 defense white paper Chinas National Defense in 2010.
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and diverse ballistic missile development program in the world and states that China is developing and testing offensive missiles, forming additional missile units, qualitatively upgrading certain missile systems, and developing methods to counter ballistic missile defenses.70 In short, as Chinese official statements often emphasize, the Second Artillerys growing capabilities make it Chinas core force for strategic deterrence.71
Chinas Nuclear Missile Force

The Second Artillery currently deploys several different missile systems for regional nuclear-deterrence missions.72 It has been transitioning to a more survivable, road-mobile theater nuclear force featuring DF-21 (CSS-5 Mod 1) and DF-21A (CSS-5 Mod 2) MRBMs.73 The DF-21 and DF-21A are two-stage solid-propellant road-mobile missiles with maximum ranges of more than 1,750 km (over 1,100 miles).74 Chinas strategic missile force also still fields the DF-3 (CSS-2), a single-stage liquid propellant IRBM with a maximum range of about 3,000 km (1,900 miles). First deployed in 1971, the DF-3 is transportable but has limited mobility. China reportedly has 1418 DF-3 IRBMs and 510 launchers, but many observers have predicted these missiles will be retired soon because of their age.75 China currently deploys 5075 ICBMs of various types, according to the 2012 edition of the U.S. Department of Defenses annual report on Chinese military and security developments.76 The silo-based DF-5 (CSS-4 Mod 1) ICBMa liquid-propellant, two-stage missilewas initially deployed in 1981. China subsequently replaced these missiles with longer-range DF-5A (CSS-4 Mod 2) ICBMs.77 With a range of at least 13,000 km (over 8,000 miles), the DF-5A is capable of striking targets throughout the continental United
70 Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, National Air and Space Intelligence Center,
NASIC-1031-0985-09, April 2009, 3. cn/ArmedForces/second.htm.
71 The Second Artillery Force of the PLA, Ministry of National Defense, PRC u http://eng.mod.gov. 72 Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, 14. 73 Chinas designations for its land-based ballistic missiles begin with DF (dongfeng, or east wind).
Western designations use CSS (Chinese surface-to-surface missile), and are typically found in U.S. Department of Defense reports.
74 Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, 17. 75 Kristensen and Norris, Chinese Nuclear Force, 2011, 82. 76 See Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples
Republic of China 2012, 24.
77 See Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Power of the Peoples Republic of China 2002
(Washington, D.C., 2002), 27; and Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Power of the Peoples Republic of China 2007 (Washington, D.C., 2007), 42.
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States. Department of Defense reports and assessments by nongovernmental experts indicate that China currently deploys about 20 silo-based ICBMs.78 Moreover, according to the director of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, China is enhancing its silo-based systems as part of the modernization of its nuclear missile force.79 In addition, the PRC still deploys some of its older DF-4 (CSS-3) ICBMs, which are liquid-fueled missiles with a relatively limited range of approximately 5,400 km (over 3,400 miles).80 Yet the most important development of Chinas nuclear force in recent years has been the long-awaited deployment of road-mobile ICBMs. The Second Artillery has finally fielded two road-mobile ICBMs, the DF-31 (CSS-10 Mod 1) and DF-31A (CSS-10 Mod 2). The DF-31 is a three-stage, solid-propellant, road-mobile ICBM with a maximum range of more than 7,200 km (over 4,500 miles).81 After a protracted development history that began in the 1980s, the DF-31 road-mobile ICBM was deployed in 2006.82 The DF-31A is a three-stage road-mobile ICBM with a maximum range of more than 11,200 km (over 7,000 miles). The DF-31As longer range enables it to reach targets in most of the continental United States. China began deploying the DF-31A (CSS-10 Mod 2) road-mobile ICBM in 2007, and Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris estimate that China has since then deployed 2040 of these missiles.83 Because mobile targets are more difficult for an adversary to locate, the deployment of road-mobile ICBMs is particularly significant in that it has provided China with a much more survivable nuclear force. Another important development aimed at enhancing the survivability of Chinas nuclear force is the maturation of the countrys long-standing pursuit of a sea-based deterrent. According to Chinas 2010 defense white paper, the PLAN is enhancing its strategic deterrence and counterattack capabilities.84 Indeed, the PLANs submarine-based nuclear deterrent finally is taking shape with the Type 094, or Jin-class, SSBN and its intended armament, the JL-2 SLBM. The 2012 Department of Defense report on Chinese military and security developments indicates that although the
78 Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, 21; and Kristensen and Norris, Chinese Nuclear Force, 2011. 79 Burgess Annual Threat Assessment. 80 Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, 21. 81 Robert D. Walpole, The Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, statement for the record to the
Senate Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services, February 9, 2000 u https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2000/nio_speech_020900.html. (Washington, D.C., 2009), 24.
82 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Power of the Peoples Republic of China 2009 83 Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, 21; and Kristensen and Norris, Chinese Nuclear Force, 2011, 83. 84 Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, Chinas National Defense in 2010.
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new Jin-class submarineshave started enteringservice with the PLAN, China has not yet completed development of the JL-2. As soon as this occurs, it will finally possess a sea-based nuclear deterrent. The JL-2 will give China an operational nuclear dyadincluding the land-based missiles of the PLAs Second Artillery Forceand will further increase the credibility of Chinas strategic-deterrent capabilities. Indeed, the Type 094 submarine appears to be a major improvement over Chinas first-generation Xia-class SSBN, though it should be noted that the Type 094 is reportedly somewhat noisier than Russias older Delta IIIclass SSBNs, which could make it vulnerable to enemy antisubmarine-warfare capabilities.85 Beyond these programs, according to a 2010 Department of Defense report, China may also be developing a new road-mobile ICBM, possibly capable of carrying a [sic] multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRV).86 This statement followed many years of speculation about follow-on ICBM systems. Rumors about a possible DF-41 ICBM program have existed for over a decade, and photos of a large, eight-axle transporter erector launcher that appeared on the Internet in 2007 have revived discussion about new road-mobile ICBMs.87 In addition, Taiwan media reports suggest that Beijing will eventually develop and deploy a follow-on SSBN called the Type 096 and a new SLBM called the JL-3.88
How Much Is Enough?

The modernization and expansion of Chinas nuclear missile force capabilities has led analysts to ponder the question of how much is enough for China. Some observers have speculated that China may take advantage of the declining numbers of nuclear weapons in the U.S. and Russian arsenals
85 For a more detailed assessment of the Jin-class submarine and the JL-2 SLBM, see Benjamin S.
Purser III and Michael S. Chase, Waypoint or Destination? The Jin-Class Submarine and Chinas Quest for Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrence, Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, August 3, 2012. Republic of China 2010 (Washington, D.C., 2010), 2.
86 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples 87 See, for example, Pamela Pun, Experts: DF-41 Could Force U.S. to Adjust Its Strategy, Hong Kong
Standard, October 15, 1999, 6. For a report on the Internet photos, see Seymour Johnson, Sighting of Road Mobile Chinese ICBM Emerges, Janes Missiles and Rockets, May 16, 2007. See also Richard D. Fisher Jr., Red AlertChina Modernizes Its Nuclear Missile Force, Janes Intelligence Review, May 14, 2009; and Richard Fisher Jr., Two Cheers for the 2007 PLA Report, International Assessment and Strategy Center, June 20, 2007 u http://www.strategycenter.net/research/ pubID.162/pub_detail.asp. Times, May 23, 2011.
88 See, for example, J. Michael Cole, Analysis: Questions Remain on Chinas Nuclear Stance, Taipei
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to rush to parity with the nuclear superpowers.89 Philip Karber has even argued that China could already have secretly amassed a significantly larger number of nuclear weapons than is widely believed. He apparently bases this conclusion on his interpretation of the motives behind Chinas large-scale construction of tunnels to support Second Artillery operations.90 As James Acton points out, however, no compelling evidence has been provided to support these assertions.91 Some of the boldest claims about Chinese capabilities also fail to take into account the amount of highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium China has available for nuclear weapons. As for the question of how much weapons-grade material China can devote to producing more nuclear weapons, there are only a handful of publicly available estimates. As Hui Zhang points out, the problem of estimating Chinas HEU and plutonium production and stocks is extremely complicated.92 As of January 2001, the Department of Defense reported that China currently is not believed to be producing fissile material for nuclear weapons, but has a stockpile of fissile material sufficient to improve or increase its weapons inventory.93 Similarly, in unclassified March 2009 congressional testimony, Lieutenant General Michael D. Maples, then director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, gave the following assessment: Chinas nuclear weapon stockpile likely will grow over the next 10 years as new ballistic missiles are activated and older ones are upgraded. China likely has produced enough weapon-grade fissile material to
89 For an example of the argument that China could try to take advantage of U.S. and
Russian reductions, see Peter Brookes, Beijings Build-Up and New START, National Review Online, December 9, 2010 u http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/254731/ beijing-s-build-and-new-start-peter-brookes. University, has been cited by a number of media reports, including Bret Stephens, How Many Nukes Does China Have? Plumbing the Secret Underground Great Wall, Wall Street Journal, October 24, 2011. for International Peace, Proliferation Analysis, October 26, 2011 u http://carnegieendowment. org/2011/10/26/underground-great-wall-alternative-explanation/67s0.
90 The analysis by Philip Karber, a former Defense Department official who now works at Georgetown
91 James M. Acton, The Underground Great Wall: An Alternative Explanation, Carnegie Endowment
92 For the most recent open-source assessments, see Hui Zhang, Chinas HEU and Plutonium
Production and Stocks, Science & Global Security 19, no. 1 (2011): 6889; and Hui Zhang, Chinas Fissile Material Production and Stocks, in Global Fissile Material Report 2010: Balancing the Books (Princeton: Princeton University, 2011), 97106. Estimating Chinas HEU inventory available for nuclear weapons requires estimating not only how much HEU China could have produced but also what nuclear weapons tests, process losses, and other demands for uranium enrichment (such as fuel for research and naval reactors) may have subtracted from this amount. As for estimating Chinas plutonium inventory, one must consider factors such as how much plutonium could have been produced and how much was likely consumed in nuclear tests.
93 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington, D.C., January 2001), 14.
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meet its needs for the immediate future.94 Additionally, recent assessments by nongovernmental experts suggest that China likely possesses enough fissile material to expand its arsenal significantly but not enough to build a force anywhere close to the size suggested by Phillip Karbers widely reported study, which concluded that China might already have thousands of nuclear weapons.95 Indeed, most nongovernmental experts estimate that China has no more than a few hundred nuclear warheads. For example, Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris estimate that China likely has a total inventory of about 240 warheads.96 Moreover, Chinese strategists maintain that China would gain few benefits from amassing thousands of nuclear weapons. With respect to its nuclear missile force, China has shown it is determined to maintain the secure, second-strike capability that is required to ensure a credible strategicdeterrence force even in the face of advances in adversary ISR, precision-strike, and missile-defense capabilities. The writings of Chinese strategists strongly suggest that going much beyond what is required for an unquestionably credible assured-retaliation capability would lead to diminishing returns at best and strategic instability at worst. For example, Yao Yunzhu argues that China continues to adhere to the views of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, who clearly believed that deterrent effectiveness does not increase in proportion with numbers of nuclear weapons, but rather that a survivable and invulnerable small arsenal can be equally effective in terms of deterrence.97 Along similar lines, Sun Xiangli argues that the experience of the U.S.-Soviet competition during the Cold War shows that the pursuit of a warfighting strategy does not substantially increase the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence. Moreover, because it requires a very large nuclear arsenal, it consumes substantial economic and technological resources. Worse still, large arsenals and warfighting strategies lead to strategic instability and increase the risk of nuclear war.98 As Fravel and Medeiros observe, Chinese leaders have believed that nuclear weapons were basically unusable on the battlefield and that once mutual deterrence was achieved, a larger arsenal or arms racing would be
94 Michael D. Maples, Annual Threat Assessment, statement before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, March 10, 2009, 23 u http://www.dia.mil/public-affairs/testimonies/2009-03-10.html. Scientists, FAS Strategic Security Blog, December 3, 2011 u http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2011/12/ chinanukes.php.
95 Hans M. Kristensen, No, China Does Not Have 3,000 Nuclear Weapons, Federation of American
96 Kristensen and Norris, Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2011, 8187. 97 Yao, Chinese Nuclear Policy and the Future of Minimum Deterrence. 98 Sun, Analysis of Chinas Nuclear Strategy, 27.
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costly, counterproductive, and ultimately self-defeating.99 China is thus extremely unlikely to attempt to match or exceed the United States or Russia in terms of the number of nuclear weapons it deploys. Nonetheless, there is ample reason to believe that Beijing will increase the size of its nuclear arsenal as needed to ensure that it maintains an assured-retaliation capability in response to perceived security challenges. This could result in substantial increases in the quantity and quality of Chinas nuclear weapons. Indeed, many observers expect China to field a larger and more sophisticated nuclear force over the next ten to fifteen years.100 The key factors that are likely to influence Chinese decision-making about what exactly the PLA requires in terms of nuclear force structure include Chinas perception of its external security environment and its relationships with major powers, principally the United States, India, Russia, and Japan; Chinas perception of potential nuclear and conventional threats to its silo-based, road-mobile, and sea-based nuclear forces; and Chinas concerns about future missiledefense developments that could undermine its ability to maintain an assured-retaliation posture capable of deterring potential adversaries. Chinese scholars suggest that missile defense is the most important factor in determining Chinas future requirements. For example, Yao Yunzhu asserts that U.S. missile-defense deployments will be the most significant factor that will influence Chinas nuclear calculus.101 She writes that Beijing will need to reevaluate the sufficiency of its nuclear arsenal to counter U.S. missile defense systems and retain a guaranteed ability to retaliate. However, Yao argues that such a reassessment will result only in variations in the size of Chinas nuclear arsenal, not in changes to the basic nature of its nuclear policy. In short, the purpose of Chinas modernization of its nuclear missile force is to keep valid its longstanding nuclear policy.102 Similarly, according to Chu and Rong, trying to retain the credibility of its nuclear deterrent in the face of a BMD [ballistic missile defense] system, China may increase its nuclear arsenal until it is beyond doubt that [the arsenal] is large enough.103 Chinese writers rarely provide specific numbers, but Chu and Rong suggest that perhaps two hundred nuclear warheads could be needed today, with that number possibly increasing to three hundred or even four hundred in the future.
99 Fravel and Medeiros, Chinas Search for Assured Retaliation, 87. 100 Ronald L. Burgess Jr., World Wide Threat Assessment, statement before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, March 10, 2011, 17 u http://www.dia.mil/public-affairs/testimonies/2011-03-10.html.
101 Yao, Chinese Nuclear Policy and the Future of Minimum Deterrence. 102 Ibid. 103 Chu and Rong, China: Dynamic Minimum Deterrence, 171.
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implications and recommendations

China has made impressive strides in the development of its nuclear-deterrence capabilities. The deployment of road-mobile ICBMs is giving the PLA the assured retaliation capability it has long sought for its growing, but still relatively small, nuclear missile force. Over the next ten years, China can be expected to continue to strengthen its nuclear missile force. The land-based component of this force will remain the most important element of the countrys nuclear-deterrent posture, even after the anticipated introduction of Type 094 SSBNs and JL-2 SLBMs into the PLANs inventory. Perhaps the most important development in this regard could be the deployment of road-mobile ICBMs with MIRVs. Chinas transition to a more secure second-strike capability is likely to contribute to greater strategic stability in the U.S.-China relationship, a goal that is emphasized in the most recent U.S. Nuclear Posture Review.104 Nonetheless, Chinas larger and more sophisticated nuclear force will also create challenges for U.S. policymakers. One possibility is that this force could give China greater confidence in using its conventional capabilities to coerce its neighbors. However, even if leaders in Beijing conclude that a more powerful and survivable nuclear force does not allow them to exert their conventional leverage, Chinas growing nuclear capabilities could still become a complicating factor in future arms-control negotiations. Furthermore, aspects of Chinese doctrine could undermine crisis stability and heighten the risk of escalation in the event of a confrontation with another nuclear power.
A Bolder Beijing?
Some U.S. scholars have argued that a more powerful nuclear force could embolden China to behave more aggressively if it becomes embroiled in a regional crisis. Most prominently, this case has been set forth by Thomas Christensen:
In the minds of Chinas top leaders, China may be acquiring a secure second strike capability for the first time or recovering one it lost after the United States developed new strike capabilities since the 1980s. If true, Chinese leaders might be more bold in conventional crises with the United States than they otherwise would be, knowing that China is at least capable of countering any American threat of nuclear escalation if a strong response is made to Chinas conventional military actions. 105
104 U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, 45. 105 Thomas J. Christensen, The Meaning of the Nuclear Evolution: Chinas Strategic Modernization
and U.S.-China Security Relations, Journal of Strategic Studies 35, no. 4 (2012): 452.
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Furthermore, Christensen argues, the relationship between a secure second-strike capability and conventional military operations is growing in importance as China develops new conventional military capabilities designed to assert or protect the PRCs interests in its maritime periphery in ways that greatly increase the chance of conventional engagement with U.S. forces, something China was previously largely incapable of doing in an effective manner. This may be especially important because of disagreements between China and other countries in the region about what constitutes the legitimate status quo, which in turn increase the volatility of potential flashpoints such as Taiwan or the Paracel and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. Christensen concludes that this could be problematic if the firebreaks between conventional and nuclear conflict are less than fully robust, and there are plausible scenarios for nuclear escalation that China could exploit to gain greater leverage in an otherwise conventional crisis or conflict.106
Arms-Control Challenges
Chinas growing nuclear arsenal will make the PRC a more important consideration in discussions about future U.S.-Russia arms-control agreements, perhaps eventually paving the way for multilateral agreements on nuclear arms control. On the other hand, Chinas larger and more credible nuclear deterrent could constitute an obstacle to future arms-control agreements if Beijing is unwilling to participate in such discussions. The integration of China into the global nuclear reduction process that President Obama outlined in his 2009 speech in Prague will eventually be required to move toward the long-term goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.107 The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review reflects this challenge, stating that over time the United States will also engage with other nuclear weapon states, including China, on ways to expand the nuclear reduction process in the future.108 Some Russian observers are also expressing concerns about the modernization of Chinas nuclear force. Even though their analysis is
106 Christensen, The Meaning of the Nuclear Evolution, 45254. 107 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by President Barack Obama, April 5,
2009 u http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-InPrague-As-Delivered.
108 U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, 12.
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at times seriously flawed, it still raises potential implications for Russian participation in future arms-control negotiations.109 Chinese scholars are well aware of the possibility that China will face greater pressure as the United States and Russia downsize their nuclear forces. Teng Jianqun of the China Institute of International Studies, for example, sees Washingtons approach as still focused mainly on Russia but notes that as bilateral disarmament progresses, the U.S. will certainly pay increasing attention to Chinas arms control policies.110 But China is clearly far from eager to be drawn into the process, especially given the asymmetry in the size of its nuclear arsenal compared with those of the United States and Russia. Teng explains:
American and Russian stockpiles make up more than 90 per cent of the worlds total nuclear weapons. Though both have nearly halved their nuclear arsenals since the end of the Cold War, their total number of nuclear weapons is still many times greater than that of states with small nuclear forces. Only when the two great nuclear powers have reduced their arsenals to an appropriate level will China follow suit.111
It should be noted, however, that Chinese scholars have not specified what number would constitute an appropriate level. This suggests that Beijing will remain reluctant to participate in such negotiations, at least until U.S. and Russian numbers decline to a level that makes it more difficult for China to resist entering into serious multilateral discussions. Moreover, Beijing may also resist pressure to take part in arms-control discussions until it has achieved its own nuclear force modernization goals. According to Wang Zhongchun, as Chinas participation in multi-lateral nuclear disarmament negotiations will unavoidably lead to a reduction and weakening of its strategic deterrent force, we should improve the base number of our nuclear
109 For a rebuttal of some of the most poorly informed Russian assertions about Chinas nuclear force
structure, see Jeffrey Lewis, Yesin on Chinas Nukes, Arms Control Wonk, web log, June 29, 2012 u http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/5460/yesin-on-chinas-nukes.
110 Teng, Chinas Perspectives on Nuclear Deterrence and Disarmament, 50. 111 Ibid. Teng further elaborates that disagreements still exist within China as to how to approach
disarmament developments in Washington. For example, with regards to potential U.S. ratification of the CTBT, some scholars feel China should seek earlier ratification to claim the moral initiative. This proposal has been met with worries that China would be placed in a Catch 22 scenario should Washington not follow suit in joining the treaty. Thus, others contend that only after the US approves the treaty should China set about considering this issue. At present, this debate remains inconclusive and will inevitably continue for some time to come. This is only one example demonstrating the traditional attitude of [the] Chinese government towards international arms control and disarmament: caution and patience. Related to this aspect, China will continue to be very cautious on international treaties, conventions, agreements and permanent mechanisms; it will never play the leading role in this regard.
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force before participating in any nuclear disarmament negotiations.112 Wang suggests that the development of a necessary quantity and quality of nuclear weapons will be required to ensure that any concessions made in future negotiations will not leave China in a position where its strategic forces fail to fulfill the promise of a retaliatory strike.
Escalation Risks
Second, beyond the implications for arms control, challenges for escalation management that arise from Chinese capabilities and doctrine also merit consideration. In particular, U.S. strategists should pay careful attention to some of Chinas thinking with respect to deterrence operations. The potential use of Chinas missile force to send signals aimed at influencing an adversary raises the possibility of miscalculation or inadvertent escalation in a crisis or conflict scenario. Miscalculation during a crisis is a particularly troubling possibility, the risk of which could be heightened by uncertainty over the message that one side is trying to convey to the other or by overconfidence in the ability to control escalation. The most serious concern is that the signaling activities described in Chinese publications could easily be interpreted not as a demonstration of resolve or as a warning but as preparation to conduct actual nuclear missile strikes, possibly decreasing crisis stability or even triggering escalation rather than strengthening deterrence. Indeed, some Chinese sources contain references that raise troubling questions about miscalculations that could result from attempts to increase the intensity of deterrence during a crisis or conventional conflict.113 While such signals are intended to put the enemy under the severe psychological strain of realizing that Chinas missile forces have entered the pre-mobilization state in hopes of causing the adversary to abandon certain activities, the authors apparently fail to fully consider the potential for catastrophic miscalculation. Given the risks of unintended escalation, some of these actions could be destabilizing, especially during a conflict with a nuclear-armed adversary. Although Chinese authors appear to demonstrate at least some awareness that actions intended to deter an adversary could instead escalate tension, discussion of this risk in the relevant publications is highly limited. For instance, Zhao Xijun notes that deterrence must be carefully calibrated to maximize the chances of achieving the desired results. If the threat level is
112 Wang, Nuclear Challenges and Chinas Choices, 6263. 113 See, for example, Zhao, Shezhandaodan weishe zongheng tan, 185.
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too low, it will fail to influence the enemy; but if it is too high, there is an equally serious risk that deterrence will fail because the enemy may lash out in desperation.114 Similarly, in another passage, Zhao offers a cautionary note that deterrence operations could accidentally trigger escalation if they are poorly timed:
Whether the timing for conducting the military deterrence of the missile forces is correctly chosen will directly affect the progress of deterrence and its outcome. If the appropriate timing is chosen, then deterrence will deter the enemy, contain the eruption of war, and obtain the objective of peace with the small price of deterrence. If inappropriate timing is chosen, then deterrence may cause the situation to deteriorate, even leading to the eruption and escalation of war.115
Nonetheless, the available sources suggest that Chinese thinking about the risks of specific actions may be rather underdeveloped, which in turn could make attempts to manage escalation in a U.S.-China crisis or conflict extremely challenging and potentially very dangerous for both parties. U.S. policymakers will face difficult choices in responding to these developments. In some cases, restraint will be required to maintain stability.116 Trying to trump Chinese nuclear modernization through a large-scale buildup of U.S. missile-defense capabilities would be costly and counterproductive. Chinese sources indicate that a principal driver of Chinese nuclear calculations is the concern that a larger and more complex U.S. missile-defense system could undermine the viability of Chinas strategic deterrent, thus leaving China vulnerable to nuclear coercion in a crisis. Consequently, limiting missile defenses intended to protect the U.S. homeland to a level appropriate for dealing with the much smaller threat posed by North Korea could help avoid precipitating a larger increase in Chinese nuclear capabilities.117 The United States will best protect its interests by dealing with Chinas growing capabilities through a strategically stable U.S.-China nuclear
114 Zhao, Shezhandaodan weishe zongheng tan, 35. 115 Ibid., 172. 116 On the importance of mutual strategic restraint in the nuclear, space, and cyber domains, see
David C. Gompert and Philip C. Saunders, Paradox of Power: Sino-American Strategic Restraint in an Age of Vulnerability (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 2011).
117 The United States should, however, continue to improve its regional missile-defense capabilities
to protect its own forces and those of its allies in the Asia-Pacific region from the threat posed by Chinas growing arsenal of conventional ballistic missiles. At the same time, Washington will need to assess how its efforts to develop its regional missile-defense capabilities could affect Chinese perceptions of U.S. missile defense and U.S. strategic intentions toward China more broadly. In particular, capabilities that blur the distinction between theater missile defense and national missile defense could influence Beijings views on its nuclear modernization requirements. For more on this topic, see Colby and Denmark, Nuclear Weapons and U.S.-China Relations, 2023.
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relationship.118 Such a relationship will need to be based on mutual deterrence, notwithstanding the fact that the U.S.-China nuclear relationship will remain highly asymmetrical even if Washington reduces its nuclear arsenal well below the level stipulated by the New START treaty between the United States and Russia. To maintain a strategically stable relationship based on mutual deterrence, however, the United States will not only need to exercise restraint in areas such as missile defense.119 It will also need to maintain a credible nuclear capability of its own, both for strategic deterrence and to assure U.S. allies and security partners in the Asia-Pacific. Some of these allies and partners may become increasingly concerned about the implications for the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence as China continues to modernize and expand its nuclear capabilities.120 Consequently, even as the United States continues to reduce the number of nuclear weapons it deploys and limit their role in its defense strategy, it will need to allocate appropriate resources to procure capabilities required for a secure, credible retaliatory force. This force must be capable of maintaining strategic stability by deterring China and Russia and assuring allies of the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence, even with a smaller number of nuclear weapons in the U.S. arsenal. The two most important programs in this regard are the Ohio-class SSBN replacement program, which is designed to provide the United States with a highly survivable, sea-based nuclear deterrent well into this century, and a new strategic bomber armed with stand-off weapons capable of penetrating the most advanced integrated air defense systems. Diplomacy will also play a key role in maintaining a strategically stable U.S.-China relationship. Although China remains reluctant to enter multilateral arms-control negotiations and its perceptions of the potential risks of greater transparency may limit its willingness to engage with the United States, Washington will need to continue pressing for an official U.S.-China dialogue on nuclear issues. Such a dialogue should build upon the achievements of the limited official interactions and Track II dialogues that
118 U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report. 119 At the same time, some observers have argued that Chinese objections to missile defense could be
an excuse for the modernization of Chinese nuclear forces, and that U.S. restraint in this area may not actually encourage corresponding restraint on Chinas part. A counterargument to this position is that restraint on the part of the United States would at least allow Washington to test the sincerity of Beijings concerns about missile defense, so long as Beijing was convinced that U.S. assurances were credible and likely to endure across successive U.S. presidential administrations. See Colby and Denmark, Nuclear Weapons and U.S.-China Relations, 2023. nuclear coercion but also to convince them that U.S. nuclear capabilities are sufficient to guarantee their security and that they therefore do not need to develop their own nuclear weapons.
120 Extended deterrence has historically been intended not only to protect allies from nuclear attack or
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have occurred in recent years, including discussions sponsored by the Naval Postgraduate School and Pacific Forum CSIS. The United States, for its part, should concentrate on accelerating this process by persuading China that increasing transparency would not undermine Chinese interests but instead benefit both sides by promoting shared interests in maintaining strategic stability. This dialogue will need to be expanded to address cross-domain deterrence challenges associated with the linkages between nuclear, space, cyber, and conventional military capabilities.121 The United States may find it difficult to overcome Chinas long-standing concerns. Yet a candid exchange of views is required to avoid a potentially dangerous competition that could diminish the prospects for future nuclear reductions, undermine strategic stability in the U.S.-China relationship, and heighten the risk of escalation in a crisis or conflict. In addition, over time this dialogue could serve as a basis for Chinese participation in future multilateral arms-control negotiations.
121 On the linkages between conventional and nuclear capabilities and the importance of including both
in such discussions, see James M. Acton, The Dragon Dance: U.S.-China Security Cooperation, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 29, 2012 u http://carnegieendowment.org/ globalten/?fa=50148.
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Expanding Contacts to Enhance Durability: A Strategy for Improving U.S.-China Military-to-Military Relations
Scott W. Harold
scott w. harold i s an Associate Political Scientist with the RAND

Corporation, a U.S.-based nonprofit, nonpartisan public-policy think tank. Dr. Harold specializes in the analysis of Chinese foreign and security policies and the international relations of East Asia. He can be reached at <sharold@rand.org>.
keywords: united states; china; military-to-military relations;

military education; track 2 dialogues
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executive summary
This article examines U.S.-China military-to-military relations and outlines a strategy for improving ties by expanding contacts across a range of functional areas.
main argument
U.S. and Chinese observers recognize that the military-to-military relationship between the two countries is the weakest component of their bilateral relationship. Strategic mistrust between Washington and Beijing is high and centers primarily on defense issues. Few analyses have systematically examined policy options for improving ties between the two militaries. Looking at a wide array of opportunities for increasing contact and cooperation, this study identifies a strategy for improving military relations. It lays out a standard by which to judge what sorts of contacts are acceptable and explores the risks and benefits of various policy options.
policy implications
The U.S. is determined to improve its military ties with China. If Washington wants to stabilize defense relations with the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA), a strategy that is both top-down and bottom-up, premised on more regular contact between military elites combined with expanded contacts at lower levels, appears to hold the greatest promise. This approach would raise the benefits for Beijing of engagement while increasing the costs to China of cutting ties. Available evidence suggests that the best approach to engagement with the PLA would be to adopt a centrally managed strategy that captures insights from across all of the U.S. militarys unified combatant commands. Engagement should avoid offering any assistance to PLA operational warfighting, power-projection, or domestic repression capabilities. Many opportunities for engagement exist that will meet these criteria, and such cooperation with China serves the U.S. national interest. U.S. officials should harbor realistic expectations about what military-to-military cooperation can accomplish. Improvements in ties will likely be incremental, take a long time, and not follow a linear trajectory. They could, however, eventually contribute to a better overall relationship.
harold u.s.-china military-to-military relations
hile the political and economic aspects of the relationship between the United States and the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) are substantial and well-institutionalized, the military-to-military ties between the two countries are recognized by observers on both sides of the Pacific as underdeveloped and deeply troubled. Military contacts have been severed repeatedly over the past twenty-plus years. Washington cut ties in the wake of Chinas 1989 crackdown on democracy protestors and after the 2001 EP-3 crisis, and Beijing suspended contacts following the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 and after U.S. arms sales to Taiwan in 2007 and 2010. The Obama administration, worried that poor military relations could aggravate strategic mistrust or cause miscalculations that lead to heightened conflict, has made improving engagement with the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) a part of its overall strategy of rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific. Chinese leaders have also demonstrated openness to expanded contact with the U.S. military. Should the United States seek to build closer military relations with the Chinese armed forces? If so, what policy options are available to develop more stable ties? And what strategy is most likely to achieve U.S. goals? This article examines the arguments for and against closer U.S.-China military-to-military relations. It concludes by advocating a strategy that expands the points of contact between the two sides and gives more actors in China a vested interest in maintaining rather than cutting ties. The article reaches this conclusion by describing current U.S. strategy and prospective areas of engagement and analyzing the benefits and risks associated with each policy option. It draws on U.S. and Chinese writings on defense diplomacy, as well as on more than two dozen interviews with leading Chinese and U.S. international security experts, including active and retired military officers, think-tank analysts, and academics specializing in international relations and security affairs. The article is organized as follows:
u
The first section (pp. 1067) provides an overview of the U.S.-China military-to-military relationship. The second section (pp. 10812) examines whether expanding ties with the Chinese armed forces is in the U.S. national interest. The third section (pp. 11231) describes policy options for deepening U.S. contacts with the PLA, providing insights from U.S. and Chinese expert analysis. The fourth section (pp. 13137) offers a set of caveats that qualify the articles recommendations.
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background: troubled u.s.-china military-to-military relations

For years, U.S. political-military leaders and policy analysts have worried that the absence of stable contacts with the Chinese armed forces could lead to or exacerbate misperceptions, misunderstandings, and miscalculations, especially as forces from the two sides operate in increasing proximity as a result of Chinas development of greater power-projection capabilities. In response, Washington has pushed Beijing to commit to building more stability in the military relationship between the two countries. Former secretary of defense Leon Panetta spoke frequently about the importance of U.S.-China military cooperation, including at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in June 2012 and in Beijing in September 2012.1 Similarly, before stepping down as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen argued in a New York Times op-ed that strategic trust would only come about through more frequent discussions, more exercises, [and] more personnel exchanges.2 Such views reflect a belief among many in the Department of Defense that while engagement cannot resolve all the disagreements between the United States and China, it can help crystallize and clarify misunderstandings on each side so as to avoid unnecessary disagreements and enable the two countries to refocus their attention on those areas where disagreement actually does exist. Consistent messaging from the Obama administration appears to have been somewhat successful in moving the issue of improving military-to-military relations up Chinas list of policy priorities, an approach that has worked in other issue areas as well.3 Over the past two years, top Chinese military leaders have committed to improved military ties. For example, the visit of former PLA chief of the General Staff Department, General Chen Bingde, to the United States in May 2011 was described as being designed to increase mutual trust.4 During a visit to the Pentagon in February 2012, Xi Jinping, then vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission, agreed to broaden and deepen ties between the PLA and the
1 Marcus Weisgerber, Panetta: Mature Relations with China Needed, Navy Times, June 2,
2012; and Craig Whitlock, As Panetta Visits China, Smiles and Challenges, Washington Post, September 19, 2012.
2 Mike Mullen, A Step Toward Trust with China, New York Times, July 25, 2011. 3 Evan S. Medeiros, Reluctant Restraint: The Evolution of Chinas Nonproliferation Policies and
Practices, 19802004 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007). trans. Scott W. Harold, May 15, 2011.
4 Zai Fei, Chen Bingde to Visit the U.S., Attend Military Exercises, Jiefang Ribao,
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U.S. military, reportedly overruling resistance from some within the PLA.5 Similarly, when Chinas minister of defense, General Liang Guanglie, visited the United States in May 2012, his visit was described as helping to further reduce misunderstandings and ease misgivings.6 The former PLA deputy chief of the General Staff, General Ma Xiaotian, has stated that China attaches great value to military exchanges as a way to enhance communication, to expand common ground, to promote mutual understanding, to manage and control risks and to avoid miscalculation, thus maintaining the stability of our military-to-military relationship.7 Although U.S. and Chinese leaders appear to agree on the importance of stabilizing military-to-military ties, the two sides have traditionally held very divergent perspectives on the goals of the military relationship and have viewed the costs of suspending military contacts as very low. This helps explain why the military relationship has not developed smoothly.8 The United States has typically approached military ties as a way to build a more accurate picture of PLA thinking, to convey U.S. expectations and red lines, and at times to engage in deterrence by showcasing advanced U.S. capabilities. By contrast, the Chinese side has tended to view such exchanges as a way to modernize its military by learning from foreign militaries while also shaping the PLAs international image and thereby improving the strategic environment in which China acts.9 The PLA has tended to be leery of revealing too much about its own hardware modernization efforts or strategic thinking, worrying that the transparency sought by the United States might reveal Chinese weaknesses. The PLA is also believed to have sought to manipulate the risks associated with poor military-to-military relations in an effort to influence U.S. policymakers. Now, however, both sides appear to have agreed that expanded military exchanges are important to building a better relationship between the countries armed forces. The next section will examine the case for such an approach.
5 Dan De Luce, Xi Backs Expanding U.S.-China Military Ties: Pentagon, Agence France-Presse,
February 14, 2012; and authors interviews, Beijing, April 2012.
6 Hu Yinan, Visit to U.S. Aims to Ease Misgivings between Militaries, China Daily, May 5, 2012. 7 PLA, Pentagon Officials Resume Regular Talks, South China Morning Post, December 8, 2011. 8 David Finkelstein, The Military Dimensions of U.S.-China Security Cooperation: Retrospective
and Future Prospects, CNA, September 2010.
9 Scott W. Harold, Chinas View of Military Diplomacy, RAND Corporation (unpublished study, 2009).
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examining the case for closer u.s. military ties with china
U.S. Skepticism toward Improving Bilateral Military Relations
Moves to improve military relations with China are not uncontroversial in the United States. There are many in the U.S. military who are skeptical of closer ties with the PLA, pointing out that the Chinese military has been indoctrinated with a deep suspicion of and hostility toward the United States; is seeking to catch up to, and prepare for the possibility of war with, the United States and its allies; and is committed to preserving the rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). From this perspective, the PLA should be kept at arms length. For some observers in the U.S. strategic community, any interactions with the PLA are likely to give the Chinese armed forces insight into how to improve their capabilities and image. The difference in the levels of U.S. and Chinese desire for stable military ties has led some U.S. analysts to worry that Washington might overpay, making costly concessions with a low probability of changing Chinese perceptions of the United States in order to improve defense relations. Former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state Randall Schriver, for example, has warned Washington against casting itself as an ardent suitor and has urged U.S. officials to suspend, or at a minimum drastically scale back, military relations with China.10 A number of U.S. policy experts who have analyzed the relationship also harbor such concerns and have argued for limited cooperation or urged the administration to aim low and aim specific.11 Indeed, former assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs Kurt Campbell argued that the United States needs to have modest expectations because progress in military confidence-building and related security ties will follow, not lead, improvements in the other facets of the U.S.-China relationship.12 Similarly, Richard Weitz, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, has argued that the most important barrier to defense relations is the contentious nature of the U.S.-China relationship. He cautions
10 Randall Schriver, Bound to Fail, Washington Times, July 25, 2011. 11 Kevin Pollpeter, U.S.-China Security Management: Assessing the Military-to-Military Relationship
(Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2004); and Olga Oliker and Catherin Yusupov, U.S.-Chinese Military Contacts in Perspective, RAND Corporation (unpublished manuscript, 2007). 19951999, Washington Quarterly 29, no. 1 (20056): 16986.
12 Kurt Campbell and Richard Weitz, The Limits of U.S.-China Military Cooperation: Lessons from
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that bilateral defense ties are unlikely to improve as long as the underlying security relationship between [the two] countries remains confrontational.13 Skeptics of deeper military contacts also worry that past failure to exert sufficient central oversight and control over engagement on the U.S. side has led to missed opportunities, crossed signals, and in some cases the transmission of information and insights that could prove operationally useful to improving the PLAs warfighting capabilities. Concerned analysts assert that engagement with the Chinese military has at times occurred in an ad hoc way, based on individual flag or general officers interest in reaching out to China rather than being driven by a single authority in the Pentagon and aimed at accomplishing strategic goals through a deliberate plan of action. In addition, lessons from previous interactions were not necessarily incorporated or reviewed by those executing the newest iteration of engagement. As a consequence, opportunities to build knowledge and expand the realm of contacts were lost.14 Finally, skeptics point to the underlying dynamics of the broader political relationship. Given the two countries different political systems and ideologies, as well as their divergent perspectives on major international security issues, some observers argue that more frequent counterpiracy exercises and greater cooperation on military medicine are unlikely to prevent China from cutting military ties the next time the United States sells arms to Taiwan.
Chinese Skepticism toward Improving Bilateral Military Relations

Skepticism of expanded military relations exists on the Chinese side as well. Many PLA officers worry that the United States will convince Chinese leaders to order the PLA to discuss operational capabilities or doctrinal concepts that will reveal weaknesses; negotiate limits on capabilities the PLA views as useful, especially in the realms of cyberspace or outer space;15 or agree to operational understandings that legitimize activities, such as close-in maritime or airborne surveillance, that the Chinese military sees as threatening.16 Additionally, a broad segment of the PLA has been educated to believe that the United States is implacably hostile to China; thus, if
13 Richard Weitz, Enduring Difficulties in China-U.S. Defense Diplomacy, Korean Journal of Defense
Analysis 21, no. 4 (2009): 381400.
14 Authors interview with U.S. expert on military relations with China, Washington, D.C., February 2012. 15 David C. Gompert and Phillip C. Saunders, The Paradox of Power: Sino-American Restraint in an
Age of Vulnerability (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2011).
16 Authors interviews, Beijing, April 2012.
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Washington wants closer military relations with the PLA, it must be seeking these as part of a plot to weaken China. Chinas long-standing approach to military contact with the United States, which seeks to create linkages between the defense relationship and problems in other aspects of bilateral relations, tends to reinforce U.S. skeptics anxieties about the cost of improving ties with the PLA. Traditionally, the Chinese leadership has sought to raise the costs of maintaining or improving ties. It has done this by framing the troubled bilateral military-to-military relationship as a consequence of Washingtons policies and arguing that an improvement in ties will require changes in U.S. behavior or attitudes. Chinese officials and analysts frequently talk about strategic trust as something that must be built up through U.S. actions before relations can improve.17 Official Chinese statements have likewise tended to blame the United States for the poor state of the military-to-military relationship, arguing that Washington should abandon its Cold War mentality and stop treating China like a second coming of the Soviet Union, revise its unfriendly military posture in the Asia-Pacific, and generally start trusting China and the PLA. In terms of specific steps, Chinese officials argue that the United States must remove three obstacles in order to improve the military relationship.18 First, it must end arms sales to Taiwan and abrogate the Taiwan Relations Act. Second, Washington must end the post-Tiananmen arms embargo, revise the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, and repeal the DeLay amendment, which collectively impose limits on the types of contacts U.S. forces can have with their PLA counterparts. Finally, Chinese officials demand that the United States cease close-in reconnaissance missions by the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy in airspace and waters proximate to China.19 It is important to note, however, that although these steps are often presented as preconditions to improving military relations, in practice Chinese officials, military officers, think tank analysts, and academics who advise the central government usually recognize that relations can move forward even in the absence of agreement on these issues.
17 Cui Xiaohuo, Trust Vital to U.S., China Military Ties, China Daily, June 25, 2009. 18 China Eyes New-Type Military Relations with U.S., Xinhua, August 6, 2011. 19 Amy Chang, The Chinese Peoples Liberation Army Delegation Visit to the United States,
May 2011: A Summary of Key Actors and Issues, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Staff Research Backgrounder, June 30, 2011. See also China Eyes New-Type Military Relations with U.S.
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Should the U.S. Advance Military-to-Military Relations with China?

Given these concerns, should Washington seek closer military ties with China? In a word: yes. The United States has much to gain from engagement with the PLA, including clearly communicating U.S. policy positions to Chinese military leaders and discussing Chinas positions with them; improving understanding of the PLAs doctrine, training, education, recruitment and retention, and operational patterns and capabilities; minimizing the impact of negative military relations on the broader relationship; and achieving cooperation in areas of common concern such as counterpiracy and disaster response. As Larry Wortzel, a former Army attach at the U.S. embassy in Beijing, has argued, We must and we will be in some form of contactthe only question is what level of engagement; there is no option for avoiding risk by avoiding contact altogether.20 To be sure, building closer military ties with China will carry risks and necessarily mean giving Chinese leaders something they wantwhether insights into U.S. doctrine or operational concepts, access to U.S. facilities or warfighting platforms, or simply continued signs of respecteven if Washington does not make concessions in the three key policy areas that China has identified as obstacles to closer ties. Indeed, if China were not gaining something of value from defense ties, it would not agree to participate. For its part, the United States clearly seeks military relations with China because Washington believes it gains something from such engagement. One should thus not be surprised if Beijing also seeks to gain something from military-to-military ties. Still, while risks exist, there are also collective benefits that could accrue to the two sides if they manage to build a more cooperative military-to-military relationship. The risks attendant upon closer relations can be mitigated, and this article argues that the benefits could outweigh these potential downsides if the United States approaches engagement appropriately. During the first term of the Obama administration, the Pentagon put in place a centralized and strategic vision for its relationship with the PLA. In January 2011, then deputy assistant secretary of defense for East Asia Michael Schiffer described the administrations approach as aimed at building a relationship based on four goals: creating clear and consistent lines of communication for senior leaders; increasing the safety of U.S. and Chinese military personnel operating in increasingly close proximity; giving each side
20 Authors interview with Larry Wortzel, Washington, D.C., February 2012.
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clearer insight into the capabilities, intentions, and doctrine of the other side so as to minimize misunderstandings and miscalculations; and encouraging and shaping Chinas engagement with regional and global multilateral organizations.21 The next section describes how the United States might achieve these goals through the expansion of military ties and cooperation.
a strategy for expanding u.s. military relations with china

Developing a U.S. strategy to achieve these goals requires expanding contacts and bringing value to a broader set of actors on the Chinese side so as to raise the costs of cutting military ties. Numerous studies of U.S.-China military relations have noted that the United States tends to prefer a bottom-up strategy of building contacts, whereas in the Chinese system no lower-level interactions occur without the blessing of top leaders, meaning a top-down approach is required.22 As one Chinese expert interviewed for this study argued, political leaders will have to set the tone, level, and agenda of military-to-military relations, while another pointed out that top leaders need to impose their will for the relationship to improve.23 At the same time, U.S. strategy cannot rely on engagement with top leaders alone. Without an expansion of contacts across different levels of the PLA and the Chinese government, it is unlikely that the United States will be able to successfully raise the costs of severing ties. Thus, U.S. strategy should focus both on increasing the frequency of contacts with top-level Chinese military leaders and on winning their support for a broader relationship that would expand contacts at lower levels. At the senior leadership level, the U.S. side is working to increase the frequency both of summit meetings and of military exchanges between the secretary of defense and the Chinese minister of defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the PLA chief of the General Staff Department, and the under secretary of defense for policy and the PLA deputy chief of the General Staff Department with responsibility for defense diplomacy.24
21 Michael Schiffer, Building Greater Cooperation in the U.S.-China Military-to-Military
Relationship in 2011 (remarks to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, January 6, 2011). with the United States, CNA, October 1999.
22 David Finkelstein and John Unangst, Engaging DoD: Chinese Perspectives on Military Relations 23 Authors interviews, Beijing, April 2012. 24 One problem is that the United States and China have yet to formalize a counterparts list. This is
necessary given the absence of exact analogues between the two systems owing to differences in how civil-military responsibilities and decision-making authority are allocated.
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Exchanges between the commander of U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) and the U.S. service branch chiefs and their Chinese counterparts are also an important avenue to building bilateral defense relations.25 Scheduling more meetings between senior political and military leaders raises the cost of severing ties because to do so would force officials to cancel events on which they have already spent time and resources planning. The forums that bring top U.S. and Chinese political and military leaders togethersenior leadership visits, the Strategic Security Dialogue, the Defense Consultative Talks, and meetings held under the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA)are opportunities for each side to emphasize its strategic priorities, plan defense exchanges for the year to come, expound on important concepts and understandings, and discuss professional operating practices and mutual expectations. Chinese experts interviewed for this study were in agreement on the importance of these top-level forums, stating that the two sides should expand high-level contacts and work to improve the quality and substance of these rather than building new forums.26 Despite the fact that few breakthroughs in bilateral defense affairs are expected at such events, U.S. defense officials agreed that these forums represent a critical piece of the military-to-military relationship inasmuch as they provide critical top cover that can allow lower-level officials to move cooperative policies forward.27 In addition to expanding contacts between senior leaders, U.S. strategy should seek to expand contacts at lower levels so as to give more Chinese actors an interest in maintaining the defense relationship. The United States has a number of options for developing contacts with the PLA at levels below the senior leadership. While the following list is notand could not becomprehensive, it does reflect the options most frequently mentioned by Chinese and American experts who have closely followed the bilateral defense relationship: cooperating on counterpiracy jointly planning for and participating in UN peacekeeping operations (UNPKO)
25 As there is no exact counterpart to PACOM in the Chinese system, the PACOM commander is
hosted by the deputy chief of the General Staff when visiting Beijing or by the commander of a military region when outside Beijing.
26 Authors interviews, Beijing, April 2012. 27 Authors interview, Washington, D.C., July 2012.
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increasing joint humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) and search-and-rescue exercises at sea participating in multilateral military exercises or exercises hosted by third countries expanding professional military educational exchanges initiating discussions about climate change, to include sharing experiences on how to reduce energy usage and pollution planning and coordinating responses to infectious disease outbreaks and cooperating on other aspects of military medicine cooperating on maritime law enforcement and fisheries policing taking steps to counter nuclear proliferation and international terrorism Military relations could also be bolstered through the use of Track 2 dialogues, including exchanges between Chinese institutions and U.S. federally funded research and development centers (FFRDC), such as the RAND Corporation, CNA, or the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA). A number of other major U.S. think tanks also hold important Track 2 and Track 1.5 discussions with Chinese counterparts on certain topics. For example, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has held discussions on cyberspace with the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), while the Naval Postgraduate School at the Monterey Institute has participated in exchanges on nuclear weapons and space with numerous Chinese hosts.
Counterpiracy
Counterpiracy is one area where the two sides are already expanding cooperation.28 While one comprehensive study on U.S.-China military contacts has argued that the PLA does not view counterpiracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden as useful for engagement with the U.S. military, Chinese experts interviewed for this study disputed this finding and were generally positive about the possibility of counterpiracy cooperation with the United States.29 They were especially interested in learning from the United States experience rescuing hostages at sea, a capability demonstrated off the coast of Somalia in April 2009 when U.S. Navy sharpshooters killed three pirates in the course
28 Chinese, U.S. Ships Conduct Joint Anti-Piracy Drill, Agence France-Presse, September 18, 2012. 29 Shirley A. Kan, U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service,
CRS Report for Congress, RL32496, July 26, 2011; and authors interviews, Beijing, April 2012.
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of rescuing a hijacked ships captain.30 By contrast, PLA Navy forces have not shown a facility for rescuing hostages at sea or managing fast-moving piracy situations. In 2009, for example, the hijacked vessel De Xin Hai was able to escape into Somali territorial waters despite the presence of three PLA Navy vessels nearby.31 For the United States, cooperation on counterpiracy carries potential benefits, only some of which would accrue if exchanges occur in the Central Command area of operational responsibility as opposed to that of PACOM. For example, while counterpiracy cooperation between the two sides in the Gulf of Aden is valuable, some U.S. observers worry that it could help the PLA Navy gain more experience with the conduct of distant operations, thereby improving power projection and appearing to legitimate a Chinese naval presence in distant waters. For this reason, the United States would prefer to find ways to engage in counterpiracy in the South China Sea. This location is more problematic for the Chinese side, as it could serve to legitimize the U.S. presence in waters where Beijing hopes to eventually exercise a veto over foreign military operations. Additionally, because piracy is less of a problem in Southeast Asia than off the Horn of Africa, increasing cooperation in the South China Sea would potentially take away resources from the more significant threat. Finally, given that pirates often operate in or flee to coastal waters, U.S.-China counterpiracy efforts in the South China Sea could result in the violation of neighboring states maritime sovereigntyan outcome that China worries might set a precedent for similar violations of its own claimed territorial rights.32 In light of the two sides concerns, expanding counterpiracy efforts slowly eastward from the Horn of Africa might make the most sense. In order to alleviate the concerns of third countries, which may be anxious about the appearance of a condominium between the navies of two great powers, China and the United States could invite neighboring countries such as India, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, or the Philippines to participate in counterpiracy exercises. Doing so would allow the United States to further familiarize friendly and allied countries with the PLA. Additionally, exchanging experience and insights into hostage rescue would be one way to demonstrate good faith and build cooperation. However, because
30 Robert D. McFadden and Scott Shane, In Rescue of Captain, Navy Kills 3 Pirates, New York Times,
April 12, 2009.
31 Vijay Sakhuja, Is the Chinese Navy Reluctant to Use Force Against Somali Pirates? Jamestown
Foundation, Terrorism Monitor, December 23, 2009.
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hostage-rescue efforts have visit, board, and seizure implications that could be seen as improving PLA capabilities, tactics, and intelligence-gathering, such exchanges could make some U.S. friends and allies uncomfortable. This kind of cooperation should thus be approved only after a thorough review of the possible implications for broader U.S. relationships and compliance with U.S. congressional regulations on military contacts.
UN Peacekeeping Operations
A second option would be to increase UNPKO cooperation with the aim of ensuring that each side is maximizing its contributions and not duplicating the efforts of the other. Chinese analysts generally believe that this is a worthwhile and relatively uncontroversial area in which the two sides can focus their efforts. By contrast, some American observers worry about the implications of cooperation on UNPKOs. First, they are concerned about the possibility of the PLA learning small-group tactics from the U.S. military. Second, given the role of the Peoples Armed Police Force (PAPF) in repressing people in Tibet, Xinjiang, and elsewhere across China, some observers believe that it is inappropriate to put U.S. forces on joint patrols with the PAPF, as occurred during the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti after the earthquake in 2010.33 By contrast, proponents of UNPKO exchanges believe that interactions between U.S. and Chinese forces in small-group settings can help break down stereotypes by giving Chinese soldiers firsthand experience with their U.S. counterparts in less filtered environments. Such exchanges could also demonstrate, in an operational setting, important concepts such as devolved decision-making and the rule of lawideas that challenge the notion that it is appropriate for the worlds largest military to defend a party instead of a set of national laws and interests. Additionally, it may be possible to avoid engagement with the PAPF, which after all is not a part of the Chinese military command and is therefore less valuable for improving military-to-military relations. One option for UNPKO cooperation mentioned by U.S. observers is to invite China to become an active participant in, rather than merely an observer of, the annual Khaan Quest multilateral peacekeeping exercises hosted in Mongolia.34
33 China, U.S. Peacekeepers Conduct Joint Patrol in Haiti, Xinhua, January 29, 2010. 34 Michelle Brown, Khaan Quest 2012 Opening Ceremony Demonstrates Strength of Multinational
Relationships, U.S. Army News, August 13, 2012 u http://www.army.mil/article/85459/ Khaan_Quest_2012_opening_ceremony_demonstrates_strength_of_multinational_relationships.
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Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief and At-Sea Search and Rescue

A third option for expanding contacts between the two sides would be for the United States and China to expand cooperation on HADR and search-andrescue operations at sea. The PLA has only recently begun to exercise HADR capabilities with foreign militaries, with most of its exercises having occurred since 2008.35 Chinese analysts see potential benefits in expanding cooperation with the United States in these areas in terms of both learning operational lessons and using those lessons to improve the PRCs international image. As has been widely noted, Chinas failure to contribute in a meaningful way in the aftermath of the Asian tsunami of 2004 spurred the development of the PLA Navys HADR capability, including the construction of the hospital ship Peace Ark, an important part of the PRCs plans to use the armed forces to expand Chinese soft power.36 At the same time, Chinese experts note that this is a relatively new area for the PLA, and some worry that such exercises could reveal PLA operational shortcomings. For such reasons, China has tended to keep exchanges small to date. For example, in one of Chinas most high-profile HADR exercises, just sixteen Australian soldiers were invited to Sichuan to prepare a joint response to a hypothetical earthquake in a third country.37 Perhaps unsurprisingly, some U.S. analysts fear that cooperation in any realm where the PLA still has both substantial operational lessons to absorb and room to grow could be undesirable. For example, capabilities that the PLA might hone through joint search-and-rescue drills could be translated into combat search-and-rescue for downed pilots in the event of a conflict between China and Taiwan or Japan. Still, the two sides practiced rescuing a distressed ship at sea as early as 2006, and in September 2012 the U.S. Coast Guard carried out an at-sea search and rescue exercise with the China Maritime Safety Administration off the coast of Hawaii, with no negative effects on U.S. national security.38 Other experts interviewed on the U.S. side were concerned that HADR exchanges might help Beijing improve its soft power and thus facilitate closer political relations between neighboring countries and China, possibly at the United States expense.
35 The author extends his thanks to Jeffrey Engstrom of the RAND Corporation for insights on
Chinas experience with HADR exercises. Presence, CNA, September 2011.
36 Peter W. Mackenzie, Red Crosses, Blue Water: Hospital Ships and Chinas Expanding Naval 37 Ma Liyao and Li Xiaokun, China, Australia Begin Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief
Exercises, China Daily, November 29, 2011.
38 China, U.S. Stage Search-and-Rescue Drill, Xinhua, November 19, 2006; and Stephanie Young,
East Meets West in Historic Exercise, U.S. Coast Guard, Coast Guard Compass, web log, September 12, 2012.
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Still, the marginal risks of improving PRC soft power through such exercises may be offset by the goodwill that the United States is likely to earn with third countries in the region by welcoming China as a responsible regional actor and creating space for it to participate in legitimate and constructive ways in the Asia-Pacific. While the PLAs General Political Department takes the lead on domestic HADR, other organizations are involved as well, including the Ministry of Water Resources and the Ministry of Railways. As these institutions build and deepen their ties with the U.S. military, such cooperation will raise the cost to China of cutting military ties.
Multilateral Exercises
A fourth possibility for expanding contacts would be for the United States and China to participate jointly in more third countryhosted or multilateral exercises. In late 2011, for example, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of Indonesia suggested to Prime Minister Julia Gillard of Australia that Canberra and Washington alleviate Beijings misgivings over an agreement to rotate 2,500 U.S. marines through Darwin six months out of the year by inviting PLA forces to exercise jointly with the U.S. and Australian militaries.39 Recent reports suggest Australia is moving ahead with initiating such exercises on the short-term horizon, according to Australian defense minister General David Hurley.40 Similarly, some U.S. analysts have advocated inviting China to participate actively in, rather than just observe, the annual Cobra Gold military exercises with Thailand, while the Department of Defense has announced that it will invite China to participate in the 2014 Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise.41 Because multilateral interactions are run by a different directorate within the PLA than bilateral interactions, such cooperation further expands the field of actors within the Chinese system with something to lose if ties are cut. Some Chinese analysts view participation in exercises hosted by third countries as undesirable because of issues of status, objectivity, and neutrality. With respect to status, a third countrys involvement could signal that the U.S.-China relationship is unhealthy or immature. One PRC analyst argued that this isnt like back in the early 1970s when we needed Pakistan
39 Tom Allard, Invite Chinas Army: Jakarta, Age, November 21, 2011; and Brendan Nicholson,
Joint Army Exercises with China A Possibility, Australian, November 22, 2011. Morning Post, December 28, 2012. Service, September 18, 2012.
40 China, Australia Weigh Joint Military Exercises, Which May Also Involve U.S., South China 41 Karen Parrish, Panetta: Navy Will Invite China to Pacific Rim Exercise, American Forces Press
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to facilitate contact. We dont need third countries today because we have direct relations.42 A retired PLA senior colonel similarly asserted, Were not really interested in third countryhosted exercises. If we want to talk, we can talk. Theres no need to involve a third country.43 Objectivity is a second issue Chinese analysts worry about. One expert argued, If theres a third country involved, that country could bring its own issues or concerns into the picture.44 Finally, one Chinese observer hypothesized that there might not be any such country today that the two sides trust sufficiently to serve as a host.45 Still, other Chinese analysts argued that exercises hosted by third countries or multilateral engagements were entirely possible, given appropriate caveats. For example, such exercises must not target or appear to target any fourth country, one analyst argued, while another pointed out that the substance of such exercises should not be sensitive but must be as uncontroversial as possible.46 Concerns about third-country neutrality were dismissed by one Beijing-based observer who argued that Thailand, Singapore, or Turkey could serve as hosts.47 U.S. experts tend to see the inclusion of China in multilateral exercises as advantageous because they place PRC military forces in a setting where they are expected to work together with the United States and its friends and allies. Because China is already an observer at Cobra Gold, inviting the PLA to elevate its level of participation would undermine claims by Chinese officials such as Major General Luo Yuan of the PLAs Academy of Military Sciences that the United States is trying to contain the PRC by excluding it from full participation in the exercise.48 At the same time, by including the PLA in such exercises, Washington would be building an additional cost into a decision by China to break military ties again, since doing so would mean forgoing the opportunities that participation in such exercises brings for contact with third-country militaries. Indeed, the PLA appears to have been unhappy about its inability to participate in RIMPAC 2012, a consequence of Chinas decision to sever military relations with the United States in 2011 when the 2012 exercise was being planned.
42 Authors interview, Beijing, April 2012. 43 Authors interview, Shanghai, November 2011. 44 Authors interview, Beijing, April 2012. 45 Authors interview, Shanghai, November 2011. 46 Authors interview, Beijing, April 2012. 47 Ibid. 48 Minnie Chan, Experts Say Drills Stir Up Disputes, South China Morning Post, February 8, 2012.
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Professional Military Education Exchanges

Professional military educational exchanges represent a fifth area where cooperation between the U.S. and Chinese militaries could be expanded. Doing so would enable the United States to develop its contacts further down the PRC chain of command and could help counter the ideological indoctrination that Chinese soldiers are exposed to early on, which paints the United States as implacably hostile to China. Educational exchanges can be disaggregated into four types: flag officers and general officers, colonels and lower-ranking officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted personnel. Each type of exchange carries different potential benefits and drawbacks. For example, flag officers and general officers are clearly the most influential, but given that they are at the end of their working careers, their influence is likely to last the shortest. Additionally, they may be the least open to rethinking received images of the United States and more vested than other levels in preserving the leading role of the CCP. At the same time, these officers may have the greatest personal authority, meaning they more accurately reflect the PRCs position and can therefore better help U.S. observers understand the current state of Chinese thinking. One level down, colonels and senior colonels represent a particularly promising level for professional military educational exchanges, since these individuals are both trusted and highly expert and represent the pool from which the next generation of general officers will be drawn. Further down the chain of command, noncommissioned officers carry the greatest potential risks from the perspective of some U.S. analysts because these officers constitute the critical node of the U.S. militarys approach to integrating officers and enlisted soldiers together into a cohesive whole. Noncommissioned officers provide unit continuity, improve tactical decisionmaking, and translate strategic vision and experience up and down the chain of command between officers and enlisted personnel, thereby helping to ensure combat effectiveness. For this reason, some U.S. observers are extremely wary about extending exchanges to the noncommissioned officer corps. At the same time, other U.S. experts argue that because the Chinese political system imposes strict limitations on lower-level decision-making, expanding exchanges with these officers could serve to impress upon the PLA forces the costs of continuing to support a political system that limits its military effectiveness and professionalization. Such exchanges could provide opportunities for the United States to better understand how the Chinese noncommissioned officer corps functions. Finally, inviting Chinese enlisted men and women to visit U.S. professional military educational institutions
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could help shape popular images of the United States, including expanding consciousness of the rule of law, civil-military relations, and popular trust. While some argue that impressions made on enlisted soldiers are unlikely to have much policy impact, when these soldiers cycle out of the military and back into Chinese society at large, such exposure could be useful for countering anti-American images propagated in the Chinese media. For their part, Chinese analysts see reasons to be wary of each type of exchange. First, officers who are fluent in English are uncommon in the Chinese system. Those who do speak English are more likely to be PLA academics or foreign affairs officersindividuals who do not exercise control over units or have much first-hand experience with operational issues. Experienced field officers are rarely allowed to interact with foreigners in the Chinese system, and when they do, these interactions are strictly controlled. Academic and foreign affairs officers in the PLA report that they interact with field officers only infrequently. Moreover, PLA personnel who are given the chance to travel abroad or who make foreign contacts report that they are often under tremendous pressure from colleagues to be extra patriotic, so as to prove their loyalty after returning home from abroad. A number of those interviewed for this study noted that there is a sense that these officials are the target of envy by their fellow soldiers who have not received similar opportunities for foreign travel or exposure. For such reasons, the influence of these officials may be limited, especially if they are perceived as a conduit for foreign viewpoints. Finally, several Chinese analysts expressed concern over the possibility of defection or the erosion of loyalty to the CCP that could come through exposure to foreign study. More than one Chinese analyst cited the defection of Senior Colonel Xu Junping to the United States in 2001, after having spent a term at Harvard University, as an event that still resonates today.49 U.S. concerns with respect to professional military educational exchanges tend to center on reciprocity and noncommissioned officer exchanges. U.S. observers point out that when PLA personnel study in the United States, they generally take the same courses as U.S. military personnel do and are housed in common facilities where they can intermingle. By contrast, in China, U.S. military personnel live in separate barracks and study in courses designed to separate them from contact with Chinese officers and soldiers. Such a situation undermines the basic reciprocity that undergirds and legitimizes military exchanges. The United States should therefore continue to press strongly for
49 Defection Casts Pall over U.S.-China Relations, Reuters, March 25, 2001; and Elizabeth
Rosenthal, Study Abroad for Chinese Is Tainted by a Defection, New York Times, April 1, 2001.
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access to the same educational opportunities and housing conditions for its officers and soldiers as visiting PLA personnel enjoy in U.S. facilities. With respect to noncommissioned officer exchanges, some U.S. observers are leery of assisting the PLA in understanding how the United States noncommissioned officer corps functions to improve U.S. command-and-control and warfighting effectiveness, inasmuch as such educational exchanges might improve the PLAs operational performance. These concerns need to be taken seriously. Yet it is unclear to what extent even first-hand observation or education in a U.S. professional military educational institution could contribute to changing practices in a system that demands as much rigorous top-down control over decision-making as the PLA requires. Moreover, it is likely that the PLA has already obtained U.S. training manuals for noncommissioned officers, and Chinese analysts have been able to observe the operation of U.S. sergeants in combat for more than a decade by watching U.S. operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Thus, a decision on inviting PLA sergeants to train at U.S. facilities may carry some downsides that need to be mitigated but nonetheless could be feasible if appropriately structured. Such interactions would require top-level review by the Department of Defense so as to ensure conformity with the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000. In addition, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command would probably need to revise its educational materials so as to ensure that sensitive information was not revealed to visiting PLA students. Contacts between the faculty and administrators of top-level military education institutions represent another area where professional military educational exchanges could be expanded. Although agreements to carry out exchanges between institutions such as the U.S. National Defense University, the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Command and General Staff College, and the U.S. Naval War College, on the one side, and Chinas National Defense University and the Academy of Military Sciences, on the other, exist in principle, they have rarely been exercised in the years since the agreements were reached. Such ties should be better developed, with the presidents and administrators of these institutions helping to create a more structured environment for professional military educational contacts. Numerous Chinese experts interviewed for this article highlighted the PLAs desire to return to the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) in Honolulu. No Chinese military officers have attended APCSS, a venue for executive education for midcareer defense professionals operated under PACOM, since the United States began admitting military personnel
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from Taiwan in mid-2002.50 Although it is important to expand professional military exchanges, the United States has already shown a willingness to be flexible on APCSS by offering to alternate slots for PRC and Taiwan military officers, something China has rejected. At the same time, civilian Chinese officials, such as academics from the Central Party School, continue to visit the center, and APCSS faculty and administrators continue to be invited to the PRC.51 As such, there seems to be little reason for the United States to ban applications or expel students from Taiwan, especially since APCSS faculty report that the institution receives a great deal of value from exchanges with civilian PRC experts and Taiwan military officers.52
Dialogue on Climate Change

A sixth option for expanding U.S.-China military-to-military cooperation is further dialogue on climate change, including rising sea levels, environmental protection, pollution reduction, and lowering the energy intensity of military operations. The Obama administration came into office looking to expand cooperation with China on climate change.53 A number of former high-ranking administration officialsincluding Jeffrey Bader, senior director for Asia-Pacific affairs on the National Security Council; David Sandalow, assistant secretary for policy and international affairs in the Department of Energy, and Kurt Campbell, former assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairshad a personal association with this issue prior to joining the administration and sought to make progress on it once in office. Such cooperation also enjoys support among policy professionals and lower-ranking government officials. For example, Kenneth Lieberthal has written on climate-change cooperation between the United States and China and encouraged the two sides to find a way to work together on this issue.54 Likewise, Kent Hughes Butts, director of the National Security Issues Branch in the Center for Strategic Leadership at the U.S. Army War College, has
50 Kan, U.S.-China Military Contacts. 51 APCSS Hosts Chinese Delegation for Tour, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS),
August 15, 2012; and APCSS Outreach Team Conducts Security Dialogs in China, APCSS, April 23, 2012.
52 Authors discussions with APCSS faculty, Honolulu, January and August 2012. 53 Jeffrey A. Bader, Obama and Chinas Rise: An Insiders Account of Americas Asia Strategy
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2012).
54 Kenneth Lieberthal and David Sandalow, Overcoming Obstacles to U.S.-China Cooperation
on Climate Change, Brookings Institution, John L. Thornton China Center Monograph Series, January 2009; and Campbell and Weitz, Limits of U.S.-China Military Cooperation.
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noted that environmental collaboration is unlikely to hit politically sensitive buttons, and thus offers great potential to deepen dialogue and cooperation. For this reason, he has urged the U.S. military to share its insights on lowering ecological footprints, greening operations, and reducing health risks to personnel. Butts also advocates that the United States and China collaborate to assess the security implications of climate changerising sea levels, changing precipitation patterns, uncertain migration scenarios, and instability in resource-rich areas, as well as exploring joint research programs aimed at improving fuel efficiency and using alternative energy for bases and noncombat transportation fleets.55 Similarly, Nora Maccoby, a former strategic adviser to the Department of Defense, has argued that the U.S. and Chinese militaries could cooperate on energy efficiency, while Michael Davidson, an environmental expert on China, has noted that the Office of Naval Research has begun exploring ways to establish scientific exchanges with the PRC on alternative energy and basic science.56 Although such measures enjoy broad support in the United States, some U.S. analysts worry that any efforts to help the PLA reduce its energy dependence might improve Chinas ability to resist a blockade in the event of a military clash over Taiwan. Chinese experts also generally favor such cooperation. Some, however, point to the possibility that discussions of energy use and pollution abatement could quickly lead into sensitive areas that might require the PLA to reveal technical data associated with fuel burn rates on airframes or naval vesselsinformation the Chinese side would probably be loath to share.57 Yet a recently announced initiative by PACOM to invite PLA officers to study logistics cooperation and resource-sharing during counterpiracy and HADR missions suggests that the obstacles to such cooperation may not be insuperable.58 Such measures will complement pre-existing efforts of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to collaborate with
55 Kent Hughes Butts and Geoffrey D. Dabelko, One Way to Boost U.S.-China Military Cooperation,
Christian Science Monitor, April 21, 2009.
56 Nora Maccoby, The U.S. Military and China as Environmental Soul Mates, Globalist, January 18,
2011; and Michael Davidson, U.S., China: A Green Security Blanket, Asia Times, May 14, 2010.
57 Authors interviews, Beijing, April 2012. 58 Donna Miles, U.S., China to Consider Sharing Resources during Joint Missions, American Forces
Press Service, October 12, 2012.
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the PLAs General Logistics Department and the Ministry of Water Resources to share lessons from each countrys waterways management experiences.59
Military Medicine Exchanges

A seventh area in which the United States could seek to expand cooperation with the PLA is military medicine. The U.S. military tends to treat medicine exchanges as an unalloyed good, seeing little risk from these kinds of contacts. To date, the United States has carried out several such exchanges with the PLA: four PLA Navy medical observers visited the hospital ship USNS Comfort in 2009 and a U.S. military medical delegation accompanied Ray Mabus, secretary of the Navy, on his visit to China in November 2012.60 Expanding cooperation on the treatment of burns and war wounds, reconstructive surgery, or research into post-traumatic stress disorder should be possible. The U.S. military has also begun exploring the value of traditional Chinese medicine, including acupuncture, and has been incorporating this approach into its overall package of treatments for military personnel.61 One officer has argued that this presents an opportunity for further engagement with the PRC.62 Opportunities to collaborate on drug trials, disease treatments, and preparations for responding to epidemiological outbreaks are also appealing to the United States. With some of the densest sites of human habitation on the planet in southern and southwestern China, the Chinese military would undoubtedly be called on as a first responder in the event of a renewed outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), avian influenza, swine flu, or any other rapidly spreading communicable disease. In such a circumstance, collaboration between the U.S. and Chinese militaries could establish patterns of communication and interaction that would constitute a prepared strategic response to a potential infectious disease outbreak in China. As such, the U.S.
59 Christopher A. Lestochi, Security Cooperation and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Role,
U.S. Army War College, Strategy Research Project, January 2012 u http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA562551; and International and Interagency Services, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Fact Sheet, July 18, 2011 u http://www.usace.army.mil/Media/FactSheets/ FactSheetArticleView/tabid/219/Article/88/international-and-interagency-services.aspx. Strategy, United States Navy News Service, June 18, 2009; China, U.S. to Hold Joint Humanitarian Drill, Xinhua, October 25, 2012; and Li Xiaokun and Zhao Shengnan, Navy Chiefs Meeting Highlights Chinas Openness, China Daily, November 28, 2012. Courier, March 19, 2009.
60 Danielle Grannan, Comfort Departs Tumaco, Heads for El Salvador in Support of the Maritime
61 Brandon C. Pomrenke, U.S. Military Incorporates Classic Chinese Medicine, Fort Campbell 62 James A. Chambers, The Rise of Chinese Military Medicine: Opportunity for Mercy Ship, Not
Gunboat, Diplomacy, Military Medicine 176, no. 9 (2011): 104350.
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Army Research Institute for Infectious Diseases has an important role to play in facilitating medical exchanges with the PLA. Because both sides benefit from their cooperation in this field, military medicine has largely been insulated from the ups and downs that have affected the broader military-to-military relationship. In interviews for this study, neither Chinese nor American observers raised any substantial concerns about military medicine exchanges. If there is a drawback to these kinds of ties, it is that such exchanges tend to be quite specialized and touch on so narrow a segment of the two sides armed forces that these contacts do not always register as deeply as they ought to, given their potential importance. Building such contacts, and especially expanding them through multilateral forums such as the annual Asia-Pacific Military Medicine Conference, nonetheless should give additional actors in the Chinese system a stake in stable military ties.63
Maritime Constabulary Affairs

Contacts between the U.S. Coast Guard and the Chinese Fisheries Law Enforcement Command and China Maritime Safety Administration represent an eighth area where military-to-military relations could be expanded. Joint efforts to prevent illegal fishing and poaching, combat smuggling, and respond to emergencies at sea are uncontroversial for both sides. Recent cooperation between the U.S. Coast Guard and the Chinese Fisheries Law Enforcement Command, a sub-administrative organ under the Ministry of Agriculture, resulted in the arrest of the unflagged Chinese vessel Da Cheng, which was engaged in illegal drift-net fishing in the high seas of the western Pacific. Such success shows that the U.S. military can help build cooperative patterns of behavior in areas where the two sides share common interests, such as in preventing the depletion of maritime protein resources.64 Similarly, search-and-rescue exercises between the U.S. Coast Guard and the China Maritime Safety Administration, a subordinate agency within the Ministry of Transportation, demonstrate that the two sides can work together to
63 Kevin P. Bell, Pacific Armies Strengthen Ties During Medical Conference in Bangkok, U.S. Army,
April 30, 2012.
64 Coast Guard, Chinese Officials Interdict Foreign Vessel for Illegal Fishing, Hawaii Reporter,
August 12, 2012.
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save lives.65 By using the U.S. military to expand cooperation and outreach, even with actors that are not part of the PLA, Washington will give Chinese decision-makers an additional stake in maintaining stable military ties with the United States and thereby raise the costs of severing ties.
Nonproliferation, Counterproliferation, and Counterterrorism

Cooperation on nonproliferation and counterproliferation and on counterterrorism, a ninth possible area for expanded contacts, is likely to be difficult. Since the attacks of September 11, China has sought to insulate itself from criticism on human rights by portraying itself as a victim of terrorism. Chinese propaganda paints ethno-nationalist dissatisfaction with Beijings rule in Tibet and Xinjiang as terrorism, and government officials have described prominent ethnic minority figures such as the Dalai Lama and Rebiya Kadeer as terrorists.66 Additionally, Beijings relations with Pakistan and efforts to block the listing of Jamaat ud-Dawaa front organization for the terrorist group Lashkar-e Taibaas a UN-designated terrorist group until the 2008 Mumbai attacks suggest that counterterrorism cooperation will be challenging as long as it appears to come at a cost to Beijings other foreign policy objectives. While some intelligence-sharing may occur between the two militaries, Chinese analysts recognize that U.S. sensitivities about human rights and the rule of law make cooperation on counterterrorism difficult. Still, it may be possible to use a multilateral venue, such as the Asia-Pacific Intelligence Chiefs Conference, where threats like terrorism and natural disasters are put on the table for discussion by the regions top intelligence officials, to push China toward a discussion of such cooperation.67 Cooperation on nonproliferation and counterproliferation is also likely to be challenging. China does not tend to talk about counterproliferation, as this language can imply roll back, a policy that is too proactive and risk acceptant for Beijings comfort. In terms of nonproliferation efforts, China has deliberately watered down or blocked numerous efforts to sanction Iran, North Korea, Syria, and other states seeking to acquire weapons of mass
65 U.S. Coast Guard, Peoples Republic of China Maritime Safety Administration Complete Search
and Rescue Exercise, U.S. Coast Guard, Press Release, September 6, 2012 u http://www.uscgnews. com/go/doc/4007/1539311/U-S-Coast-Guard-People-s-Republic-of-China-Maritime-SafetyAdministration-complete-search-and-rescue-exercise. Ford, Spiritual Mother of Uighurs or Terrorist? Christian Science Monitor, July 9, 2009. Intelligence Chiefs Meet to Discuss Security, Korea Herald, June 7, 2010.
66 China: Dalai Lama Stance on Suicides is Terrorism, Associated Press, October 19, 2011; and Peter 67 The author thanks Mark Cozad of the RAND Corporation for this insight. See also Asia-Pacific
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destruction (WMD).68 Some Chinese strategic thinkers view these states as useful counterweights to U.S. power because they are friendly to China and unlikely to threaten the PRC even if they acquire WMDs; conversely, some Chinese analysts argue that China should not confront these states so as to avoid becoming a target of their newfound capabilities.69 Access to energy and other raw inputs also serves to limit Chinese interest in cooperating on sanctions and nonproliferation. Chinese leaders are further concerned that supporting international sanctions could end up legitimizing a sanctionsbased approach that might one day be turned against the PRC itself. Past and suspected current involvement of Chinese state-owned defense industrial firms in helping Iran and North Korea build their nuclear programs represents an additional barrier to deep cooperation in this area. Finally, concerns about legitimating U.S. seizure of suspect vessels on the high seassomething that happened to China in the 1993 Yinhe incidentlimit Beijings enthusiasm for measures such as the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative. Nonetheless, some discussions between the two countries militaries, or between U.S. defense officials and the Chinese strategic, policing, and intelligence communities, could help sensitize each side to the definitions, concepts, and operating assumptions that guide the other. While China is unlikely to become a strong force for nonproliferation in the near future, it may be possible to prevent unauthorized weapons sales by using defense exchanges to help Beijing better understand best practices in controlling its sprawling arms industry. It could also be useful for U.S. and Chinese experts to trade insights into how to deal with potential maritime-based proliferation incidents so that the two sides are not attempting to innovate a response on the fly in the event of a quickly developing situation.
Track 1.5 and Track 2 Dialogues

A tenth area in which the U.S. and Chinese militaries could expand their contacts is Track 1.5 and Track 2 dialogues.70 Numerous such dialogues exist, including the Sanya Initiative, the dialogue on cyber issues between CSIS and CICIR, and the Naval Postgraduate Schools nuclear dialogue with a changing
68 It is worth noting here that North Korea and China are formal allies under a 1961 mutual
security treaty.
69 Scott W. Harold and Alireza Nader, China and Iran: Economic, Political, and Military Relations,
RAND Corporation, Occasional Paper, 2012.
70 Since all Chinese attendees at Track 2 dialogues are required to report on their conversations, all
such dialogues should be considered Track 1.5 in nature. The author thanks Larry Wortzel for this insight.
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set of Chinese interlocutors. Contacts between retired military officers, officers or defense personnel serving in private capacities, and defense policy analysts and academics with knowledge of how the two sides think can provide an instrument for the United States and China to maintain ties if formal military relations are severed. Such discussions can also help the two countries expand contacts among new generations of experts, explore each others thinking on sensitive issues, and develop common understandings of critical concepts such as deterrence, escalation control, war termination, and red lines in space, cyberspace, and the nuclear realm. While observers on both sides see value in Track 2 dialogues, there are risks as well, including the possibility that such venues will be used for influence operations to spread disinformation, collect intelligence, or recruit well-placed contacts. The most prominent venue for dialogue among retired flag and general officersthe Sanya Initiative, brought together by retired admiral William Owens and retired general Xiong Guangkaihas been criticized by both U.S. and Chinese analysts as exemplifying many of these perceived risks.71 In part, this stems from the decision by Owens to pen an op-ed arguing for ending U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and lifting restrictions on advanced technology transfers to China that appeared to place most of the blame for the problems in the bilateral relationship on U.S. policy.72 Many U.S. defense analysts also point to Owenss efforts to help Huawei gain access to the U.S. telecommunications market as undermining his perceived objectivity. Similarly, retired PACOM commander and former U.S. ambassador Joseph Prueher, another Sanya participant, has urged Washington to cease arms sales to Taiwan.73 In light of these efforts by Sanya Initiative participants to shape public opinion, some U.S. defense experts worry that the venue is a Chinese intelligence effort to woo a cohort of high-ranking ex-officers who could lend legitimacy to the PRCs preferred policy positions.74 A number of Chinese observers also view the Sanya Initiative as having caused more harm than good due to the appearance of a conflict of interest among some U.S. side participants. In fact, no Chinese expert interviewed for this study thought the dialogue had helped improve bilateral relations. One Beijing-based academic expert on defense affairs stated:
71 Greg Torode, Man on a U.S.-Sino Mission, South China Morning Post, May 23, 2010. 72 Bill Owens, America Must Start Treating China as a Friend, Financial Times, November 17, 2009. 73 A Way Ahead with China: Steering the Right Course with the Middle Kingdom, Miller Center for
the Study of Public Affairs, University of Virginia, 2011.
74 Authors interview, Washington, D.C., February 2012. See also Bill Gertz, Chinese Communists
Influence U.S. Policy through Ex-Military Officials, Washington Free Beacon, February 6, 2012; and John Garnaut, China Gets into the Business of Making Friends, Sydney Morning Herald, May 25, 2013.
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It is not valuable. Those PLA officers who are participating in it are not in the loop anymore and are just looking for an excuse to eat good food, drink good wine, golf and enjoy a holiday. All they are doing is pushing PRC talking points. Chinese experts on the United States understand that Sanya is a negative because it is all just about personal engagement, holidays, and eating foodits not just not a positive format, its actually bad for the relationship.75
Another interviewee, a retired PLA general, noted that we recognize that the Sanya leadership from the U.S. side is discredited and that the forum as a whole has lost credibility.76 Still, the forum could be useful again if handled differently. Specifically, the individuals leading it from the U.S. side should not simultaneously be doing business in China and writing op-eds that advance highly controversial policy options that coincide with Chinese talking points. Plans to transfer management of the Sanya Initiative to the East-West Institute may help rehabilitate its utility as a venue for U.S.-China military contacts. As one retired U.S. flag officer who has worked on military engagement with China has stated, Sanya could [still] be useful if they ditch the whole abandon Taiwan emphasis.77 Other Track 2 venues play important roles in advancing each sides understanding of the others positions. For example, although the CSIS-CICIR cyber dialogue has had very little success in finding common positions on cyber issues, it does appear to be teaching the Chinese side to think about cyber issues from a policy perspective, while also helping the two sides better identify and understand their counterparts.78 Similarly, the Naval Postgraduate Schools nuclear dialogue has brought together U.S. civilian experts and defense officials and survived the repeated cutoff of military ties during the forums eight-year run. One participant related that:
Unquestionably we are learning from these dialogues. We are learning, for example, why they see missile defense as such a threat. We are able to convey the meaning we attach to strategic stability. We are learning the nuances of their ideas about what constitutes first use. Our discussions center on trying to define and understand each sides concepts such as a secure second strike capability, what deterrence means and what would deter, the definition of counterforce, etc. We have also deepened our understanding of just how shallow their thinking is on nuclear warfighting. A number of issues that senior U.S. policymakers on nuclear issues would have very developed thoughts on and that would have been hashed out over the course of years of debating
75 Authors interview, Beijing, April 2012. 76 Ibid. 77 Authors interview, Washington, D.C., February 2012. 78 Authors interview, Washington, D.C., July 2012.
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these issues, they are still just beginning to grapple withthings like war control. We are seeing the evolution of their thinking on submarines. We are also talking about lots of stuff that would be tough to dialogue about officially, things like What are the prospects for arms control?79
A separate U.S. Air Force Academy dialogue on space issues with the Chinese National Defense University and the Academy of Military Sciences existed from 2004 to 2010 but has lapsed because of lack of funding. The Pentagon should consider resuming funding for this dialogue as a part of proposed discussions with China on space, cyber, and nuclear issues. Such dialogues may pick up additional participation from federally funded research and development centers such as RAND, CNA, and IDA. Indeed, IDA previously participated in three rounds of dialogue with the China Institute for International Strategic Studies (CIISS) from 2006 to 2008 on topics including personnel costs, common security challenges, and defense industrial development and procurement.80 Chinese experts tend to view this as a promising area for expanding contacts and building mutual understanding. Of course, there exist other areas where the U.S. military might expand contacts with the PLA. Exchanges of U.S. military bands and Chinese military song and dance troupes carry few risks and can cultivate positive images among soldiers.81 These activities are already occurring and should be continued.82 The United States should also consider using the reserve components of the U.S. military, especially the National Guard, to interact with China, since they highlight the state-federal divide, the rule of law, and the national, civilian-governed nature of the U.S. military. The final section below offers some cautionary notes as the U.S. pushes forward with engagement with the PLA.
79 Authors interview, Washington, D.C., July 2012. 80 Stephen J. Balut et al., Proceedings of the 1st IDA-CIISS Workshop: Military-to-Military Relations
and Defense Personnel Costs, Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), 2006; Stephen J. Balut et al., Proceedings of the 2nd IDA-CIISS Workshop: Common Security Challenges and Defense Personnel Costs, IDA, 2008; and Stephen J. Balut et al., Proceedings of the 3rd IDA-CIISS Workshop: Challenges and Opportunities of Common Security and the Business of Defense, IDA, 2009.
81 Peter Apps, From Opera to Exercises, U.S. and China Deepen Military Ties, Reuters, May 22, 2013. 82 China-U.S. Military Bands Hold Joint Concert, Xinhua, October 30, 2012.
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caveats and qualifications

There is no magic bullet strategy that will guarantee an improvement in U.S.-China military relations. History, divergent interests, and mutual suspicions are too powerful to guarantee that even a well-crafted approach will not founder if the types of contingent events that have bedeviled the relationship in the past recur. Moreover, no approach is risk-free, not even a strategy of minimizing contact. A smart strategy will avoid putting the United States in the position of being a supplicant in military engagements; the United States should not show up merely looking to engage, but should instead come to its interactions with the PLA with its own set of issues that China should be expected to address.83 These could include committing to discuss strategic restraint in the nuclear, space, and cyber realms; increasing efforts to avoid incidents at sea and in international air space; and reducing the missile threat against Taiwan. The U.S. side should also prepare extensively in advance of any engagement opportunity so as to pose useful questions and ensure that its efforts are additive over time and result in the maximum learning possible.84 Finally, as Larry Wortzel has argued, any engagement with the PLA must provide no operational insights that improve PLA warfighting, power-projection, or domestic-repression capacities.85 It is also important to understand what such an approach cannot seek to do. Even a highly institutionalized and cooperative U.S.-China military relationship is unlikely to ever rival the bilateral economic relationship in importance. Moreover, U.S. political-military leaders have sometimes characterized deeper engagement with the PLA as being useful in the event of a crisis, during which U.S. officials hope to be able to pick up the phone and know the military official on the other end. As experience has shown, this is a dangerous illusion. The role of PLA Foreign Affairs Office officials in the event of a crisis is to block, not facilitate, contact between foreigners and PLA commanders or decision-makers while the Chinese side reaches a consensus on its policy response. Indeed, since the establishment of a military hotline
83 The author wishes to thank Randall Schriver for this suggestion. Authors personal phone
communication with Randall Schriver, August 2012.
84 Kenneth W. Allen, U.S.-China Relationship: Economics and Security in Perspective,
testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Washington, D.C., February 2, 2007.
85 See The Proper Scope, Purpose, and Utility of U.S. Relations with Chinas Military, Heritage
Foundation, Heritage Lecture, no. 689, October 10, 2000 u http://www.heritage.org/research/ lecture/the-proper-scope-purpose-and-utility.
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in 2008, it has been cut off twice by the PRC.86 Likewise, during the 2001 EP-3 crisis, U.S. officials were unable to get anyone to take their calls prior to a decision being made by the Politburo Standing Committee or the Central Military Commission, because no Chinese official can afford to step out in front of an issue in a way that might appear to box in the central leadership. As such, friendship, familiarity, and an understanding of how individual military commanders think is not particularly relevant during a crisis with China. Instead, it is important to understand how the Politburo Standing Committee or Central Military Commission is likely to view a crisis. Reflecting this constraint, Chinese interviewees highlighted the need for U.S. analysts to understand that improved operational linkages will have limited utility for improving overall U.S.-China relations. As Australian defense expert Carlyle Thayer has argued,
[T]here is not much evidence that military-to-military contacts and strategic dialogue have reduced strategic mistrust and improved transparency. [However] without such interaction, there is a risk that mistrust between the two militaries could spill over and have a major negative impact on bilateral relations in general.87
Improved U.S.-China military relations can play a role in reducing overall suspicions and insecurity most effectively if they are understood as just one part of a broader outreach effort over an extended period of time. Even so, the PLAs increasing professionalization and narrowing focus on technical questions associated with warfighting, along with the overriding mantra that the CCP controls the gun, mean that the scope for improving the overall relationship through better ties to the PLA is at best probably limited. This caveat, however, should not be mistaken for an argument that the position of the skeptics is right. In responding to the question of just how much difference expanded military-to-military ties would make for the overall relationship, even if the two sides increased contacts in all the areas noted above, Chinese interviewees argued that while the value of broader and deeper military contacts between the two sides should not be overestimated, it should not be underestimated either. As one interviewee argued, Once links are established, they are easier to reconstruct if severed. Another noted that broad, deep, and routinized contacts between the two sides were the definition
86 Hu Yinan, Military Hot Line Smoothes Rocky Relationship, China Daily, November 12, 2011. 87 Carlyle Thayer, Enhancing Transparency? U.S.-China Military-to-Military Contacts and Strategic
Dialogues (paper presented at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politiks Berlin Conference on Asian Security, Berlin, June 1819, 2012).
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of stability and normal interactions, and a third expert maintained, perhaps optimistically, that more interactions equal more trust and understanding.88 Overall, Chinese experts interviewed for this study recommended beginning with easier, less sensitive issues and proceeding to harder, more complicated problems, an approach that has characterized Chinas strategy for dealing with other tough problems, such as the cross-strait relationship.89 Luo Yongkun, a researcher with CICIR, has confirmed Chinas preference for this approach, stating that it is easier to start [with] non-traditional security cooperation due to the relatively small differences betweencountries on these issues and work to broaden outward from there.90 In practice, this means starting with cooperation on counterpiracy, HADR, at-sea search and rescue, and military medicine, and holding Track 2 dialogues. The two sides are already pushing ahead on counterpiracy and HADR cooperation, having discussed these issues at the MMCA meeting in Qingdao in late September 2012.91 Due to their greater operational sensitivity, logistical and professional military educational exchanges are likely to prove more challenging. Finally, making progress on cyber, space, and nuclear practices; cooperating on counterterrorism, nonproliferation, and counterproliferation; and defining operational norms in waters near China will likely require the greatest amount of time, patience, and effort. On the issue of professional military education, the United States should press China to extend interactions from military academics to operators, while also conditioning PLA access to U.S. institutions on genuinely reciprocal exchanges. Reciprocity may not be immediately forthcoming, and Washington should be prepared to wait, expanding cooperation only when the two sides are willing to meet on equal terms. Establishing maritime rules of the road through the MMCA will also be challenging. The issues associated with determining operational guidelines do not fall under the exclusive control of the PLA, but also touch on issues governed by the State Oceanographic Administration and the Fisheries Law Enforcement Command and carry implications for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the legal architecture articulated by the National Peoples Congress.
88 Authors interviews, Beijing, April 2012. 89 Alan D. Romberg, Cross-Strait Relations: First the Easy Steps, Then the Difficult Ones, China
Leadership Monitor, no. 26 (2008): 131. November 4, 2011.
90 Cui Haipei, SE Asia, Neighbors Urged to Boost Humanitarian Aid, Disaster Relief, China Daily, 91 China, U.S. Militaries Hold Annual Maritime Security Meeting, Xinhua, September 29, 2012.
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The United States should bear in mind that the extension of politically significant symbols of respect can go part of the way to helping the United States and China deepen their cooperation. At times, the suggestions of Chinese experts interviewed on this topic took on novel forms: for example, one think tank analyst linked to the PLA suggested the United States should lift the arms embargo and then just deny every military technology transfer request China puts forward. Another academic urged Washington to shift its policy on unification of Taiwan and the mainland, while setting conditions that the current PRC would find impossible to meet, such as supporting reunification only if carried out under liberal democratic auspices. This interviewee noted that just the appearance of the word reunification in U.S. policy documents, no matter how conditionally, would help improve U.S.-China military relations. Such creative, if unlikely, policy shifts may not serve the United States interests, inasmuch as they would give China more influence in shaping U.S. policy than is healthy. Nonetheless, the innovative nature of these proposals suggests both possible flexibility on the Chinese side and the value of Track 2 dialogues, where potential solutions to long-standing issues in the relationship can be explored through brainstorming and unconventional thinking. U.S. analysts should be prepared to engage with their Chinese interlocutors in efforts to find novel solutions, while also bringing U.S. concerns to the table for the PRC to address. Such engagement should not be an opportunity for the Chinese side to frame all the problems in the bilateral relationship as stemming from U.S. actions or policies. Finally, owing to the political transitions in both China and the United States, the realities of staff turnover, and the seriousness of the problems in the relationship, improving military-to-military relations is likely to take some time. U.S. officials should thus adopt realistic, limited expectations and anticipate spending years gradually raising the level, frequency, breadth, and depth of the relationship. This appears to be well understood. For example, in January 2011, at the end of a trip to Beijing, then secretary of defense Robert Gates stated that the United States must play the long game and expect not breakthroughs but rather evolutionary growth of relationships and activities together that over time have a positive effect on the overall relationship.92 Frequent high-level meetings should be used to generate momentum, while expanded contacts with middle- and lower-level officers and soldiers can be
92 Quoted in Bonnie Glaser and Brittany Billingsley, Pomp and Substance: Hus State Visit to the
U.S., Comparative Connections, May 2011.
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used to cultivate PLA personnel who better understand the United States and the value of cooperation with the U.S. military. More generally, the Department of Defense should continue to exert firm, centralized control over the engagement effort under the leadership of the deputy assistant secretary of defense (DASD) for East Asia within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. The DASD for East Asia should continue to work closely with PACOM to ensure that all U.S. military interactions with China are centrally coordinated. Such an approach helps avoid sending conflicting signals while also ensuring that lessons, interface opportunities, and engagements across other combatant commands complement those stemming from initiatives led by PACOM. Close coordination between the Departments of Defense and State is important to ensure that military and diplomatic lines of communication are mutually reinforcing. The DASD for East Asia will thus need to build a close working relationship with the deputy assistant secretary of state responsible for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. The imperative to engage across government departments highlights the fact that the U.S. militarys overall engagement effort can and should correctly be framed as belonging to the United States rebalance to the Asia-Pacific. This policy initiative contains both military and diplomatic elements, as well as economic implications that lie outside the scope of this article. Military and diplomatic leaders can point out to their Chinese counterparts that greater U.S. attention, resources, and capabilities in the Asia-Pacific mean more opportunities for the U.S. military to interact, engage, and build patterns of operational contact with the PLA. By framing expanded military ties with PLA forces as a part of the rebalance, U.S. officials can help legitimate that broader effort and reassure anxious Chinese officials that the United States is paying more attention to the Asia-Pacific without intending to threaten China. This can be demonstrated through skillful military diplomacy, such as inviting the PLA to RIMPAC 2014, carrying out counterpiracy exercises in the Gulf of Aden, and expanding peacekeeping exchanges. The latter half of 2013 will be a key time to push ahead with strategic planning to improve U.S.-China military relations, because by this point the Obama administration will be finalizing its staffing changes and China will have completed the transitions in its state and military positions. By late summer or early fall 2013, the two sides should be well-placed to begin moving past their mutual focus on domestic political issues and considering broader strategic issues, something Chinese interviewees recognized in their
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comments for this study.93 The next two to three years, during which the new Chinese political-military leadership will be working out the collective policy priorities that will define the Xi Jinping era, represent a critical period of strategic opportunity for the United States communication and engagement with China. By 2015, President Xi Jinping is likely to have consolidated his political power and begun to put his own stamp on policymaking, including international security affairs. At that point, the window for policy innovation is likely to narrow. This means that over the latter half of 2013 the Obama administration, and the Department of Defense in particular, should prioritize advancing a strategic, centralized, and comprehensive engagement plan with the PLA that both increases the costs to China of severing ties and clarifies the benefits of maintaining stable bilateral military relations.
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Policy Succession and the Next Cross-Strait Crisis

Bruce Gilley
bruce gilley is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director
of the PhD Program in Public Affairs and Policy in the Mark O. Hatfield School of Government at Portland State University. He specializes in the comparative politics and international relations of China and Asia and is the co-editor of Seeing Beyond Hegemony: Middle Powers and the Rise of China (forthcoming) and the author of The Nature of Asian Politics (forthcoming). He can be reached at <gilleyb@pdx.edu>.
u Earlier versions of this article were presented at a conference on Cross-Strait Relations under New Management, hosted by the University of Nottinghams China Policy Institute on June 12, 2012, and as part of a speaker series organized by the Taiwan Studies Program at Stanford Universitys Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law on January 14, 2013.
note
keywords: taiwan; china; cross-strait relations; policy change;

policy succession
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executive summary
This article argues that Chinas policy on Taiwan is likely to evolve toward political engagement as a result of the multiple actions of policy actors rather than politicians on both sides.
main argument
This article draws on policy-science theory concerning public-policy change to identify the possible trajectories of and likely actors in Chinas future policy toward Taiwan. It identifies three scenariospolicy transformation, policy stasis, and policy evolutionand evaluates the possibility and implications of each. The article argues that policy evolution, probably in the form of a policy succession toward political and military issues led by programmatic and other policy actors, is the most likely outcome. This conclusion diverges significantly from the mainstream belief by analysts in Taiwan and the U.S. that policy stasis held in place by the new leadership of Xi Jinping is the most likely scenario.
policy implications
Chinas policy toward Taiwan is more likely to evolve toward noneconomic issues in the Xi period, possibly under the influence of programmatic and other policy actors. Taiwan needs to have a forward-looking and proactive strategy for meeting this expected evolution in cross-strait policy. The U.S. will continue to play a role in creating supportive external conditions for the reconciliation, as well as appealing to both sides to work toward a practical solution to their formal conflict.
gilley policy succession and the next cross-strait crisis
here is a common belief among analysts in Taiwan and the West that the new leadership chosen in China in 2012 will continue to pursue the successful reconciliation with Taiwan that was begun by the two sides in 2005. This belief may be dangerous, however, because it presupposes a certain view of how policies evolve in light of prior commitments. By assuming that policy continuity in the Taiwan Strait means no policy change, analysts may have forgotten that policies evolve over time. In particular, Beijing may intend to continue its cross-strait policy by successively expanding it into political and military spheres. If this model of policy succession more accurately renders what Beijing means by policy continuity than a model of policy stasis, then future cross-strait relations are at risk. There seems to be a slow-moving crisis emerging in which Taipei clings to a belief in a status quo relationship while the relationship shifts into new areas. Understanding the dynamics of policy change in Beijing is key if both Taipei and Washington are to successfully manage the cross-strait relationship in coming years. This article is organized as follows:
u
The first section (pp. 14143) briefly introduces a theory of policy change in order to frame the discussion of cross-strait policy. The second section (pp. 14358) considers three alternative scenarios for Beijings future cross-strait policy: policy stasis, policy transformation, and policy evolution, and contends that one form of policy evolution, known as policy succession, is the most likely scenario. The third section (pp. 15859) concludes the article with a consideration of how Taipei and Washington might creatively respond.
how policies change

Public policy theory includes the study of how policies change over time. In effect, there are three broad directions in which such change can occur.1 Public policies can remain largely fixed in terms of both overall goals (sometimes called long-term impacts) and immediate objectives (sometimes called short-term outcomes), changing only in terms of the context of implementation (sometimes called stasis or stability); they can change dramatically in terms of both goals and objectives (radical, transformative, root, major, or innovative policy change); or they can remain fixed in terms of
1 Nancy Roberts and Paula King, Transforming Public Policy: Dynamics of Policy Entrepreneurship
and Innovation (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1996).
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goals but evolve in terms of objectives (incremental, first order, evolutionary, branch, or momentum policy change). Within the evolutionary or incremental category of policy change, a range of subtypes can be identified. Perhaps the most noteworthy is what Brian Hogwood and B. Guy Peters call policy succession, which involves a significant refurbishment of policy objectives, program characteristics, and organizational forms, while still operating under the same overall goals.2 Where change builds upon the same policy image (the assumptions of the context of the policy), it is linear policy succession; and where it involves a shifting policy image, it is nonlinear. In general, policy scientists emphasize the importance of seeing policies as dynamic ideas whose significance changes over time with implementation and revision. Legislative acts or authoritative pronouncements from political leaders are not the only factors shaping the content of policies. The endogenous role of policy actors (including networks, entrepreneurs, and programmatic actors) that shape policies on a daily basis may be equally significant. In particular, programmatic actors generate the ideas for how policies should change, making use of their resources, ideas, and existing authority. William Genieys and Marc Smyrl define these actors as small, closely integrated groups of policy managers motivated mainly by the desire to gain more authority over a given issue area.3 Moreover, policies as implemented are also shaped by a range of exogenous factorseconomic, technical, social, political, and administrative. Policy change in foreign relations is a relatively new field because traditionally foreign policy has been seen as the tightly managed realm of political leaders. But the number of policy actors in this sphere has proliferated with globalization and the complex interdependence it produces, making conventional models of policy change more relevant.4 Any foreign policy agenda (such as cross-strait reconciliation) that operates across several domains (such as finance, transport, trade, investment, health, travel, maritime safety, policing, arbitration, and international representation) will be managed by many different groups of policy actors. This will give programmatic actors a strong incentive to change policies in order to gain authority and autonomy.
2 Brian W. Hogwood and B. Guy Peters, Policy Dynamics (New York: St. Martins Press, 1983). 3 William Genieys and Marc Smyrl, Elites, Ideas, and the Evolution of Public Policy (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).
4 Deborah D. Avant, Martha Finnemore, and Susan K. Sell, Who Governs the Globe? (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2011).
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There is a scattered literature on why bilateral peace or reconciliation policies survive and change. There is little doubt that the key factor is whether broad political coalitions on both sides want peace.5 A second factor concerns the substantive provisions of any reconciliationprovisions like joint commissions; confidence-building, arms-control, and troop-reduction measures; and the resolution of key political issues. Since peace agreements often cover many complex areas, they usually open up significant space for policy actors on both sides to initiate policy change. In other words, if such agreements survive, they usually also evolve. Policy evolution rather than stasis has been the norm, for example, in Chinas treatment of Hong Kong since agreeing on the terms of its decolonization with Britain in 1984.6 While Beijings overall policy images and goals have not changed, there have been significant renovations of policy objectives and means. In particular, Beijing has shifted from a relatively hands-off approach of benign neglect with a focus on economic integration to a more engaged approach with a focus on political and social integration. In some cases, political leaders in China have initiated the changes, as happened with the proposals for a national education curriculum in Hong Kong public schools that was announced in 2010 and then delayed in 2012 after popular protest.7 In other cases, however, programmatic actors have been at the fore, as with the various interpretations of Hong Kongs right to democratic development made by the legal bureaucrats of the National Peoples Congress between 2004 and 2007. Chinas policy on Hong Kong, as Zheng Yongnian and Tok Sow Keat show, has been a constant struggle between bureaucratic control and political control.8
china-taiwan dtente
THe reconciliation of China and Taiwan has been driven by both national and global factors. After the ending of major hostilities in 1958, cross-strait
5 Evan Hoffman and Jacob Bercovitch, Examining Structural Components of Peace Agreements and
Their Durability, Conflict Resolution Quarterly 28, no. 4 (2011): 399426; and Virginia Page Fortna, Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). A Crisis-Transformation Perspective, Journal of Contemporary Asia 41, no. 1 (2011): 99116. Chinas Post-Colonial City, China Perspectives, no. 4 (2012): 6369.
6 Alvin So, One Country, Two Systems and Hong KongChina National Integration:
7 Karita Kan, Lessons in Patriotism: Producing National Subjects and the De-Sinicisation Debate in 8 Zheng Yongnian and Tok Sow Keat, Beijing Responds to Hong Kongs Democratization
Movement: From Bureaucratic Control to Political Leadership, Asian Affairs: An American Review 33, no. 4 (2007): 23556.
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relations entered a period of relative neglect characterized by mutually recriminatory propaganda. A first attempt at reconciliation initiated by Beijing in 1979 ended with the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989. The simultaneous rise of irredentist hard-line nationalism in China after Tiananmen and the democratization of Taiwan sent relations into a downward spiral that lasted until the re-election of Taiwanese nationalist Chen Shui-bian as president of Taiwan in 2004. The following year in Beijing, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Taiwans Kuomintang (KMT) issued a joint statement on peaceful development. This statement became the basis of official policies once the KMT regained the presidency in Taiwan in 2008. Among other provisions, it included plans to resume cross-strait negotiation on the basis of the 1992 consensus, in which the two sides agreed to disagree about their definition of one China, as well as plans to cease hostilities, conclude a peace agreement, launch military confidence-building measures, expand economic engagement, negotiate Taiwans participation in international organizations, and set up a party-to-party mechanism for consultations.9 In the period since 2008, the two sides have engaged in a rapid and previously unthinkable series of breakthroughs, mainly in the economic field. This includes the 2010 Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) to lower tariffs or relax access in China for products and services from Taiwan, the commencement of regularly scheduled direct air and sea travel, the opening of Taiwan to Chinese tourism, the creation of tourism-promotion agencies in each others territory, and plans to open trade- and cultural-promotion offices. Taipei has described the reconciliation in terms of economics first, politics second (xian jingji, hou zhengzhi),10 as seen in the annual reports of the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), stressing economic areas as the primary goal.11 The deferred politics, in this case, includes security issues; military measures, such as codes of conduct and notification of drills and deployment reductions; national identity; sovereignty; international recognition; Taiwans ties to the United States, including arms procurement; and cross-strait
9 Shirley A. Kan, China/Taiwan: Evolution of the One China PolicyKey Statements from
Washington, Beijing, and Taipei, Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress, RL30341, June 24, 2011. (Republic of China), November 10, 2012. mac.gov.tw/public/Data/222157671.pdf.
10 Shih Hsiu-chuan, Ma Says Time Not Right for Cross-strait Peace Pact, Central News Agency 11 Mainland Affairs Council, 2010 Annual Report, December 2011, available in Chinese at http://www.
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governance institutions, including the question that one Beijing official called cross-strait democracy.12 While it is true that conciliation has mostly involved economic issues, there have been some clear ventures into political territory. Since 2009, Beijing has allowed Taipei to join the annual meetings of the World Health Assembly, which is the executive body of the World Health Organization (WHO), and has agreed to consider its application to join the International Civil Aviation Organization in a similar capacity. In addition, China and Taiwan conducted two sets of joint maritime search-and-rescue drills in 2010 and 2012 and agreed to hold the exercises every other year. Beijing has also called an unofficial truce to the poaching of Taiwans remaining diplomatic allies, and Taiwan in turn has dropped its bid to join the United Nations. Taiwan has also passed regulations authorizing local government officials to visit China on exchanges. Beijing has avoided the economics first, politics later formulation of relations in favor of comprehensive descriptions, perhaps being more realistic about the political significance of economic cooperation and more willing to highlight political and military items.13 While often repeating the Taiwan formulation of economics first, politics second, Chinese officials have generally added statements about the inherently political nature of all agreements. As early as 1997, Beijing was saying that any cross-strait reconciliation should be politics first, economics later.14 The formulation now preferred in China is to make great strides with small steps (xiaobu, kuaipao), which suggests it believes that even incidental political moves in the context of economic cooperation will have profound effects.15 (Beijings preference for this formulation is ironic given that it was regularly used by mainland media to attack former Taiwan president Chen Shui-bians efforts to nudge Taiwan in the direction of independence). Qiang Xin of Fudan University states that the mainland expects that the spillover effect of economic cooperation
12 Tzai Su-chia and Lilian Wu, One China Framework Key to Cross-strait Democracy: PRC
Official, Central News Agency, April 19, 2012.
13 In his work report for the National Peoples Congress in 2013, then Chinese premier Wen Jiabao
stated that Beijing sought to strengthen the political, economic, and cultural foundation and public support for growing cross-strait relations. See Report on the Work of the Government (report delivered at the first session of the Twelfth National Peoples Congress, Beijing, March 5, 2013), available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013npc/2013-03/18/content_16317917.htm. Matters; Beijing Expert Maintains That It Is Difficult for Routine Talks to Solve Difficult Problems Encountered During Previous Cross-Strait Talks, Wen Wei Po, Hong Kong, December 14, 1997, A1, available from BBC Monitoring Service, December 16, 1997. Transition, Journal of Contemporary China 19, no. 65 (2010): 534.
14 Tseng Wan-shu, Tang-Chiao Talks May Focus on Political Issues and Then Discuss Routine
15 Qiang Xin, Beyond Power Politics: Institution-Building and Mainland Chinas Taiwan Policy
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could help bridge the current political and ideological gulf between the two sidesso as to lay down a stable foundationfor the establishment of political, diplomatic, and military cooperation mechanisms.16 From the standpoint of previous historical cases of reconciliation, the absence of an agreement on the key political issue of Taiwans status remains a serious vulnerability. In addition, the failure to make arms control, troop reductions, or other military confidence-building measures a first step also weakens the foundations of reconciliation. More fundamentally, the policy images that guide both sides differ significantly. Taipei has characterized the reconciliation, perhaps not very strategically, as similar to what took place between West Germany and East Germany from 1969 until 1989. Beijing, on the other hand, has characterized it as the reward for an end to independence effortsperhaps analogous to Russias policy toward Chechnya since 2000, following the collapse of their initial reconciliation from 1996 to 1999and as an implicit recognition that sovereignty rests in Beijing. The question, then, is how are the political coalitions and policy actors in China likely to manage cross-strait policy in coming years? The following sections consider three possible scenarios: policy transformation, policy stasis, and policy succession.
Scenario 1: Policy Transformation

Policy transformation by Beijing could come in one of two forms: an abandonment of reconciliation and a return to the more disengaged and hectoring policy it followed during 195879; or an abrupt shift toward a more urgent and militarized insistence on a timetable for political unification, more redolent of the period from 1989 to 2005. A third possibility, wherein China follows its own version of the Sinatra doctrine and allows Taiwan to determine its own future on the basis of sovereign equality, is highly unlikely. Given the significance of cross-strait reconciliation for Chinas broader foreign-policy agenda, any policy transformation would almost certainly have to result from either top-level political actions in Beijing or unanticipated exogenous shocks. Policy and programmatic actors have neither the resources nor the authority (much less the intentional ideas) to transform the policy. In terms of political leadership, David Welch argues that transformative changes in foreign policy result when political leaders seek to avoid a looming
16 Xin, Beyond Power Politics, 539.
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loss (loss aversion) rather than to achieve a gain.17 On this theory, the Xi Jinping leadership in China would act to abandon reconciliation in favor of a harder line if it felt the policy was in danger of moving Taiwan decisively toward independence. This would threaten the core of the Taiwan policy articulated by Chinas Anti-Secession Law of 2005, the overarching aim of which is the elimination of Taiwan independence forces. Yet probably only a sharp change in direction by Taiwan would create a perception of potential losses among Chinese leaders. In particular, a less conciliatory posture under a re-elected Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) president in 2016 might force Beijing to alter course. Xi warned in 2011 that Taipeis rejection of the 1992 consensus (which would be perceived as an insistence on Taiwans independence) would mean that negotiations across the strait cannot continue and all the agreements made in the past cannot be fulfilled. Cross-strait relations will return to the volatile situation of the past.18 Xi himself certainly shows a bias for action, which is one reason he was chosen as party general secretary over the cautious premier Li Keqiang. Xi once said, Sometimes it is necessary to pound the table, otherwise you will not frighten anyone and not get anyones attention.19 Remarks Xi made to embassy staff in Mexico in 2009 also suggest that he fits the ideological profile of a Leninist nationalist in contemporary Chinese elite politics.20 Thus, nationalist assertion is more likely under Xi than it was under Hu. As one DPP adviser put it, Id expect even his conciliatory moves to be lined with steel.21 Yet Xi, who is expected to rule from 2012 to 2022, inherits a policy from Hu Jintao that is widely seen as successfully reducing the possibility of Taiwan independence. Moreover, Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) voices have been noticeably quiet since the KMTs election in 2008, despite continued U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. More broadly, the structural factors that make the reconciliation logical from Beijings perspectivethe economic integration of Taiwan, reputation-building in the Asia-Pacific, and relations with the United Stateswill all remain stable. The DPP, meanwhile, has been toning down its
17 David A. Welch, Painful Choices: A Theory of Foreign Policy Change (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2005).
18 Minnie Chan, Xi Warns Taiwan on 1992 Consensus, South China Morning Post, December 17, 2011. 19 Qianwan buyao jixiang dangguan youxiang facai [Never Think That Being an Official Means
Getting Rich], Xinhua Daily Telegraph, December 7, 2012 u http://big5.xinhuanet.com/gate/big5/ news.xinhuanet.com/mrdx/2012-12/07/c_132026197.htm. Brief, November 30, 2012, 47. Times, November 17, 2012.
20 Bruce Gilley, Chinas New Leaders to Strengthen the Party-State, Jamestown Foundation, China 21 Lee Seok Hwai, Policy towards Taiwan: More Proactive Cross-strait Moves Expected, Straits
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anti-China policies and rhetoric, meaning that even if it returned to power in 2016, it would not likely abandon the reconciliation effort. Another theory of transformative policy change is the idea of diversionary war in which policy change results from domestic instability rather than fears of loss aversion. Comparative evidence suggests that the possibility of a diversionary war is higher when the state and regime of the aggressor nation enjoy robust legitimacy (necessary for popular mobilization) while the individual leader is in a weak position within the political elite.22 This gives the leader an incentive to try to gain an upper hand on political rivals through the populist support that might result from an act of aggression. The diversionary war, however, must be a feasible option, and the leader must have a prior disposition for it.23 Although some Taiwan analysts have warned that a fragmentation of power would lead Xi to take an assertive stance on Taiwan to show he is not a weak leader,24 all signs suggest that his assumption of power was largely uncontroversial and enjoyed broad support. Xi also assumed chairmanship of the Central Military Commission at the same time that he became party general secretary in 2012, which indicates a strong consensus about his military control. His rapid rollout of a range of new initiatives on anti-corruption and economic reform suggests that his position is not weak within the leadership and also provides him with a repertoire of effective options to deal with domestic unrest. Moreover, as the next section discusses, there is no evidence that Xi is predisposed to a diversionary attack on Taiwan given his affinities with its people.
Scenario 2: Policy Stasis

The second scenario of policy stasis is the most widely assumed future of Beijings cross-strait policy under Xi Jinping.25 This is because policy stasis is often assumed to constitute the only alternative to policy transformation. In this scenario, Beijing continues to allow Taiwan to largely define the content of the reconciliation and alters its policies only in terms of the context and
22 T. Clifton Morgan and Christopher J. Anderson, Domestic Support and Diversionary External
Conflict in Great Britain, 19501992, Journal of Politics 61, no. 3 (1999): 799814. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012).
23 Amy Oakes, Diversionary War: The Link between Domestic Unrest and International Conflict 24 Arthur Ding, as quoted in Eva Dou, For Taiwan, 20 Years of Agreeing to Disagree with Beijing,
Wall Street Journal, China Real Time Report, web log, November 9, 2012.
25 William Lowther, Analyst Says Xi Will Not Change Cross-strait Ties, Taipei Times, November 28,
2012; and Xi Jinping to Keep Taiwan Status Quo, Central News Agency, November 16, 2012.
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requirements of implementation. Under policy stasis, reconciliation would continue to focus almost exclusively on economic, social, and cultural issues. Given Taiwans reluctance to pursue political or military reconciliation, Beijing would be content to leave such issues out of discussions. Hu appeared to indicate to Taiwan leaders shortly before he passed over the reins to Xi that this is what he meant by policy continuity.26 And to be sure, Taiwan has made clear its desire for policy stasis. President Ma Ying-jeou has said he will not seek a peace agreement during his second term, which ends in 2016, while Taiwan premier Sean Chen said shortly after Xis ascension that the upgrading of cross-strait economic dialogue should still be the priority over political issues between the two sides. In early 2013, Ma was more explicit in his prediction that there is no reason [for Xi] not to continue the previous policy given that moving into political issues would require facing the very difficult question of sovereignty.27 Conscious of the trepidations expressed by Taiwans people, the KMT has argued that Xi will maintain a low profile on the issue as long as the KMT is re-elected in 2016.28 There are good reasons to believe that Beijing might accept this status quo. Much of the reasoning for the scenario of policy stasis is personalistic. Xi Jinping is known as a zhitaipai, or Taiwan expert, as a result of his long experiences in southern China, which brought him into close contact with Taiwanese. Xi, for instance, is close to Jason Hsuan, the chairman of Taiwans TPV Technology, calling him a long-time friend.29 In 2010 in Boao, a conciliatory Xi said that as long as the two sides consider themselves as one family, it will be easy to discuss anything and any problem could be eventually resolved.30 Moreover, Xis wifes family split in 1949, with part of them going to Taiwan, where his brother-in-law and others now live. His wife Peng Liyuan has said that she has many relatives in Taiwan, and she herself visited the island in 1997 on a cultural exchange and is well-known there. There are also rumors that Xis father, CCP revolutionary hero Xi Zhongxun, maintained personal ties to KMT elders after 1949. Ma was the first KMT leader to ever congratulate a CCP leaders selection when he wired Xi in November 2012.
26 David Pilling and Sarah Mishkin, Hu Assures Taiwan Over Leadership Change, Financial Times,
September 7, 2012. March 7, 2013.
27 Elaine Hou, Chinas New Leader to Continue Current Taiwan Policy: Ma, Central News Agency, 28 Liangan hudong jinru panzhengqi [Cross-strait Interactions in the Consolidation Period], Dalu
Qingshi Shuangzhoubao, April 1, 2013, 15.
29 Xi May Turn to Private Firms to Jump-Start China Economy, Nikkei Report, November 15, 2012. 30 Chinese VP Calls for Smooth ECFA Negotiations between Mainland, Taiwan, Xinhua English
News, April 11, 2011.
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Ma also made a point of addressing Mr. Xi Jinping rather than the usual Beijing authorities during his New Years speech in 2013.31 Indeed, Xi is in part responsible for Beijings hearts and minds policy of reconciliation with Taiwan. His efforts to woo Taiwanese investors while serving in Fujian and Zhejiang provinces between 1985 and 2007 were part of his dossier for promotion.32 The Pingtan Island development zone being built off the coast of Fujian just 126 km from Taiwan, meanwhile, is widely seen as Xis brainchild, since TPV is its anchor investor.33 KMT vice chairman John Chiang said of Xi in 2012, Given his experiences in dealing with Taiwanese investors, businessmen and also on cross-strait relations, I see no reason he will have a different policy toward Taiwan.34 Tsai Der-sheng, director-general of the Taiwan National Security Bureau, likewise said that Xi has the best understanding of Taiwan among Chinas top echelons.35 Furthermore, Xi himself has sometimes talked in terms of policy stasis. In 2012, he said that the current need on Taiwan is to implement the ECFA agreement and other agreements.36 If the only alternative to policy transformation is some form of policy stasis, then without a doubt policy stasis is more likely. It is clear that Beijing shares with Taipei the view that a cautious policy is to be preferred to the volatile situation of the past.
Scenario 3: Policy Succession

As noted, however, there is a third possibility, a policy succession in which policy evolves to embrace new objectives while maintaining the same goals and images. While peaceful reunification has always been Beijings macro goal, the relative weight attached to specific objectives with stronger political overtones, such as military confidence-building measures or the signing of a peace treaty, has shifted since 2005. From Beijings perspective, cross-strait policy has always been premised on some notion of policy succession. Even Taiwans economics first, politics later formulation has encouraged this view. Moreover, the return to office
31 Minnie Chan, Ma Ying-jeou Appeals to Xi Jinping to Strengthen Cross-strait Ties, South China
Morning Post, January 2, 2013. Review of Books, 2003).
32 Andrew J. Nathan and Bruce Gilley, Chinas New Rulers: The Secret Files (New York: New York 33 China Island Morphs from Military Outpost to Taiwan Trade Hub, Nikkei Report, July 12, 2012. 34 Taiwan Official Expects Smooth Times with China, Agence-France Presse, February 1, 2012. 35 Chen Pei-huang and Bear Lee, Chinas Next Leader Has Best Understanding of Taiwan: NSB
Head, Central News Agency, March 10, 2012.
36 Ibid.
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of the KMT in 2012 has made Beijing think that there is backing in Taiwan for policy succession. Jacques deLisle observes that such perceptions and the impetus they create for heightened mainland pressure on Taiwan to engage on the more difficult political issues are only likely to increase during Mas second term.37 Indeed, it is unclear whether it is possible to continue with reconciliation without discussing political issues.38 Structurally, comparative evidence suggests that there is a need for the two sides to address the noneconomic issues (in particular the political status of Taiwan and military measures) if the reconciliation is to survive. The reason is that without addressing these issues, the trust and shared image needed to facilitate cooperation are missing. Thus, functionally speaking, political and policy actors on both sides have incentives to seek to move cross-strait policy toward addressing noneconomic issues in order to consolidate the reconciliation. There are also more practical questions. As cross-strait disputes arise, the need for mechanisms of decision-making, problem-solving, and mediation will increase. Indeed, Taiwans long-standing policy that it would not be willing to discuss unification until China became democratic was premised on just this assumption. Taiwan, in other words, has always put politics first, and rightly so. This is because without an institutionalized political relationship in which actors on both sides can pursue and resolve policy issues, the relationship will lack predictability and stability. Policy succession could be initiated by either political or programmatic actors. Thus far, most attention has been paid to the former, in particular those in China. Hu Jintao made several references to the idea of policy succession during his time in office. We cannot wait for political negotiations forever, he said in his 2009 New Years speech. Likewise, in his last speech before leaving office, Hu said, We hope that the two sides will jointly explore cross-strait political relations and make reasonable arrangements for them.39 The result of this is that the precise meaning of the common Chinese idiomatic expression applied to the Taiwan issue, Hu sets the standard and Xi mimics it (Hu gui Xi sui), becomes more one of Hu begins and Xi follows up. Xis responsibility, in this view, will be to take reconciliation to the next stage because this is what
37 Jacques deLisle, Taiwans 2012 Presidential and Legislative Elections: Winners, Losers, and
Implications, Foreign Policy Research Institute, E-Notes, January 2012 u http://www.fpri.org/ enotes/2012/201201.delisle.taiwan.pdf. (New York: Routledge, 2013).
38 Weixing Hu, New Dynamics in Cross-Taiwan Strait Relations: How Far Can the Rapprochement Go? 39 Hu Jintao, Firmly March on the Path of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive
to Complete the Building of a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects (report to the Eighteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Beijing, November 8, 2012, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/special/18cpcnc/2012-11/17/c_131981259.htm.
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is implied by Beijings goals. To freeze the policy at economic cooperation would be to suspend the policy rather than continue itperhaps Hu begins and Xi destroys (Hu gui Xi cui). The view in Beijing is that it is Xis job to harvest the fruit of Hus reconciliation, which has proceeded on terms highly favorable to Taiwan (extending unilateral economic benefits, halting diplomatic poaching, allowing WHO participation) on the premise that this approach will lead to broader cooperation.40 In retrospect, a more strategic Taiwan might have rejected this one-sided reconciliation because it reinforced the image of Taiwan as just another greedy provincial government scrambling for goodies from the center. Mustering popular support in Taiwan for concessions to China, however, would have been difficult. Calling in the favors from Beijings perspective means moving to the quid pro quo of political and military issues, as well as reducing independence activities in Taiwan. There is a strong parallel here to Russias post-2000 policy in Chechnya, which offered unilateral economic and other concessions in return for political fealty. The policy succession view on domestic issues was articulated by Xi in an interview in 2000: You always want to do something new in the first year. But it must be on the foundations of your predecessor. It is a relay race. You have to receive the baton properly, then run well with it yourself.41 When he took power, Xi called for consolidation of the political, economic, cultural, and social foundation for the peaceful development of cross-Strait ties.42 Moreover, it is possible that being a zhitaipai might lead him to be more rather than less forceful in the push for policy evolution if he believed this was part of being one big family. New premier Li Keqiang, meanwhile, said at his first news conference that the new government will carry out promises made by the previous government, and we will work hard to identify new pillars of cooperation.43 The latter view has also been articulated by Su Chi, former secretary general of the National Security Council, who warned that the reconciliation begun in 2005 will be a decade old by 2015 and that Xi will want to escape from Hus shadow and make his own contribution: Xis
40 Xi Jinping Will Have New Thoughts on Cross-Strait Issues, Hong Kong Economic Journal,
February 9, 2012.
41 Quoted in Jeremy Page, Bob Davis, and Tom Orlik, Chinas New Boss, Wall Street Journal,
November 10, 2012. November 15, 2012.
42 Hu, Xi Call for Efforts to Promote Peaceful Development of Cross-Strait Ties, Xinhua, 43 Full Text of Chinese Premiers News Conference on 17 March, Chinese Central Television,
available from BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, March 18, 2013 (italics added).
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administration will take control of the initiative now.44 Earlier, Su had said that Xi might adopt a more proactive approach to engaging with Taiwan than Hu, and not be satisfied with maintaining the cross-strait status quo.45 Still, from the perspective of loss aversion, there are doubts about whether Xi (or Li) will feel sufficiently compelled to initiate a policy succession. This view, however, ignores another possible source of policy succession: programmatic actors in China and Taiwan moving to enhance their authority by shifting the relationship into deeper issues. The reasons for this are that, as with Hong Kong after 1997, Taiwan policy is operating under increasingly institutionalized forms on both sidesforms that give significant autonomy to programmatic actors. The KMT may be right that Xi will not initiate a policy change. But a policy change may occurindeed is already occurringnonetheless. One of the most overlooked aspects of the cross-strait peace agreement is the extent to which it has given rise to extensive policy networks, policy entrepreneurs, and programmatic actors on both sides. A report by the Congressional Research Service observes that a range of government officials and their counterparts developed routine contacts across the strait, including through direct phone calls, at the administrative level.46 These interactions bring together policy actors, including programmatic actors, from both sides. Importantly for the Chinese case, participants include provincial-level bureaucrats, policy entrepreneurs, and political leaders eager to grasp Taiwan policy for their local interests. There is also a proliferation of area-specific meetings that are helping further institutionalize the relationship in the hands of policy actors rather than political ones. For instance, a forum on cross-strait cultural and creative industry cooperation was held in China in 2012 and attended on the Beijing side by leaders from the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) and on the Taiwan side by the semi-official National Culture and Arts Foundation, headed by former Acer chairman Stanley Shih. The two sides agreed to establish a council on cross-strait cultural and creative industry cooperation, headed
44 Scarlett Chai and Jamie Wang, Xi Jinping to Change Course on Taiwan Policy: Former Minister,
Central News Agency, November 15, 2012.
45 Lawrence Chung, Too Soon for Talks with Taiwan Beijing to Get Own House in Order before
Political Dialogue, Analyst Says, South China Morning Post, November 11, 2012.
46 Shirley A. Kan and Wayne M. Morrison, U.S.-Taiwan Relationship: Overview of Policy Issues,
Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress, R41952, October 10, 2012, 7.
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on the mainland side by Wang Chunzheng, a former vice chairman of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC).47 Simply because of the range of issues that cross-strait reconciliation covers, it has created a much broader policy community on the China side than has ever been involved in Taiwan affairs. For instance, the NDRC has begun to engage directly with Taiwan on direct and portfolio investment from China.48 Management of the ECFA is handled in China by the Ministry of Commerce, while the Ministry of Transportation manages cross-strait shipping and flights. The securities regulators and central banks of both sides are in constant contact as they prepare rules governing financial transactions between China and Taiwan. The health ministries on both sides are likewise in charge of a pact on health and medical cooperation. If these programmatic actors seek to increase their authority through policy evolution, it could lay the groundwork for a succession into political areas. Even if Xi and other political actors may not intend to push for this degree of policy evolution, the policy and programmatic actors in China and, to a lesser extent, Taiwan have the incentives to do so. To offer a concrete example, in 2009 a judicial cooperation agreement was signed under which the two sides pledged to cooperate in serving judicial documents, investigating and collecting criminal evidence, upholding each others civil judgments and arbitration awards, and repatriating criminals and suspects. In 2010 and 2011, a series of landmark visits took place between top-ranking police, prosecutors, and court officials from both sides.49 As a result, an explosion of cooperation occurred: over 500 joint investigations took place, more than 26,000 court documents were served, 379 criminals or suspects were repatriated, and 216 business meetings were held between June 2009 and March 2013.50 The development of such thick policy networks prompted Taiwans Ministry of Justice to elaborate the basis of the relationship by implementing regulations that framed judicial cooperation in terms of
47 Liangan wenchuang chanye hezuo kua dabu [Cross-strait Cooperation in the Cultural and
Creative Fields Takes First Step], Taiwan National Culture and Arts Foundation, December 20, 2012 u http://www.ncafroc.org.tw/news_show.asp?tp=1&id=2179.
48 Taiwan Capital Has Access to Most Mainland Sectors: NDRC, Xinhua, November 10, 2012. 49 In 2010, the director-general of Taiwans National Police Agency, Wang Cho-chiun, visited China
for a week with a sixteen-member delegation and later that year Chinas Vice Minister of Public Security Chen Zhimin returned the visit. In 2011, Taiwans state public prosecutor-general, Huang Shih-ming, visited China for a week with tweleve senior staff. in Combating Crime and Judicial Cooperation], Government of Taiwan, Ministry of Justice, June 25, 2009March 31, 2013 u http://www.moj.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=282788&ctNode=32135&mp=001.
50 Haixia liangan gongtong daji fanzui ji sifa huzhu xieyi [Statistics on Cross-strait Mutual Cooperation
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principles of humanitarianism and mutual benefit (rendao huhui yuanze).51 For instance, requests for repatriation would be denied if the alleged crime involved political, military, or religious crimes, thus upholding Taiwans human rights claims while accepting China legal claims in other areas.52 By concretely defining how to deal with human rights differences, programmatic actors moved forward in a way that politicians could not. Another example involves the investment protection agreement for resolving disputes between Taiwan investors and Chinese government organs, which was signed in 2012 after more than two years of negotiations by programmatic actors on both sides. The pact rules out international arbitration (rejecting the sovereign status of Taiwan) but also specifies that arbitration can be conducted under Taiwans laws outside China. It thus creates a precedent of judicial parity between the two systems by in effect allowing them to exercise joint sovereignty over investment disputes.53 By working out a modus vivendi with implicit political implications for defining the image that guides the reconciliation, policy actors have achieved more than politicians. Finally, in the field of education, Taiwans Ministry of Education, along with the University Entrance Committee for Mainland Chinese Students run by Taiwan universities, has coordinated with counterparts in China to plan for an expected surge of students from China since Taiwan began to open to these students in 2011. Under arrangements worked out in 2013, Taiwan regulators used Beijings own short list of top universities to select the 111 mainland universities whose students could apply to study in Taiwan.54 The two sides have also created what may be the first joint semi-official website in their efforts to attract each others students.55 Policy and programmatic actors in China partly depend on willing cooperation from their counterparts in Taiwan. Many constituencies in Taiwan are urging Taipei to continue moving the relationship forward and are
51 Haixia liangan zuifan jiefan zuoye yaodian [Key Points on the Handling of Cross-strait Criminal
Repatriations], Government of Taiwan, Ministry of Justice, January 3, 2011 u http://mojlaw.moj. gov.tw/LawContentDetails.aspx?id=FL057599. Handling of Cross-strait Repatriation of Criminals or Suspected Criminals], Government of Taiwan, Ministry of Justice, January 3, 2011, http://mojlaw.moj.gov.tw/LawContentDetails. aspx?id=FL057600. August 10, 2012.
52 Haixia liangan jibu yifan xingshifan huo xingshi xieyifan zuoye yaodian [Key Points on the
53 Philip Liu, Taiwan and China Sign Investment Protection Agreement, Taiwan Economic News, 54 Chen Yi-ching, Lee Yu-hsin, and Stacy Hsu, Legislators Pan Decision to Accredit More PRC
Colleges, Taipei Times, March 14, 2013.
55 The website is available at http://hxla.gatzs.com.cn/.
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thus working to create a willing policy network for actors in China to do just that.56 In particular, the business community, which includes Japanese, South Korean, and other foreign companies with operations in Taiwan, supports this policy. The MAC has approved several visits to Taiwan by TAO officials, which Su Chi noted will contribute to the forging of cross-strait political dialogue.57 Moreover, Ma himself has encouraged the growth of policy networks on both sides in the belief that they will constrain the Chinese side. For example, he stated in his 2013 New Years speech that the further institutionalization of cross-strait ties will foster deeper understanding between our people and consolidate cross-strait peace.58 At the party level, the CCP and KMT held eight rounds of an economic, trade, and cultural forum (liangan jingmao wenhua luntan) in China between 2006 and 2012, which were attended by about 250 delegates from party, industry, and research communities on each side. More importantly, various aides, advisers, and unofficial representatives of the two main parties in Taiwan now shuttle regularly between Taipei and Beijing and have a firstname familiarity with their relevant counterparts in China. Even the DPP has been sending senior members to China, including former chairman and premier Frank Hsieh in 2012. It also re-established its China Affairs Office and a related policymaking committee in 2012, after having folded the office into the International Affairs Office in 2007. At the cabinet level, the Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Committee (CSECC) (liangan jingji hezuo weiyuanhui) was formed under the ECFA and meets every six months to manage the economic relationship. The CSECC also increasingly manages noneconomic issues such as the registration of representative offices and NGOs by one side in the others territory. There are now even discussions about opening offices of the political contact groups, the Straits Exchange Foundation and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits, in each country. Of course, there are also policy actors in Taiwan that seek to slow down or reverse the reconciliation. The National Security Bureau, for example, has called for the creation of a security system to manage the relationship to ensure that it does not go too far.59 Ma, meanwhile, accused the Council of Agriculture of foot-dragging after China requested it open up Taiwan markets
56 James Lee, Taiwan Urged to Speed Up Follow-up Trade Talks with China, Central News Agency,
November 2, 2012.
57 Former NSC Official Champions Political Dialogue with China, Taipei Times, December 17, 2012. 58 Sofia Wu, Cross-Taiwan Strait Peace Top Priority, Central News Agency, January 1, 2013. 59 Taiwan Needs Risk Management Plan for China: NSB, Taipei Times, March 11, 2012.
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to seventeen Chinese agricultural products in November 2012.60 But by and large, the policy actors on the Taiwan side have worked more proactively with their Chinese counterparts to push the relationship to evolve or succeed to the level of political talks. This is not to say that political talks between the two sides could occur naturally or that peaceful unification could happen by stealth. Ultimately, political actors on both sides remain dominant. However, the context in which political actors behave is being significantly changed by these programmatic initiatives. Such functional or bureaucratic spillover effects from economic cooperation have been widely cited in explanations of European political integration. On the Taiwan side, while formal political talks remain a nonstarter, de facto political talks are taking place every day between political actors on both sides. On the China side, even if Xi wanted to execute a policy pause, it would be far from easy to do so without great cost. While it is true that the absence of crisis would seem to reduce the pressures from Beijing to advance the policy, policy succession has a momentum of its own, built into documents and institutions and overseen by programmatic actors with an incentive to keep moving forward. Qiang Xin of Fudan University is most explicit in arguing that Beijing has moved toward an institutionalized rather than political (power politics) management of the relationship with Taiwan because of a belief that this approach will make it easier to move the relationship into political and governance issues.61 There is also some evidence of programmatic actors explicitly pushing for policy succession throughout 2012 and 2013. In early 2012, for instance, Beijings TAO issued a statement calling for a new phase of consolidating political mutual trust, including efforts by both sides to agree on a shared national identity.62 This request was repeated that year by a TAO spokesperson, who noted, We cannot avoid political and military problems and disagreements. Eventually we will have to face them.63 Or, as another TAO spokesperson observed, the situation cannot be one of simply peace forever. Rather it should develop in the direction of peaceful reunification.64
60 Chen Ching-min and Jason Pan, DPP Slams Ma for Approving More Imports, Taipei Times,
December 14, 2012.
61 Xin, Beyond Power Politics. 62 Kan and Morrison, U.S.-Taiwan Relationship. 63 Guotaiban xinwen fabuhui jilu [Taiwan Affairs Office, Press Conference Transcript], Taiwan Affairs
Office, February 15, 2012 u http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/xwfbh/201202/t20120215_2294256.htm. Political Contacts], Ta Kung Pao, January 16, 2012 u http://www.takungpao.com.hk/ news/12/01/16/TM-1442747.htm.
64 Sui Hsiao-chiao, Li Jiaquan: Ma ying kaolu zhengzhi jiechu [Li Jiaquan: Ma Should Consider
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Likewise, TAO spokesman Yang Yi said in 2012 that political issues in cross-strait relations are always there. We will have to deal with them sooner or later. The two sides should work together to build a common understanding and pave the way for solving difficult political issues in the future.65 The TAO spokesman further stated that Taiwans concerns about Chinas military buildup across the strait would be best addressed through timely meetings and the creation of a mutual trust security mechanism,66 making it clear that Beijing sees its military buildup as a leverage stick to bring cross-strait policy to the next stage. This latter statement confirmed concerns expressed after the 18th Party Congress by MAC minister Wang Yu-chi that Beijing would exert more pressure on Taiwan to begin political talks. In March 2013, new TAO director Zhang Zhijun was even more explicit in outlining a strategy of comprehensive relations. Political issues, he said, should never be artificially categorised as a restricted area.67 As with Hong Kong, the political leadership in Beijing would need to tacitly consent, something quite natural given the in-built assumptions of policy succession on the China side. It is more likely that, as with Hong Kong, the leadership would intervene to prevent policy succession rather than encourage it. This is not to suggest that policy succession will occur under cover of darkness, without the approval of political elites. Rather it is to suggest that it will be driven by policy and programmatic actors and endorsed by a political leadership that is committed to Beijings overarching policy goals and image and does not want to be seen as soft on the Taiwan issue.
policy implications
The purpose of this article has been to introduce a policy-science perspective on cross-strait reconciliation. As the relations between China and Taiwan deepen, policy management is increasingly institutionalized under a variety of programmatic and regulatory frameworks. As such, policy science may shed new light on the future of the relationship and offer a perspective overlooked by traditional approaches to international relations or area studies. In particular, it draws attention to the possibilities of a significant form of policy evolution known as policy succession and the role played by
65 Mainland Calls for Joint Efforts to Resolve Cross-straits Issues, Xinhua, November 16, 2012. 66 J. Michael Cole PRC Steps Up Pressure for Peace Pact, Taipei Times, December 13, 2012. 67 Lawrence Chung, Taiwan Affairs Head Outlines Agenda, South China Morning Post, March 23, 2013.
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programmatic actors and policy entrepreneurs that are part of the broader policy networks on both sides. For Taiwan, the possibility of a slow-moving crisis emerging from a policy succession on the Chinese side means that Taipei needs to rethink its current complacency about keeping the relationship limited to economic and other easy issues. At present, Taiwan is clinging to the reeds of policy stasis rather than shooting the rapids of policy succession, which means its reconciliation policy is always in danger of being scuttled. Even if Taiwan were able to prevent policy succession, it is far from clear that this would be in its interests. Beijings avoidance of a shift to a more confrontational transformation of cross-strait policy is in part premised on the idea of policy evolution. Moreover, the stability of cross-strait reconciliation probably depends on shifting to political, institutional, administrative, and military issues as well as the deeper policy images behind them. As Ma has argued, the constraints on Chinas use of military force will grow as the relationship becomes broader, deeper, and more institutionalized. If Taiwan wants to establish a durable peace agreement with China on favorable terms, it needs to be at the forefront of the policy succession. This will require much greater coordination and consensus on cross-strait policy among Taiwans national security, foreign affairs, and defense agencies than currently exists. This analysis has focused wholly on the dynamics endogenous to China and Taiwan and has left out exogenous factors, the most important of which is U.S. policy toward China, Taiwan, and the Asia-Pacific region. Thus far, the United States has aptly maintained a low profile on cross-strait reconciliation. However, this low profile also requires significant remonstration with both Beijing and Taipei to find a solution acceptable to both sides. While it is easy to dismiss hard-line voices in the United States wanting Taiwan to seal itself off from the realities of political negotiations with China, it is equally important to reject soft-line voices in the United States wanting Taiwan to embrace increased cooperation and integration with the mainland without a clear political strategy. By supporting a conducive external environment, Washington may help programmatic actors in both China and Taiwan find a way to end the 70-year old state of war between the two sides.
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Call for Papers
ISSUES & STUDIES (ISSN 1013-2511), published quarterly by the Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan, is an internationally peer-reviewed journal dedicated to publishing quality social science research on issuesmainly of a political naturerelated to the domestic and international affairs of contemporary China, Taiwan, and East Asia, as well as other closely related topics. The editors particularly welcome manuscripts related to China and Taiwan. Authors may submit via e-mail an original manuscript copy, a half-page summary, and five keywords in Word format to <issues@nccu.edu.tw>. In order to ensure the anonymity of the review process, we ask that all correspondence regarding submissions be direct to this e-mail account. Subscription: annual subscription rate is US$40.00, plus postage of US$12.00 (surface mail) or US$28.00 (air mail). Please pay in advance by check payable to National Chengchi University.
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asia policy , number 16 ( july 2013 ) , 16191

book review roundtable
Alexander Cooleys Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in Central Asia
New York: Oxford University Press, 2012 ISBN: 978-0-19-992982-5 (hardcover)
Marlene Laruelle James Sherr Mamuka Tsereteli Kathryn Stoner Andrew C. Kuchins Erica Marat S. Enders Wimbush Alexander Cooley
asia policy
Central Asia as a Case Study for a Multipolar World Marlene Laruelle
lexander Cooleys book Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in Central Asia is a more than welcome read for at least three reasons. First, at a time when the U.S. media is full of stereotypes on the Great Game being played out around the drawdown from Afghanistan in 2014, this work sheds light on the real mechanisms of balanceor of imbalancebetween great powers and small countries. It questions the conventional wisdom of considering the states of Central Asia as mere victims or pawns caught in the game of great powers, dispossessed of means to exert pressure and devoid of autonomy in their foreign policy choices. As Cooley brilliantly shows, the Central Asian governments have rather succeeded in imposing their rules on the major powers, whether one is talking about Russia, the United States, or China. Bilateral relations in large part operate according to modalities decided by the local governments, not by the major capitals, which have no other choice than to yield to the stipulated rules. The strategies of mimetism developed by the Central Asian states allow them to present the particular face that is desired by their interlocutor. When negotiating with Moscow and Beijing, the Central Asian states do not conceal the authoritarian nature of their decision-making. When meeting with Europeans and the Americans, however, Central Asian leaders display concern for democratization and good governance, emphasizing the process of transition toward the norms of the Western market economy and democracy. In so doing, they request more time to be able to integrate the requested changes and show a concern to improve their governance. Central Asian states also reiterate Western preoccupations when it is in their own interests. They point out, for example, their secular legislation and refusal to become Islamic states, in particular when dealing with Israel. At other times, they play the role of countries menaced by the Afghan threat, so as to ingratiate themselves with Europe and the United States and obtain Western financing. Second, the book sheds light on the stark realities underlying negotiations between the major powers and the states of Central Asia. Far from remaining content with a superficial discourse on the foreign policy strategies of each of the actors, Cooley analyzes in-depth the mechanisms that underpin these states often transactional foreign policies. For example, they engage in tough
marlene laruelleis the Director of the Central Asia Program in the Institute for European,
Russian, and Eurasian Studies and a Research Professor at George Washington Universitys Elliott School of International Affairs. She can be reached at <laruelle@gwu.edu>.
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negotiations with Russia and the United States on the price for obtaining military bases. In the case of China, however, Central Asian states make strategic political concessions on issues such as the cession of territory, Uighur secessionism, and the adoption of Chinas language on the three evils in exchange for Chinese investment. For external actors, participation in the logics of the Central Asian elites is inevitable: all of them thus become, willynilly, the accomplices of strategies for sending Central Asias public money offshore. While this situation may not perturb Moscow or Beijing, it is much more problematic for Washington, which has the duty of accountability to its citizens and their representatives. In the end, U.S. policy in the region has a schizophrenic character: on the one hand, it speaks of good governance and rule of law, while on the other, in the name of strategic interests, it is obliged to follow the logic established by the elites in place. Theoretical works such as Great Games, Local Rules that go beyond the diplomatic level and take into account the realities of negotiations taking place in the hallways of power can only be beneficial for international relations. Last, the book illuminates the transformation of international affairs at the beginning of the 21st century. Central Asia is positioned as a test region, a textbook case of the evolutions underway that escape the postCold War framework and portend a more complex era. Military and diplomatic power obviously remain important and must not be underestimated, but they are complemented and rivaled by several other aspects of power: soft-power tools, business diplomacy, the capacity to invest huge amounts of funds in the name of good neighborhood relations, a diplomacy of fear and threat, and the current institutional complexity, which gives an institution such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation more legitimacy than it has capacity for concrete action. Western powers thus find themselves weakened not only by the rise of the Asian powers but also by the regionalization of international relations, which can suddenly turn a medium-sized power into an extremely powerful driver or spoiler. Central Asia, which is in many respects a peripheral region, has therefore become central on the strategic checkerboard, not because it is the heartland of the Great Game, but because it illustrates the new complexity of international affairs. Some elements that would have given extra grist to Alexander Cooleys already very convincing mill of ideaselements that I hope will figure in one of the authors future projectsinclude the following: 1. The question of how public opinion in the countries concerned perceives foreign policy, or more precisely of the intertwining of domestic and international legitimacies, is central to understanding
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the strategies toward and within the region. The author rightly evokes Central Asian political legitimacies, but less so those of Russia, China, and the United States, for which nation-branding and control of information also constitute an integral part of the tool kits available. 2. The diversity of actors within the states themselves is also an essential element of explanation. Just as there exists no single U.S. political line, so too there exists no uniform Russian, Turkish, or indeed Chinese policy. Instead, policy changes depend on whether the central bodies of power, regional bodies, military and security actors, or business circles are involved. 3. Cooleys work is too state-centric. Central Asia provides a unique platform for studying the multiplicity of actors on the international stage: private firms, religious actors, and diasporas and migrants are, for example, important elements that change the balance of policymaking both for local governments and for external actors. In sum, Great Games, Local Rules has quickly become essential not only for studies on Central Asia but also for understanding contemporary changes in the international arena. With the United States withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014, the book highlights the possibility of a post-American Central Asia where the United States seems to have no other real strategy than to offer transactional politics to the strategies of other states and let regional powers and local regimes shape the future of the region.
How to Suborn Great Powers James Sherr
ven if it does nothing else, Alexander Cooleys latest book, Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in Central Asia, will remind us that we are well into the revisionist phase of understanding what didand more importantly, did notchange in the countries of the former Soviet Union after the end of the Cold War. Let us hope that the mood is contagious. The World Bank, the European Commission, the U.S. Congress, and the better business
james sherris an Associate Fellow of Chatham House and the author of Hard Diplomacy and Soft
Coercion: Russias Influence Abroad (2013). He can be reached at <james.sherr@lincoln.ox.ac.uk>.
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consultancies are still well-provisioned with individuals promoting reform with the rectitude of English Whigs promoting enlightenment. Some ten years ago, Ivan Krastev reflected on the consequences of pretending that reform has nothing to do with cultures.1 As Cooley demonstrates, patrimonialism is not only a culture but a tenacious and adaptable system. The tsarist dispensation was patrimonial as a matter of principle. The Soviet state, between purges and liquidations, was obliged to compromise with local (and often tribal) variants of patrimonialism, and the post-Soviet states of Central Asia are patrimonial to the core. The whowhom in these countries is not conservatives versus reformers but networks of patrons and clients that knit society together, as well as divide it. The norms of this world are organic rather than rational, informal rather than public; and its public institutions for the most part are either decorative or captive. Rent-seeking is pervasive, and resources and power are interchangeable. What Vladislav Inozemtsev stated about Russia applies in Central Asia with a vengeance: what Westerners would call corruption is not the scourge of the system, but the basic principle of its normal functioning.2 As the title implies, Great Games, Local Rules is largely the story of how external powersvery great ones, indeedhave had to accept local rules as the price of presence and access. In the case of Russia, many will find this surprising. As the author notes, above all, Moscow has sought regional primacy and of all the great powers, it easily possesses the most extensive array of regional ties (p. 51). Even if one excludes the intra-elite and institutional linkages that survived the Soviet dissolution, the Russian Federation has an unequalled array of soft-power resources, notably the remittances provided by the regions migrants (which account for 49% of Tajikistans entire GDP). It is also the only country with a plausible military counter to the regions destabilization. Just as much as its Soviet predecessor (or any liberal state), contemporary Russia is the bearer of rationalist, integrationist agendas (recently, the Eurasian Union). What Cooley manages to show is that, despite these ambitions and assets, Russias agendas have been adulterated, parried, or bent to serve local interests. Not surprisingly, it is the United States, with its metronomic litany of reforms and rights-driven causes, that has suffered the greatest rebuffs (notably after the Andijan episode of 2005). Yet, in ways that are both edifying and dispiriting, Washington has adapted to realities on the ground, maintaining
1 Ivan Krastev, Shifting Obsessions: Three Essays on the Politics of Anticorruption (New York: Central
European University Press, 2004), 3031.
2 Vladislav Inozemtsev, Neo-Feudalism Explained, American Interest, March/April 2011 u
http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=939.
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and in some ways expanding the military presence it secured in the wake of September 11. The picture the book presents of the political prerogatives assumed by the Pentagon and U.S. Central Commandutterly disorienting to any product of the British military systemis a story in itself. But, according to Cooley, the erosion of U.S. credibility as an exporter of democratic values and accompanying loss of prestige remains the greatest casualty of Washingtons engagement with the Central Asian regimes (p. 164). He finds it doubtful that this steady decline in overall U.S. regional influence will be reversed in the wake of the Afghanistan withdrawal (p. 164). Thus far, it is China that has accumulated the biggest prizes. Beijing has broken the Russian energy monopsony, whereby Russia once could buy Turkmenistans gas for derisory sums and sell it on the European market at oil-indexed prices. Unlike the European Union, which dithers over gas interconnectors in its own jurisdiction, China has built pipelines and other infrastructure projects to specification and on time. Of the three big players, it has been the least demanding and the most adept. Yet China is not without flaws, and indeed illusions. It too seeks to advance Central Asian integration, not as a good in itself but as a complement to its own regional policy and as a means of diluting Uighur separatism. China might be less intrusive than the United States or Russia, but it is unabashedly self-interested. According to Cooley, if it fails to sufficiently demonstrate that it is acting for the broader good, and not just as a plunderer of the regions natural resources and energy, China risks a regional backlash (p. 166). That fact serves to remind us that, in addition to local agendas, the countries of Central Asia have national interests. President Nursultan Nazarbayevs Kazakhstan has perfected the art of keeping external powers engaged and in check. Yet Nazarbayev is not alone in understanding that the alternative to a multivector policy is loss of autonomy and failure. What is missing in this schema is any articulated notion of regional interest, let alone the recognition that, beyond counterterrorism and regime survival, such a thing exists. As Cooley notes, barriers to integration persist not because national governments lack the necessary technical expertise or capacity, but because elites privately benefit from the regions enduring system of national regulations and border restrictions (p. 160). Yet there is more to it than that. Barriers are ingrained in the mentalities of an ethnically and tribally demarcated world. It hardly makes sense to exploit such divisions if one wants to overcome them, yet the architects of the Soviet project set out to do both, oblivious of the essential contradiction between their vision and their methods. With partial success, they integrated Russians into distant lands; through inadvertence as much
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as malice, they deepened the alienation of neighbors. Anyone lamenting the absence of integration in Central Asia should first ask what usable heritage the countries of the region possess. Despite its strictly regional focus, Great Games, Local Rules is possibly the most cogent critique of postCold War orthodoxy published to date. Yet, invariably, the demolition of one orthodoxy erects another. It is doubtful that Alexander Cooley has such an intention, but the revisionist trend, now encompassing the European ex-Soviet states and the EU-integration project itself, risks becoming an avalanche. Patrimonialism is not only antithetical to the norms of liberal, Western democracy; it is a viable antithesis, as Central Asia demonstrates in a remarkably pure form. Yet in the European parts of the former Soviet Union, patrimonialism does not exist in a pure form. It is by turns adulterated, modernized, counterbalanced, and opposed by European inheritances, aspirations, and norms of conduct. The Russian Federation has perfected a workable, if unsettling, synthesis between patrimonialism and competitive business practice. There, as in Ukraine, this synthesis is anathema to a growing body of small- and medium-sized entrepreneurs, who not only understand what EU standards are but have an avowed need for them. In these states and a good many others, Western standards and practice have alienated some and been grist to the opportunism of others. But they have also created points of friction within states and begun a process of evolution to which even Kazakhstan might not prove immune. The betrayal of expectations that are largely of our own making has not brought an end to this evolution, let alone history, which has a habit of surprising those who think they understand it.
Winners and Losers of Strategic Games in Central Asia Mamuka Tsereteli
lexander Cooleys Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in Central Asia is a significant contribution to the intellectual exploration of great-power dynamics in Central Asia. Cooley skillfully consolidates scattered knowledge about the experience of the great powers
mamuka tsereteli is a Director of Research at Central AsiaCaucasus Institute at the Johns Hopkins
UniversitySchool of Advanced International Studies. He can be reached at <mamukagt@aol.com>.
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and different local actors in Central Asia into a strategic picture of the region that is valuable to both the academic and policymaking communities. The books major argument is that three major powersChina, Russia, and the United Statesare not involved in a nineteenth-century-style, zero-sum competition but rather are pursuing different individual strategic purposes in Central Asia that have allowed them to co-exist in the region without major confrontation in the last decade. At the same time, Cooley argues that the Central Asian states and their rulers are important actors in their own right. The book demonstrates local political leaders mastery of balancing the great powers in Central Asia, which has helped them maximize political sovereignty while also securing the survival of their regimes. The book shows that Moscow, Beijing, and Washington all managed to achieve some balance of their strategic interests in postSeptember 11 Central Asia. The United States obtained basing rights and strategic access to Afghanistan via the region. Starting from 2008, the United States facilitated the development of the Northern Distribution Network, the supply line for U.S. troops stationed in Afghanistan that transits and benefits several Central Asian states. Russia has kept its southern borders secure and maintained strong economic and political ties with Central Asia. China has limited the spread of radical Islamic influence in its own Uighur-populated Xinjiang region, which neighbors Central Asia, and established itself as a key trade and investment partner for most of the states in the region. But Cooleys analysis demonstrates that there are still winners and losers in this modern game of great powers. The strategic positions of Russia, the United States, and China in Central Asia are different today from what they were in the preSeptember 11 era. First, looking at how the role of Russia has changed, Russia is no longer the sole outside military power accepted by the regional states. The presence of U.S. and other Western troops in Central Asia reflects the strategic retreat of Russia. Russia is also no longer the sole provider of the transit of energy riches from the Caspian basin, with China absorbing significant amounts of hydrocarbons from the region. And Russia is no longer the leading trade partner for the region, replaced in this position by China. Russia has thus clearly lost its strategic position as the dominant political and economic force in Central Asia, a position that it had held for almost two hundred years. Cooley still thinks that Russia holds broad and deep soft power that in the long run gives it a unique advantage over China and the United States and supports its privileged role in the region. Russia is the most significant provider of public goods for the region. One substantial element of Russias soft power is that it is a key source of remittances to Central Asia
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from labor migrants, mostly from Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. The Customs Union is another soft-power instrument that Moscow pushes to advance its interest. Moreover, the book argues that Russia will return to its position as the security guarantor for the region after withdrawal of the majority of the U.S. troops from Afghanistan in 2014. Russia will face its own limits, however, including its ability to mobilize financial and human resources for a larger security presence in Central Asia. Although Russian limits are not discussed in the book, Cooley indicates that the Kremlin may not have the political will to play this role in the region. Lack of political will by Russia, which is trying to secure its strategic borders, can only be explained by a lack of financial and human resources. Moscows strategic recovery in Central Asia will be determined by a combination of internal and external developments at work in Russia. Cooley calls China a winner on points in the new Central Asian Great Game. The book demonstrates multiple gains made by China in Central Asia, the majority of them economic. Two facts stand out among other developments in the last five years. The first is that China bypassed Russia as the regions leading trade partner. The second is that three countries in Central Asia (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan) are now connected to China with oil or natural gas pipelines and for the first time in decades have access to a sizable export alternative to the Russian market and transit system. The geopolitical significance of these developments is hard to underestimate. At the same time, there are factors that the Central Asian states do not welcome in their relationships with China. The two major factors are the inflow of cheap labor accompanying Chinese investments and the trade imbalance, as Central Asia only exports mineral resources, whereas China exports a wide range of manufactured and finished products to the region. While some public opinion surveys demonstrate public discontent with Chinas growing economic influence,1 the Central Asian states and their leaders currently enjoy Chinas greater economic presence in the region and skillfully use it as a balancing factor vis--vis the United States and Russia. U.S. interests in Central Asia during the last decade were determined by the war on terrorism and the large-scale U.S. military presence in Afghanistan. Washingtons long-term interests in Central Asia beyond the overall stability and security of the frontline region are less clear. The United States will still
1 Central Asia Barometer, M-Vector, October 24, 2012
news/?id=290.
http://www.m-vector.com/en/
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have a military presence in Afghanistan after 2014, but the depth of U.S. interest in Central Asia is more difficult to predict. Against this backdrop of external great-power interests in Central Asia, Cooley also discusses the role that local elites and leaders play in Great Game power dynamics. Yet such internal political, social, and economic developments are not a major focus of the book. They are significant, however, from the perspective of internal security dynamics and will affect external choices and directions in the years to come. Three interrelated internal issues, in particular, will contribute to the long-term future of the region and thus deserve greater attention. The first is the upcoming leadership transitions in the two largest and most economically and politically influential Central Asian countries: Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. How these countries manage this process, and whether foreign powers can influence the outcomes, will affect the short- and long-term direction of both domestic and foreign policy in the region. The second issue is demographic trends, such as the growing number of younger citizens with limited educational or employment opportunities, most significantly in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The third is the economic policies, corruption, and poor governance that limit economic growth and the process of job creation. The official statistics grossly underestimate unemployment, and the growing number of unemployed young men will inevitably lead to social and economic conflicts that could easily evolve into security challenges unless addressed by policymakers. The book would gain tremendously by greater reflection on these three issues of internal development and their potential impact on great-power competition in the region. Overall, in Great Games, Local Rules, Cooley manages to combine theories of international relations with empirical data about the interaction between great powers and local actors in Central Asia. He thus lays the groundwork for a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of strategic development in the region. The book will be a great source of knowledge for students of Central Asia and policymakers alike.
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Old Games, New Rules? Great Powers in the New Central Asia Kathryn Stoner
n the nineteenth century, the British and Russian empires squared off in Central Asia. Britain was fixated on protecting its colony in India, and worried about political decay and Russian assertiveness in the Islamic areas to the north, particularly Afghanistan and what are now, more or less, the five Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. For its part, Russia was primarily interested in keeping the peace and gradually expanding its empire among the restive khanates to the south, if not actually going all the way to India. In the end, a war never took place between these two great powers of the day, but an ongoing set of strategic games transpired as Russia and Britain tried to capture enhanced trade opportunities that ran through the Silk Road regions. Although the players now are a significantly weakened Russia, the United States, and China, the competition between great powers in the nineteenth century parallels the Great Games being played in Central Asia today that are so well documented in Alexander Cooleys new book Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in Central Asia. One of the great strengths of Cooleys book is to explain how the interests of contemporary great powers are often thwarted or manipulated by corrupt Central Asian leaders bent on self-preservation. Still, cooperation between Central Asian states and the United States, China, and Russia has been more the norm than the exception, even if the great powers have been unable to dictate outcomes to local authorities. With the partial exception of Russia, the interests of contemporary players of the Great Game in Central Asia are rather different than those of their nineteenth-century predecessors. The United States has become involved in Central Asia as part of the war on terrorism and U.S. efforts to wipe out the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Russia, the natural successor state to the Soviet Union, has a traditional geostrategic interest in Central Asia and views the region as part of its natural sphere of interest and security. Russia is also concerned with the protection of significant ethnic Russian populations, particularly in Kazakhstan, and perhaps most centrally, control
kathryn stoner is a Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the
Deputy Director of the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law at Stanford University. She can be reached at <kstoner@stanford.edu>.
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over the regions lucrative gas and oil markets. China is a relative newcomer to political engagement in Central Asia. Like the United States, its interests are far narrower than Russias and are primarily a result of Beijings need to stabilize and prevent separation of the ethnically Uighur Xinjiang Province. To be sure, however, all three contemporary great powers are interested in Central Asia to further their own security, as were Britain and Russia in the nineteenth century. Cooleys study of the current Great Games played by local rules is comprehensive, well-researched, and accessible. Distinct from other recent scholarship on the region, the books focus is not domestic politics alone or the resource riches of some Central Asian governments but the interaction between domestic politics and international relations in a complex and increasingly important part of the world. For students of international relations, great-power interactions in Central Asia have become a natural experiment for observing the dynamics of a multipolar world, including the decline of U.S. authority, the pushback against Western attempts to promote democratization and human rights, and the rise of China as an external donor and regional leader (p. xiv). As a result, Cooleys book is a welcome addition to the literature on postcommunist countries, international relations, and Central Asian politics. Despite its considerable strengths, there are a few areas where one might quibble with the books analysis. First, although Cooley starts out emphasizing that the regimes in Central Asia play their weak geopolitical hands strongly against great-power interests, he overlooks the fact that there is frequently an interactive effect between local and great-power interests. We learn a great deal in chapter 7, for example, about the double-dealing that went on between Russia and Kyrgyzstan in the threatened 2009 eviction of U.S. forces from the Manas airbase, a key staging and supply post for the U.S. militarys efforts in Afghanistan. But this sort of manipulation by Kyrgyzstan would not have happened had Russia not supported it. Thus, it is not accurate to portray the Kyrgyz as holding all the cards in this round since Russia clearly controlled the game board. Second, and related, Cooley underemphasizes the fact that the United States, in particular, has extremely narrow interests in Central Asia limited to its involvement in Afghanistan. The United States has no other territorial, economic, or resource interests in the region. This puts it in a rather different position in dealing with Central Asian states and gives it very little regional leverage. The United States cannot, like Russia, threaten to send back a huge influx of migrants to Uzbekistan or Kyrgyzstan should they not bend to its will; it cannot credibly promise great trade inflows into the area as China can. It is not surprising, therefore, that the United States maintains its temporary
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military bases at the whim of the leaders of Uzbekistan or Kyrgyzstan (in coordination with their traditional partner and sometimes ruler Russia). Given this, we also should not find it surprising that the United States would have little leverage in promoting democracy or human rights in the region. That is, Russia and China have greater influence over Central Asian states as a natural function of geography in comparison to the United States. They live in the neighborhood. This is perhaps why the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation has worked better than any other regional international organization. Further, Russia can and has asserted itself in a rather unsavory way in Central Asian politics (as it has in Ukrainian and Georgian politics, for example). Moscow can manipulate gas and oil markets in the region, turn trade routes on or off, use soft and hard power, and upset the stability of any Central Asian state that it wants to. Russia is a regional hegemon that occasionally must negotiate with weaker powers, as Cooley notes. It is rarely, however, defeated by them on issues of great strategic importance. Third, a more significant shortcoming is the books tendency to overlook the extent to which Central Asian states diverge from one another and the effect that this might have on their relationships with Russia, China, and the United States. While it is fair to say, as Cooley does, using Freedom House metrics, that Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan are not free, their regimes are not all the same either. Uzbekistan has a much harsher form of autocracy than does Kazakhstan, for example. Tajikistan and Kazakhstan differ significantly in terms of human development and state capacity. Kyrgyzstan has some experience with more liberalized forms of government than the other four Central Asian states, and it is the only one of the five states to have joined the World Trade Organization (WTO). Turkmenistan is, of course, a semi-Stalinist and largely isolated enigma. The divergence in types of autocracies in Central Asia could reasonably affect their interactions with the three great powers operating in the region. Does the fact that Russia and China are both autocracies change the nature and quality of interactions with the autocratic, patrimonial regimes in Central Asia, for example? We should expect that it would. China is not concerned about liberalization in Uzbekistan (as was the United States in the first part of the 2000s) and is far more interested in Kyrgyzstans stability than its potential for democracy. Beijing also does not tie aid or trade to progress on human rights, as Washington has attempted to do. Similarly, the Russian state shares many of the same pathologies as the elite-dominated, highly personalized, and underinstitutionalized regimes of Central Asia, but it has less in common with more
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liberalized states such as Kyrgyzstan. Should we, therefore, expect it to have a more cooperative relationship with some Central Asian states than with others? Fourth, and related to the point above, great-power interests are not, of course, the same in each of the five Central Asian states. China, Russia, and the United States may have more or less leverage in one country than in another as a result. Russia, for example, has significant trade flows with Kazakhstan. The two countries also share a huge border, and ethnic Russians amount to 33%50% of the population of Kazakhstan. The president of Kazakhstan speaks Russian. Both states economies are heavily dependent on oil and gas. In contrast, Russia has a somewhat different set of interests in Kyrgyzstan. Moscow is not, for example, particularly supportive of any color revolution there, given its potential to spread to Russia itself. Cooley does not tell us what effect these differences might have on strategic interactions between each of the great powers and respective Central Asian states. Fifth, and finally, Cooley argues that the Great Game in Central Asia over the past decade demonstrates the decline in U.S. power abroad. Of the three powers operating there, China is the strongest, followed closely by Russia, with the United States lagging far behind. I disagree, however, that this is a good test of U.S. power in comparison to the effort in Iraq or Afghanistan where regime change and state-building became the agendas. That is, it may be true that U.S. power is declining, but Central Asia is not a critical case where we might accurately evaluate U.S. power relative to China or Russia. After all, the United States has the least to gain (and has made the smallest effort) of all three great powers to influence politics in Central Asia. Its interests in the region are confined (as Cooley himself notes) very narrowly to the security of its temporary bases in Kyrgyzstan (and formerly in Uzbekistan). It is not attempting regime change in any of these countries, although it continues to support liberalization in Kyrgyzstan as it did in the 1990s. The amount of money that Cooley documents was spent on human rights and democracy promotion in Uzbekistan, for example, was pocket change to the U.S. government; it was not a serious effort to democratize the region. Similarly, the United States has made few attempts to trade with or create sustainable multilateral institutions in the region, as neighboring China and Russia have done. Before the war in Afghanistan, the United States had little involvement in Central Asia. After the drawdown of troops in 2014, that will undoubtedly again be the case, even with a lingering military presence. Despite these five critiques, Alexander Cooley has written an excellent book. It should be required reading for anyone interested in better understanding one of the most fascinating and complex areas of the world.
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Why Washington Needs to Integrate the New Silk Road with the Pivot to Asia Andrew C. Kuchins
lexander Cooleys Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in Central Asia is a must-read strategic primer of the challenges and opportunities for any aspiring great power in Central Asia. His analysis tracks the varying successes of the United States, Russia, and China in Central Asia since 2001 and the onset of the war in Afghanistan. The events of September 11 dramatically increased Washingtons interests in the region and shifted them predominantly to support the war in Afghanistan. During this past decade under Vladimir Putin, Russiarecovering from its loss of empire and the economic disaster of the 1990shas sought to reassert its influence through various bilateral policies and multilateral institutions. Chinas regional influence has grown principally through economic means, and its favored multilateral security and economic institution is the aptly named Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. But while great powers may have grand designs, the real story of Cooleys book is how effectively regional leaders have been able to manipulate and play off the economic and security interests of the great powers to strengthen the sovereignty of their states, as well as increase their political and economic leverage over domestic political competitors. If a state is unwilling to play by local rules, achieving other policy goals will be met with a mounting parade of obstacles. In the case of the United States, for example, this meant quieting objections to human rights violations and democratic shortcomings for return for support in Afghan war efforts. Of course, such trade-offs offend the high morals that Americans like to claim in U.S. foreign policy. I recall several years ago a State Department official telling me with a straight face that our engagement of Central Asian states in the Northern Distribution Network, a set of new transit corridors to support U.S. troops in Afghanistan, would increase our ability to support the cause of defending human rights in Central Asia. Suffice to say, there has been no evidence in the past three years to support this contention. The track record of the Russians since 2001 has been mixed at best. After more than one hundred years as part of the Russian empire and the Soviet
andrew c. kuchins is Director and Senior Fellow of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center
for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. He can be reached at <akuchins@csis.org>.
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Union, Central Asian states remain very sensitive to initiatives from Moscow, whose likely goal is to erode their sovereignty or interfere on one side or another in their domestic politics. Russia, as a provider of public goods, strikes Central Asian elites as almost oxymoronic. Regional perceptions of the United States as a provider of public goods may be higher, but Washingtons credibility suffers from being viewed as a short-timer whose interests can be ever so fickle. Cooley argues that in this triangular competition over the past decade or so, China has probably won on points, as Beijing is viewed as only interested in economic ties that increase jobs and build infrastructure (p. 165). However, the accelerating shift to a genuinely multipolar environment in Eurasia increases the options for Central Asian states to partner with outside countries, including India, Turkey, Iran, and others; thus, the competition grows for access to the regions assets, be they military, strategic, economic, or otherwise. Certainly, from a U.S. standpoint, we are at a crossroads with Central Asia. As the United States withdraws its troops from Afghanistan, U.S. interest and influence in the region, as Cooley suggests, is bound to decline. After more than a decade in Afghanistan and Iraq, the mantra No more land wars in Eurasia reverberates from the White House to Foggy Bottom to the Pentagon. The new strategic buzz in Washington is the pivot to Asia, which essentially boils down to the management of the rise of Chinas power and influence in the years and decades to come. But the Obama administrations conception of Asia goes back more than a hundred years ago to that of Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, the United States first great strategic thinker. Mahan regarded Asia as consisting of East Asia, or the area from Northeast Asia to Southeast Asia. Thus, Washingtons focus has been on the Asia-Pacific region for over a century, as evidenced by wars with Japan, Korea, and Vietnam. Chinas historical and cultural interpretation of Asia is not surprisingly very different, as it includes eastern areas of Russia to its north, Central Asia and Afghanistan to its west, and Pakistan and India to its southwest. Just as the Obama administration announced its pivot to Asia, leading Chinese strategic thinkers, such as Wang Jisi at Beijing University, began to increasingly advocate for Chinas march to the west through Central Asia to Iran and the greater Middle East.1 This is not to suggest that China views these regions to the north, west, and south as its territoryalthough China is engaged in a long-standing territorial dispute with India and also made a small claim in
1 See Wang Jisi, Marching Westwards: The Rebalancing of Chinas Geostrategy, International and
Strategic Studies, no. 73 (2012).
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July 2012 to seventeen kilometers in the Altai region, despite a 2004 border treaty with Russia that was to resolve the issue forever. Wang is not suggesting a military march, of course, but rather a continued expansion of Chinese economic influence and power to the west. While it may be politically incorrect to use the word containment in regard to U.S. policy toward China, containment is certainly how the pivot to Asia is understood in Beijing. So the Chinese response will be to continue to build high-speed trains, highways, and pipelines from western China to the greater Middle East, as well as to ports on the Indian Ocean, as their trade and investment ties accompany this strategic goal. I should not overstate this since Chinas highest strategic and economic priorities will lie to its east for a long time to come. But increasing access and influence to the north, west, and southwest are significant and natural strategic goals as well. There is a strong argument for Beijing to do so, as a westward push could provide transcontinental shipping routes for oil, gas, and other goods that would be far removed from the purview of the U.S. Navy. This brings us back to the theme of Cooleys book: the way in which the jockeying of Russian, U.S., and Chinese great-power designs among the Central Asian states enhance these states own sovereignty and domestic political power. Beijings economic power in this part of the world will continue to grow, absent an economic meltdown in China. Chinese companies, unconstrained by anything like the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act or shareholder reporting, will continue to line the pockets of local, regional, and national officials in Central Asia to strengthen their access to the regions mineral and hydrocarbon resources and will build more transit infrastructure to ship these goods to the Chinese market. Ever since the financial crisis, China, with its more than $3 trillion in foreign exchange reserves, has been on a global buying spree that increasingly raises concerns, especially among its mineral-rich neighbors. Chinese domination of Mongolias rapidly growing economy (the second-fastest growing economy in the world right now) reached such a point that the parliament in Ulaanbaatar recently passed legislation that requires legislative approval of any foreign investment over $70 million.2 Even in Central Asias largest and most wealthy state, Kazakhstan, there is considerable concern about the increasing Chinese stakes in Kazakh oil and gas resources, as well as about illegal Chinese migrant workers. Russia is also concerned that its eastern
2 See Oliver Backes, China at the Gates: Chinas Impact on Mongolian Natural Resources and
Investment Policy, Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 6, 2013 u http://csis.org/ blog/china-gates-chinas-impact-mongolian-natural-resource-and-investment-policy/.
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regions, which are rich in hydrocarbon and mineral wealth, will be gobbled up by Chinese companies, effectively eroding Russian sovereignty. The best defense for the Central Asian states, Russia, and all of Chinas neighbors is improvement of their investment environments to make them more attractive to a wider set of bidders. But this requires improved governance, transparent and effective rule of law, strengthened property rights, and all of those good things that attack the foundations of patrimonial authoritarian systems. If Chinas economic presence is viewed as too heavy-handed or pervasive, there will be increasing public opposition to it that local leaders will have to address. The China factor was not the main reason behind the riots in Zhanozhen, Kazakhstan, in December 2011, but it did play a role. Probably the most potentially effective policy strategy that the United States has in this region in the coming years is the so-called vision of a new Silk Road: a regional economic cooperation strategy for Afghanistan and its neighbors that emphasizes strengthening both hard and soft trade and transit infrastructure to link the heart of Asia with the greater Middle East, East Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Russia, and Europe. Although the region certainly needs more railroads, roads, modern airports, and the like, the biggest obstacle to moving goods rapidly and predictably to multiple markets in all directions is bureaucratic and institutionalwhat both I and Cooley call borders acting as toll booths (p. 154). As virtually all studies conclude, reduction of graft and red tape at the borders will do more to strengthen regional economic connectivity and increase the variety of market options for Central Asian states than any other policy action. Cooley is right to conclude that, so far, the internal nature of the regional patrimonial states is the biggest obstacle (see pp. 14961), but if national sovereignty in the region feels under greater threat, perhaps reviving the network of transcontinental transit corridors that Washington calls the new Silk Road may achieve a more positive response from albeit reluctant regional leaders. The United States would benefit from viewing support for this initiative as a key part of the strategic pivot to Asia.
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Domestic Challenges, International Opportunities: Understanding Security Cooperation in Central Asia Erica Marat
he Central Asian countries are often defined as passive observers of the U.S., Russian, and Chinese rivalry, a conflict of interests that resembles the Great Game between Great Britain and tsarist Russia roughly a century ago. The comparison is often drawn for lack of a better empirical understanding of how Central Asias five post-Soviet countries function on the international scene, while the United States interest in the region significantly increased in the postSeptember 11 era, much to the dismay of neighboring Russia and China. Alexander Cooleys Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in Central Asia dispels the myth that these big three are locked into constant competition. While competition among the United States, Russia, and China exists, there are also instances of collaboration on joint goals, mimicking of one anothers policies, and opportunities to free ride, owing to various security arrangements led by one or another of the three. Yet it is the Central Asian political elites who seem to benefit the most from the increased interest of global powers. The political elites in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have developed local rules for playing the big three against each other for the benefit of domestic audiences, primarily to prevail over political rivals and strengthen their own hold on power. The most blatant example of leveraging the Kremlins displeasure with the U.S. military to benefit the mercantile interests of the political elites comes from Kyrgyzstans former president, Kurmanbek Bakiyev. In 2009, Bakiyev secured both a $2 billion loan from Russia and a significant increase in U.S. payments to use an airbase in Bishkek by first announcing that he would expel the U.S. military from the base and then four months later changing his mind. Uzbekistan president Islam Karimov has also been skillful in keeping both Russia and the United States nervous about his engagement in regional initiatives, such as the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) or providing access to the U.S.-NATO Northern Distribution Network for Afghanistan. Just as Cooley uncovers the patrimonial logic of the Central Asian leaders foreign policy, he also shows how each of the big three powers at one time
erica marat is an expert on Central Asia and has published widely on the region. Her most recent
book is The Military and the State in Central Asia: From Red Army to Independence (2009). She can be reached at <erica.marat@gmail.com>.
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or another developed patron-client relations with the Central Asian states. Seeking to advance their own interests in the region, Moscow, Washington, and Beijing often ignored reports of human rights abuses and were ready to engage with corrupt leaders if needed. By explaining the logic of the big threes policy decisions in Central Asia since the September 11 terrorist attacks, Great Games, Local Rules is as much a book about transnational and domestic corruption as it is about international relations. The book also demonstrates how regional actorsIndia, South Korea, Turkey, and Japanwere effectively squeezed out of Central Asia by the overwhelming presence of the big three. Those countries, although sharing economic and political interests in the region, were unable to build trade relations and political alliances with the Central Asian countries because these niches were quickly filled by regional organizations led by Russia, China, and the United States. Great Games, Local Rules offers a rich analytical and empirical basis for further research in both international relations and Central Asian studies. The book poses three interrelated questions about how local rules developed in response to the global powers competition in Central Asia. First, are local rules in Central Asia the sign of a new norm in which small countries play great powers against each other instead of looking for win-win solutions? Are they emerging as a result of declining Western influence? Beyond Central Asia, does the collaboration among several global powers and small states follow a similar logic? Cooley explains the emergence of local rules as the product of a postWestern world in which the United States must compete with regional powers. Second, how uniform are the local rules of Central Asia? The ousting of Bakiyev in 2010 demonstrated that erratic foreign policy breeds corruption and angers opposition groups. By contrast, Kazakhstan president Nursultan Nazarbayevs balanced foreign policy has led to years of fruitful relations with Washington, Moscow, and Beijing and contributed to strong domestic support for his regime. Did Bakiyev overplay his advantages? And is Nazarbayev-like behavior the epitome of effective local rules in the region? Finally, can the Central Asian states in fact be treated as a coherent region? Great Games, Local Rules approaches the five states as constituting a region, while acknowledging that they in no way function as a single economic bloc. The differences among these countries economic and political development continue to grow wider over time. Because the five states lack economic integration and have been implementing restrictive border regimes, Cooley asks whether Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan should be considered in the same fashion as, for instance, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldovacountries that
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share geographical proximity but are substantially different from one another in terms of post-Soviet political and economic development. Cooley tackles this issue by outlining several perspectives that regard Central Asia as a region. The United States, Russia, and China lump the Central Asian states together because of the political and security interests they pursue there. Furthermore, the Central Asian states themselves often pretend for regional audiences to function as political allies, even though economic integration has not taken place. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, regional integration is taking place from the bottom up, courtesy of shuttle traders who bypass strict border regimes in search of profit. These shuttle traders transit goods from China through Kyrgyzstan to Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. These informal trade routes might one day shape the parameters of regional trade agreements. By posing these questions, Great Games, Local Rules is an important stepping-stone toward building a theory of international relations based on Central Asia that differs from classical Western approaches. The books empirical richness should appeal to a wide range of readers looking to understand how Russia, China, and the United States formulate their policies toward Central Asia as well as how those policies are received in the region.
The Rules of Central Asias Games Are Changing S. Enders Wimbush
lexander Cooleys concise and well-written analysis of the evolving contest among Russia, China, and the United States for position and influence in Central Asia is indeed welcome. Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in Central Asia is likely to be the starting point for future assessments of this region. These should multiply as the complexity of the regional and global dynamics that affect Central Asia deepens. New actors are already entering the region with their own unique objectives and strategies. Some traditional actors will be eclipsed as their capabilities wane or as they seek respite from distant entanglements there.
s. enders wimbush is Executive Director for Strategy and Development at The National Bureau of
Asian Research. He can be reached at <ewimbush@nbr.org>.
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New generations of Central Asian elites will soon compete for power, and some will harbor very different visions for how their countries should be governed, strategically aligned, and integrated into a global economy. Conflicts spawned by the regions failed and failing states and aggressive ideologies from abroad will produce security challenges that cascade across borders. Stability will prove elusive and outright peace probably unobtainable. Not surprisingly, todays rules of the game, appropriately described by Cooley, will change. I would argue that by 2012, when Great Games, Local Rules appeared, the rules were already evolving in several Central Asian countries, not changing so much as adding new layers. Cooley is correct to emphasize the Soviet-era mindset of todays generation of Central Asian leaders. For them, ensuring the survival of their patrimonial regimes, gaming their economies for maximum personal gain, and guarding the gate lest outside influences disrupt these comfy arrangements is instinctive. But it is increasingly evident that this is not the limit of their strategic visions, at least not all of them. Uzbekistans president Islam Karimov is notable for his grasp of Central Asias larger strategic dynamics. For example, his efforts to encourage tighter economic integration with Afghanistan through energy and transport demonstrate his understanding of how that countrys vulnerabilities could spike after the U.S. withdrawal in 2014 and affect Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Kazakhstans president Nursultan Nazarbayev has substantially redesigned his countrys foreign-policy objectives and practices, which recently featured hosting 5+2 talks on Irans nuclear ambitions.1 Even hermetically sealed Turkmenistan shows an inclination in this direction with its recent energy diplomacy. Great Games, Local Rules masterfully describes how the Central Asian leaders successfully play the great powers off against each other, often resulting in the latter acquiescing to the local rules of the game. But more is at work here, at least in some placessomething we might think of as strategic intent that transcends purely local interests. Another way to describe this distinction is to note the sharp contrast of these states former status as the objects of other states foreign policy with their current status as strategic actors in their own right. One might interpret these countries design of larger strategies as efforts to double-down on the patrimonial rules Cooley describes, and that might be right. But I doubt that doubling-down is the sole or even the
1 The 5+2 talks include Transnistria, Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, and the Organization for Security
and Co-operation in Europe, plus the United States and the European Union.
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most powerful incentive. The emerging Central Asian landscape described by Marlene Laruelle and Sebastien Peyrouse in their groundbreaking book Globalizing Central Asia will become increasingly inhospitable terrain for the old rules, though they will certainly linger for at least a generation or more. We should anticipate several Central Asian states becoming more assertive actors in a larger strategic universe, which is where their interests will increasingly be located. This will add additional complexity and uncertainty to the new great-power contest in the region. Every great contest needs some great contestants. Yet the triangular contest for power in Central Asia among Russia, China, and the United States is very unequal, more scalene than equilateral. Of these, Russia strikes me as the least able to compete effectively for the long haul. Spiraling down across virtually all measures of power, authority, and influence, Russia is a dying state tempting debilitating crises at multiple levels. Cooleys discussion of Russias seeming indifference to the fate of Central Asia after the Soviet Unions collapse in 1991 is spot on, as is his assessment that the main challenge in analyzing Russian policy toward Central Asia is that it lacks a single overriding strategic goal (p. 51). This begs the question: how can a state compete effectively if its objectives are unclear and its competitive resources are being quickly depleted? Nearly all Russian initiatives to regain prestige and stature in the region have failed to impress the Central Asians, much less the Chinese. Writing in 2011, I concluded that Russia is not one of Asias rising powers but the opposite.2 I see nothing today suggesting otherwise. Can we say that the United States also lacks an overriding strategic goal in Central Asia? When Central Asia was suddenly released from Soviet control in 1991, Americans were even more indifferent to the region than the Russians because few of them knew anything about it. I am unaware of Central Asia ever figuring in U.S. strategy at more than a transactional level. Cooleys account strengthens this conclusion. President Obama underlined the transactional basis of U.S. involvement by fixing the date for the transaction to end in 2014. This decision was apparently made without regard for the longer-term strategic implications of the United States virtual disappearance from this contestnot just for China and Russia but for all of Eurasias key actors. Consider that Central Asia today is arguably the worlds most contested geography.
2 S. Enders Wimbush, Great Games in Central Asia, in Strategic Asia 201112: Asia Responds to
Its Rising PowersChina and India, ed. Ashley J. Tellis, Travis Tanner, and Jessica Keough (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2011), 279.
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Powerful regional statesRussia, China, India, Iran, and Turkeyall seek a competitive advantage in the Central Asian space. This list includes four nuclear powers, with a fifth (Iran) close at hand and possibly a sixth (Turkey) further over the horizon. Outside contestantsfor example, the United States, Europe, Japan, South Korea, and Saudi Arabiaincrease the density of this strategic soup. Is this an arena where the United States can afford strategic fatigue? Meanwhile, Chinas quiet incremental penetration of Central Asia gathers momentum. It is not without issue, and occasionally the Chinese encounter pushback on the ground, usually when they are insensitive to cultural norms, customs, or preferences. But Beijings use of economic incentives, a comparatively efficient labor force, and engaged regional organizations like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, through which China can identify opportunities and leverage corporate diplomacy, far outstrips Russias ability to compete or counter. To the extent that Central Asia is a great-power contest, it is now Chinas to lose. With the United States heading for Central Asias exits, the contest loses a strong stabilizing player. One wonders if the White House ever considered how a continued U.S. presence in the region, perhaps no more than a few hundred soldiers in training missions and other activities, might affect the blossoming uncertainties that a U.S. absence will undoubtedly produce. As I speculated last year in testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, such a residual presencein Uzbekistan, for examplecould exert a calming influence on what could rapidly become an unruly and possibly violent competition among Central Asias other contestants.3 Cooleys analysis and logical exposition alert readers to the possibility of alternative futures in Central Asia about which the United States has thought little and for which it is ill prepared. Great Games, Local Rules is in that respect an excellent starting point. I hope Cooley will accept his own challenge.
3 S. Enders Wimbush, The United States and Central Asia, testimony before the House
Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia, Washington, D.C., July 24, 2012 u http://archives. republicans.foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/HHRG-112-FA14-WState-WimbushS-20120724.pdf.
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Can We Change the Rules? External Actors and Central Asia Beyond 2014 Alexander Cooley
wrote Great Games, Local Rules in the hope of facilitating a dialogue between observers of Central Asia and international relations scholars interested in the political dynamics of the postCold War world. For too long, the latter group has ignored Central Asia, dismissing it as an exotic arena of imperial competition and opaque local tradition that is of little global relevance. Specifically, I wished to flag what I considered important trends of the multipolar regional order U.S. tacit security bargains and declining normative power, the Russian-led backlash against Western democratic norms and human rights promotion, and Chinas rise as a dominant economic player. Most importantly, I wanted to draw wider attention to the statecraft of the Central Asian states, demonstrating how relatively weaker states can still channel, translate, and manipulate external interests and agendas for their own domestic political purposes. Engaging in an Asia Policy discussion about these ideas is therefore a deeply enriching and humbling opportunity, for the scholars assembled in this forum are all distinguished researchers and long-time observers of the Eurasian political landscape. A short response cannot do all of their points justice so I look forward to engaging with the important issues they raise beyond justthesepages. I have grouped my response to the reviews into three categories of topics raised by the roundtable participants: (1) the appropriateness of my analytical framework for explaining major regional developments and interactions, (2) the relevance of Central Asias lessons to other areas of the postCold War world, and (3) the implications for U.S. policy toward the region following the planned U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014.
The Analytical Framework of Great Games, Local Rules

My main analytical purpose in the book is to show how the big three external powers have sought different strategic goals in the region, but I also illuminate how, in addition to competition, the external powers have cooperated, mimicked, and learned from one another as they interacted in the Central
alexander cooley is Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science at Barnard
College, Columbia University, in New York. He can be reached at <acooley@barnard.edu>.
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Asian arena. All the while, the regions autocrats have used these external interactions as opportunities to extract resources to preserve their regimes, feed their domestic patronage machines, and push back against external criticism or conditions that might threaten the political status quo. James Sherr identifies these patrimonial dynamics as the political antithesis of western liberal and democratic institutions, though he is prudent to caution that the regions patrimonialism is neither pure nor immune from all transformative attempts. Yet the lens of patronage politics provides what I think is a theoretically useful assumption for examining internal-external interactions. Rent-seeking, pseudoreforms, and competing norms are logical consequences that flow from these political imperatives, rather than an exceptional or even culturally bound set of local behaviors. Nevertheless, in a bid for parsimony, I do oversimplify. Kathryn Stoner rightly suspects that the different flavors of authoritarianism within the region might also affect their patterns of external engagement. How else can one explain Turkmenistans latching onto China so quickly as its main external patron, the close Kazakh-Russian partnership, or the prickly relations of repressive and paranoid Uzbek president Islam Karimov with both Moscow and Washington? Marlene Laruelle accurately notes that societal actors, such as businesses and migrants, are absent from my state-centric account, while Enders Wimbush and Sherr point out that some of the Central Asian states have graduated beyond these elite-led imperatives and are pursuing external engagements with the purpose of both enhancing their international standing (Kazakhstan especially) and influencing the region more broadly (in the case of Uzbekistan). These are fair and important observations. And even competitive patrimonialism has its limits. As Erica Marat observes, Kyrgyz president Kurmanbek Bakiyev overplayed his hand when he initiated a public bidding war between Russia and the United States over the Manas airbase. Although regional elites undoubtedly will be concerned with an increasingly complex array of personal, social, and national agendas going forward, it is worth recalling the regions political context during the 2000s. All of the regions rulers consolidated their grip on power and then proceeded to securitize their coercive organs in response to counterterrorism imperatives and perceptions of imminent transnational regime threats. In so doing, they were supported by all three external security patrons. Perhaps a more productive way of advancing our understanding, to echo John Heathershaws earlier critique of my book, would be to think more systematically about how these elites and new societal actors are joined in a number of transnational networks that interpenetrate the region, be it narcotics trafficking, the unofficial shuttle trade, money laundering, and
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foreign deal-making financiers, or as sites for the dissemination of contested norms and international standards. The participants also note other important ways in which the analysis might be starting to date itself. Both Andrew Kuchins and Wimbush, I believe correctly, observe a growing complexity and contestation over the region that involves not only the big three patrons of Russia, the United States, and China, but several other actors such as Turkey, India, South Korea, Japan, the Gulf States, and Iran. These states too offer the Central Asian governments new opportunities and strategic partnerships; though, as I briefly explore in the case of India negotiating for basing rights with Tajikistan, they occasionally have also overestimated the extent of their own potential for regional influence. Mamuka Tsereteli also points to a looming social backlash against Chinese economic penetration in the region, especially the visible presence of Chinese workers and the asymmetrical terms of trade China has forged with the region. This is an important issue that at some point will surely come to a head, though unlike parts of Africa that have experienced anti-Chinese backlashes, Central Asias less vibrant civil societies and weaker organized labor movements may limit the formal political opportunities for such campaigns.
Central Asia and the Dynamics, Institutions, and Norms of International Order
Sherr describes Great Games as a cogent critique of post-Cold War orthodoxy. I am not accustomed to sporting the revisionist label, but I will gladly accept it if the book prompts scholars and policymakers to re-examine some underlying assumptions about the extent of Western influence in emerging regional orders in areas such as the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Latin America. On the U.S. regional role, in particular, Stoner advances an important and powerful counterargument: given the United States overwhelming interest in stabilizing Afghanistan, and the resulting instrumentalization of the region for that military campaign, U.S. policy toward Central Asia is sui generis, hardly comparable to its role in other parts of the world. In short, the United States did not fail in its bid to influence Central Asia, mostly because Washington did not actually commit significant levels of resources or political capital to the region. Many U.S. policymakers share Stoners observations, and she is on the mark to say that the United States has not intensively engaged with the region beyond the security sphere. However, her comparative point follows only if we view U.S. strategic interest and focus as the primary determinants of its
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actual international influence. A cursory look at the political outcomes of U.S. interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq suggests otherwise. Here, Marat frames the question helpfully: is diminished U.S. standing in Central Asia the result of U.S. decline or the result of the Central Asian states actively seeking and finding alternative patrons who are less critical of their internal policies? If we analytically privilege how the Central Asian states have become more adept at leveraging alternatives and pushing back against the Western normative agenda, then the mechanism explaining this observed U.S. waning is both beyond the scope of U.S. intentions and more readily transferrable to other regions. A couple of examples of both hard security and soft power illustrate the importance of this analytical distinction. For example, the fact that the United States has provided private goods to the Uzbek and Kyrgyz governments to maintain military bases and access routes in the face of Russian pressure could be, on its own, explained away as an unremarkable and one-off side effect of its Afghanistan-centered engagement. But taken together with other recent failed bargains and contested access agreementsincluding the Iraqi governments refusal to grant the United States a long-term status of forces agreement in 2011, Pakistans periodic closure of the southern logical routes and demands for more security assistance, and the political turbulence over U.S. military facilities in Ecuador or Bahrain, where host governments have turned to alternative patrons (China and Saudi Arabia, respectively)it is more difficult to dismiss the Central Asian cases as isolated. U.S. base hosts and strategic partners worldwide appear increasingly willing to invoke exit options for domestic political purposes.1 In the soft-power sphere, the U.S. and Western role as the primary providers of public goodsdevelopment assistance, investments in infrastructure, rulemaking, and standard settingis also clearly being undermined. China offers loans and infrastructure financing without the domestic conditions demanded by Western-dominated international financial institutions. However, unlike its role in many parts of Africa or Southeast Asia, Beijing does not usually actively participate in international donor coordination activities in Bishkek or Dushanbe. Thus, Chinese economic assistance has allowed countries like Tajikistan and Turkmenistan to avoid turning to Western lenders during the economic crisis, thereby diminishing Western leverage over them. It is worth noting that, as an external donor, China has also seen the mismanagement
1 I explore this topic at greater length in a forthcoming article co-authored with Daniel Nexon. See
Alexander Cooley and Daniel Nexon, The Empire will Compensate You? The Structural Dynamics of the U.S. Overseas Basing Network, Perspectives on Politics 11, no. 4 (2013).
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of its funds as local elites have turned public works projects into private revenuestreams. In addition, the region has spawned its own new organizations that provide novel frameworks for cooperation, alternative normative standards, and legal justifications. Groups such as the Chinese-led Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Eurasian Economic Community Customs Union present themselves as more appropriate regional alternatives to the hegemonic Western counterparts, even as they quite deliberately copy the organizational forms, if not substance, of the Organization for Security Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), NATO, and the European Union. These new regional organizations provide legal and normative buffers to member states from external pressures and international criticism. There is also, I would argue, a sociological dimension at play here: a rising global demand in policy and academic circles for a workable antithesis or model to U.S.-led international architectures. Such analysis, as Laruelle observes, permeates and biases much coverage of the SCO and, I would add, its more global counterpart, the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) forum. Why else would there be such international fascination with the SCO despite the gaping mismatch between its ambitious multilateral agenda and its actual meager accomplishments? Similarly, what makes the meme that the U.S. promotes double-standards on human rights when dealing with Central Asian rulers so resonant, when realpolitik long dominated its Cold War policy to friendly autocrats? It is here that the contemporary global spotlight becomes more damaging. For regardless of Washingtons actual intentions and limited regional ambitions, the United States struggles in Central Asia have been publicly aired by global media outlets and international advocacy groups, many of them keen to note the inconsistency between Washingtons value-based rhetoric and its strategicbargains.
U.S. Engagement in Central Asia after the Drawdown of U.S. Forces from Afghanistan
Finally, the roundtable raises the critical question of just what type of engagement the United States should maintain in Central Asia given its drawdown from Afghanistan. The answer, I think, depends on the criteria that are invoked when posing the question. If the question posed asks what the vital U.S. long-term strategic
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interests are in the region, seeing none, a plausible case for disengagement could be made. However, abandoning the region would be shortsighted, and the roundtable authors offer some important and forward-looking strategic rationales for maintaining engagement. Looking eastward, Kuchins views U.S. sustained engagement in Eurasia as a logical accompaniment to Washingtons East Asian pivot. Wimbush sees the complexity and layering of the region, and of its different actors, as a compelling reason for why the United States must remain engaged as an arena of global interest. He also advocates that U.S. troops would provide a stabilizing presence in the region, perhaps by maintaining a residual force in Uzbekistan. Both are important strategic rationales to consider, but both also carry some risks. Chinese and U.S. relations in Central Asia have been relatively cooperative, but the potential for competition certainly exists in areas such as energy politics and some of the global order issues identified earlier. The combination of a more robust Silk Road strategy, an enduring U.S. security presence on Chinas western flank, and Beijings fear of outside meddling in Xinjiang might make the U.S. presence in Eurasia the target of a future Chinesecounterthrust. Wimbushs plea for an enduring regional military presence in Uzbekistan may be particularly disconcerting to Russia, which seems to have used the uncertainty generated by the U.S. drawdown to opportunistically reassert itself in its relations with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, concluding deals for new military bases, promising new military assistance packages and investments in strategic sectors, and pressing these states to commit to joining the Moscowled customs union. In the Kyrgyz case, Moscow has also compelled Bishkek to stick to a public commitment that it will close Manas in 2014 following the expiration of the current agreement. Given Tseretelis observation about the growing disconnect between Russian ambitions and capabilities, the regional fallout of Moscows renewed effort to turn the smaller Central Asian states into political clients may become messy if Russian support exacerbates long-standing regional rivalries with Uzbekistan over water rights, disputes about borders and ethnic enclaves, and, as Tsereteli identifies, the uncertainty of looming political transitions in Astana and Tashkent. The potential for regional entanglements by the United States and Russia in local disputes, even in the pursuit of stability, remains ever-present. On the other hand, a good case can be made that the drawdown from Afghanistan will untie the hands of both Washington and Brussels and allow them to focus on a more balanced portfolio of non-security matters, including promoting international legal standards, campaigning for the whole Central
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Asian regions accession into the WTO, bettering the regions still dismal human rights records, encouraging educational programs and exchanges, and improving governance and transparency. Even in the realm of continued security cooperation and counterterrorism, there is room both to remain effective against transnational threats and to nudge local and regional practices toward greater conformity with emerging international practices and legal standards. And at some point, U.S. and EU officials will need to make a more public case about why their approaches to regional challengessuch as ensuring political stability, mitigating and resolving conflicts, guaranteeing minority and religious rights, nurturing civil society, and insisting on transparency in government are not just policies that suit the agendas of the West, but actually offer a more sustainable basis for pursuing state-building and regional integration, and indeed for partaking in globalization itself. But the West will be hard-pressed to actually sell these messages unless policymakers can demonstrate a longerterm regional commitment to the Central Asian governments, as well as some humility and self-reflection on the so-called values issues. I fully agree that complexity and uncertainty are likely to characterize the region for some time. In response, the United States must overcome its strategic fatigue, be more pragmatic in its dealings with Moscow and Beijing, and accept that its actions in this region have important, even if unintended, demonstration effects in other venues on a variety of security, economic, social, and legal matters. All the while, Washington must do a better job of listening to local perspectives about the regions looming challenges and actively defending U.S. principles and norms from regional alternatives that are gaining currency. In short, successful multipolar diplomacy will require considerable multitasking.
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Asia Policy 16 July2013

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asia policy number 16 july 2013

china s upstream advantage in the great himalayan watershed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

melting the geopolitical ice in south asia . . . . . . . . . . . 19

himalayan water security: a south asian perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

hydropower dams on the mekong: old dreams, new dangers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

climate change and water security in the himalayan region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

securing the himalayas as the water tower of asia: an environmental perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

policy succession and the next cross-strait crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139

book review roundtable

central asia as a case study for a multipolar world . . . 162

how to suborn great powers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164

winners and losers of strategic games in central asia. . 167

the rules of central asia s games are changing . . . . . 181

guidelines for submission

II. Manuscript Format

A sample Executive Summary is provided in Section III below.

III. Sample Executive Summary

Executive Summary [total length not to exceed 275 words]

IV. Note Format and Examples

Part 1: English-Language Sources

Part 2: Foreign-Language Sources

Part 3: Subsequent Citation

Subsequent use: Huntington, Clash of Civilizations, 13637.

asia policy, number 16 ( july 2013 ) , 150

The National Bureau of Asian Research, Seattle, Washington

FIGURE 1 Major Himalayan Rivers

UZBEKISTAN KYRGYZSTAN TAJIKISTAN

Amu Darya Yellow

TAIWAN MYANMAR BANGLADESH

SRI LANKA BRUNEI M A L A Y S I A SINGAPORE

roundtable himalayan water security

kenneth pomeranzis University Professor of modern Chinese history at the University of

roundtable himalayan water security

China, Its Neighbors, and the Implications of Dam-building

roundtable himalayan water security

Water Problems and Solutions

roundtable himalayan water security

roundtable himalayan water security

The Ripple Effect of Chinas Water Needs

2011 u http://blogs.ei.columbia.edu/2011/05/19/the-push-to-dam-china%e2%80%99s-rivers/. Indicators, World Bank u http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ER.H2O.INTR.PC.

May 4, 2013 u http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/world/asia/plans-to-harness-chinas-nu-riverthreaten-a-region.html.

roundtable himalayan water security

5 See Mekong/Lancang River, International Rivers u http://www.internationalrivers.org/

Future, Stimson Center, January 2012 u http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/ SRSF_Web_2.pdf. chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-03/31/content_9664697.html.

roundtable himalayan water security

13 See South-North Water Transfer Project, International Rivers website u http://www.

Transport Scheme, Circle of Blue, March 1, 2011 u http://www.circleofblue.org/waternews/2011/ world/a-dry-and-anxious-north-awaits-china%E2%80%99s-giant-unproven-water-transport-scheme.

January 15, 2013 u http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/energy/hydropower-geothermal/ will-himalayan-dams-solve-indias-energy-woes-14982175.

The Need for Formal Cooperation

roundtable himalayan water security

roundtable himalayan water security

Melting the Geopolitical Ice in South Asia Robert G. Wirsing

The Scarcity of Water in South Asia

robert g. wirsing is Professor of Government and Chair of Faculty at Georgetown Universitys

roundtable himalayan water security

The Uncertainty Wrought by Climate Change

May 20, 2013.

The Implications of Dam Building

roundtable himalayan water security

Melting the Ice? Prospects for Regional Cooperation

Trigger Water Wars, Washington Times, April 8, 2013.

Hindu, April 15, 2013 u http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/south-asia/nepal-indiabangladesh-to-make-most-of-ganga-water-hydropower/article4617600.ece.

roundtable himalayan water security

The Importance of Water Sharing