PolishSociety:aSociologicalAnalysis

PolishSociety:aSociologicalAnalysis

byAdamPodgrecki

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Source: PRAXISInternational(PRAXISInternational),issue:1/1987,pages:5778,onwww.ceeol.com.

EASTERN EUROPE AND SOCIAL THEORY

POLISH SOCIETY: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS*

Adam Podgrecki Problem The social history and life of the majority of European countries are characterized by considerable stability and continuity. Recent Polish history contradicts sharply this general observation. World War II and the progressive sovietization of Poland after 1945 introduced several important processes which are still not well analyzed sociologically. The most significant among them led to the disappearance of many segments of Polish society as they existed throughout the centuries. The Polish-Jewish population (around 3 million) has been annihilated. The Polish landed-gentry has been destroyed. Likewise, tradespeople have virtually disappeared. The big and middle business classes have ceased to exist. Independent cooperatives have disappeared. Several influential minorities including Germans, Ukrainians and Lithuanians have vanished. Independent political parties and organizations have been outlawed and crushed. The traditional intelligentsia, those who regarded service for their own society as a duty and mission, has lost its previous decisive influence. Likewise, the number and skills of artisans have dramatically declined.1 Therefore, the existence and functioning of an informal social structure, which developed in a very complicated way, has a special significance for the understanding of the complexity of contemporary Poland. This informal structure is additional to the infrastructure which was originated by the nobility. It was especially elaborated when the country lost its independence, i.e., when Polish society was deprived of its statehood (1795-1918). In carrying out a global analysis of a society of this type, it is therefore advisable to pay special attention to the historically determined informal system of relations between the social structure, on the one hand, and the type of personality characteristics which function within the framework of this structure on the other. For it might appear that the type of personality historically formed in a given society reflects its current social structure, or it might appear that its current social structure is shaped by those personality characteristics. So, in order to be certain about these assumptions one should attempt to present, first a global analysis of the structure of the society in question, and secondly to consider in what way the basic elements of its structure are linked with the basic personality features of its societal members. In other words, this kind of approach means that one has to
* I would like to add that my opportunities to study the subject in a direct way ended in 1977 which reflects the fact that sources used data from the mid-1970s or earlier. Nevertheless, I would like to note that the nature of the subject tends to grasp some long-term developments and therefore the newest studies on the matter are not of the primary importance.

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compare the existing empirical knowledge concerning social structure with the knowledge concerning the various ethoses of different social groups in the society in question. Social Composition One may say that the numerous studies of Polands social structure conducted after 1945 present, in effect, a rather complex and obscure picture. On the one hand, it is claimed in the relevant literature that the countrys social structure is relatively homogenous; on the other hand, various processes of social decomposition and recomposition are stressed. Some researchers claim that Polish society is characterized by a relatively low differentiation of incomes. Nevertheless, it was shown that the factor of individual subsidiary earnings is an important variable component of secondary economic differentiation (hidden economy). This component constitutes an essential, but quite often overlooked or unrecognised, element of social life. Some writers claim that in Poland social mobility affects individuals, classes, and strata, whereas in capitalist countries upward and downward mobility basically affects only individuals. These general observations concerning Poland are based on research by Adam Sarapata. A study of Stefan Nowak (published in 1966 but carried out in 1961) confirms Sarapatas initial findings. According to Nowak,
If we accept that the transition from country-side to town, movement from the ranks of unskilled to skilled, from those of manual to non-manual workers, and for the children of administrative employees, entry into the category of intelligentsia with higher education all constitute social advancement, then 42% of the population . . . occupies [after the Second World War A.P.] positions higher than the occupations of their fathers.2*

Generalizing from the above data, Jan Szczepanski goes even further, repeating and modifying the earlier idea of Stanislaw Ossowski, and declares that whole social classes may be mobile when, for example, they take power after a revolution.3 Research on the hierarchy of occupation and positions present as considerable amount of interesting data on social stratification in Poland. The already classic in this respect research of Wesolowski and Sarapata (carried out in 1958) specified three crucial features relating to social position: its stability, the material benefits derived from it, and the prestige attached to it. The research showed that in Polish society the factors which are most highly esteemed fell under the category knowledge and skills. These findings explain to some extent the unusually high position occupied by qualified workers during the Solidarity period. This was indicated by the high position in prestige ratings accorded to the learned professions and skilled workers and by the low position of unskilled workers. This generalization was also supported by the decline in the prestige of the private sector, regardless of the relativily good financial situation of the people in this category. Another result of this research was the assertion that the changes which took place in Poland before 1958,
* All quotations, unless indicated to the contrary, have been translated by the author.

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did not lead to particular demographic and social categories forming different ways of assigning social prestige to occupations and positions. To a certain extent, at least, a system of common values emerged.4

This research also makes a start towards establishing a comparative framework for the analysis of similar hierarchies of various groups and socio-occupational positions in a number of societies. For example, in West Germany in the late fifties, the first four positions on the social prestige scale were occupied by the following social groups: (1) capitalists, managers, higher administrators (members of the government), university rector, land owner; (2) intelligentsia (university professor, opera singer, teacher); (3) non-manual employees, (accountant, draughtsman); (4) small capitalists, handicraftsman. However, in Poland the first four positions were occupied by: (1) intelligentsia (university professor, doctor, teacher, mechanical engineer, lawyer, agricultural engineer, journalist); (2) skilled workers (iron and steel worker, lathe operator, foreman); (3) non-manual workers, (accountant, head of administrative unit); (4) small capitalists and handicraftsmen.5 Research carried out during 1964 - 67 in Lodz by Szczecin and Koszalin, based on a relatively complex technique, led to the conclusion that
in terms of earnings, skilled workers have overtaken clerical-manual workers and in terms of prestige office workers in comparison with the pre-war period. Foremen and brigade leaders have a higher average income and higher average prestige than office workers and differ little from them with regard to general evaluation of their position. Although these can be considered new phenomena, the substantial difference in the position of the intelligentsia and technicians in relation to that of blue collar workers also indicated the persistence of old forms of allocating rewards.

Another general conclusion of this inquiry states:

. . . the difference between manual workers and other social categories is probably smaller than during the pre-war period. Nevertheless, the distance separating non-manual employees from working class is still sufficiently great to be considered an inheritance from capitalist society which has not yet been eliminated.6

Other research suggests that in Poland the social structure is, to a considerable extent, perceived as open, and it suggests that the level of openness is very close to the model of equal opportunity. These conclusions are based on data derived from a series of studies on social stratification (Janicka, 1973, pp. 61 and 91 - 100). Nevertheless, other research interestingly reveals that the above mentioned openness of the Polish social system mainly concerns access to political and social positions but does not necessarily concern social life as such. It has been shown that
although we do not find the emergence of impassable barriers or great distances in social interactions, we can observe visible tendencies to restrictions of social life. Such characteristics as the nature of ones work, ones socio-occupational position and education play a key role in this instance.7

Indeed, people may be pressed to work together in various places and

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institutions, but they would not necessarily associate themselves easily with those whom they ideologically reject (for example Party Members). Despite its intriguing results, the work of Ryszard Dyoniziak has been virtually unnoticed in the realm of the generally unrevealing literature on social stratification. Dyoniziak asserts that a clear relationship exists between social position and attitudes concerning egalitarianism, consumption and social needs as well as so-called false consciousness.
We can see that the strength of egalitarian demands is inversely proportional to perceived consumption needs . . . Thus, as consumption needs increase, demands for egalitarianism within individual occupational groups decline.8

Consequently it could be said that Appetite comes not only with the eating but tends also to restrict the eating of the others. Does it mean, in consequence, that if in some areas Polish socialism seems to be successfully spreading the idea of equality, it simultaneously starts to work against itself? Some generalizations concerning social stratification in Poland can be found in a work edited by Jan Szczepanski who tried unsuccessfully to present a synthesis of the social structure of the socialist society. He presents instead various abstract observations which nevertheless rarely provide some concrete assertions. One of these concerns the position of manual workers:
The contradiction in their position consists of the fact that, according to the ideology and the legal principles of the system, they are the co-owners of the means of production, while at the same time, they are hired workers subject to the technological constraints resulting from their relationship to machinery, which constraints also find their repercussions in legal work regulations.9

Another observation of this type concerns administrative personnel:

On the one hand there is a contradiction between the importance of this category and its qualifications, and on the other, between the significance of its functions and its work, and between its responsibility and its prestige.10

According to the same author, the processes concerning the social structure are, on the whole, planned and designed in advance.
Here also we come to the conclusion that the role of spontaneous processes is limited, although they cannot be completely eliminated or regulated. Nevertheless, their effects are channelled by plans, laws and regulations. It seems that precisely this channelling of spontaneous processes, processes of change and social transformation, this mutual interaction between spontaneous tendencies and processes of planned changes in the social structure through the planning of education, employment, wages policy, etc., is sociologically the most fascinating aspect of the development of industrial society in our country.

The same problem is also treated, if somewhat differently, by Narojek. Having analyzed various processes of social change and various, more or less consciously conceived, social-techniques of economic and social transformation, Narojek comes to the conclusion that
. . . in socialist society two kinds of dynamics coexist with each other: on the one hand, the dynamic of socio-systemic transformation and on the other, the

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dynamic of adaption and praxeological thinking. This results from the fact that (this society) is simultaneously a political movement which promotes social goals on the basis of a given scale of values and a system or organized activity, a planned society.12 This interesting problem is treated more thorougly by Staniszkis, who claims that under special conditions which are inherent to the system, the spontaneous social processes take the upper hand over the general and centrally planned socio-economic strategy. Subsequent strategy is designed to overcome these conditions, transferring itself after a while into a normal one. Consequently, strategies which are designed to deal with extraordinary situations (conflicts, tensions, riots, etc.), in fact, regulate ordinary social life.13 The picture of Polish society which deals mainly with industrialization and urbanisation would be doubly crippling if it were not supplemented with data on the social structure of the countryside. It is generally estimated that just under half of Polands society lives in rural areas. Its structure is complex and differentiated. According to Galeski, (the only existing but still based on the obsolete date synthetic attempt), one can distinguish such kinds of farms: (1) farms which constitute an additional or marginal source of maintenance for the family (there are about one million of such farms); (2) farms which constitute the main but insufficient source of livelihood (less than 20% of total); (3) farms which are the sole source of family support (less than 80% of total); (4) farms based on hired labour (not more than 50,000); (5) agricultural cooperatives, i.e. multi-family peasant farms (in 1962 these numbered 1,342 and contained 26,000 families); (6) large-scale farms, nearly all of them state farms (over 8,000 employing 370,000 people).14 Because of its normative context (contradictory values which weaken traditional social bonds) and because of the influence of modernization processes (especially the impact of the mass media which is orientated mainly towards urban areas), this complicated agricultural structure is predominantly influenced by cultural models originated in the towns. Indeed according to research carried out by Makarczyk and Szpakowski in 1959 and 1969, about one-third of the rural population would like to change their place of residence, from the countryside to towns, other things being equal. This research is all the more valuable and unique for being a follow-up study (1969) to previous research (1959). Analyzing this former inquiry, Makarczyk writes
Trends towards stabilisation in the countryside and in the occupation of a farmer are stronger the higher the economic status of the farm, the higher the social position of the owners of the farm, and the higher the subjective evaluation of their own social position in terms of prestige, income and security.

This excellent study gives several indicators that the impact of urban culture on the countryside has produced and continues to produce a considerable amount of uniformization of the culture of town and country. The task of presenting a global synthesis of Polish social structure then based on the results of existing studies is still an open-ended one. The present attempt to furnish this kind of preliminary synthesis is only able to produce a

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global picture full of contradictions. On the one hand, Polish society appears to be homogeneous (this is due to the relative similarity in the basic centrally distributed earnings of the population), but on the other hand, this society is very strongly affected by the functioning of the secondary unofficial system of economic differentiation and secondary adjustment (second economy). Although the decomposition of previous class distinctions has resulted in the lessening of differences between town and country and between manual and non-manual work, the gap which still divides non-manual from manual workers is substantial enough to constitute an inheritance from capitalist society. Although downward social mobility is perceived as insignificant and upward mobility is perceived as vivid, the mobility to level down individuals leads to a systematic destruction of traditional reference groups and to the weakening, or even elimination, of the previously existing natural agents of social control. The processes of social and economic growth leading to urbanization, and to the relative increase of the standard of living in the seventies and rapid decline of these processes in the eighties, also call into existence various processes and phenomena of social pathology. In Polish research on social stratification, however, these processes and phenomena are amazingly and paradoxically absent. Although decomposition of traditional class structures leads, from one point of view, to a lessening of social and economic differences, from another it also frequently generates an alienation from traditional norms without at the same time creating sufficient premises for the emergence of positive mechanisms such as to help the regeneration of the previously disrupted social bonds. These processes lead to the formation of new individual and social life patterns which have then a tendency to carry out this recomposition on a lower level, on the level of mass culture. However, when mass culture starts to act as a catalyst of recomposition processes by providing ready-made stereotyped models of attitudes and behaviour, it simultaneously blocks the processes which lead to affiliation with the higher social values and deprives traditionally approved values of the respect previously accorded to them. The new homogeneity of value does not lead to the cementing of traditional local ties disrupted by vertical mobility. Moreover, the peasantisation of the towns, although it has recently (in seventies and eighties) lost some of its previous momentum and intensity, can still be felt in another form. The old traditional and neighbourly ways of life of the peasant community where business and service were mutually rendered, has now been taken over (at least in principle) by the rational, pragmatic, and impersonal state administration. These processes give rise to the tendency to achieve success on the basis of other criteria. One of them may be the utilization of privileges which can be achieved through the occupation of a particular social and political position. This is why we can also observe a move towards a situation in which social positions are considered attractive in so far as they constitute a means to obtain an access to social stations which give easy access to attractive social rewards. Nevertheless a peculiar scheme of pyramidal trinity, as the diagnostical picture of Polish society, emerges. At the top is placed a powerful and economically relatively well equipped social stratum (but not well recognized

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sociologically despite the fact that some politically oriented sociologists, as members of the power elite, belong to it). The bulk of the population is situated in the middle (those average members of the society constitute the main target of existing sociological inquiries). And finally a relatively large proportion of Polish society seems to be composed of those who are on the level (or rather below it) of the social minimum. This social structure is also almost exotic sociologically but there are a few economic studies which give reliable insight into this social stratum. (Tymowski, 1973). Since economically significant private property was liquidated in Poland in 1945, it seems to be clear that not financial power but political power and the political network of connections constitute the main factors which determine the composition of Polish society. Thus, a preliminary consideration of the social structure leads one to assume that an analysis of political structure and of various personality patterns, and not of the means of production, is decisive since only they possess the real potential to cope with the new type of social reality. In this respect it may appear that the values imposed on society, by basic notions of the legitimacy of its social structure, could be regarded as essential links between social stratification and the cluster of accepted schemes of life styles. In order to fully understand the functioning and legitimacy of the Polish legal system, it is necessary to take account of the traditional background against which respect for the law was formed. During the period when the country was deprived of independence (1795-1918) law, and especially that part of the legal system which was connected to the state, was treated as a symbol of the invaders power. Lack of respect for this sector of public law was then often seen as an act of patriotism. The national rampageous uprisings (the most important being in 1830 and 1861) which were intended to regain independence were based on an armed, underground struggle and at the same time contained elements of contempt for organic work, based on procedural systematic and legal achievements. The short period of pre-war independence (1918-1939), oriented towards consolidating the country, constructing a new industrialised base and a state administration, and additionally torn by social and political contradictions of a reborn state, could not constitute a good socio-legal school, above all because of the lack of the above mentioned traditionally accepted and sufficiently prestigious structures which could strengthen or generate acceptable types of legal attitudes. The specific period of German occupation (1939-1945) characterized by Wyka as pretense living (limbo life) depended on the suspension of social, moral, and legal norms with such a strength that this relatively short period accumulated a considerable potential. The negative psychological characteristics which arose on the basis of constant bribery, black market activities, as well as strategies originated by the biological necessity to survive maintained their value long after the condition which created them disappeared. Additionally, the Jewish population which had fulfilled an effective role in Poland in trade (as a sui generis middle class since Polish knightly tradition forbade its members to engage in business) was liquidated by the Germans. In consequence, some

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segments of the population which were not equipped with organizational and trade abilities of this type emerged to undertake this task of conducting trade.17 The post-war (after 1945) struggle between various old and new authorities, traditional values and newly imposed institutions, in many areas of social life led to such far-reaching mutual refutation of their prestige that an almost complete social nihilism emerged as a result. Life Styles the Polish Intelligentsia All these and other processes should be taken into account when one wants to consider the actual, rather than the normative, model of the functioning of the life style of the Polish intelligentsia. In a classical work concerning the normative profile of the pre-war Polish intelligentsia which was the general procreator of the Polish social ethos Chalasinski presented the following characteristics of this social stratum*: (1) an essential feature of the intelligentsia is fear of being declassed again (the previously downgraded gentry uprooted from its land fears further downgrading); (2) the code of correct behaviour constitutes a barrier separating the intelligentsia from the lower strata, thus safeguarding its shaky social position; (3) the intelligentsia is characterized by a feeling of superiority which has only spurious social justification. Therefore it displays constant concern for a so-called good reputation and for social respect; (4) the intelligentsia is characterized by its own ghetto sub-culture (the ghetto does not like outstanding individuality: the ghetto is especially negativistic towards young people of talents); (5) a further specific characteristic of the intelligentsia is its unproductiveness elevated to the status of virtue, its orientation towards consumption and its dependence upon those in authority; (6) although the intelligentsia should be considered the main creator of Polish culture, it is basically an amateur creator; (7) the education achieved by members of the intelligentsia possesses a largely decorative character.18 Presently the analysis of Chalasinski has primarily historical value and it cannot be due to the rapid recent social changes taken as a comprehensive picture of the contemporary Polish intelligentsia (mainly due to the rise of the half-intelligentsia, technical-intelligentsia, middle-level intelligentsia, or socalled string intelligentsia.) Nevertheless, it should be stressed that the intelligentsia, as a successor of the Polish gentry, imposed the main matrix for the models and patterns of behaviour of other strata and social classes. This is another reason why the moulding of the newly propagated ethos under socialism is so turbulent in Poland. In the context of the previous analysis, it seems interesting to make an attempt to present a synthetic picture of the ethos of Polish society.
* Ossowska disagreed with Chalasinskis characterization (Ossowska, 1969). Although Ossowska was right to question some of his arguments (particularly where she showed that the picture drawn by Chalasinski is not only specific to the Polish inteligentsia), sill the general tenor of his analysis seems to be well substantiated by historical and sociological data.

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Polish Ethos
In investigating problems relating to the ethos of a society or nation, at least three approaches are possible. The phenomenological approach attempts to penetrate into the so-called spirit of a nation or society. It aims to reveal its characteristic feature and essence. This kind of approach is used quite often and is usually the most attractive and sometimes seems justified (Barzini, 1983) but, by its very nature, may produce jumping into a wrong track as it could happen a false picture. The method which seems more reliable in analyzing the national character of a society is the historical method. This method consists of collecting various facts and historical data which are subsequently used for generalizations derived from this material. One suspects, though, that the methodological procedure for preparing this type of historical generalizations is basically misleading. A priori accepted political opinions, ideological values, and subjective factors, are contained by a certain, usually unrevealed framework, according to which historical data and facts are later collected as convenient illustrations. Another approach is also possible. Anthropological and sociological methods provide, at the present stage of the development of the social sciences, quite reliable empirical data on the basis of which one may attempt to construct an initial global synthesis of the given society or nation. The latter approach has the advantage over the others of being based on data collected in a systematic and inductive way. However, it does have a certain weakness: generalizations based on these data often far exceed their legitimate scope, reliability of recorded answers depends on many circumstances, several problems are regarded as tabu for questioning, etc.* There exist several studies dealing with the basic attitudes of the Polish population. For example, we can mention research into the moral and legal attitudes of society five national surveys carried out between 1962 and 1970 (material published in: A. Podgorecki, 1964; A. Podgorecki, 1966; A. Podgorecki, J. Kurczewski, J. Kwasniewski, M. Los, 1970); into the ethics of young people (Kicinski, Kurczewski, 1975); and into socio-political attitudes (Nowak, 1976). It is worthwhile remembering that some of the above mentioned studies took into consideration representative samples of the whole society and have been systematically repeated during more than one decade (196275). In order to introduce some systemization into this material, one may propose some conceptual differentiations. They deal mainly with different types of attitudes. Declared attitudes are generally those attitudes which are the results of installation into individuals social values by various educational methods, socialization processes, idealistic appeals, etc. Nevertheless declared attitudes are not always identical with approved attitudes. Past and present experiences have taught the Poles to find numerous ways of concealing any possible divergence between declared and approved attitudes. Approved attitudes (attitudes internally accepted) are not always those which are
* Therefore the following reconstruction which utilizes this type of method of ethos of Poles is not free from this limitation.

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externally declared, and they do not always constitute the basis of actual behaviour. They might be suspended under pressure of some kind of ad hoc need or under stress of long and intensive constraints. Attitudes which constitute the basis of actual behaviour (motivational attitudes) are from a sociological point of view the most interesting ones. In fact, they trigger social interactions. Nevertheless, collected material suggests the existence of attitudes of an even more complicated structure. They are meta-attitudes. Four basic kinds of meta-attitude can be identified. They are: fiddling attitude oriented towards survival, instrumental attitude, attitude of spectacular principledness and the all thumbs attitude as being especially characteristic for the Polish ethos. These meta-attitudes do not find direct expression in behaviour. However, they influence other attitudes. Attitudes of this kind operate as hidden forces which exist outside the sphere of perceived opinions and values and which determine how the latter are to be manifested externally. A meta-attitude can thus be defined as a kind of disposition towards a certain type of stable reaction which does not manifest itself externally, but from inside structures externally expressed and identifiable motivations. So we can say that metaattitudes are hidden and petrified attitudes. The most important of these attitudes is the fiddling attitude of survival.* This meta-attitude, which constantly intervenes in the individual and collective life of the Poles, is incredibly flexible. It is constantly tested. Lech Walesa said:
A communique was issued on the subject of my meeting with the Holy Father. I can add only one thing to it. I noticed at one point that the Holy Father looked tired, troubled. I decided to cheer him up, since I saw that he wanted to cheer me up. So I said to him, Holy Father, I think Poland is a chosen nation, the most fortunate nation in the world. The Holy Father looked at me and asked why I thought so. I told him that every day, many times a day, we can define ourselves. We live helplessly, things which are evident are not evident here, black is white for us. We are constantly testing ourselves. That is why we are able to go back to the basics. At the same time we look at rich Americans and ask, What tests do they measure themselves by? Well, they can pick up a new girl, get a new car. . . , . 19

It aims also at accumulating material possessions in order to have security (rather psychological than economic) in the face of uncertainty. The attitude of survival in the particular version worked out by the Poles has an autotelic character (value to itself.) Thus the tendency to acquire relationships (that enlarges the association of equals) loses its teleological origin as a mean to ensure the conditions for survival. Envy then becomes envy for its own sake
* Perhaps an anecdote will be a better indication of the meaning of the meta-attitude oriented towards survival. An American millionaire of Polish origin once told this writer how he had achieved his remarkable success. The owner of several helicopter factories, he maintained that his helicopters were better than any others because they were tested by Polish pilots. They had a gift to find minor defects in the helicopters design which might in certain conditions lead to tragedy. These pilots equipped with the incredible drive to survival were psychologically able to withstand tests and individual strain, which other nationalities were not capable of. Thus, in his opinion, this national characteristic which he had used in combination with American technology, had built his impressive success and wealth.

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losing its original force as a negative regulator generated by the attitude of survival which in an anticipatory way peeps into and undermines the skills and strategies of others, in order to prevent them from threatening ones own options. The Polish strategy of survival at present seems to be based on two contradictory factors. The first factor relies on strong links with the family (mainly nuclear) and carefully selected friends. Quite sophisticated studies indicate that at the forefront of the values respected by the contemporary Polish population is the welfare of their own children and marital success (quite often understood as mutual defence union). Acceptance by others and ones good health are also highly placed (Podgorecki, 1964; Kocowski, 1975). The situations in which the children in Polish families are coming to be treated as idols, symbolizing the closeness of the small group, are characterized by the kind of emotional humanism specific to the world of values confined within the framework of narrow communities. In situations of uncertainty related to the external threat, this internal asylum is treated as both a heterotelic (teleological) and an autotelic value; autotelic because of the rewards which it directly provides, and heterotelic because of the possibility of cutting oneself off from disturbing external events. It is well known that the Polish ethos is characterized by individualism in its traditional and modern versions, as well as by a tendency to cultivate friendship ties. Yet it is not always recognized that in Poland the focus on friendship is an expression of the tendency to associate, by mutually binding decision, with equal individuals. Associating with someone on the basis of ability to make ones own decisions, often marked by Brderschaft, is itself a manifestation of sui generis, arbitrarily established elitarianism. This equality holds for those in the same status category, although not automatically. A voluntary act of internal and selective acceptance is necessary if the potential informal possibilities are to be ritualistically transformed into concrete and stable ties. These mutual ties constitute the unusually strong and vital fabric of the inner life of Polish society. This particular type of social relationship may transfer or degenerate itself into the phenomenon of dirty togetherness. Presently dirty togetherness may be regarded as the second factor of the Polish strategy of survival. Dirty togetherness means that elements of traditional social control, plucked from ethical emotions, are so saturated by various erosive influences that they eventually lose their character as agents of social control and assume new traits of specific perverse loyalty. This loyalty is additionally cemented by family ties, mutual fiddling services, private transactions. These transactions open the possibility of mutual blackmail in case of violations of the reciprocal code of collaboration when the behaviour known to the hitherto tested partners is disclosed. All these ties, manipulative and instrumental in their character, serve to establish stronger links than the impersonal, rational relationships, and in turn create their own superstructure which dominates the social system in which they prosper. Indeed, the fact that dirty togetherness usually is perceived as an influential superstructure by the public at large and the uncertainty where its

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decision-making centre is located, evokes various attitudes of social insecurity. It also induces the strong conviction that only those public programmes have a chance to be materialized which will not be confronted with counteraction by the superstructure of the community of dirty interests. When there is a reason to expect counteraction, or even retaliation, the agents of that community will extinguish any attempts of actions threatening them. Various clusters of dirty togetherness, when they link themselves (or are perceived by the public as interrelated) into a developed frame or superstructure, may have a very important additional effect. They may bond the social system together as a whole. In order to make this point clearer let us connect the notion of dirty togetherness with a short analysis of the concept of legitimacy: (a) Legitimacy which is based on the normative grounds: According to this type of legitimacy, only those regulations and institutions have legal validity which are properly deduced from the legal norms of the higher order. At the top of the hierarchy of all norms exists the ultimate norm (KelsenianGrundnorm) which is regarded as the final source of normative power; (b) Legitimacy which is based on the democratic support of the population: legitimacy which is normatively valid but nevertheless rejected as unjust, reactionary, oppressive by the majority of the population is regarded, according to this understanding, as devoid of legal authority; (c) Legitimacy which takes its validity from the rejection of all other possible options (negative legitimacy): a certain type of legal system which does not have the support of the majority of the population nor is deduced from a legally valid constitution may still be regarded as legitimate if all other options (e.g., lack of sovereignty, war, total destruction) are considered even worse alternatives; (d) Legitimacy which is based on the existence of the superstructure of dirty togetherness: if behind the given legal system (which is rejected by the population at large as unjust, undemocratic, etc.) there operates a complicated infrastructure of mutually interdependent interests, then this legal system may become accepted, not on the basis of its own merits, but because it creates a convenient cover-system for the flourishing phenomenon of dirty togetherness. Then each institution, factory and organization serves, independently from its own production tasks, as a formal network which gives a stable frame of reference for an enormous amount of mutual semi-private services, reciprocal arrangements. For example: the acceptance into a medical school of a daughter of a highly placed person in return for the possibility of buying the unaccessible cement for building a house; the privilege of immediately buying a car in exchange for admission to a well-equipped, specialized hospital for an elderly aunt, etc. In this situation the formal legal network, irrespective of its own questionable productive efficiency, becomes a very precious cover-scheme. It is clear that individuals who operate inside this system will, after a while, start to support this legal matrix not because they accept it (as a system which has a normitive

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validity, or a system which is supported on the basis of its own inherent virtues), but because they become familiar with it, with the rules of its game, with its whos who background and with its conditions of efficiency. It is not difficult to notice that the community of dirty togetherness is defensively directed. It tries to defend itself against the official hostile system in which it operates and which it supports perversely. By spectacular principledness one means the attitude which not only approves of a given norm or value for their own sake, irrespective of the circumstances, but which also celebrates certain norms or values because they are considered sacred and symbolically significant. A clear tendency of the Poles is to accord particular respect to everything connected with the fatherland, political independence, the suffering of the nation throughout its history (martyrology). Also impressive is their organic scepticism regarding everyday systematic work, the apotheosis of such historical events as the Gallant Rescue of Vienna (1683), the Charge at Samosierra (1808) or the Polish participation in the Air Battle of England (1941), the tendency to be the Messiah of the World, and also the celebration of even the least important minor social, religious and state holidays, and so forth. Ordinary, common sense in everyday use, principledness is alien to this attitude. These virtues are treated as autotelic values. The Poles are unable to profit from their heroic accomplishments. Practically nobody knows that Enigma (code machine) was captured and decoded by Polish mathematicians. But practically everybody competent in this matter knows that the ability to intercept German messages sent by this device was crucial for the Allied Forces in winning the Second World War. Practically nobody knows that one of the German V-missiles was captured by the Polish Underground Army and sent to England. This operation too had tremendous value for the Allied military forces. Polish martyrology has autotelic value. The Poles, as opposed to other nations, are unable to translate their own sufferings into political or even economic advantage. Their spectacular principledness has almost become a sacred value. There are data which suggest that spectacular principledness has been maintained in Polish society through traditional attachment to its religion. Survey data from 1964 show that about 86% of the urban and 90.01% of the rural population define themselves as believers.20 Subsequent research carried out in 1966 (both studies based on representative samples of the Polish adult population) show that 72.5% of the urban and 82.8% or the rural population claim to be believers. On the other hand, research carried out in 1971 dealing with what might be called the middlelevel intelligentsia (young people undergoing occupational training in institutions of supplemental education, teachers and local government employees a total of 1,115 people), shows that 64.8% of those investigated defined themselves as believers. Women claim a religious view more often than men. A lower level of education is more frequently associated with declared religious faith. Rural respondents more often than urban ones define themselves as religious. This is also true of older people as compared to young ones. This kind of residue of religious belief may support attitudes of spectacular principledness. It may also constitute the basis for the strength-

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ening of status traditionally ascribed. Thus, religious attitude may constitute an element in a chain linking the attitude of spectacular principledness and the traditional acceptance of ascribed status presently challenged by socialist thought. In order to present more adequately the essential features of the attitude of spectacular principledness, it should be noticed that in Polish society, the value of a gesture is more important than the value of the relevant action which is supposed to solve a given task. To be more specific, in Polish culture, an attempt to do something which has the form of a spectacular demeanour, a form which confronts the problem impressively, is valued higher than a pragmatic, logistic, practical or economic solution. In Poland, the social position of a given person is not determined in fact by its real potential (qualifications) but is established by the social show which a given person delivers when approaching the problem. Symbolic values certainly overpass real ones. Informal evaluations are more significant than tangible, socially and objectively recognized effects of acts and tasks in question. Legends and myths become the most critical factors. The subjective aura of an intended social action and the capacity to transmit it into a social performance visible for relevant audience seems to be more important than the consequences of the actual action. In relation to moral norms and legal norms, this meta-attitude expresses itself as a rigoristic posture. This rigour is, above all, manifest in relation to others, as it seems to be a characteristic of human nature in general. However, this rigour does not remain only at the level of expression. Research shows that the sanctions of the Polish legal system are applied in social life in a manner matching these general attitudes.21 This tendency towards social punitiveness can be explained in a number of ways. One may suppose that it is the expression of a certain kind of ambivalence regarding the law. On the one hand, it may express respect for the law (this is linked to the demand for its widespread application); on the other hand, it may reflect the fact that the law is not adequately applied and followed (so, consequently demands for the strengthening of the law through the utilization of its own sanctions). More convincing seems to be the supposition that social punitiveness constitutes an expression of certain elements of accumulated social frustration. (It should be noted for comparison, that Finnish society, supposedly because of its historical frustrations comparable to those of Poland, also demands and applies the sanctions of criminal law in the large scope). This problem is an extremely complex one. All in all, one may state that when social informal rigour produces expected results, it manifests a genuine respect for the law. In general, an informal legal rigour seems to be more socially effective the greater the extent to which the law is perceived as just and fair. Another meta-attitude common among Poles is instrumentality. Just as the principled attitude accepts or rejects certain norms for their own sake, the instrumental attitude is selective and calculating. On the basis of subjective calculation of profit and loss, it accepts those norms which appear to be convenient for the attainment of desired goals and rejects all others. It would be a fundamental mistake to think that this attitude is as a rule socially

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destructive. It may form the basis for carrying out various tasks going beyond ones individual interest. But, in fact, this attitude is predominantly oriented towards private goals. Research shows that the present younger generation in Poland is characterized by this attitude to a greater extent than the previous generation. We can discern various kinds of instrumental attitudes in the sphere of financial activities, in sex life, in personal relationships, in political options, in institutional arrangements, etc. These different kinds of instrumental attitudes may appear isolated from each other in certain patterns, or they may constitute a whole instrumental personality. A summary of the research done in 1964, 1966 and 1970 on the principled and instrumental attitudes suggested the following: 1. The principled attitude rises respectively with increases with age; 2. The pool of instrumental attitudes rises with the educational level but respondents with higher education (completed or not) are nevertheless disposed to a compromise position; 3. Private farmers are more disposed to the principled attitude than are members of other occupational groups; 4. The principled attitude is associated with living in a big city; 5. The principled attitude is linked more with the lack of an insecurity feeling than with symptoms of insecurity, while the instrumental attitude is associated with a strong feeling of insecurity; 6. Proper adaption to life is essentially linked with the principled attitude, while maladjustment is associated with an instrumental one. A comparison of the above findings with previous ones leads to some modification of earlier formulated generalizations. Among those particularly reinforced by the most detailed 1970 research is the hypothesis regarding the relationship between age and acceptance of a principled or instrumental attitude (rise in frequency of the principled attitude with age) and the relations associated with subjective social straits. The instrumental attitude is thus linked in the previous and 1970 research with insecurity and maladjustment, while the principled attitude is associated in both with proper adaption to life and a security feeling. (The 1970 findings were presented in A. Podgorecki and A. Kojder, 1972.) It is easy to notice that the instrumental attitude may be regarded as a sui generis consequence of the fiddling-survival attitude. It should also be recorded that this attitude is contradictory to all those attitudes which stress the principled approach to interpersonal relationships. So, while instrumentality has some roots in the Polish national character (even if fiddling was directed mainly against governance imposed by foreign powers which occupied Poland through more than one century), it certainly is a calculative, ideological life perspective (even if the traditional spectacular principledness gives a certain type of rationalization in cases of the common, everyday breach of the law). But nothing besides socialism carried on instrumental attitudes to their full blossom. The tension between contradictory hierarchies of values, the constant tendency to suppress the traditional attachments to institutions and organizations generated by Polish society through its history, everyday inefficiency that necessitates marked departures from norms otherwise

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regarded as healthy and valid, erosion of trust among close friends, even among members of the family, the distribution of rewards linked with political flexibility caused by changeable ideological programmes, all combine to introduce, wave after wave, new floods of privately oriented instrumental attitudes or even social nihilism. The all-thumbs meta-attitude is characterized by the imminent impossibility to achieve the desired goal. Thus a meta-attitude of this type leads to the partial realization of the goal (realization of this part of the goal which is not necessarily the most essential one), or produces some additional byproducts which undermine (or even ridicule) the goal itself. It may also create, during the process of the realization of the goal, some side effects turning attention to details which change the whole task-oriented process into a farce. There are many factors which generate this type of meta-attitude. These include the inability to work in a disciplined way, disinclination towards cooperation, the disproportionate pressure of antagonistic circumstances working against the established plan, the bifurcation of contradictory currents which whimsically escape control. In general, one may say that the unexpected but structurally designed dissonance between rational expectations and the results obtained constitute the essential factor of the allthumbs meta-attitude. Although this attitude has always been an ingredient of tragedy, still a substantial element of inadvertent folly is inseparably connected with it. As everybody knows KOR (the Workers Defence Committee) had a decisive influence on the triumphant emergence of Solidarity. Nevertheless the end of KOR seemed to be designed by the spirit of the all-thumbs meta-attitude.
Even after this final act (the dissolution of KOR A. P.) another small chapter in the history of KOR occurred. In itself it was rather minor, but it was widely noticed and variously interpreted, and affected both nerves and health. On the day of Lipinskis speech (Sept. 28, 1981) A. P.), the delegation from the Radom Region of NSZZ Solidarity introduced a motion to the effect that the congress should pass a resolution thanking Kor. The chairman of the Radom region explained why it was this particular region that was introducing the motion, which given the events of 1976 and the enormous work which KOR had accomplisheed in Radom was rather obvious. Late in the evening, after the conclusion of the plenary meetings, Pawel Niezgodzki suggested that the delegation of Mazowsze should introduce a countermotion. This was a long and affected statement containing a number of formulations from the preface to the project of the program of Solidarity, as well as many other statements, such as that Poland has been Christian for a thousand years, that the Church and the pope have played an enormous role in creating the situation that made this congress possible, and so on. The motion also contained a single sentence positive about the democratic opposition, without any specific mention of KOR (though it was not the democratic opposition, but KOR that was dissolving) . . . The motion was withdrawn. And is this silly episode to serve as a conclusion to the history of KOR ? It must,

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since the Social Self-Defense Committee KOR no longer existed. Much was left behind, and much will survive for a long time to come: in the people who participated in its work, or those who benefitted from it, in Solidarity, in several important years of Polish history, in the effects that will last for many years, and also in the books and periodicals that constitute a material proof that all this was not just a dream.22 The writings of W. Gombrowicz present quite a picturesque kaleidoscope of the meta-attitude in question. Social roots of this attitude are the following: if one is unable to solve the problems at hand, he might, consciously or unconsciously, transform the solving-task-attitude into a theatrical show. Then gratification does not come from the desired effects, but it comes from the spectacle involved. Conclusion Although the existing elements of the research on the Polish society are, despite the relative sophistication of some of them, scattered, selective and fragmentary, they show very clearly that this society is undergoing fundamental changes. These transformations consist, on the one hand, of the tendency towards a flattening of the social structure through an increase in its homogeneity (the planned decomposition of the classes and strata of the pre-socialist social structure), and, on the other hand, of the emergence of new, unplanned heterogenous strata based on the secondary distribution of incomes which drastically change the officially proclaimed equality. These kinds of processes give rise firstly to a planned social composition in accordance with the ideological measures undertaken to implement the principle of egalitarianism, and secondly, to a recomposition which is contrary to the expectations of the planners. Therefore it would be useful in the Polish case which is a deliberately designed societal laboratory, to distinguish between functional recomposition (consistent with expectations) and dysfunctional recomposition (giving rise to unexpected side-effects negative to the planners point of view), and also to distinguish between spontaneous recomposition processes and those which are guided ones. One of the crucial problems concerning society as a whole is the distance between functional and dysfunctional changes inside this society and the extent to which these processes have so far ignored the question of a general psycho-social deviance, namely the special type of societal schizophrenia. These processes lead, as was mentioned before, to a pyramidal reversed triptych: on top we have the purely instrumentally oriented stratum of operators; in the middle is the mixture of those corroded by the instrumentality as well as the mass of those escaping into principal orientation; and on the bottom there is a large stratum of less successful fiddling-survival strategists. The above-mentioned dualism of the processess taking place in the heart of the present Polish society has its equivalence in the life style of the Poles which is expressed in sui generis social ambivalence, kept under control by,

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among other things, the most excessive vodka-alcoholism in the world (the USSR does not publish the relevant data). It is maintained by the constant pressures created, on the one hand, by the fear of authority which comes from pragmatic and practical sources (if a given government possesses the total legal and factual power, it seems to be conformistically well advised to comply with its regulations) and the mission type of attitude of the traditional Polish intelligentsia. The latters watch-dog pressure constantly reinterprets all regulations issued by the government. Thus, a member of the Polish society is according to these contradictory pressures, always under the scrutiny of an official control and the stress of an invisible peer-group force. In short, both give him contradictory guidance. It is not difficult to see that these two sets of factors (official and informal) reinforce the continuous growth of a schizophrenic personality based on ambivalence.* The assertion that the ethos of the Poles is an outcome of this nations past history would be merely banal if it were not for the fact that the modern structure and stratification of Polish society seems to be molded by the above-elaborated personality patterns. More concretely, the specific type of the underdevelopment of Polish society (due to lack of a developed middle class) shifted the trends of its societal development towards the ethos of higher social classes, thus giving these classes almost direct access to the process of designing basic patterns of life for the lower social strata. Thus in the historic progress of amalgamating the structure of Polish society, the positive economic motivation did not have enough momentum for development comparable to that in Western Europe. This, in effect, led to a situation in which the socially established patterns of behaviour (meta-attitudes) became decisive. If these generalizations are correct, then Polish society illustrates a case which directly contradicts the Marxist way of thinking. It presents a situation in which the Marxist superstructure is more influential than the base. In any case, the explanatory potential of the above-presented ideas of meta-attitudes seems not to be exhausted. The functioning of the sociopolitical elite may be explained through the shift of instrumentally oriented members of this society towards the top positions of power. The perseverance of these institutions which, being hated by the overwhelming majority, continue to exist may be explained not only by the use of force but also, to a large extent, by the phenomenon of dirty togetherness and by the functioning of this part of the instrumentally greedy half-intelligentsia which is motivated by the drive to compensate for its low social origin. Therefore, the vast sector of public economy and administration operates as a consequence of the perverse support which it gains from the fiddling-survival and instrumental attitudes. For fiddling-survival attitudes seem to be responsible for the miraculous transformation of the existing institutions and organizations
* It is interesting to notice that in Poland those who possess the power are, of course, not eager to reveal that the very basis of their existence is not supported by the public at large. And this is precisely why those who occupy official positions curtail studies which try to enter into this area. As a result, there are research blanks and spots. In consequence, the existing diagnostic and synthetic picture of the Polish society, based on the systematically collected data, becomes dangerously crippled.

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into a hidden second life (second economy) system which supports them. The very simple rationale for this is that, when official institutions and organizations give the shelter for second life activities which blossom under its cover, practically all who participate in it have some vested interests in keeping this formal system going. All in all, one may say that, on the grounds of repeated negative historic and collective experiences, the described meta-attitudes have been, by trial and error, singled out and selected as the most suitable. In consequence, meta-attitudes such as fiddling survival, instrumentalism, spectacular principledness, all thumbs, represent the unique historic resultants of the life of Polish society. Since recent Polish history was shaped by foreign regimes and upheavals to regain independence, wars and more or less open dissident movements, those attitudes may be regarded as the most crucial elements of Polish social life. They structure the social structure. Independently of all changes in the social structure and independently of all clashes of old and new values taking place in Poland after the Second World War, the real picture of this society remains a dark enigma. So, why have the seemingly dynamic and semi-independent Polish social sciences been, and why are they now, unable to render a diagnosis which might resolve the mystery of this society? Social sciences in Poland recently underwent a rapid transformation. Two categories of scholars started to play a dominant role there: instrumental and spectacular. Instrumental scholars using science as a means to achieve a relatively stable and traditionally respectable career are not concerned with the truth; they are worried about whether they may secure for themselves a profitable life by tailoring the factual data and their interpretations according to the demands of those who are influential. Neither are spectacular scholars, despite their continuous and desperate fights with the rules, able to approach reliably the existing social reality. Obsessed with the competition among themselves in their desire to capture the highest value, the informally binding governance of souls, they are engaged in the self-myth creating processes, since nothing else but a large social visibility may grant them the security and possibility of spreading their ideas. This is why the Solidarity Movement, as a worldwide experiment in social-psychology and politics, did not find, until now, an adequate explanation. What, then, is the uniqueness of this Movement in the light of previous considerations? The skilled workers (with their instrumental orientation) rapid rise to national prominence, and their union (principled in character and the first in Polish history) with the Polish intelligentsia have been, paradoxically enough, directed against the workers-state. Traditional, spectacular drives of the Polish intelligentsia have been reinforced by the encouraging and theatrical role of the Polish Church as well as by the superstar performance of the Polish Pope. Being unable to fight with the arrogant and shrewd neighbouring superpower, the ingenious survival strategy of the Polish people manifested itself through the Gandhi-like attitude of nonviolence. The youthful dominant character of the Solidarity Movement, being in sharp contrast with the

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pragmatism of the experienced older generation, based its values on the respect for the pluralistically and horizontally comprehended values. This pluralistic (respect for various life and political philosophies) and horizontal perspective was not only favourable for democratic renewal; it triggered as well, a strong and accelerating process of the decomposition of discipline and membership in the Communist Party. But when martial law was declared, the same ingenious survival strategy of the Poles did not opt for, as might be dictated by the traditionally Polish belligerent flavor of principled spectacularness, open war with the puppet army or forces from the outside, but unexpectedly called for the social posture of a spurious failure: the all thumbs attitude. This attitude pushed, still boiling, spectacular principledness into the cool and conspiratorial style of the life of the underground (so well developed during the Second World War). This underground life, through its legends, martyrs and subculture, is going to accumulate, crystalize and preserve those values on which the principled spectacularness of future generations will rest. Thus, the development of Solidarity should be regarded not only as a dramatic, pluralistic and nonviolent protest directed against the overgrowth of the inner society of dirty togetherness but also as the further preservation of the specificity of the sacred Polish values contained in a counter-culture. Finally, it is possible to show several interconnections between the various types of ethos of the Polish nation and its social structure. Instrumentality is, obviously, not only a result of the defiant attitudes of the Polish people toward different kinds of foreign powers, which occupied Poland during the last two centuries. Instrumentality is also a result of an acceleration of socio-political (vertical as well as horizontal) mobility which took place in the 20th century and after the Second World War in Poland. Then, several conflicting authorities connected with the various ruling social strata, losing their legitimacies and being officially and forcibly replaced by the competing, although not necessarily socially accepted, power centers, produced as the result of these value struggles a growing skepticism. Thus, socio-political and legal authorities, mutually cancelling each others prestige, generated as the net result, the general attitude of private instrumentality, if not nihilism. Spectacular principledness bound (and binds) together many features of Polish history; especially its grandiose medieval heritage as one of the most powerful and peaceful European states established in the 10th century; a powerful nobility, which in the 16th century constituted around one-eighth of the entire Polish population and had the right to elect its kings democratically; the nobilitys highly treasured and, the earliest in Europe, inter-class democracy, as well as, when Poland lost her independence in the second part of the 18th century, the heroic national resistance against various types of external oppression. Survival strategy contributed much to the preservation of national values (which were mainly of a societal, show-nature, potlatch type character) during the long period of German and Russian occupation. The all thumbs attitude, being strongly connected with the amateurish ethos of the Polish nobility and its product, the intelligentsia, manifested itself

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not only by the inherent inability to achieve something tangible and to apply it to reality task-oriented patterns of social behavior. It also manifested itself by the lasting domination of these patterns of behavior, not only over the weak Polish bourgeoisie (since the task-oriented Jewish middle class was, to a large extent, alienated from Polish society), but domination over the weak Polish working class as well (which was rather inclined to regard national independence as a more important issue than the problem of class revolution). Self-oriented irony plays, in the case of this attitude, the role of a mechanism which tries to screen individual and societal dignity behind ones own mockery.
NOTES
1. W. Wyrwa, Historia lat siedemnastu, Aneks, 1986, pp. 41-2. 2. St. Nowak, Psychologiczne aspekty przemian struktury spolecznej i ruchliwosci spolecznej, Studia Socjologiciczne (Studies in Sociology), No. 2/21, 1966, p. 89. 3. J. Szczepanski, Elementarne pojecia socjolgii (Elementary Notions of Sociology) (Warszawa: P. W. N , 1970), p. 497. 4. W. Wesolowski, A. Sarapata, Hierarchie Zawodow i Stanowisk (Hierarchies of Professions and Positions), Studia Sociologiczne (Sociological Studies) No. 2, 1961, pp. 107108. 5. Ibid., p. 116. 6. K. Slomczynski, Zroznicawanie spoleczno-zawodowe i jego korelaty (Socio-Professional Differentiation and its Correlation), Wroclaw, Ossolineum, 1972, pp. 268269. 7. W. Warzywoda-Kruszunska, Zbieznosc Cech Spolecznych Wspolmalzonkow (Congruency of Social Characteristics of Spouses) in: Struktura i Ruchliwosc Spoleczna (Structure and Social Mobility), K. Slomczynski, W. Wesolowski, eds. (1973), p. 24. 8. E. Dyoniziak, Potrzeby konsumpcyjne a problem Falszywej swiadomosci (Consumptive Needs and the Problem of False Consciousness,), Kultura i spoleczenstwo (Culture and Society), no. 2, IV, XI, 1967, pp. 211212. 9. J. Szczepanski, Przemysl i Spoleczenstwo w Polsce Ludowej (Industry and Society in Peoples Poland) (Wroclaw: Ossolineum, 1969), pp. 446488. 10. Ibid., p. 480. 11. Ibid., p. 492. 12. W. Narojek, Spoleczenstwo planujace (Planning Society) (Warszawa: P. W. N., 1973). 13. J. Staniszkis, Patologia struktur organizacyjnych, (Pathology of Organizational Structure) (Wroclaw: Ossolineum, 1972), pp. 145146. 14. B. Galeski, Socjologia wsi (Rural Sociology) (Warszawa: P. W. N., 1966). 15. W. Makarczyk, Z. Szpakowski, Przemiany zycia spoleczno-kulturalnego ludnosci wiejskiej (Changes in Social Life of Peasant Population), Warszawa, Usrodek Badania Opinii Publicznej i Studiow Programowych (Centre of Public Opinion Studies), 1972, p. 59, table 48. 16. W. Makirczyk, Czynniki slabilizacji w zawodzie rolnika, i motywy migracji do miast (Elements of Stabilization in Farmers Occupation and Motives of Migration) (Wroclaw: Ossolineum, 1964), p. 161. 17. K. Wyka, Zycie na Niby (Limbo Life), PIW, 1957. 18. J. Chalasinski, Spoleczna genealogia inteligencji polskiej. (Social Genealogy of Polish Intelligentsia.) (Warszawa, 1946), pp. 3795. 19. Committee in Support of Solidarity Reports, No. 20, Dec. 10, 1983, p. 8. 20. A. Podgorecki, Prestiz Prawa (Prestige of the Law), Warszawa, Ksiazka i Wiedza, pp. 197209. 21. J. Jasinski, Punitywnosc Systemow Prawnych (Punitiveness of Legal Systems) in Studia Prawnicze, No. 35, 1963. 22. J. J. Lipski, KOR, (Berkeley: California University Press, 1985), pp. 454-456.

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