Study Guide

Rethinking and extending the mandates of the UN peacekeeping missions.

Reformed Security Council

MMUN 2013 Reformed Security Council Study Guide

MMUN 2013 Reformed Security Council Study Guide

SUMMARY

I. Role of the Committee .................................................................................. 4

II. What is Peacekeeping ? ................................................................................. 5

III. Actions taken ............................................................................................ 11

IV. Conclusion ................................................................................................ 14

MMUN 2013 Reformed Security Council Study Guide

I.

Role of the Committee

Marrakech Model United Nations 2013 Staff thought it would be interesting to enlarge the Security Council to 18 members. As you may know a large majority of the member states would like to reform the Security Council. You can nd all the different reforms explained on the following website: http://pfcun.org/ MMUN 2013 Security Council is therefore composed of the 15 initial members plus Brazil, India and South Africa.

The Security Council has primary responsibility, under the United Nations Charter, for the maintenance of international peace and security. It is for the Security Council to determine when and where a UN Peacekeeping operation should be deployed. The Security Council responds to crises around the world on a case-bycase basis and it has a range of options at its disposal. It takes many different factors into account when considering the establishment of new peacekeeping operation, including: Whether there is a ceasere in place and the parties have committed themselves to a peace process intended to reach a political settlement; Whether a clear political goal exists and whether it can be reected in the mandate; Whether a precise mandate for a UN operation can be formulated; Whether the safety and security of UN personnel can be reasonably ensured, including in particular whether reasonable guarantees can be obtained from the main parties or factions regarding the safety and security of UN personnel. It establishes a peacekeeping operation by adopting a Security Council resolution. The resolution sets out that missions mandate and size. Also, it monitors the work of UN Peacekeeping operations on an ongoing basis, including through periodic reports from the Secretary-General and by holding dedicated Security Council sessions to discuss the work of specic operations. The Council can vote to extend, amend or end mission mandates as it deems appropriate. Under Article 25 of the Charter, all UN members agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council. While other organs of the UN

MMUN 2013 Reformed Security Council Study Guide

make recommendations to Member States, the Council alone has the power to take decisions which Member States are obligated to implement.

II.

What is peacekeeping?

1. Principles of UN Peacekeeping Missions There are three basic principles that continue to set UN peacekeeping operations apart as a tool for maintaining international peace and security. These three principles are inter-related and mutually reinforcing:

Consent of the parties Impartiality Non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate

Consent of the parties UN peacekeeping operations are deployed with the consent of the main parties to the conict. This requires a commitment by the parties to a political process. Their acceptance of a peacekeeping operation provides the UN with the necessary freedom of action, both political and physical, to carry out its mandated tasks. In the absence of such consent, a peacekeeping operation risks becoming a party to the conict; and being drawn towards enforcement action, and away from its fundamental role of keeping the peace. The fact that the main parties have given their consent to the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation does not necessarily imply or guarantee that there will also be consent at the local level, particularly if the main parties are internally divided or have weak command and control systems. Universality of consent becomes even less probable in volatile settings, characterized by the presence of armed groups not under the control of any of the parties, or by the presence of other spoilers. Impartiality Impartiality is crucial to maintaining the consent and cooperation of the main parties, but should not be confused with neutrality or inactivity. United Nations peacekeepers should be impartial in their dealings with the parties to the conict, but not neutral in the execution of their mandate. MMUN 2013 Reformed Security Council Study Guide 5

Just as a good referee is impartial, but will penalize infractions, so a peacekeeping operation should not condone actions by the parties that violate the undertakings of the peace process or the international norms and principles that a United Nations peacekeeping operation upholds. Notwithstanding the need to establish and maintain good relations with the parties, a peacekeeping operation must scrupulously avoid activities that might compromise its image of impartiality. A mission should not shy away from a rigorous application of the principle of impartiality for fear of misinterpretation or retaliation. Failure to do so may undermine the peacekeeping operations credibility and legitimacy, and may lead to a withdrawal of consent for its presence by one or more of the parties. Non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate UN peacekeeping operations are not an enforcement tool. However, they may use force at the tactical level, with the authorization of the Security Council, if acting in self-defense and defense of the mandate. In certain volatile situations, the Security Council has given UN peacekeeping operations robust mandates authorizing them to use all necessary means to deter forceful attempts to disrupt the political process, protect civilians under imminent threat of physical attack, and/ or assist the national authorities in maintaining law and order. Although on the ground they may sometimes appear similar, robust peacekeeping should not be confused with peace enforcement, as envisaged under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

Robust peacekeeping involves the use of force at the tactical level with the authorization of the Security Council and consent of the host nation and/or the main parties to the conict. By contrast, peace enforcement does not require the consent of the main parties and may involve the use of military force at the strategic or international level, which is normally prohibited for Member States under Article 2(4) of the Charter, unless authorized by the Security Council.

A UN peacekeeping operation should only use force as a measure of last resort. It should always be calibrated in a precise, proportional and appropriate manner, within the principle of the minimum force necessary to achieve the desired effect, while sustaining consent for the mission and its mandate. The use of force by a UN peacekeeping operation always has political implications and can often give rise to unforeseen circumstances.

MMUN 2013 Reformed Security Council Study Guide

Judgments concerning its use need to be made at the appropriate level within a mission, based on a combination of factors including mission capability; public perceptions; humanitarian impact; force protection; safety and security of personnel; and, most importantly, the effect that such action will have on national and local consent for the mission. 2. The mid-1990s: A period of reassessment The general success of earlier missions raised expectations for UN Peacekeeping beyond its capacity to deliver. This was especially true in the mid 1990s in situations when the Security Council was not able to authorize sufficiently robust mandates or provide adequate resources. Missions were established in situations where the guns had not yet fallen silent, in areas such as the former Yugoslavia - UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), Rwanda - UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) and Somalia - UN Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II), where there was no peace to keep. These three high-prole peacekeeping operations came under criticism as peacekeepers faced situations where warring parties failed to adhere to peace agreements, or where the peacekeepers themselves were not provided adequate resources or political support. As civilian casualties rose and hostilities continued, the reputation of UN Peacekeeping suffered. The setbacks of the early and mid-1990s led the Security Council to limit the number of new peacekeeping missions and begin a process of selfreection to prevent such failures from happening again. The Secretary-General commissioned an independent inquiry [S/ 1999/1257] into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and, at the request of the General Assembly, provided a comprehensive assessment [A/54/549] on the 1993-1995 events in Srebrenica in the former Yugoslavia. The circumstances that led to the UN withdrawal from Somalia were also carefully examined [S/ 1995/231]. In the meantime, UN peacekeepers continued their long-term operations in the Middle East, Asia and Cyprus. With continuing crises in a number of countries and regions, the essential role of UN Peacekeeping was soon emphatically reaffirmed. In the second half of the 1990s, the Council authorized new UN operations in:

Angola - UN Angola Verication Mission III (UNAVEM III) and UN Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA);

MMUN 2013 Reformed Security Council Study Guide

Bosnia and Herzegovina - UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH); Croatia - UN Condence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO), UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) and UN Civilian Police Support Group (UNPSG); the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia - UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP); Guatemala - UN Verication Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA); Haiti - UN Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH) UN Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH) and UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH).

3. Towards the 21st century: New operations, new challenges At the turn of the century, the UN undertook a major exercise to examine the challenges to peacekeeping in the 1990s and introducing reform. The aim was to strengthen our capacity to effectively manage and sustain eld operations. With a greater understanding of the limits and potential of UN Peacekeeping, the UN was asked to perform even more complex tasks. This started in 1999 when the UN served as the administrator of both Kosovo in the former Yugoslavia - UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), and in East Timor (now Timor-Leste) - UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), which was in the process of gaining independence from Indonesia. In the following years, the Security Council also established large and complex peacekeeping operations in a number of African countries: Peacekeepers also returned to resume vital peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations where fragile peace had frayed, in Haiti - UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and the newly independent Timor-Leste - UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT).There was also a short peacekeeping operation in Syria - UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) which had to be withdrawn four months after its establishment in April 2012. In the rst decade of the century, UN Peacekeeping found itself stretched like never before and increasingly called upon to deploy to remote, uncertain operating environments and into volatile political contexts. Peacekeeping faced a varied set of challenges, including challenges to deliver on its largest, most expensive and increasingly complex missions, challenges to design and execute viable transition strategies for missions where a degree of stability has been attained, and challenges to prepare for an uncertain future and set of requirements. MMUN 2013 Reformed Security Council Study Guide 8

By May 2010, UN Peacekeeping operations had more than 124,000 military, police and civilian staff. Since then UN Peacekeeping has entered a phase of consolidation. The numbers have, for the rst time in a decade, started to decline slightly, with the reduction of troops in UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and the withdrawal of UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) at the end of 2010. However, this by no means indicates that the challenges faced by the UN are diminishing. While the numbers of military peacekeepers may be decreasing, the demand for eld missions is expected to remain high, and peacekeeping will continue to be one of the UNs most complex operational tasks. Moreover, the political complexity facing peacekeeping operations and the scope of their mandates, including on the civilian side, remain very broad. There are strong indications that certain specialized capabilities including police will be in especially high demand over the coming years. Today's multi-dimensional peacekeeping will continue to facilitate the political process, protect civilians, assist in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants; support the organization of elections, protect and promote human rights and assist in restoring the rule of law. 4. Mandates and the legal basis for peacekeeping The UN Charter gives the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. In fullling this responsibility, the Council can establish a UN peacekeeping operation. UN peacekeeping operations are deployed on the basis of mandates from the United Nations Security Council. Their tasks differ from situation to situation, depending on the nature of the conict and the specic challenges it presents. UN Charter The Charter of the United Nations is the foundation document for all the UN work. The UN was established to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war and one of its main purposes is to maintain international peace and security. Peacekeeping, although not explicitly provided for in the Charter, has evolved into one of the main tools used by the United Nations to achieve this purpose. The Charter gives the UN Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. In fullling this MMUN 2013 Reformed Security Council Study Guide 9

responsibility, the Council may adopt a range of measures, including the establishment of a UN peacekeeping operation. Chapter VI deals with the Pacic Settlement of Disputes. UN peacekeeping operations have traditionally been associated with Chapter. However, the Security Council need not refer to a specic Chapter of the Charter when passing a resolution authorizing the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation and has never invoked Chapter VI. Chapter VII contains provisions related to Action with Respect to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression. In recent years, the Council has adopted the practice of invoking Chapter VII of the Charter when authorizing the deployment of UN peacekeeping operations into volatile post-conict settings where the State is unable to maintain security and public order. The Security Councils invocation of Chapter VII in these situations, in addition to denoting the legal basis for its action, can also be seen as a statement of rm political resolve and a means of reminding the parties to a conict and the wider UN membership of their obligation to give effect to Security Council decisions. Chapter VIII of the Charter provides for the involvement of regional arrangements and agencies in the maintenance of international peace and security provided such activities are consistent with the purposes and principles outlined in Chapter I of the Charter. Peacekeeping mandates UN peacekeeping operations are deployed on the basis of mandates from the United Nations Security Council. Over the years, the range of tasks assigned to UN peacekeeping operations has expanded signicantly in response to shifting patterns of conict and to best address threats to international peace and security.Although each UN peacekeeping operation is different, there is a considerable degree of consistency in the types of mandated tasks assigned by the Security Council. Depending on their mandate, peacekeeping operations may be required to: Deploy to prevent the outbreak of conict or the spill-over of conict across borders; Stabilize conict situations after a ceasere, to create an environment for the parties to reach a lasting peace agreement; Assist in implementing comprehensive peace agreements; Lead states or territories through a transition to stable government, based on democratic principles, good governance and economic development. 10

MMUN 2013 Reformed Security Council Study Guide

Depending on the specic set of challenges, UN peacekeepers are often mandated to play a catalytic role in the following essentially peacebuilding activities: Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants; Mine action; Security sector reform and other rule of law-related activities; Protection and promotion of human rights; Electoral assistance; Support for the restoration and extension of State authority; Promotion of social and economic recovery and development.

Security Council mandates also reect a number of cross-cutting, thematic tasks that are regularly assigned to UN peacekeeping operations on the basis of the following landmark Security Council resolutions: Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security; Security Council resolution 1612 (2005) on children and armed conict; Security Council resolution 1674 (2006) on the protection of civilians in armed conict. III. Actions taken

In 2000, the UN started a major exercise to analyze its peacekeeping experience, and introduce a series of reforms to strengthen its capacity to manage and sustain eld operations. This was brought about by the surge in demand for UN peacekeepers, with the blue helmets being increasingly asked to deploy to remote and often volatile environments. Peacekeeping also faced a varied set of challenges which included: deploying its largest, most expensive and increasingly complex operations; designing and executing transition strategies for operations where stability has been achieved; equipping communities as far as possible with capacity to ensure long-term peace and stability. 1. The Brahimi Report In March 2000, the Secretary-General appointed the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations to assess the shortcomings of the then existing MMUN 2013 Reformed Security Council Study Guide 11

system and to make specic and realistic recommendations for change. The panel was composed of individuals experienced in conict prevention, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The result, known as the Brahimi Report, after Lakhdar Brahimi, the Chair of the Panel, called for: renewed political commitment on the part of Member States; signicant institutional change; increased nancial support. The Panel noted that in order to be effective, UN peacekeeping operations must be properly resourced and equipped, and operate under clear, credible and achievable mandates. Following the Brahimi report, UN Member States and the UN Secretariat continued major reform efforts, including through: Capstone Doctrine in 2008, outlining the most important principles and guidelines for UN peacekeepers in the eld; Peace operations 2010 (2006), containing the reform strategy of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO); 2005 World Summit [A/RES/60/1], establishing the Peacebuilding Commission; High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change [A/59/565], setting out a broad framework for collective security for the new century. 2. New Horizon The most recent reform documents The New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping (2009) and its Progress Reports No.1 (2010) and No.2 (2011) assess the major policy and strategy dilemmas facing UN peacekeeping today and in the coming years. They attempt to reinvigorate the ongoing dialogue with Member States and other partners on how to better adjust UN peacekeeping to meet current and future requirements. Read more about New Horizon. Restructuring the peacekeeping department The major structural change as part of peacekeeping reform took place in 2007. To strengthen the UNs capacity to manage and sustain new peace operations, the Secretary-General restructured [A/61/858] the peacekeeping architecture by: Splitting DPKO into two, creating a new, separate Department of Field Support (DFS); Bolstering the support for new activities in DPKO; MMUN 2013 Reformed Security Council Study Guide 12

Augmenting resources in both Departments and in other parts of the Secretariat dealing with peacekeeping.

DFS developed the Global Field Support Strategy [A/64/633] in 2010 aimed at transforming service delivery to the eld and adapting it to the requirements of todays peacekeeping operations. Once implemented, support to the eld will become more predictable, professional and exible, while ensuring cost efficiencies and transparency. Historically, the countries that provide troops for peacekeeping missions are reimbursed for their contribution by the UN. The question of the rates is therefore extremely important for a large number of countries whether it's through the direct provision of military personnel or through the nancial obligations that make deployment of a peacekeeping presence possible. In 2011, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to establish a Senior Advisory Group (SAG) to examine the "rates of reimbursement to troop-contributing countries and related issues" (ref. GA Resolution 65/289 of 30 June 2011). The SAG issued their report in November 2012, and the Secretary-General followed this with a report on how to implement these recommendations.

The SAG recommendations included: a new approach to gathering data on the common and essential additional costs incurred by contributing countries in deploying their forces to UN Peacekeeping missions; an award of a premium to individual units that are operating without restrictions under exceptional levels of risk; a further premium for the provision of enabling capacities in highdemand and short supply.

On 10 May 2013, the General Assembly adopted resolution 67/261 which approved the conclusions and recommendations of the SAG, subject to a number of provisions. 3. Conduct and discipline reform Other reforms have been introduced in the eld of conduct and discipline. The Secretary-General imposed a zero tolerance policy following allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers in host countries. At the request of the Secretary-General, MMUN 2013 Reformed Security Council Study Guide 13

the then Permanent Representative of Jordan to the UN, Prince Zeid Raad Zeid Al-Hussein, produced a sweeping strategy, known as the Zeid Report [A/59/710]. It recommended engaging troop and police contributors, other Member States and the wider UN system in a new conduct and disciplining architecture for peacekeeping. In 2008, an UN-wide strategy for assistance to the victims of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN personnel was adopted by the General Assembly in resolution A/RES/62/214 PDF Document.

IV.

Conclusion

Peacekeeping has proven to be one of the most effective tools available to the UN to assist host countries navigate the difficult path from conict to peace. Peacekeeping has unique strengths, including legitimacy, burden sharing, and an ability to deploy and sustain troops and police from around the globe, integrating them with civilian peacekeepers to advance multidimensional mandates. As past experience shows, there are several factors that are essential for a successful peacekeeping operation. It must:

Be guided by the principles of consent, impartiality and the nonuse of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate; Be perceived as legitimate and credible, particularly in the eyes of the local population; Promote national and local ownership of the peace process in the host country. Genuine commitment to a political process by the parties in working towards peace (there must be a peace to keep); Clear, credible and achievable mandates, with matching personnel, logistic and nancial resources; Unity of purpose within the Security Council, with active support to UN operations in the eld; Host country commitment to unhindered UN operations and freedom of movement; Supportive engagement by neighboring countries and regional actors;

Other important factors that help drive success include:

MMUN 2013 Reformed Security Council Study Guide

14

An integrated UN approach, effective coordination with other actors on the ground and good communication with host country authorities and population; The utmost sensitivity towards the local population and upholding the highest standards of professionalism and good conduct (peacekeepers must avoid becoming part of the problem).

MMUN 2013 Reformed Security Council Study Guide

15