Rubenecia v CSC Facts: -Teachers of Catarman National HS filed before MSPB administrative complaint against petitioner Rubenecia, the

School Principal: >dishonesty >nepotism >oppression >violation of Civil Service Rules *MPSB investigation: charged Rubenecia, required him to answer. Rubenecia did not file answer, requested instead to be furnished with copies of the documents submitted by complainants. CSC Regional Director invited him to visit their office to identify and pick up the document that he might need but he deferred, saying he still had enrollment problems. Later, CSC Regional Office reiterated that he answer but he reiterated request that he be provided with copies of supporting documents. -hearing scheduled but complainants did not appear, nor did he file his answer though he was there. On the same day, Regional director issued order that the case was deemed submitted for resolution on the basis of the documents filed (and hellurh, the only documents with CSC Regional Office are those of the complainants) -Rubenecia wrote to Chairman of CSC for dismissal of his -Regional Director submitted to MSPB the investigation report but before MSPB could render a decision, CSC issued RESOLUTION 93-2387 which provided, among other things, that cases then pending before the MSPB were to be elevated to the Commission for decision. In accordance with the Resolution, Rubenecias case was elevated to CSC. *CSC: GUILTY, dismissed from service. MR (lack of jurisdiction), denied "I. VIOLATION OF CIVIL SERVICE RULES AND REGULATIONS The records show that Rubenecia committed the said offense. He himself admitted that he did not accomplish his DTR but this was upon the suggestion of the Administrative Officer. Rubenecia cannot use as an excuse the alleged suggestion of an Administrative Officer. As the principal of a national high School, he is expected to know the basic civil service law, rules and regulations. II. DISHONESTY The Commission finds Rubenecia liable. He was charged for misrepresenting that he was on 'Official Travel' to Baguio City to attend a three-week seminar and making it appear in his CSC Form No. 7 for the month of October 1988 that he has a perfect attendance for that month. Rubenecia in order to rebut the same simply reiterated previous allegation that he attended the SEDP Training in Baguio City during the questioned months without even an attempt on his part to adduce evidence documentary or testimonial that would attest to the truth of his allegation that he was indeed in Baguio during those weeks for training purposes. A mere allegation cannot obviously prevail over a more direct and positive statement of Celedonio Layon, School Division Superintendent, Division of Northern Samar, when the latter certified that he had no official knowledge of the alleged 'official travel' of Rubenecia. Moreover, verification with the Bureau of Secondary Schools reveals that no training seminar for school principal was conducted by DECS during that time. It was also proven by records that he caused one Mrs. Cecilia Vestra to render service as Secondary School Teacher from January 19, 1990 to august 30, 1991 without any duly issued appointment by the appointing authority. III. NEPOTISM With respect to the charge of Nepotism, Rubenecia alleged that he is not the appointing authority with regard to the appointment of his brother-in-law as Utilityman but merely a recommending authority. With this statement, the commission finds Rubenecia guilty. it should be noted that under the provision of Sec. 59, of the 1987 Administrative Code, the recommending authority is also prohibited from recommending the appointment to non-teaching position of his relatives within the prohibited degree. IV. OPPRESSION Rubenecia is also guilty of Oppression. He did not give on time the money benefits due to Ms. Leah Rebadulla and Mr. Rolando Tafalla, both Secondary Teachers of CNHS, specifically their salary differentials for July to December 1987, their salaries for the month of May and half of June 1988, their proportional vacation salaries for the semester of 1987-1988, and the salary of Mr. Tafalla, for the month of June, 1987. Rubenecia did not even attempt to present countervailing evidence. Without being specifically denied, they are deemed admitted by Rubenecia.

V. INSUBORDINATION He is not liable for Insubordination arising from his alleged refusal to obey the 'Detail Order' by filing a sick leave and vacation leave successively. The records show that the two applications for leave filed by Rubenecia were duly approved by proper official, hence it cannot be considered an act of Insubordination on the part of Rubenecia when he incurred absences based on an approved application for leave of absence. Rubenecia is therefore found guilty of Dishonesty, Nepotism, Oppression and Violations of Civil Service Rules and Regulations. ISSUES (1) WON the CSC had authority to issue its Resolution No. 93-2387 and assume jurisdiction over the administrative case against petitioner; and (2) Whether or not petitioner had been accorded due process in connection with rendition of CSC Resolution No. 94-0533 finding him guilty and ordering his dismissal from the service. HELD (1)YES it has authority to issue the said resolution and YES it has jurisdiction over the administrative case RUBENECIA: Since MSPB was a creation of law, it could only be abolished by law and not by CSC the questioned resolution in sum does the following: 1. decision in administrative cases appealable to the Commission pursuant to Section 47 of the present Civil Service Law may now be appealed directly to the Commission itself and not to the MSPB . 2. Administrative cases already pending on appeal before the MSPB or previously brought directly to the MSPB, at the time of the issuance of Resolution No. 93-2387, were required to be elevated to the Commission for final resolution. The functions of the MSPB relating to the determination of administrative disciplinary cases were, in other words, re-allocated to the Commission itself. WHY RELOCATE: to "streamline the operation of the CSC" which in turn required the "simplication of systems, cutting of red tape and elimination of [an] unnecessary bureaucratic layer." The previous procedure made it difficult for cases to be finally resolved within a reasonable period of time. The change, theretofore, was moved by the quite legitimate objective of simplifying the course that administrative disciplinary cases, like those involving petitioner Rubenecia, must take. We consider that petitioner Rubenecia had no vested right to a two-step administrative appeal procedure within the Commission, that is, appeal to an office of the Commission, the MSPB, and thereafter a second appeal to the Civil Service Commission itself (i.e., the Chairman and the two (2) Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission), a procedure which most frequently consumed a prolonged period of time. >>>We note also that Resolution No. 93-2387 did not purport to abolish the MSPB nor to effect the termination of the relationship of public employment between the Commission and any of its officers or employees. At all events, even if Resolution No. 93-2387 had purported to do so, petitioner Rubenecia, who does not claim to be an officer or employee of the MSPB, has no personality or standing to contest such termination of public employment. >>>he cannot argue that he was not notified that his case was elevated to CSC because (a) CSC Resolution 932387did not require individual written notice sent by mail to parties in administrative cases pending before the MSPB; (b) CSC Resolution 93-2387 was published in the Manila Standard so it would be deemed substantially complied; and (c) it was Rubenecia himself who insisted on pleading before the Commissioner (he filed MTD before commissioner and not before MSPB) History of the Merit System Protection Board - PD 1409 created in the CSC the Merit Systems Board and gave it power to hear and decide administrative cases. If the Board orders the removal of the public officer, it would be subject to automatic review of the CSC. All other decisions of the Board are subject to appeal to the CSC -1987 Admin Code re-created the Merit System Board as Merit System Protection Board (MSPB) which was intended to be an office of the Commission like any other 13 offices in the CSC. MSPB was made a part of the

internal structure and organization of the CSC and thus a proper subject of organizational change which CSC is authorized to undertake under SECTION 17 of the CIVIL SERVICE LAW. (2) YES Due Process = Notice + Opportunity to be heard NOTICE: Formal charge which contained the essence of the complaint and the documents in support thereof that had been furnished to Rubenecia + testimony of the principal witnesses against him given during the preliminary hearing. ON THE NONFURNISH OF SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS: he was given the opportunity to obtain those documents but he did not avail of it + he sent a formal letter-answer to CSC Chair controverting the charges against him and submitted voluminous documents in support of his claim of innocence. MR CURED WHATEVER PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS DEFECT: MR gave him opportunity to be heard ON FINDINGS OF THE CSC: The settled rule in our jurisdiction is that the finding of fact of a n administrative agency must be respected, so long as such findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or even preponderant. It is not the task of an appellate court, like this Court, to weigh once more the evidence submitted before the administrative body and to substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency in respect of sufficiency of evidence. In the present case, in any event, after examination of the record of this case, we conclude that the decision of the Civil Service Commission finding Rubenecia guilty of the administrative charges prepared against him, is supported by substantial evidence. Quimbo v Gervacio Facts: -Quimbo, the Provincial Engineer of Samar, was administratively charged for HARASSMENT AND OPPRESSION by Padoan, a general foreman who was detailed to the Motor Pool Division, Provincial Engineering by then Prov. Gov. Quimbo was placed under preventive suspension w/o pay to commence upon receipt of the order and until such time that it is lifted but in no case beyond 6m. He began serving it on March 18, 1998 but it was lifted April 27, 1998 after presenting 2 witnesses on direct examination. *OFFICE OF DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN: GUILTY of OPPRESSION, suspended from office for 8 months w/o pay. Approved by Ombudsman. MR DENIED. Elevated to CA *CA: GUILTY OF SIMPLE MISCONDUCT, suspension of 2 months w/o pay. -CA deci became final so Ombudsman ordered Provincial Governor its implementation. Quimbo filed MR/Motion for modification of said order, calling to attention the fact that he was on preventive suspension from March 18 to June 1, 1998 (so in effect, he wanted his 2m17d suspension previously served to be credited for his penalty, thus he wont serve it anymore) -Provincial Governor sought clarification w/Ombudsman. *Ombudsman clarified that since preventive suspensionis not a penalty, but a preliminary step in the investigation. If investigated then found guilty, imposition of penalty warranted. Quimbo appealed to CA. *CA: dismiss petition. AFFIRM OMBUDSMAN ISSUE: WON the preventive suspension should be credited for his penalty HELD: NO. Preventive suspension is not a penalty. Not being a penalty, the period within which one is under preventive suspension is not considered part of the actual penalty of suspension. -this is EXPRESSLY PROVIDED UNDER SEC25, RULE XIV: SEC. 25. The period within which a public officer or employee charged is placed under preventive suspension shall not be considered part of the actual penalty of suspension imposed upon the employee found guilty. NATURE OF PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION: merely a preventive measure, a preliminary step in an administrative investigation -purpose: prevent accused from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper w/ records w/c may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him

-not a penalty: RULE XIV, Section 21, OMNIBUS RULES IMPLEMENTING BOOK V OF THE ADMIN CODE ON NON-APPLICATION OF GLORIA: It involves 2 kinds of preventive suspension which is relevant in determining >the entitlement of the employee to compensation during the period of suspension > the crediting of preventive suspension to the final penalty of suspension PENDING INVESTIGATION (Section 51 of the Civil Service Law [Book V, Title I, Subtitle A of the Administrative Code of 1987]) PENDING APPEAL if the penalty imposed by the disciplining authority is suspension or dismissal and, after review, the respondent is exonerated (Section 47(4) of The Civil Service Law) Not a penalty but only a means of enabling the A penalty, BUT: disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered *if subsequently exonerated: considered under investigation preventive suspension, should be reinstated w/ full pay for period of suspension *if conviction affirmed: period of suspension becomes part of final penalty of suspension (so credited) >>>as QUIMBOs suspension is pending investigation,IT CANNOT BE CREDITED TO FORM PART OF THE FINAL PENALTY OF SUSPENSION NON-APPLICATION OF CREDITING IN CRIMINAL LAW: Not only are they distinct in the objective or purpose, or in their nature as preventive imprisonment involves restriction of personal liberties which is not the case with preventive suspension; the respective laws covering them are explicit. NONAPPLICATION OF EQUITY: law expressly provides that rules on crediting of preventive suspension to final penalty of suspension is not allowed. Ombudsman v Pelino Facts: The Field Investigation Office (FIO) of the Office of the Ombudsman, through its Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer Maria Olivia Elena A. Roxas, filed a complaint against respondent and Joseph Albert Pelio Cuaki for (a) 18 counts of perjury in her SALN, (b) RA 6713, (c) Dishonesty and grave misconduct, and (d) RA 1379. Pelio is the head of the BIR Large Taxpayers Document Processing and Quali ty Assurance Division, while Cuaki is respondents son. The complaint charges respondent with illegally acquiring and accumulating the following property and investments, as well as incurring expenses and liabilities grossly disproportionate to her income and earning capacity as a government employee, and for not disclosing the same in her annual SALNs several real and personal properties. Moreover, she omitted to declare in her Personal Data Shee that she has a son. On the contrary, she claims that she is single. Respondent filed a Sworn Explanation detailing her defenses to the accusations against her. The Ombudsman placed respondent under preventive suspension for six months and directed her to file her counter-affidavit. Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon Victor C. Fernandez found that the evidence of guilt is strong that PELIO committed acts of dishonesty and grave misconduct which would warrant her removal from office if proved. Respondent filed an Urgent Motion to Lift Order of Preventive Suspension arguing that the charges were not substantiated, that the alleged acts of misconduct do not have a direct relation to the performance of her functions, that the charge is a ground for criminal, not administrative prosecution. Before her motion to lift order of preventive suspension and the supplemental motion thereto could be resolved, however, PELIO elevated the matter to the CA via a petition for certiorari with application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction against the petitioners claiming grave abuse of

discretion in her being placed under preventive suspension while the charges against her were pending. The CA granted the TRO. Issue: WON the order of preventive suspension was proper Held: Yes Ratio: However, there is a need to make a determination as to whether the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed order of preventive suspension. To do this, we must resolve the issue of whether the evidence of PELIOs guilt is strong as to justify the issuance of a preventive suspension order against her. RA 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989: In preventively suspending a public officer or employee pending investigation, the law does not require that all the four requirements should concur. What is required is merely a showing that the evidence of guilt is strong; and that any of the three (to wit: (a) the charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charge warrants removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him), is present. The immediate issuance of a preventive suspension order is required to prevent the subject of the suspension from committing further irregularities. PELIO is charged with eighteen (18) counts of perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code; violation of R.A. No. 6713, 8 in relation to 11 thereof; dishonesty and grave misconduct; and violation of R.A. No. 1379. Thes e are all in relation to PELIOs failure to disclose material information in her Personal Data Sheet and Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN). In her counter-affidavit, PELIO admits such non-disclosure but claims that her alleged unexplained wealth came from, among others, a certain Henry Go, former Vice Chairman of Universal Robina Corporation, who is the biological father of CUAKI. She claims that in 1985, Alfonso brought CUAKI then a baby to her home, explaining to her that the boys father was one of his business buddies and that his mother had abandoned him at the hospital. Thereafter, Alfonso had caused the boy to be registered as Joseph Albert Pelio Cuaki; that in the boys birth certificate, it was made to appear that s he and Alfonso were married and the boy was their son; but that she never signed the said birth certificate and that her signature which appears therein is a forgery. She claims that she was shocked, alarmed and angry at Alfonso for what he did, and sh e insisted that he rectify the childs birth certificate, but that before he could do so, Alfonso died. Apparently, nothing was ever done to correct the alleged falsified birth papers of the boy, despite the fact that he grew up with PELIO, who learned to love and treat (CUAKI) as (her) own flesh and blood, nurtured him every day of his life and watched him grow as a proud mother would. Rosa Cuaki, Alfonsos wife, allegedly could not believe that her husband could have had a child outside of their marriage, so she filed a criminal complaint against PELIO for falsification of CUAKIs birth certificate which was dismissed by the Secretary of the Department of Justice. We have held time and again that what the law requires is merely that, first, the evidence of guilt must be strong; and second, that at least any one of the three circumstances (1) that the charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (2) that the charge warrants removal from the service; or (3) that the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him is present. In PELIOs case, we find that evidence of her guilt is strong. The evidence does not show that CUAKI is Gos son, such that it could be believed that PELIO, who claims to act as the de facto guardian and administrator of the boys properties, received a total of P11,640,000.00 from 1985 up to 2000 as financial support from Go, which she used to purchase some of the properties in question. Alf onso and PELIO are CUAKIs parents, as the latters certificate of live birth shows. Although the same has been denied by PELIO herself, who claims that CUAKIs birth certificate is a forged document, the said document subsists and has not been duly void ed. Being a public document, CUAKIs certificate of live birth offers prima facie evidence of filiation and a high degree of proof is needed to overthrow the presumption of truth contained therein. This is pursuant to the rule that entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer are prima facie

evidence of the facts therein stated. The evidentiary nature of such document must, therefore, be sustained in the absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity. This being the case, it follows that we cannot, under the law, consider PELIOs claim that she used the amount of P11,640,000.00 which she allegedly received from Go (which was intended for CUAKI) to acquire the Valle Verde (Pasig City) residence, the San Juan condominium, the house and lot in Tagaytay City, the Isuzu Fuego pickup and the Toyota RAV4, as well as to finance her yearly trips abroad with CUAKI. PELIO claims she is not CUAKIs biological parent; and that in 1983, or two years before CUAKI was born, she had her uterus surgically removed. She blames Alfonso for obtaining the boys fake birth papers wherein she is declared as the boys mother. This is, however, a matter of defense which is appropriately threshed out during trial. As against her self-serving denials, the boys certificate of live birth prevails. Even granting that the claim of forgery is true and that she had nothing to do with the commission thereof, an inquiry should be made into the extent of PELIOs participation in the fraud, taking into consideration that all these years, she may have condoned the use of these documents, or herself used them. During their trips abroad, CUAKI who was then only a minor would not have been allowed by the immigration authorities to travel along with PELIO without the requisite passport and written permission from CUAKIs real parents, whom PELIO does not even know at all, as the evidence suggests. Even assuming that CUAKIs real parents were known to her, they would not have been able to give their written consent just the same, because CUAKIs birth papers declare PELIO and Alfonso as his parents. In such event, PELI O may be criminally charged with use of falsified documents, as well as administratively, for dishonesty and grave misconduct. Finally, CUAKIs birth certificate constitutes proof that PELIO, who was working with the BIR, maintained an adulterous relationship with Alfonso, who was married to Rosa Cuaki. In addition to the accusations made against her, PELIO should be charged with immorality as well. There likewise appears to be strong evidence to suggest that, apart from failing to disclose the subject properties in her SALNs, PELIO is harboring unexplained wealth as well, considering the sheer number of real and personal properties acquired by her in her name and in that of CUAKI. During the period 1993 to 1994, PELIO and CUAKI took four (4) and two (2) foreign trips each, respectively, and PELIO acquired no less than four (4) sizable pieces of real property: a 578-square meter residential lot in Tanza, Cavite (TCT 408006); a 1.58 hectare lot in Naic, Cavite (TCT 874663); a 2.09 hectare lot in Naic, Cavite (TCT 874664); and a 4,475-square meter house and lot in Tagaytay City. Yet in her 1993-1994 SALNs,[50] she did not declare any cash in bank; nor is there any indication in her previous (1986-1992) SALNs[51] that she had property which she may have sold (and which is no longer declared in her 1993 and 1994 SALNs) or any business interest from which to draw funds to be able to afford to acquire the said four pieces of property; nor did her liabilities increase (to show, for example, that she took a loan for the purchase of these properties); nor did she inherit said properties; nor was she a donee thereof, as the evidence shows that she appears to have acquired all four by purchase totaling, per purchase price and estimate of the FIO based on market value, P1,063,508.00. In 1993, PELIOs annual salary was only P56,522.00; and, for 1994, P65,832.00. The discrepancy is too obvious to ignore. Indeed, PELIOs admissions, coupled with the evidence on record, have farther-reaching implications than the appellate court was willing to consider. The Ombudsman is not guilty of abuse of discretion in placing PELIO under preventive suspension because there is enough strong evidence to engender the belief that she is guilty of the accusations lodged against her. Besides, the admissions contained in her defense leave us with more questions than answers, and may have opened a Pandoras box worthy of further serious inquiry by the petitioners. Thus, we do not subscribe to PELIO's argument in her Comment, borrowed fro m the appellate courts pronouncement, that the FIO complaint, apart from alleging non-disclosure of material facts in the SALNs, did not show any other positive or specific unlawful acts on her part that will support the charge of dishonesty, grave misconduct, lack of integrity or untrustworthiness. Her failure to disclose in her personal data sheet and her SALNs that CUAKI was her son constitutes an act of deception and dishonesty, in that by not disclosing the fact, she is effectively shielding herself from a possible charge of immorality or falsification. Moreover, the non-disclosure of a substantial number of properties opens her to a charge of harboring

unexplained wealth, since the acquisition of the undisclosed properties was manifestly out of proportion to her salary as earlier on demonstrated herein. Considering PELIOs high rank and delicate office, the gravity of the charges against her dishonesty, grave misconduct, accumulation of unexplained wealth and perjury, and the possibility of filing other charges as a result of her admissions in her pleadings, such as immorality, falsification and/or use of falsified documents which merit dismissal from service as the corresponding penalty, it may not be said that the Office of the Ombudsman exercised its discretion in a despotic and arbitrary manner; preventive suspension was an option which it could properly exercise under the circumstances. There is nothing improper in suspending an officer pending his investigation and before the charges against him are heard. The immediate issuance of such order is required to prevent the subject of the suspension from committing further irregularities. Such prompt action, moreover, is in consonance with 15 of R.A. No. 6770 which exhorts the Ombudsman to give priority to complaints filed against high ranking government officials and/or those occupying supervisory positions, those involving grave offenses as well as those involving large sums of money and/or properties. Ultimately, the Ombudsman is given the discretion to decide when the evidence of guilt is strong. This fact is bolstered by 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which expressly left such determination of guilt to the judgment of the Ombudsman on the basis of the administrative complaint. In the instant case, the order of preventive suspension was issued only after PELIO filed a sworn explanation detailing her defenses to the charges made against her. It may thus be said that the order for her preventive suspension was issued after assessment of her defenses. Being so, we find no abuse, much less grave abuse of the exercise of this discretion. Gobenciong v CA Facts: Dr. Pedro Gobenciong was Administrative Officer IV in Eastern Visayas Regional Medical Center (the hospital), a public hospital. In 1996, the hospital planned to buy a hemoanalyzer/particle counter. A public bidding was had, where Alvez Commerical, Inc. won. A Purchase Order was issued for 2 nebulizers and 1 particle counter. The nebulizers and hemoanalyzers appeared to have been delivered, as per: Certification of Acceptance signed by Engr. Jocano and Supply Officer Babula. Sales Invoice signed by Supply Officer Babula acknowledging receipt of the goods in good condidion. COA Inspection Report certified by Engr. Jocano and Gobenciong attesting that the goods had been inspected as to quality and quantity. As it turned out, the hemoanalyzer was never actually delivered. Dr. Flora dela Pena, head of the hospitals Laboratory Unit, filed an administrative complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas (Ombudsman) charging Gobenciong, Babula, Jocano, and 3 other persons with Falsification of Public Document and Misconduct. Upon Dela Penas motion, Ombdusman placed respondents, save one, under a six-month preventive suspension and directed the proper DOH Officer to immediately implement the Order. Gobenciong sought reconsideration of this order, but without awaiting the Ombudsmans action thereon, Gobenciong filed a petition for certiorari in the CA. CA denied Gobenciongs petition for certiorari on the strength of Sec. 24 in relation to Sec. 27 of RA 6770, which expressly empower the Ombudsman, under defined conditions, to preventively suspend, for a maximum period of six months, all but three categories of public officials and employees under investigation by his office and to direct the immediate implementation of the corresponding suspension order. Ombudsman eventually found Gobenciong, et al guilty of Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and imposed a penalty of 1 year suspension without pay. Gobenciong filed a motion for reconsideration, which Ombudsman denied, prompting Gobenciong to appeal to the CA. CA partially granted Gobenciongs appeal and set aside the Ombudsmans Decision in i nsofar as it

imposed the penalty of 1 year suspension without pay. Relying on Tapiador v Office of the Ombudsman, it held that the disciplinary power of the Ombudsman in administrative cases is limited only to recommending to the disciplining authority the appropriate penalty to be meted out. Issues: 1. Whether a preventive suspension ordered by the Ombudsman is immediately executory, notwithstanding a pending motion to reconsider the corresponding order? 2. Whether the disciplinary power of the Ombudsman is merely recommendatory? 3. Whether RA 6770, on the ground of undue delegation of legislative authority and under the equal protection clause, is unconstitutional? Held: 1. YES. Sec. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions.All provisionary orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory. A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and shall be entertained only on any of the following grounds: (1) New evidence has been discovered which materially affects the order, directive or decision; (2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the interest of the movants. The motion for reconsideration shall be resolved within three (3) days from filing; Provided, That only one motion for reconsideration shall be entertained. x x x Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one months salary shall be final and unappealable. The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the Ombudsman as the interest of justice may require.24 Sec. 8, Rule III of the Ombudsman Rules of Procedure Sec. 8. Motion for Reconsideration or reinvestigation; Grounds .Whenever allowable, a motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation may only be entertained if filed within ten (10) days from receipt of the decision by the respondent on any of the following grounds: a) New evidence had been discovered which materially affects the order, directive or decision; b) Grave errors of facts or laws or serious irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the interest of the movant. Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation shall be allowed, and the hearing officers shall resolve the same within five (5) days from receipt thereof. Indeed, there exists no irreconcilable inconsistency between the two sets of provisions respecting the immediate implementability of a preventive suspension order emanating from the Ombudsman. As it were, the conflict concerns only the period for filing a motion for reconsideration. What was once the five-day reglementary period fixed under Sec. 27(2), RA 6770 is now 10 days under Sec. 8, Rule III, Ombudsman Rules of Procedure. Apart from this change, both sections in question can validly be harmonized and given effect at the same time. Reading and harmonizing together Sec. 27(1) of RA 6770 and Sec. 8, Rule III of the Ombudsman Rules of Procedure, it is at once apparent that the immediately executory quality of a preventive suspension order does not preclude the preventively suspended respondent from seeking reconsideration of such order. The existence and availment of the right to move for reconsideration does not motu proprio stay the immediate execution of the provisionary order of preventive suspension. An order of preventive suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. And it is usually made immediately effective and executory to prevent the respondent from using his/her position or office to influence prospective witnesses or tamper with the records which may be vital to the prosecution of the case. 2. NO. CAs cited portion of the Tapiador case is a mere obiter dictum which cannot be cited as a doctrinal pronouncement of the Court. Furthermore, the refusal, without just cause, of any officer to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or employee, which is a ground for disciplinary action, is a strong indication that the Ombudsmans recommendation is not merely advisory in nature but is

actually mandatory within the bounds of law. By stating that the Ombudsman recommends the action to be taken against an erring officer or employee, the provisions of the Constitution and in RA 6770 intended that the implementation of the order be coursed through the proper officer (Ledesma v CA). 3. NO. The Office of the Ombudsman is a creature of the Constitution. The framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the office to be strong and effective, with sufficient bite and muscle to enable it to carry out its mandate as protector of the people against the inept, abusive, and corrupt in the Government. They, however, left it to Congress to invest the office with more broad powers to enforce its own action. Clearly then, the espoused theory of undue delegation of authority is untenable. For, in the ultimate analysis, it is the 1987 Constitution no less which granted and allowed the grant by Congress of sweeping prosecutorial, investigatory, and disciplinary powers to the Ombudsman. Furthermore, the issue of constitutionality was not raised at the earliest possible opportunity; this means before the Office of the Ombudsman, or at least before the CA. CSC v Cortez Facts: Respondent Delia T. Cortez, Chief Personnel Specialist of the Examination and Placement Services Division (EPSD) of Civil Service Regional Office (CSRO) No. X, Cagayan de Oro City, was formally charged with dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service. That when Abina and Ofredo presented the said application forms at the EPSD, respondent Cortez pasted a stamp worth P150.00 on each of the application forms. Thereafter, she asked from them the payment corresponding to the value of the stamps pasted on the said application forms; 4. Thereafter, Abina and Ofredo returned to the Cashiers Office to inquire as to whether there are still other fees to be paid. But when the Cashier saw that the said application forms were already pasted with stamps, she examined the same and she noted that the serial numbers of the said stamps did not correspond with the serial numbers of the stamps issued to said Office; 5. This prompted the cashier, accompanied by Abina and Ofredo[,] to proceed to the EPSD and confronted [sic] respondent Cortez on the unauthorized selling of stamps. Consequently, respondent immediately removed the stamps from the application forms, kept them, and brought out the money which Abina and Ofredo earlier gave her and handed the same to the Cashier who subsequently, issued them another stamps She denied that she collected money for the stamps and that there was a confrontation between her and the cashier. She branded the charges against her as brazen lies and concoctions of some people determined to destroy her more than twenty years of service in the CSC, eight years of which she served as Chief of the EPSD.[4] CSC placed respondent under a 90-day preventive suspension pending formal investigation of the serious charges against her.[5] After carefully evaluating the evidence of the parties, petitioner CSC in its Resolution No. 010499 of 22 February 2001 concluded that the version of the complainants was more credible. It noted that witnesses Abina and Ofredo categorically pointed to respondent as the source of the questionable stamps and material portions of their testimonies were corroborated by two other witnesses, Eva S. Alcalde and Acting Cashier Angeline P. Lim. Thus, it ruled that respondent was guilty of illegally selling recycled stamps for her own financial gain, an act which constituted dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service. It ordered respondent dismissed from the service with forfeiture of benefits and disqualification from reemployment in the government service, without prejudice to any civil or criminal liability in a proper action.[13] Court of Appeals granted respondents petition. It ruled that although respondent was properly accorded administrative due process as evidenced by the fact that she was able to file an answer, a counter-affidavit and even a motion for reconsideration, the penalty of dismissal imposed on her was too harsh considering (a) her twenty-one years of service in the government, (b) the fact that it was her first offense and (c) that no damage was sustained by the Government. Accordingly, it modified the penalty imposed on respondent from

dismissal from the service with all its accessory penalties to that of forced resignation from the service with entitlement to all the benefits under the law Issue: WON private respondent should be dismissed Held: Yes Ratio: Under the Civil Service Law[19] and its implementing rules,[20] dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service[21] are grave offenses punishable by dismissal from the service.[22] Thus, as provided by law, there is no other penalty that should be imposed on respondent than the penalty of dismissal. Of course, the rules allow the consideration of mitigating and aggravating circumstances[23] and provide for the manner of imposition of the proper penalty. Jurisprudence is abound with cases applying the above rule in the imposition of the proper penalty and even in cases where the penalty prescribed by law, on commission of the first offense, is that of dismissal, which is, as argued by petitioner, an indivisible penalty, the presence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances may still be taken into consideration by us in the imposition of the proper penalty. Under the facts of this case, respondent is not entitled to a lower penalty. Petitioner CSC is correct that length of service should be taken against the respondent. Length of service is not a magic word that, once invoked, will automatically be considered as a mitigating circumstance in favor of the party invoking it. Length of service can either be a mitigating or aggravating circumstance depending on the factual milieu of each case. Length of service, in other words, is an alternative circumstance. Moreover, a review of jurisprudence shows that, although in most cases length of service is considered in favor of the respondent,[28] it is not considered where the offense committed is found to be serious. Applying the above-cited cases to the case at bar, we cannot also consider length of service in favor of the respondent because of the gravity of the offense she committed and of the fact that it was her length of service in the CSC which helped her in the commission of the offense. Respondent was in the Civil Service Commission for twenty-one years, the last eight years of which (19901998) she spent as Chief of the Examination and Placement Services Division (EPSD). Surely, respondent earned the last position because of her length of service in the CSC. As Chief of the EPSD, she naturally had access to the previously processed and approved application forms wherefrom she detached the stamps and later on sold to new civil service examination applicants and pocketed the proceeds of the sale. Respondents length of service in the CSC, therefore, clearly helped her in the commission of the offense. As to the gravity of the offense, which is the other factor why we cannot consider length of service in favor of the respondent, it is clear from the ruling of the CSC that respondents act irreparably tarnished the integrity of the CSC. Respondent was the Chief of the EPSD, but despite such important and senior position which should have impelled her to set a good example to her co-employees and other civil servants, respondent flagrantly and shamelessly violated the law by selling, for her own financial gain, used examination fee stamps, right in her own office and during office hours. In several cases,[33] we imposed the heavier penalty of dismissal[34] or a fine of more than P20,000,[35] considering the gravity of the offense committed, even if the offense charged was respondents first offense. Thus, in the present case, even though the offense respondent was found guilty of was her first offense, the gravity thereof outweighs the fact that it was her first offense. Office of the Ombudsman v Masing Facts: In G.R. Nos. 165416 and 165731, respondent Florita A. Masing was the former Principal of the Davao City Integrated Special School (DCISS) in Bangkal, Davao City. Respondent Jocelyn A. Tayactac was an office clerk in the same school. In 1997, respondents were administratively charged before the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanaofor allegedly collecting unauthorized fees, failing to remit authorized fees, and to account for public funds

respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over them. Respondents alleged that the DECS has jurisdiction over them which shall exercise the same through a committee to be constituted under Section 9 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4670, otherwise known as the The Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. Ombudsman for Mindanao rendered a joint decision finding respondents Masing and Tayactac guilty. Court of Appeals granted MR. In G.R. No. 165584, respondent Florita A. Masing faced yet another administrative case before the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao filed by Erlinda P. Tan.[5] The charges were oppression, serious misconduct, discourtesy in the conduct of official duties, and physical or mental incapacity or disability due to immoral or vicious habits. As in the other administrative cases, respondent Masing filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Office of the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case. Ombudsman for Mindanao found respondent Masing guilty. Court of Appeals set aside the assailed Ombudsman decision Issue: WON Ombudsman has jurisdiction Held: Yes Ratio: Re: intervention of ombudsman in CA. In the cases at bar, the rulings of the Court of Appeals adversely affected the all-important jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman. The rulings aggrieved the Office of the Ombudsman for they have serious consequences on its effectiveness as the body charged by the Constitution with the prosecution of officials and employees of the government suspected of violating our laws on graft and corruption. In Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy,[20] we recognized the standing of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) to appeal a decision of the Court of Appeals which reversed its decision finding Dacoycoy guilty of nepotism and ordering his dismissal from the service. Although the CSC was the quasi-judicial body which rendered the decision appealed to the Court of Appeals, it became the party aggrieved or adversely affected by its decision which seriously prejudices the civil service system.[21] Respondents, however, insist that the findings of the Ombudsman are mere recommendations, and that he may not directly impose administrative sanctions on public officials and employees, citing Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman.[32] The proper interpretation of the Courts statement in Tapiador should be that the Ombudsman has the authority to determine the administrative liability of a public official or employee at fault, and direct and compel the head of the office or agency concerned to implement the penalty imposed. In other words, it merely concerns the procedural aspect of the Ombudsmans functions and not its jurisdiction. The statement that made reference to the power of the Ombudsman is, at best, merely an obiter dictum and, as it is unsupported by sufficient explanation, is susceptible to varying interpretations x x x x [h]ence, it cannot be cited as a doctrinal declaration of this Court nor is it safe from judicial examination. Finally, respondent Masing contends that she may be administratively dealt with only by following the procedure prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. No. 4670 or the The Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. She cites Fabella v. Court of Appeals.[38] In Fabella, several public schoolteachers were administratively charged by then DECS Secretary Isidro Cario for taking part in mass actions in violation of civil service laws and regulations. A committee was constituted to hear the charges. The teachers assailed the procedure adopted by the committee in a petition for certiorari filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Fabella, however, does not apply to the cases at bar. The public schoolteachers in Fabella were charged with violations of civil service laws, rules and regulations in administrative proceedings initiated by the DECS Secretary. In contrast, herein respondents Masing and Tayactac were administratively charged in lettercomplaints duly filed before the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao. The charges were for violations of R.A. No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and

Employees, collecting unauthorized fees, failure to remit authorized fees, failure to account for public funds, oppression, serious misconduct, discourtesy in the conduct of official duties, and physical or mental incapacity or disability due to immoral or vicious habits. In short, the acts and omissions complained of relate to respondents conduct as public official and employee, if not to outright graft and corruption. It is erroneous, therefore, for respondents to contend that R.A. No. 4670 confers an exclusive disciplinary authority on the DECS over public school teachers and prescribes an exclusive procedure in administrative investigations involving them.[44] R.A. No. 4670 was approved on June 18, 1966. On the other hand, the 1987 Constitution was ratified by the people in a plebiscite in 1987 while R.A. No. 6770 was enacted on November 17, 1989. It is basic that the 1987 Constitution should not be restricted in its meaning by a law of earlier enactment. The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 were quite explicit in conferring authority on the Ombudsman to act on complaints against allpublic officials and employees, with the exception of officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over members of Congress and the Judiciary Therefore, the statement in Fabella that Section 9 of R.A. No. 4670 reflects the legislative intent to impose a standard and a separate set of procedural requirements in connection with administrative proceedings involving public schoolteachersshould be construed as referring only to the specific procedure to be followed in administrative investigations conducted by the DECS.