Search - 33 Results - "September 11" & "below the impact" Page 1 of 5

Source: News & Business > News > US Newspapers and Wires IjJ
Terms. "September 11" & "below the impact" and date(geq (9/11/01) and leq (9/11/04)) (Edit Search)
•f Select for FOCUS™ or Delivery
c:i
The New York Times, January 30, 2002

Copyright 2002 The New York Times Company

The New York Times

January 30, 2002, Wednesday, Late Edition - Final

SECTION: Section A; Page 1; Column 1; Metropolitan Desk

LENGTH: 2267 words

HEADLINE: A NATION CHALLENGED: FIREFIGHTING INQUIRY;

Before the Towers Fell, Fire Dept. Fought Chaos

BYLINE: By JIM DWYER and KEVIN FLYNN

BODY:
In scores of emotionally searing interviews conducted by the Fire Department for an internal
inquiry, the agency's most senior commanders have provided new and, in some cases,
alarming revelations about the events of Sept. 11.

They said they had little reliable radio communication that morning, could not keep track of
all the firefighters who entered the towers, and were unable to reach them as the threat of a
collapse became unmistakable.

The commanders decided early on that roaring fires on the high floors of the towers could not
be subdued. Many worried aloud that the buildings were in danger of at least partial failure.
Confusion extended, for some, to which tower was which. Although they feared that the
buildings were doomed, they could not bring their troops back in time.

One chief estimated that at the moment the north tower fell, nearly every civilian below the
floors directly hit by the airplane had already evacuated, and that only firefighters remained
inside the stairwells of a building that was seen as a lost cause.

So poor were communications that on one side of the trade center complex, in the city's
emergency management headquarters, a city engineer warned officials that the towers were
at risk of "near imminent collapse," but those he told could not reach the highest-ranking fire
chief by radio. Instead, a messenger was sent across acres, dodging flaming debris and
falling bodies, to deliver this assessment in person. He arrived with the news less than a
minute before the first tower fell.

Taken together, the interviews with virtually every surviving member of the department's top
command offer the most detailed and intimate portrait yet of the strategy and problems on
Sept. 11. By themselves, they do not answer difficult questions such as whether lives might
have been saved with different equipment or procedures. But for the department and the
city, officials said, these accounts will be a starting point in an inquiry about the Fire
Department's emergency response procedures.

For history, these accounts accomplish a separate but equally rich task: they mark with
precision acts of bravery, struggles to live, and the widespread feelings of being unmoored
from reality on that sunny morning.

http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=ddb9a93d7d608bd58207d79a26dd5e6e&docn... 2/20/2004
<earch - 33 Results - "September 11" & "below the impact" Page 2 of 5

They also reflect the actual spoken voices of the department, men and women of all ranks:
firefighters, doctors, chaplains, paramedics, fleet mechanics, support staff who responded to
the catastrophe without having to be asked. By one turn or another, their lives were spared,
and in many cases they were able then to rescue others. As they rushed to the scene, many
said they reflected that the day would expose them to dangers beyond their experience.

Walter Kowalczyk, the senior Emergency Medical Service officer on duty that day, recalled
driving up West Street and seeing body parts and debris. "My mouth went dry," he said. "I
had the sensation that I had a job to do. I had to ensure the safety of the E.M.S. work force.
But how do I do this if I can't talk?"

A chaplain, the Rev. John Delendick, recalled fleeing from the collapse, next to a police officer
who asked the priest, midstride, to hear his confession. Invoking a little-used power, the
priest said he believed an act of war had taken place and was declaring "general absolution"
for sins that covered all believers in the area.

Chief Kowalczyk and Father Delendick were among 500 members of the Fire Department
interviewed since late September, under an oral history project started by the commissioner
at the time, Thomas Von Essen. Mr. Von Essen had felt that the department needed a
rigorous outside examination of how and why so many of its members died Sept. 11.

The department has so far declined to release the transcripts of the interviews, but some 50
were made available this week to The New York Times. Last night, Mr. Von Essen's
successor, Nicholas Scoppetta, announced that he intended to hire an investigator to review
the department's operations that day.

"The Fire Department is seeking the services of a consultant to perform an independent

evaluation and study of the department's response and operations during and after the
attacks on the World Trade Center on Sept. 11, 2001," Mr. Scoppetta said in a statement.
"The purpose of this study will be to make findings and recommendations that will help
improve the department's response to catastrophic emergencies."

100 Terrible Minutes

As chaotic as the events of those 100 minutes seemed, it is clear from the accounts that they
unfolded for the fire officials in distinct phases, beginning with the first attack at 8:48. That
was followed by the second plane, which hit the south tower at 9:03; the collapse of the
south tower at 9:59; and the failure of the north tower at 10:28.

Nearly all of the department's highest-ranking and most experienced leaders arrived at the
World Trade Center within minutes of the first attack, having a clear view of the calamity
from the Fire Department Headquarters less than two miles away in downtown Brooklyn. As
they sped across the harbor, many of them worried about what lay ahead.

From the Brooklyn Bridge, Albert Turi, the deputy assistant chief of fire safety, tried to
measure how much of the north tower was on fire.

"I knew right from the start that there was no way this Fire Department could extinguish six
or eight floors of fire, fully involved, in a high-rise building," Chief Turi said. "It's just not
possible, because we don't have the means to do it."

Just entering the building had lethal risks: the debris and bodies falling from the upper floors
were killing people on the ground.

http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=ddb9a93d7d608bd58207d79a26dd5e6e&docn... 2/20/2004
Search - 33 Results - "September 11" & "below the impact" Page 3 of 5

The first chief on the scene was Joseph Pfeifer, who had been at Church and Lispenard
Streets with probationary fire officers and a documentary-film maker when the plane roared
overhead. On his way to the trade center, Chief Pfeifer alerted the dispatchers to sound the
alarm for a major catastrophe.

He ordered a staging area at West and Vesey Streets, set up a command center in the lobby
of 1 World Trade Center, and learned that people were trapped in the elevators. Others could
not get down from the floors above the fire. He sent the first firefighters up to begin rescue
work.

"I told engines, half the group to take hose, the other half not to, at least early on, and
started their way up," Chief Pfeifer said. "Also, I saw my brother, who was a lieutenant in 33,
and we spoke a little bit, and then he went up also." (His brother, Lt. Kevin Pfeifer of Engine
Company 33, was on his way down when the building collapsed. He did not survive.)

Peter Hayden, whose title at the time, deputy chief for Division 1, gave him authority for that
area of Manhattan, joined Chief Pfeifer in the lobby of the north tower. They tried, he said, to
get the building's elevators working. They set up a command board, to keep track of which
companies were on the scene.

"In the initial stages, it wasn't chaotic," Chief Hayden said. "It was under control, very calm."

Saving Lives Comes First

When the second plane hit 2 World Trade Center, the south tower, a second command center
was set up in that lobby. The chiefs had already been discussing the stability of 1 World
Trade Center.

"The potential and the reality of a collapse was discussed early on," Chief Hayden said. "But
we were at a level of commitment. We also received numerous distress calls. We realized we
had a lot of dying and fire up there."

When Mr. Von Essen, and two of his top deputies, William Feehan and Thomas Fitzpatrick,
arrived in the lobby, they discussed the approach.

"I specifically remember telling Commissioner Von Essen that we were not attempting to
extinguish this fire," Chief Hayden said. "We were not trying to put this fire out. We had
thousands of people coming down the stairs, and that was our focus."

Around the time that the second plane hit, a ranking chief, Joseph Callan, had seen enough.

"Approximately 40 minutes after I arrived in the lobby, I made a decision that the building
was no longer safe," Chief Callan said. "And that was based on the conditions in the lobby.
Large pieces of plaster falling, all the 20-foot-high glass panels on the exterior, of the lobby
were breaking. There was obvious movement of the building, and that was the reason I gave
the order for all Fire Department units to leave the north tower."

The communications, though, frustrated the commanders. They were particularly stymied by
the failure of a device called a repeater inside the building that was supposed to boost the
signal.

"At one point after the second plane hit, I think, I'm not positive of the time line, I know
Chief Callan asked over the radio to come down to the lobby," Chief Pfeifer said. "But with
difficulty with communications, that didn't happen. It didn't fully happen. I'm not too sure
who heard that or how many people came down. There was no way of really telling at that

http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=ddb9a93d7d608bd58207d79a26dd5e6e«&docn... 2/20/2004
jearch - 33 Results - "September 11" & "below the impact" Page 4 of 5

point."

That was a problem across the complex that morning, not just in 1 World Trade Center. At 7
World Trade Center, the city's Office of Emergency Management was evacuating based on a^
report that a third_plane had been hijacked. John Peruggia, an Emergency Medical Service
chief assigned"to th^e~OlTiee~of-£rnoFgGftcy- Management, met with officials from other<c-
agencies, including an "engineer-type person," as he put it. (^ *•

"They were very confident that the building's stability was compromised and they felt that^
the north tower was in danger of a near-imminent collapse," Chief Peruggia said., I/
The problem was getting this word to the chief of the Fire Department, Peter Ganci, who had
set up a command post on West Street, across from both towers.

"We didn't have the tools that we normally have to communicate with our agency," Chief
Peruggia said. The cellphones were not working, he added, and radios were spotty. "I don't "<a
have a fire ground radio, so I had no direct communications with my boss at that time."

Instead, he told an emergency medical technician to deliver the message directly to Chief
Ganci, several blocks away. The message reached Chief Ganci about a minute before the
south tower collapsed.

In 1 World Trade Center, Chief Hayden was becoming more disturbed about the flow of
firefighters into the building.

"Early on, we realized that a number of the companies were coming in and were not
reporting to any staging area we established," Chief Hayden said. "So we were losing control
of the companies coming. There was also communication problems later on with companies
coming in, units responding to the second alarm after the other plane hit. They weren't sure
which was World Trade Center 1 and World Trade Center 2. So that became confusing.

"Of course, off-duty members were coming and they were reporting directly upstairs," Chief
Hayden said. "So at one point in time — I want to say that Chief McGovern was still in the
lobby — we had to account for everybody going upstairs. That became a critical issue."

The chiefs called the firefighters down several times, Chief Hayden said. "However, we didn't
get a lot of acknowledgement." , ->

"The last report we had from anybody at all," Chief Hayden said, "was that there were people
heading up around the 48th floor. That was several minutes prior to this collapse. So we had
people as high as the 50th floor while we had communications."

Similar concerns were first raised publicly last week by Deputy Chief Charles Blaich in a
speech at John Jay College of Criminal Justice.

The commanders considered an airborne rescue. "At one point I was asked to get the
operations with the helicopter into motion," Chief Pfeifer said. "Unfortunately, or fortunately,
I could not get ahold of the dispatcher to do that. One of the citywide radios got moved
around and I couldn't grab that, and there were no phone lines."

A Chaplain's Death

Among those in the lobby of 1 World Trade Center was the Rev. Mychal Judge, a Fire
Department chaplain. Although some early reports said that he died while giving last rites,
officers at the scene described him praying in the lobby. When the other tower collapsed, he

http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=ddb9a93d7d608bd58207d79a26dd5e6e«fedocn... 2/20/2004
search - 33 Results - "September 11 " & "below the impact" Page 5 of 5

and others rushed around a corner. During that flight, Father Judge apparently collapsed.

Chief Pfeifer said Father Judge had no obvious injuries that he could see in the gloom. "He
was lying on the ground and I went over to him, took off his collar, I opened up his shirt,
checked for a pulse," Chief Pfeifer said. "I knew at that point he didn't have any."

As the firefighters carried the dead chaplain, another chief, Richard Picciotto, was in a
stairwell of 1 World Trade Center, calling for the firefighters to evacuate. At that point, the
civilians below the impact area had all but finished evacuating.

"So the only people in building tower one are firemen," Chief Picciotto said, in an account he
gave on "The Montel Williams Show," which was included in the oral histories. With no /^t^ yj
response from the command center, he said, he issued an order to evacuate. , A
\M)\ o
As the firefighters descended, Chief Picciotto said, he heard a voice on the radio V* \s
countermanding his order, delaying them for a minute. Before his group reached the bottom,
the building collapsed, trapping them for hours.

Out in the street after leaving 1 World Trade Center, Chief Pfeifer recalled, he did not know $
the first tower had totally failed. -- • --- %
^0
"I knew we had a big collapse but I had no idea," Chief Pfeifer said. "What people saw on TV H
I didn't see, and nobody told me that's what had occurred, and I didn't hear any radio \s of tha

http://www.nytimes.com

GRAPHIC: Photos: Emotions ran high for emergency personnel who responded to the scene
of the terrorist attack. Many firefighters learned that family members could not be
immediately located after the twin towers collapsed. (Krista Niles/The New York Times)(pg.
All); Looking back at the devastation around the World Trade Center on Sept. 11,
firefighters recalled the overall confusion and poor communication. (Angel Franco/The New
YorkTimes)(pg. A10)

LOAD-DATE: January 30, 2002

Source: News & Business > News > US Newspapers and Wires Ijj
Terms: "September 11" & "below the impact" and date(geq (9/11/01) and leq (9/11/04)) (Edit: Search)
View: Full
Date/Time: Friday, February 20, 2004 -11:33 AM EST

About LexjsNexjs | Terms ..andConditions

Copyright © 2004 LexisNexis, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=ddb9a93d7d608bd58207d79a26dd5e6e&docn... 2/20/2004