Did Someone Say "Rights"? Liu Shipei's Concept of Quanli Author(s): Stephen C.

Angle Reviewed work(s): Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 48, No. 4 (Oct., 1998), pp. 623-651 Published by: University of Hawai'i Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1400020 . Accessed: 02/02/2012 12:03
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DID SOMEONE SAY "RIGHTS"? LIU SHIPEI'S CONCEPT OF QUANLI Introduction

StephenC. Angle

As East Asianintellectuals Sketch. encountered and interpreted Western ethicalwritingsin the nineteenth and earlytwentiethcenturies, they wereoftenfacedwithforeign conceptsthatseemedto have no precise in theirown languages. Thesewere conceptsthatmanyof equivalents these intellectuals wantednot only to understand but also to use and to teachto fellow members of theirsocieties.Inorderto talkand write aboutthese conceptsin theirown languages, therefore, they invented newterms to represent the Western ideas. Thesetermswere not createdout of whole cloth.Inthe firstplace, the symbolsusedto expressthe neologisms were not completely new: termswhose meanings had been extendedor they were eitherexisting ornewcompounds formed from twoormore extant characters. redefined, Moreimportantly, since wordsget theirmeanings in partthrough their relations to otherwords,the conceptual contextsin which neologisms what they meantto those who spoke, appeared helpedto determine andreadthem.Inshort, the status of theseterms as wrote,heard, despite translations of we need to allow for the words, putative foreign possibility that some of the neologismsmeant-at particular points in time, for can certainly words meanings change-different thingsthanthe foreign withwhichtheywerecorrelated. InthisessayIwill argue thatone important did neologism, "quanli," in fact meansomething different fromthe termit purports to translate, in the writings of one Chineseintellectual, LiuShipei namely"rights," (1884-1919).Thisdoes not meanthat,as Liuused it, the meaningof has no overlapwith any of the meanings of "rights." I will "quanli" argue,though,thatthese overlapsare in a crucialsense coincidental, since the notionof quanlithatwe see in severalof Liu'smajorworks a growth out of the Confucian rather thanan impotradition, represents sitionuponthattradition.1 Ingeneral,I believethatwe do a better job senseof Chinesenineteenthandearlytwentieth-century making political and ethicaldiscourse if we highlight the degreeto whichthe conout of various strands of nativetradition. Thus PhilosophyEast& West ceptsinvolved developed I believethatit is a mistake simplyto assumethattermslike "quanli," Volume48, Number4 and others meant the same as the Western- October 1998 "ziyou," "pingdeng," terms that Of coursethis period 623-651 language they were used to translate. was both complexand fluid;to a significant degree,discussionand ? 1998 debate involving termslike "quanli" can be understood as a kindof by Universityof overwhatconceptsthe community to Hawai'iPress will, in the end, refer negotiation
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AssistantProfessor in the Philosophy at Department Wesleyan University

with these terms.Westernwords, concepts, theories, and ideologies all play roles in these developing Chinese discourses, but the roles are in many cases limitedto catalyzing change or encouragingtrendsalready underway. I focus on Liu in this essay because his writingsabout quanli offer good examples of these phenomena. I will arguethat quanli, particularly as Liu understoodit, did not representanythingradicallynew to Confucian discourse about ethics and politics. Liudrew on and developed views about the legitimacyof personal interestsand activitiesthat had been discussedby a numberof earlierConfucianthinkers.Evena cursory examinationof Confuciandiscussions of desires and interests,though, would revealwhat a vexed topic this had been ever since the beginning did not of the Song dynasty.Mostanalystsagree that Neo-Confucianism either thinkers Neo-Confucian explicitly major promoteself-abnegation; At the of certaindesiresor interests. or implicitlyendorsedthe fulfillment same time, however, the reduction of desires and opposition to selfthemes in most Neo-Confucianwritings.One way ishness are prominent these issues were is to notice that to see how crucial and controversial while leading Neo-Confucians regularlycriticized people for wanton concern with desires and interests,these Neo-Confucianswere in turn criticized for being overly restrictiveand even self-abnegating.2I will which show that what quanlioffersLiuis a new resourcefor articulating and abilities are interestsand why. legitimate made to introLiuShipei. The decisions that Liuand his contemporaries duce and promotenew terminologymustbe understoodagainsta background of the period's historicaland culturalcontext. These were not pure intellectualsdebating semantics in isolation from the real world. a They were individualsdeeply engaged in tryingto revive or transform Chinathathad, since the middleof the nineteenthcentury,been wracked aggression.The ongoing political by rebellion,civil war, and imperialist crises increasinglyhad led to a sense of deep culturalcrisis:the nations of the West not only had superiorweaponry;they also had new, different, and possiblysuperiorideas as well. Liu'swas a powerfulvoice in the debate over what to make of these Westernideas. Liu was born into a leading Yangzhou scholarly family in 1884.3 In 1902, at the age of eighteen, he obtainedthe juren degree in the civil service examinations. He failed the metropolitanexam in Beijing the followingyear-only two yearsbeforethe exam systemwas abolishedand made his way to Shanghai.There he would live for the next two years, write the texts with which I will be concerned in this essay, and political activities. He fled Shanghaito avoid engage in revolutionary arrestin 1905, returnedhome and was married,then traveledto Japan and in 1907 on the invitationof Zhang Binglin,a leading revolutionary & West East Philosophy 624

editor of the radical flagship People's Journal.For a time Liu became increasinglyradical, publishingand coediting (with his wife, He Zhen) in the foundingof the anarchistjournalTianyee, as well as participating the Institutefor the Study of Socialism. Liu and his fellow anarchists' ideas helped to set the stage for the growthof a Chinese interpretation of Liu himself soon abandoned radical to but Marxism, politics, returning on some of his erstwhilecompanionsin the Chinain 1908 and informing movement. He focused primarily on scholarly pursuitsin revolutionary the following decade, though he did participatein the ill-fatedeffortto make YuanShikaiemperor.He became a professorat BeijingUniversity in 1917, only to die of tuberculosistwo years later. Beyond a certain point, we can only speculate about the passions and personalitiesthat shaped Liu'serraticpublic life.4 Two things help to provide some unity behind his strangejourney from aspiringexamto reactionary: his scholarship,informedby a deep takerto revolutionary of the Chinese knowledge philosophical tradition,and a penetrating, iconoclastic intelligence. Liuhelped to found the NationalEssencejournal in 1905, and for the restof his life remainedcommittedto its mission of keeping Chinese philosophyand culturealive. Priorto his temporaryconversion to anarchism in 1907, Liu authoredfour majorworks. In this essay, I focus on two of them: the 1903 Zhongguo minyue jingyi or Essentialsof the Chinese Social Contract (hereafterEssentials) (LiuShipei 1936a), which Liucoauthoredwith Lin on Xie,5and the 1905 Lunli jiaokeshu,which I will translateas Textbook Ethics(orsimply Textbook) (LiuShipei 1936b). Liu'sothertwo significant pre-1907 worksare the Rangshu (Bookof expulsion)publishedin 1903, and the Lixueziyi tongshi (Generalexplanationsof Neo-Confucianterminology)of 1905. The former,largelyconcerned with promotingethnic nationalism,does not touch on quanli. The latterdoes deal with quanli to some extent, particularlyin Liu's discussion of "righteousness"(yi) (LiuShipei 1936c, pp. 19b, 20b, 21a). However, since the materialon is very similarto the more lengthytreatquanli in GeneralExplanations I will generallycite only the Textbook.6 ment in the Textbook, The Essentialsis a fascinatingselection of and commentaryon ethical and political writingsfrom the whole range of Chinese philosophy. Liu and Lin develop their own views throughcomparisonsof Chinese authorswith Rousseau (as Liu and Lin understandhim). Each section begins with representative quotes fromclassical to early modernsources. Liuand Linthen add extensive commentaries,usuallymuch longerthan the originalquotations.They often make direct comparisonsto passages from Rousseau'sSocial Contract(in Chinese translation), so by reading between the lines one can constructa pictureof Rousseau'sideas, but their main point is to explore the Chinese sources for evidence of concern with the min yue, or social contract. Full treatmentof this text StephenC. Angle

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would take me too farafield;suffice it to say that I do not believe that Liu and Linare anachronistically readingWesternethico-politicaldoctrines back into Chinese history in order to assuage their wounded cultural pride,as some would have it.7 Instead,I would argue,they are engaged in a legitimateexplorationof and reflectionon their traditionfrom the vantage point of concepts like min yue-concepts related to Western notions, but in many cases not identical to them.8 Since my interpretation of Liu's understandingof "quanli" precisely illustratesthis point, I will set this theme aside for the moment. In the Textbook,Liu lays out a much more systematicpresentation of an ethical theory than any we find in earliercenturies. His goal is a complete reworkingof Confucian ethics, and his methods and conclusions merit comparison to the similar objectives of Liang Qichao (1873-1929) in the more popularizedOn the New People of two years earlier.9LikeLiang's"new ethics," Liu'sethical theory is shornof much of the metaphysicalapparatus that accompanied earlierNeo-Confucian ethical teachings, and, like Liang, Liu is to some extent familiarwith Western philosophicaltrendsand concepts. To an even greaterdegree than Liang in On the New People, Liu'sethics is deeply indebted to strands of the Neo-Confucian tradition, and reads like a conscious updatingof the Confucianethical worldview, as we shall begin seeing momentarily.10 A word on Liu'saudience and influence may be in order.The contrast with Liangthat I have just suggested is helpful. Both were concerned with rethinkingConfucianethics in the light of new ideas and new realities.In some of his writings,Liangdid this more in the mode of journalistthan scholar, while Liu was first and foremost a scholar and thinker.Liang'swritingswere thus more accessible and certainlymore widely published. There seems little question, though, that among proa powergressive intellectualsboth in Chinaand Japan,Liurepresented ful intellectualforce. As Hao Chang concludes in his recent study of Liu, "the only person among the revolutionaryintelligentsiato rival Zhang Binglin'sintellectualprestigewas LiuShipei" (Hao Chang 1987, p. 146). This is not to say, of course, that Liu single-handedlyshaped the course of discourse about quanli (or anything else). I have chosen to focus on Liunot so much because of his influencebut because he nicely discourse exemplifiesthe complexitiesof China'semergingquanli/rights at the beginningof the twentiethcentury.We will see that as Liuuses the term, "quanli"refersto one's legitimatepersonal interestsand abilities. Liuarguesthat there is a reciprocalrelationbetween quanli and ethical responsibilities:enjoying one's quanli mobilizes one to act ethically, while the ethical action legitimizesone's having quanli. Understanding East &West that all people have these legitimatepersonalinterestsand abilities,and Philosophy 626

thus sharethe abilityto act ethically, leads to a recognitionof the weight that we all bear. of ethical responsibility and "Quanli."Up to this point I have treatedquanlias if it was "Rights" the single neologism associatedwith a single notion of rights.Infact, the situationwas more complicated in two ways. First,in additionto English, EastAsian intellectualswere readingtexts written in or translatedfrom several other languages;alongside "right,"therefore,we must add the French "droit,"the Dutch "regt,"and the German "recht,"at the very least. In many cases there were small and largedifferencesbetween the legal and philosophicaltraditionsoriginallyexpressed in these different tradilanguages. On top of this, even within a given cultural-linguistic often so differencesover what "rights,""droits," and on tion, there were meant-to say nothing of the many substantivedifferencesover what rightsthere were and who could hold them. Given these many differences,it is impossibleto give one definition of "rights"with which all would agree. Still, for my purposes it will be helpfulto have at least a roughfeel for the Westernconcepts. According to one view, rightssimply are intereststhat are protectedby law. If the law recognizes and protects your interest in a certain parcel of land, for instance, then and only then can you be said to have a right to Thisview, known as "positivism," had influential that property. German, of whom and American were known in East proponents,many English, Asia by Liu'sday.11The main competitorof positivismin the Western traditionis "naturalrights,"a view that developed out of the Christian idea that God had grantedall people powers over certain things, chief among which was one's life. Beginningin the seventeenth century,the idea that we had rights,which "consistethin the libertyto do or to forebear," as Hobbes put it, began to be separablefrom God's will; reason alone, it was argued, could discover what rights we had.12 It was a variantof this idea that ultimatelyled to the notion of rightsmostfamiliar in the modern West, namely that certain interests-life and liberty, among others-are "inalienably"our own, as our "humanrights." A second complication to an examinationof "quanli"discourse in EastAsia is that "quanli"was not the only term used as an equivalent for "rights"and its correlatesin other languages. The firstclear use of for "rights,"and possibly the firsttime a rights "quanli"as a translation concept was rendered into Chinese, came in a translationof Henry Wheaton's 1836 Elementsof International Law,which was done by the W.A.P.Martinand publishedin 1866 as Wangguo Americanmissionary gongfa.13Ina passage on the "Conductof foreignstatestowardsanother nation involved in civil war," to cite one example, Wheaton says that when such foreignstates professneutrality, they must "allow impartially to both belligerent parties the free exercise of those rightswhich war Stephen C. Angle 627

gives to public enemies against each other" (Wheaton [1836] 1878, P 32). In his translation,Martin refers to these rights as "jiao zhan &ttfJI p. 1866, vol. 1, p. 19b). "Quanli"is not the only termused quanli"(Martin as a correlatefor "rights"in Wanguogongfa, though; much more frequently, "quan"alone is used.14Be this as it may, it seems likely that for Wanguogongfawas the originof "quanli" being used as a translation The text was transmitted to Japanthe year afterit was published "rights." (Blacker1969, p. 126), afterwhich we begin to see the corresponding Japaneseterm "kenri"used to stand for "rights"and its synonyms in other European languages.15 The storyof how "quanli"(and its Japaneseand Koreancorrelates) for "rights"is graduallycame to be adopted as the standardtranslation still only partlyunderstood.One early Japanesetranslationcame from TsudaShinichiro's 1862 notes on what he learnedwhile studyingabroad in Holland. His translation for the Dutch "regt"was "honbun,"literally ** one's original part or station (Yanabu1996, pp. 2-3). Some important early Meiji Japanese intellectualswho were interestedin rights-related . ideas used the homophonicterm "kenri" 1ft (Chin:"quanli")in preference to The term with which I am ffi lJ concerned, "kenri"/ "quanli."16 primarily lf IJ "quanli,"does not appear in the list of definitionsfor "right"in Hepburn's1867 English-Japanese dictionary,but it does appearprominently in the revised list of the 1886 third edition of that same work (ibid., pp. 6-8). In China, Yan Fu's influential 1898 translation into Chinese of Huxley's account of social Darwinism, Tianyan lun, uses "quanli"to In a letterYan wrote to LiangQichao several years translate"rights."17 later, however, Yan expressed reservationsabout "quanli"as an adefor "rights," and considereda varietyof alternatives.18 quate translation to "quanli"in his translation of Edward Yan returned By 1904, however, Liu 1994, pp. 20-21). Liang Jenks'A Historyof Politics (Kwang-Ching Qichao himself used only the term "quan"in his firstarticlesthat have been taken to have rights-related themes, for instance the brief 1896 to CheckAbuses."19 "China's Weakness Comes FromTrying titled piece uses "quanli,"though Inhis studyof Rousseaufrom1901, Liangregularly term in its the (_ ft place (Liang1989, 1:6:106). "quanli" occasionally using the time of his manifesto On the New People in 1902, ethico-political By 4flJ Liang found "quanli"to be adequately importantto merit an entire chapter(Liang1989, VI:4:31-40).20 If my goal here were to provide a satisfyinghistoricaland sociological explanationfor the ultimateadoption of "quanli"as the transand so on, I would need to examinethe details lationfor "rights,""regt," each of the uses I have just sketched much more carefully. surrounding In addition,I would need to considerthe roles of relatedbut slightlydifmissionaries East &West ferenttermsand discourses,such as the writingsof Christian Philosophy 628

free will in termsof the "quan"to rule oneself, about issues surrounding the discussions of local self-rule that centered on "minquan(people's quan),"and the doctrineof governmentalseparationinto "threepowers (threequan)"-namely, legislative,executive, and judicial.21 I will not discuss these issues here because my currentaim is simply to suggestthatthe linguisticand conceptual landscapethat Liuinhabited when it came to quanliand relatednotions. was jumbledand fragmented In the years priorto his writingthe texts with which we will be concerned here, therewas consensus neitheron which word should be used to translate "rights" nor on what the various words that were used meant. While this does not mean that we can ignore this context when exploringwhat Liu meant by his uses of "quanli,"it does indicate that we should come to Liu'swritingswith our minds open to the possibility that "quanli"may not simply mean rights. PersonalInterests of quanli is scattered Quanli and Si. Evidence for Liu's understanding his ethical A to throughout writings. good place begin is with the connection that he draws between quanli and a general notion of interest. Lesson Six of Liu's Textbookon Ethicsis devoted to the definitionsof quanliand yiwu-the lattera termused to translate"duty,"aboutwhich I will say more below. Liunotes thatthe Legalist text Han FeiZi (ca. 200 records definitionsfor "personal"("si")and "general"("gong").22 B.C.E.) "Personal," the text says, means to "seek oneself (zi ying)," and "general" means to "turnone's back on the personal (bei si)."23 Liu then connects these ideas to quanli, writingthat "the doctrineof 'seeking oneself' comes close to the Western idea of quanli" (1936b, I, 6b). This is, at least on the surface,a surprising connection for Liuto make. Chinese si almost Throughout history, always has been derided as an obstacle to morality.Mencius,for example, said that one of the types of unfilialbehaviorwas to neglect one's parentsby focusing too narrowly on the personal concern for one's wife (Mencius IVB:30). By linking quanli and si, therefore,it would appear that Liu is either bucking the Confuciantraditionby elevatingthe value of si, or else indirectlybreaking with the high esteem in which the Westerntraditionhas held rights, for which quanli is supposedlya translation. Before exploring this puzzle further,it will be helpful to recall a bit more historythan Liu shares with us. The earliest use of "quanli" occurs in the Confucianclassic Xunzi (ca. 220 B.C.E.). The authorsays that when one has perfectedone's learningand self-cultivation,"quanli cannot move one [to do wrong]."24In his recent translation,Knoblock treats quan and li as two separate, though related, terms; he translates "quanli" as "the exigencies of time and place and considera- StephenC. Angle

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tions of profit"(Xunzi1988, p. 142). Standard Chinese interpretations of this sentence render quanli as "power-and-profit."25 However exactly we understand quanli in the context of Xunzi'sthought,it is clear that(1) it involves referenceto personalprofitor benefit,rather than to any more of and Xunzi believes we notion (2) well-being, general ought not to be In in swayed by it. Xunzi'swritings, fact, quanli plays a role very similar scholar... does not to thatof si: he says thatthe proper"general-minded others out of considerations of personal ends harm to bring by acting considerations that Both and that (si)."26 si, is, representpersonal quanli one ought to ignore. Given that quanliand si have fromthe firstplayed similarroles, Liu's Justfollowing the paslinkingof the two startsto sound less surprising. which I Liu that a says problemwith all tradibegan, though, sage with tional Chinese ethical theories is thatthey neglect quanli(1936b, II,6b). It is clear from this and others of Liu'scomments in the Textbookand in the Essentials that Liubelieves quanli, and implicitlysi as well, to be good things-aspects of our lives that need to be valued. Now Liuis not intellectualto use "si"positively:Liang the only early twentieth-century the was Qichao importanceof "side" (roughly"personal emphasizing virtue")at about the same time that Liu was writing. Liang'sstress on of personal personalvirtue,though, was not intended as an affirmation need for to the commitment a Confucian reflected but rather interests, harethical more as a toward cultivation general step personal ethical of human mony.27 We need to look furtherinto Liu's understanding for viewing quanliand si natureif we are to comprehendhis motivations positively.

Natures.In the Essentials,Liudiscusses the Lectures Our Self-interested on the Four Books by the Confucian official and thinker Li Liuliang (1629-1683). Li believed that the origins of his country'stroubles lay cultivatedminds, and condemned his age as a "utilitarian in improperly world" (LiuShipei 1936a, III,16a). Li wrote that the solution to these problemswas to unify the rulerand the ruled-to insist that the ruler look only to the generalgood and suppressany selfish, personaldesires. Liu'sreactionto all this is twofold. He applauds Lii'scriticismof rulers for following only their personal interests,adding that this idea of the unity of the interestsof rulerand ruled is echoed in Rousseau'sSocial At the same time, however, Liubelieves that Li's proposalthat Contract. rulers(andthe ruled)need to do away with personaldesires-to "eliminate the distinctionbetween general and personal," as Liu puts it-is misguided. "Fromthe firstmoments of life," Liuwrites, "there is not a person but that has thoughtsof seeking their personal interests"(1936a, III,17b). It is impossibleto wipe out this basic featureof human nature. The West East & good news is that we have no need to eliminate personal interests. Philosophy 630

"Ifyou want to controlthe pursuitof personalprofiton the partsof both the people and the prince, there is nothing better than drawing a line between the realmsof general and personal"(ibid., 17b). I will explain below how Liu sees this drawing of lines as helpful, when I discuss "extension." Forthe moment,note that Liumakes a similarpoint when discussing the ancient utopianismof the "LiYun" chapterof the Book of Rites. In the "LiYun,"we are told of a wonderfultime in which the "greatDao" was practiced, leading all in the cosmos to think only of the general good. There were no robbers;no one locked their doors (Liu Shipei 1936a, I, 8b). Liu thinks that while these are beautiful images, the of human motivationupon which they rest is badly misunderstanding taken. He cites Rousseauas maintaining that "havinga mind to seek the good of the masses comes from the concatenation of many people's having minds to benefit themselves" (ibid., 9a).28This is the same idea, Liu continues, as Mencius' claim that the extension of kindness from those close to us-including, at least for Liu, kindnessto ourselves-to those more distantfrom us gives rise to humaneness(ren).29 The problem that Liu has identified with the idealism of Lu and the "LiYun" passage needs to be carefullystated. His point is not that people are motivatedonly by thingsthat directlybenefitthem, but rather that personal interestsare a basic, naturalpart of our motivationalsystems that cannot be ignored. Liu'sresistanceto the idealism of the "Li Yun" chapter springsfrom its failureto validate personal desires as an individual'sfirstconcern. Liucriticizes Mozi's idea of "universallove" for the same reason (1936a, I, 9a). A humane ethical system must be built on the foundation of the actual motivationalsystems of human beings. Liu is well aware that this idea had been developed by Confucians before him. Liu'sremarkabout people having "thoughtsof seeking their personal interests"from the moment they are born echoes the famous firstline of the Mingyidaifanglu of HuangZongxi (1610-1695): "Inthe beginning of human life each man lived for himself (zi si) and looked to his own interests(zi li') (Huang 1985, p. 2; translationfrom Huang tiJn 1993, p. 91). Huang'sattitudetowardpersonalinterestsis actuallysomewhat complex, since-as I will discuss later-he believes that sages must ignorethese considerationsin orderto rulewell. Otherthinkersare still less suspicious of personal desires than Huang. FromChen Liang (1143-1194) in the Song, to Luo Qinshun (1465-1547) and Wang Gen (1483-1540) in the Ming, to Dai Zhen (1723-1777) in the Qing, Confucians had long been stressingthe legitimacyof personalfeelings and desires.30One of my goals in the remainderof this essay will be to highlightthe connection between this strandof the Neo-Confuciantradition and Liu'sview of quanli.31 StephenC. Angle

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an

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Abilities Legitimate A second theme in Liu'sdiscussion of quanli is the positive ethical role that Liuseems to assign to quanli when he says, for instance, that (1472-1529) notionof "purequanli is essentiallylike Wang Yangming's knowing" ("liangzhi").32In the Textbook,in the course of praising Wang's notion of pure-knowingfor the way in which it "forces the manifestation of all the people's committedspirit(zhiqi)"(ibid.,24b), Liu writes:
Chinese people all believe that sagehood is something impartedby the cosmos (tian),not somethingthat one can stand up and grab for. Since the doctrine of pure-knowingwas first proposed, [though,they] have believed that the pure-knowing of everyone is the same, and that that which a person receivesfromthe cosmos is alwaysthe same. Thatwhich people receive from the cosmos is that referred to in "Yaoand Shun are the same as all people." Thus lowly and poor people can look within and seek to enter the Way.... The Westerner Rousseau invented the doctrine of "cosmically endowed people's quan,"accordingto which goodness is the root natureof all people. [He] hopes that all people will willingly desire the general [good] and all things will returnto equality (pingdeng).AlthoughWang Yangmingdid not and that say [precisely] this, in practice the doctrine of "pure-knowing" of "cosmicallyendowed people's quan" are mutuallythe same. Thatwhich people receivefromthe cosmos is the same, and thusthatwhich [their] quanli attainsought to be withoutany differentiation. (1936b, I, 25a)

Liu makes some very similar points during his discussion of Wang in the Essentials.He says that Wang's pure-knowingdoctrine originates in Mencius' teaching that human nature is good, and that Rousseau similarlybelieved human natureto be good in Mencius'sense. There is indeed at least a surface similaritybetween Rousseauand Mencius on this point. The difficulty,of course, is readingpure-knowinginto Rousseau. Liu attemptsto do this by emphasizingthat pure-knowingis the same for everyone, regardlessof intelligence, position, and so on. Similarly, says Liu, Rousseau stresses that in the state of nature, everyone has an equal quan of self-determination for A1# (ziyouquan,Liu'stranslation (Rousseau1987, 1.2, p. 142). Afterthe social contract "rightto liberty") has been established,the law makesno distinctionsbased on intelligence or power. Thus, Liuconcludes, Wang and Rousseau"emergefrom the same track"(1936a, III,3a). Since my purposehere is not to compareWang and Rousseau,I will not pursue Liu'ssuggestionsalong these lines. The importanceI see in the passages I have just been citing is ratherin the ways that they shed light on what Liu means by "quanli."In both passages Liuemphasizes that since we all have the capacity for pure-knowing,according to Wang, we all can thereforeact morally.There is no division into people East &West good frombirthand people bad frombirth;even "lowly and poor people Philosophy 632

directsthem to do, "and can look within," see what their pure-knowing seek to enter the Way." In identifyingthis with "cosmically endowed people's quan,"Liuseems to be sayingthatour quanliare our abilitiesto act morally. is particularly The last sentence I quoted from Liu'sTextbook important in this regard.Since our moralpotentials,our moralabilities,are all the same, "thusthat which [our]quanli attainsought to be without any I mentioned above that there are two differentinterdifferentiation." that analystshave used to gloss "quan"when it contemporary pretations appearstogetherwith "li" in the Xunzi:"exigencies of time and place" and "power."Inthe contextof Liu'sdiscussionof "thatwhich [our]quanli attains,"the stressseems to be on the "power"or "ability"meaning of We all have the power to achieve Mt) quan, as in "power" ("quanli").33 morallyworthy ends. We all have the abilityto contributepositivelyto the moralbetterment of our societies. This fact about our moral capabilities has two complementary implications. First,it suggests a rejection of any paternalisticdivision between moral superiors and moral inferiors,the former guiding the latter.Whateverwe ultimatelyconclude about the relationbetween Liu and "Confucianism," we can see that he had no sympathyfor the strand of that traditionexemplified by Confucius'claim that "the people can be made to follow [our path], but cannot be made to understandit" (AnalectsVIII:8). Second, it makes clear that Liuwill tolerateno excuses for failureto be politicallyand morallyinvolved in the futureof Chinese (and human, for that matter) society. Ifwhat one person'squanli is able to attainis less than another's, Liu is saying, the fault may very well lie in the agent's lack of effort.He concludes this section of the Essentials by summarizing these twin benefits of both Wang's advocacy of "pure-knowing"and Rousseau's notion of quanli: "this doctrine of pure-knowingnot only acceleratesthe manifestation of an active spiritby the benightedmasses, but also is enough to accelerate [the appearance of] the common people's disposition to compete for quanli" (1936b, I, 25b). The syndrome that Liu hopes will be sparked by doctrines like Wang's and Rousseau'shas two halves: people come to realize that they have legitimate interestsand strive to fulfill them, while at the same time recognizing that with these interests come responsibilities.People's active energies need to be both arousedand harnessed. Extension Extensionof Oneself. Liu certainlycares about more than just our personal interests.Ifwe turnto his comments on the Analects,for instance, we will begin to see the connection he draws between personal and Stephen C. Angle

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general concerns.34He stressesthe reciprocalnatureof the relationships discussed by Confucius and uses this to explicate the distinctiveconthe way ception of the "general"that he finds in the Analects."Although of the Confucianslies in valuingthe general,"Liuwrites,"the essence of valuingthe general lies in doing-one's-best-for-others (zhong)and usingoneself-as-a-measure(shu)" (1936a, I, 11b).35 Liu then cites several passages from the Analects, all of which insist that to cultivate oneself and to reach one's own goals, one has to help othersdo the same. Liuis drawingon what Westernanalysts have come to call the "social conWe are more ception of the self" that lies at the heartof Confucianism. than atomistic individuals:we are partlyconstitutedby, and our wellbeing is dependent upon, our relationshipswith others.36We have to extend what we care about, therefore,to include others. Liu believes that reflectionon our own lives, selves, and interests should make evident to us how important quanli is to our self-worthand to our abilityto play positive roles in our largercommunity.If we take ourselvesas models forthe otherswith whom we interact, we will recognize that the same kindsof personalinterestthat are important to us will be important to them. Extending our care to others, therefore,involves doing our best to see that they attain the same sorts of personal satisfactions as we do. This is surelya familiaridea to any parent(or spouse or sibling).Partof what makes our lives go well is for our children's(or spouse's or sibling's) lives to go well-for them to attain the kinds of quanli that we value. Liu'spoint, in other words, is that Confuciusdid not advocate valuing the general at the expense of the personal, but insteadtaughtthat the general would grow out of the personal. Quanli seems to representpreciselythe kind of personalbenefitfromwhich an ethical system mustbegin. Limits to Extension. Extension is not the only metaphor that Liuuses when talkingabout the need to heed others'interestsas well as one's own. He also talks of limitation.He writes, for instance, that "self-determination EL (ziyou)of ideology; self-determination of action; these are definitelyan individual'squanli. Self-determination is what Zhuangzi meant by 'let it be, leave it alone'.37But self-determination cannot be without limits. Thus Chinese ancients always talked of humaneness (ren) and right teousness (yi) together"(1936b, I, 27b). Liu subsequentlydefines yi as ^ "affairsattaining appropriateness,"and connects this to "restraining one's self-determination" so thatone does not "loweranother'swelfare" adds he that "that which makes yi a virtue is its (ibid., p. 28a). Later, to an limit individual's self-determination and make it not invade [ability] another'sself-determination" (ibid., p. 28b). Inthe Textbook, Liuwritesthat "Allactions in which one fails to useEast & West oneself-as-a-model are instancesof going beyond the limitsof one's (shu) Philosophy 634

legitimatepersonal interestsand abilities (quan xianY'(1936b, II, 31b). This sort of transgression can come about in either of two ways: (1) we "invade others' quan by doing thingsthat negate properdistinctions"or (2) we "invadeothers'ii by coveting improper goods" (ibid.).Notice that Liuhas analyzed quanli into two spherescorresponding to the two terms out of which it is compounded. Quan seems here to referto the abstract side of one's interests: the "space" in which one expects to be able to the realm over which one expects to have control. Li, on the operate, other hand, comprisesmore materialbenefitsand interests. On the surface, all this talk of limitingand restraining might sound to the of extension that we diametrically opposed image just examined. Where the previous metaphorencourages us to expand our concerns and even to impose our values on the world around us, this new metaphor speaks of holding ourselves back, of not invading the ability of anotherpersonto determinehis or her own way. The key to seeing that the two images are not-at least in Liu's eyes-in tension, but are actually complementary,lies in Liu'svery traditional definition of yi: "affairsattainingappropriateness." Expansion and restraint need not be in conflict. The basic idea is quite intuitive: we want people to care for others, to try to do for others what they (the carers)think right-but only to a point. In some relationships,we normallywelcome a good deal of expansive caring:we accept quite a bit of shapingand guidance fromour parents,for instance. Evenhere, though, there are limitswhich, if transgressed, make us feel "invaded."In other of we be more types relationships may likelyto feel our elder sibling's(or our spouse's) caring as invasive, depending on how stronglyshe or he triesto persuadeus to value things in her or his way. Still, there are obvious problems. Where does one draw the line between extendingoneself to care for othersand restraining oneself from them? How does one know how much is invading caring appropriate? Liu'sanswer to these questions draws on a centraltheme of Confucian thoughtthat he sees echoed and confirmedin the writingsof Rousseau. Thereis a patternof human interrelationship, Liubelieves, that makesfor a harmonious,happy society of self-motivatedpeople. Confuciansreferred to this patternas li; Rousseaucalled it the generalwill. In both cases S there is assumedto be a way that, given (or despite)the actual naturesof people, society can work. It is particularly that Liudoes not make the identification interesting between li and general will in the context of discussingthe thinkersbest known for advocating li, like the Song dynasty philosophersCheng Yi (1033-1107) and Zhu Xi (1130-1200), but insteaddrawson the writings of the Ming dynasty official Lu Kun (1536-1618). Li's biographer, Joanna Handlin, describes Lu as pessimistically "capitulatingto the 'selfishnessthat naturally C. Angle accompanies humandesires,"' and: Stephen

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his fellow officialsof theirresponsibility "to see thatthe thingsof remind[ing] the world attaintheirdue." "Ifthe ignorantmen and women ... do not fulfill their allotted desires," Lu elsewhere warned, "the world will not be peaceful." Awarethat "those who do not have enough will die chasing aftertheir shares," Lu called for a balanced and equitable distributionof goods. (Handlin1983, p. 134)

What is most importanthere for our purposes is not Lu's pessimism but his recognition-however reluctant-of the importanceof affirming on Luthe feeling that here people's desires.We can see in Liu'sremarks Liuhas found somethingof a kindredspirit,especially in the linkthat Lu suggestsbetween li and shi, which means force, power, or effectiveness. As Liureadshim, Luarguesthat reliable,effective politicalaction comes fromheedingthe properpatterns of humanrole-responsibilities (the /i)which very much include the legitimatedesires, interests,and sphere of activityof the common people (LiuShipei 1936a, III,1b).38 This way of understandingthe relation between extension and restraint-that there is an ideal patternof activitiesaccordingto which and extensionwill be in harmonywith one another-also brings restraint us back to Wang Yangming'snotion of pure-knowing.Our faculty of pure-knowing, accordingto Wang, is precisely our means for determinour ing properplace in the overall patternof human, and even cosmic, activities. Liu's invocation of pure-knowingas support for his undertherefore,providesfurther standingof our quanliand our responsibilities, evidence that Liuhas just this image of an ideal patternin mind. Quanli and Responsibility Rulers.The relation between one's quanli and one's ability to play a positive role in the communityis a theme on which Liuplaces considerable importance.There is a reciprocalrelation,he believes, between one's quanliand one's ethical responsibilities (yiwu).This is most clearly in his discussionof rulers."Ancientsages," he writes, illustrated
spoke vigorouslyabout the difficultyof being a ruler(jun).Since the people were to be given leisure and joy while the ruler assumed all worries and effort,thus humans' naturaldesires (ren qing) are such that no one would want to occupy the ruler'sposition.Therefore, since the rulers(junzhu)have ethical responsibilities that they are supposed to carryout, they [mustalso] have quanlithatthey are supposedto enjoy. (1936a, III,p. 21 b)

Rulersmeritthe quanli they receive because of the responsibilities they assume.Conversely-and perhapsmoreimportantly-they are motivated that come with the responsibilities by this quanlito take on and perform is that Liu does not see quanli as It to ruling. important realize, though, their roles well. His simply a rewardor incentive for rulers'performing &West point is ratherthat while the role of ruler is a difficultone, it is at the East Philosophy

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same time very fulfilling.Quanli is analyticallydistinctfrom its matching yiwu, but in realitythey come together,a package deal. In anothersection of the Essentials, Liuquotes a famous saying of Wang Fuzhi(16191692), a Qing-dynastyConfucian, which Liu feels expresses the relaand reward:"Cosmicpattern(tianli) is in tionshipbetween responsibility the midstof people's desires"(1936a, III,20b). Liuapprovesof this sentiment for reasons similarto those for which he cited Lu Kun.Wang is resistingthe tendency of many Confuciansto be suspicious of people's desires (yu), and instead recognizes the intimate relationshipbetween the fulfillment of such desiresand the exercisingof moralresponsibilities. there has been a long paradeof unscrupulousrulers Unfortunately, in China'shistorywho have taken advantageof the power thatthey have been granted as rulers to attempt to enjoy much more benefit than their usually meagerperformance of their responsibilities has warranted. Liu calls this "the strongtransforming their power (quanli)into quanli" Mt tI'J 20b). Liu says that he has the Chinese "ThreeBonds" doc(1936a, 111, trine in mind as a specific instance of this evil, since the Three Bonds change what had been reciprocalrelationsinto a one-way relation(ibid., 21 a).39Insteadof balancingthe loyaltysubjectsowed theirrulerwith the the rulerowed his or her subjects,for instance,the Three responsibilities Bonds speak only of the subjects' loyalty. The Three Bonds attemptto make legitimate, by re-characterizingas quanli, the unearned and unmeritedbenefitdemanded by irresponsible rulers. Liu'scriticismof the Three Bonds echoes similarcharges leveled a few years earlierby his contemporary Tan Sitong (1864-1898). A comof Liu's views on rulers with those of Huang Zongxi, on parison proper the other hand, brings out an interestingcontrast. Liu-like Tan and other membersof both the reformand revolutionary camps-approved of Huang's trenchantcriticismsof illegitimaterulers. Huang's description of the attitude that ancient rulers had toward personal benefit, and thus of the attitudeall proper rulersshould have, however, ran as follows: no one promoted the general Thensomeonecameforth benefit.] [Originally who did notthink of benefit in terms of hisown benefit butsought to benefit and who did not thinkin termsof harmto himself, but all-under-Heaven, to spareall-under-Heaven fromharm. Thushis labors werethousands sought of timesgreater thanthe labors of ordinary men.Nowto worka thousand or ten thousand timesharder withoutbenefitting oneselfis certainly not what mostpeoplein the worlddesire.(Huang fromHuang 1985, p. 2; translation
1993, p. 91)

Huang, in short,makesthe properrulerout to be a kindof psychological oddity: someone who doesn't care about his own benefit. As we saw C. Angle above, in contrast,Liubelieves that for rulers,as for all people, respon- Stephen

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sibilitiesand quanligo hand in hand. Liu'sclaim thatgood rulersare not motivated in fundamentallydifferentways from the rest of us is more consistent with a classic Confuciantheme than Huang's suggestion of basic difference:Mencius taughtthat the sages Yao and Shun were just like oneself (MenciusIVB:32). Liuis also echoing the views of Dai Zhen, whom I mentionedabove thatstresses of the strandof Neo-Confucianism as a centralrepresentative the legitimacyof personaldesires.Justpriorto his comments about the ThreeBonds,Liucites severalpassagesfromDai's Evidential Studyof the Meaningsof the Termsin the Mencius. Dai advocates recognizingthat everyone has similarwants and desires, and that each allows his own to be manifestedonly to the degree that it is compatiblewith similarmanifestationon the partsof others. Dai complains that modern rulerslook of pattern(li)-by which he means followdown on real manifestations of the people-while usingtalk of "pattern" the desires and fulfilling ing of to justifyall manner repression(LiuShipei 1936a, III,20b). Another way that Liu explains the difference between the quanli properfor a rulerand the so-called quanlithat most rulershave claimed between two kindsof tax, the fu and for themselves is by distinguishing J the gong. The fu, he says, is intendedfor the use of the state: it is one A way that the people contributeto the general well-being. The gong, on the other hand, goes to the ruler as "quanlithat he ought to enjoy" (1936a, III,p. 22a). This differencestems from the fact that "the ruler's quanli is differentfromthe general quanli" (ibid., 21 b). The ruler'sown as Liu quanli is that which he meritsas a resultof the role he performs; This is reward" out of mutual "the tax arises puts (ibid.).40 *Hi it, pregong cisely analogous to the way any individualhas legitimatequanli, based in society-which I will expand on in on the role that he or she performs a moment. Problemsarise when rulers ignore the distinctionbetween fu and gong and take all taxes to be their personal quanli. This is like viewing the empire as the personalpropertyof their family,which, Liuexplains, Chinese sages fromthe very beginningdid not intend.This is, in fact, a complaint that had been lodged against rulers long before Liu, most prominentlyby Huang Zongxi in the early Qing (Huang 1985, vol. 1, pp. 1, 6). Once again we see a way in which Liu can be viewed as inheritingand extending-even while revising-elements of the Confucian tradition. I have already noted that Liu approves of Wang Fuzhi's view of the relation between human desires and the cosmic pattern.Liu adds, though, that Wang is too sanguine about the likelihoodof rulers'being able to resist the temptationto legitimize undeserved benefits. Wang simply stressesthat rulersshould follow the feelings of the people-and for rulersas encoded in in so doing, follow the proper responsibilities East & West Philosophy 638

cosmic pattern.He ignoresthe legitimatepersonalspheresof the people, which include the fundamental "ability of self-determination(ziyou quan)" (1936a, III,12a). Generalizationto the Masses. Wang's problem, in short, is that he does not take the masses (min)seriouslyenough as people (ren).Liubelieves that rulers'being entitledto the gong tax as partof their quanli is only a special case of the situationinto which all people are born:we all have abilities that, when developed, provide satisfaction-that is, quanliand simultaneouslycontributeto the general good. It is by developing and exercising these capacities that we use our ability of self-determination.CitingRousseauas his source, Liuassertsthat "thosewho give up theirabilityof self-determination give up thatwhich makesthem people" For a ruler to 12a). (1936a, 111, impose roles on people, or to deny them their quanli, is to fail to treatthem as people. As I have just indicated,though,the abilityof self-determination that we all have bringswith it important Rulers, therefore,are responsibilities. not the only people responsiblefor the plight of society that Liu sees in his day: most individualshave failed to exercise their abilitiesso that they, too, may not meritwhatever quanlithey have managedto obtain. Liuexplains:

AI

all havetheability to choosetheir ownwork(zhiye).41 Let each Vt People (quan) see where his or her nature made him or Choose [has her]complete. person arestrong as thaton whichto relyto order [anarea]inwhichhisorhertalents hisorherlife(zhisheng). all peoplecanorder theirlives,thenno one [When] willagainneedto depend what on others allwillbe "self-standing givethem; cannotbe invaded people"(zilizhi min).... Thuspeople'sproperty by the Thusself-choice of workis a responsibility thatall individuals government. shouldcarry of the quanli thatall out,andat the sametimeis thefoundation individuals enjoy.(1936b,I, 39a) The idea is once again that built into our abilities,feelings, desires, and motivationalsystems-in a word, our natures-is a pathfor us to follow, a properway for us to fit into the largersocietal pattern. Conclusion The perspective that allows us to make sense of all that Liu says about quanli is this: by adding "quanli"to his vocabulary,Liuwas able to stress the importanceof affirmingboth individualinterestsand abilities, and the satisfactionsgained by exercising responsibilities,more easily than he could have without the concept of quanli. The idea that individualshave legitimateinterestsis not at all new to Confucianism; indeed, as I have noted, this is a prominenttheme in a strandof Confucian writingswith which Liu quite consciously identified. Be this as it may, though, the unsavoryconnotationsof "personal"and of "desire" Stephen C. Angle

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made affirmingpeoples' legitimate interestsa difficult topic for Conwiththe possibility of misinterpretation. "Quanli" fucians,andone fraught gives Liunew resourcesfor dealing with this problem. IfLiu's"quanli"means ethically legitimateinterests and abilities,as I from"rights." There have argued,it is naturalto ask how this is different is much of interestand real contemporaryimportanceto be said in response to this kindof question,butthe logic of my argumentin this essay pushes me towarda somewhatdifferentissue. My theme has been to see Liu'sdiscussion of "quanli"as grounded in Confuciandiscourse rather than in one or anotherWesterndiscussion of "rights,"so I suggest we for as a translation ask insteadwhat is gained by avoiding using "rights" are those that our Liu's of uses (at least) things "quanli"-even though legitimate interestsand abilities, like the ability to determineour own work, sound a lot like thingsotherswould call rights. I believe several things are gained. First,we move toward a richer and more accurate picture of the changing culturallandscape in early China. It is a platitudethat this period involves both twentieth-century and change. Many of the most significantcontinuities and continuity are changes masked,however,if we simplytake neologismslike "quanli" at face value. Change then comes to be equated with Westernization, As I have presentedit, in and continuitywith rejectionof Westernization. of Liu's discussion contrast, "quanli"representsa change within conA second benefitof avoidingthe temptationto translate"quanli"as "rights"is the reminderthat the concepts used in differentculturescan differencesare obscured, Cross-cultural be, and often are, quite different. and cross-cultural consequentlyobstructed,when we too understanding that are assume talkingabout the same thingswe are. Only they quickly when we are cognizant of the possibilityof differencecan we ask questions about the relations between our concepts. The third benefit of then, is that resistingan equation between Liu's "quanli"and "rights," and possiblygenuine political genuine dialogue, genuine understanding, and ethical consensus can result. By recognizing our differences, we can-insofar as we are motivatedto do so-work to overcome them. a radiMy contention, in sum, is that Liu'squanlidoes not represent cal breakwith the Confuciantradition.Liushareswith other Confucian thatwhen writers,with LiangQichao, and with Rousseauthe assumption properly understood, individual and group interestscoincide.42 Conthe kinds of fucians have always believed that correctlyunderstanding creaturesthat we are and the kind of cosmos that we inhabit leads us to see that there is a single patternof interactionsbetween things in for all. Thereis room in the cosmos thatresultsin harmonious flourishing this picturefor differencesbetween the patternof my behaviorand the West East & Philosophy patternof your behavior,so long as they fit togetherto complementthe 640

to Westernization. unrelated thatis largely tinuity

Thus my naturemight have made overall patternof human interactions. me fit to teach college students,while someone else's might have preor a public servant. pared him or her be an entrepreneur Liu'sassertionthatpeople may have to follow different pathsin order to realizetheirnatureshas some Confucianprecedent.Menciushad long before arguedthat a division between those who laborwith their minds and those who labor with their strengthwas both acceptable and even His focus on the responsibility of individuals necessary (MenciusIIIA.5). to stand for sound un-Confucian. L themselves, though, may (jishen) up Mencius puts very little ethical responsibilityon the shoulders of the masses (min):he says that if rulersfail to providefor the masses and then punish them when they act wrongly, the rulers have "trapped"the masses (MenciusIA.7).De Bary'srecent The Trouble with Confucianism stressesthis point, arguingthat one of Confucianism's greatweaknesses was its confining of ethical responsibilityto a moral elite.43 Without thatevery Confucianagreedthatethical responsibility was solely insisting a noble man's burden, can we nonetheless conclude that Liu diverged here fromthe Confucianmainstream? In the years immediatelyafter writingthe Essentialsand the Textbook, Liuturnedtowardincreasinglyradicalegalitarian views, becoming one of the leading spokespersonsfor anarchistideology among the Chinese intellectualsin Tokyo.Thoughit is beyond the scope of the current essay to demonstrate,Liudid have a greatdeal more faith in and empathetic connection to the people thandid his contemporary LiangQichao. I make the comparisonwith Liangbecause much of what Liangwrote about quanli sounds very like Liu(Angle 1996). To a greaterextent than was the case with Liu, though, Liang'sconcerns remainwith the individual moralhero, the enlightened"noble man" ("junzi") who can lead others (Angle 1994, chaps. 3, 5). At the time that he wrote the texts with which I have been concerned here, Liuhad not yet completely rejected hierarchy,as can be seen in part by his continued assumptionthat the sovereign of the state would be an individual ruler. His views were evolving;he was, afterall, only twenty-oneyearsold when he completed the Textbook.It is at least fair to say that he identifiedwith a strandof Confucianismthat itself had mounted significantcritiquesof an overly rigidhierarchy,and that in his early writingson quanliwe can see some hintsof a move beyond Confucianelitism altogether.

NOTES

Earlier versions of this essay were presented as papers at the Seventh East-West Conferenceand at the ColumbiaRegionalSemi- Stephen C. Angle Philosophers'

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nar on Neo-Confucianism.I benefitedfrom comments received at each forum. My thanks also go out to BryanVan Norden and P. J. Ivanhoe, who read and commented insightfully on this essay, and most especially to PeterZarrow,who followed this materialthroughseveral draftsand whose suggestionshave helped enormously. 1 - I distinguishbetween words and concepts by settingoff the former, but not the latter,with quotationmarks.Inthe firsttwo sentences of the paragraphin which this note appears, for instance, I referto the word "quanli";in the thirdsentence, I referto the concept of because one of the questions quanli. This distinctionis important, I am asking here is whether "quanli"and "rights"-two different words-refer to the same concept. 2 - Two secondaryworksthat begin to explore these issues are Munro 1988 and Chan 1989. 3 - This summaryof Liu'slife is drawnfrom Hao Chang 1987, Zarrow 1990, Bernal1976, and Onogawa 1967. 4 - Zarrow1990, p. 35, canvassesa few possible explanationsfor Liu's of the revolutionaries. repudiation educator and propagandist. MartinBernal 5 - Linwas a revolutionary concludes that Liu was the major author of this joint work since Liu'sname appearedfirst,despitethe fact that Linwas older (Bernal 1976, p. 92). While this is far from definitiveevidence, the overbetween the views expressedin the Essentials whelmingsimilarities and in the Textbook rendermoot the questionsof whose views are dominantin the Essentials.I will generally use it, therefore,simply as anothersource for Liu'sideas. 6 - See Hao Chang 1987, pp. 150-156, for a discussionof the General Explanations. 7- I have Joseph Levenson in mind here; see, among other things, Levenson1967, p. 4. 8 - See also Hao Chang'sexcellent analysisof this text, in Hao Chang 1987. 9 - On Liang's"new ethics" in On the New People, see Angle 1994, chap. 3. is morescholarly of EthicalEducation WN& 10 - Liang's1905 work TheMirror than On the New People, and bears strikingsimilaritiesto Liu's Textbook. &West East Philosophy 642 11 -Chief among these was Rudolfvon Jhering(1818-1892), whose Strugglefor LawgreatlyinfluencedLiangQichao. See Angle 1996.

See also Minear 1970, which discusses the influence of another German positivist, Paul Laband, on the Japanese legal scholar Hozumi Yatsuka(1860-1912). 12 - Hobbes [1651] 1968, pt. 1, chap. 14. On the development of the naturalrightstradition,see Tuck 1979. 13 - Hsu 1983, p. 274; Spence 1990, p. 201. Martinbegan the translation in 1862 and presented it to the Qing government'sZongli Yamenin 1864, whereupon it was revisedand publishedtwo years later. 14 - Nor does "quan"always mean "rights"; see, for example, Martin 1866, vol. 1, pp. 1b and 19b, where it is used to translate "authority." 15 -See Chang Chia-Ning 1991 for extensive discussion of the text. Chang notes that it was translatedinto Japanesein 1871. There is a was firstcoined in Japan. widespread belief that "quanli"/"kenri" for claims that it was "coined by a JapaGeorge Sansom, instance, nese scholarwho had been sent to the University of Leidento study law" (Sansom [1949] 1973, p. 446). Sansom is referring to Nishi Nishi's Thomas Amane; Havens, recEnglish-language biographer, was in fact introducedinto Japanby ognizes that the term "kenri" MitsukuriRinsho, based on a previous Chinese use of the term, in 1869 (Havens 1970, p. 65 and n. 60). In her study of Fukuzawa Yukichi, Carmen Blackeralso discusses Mitsukuri's borrowingof "kenri"from Wanguogongfa(Blacker1969, p. 105). Havensargues that Nishi independentlyintroducedthe notion of rightsinto Japanese, renderingit as "quan,"in 1867. Thisuse, too, may have been influencedby Wanguogongfa, but it is difficultto be certain. 16 - See, for example, NishimuraShigeki's 1875 "An Explanationof 'Right',"translatedin Braisted1976, pp. 510-513. See also the discussion in Yanabu1996, Suzuki 1996, and Tucker1996. 17 - Yan 1986, vol. 5, p. 1396, published in 1898 though available in manuscriptform as early as 1895. The crucial sentence is cited in Kwang-Ching Liu 1994, pp. 15-16. "Rights"is used in the correspondingpassage in Huxley'soriginal.In the context of Yan Fu's translation,though, it is far from obvious that he means anything more by "quanli"than power and profit-which is the ancient meaning of the term, as I discuss below. Suzuki thereforedenies that this is an instance of "quanli"meaning "rights";see Suzuki 1996, p. 50. 18 - This letteris cited in Kwang-Ching Liu1994. C. Angle Stephen 643

19 - Liang 1989, 1:1:96-99. See Nathan 1985, pp. 50-51, for translationof "quan"as "rights." 20 - I deal with Liang'suses of rights-related terminology,and especially with the ideas he expresses in the 1902 essay "On Quanli Consciousness," in Angle 1996. 21 - On the missionaries'use of "quan,"see Kwang-Ching Liu 1994. Mizoguchi1991 containsa splendiddiscussionof the manyaspects of the minquan discourse; Kwang-ChingLiu 1994 discusses the views of two turn-of-the-century intellectualswho developed the minquantradition,He Qi and Hu Liyuan(pp. 17-20), on whom see also Xu Zhengxiong1981. Forthe developmentof ideas about and termsfor the "threepowers" in both Japanand China, see Suzuki 1996. 22 - The terms "si"and "gong"are morecommonly renderedin English as "private"and "public,"respectively.One reasonfor dissatisfaction with these conventional translationsis that "private"implies "hidden," while si does not. Confucian writers have long made clear that personalfeelings are public, since they are open to and exert influence upon others.See, for example, MenciusVIIA.21. 23 - Liu Shipei 1936b, I, 6b. In most versions of the Han Fei Zi, the definition for "personal" that Liu is quoting reads "revolving I~ ~around self" ("zi huan") ratherthan "seeking self" (ZhouZhongling) et al., eds. [Beijing:China Bookstore Press, 1982, 49:10, p. 857]). The early dictionaryShuo wen jie zi cites this same Han Fei Zi passage but, like Liu, has "seeking"ratherthan "revolving" (Xu Shen 1981, p. 321). The differencebetween the two terms is slight; one modern version of the Han Fei Zi suggests that they mean the same thing (Han Fei Zi 1982, p. 42 n. 17). Anothersimilarity is brought out when one considers that another meaning of ying is "encampment":both ying and huan have to do with boundaries. "Personal"thus means separatingthe self off from wider, more general concerns. I am indebtedto Donald Munrofor a discussionof this point. 24 - Xunzi Index (Shanghai: Shanghai Ancient Books Press 1986, 3/1/49; see also 47/12/76). 25 - Forexample, Li 1979, p. 20; EncyclopedicDictionaryof the Chinese Language(Taibei:Chinese CulturalUniversity,1973, vol. 5, p. 525). 26- Xunzi Index 1986, 8/3/41; adapted from John Knoblock'stransPhilosophyEast& West lation of Xunzi (Xunzi 1988, p. 179).

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27-See Liang 1989, VI:4, and Angle 1994, chap. 3, and compare : "Acting humanely must come from Confucius in Analects XII:1 the self." 28 - Liucites this idea as coming frombk. 3, chap. 3 of the Social Contract.While Liuis usuallyquite reliablein his citationsof Rousseau, this one is somewhat mysterioussince the chapter in question is wholly concerned with differentkinds of governments.The sentiment Liu expresses here is not at all foreign to Rousseau'swork, though;in bk. 2, chap. 4, Rousseauwritesthat "Thisprovesthatthe quality of right and the notion of justice it produces are derived from the preferenceeach person gives himself, and thus from the natureof man" (Rousseau1987, p. 157). 29 - See, for example, Mencius IA:7. I expand on this theme below. 30 - On Chen, see Tillman 1982 and especially Tillman 1994. Luo's see Luo 1987. Wang majorwork has been translatedinto English; Gen is discussed in De Bary 1970. Two of Dai Zhen's important see Dai Zhen: Inquiry into works have been translatedinto English; goodness, trans. Chung-yingCheng (Honolulu: East-WestCenter in Wordsand Press, 1971) and TaiChen on Mencius: Explorations and Mansfield Freeman trans. Chin (New Ann-ping Meaning, Haven:Yale UniversityPress,1990). 31 - See also Hao Chang 1987 for further aspects of Liu'sconnection to the traditionexemplifiedby Dai Zhen. 32 - Pure-knowingis the inborn faculty we all have, to know what is good and what is bad. The term "liangzhi"is mentionedbrieflyby Mencius, but Wang Yangming makes the notion central to his ethical and psychologicalwritings.See MenciusVIIA.15and Wang I follow 1963, passim. Intranslating "liangzhi"as "pure-knowing," Ivanhoe 1990. 33 - A number of authors have recently suggested that the fact that "quan"can mean "exigency" is relevantto its being chosen as a partial translationfor "rights."Ames and De Bary suggest that Tucker this connection shows why "quanli"was a bad translation; argues ingeniously, on the other hand, that the connection might explain why "quanli"was an appropriatetranslation.See Ames 1988, De Bary 1988, and Tucker 1996. My reaction to both of these kinds of argumentis that while there can be no doubt that "quan" can have the meaning that they are highlighting,I have seen no evidence thatanyone discussing "quanli"in the nineteenth C. Angle or twentieth centuries ever had this in mind. I suspect, therefore, Stephen

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are irrelethatwhatevertheirphilosophicalmerits,these arguments vant to the historicalsituation. 34 - In a separate article published in 1907, Liu argues that we have a psychological disposition to help others, which he calls our "benefit-others-mind" ("li tuo xin") (LiuShipei 1907, p. 6). Since a detailed examination of Liu's conception of moral psychology is beyond the scope of the presentessay, for the time being I mustset aside any explorationof the relationbetween this "benefit-othersmind" and elements of Liu's view of ethics that I have already discussed. 35 - "Zhong"and "shu" are often translatedas "loyalty" and "reciprocity,"respectively,but in the Confuciancontext the translations I have used here, adaptedfrom D. C. Lau'stranslation of Analects IV:15(London:Penguin,1979), are more perspicuous. 36 -The literatureon this issue is large, most of it stemming from seminal Confucius:The Secularas Sacred (New York: Fingarette's Harperand Row, 1972). Examplesof more recent discussions are Ames 1991, Cua 1980, and Hansen 1992. ~' 37 - "Let it be, leave it alone" is BurtonWatson's translationof "zai you" from the Zhuangzi (ChuangTzu:Basic Writings[New York: Columbia UniversityPress, 1964], p. 114). I am endorsingthis as what I think Liuthoughtthat Zhuangzi meant-since this is a traditional interpretation of "zai you," and fits the context well-and not as the correct interpretation of Zhuangzi, on which see Lau 1991. 38 - Interestingly enough, partof this picture ill accords with Handlin's of Lii.She writesthat "In his search for an objective understanding framework throughwhich one could overcome conflicting claims to knowledge, Lu ... let concern for 'principle'[thatis, l/]-which had dominated so many philosophical discussions-recede into the background"(Handlin 1983, p. 141). It may well be that Liu was reading his own concerns into Lu, but that is a question for further study. of subject 39 - The "ThreeBonds" ("sangang") are "the subordination to monarch,child to parents,and wife to husband"(Kwang-Ching Liu1990, p. 1). 40 - Liu believes that this idea is also found in Rousseau:"The Social Contractsays that the quanli which the ruler (junzhu)ought to receive is [determinedaccording to the] standardof the responsibilitiesthat the rulerfulfillstowardthe people" (1936a, III,p. 21b). East & West Liucites bk. 2, sec. 4 of the Social Contract.The troublewith this Philosophy 646

reading of Rousseau is that while Liu is clearly talking about the ruler here, Rousseautalks only of the "sovereign"in this section and all relatedpassages. This is, I believe, a ratherstraightforward misunderstandingof Rousseau attributableto the ambiguity of "sovereign."This has a significant impact on Liu's overall interpretationof Rousseau,but not in ways that affect my present discussion, so I put the issue aside for now. 41 - "Zhiye"is the standardterm in modern Chinese for "profession," but in this context Liu'sintentionis much broaderthan our notion of profession,so I translateit as "work"instead. 42 - Nathan has noticed this assumption in the writings of Liang and other twentieth-centuryconstitutionalists; see Nathan 1986, 138 and 120-121. f., 1985, pp. pp. 43 De Bary 1991, pp. 21-22, and chap. 6. See also Metzger 1977 on the weight of responsibilitythat Confucian intellectuals consequentlybore.

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