Neoliberalism, Corporatism, and Small Business Political Activism in Contemporary Mexico Author(s): Kenneth C.

Shadlen Reviewed work(s): Source: Latin American Research Review, Vol. 35, No. 2 (2000), pp. 73-106 Published by: The Latin American Studies Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2692135 . Accessed: 05/10/2012 23:41
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NEOLIBERALISM, CORPORATISM, AND SMALL BUSINESS POLITICAL ACTIVISM IN CONTEMPORARY MEXICO* Kenneth C. Shadlen
BrownUniversity

Abstract: In the 1980sand1990s, neoliberalism andchanging policy-making regimes presented social actors throughout Latin America with newchallenges andopportunities. This article analyzes the political strategies developed bytwo organizations smallmanufacturers in Mexico to representing forresponding these sweeping economic andpolitical the changes, emphasizing organizational bases ofpolitical activism. areassessed toorganizations' Strategies according oropposition toeconomic extent to public expression the ofsupport for policies, work which organizations within interest existing arrangements for representation, andthe andtheir political alliances made bysmall business organizations inMexico toradical leaders. Onestrategy entailed economic acquiescing policy topreserve resources a setofcorporatist instituchanges, deploying significant that tions the inregulated business association, andsupporting government Another cumbents. entailed criticism strategy voicing persistent public ofneoa national liberalism, and spearheading campaign against business corporatism, supporting the Center-Left opposition. Analysis ofthese strategies demonstrates the important effects ofinstitutional legacies during periods ofregime change. The institutions itdifficult perseverance ofcorporatist canmake weak actors for toshed oldmodes of activism, notwithstanding a changed array ofmaterial and incentives. political

Inthe1980s Latin and 1990s, countries throughout America adopted neoliberal modelsofeconomic that featured extensive development trade liberalization, offoreign ofstate enderegulation investment, privatization and fiscal In many neoliberalism has been terprises, orthodoxy. countries, ofinteraction between eliteeconomic actors accompanied by new forms in economic and thestate.'Thesemajor and thenature of changes policy
*1wish to thanktheLARR editorsas well as fiveanonymousreviewersalong withJeffrey Anderson and Eduardo Silva fortheirextensiveand constructive evaluations of thisarticle. Thanks are also extended to Ruth BerinsCollier and David Collier forthe insightful commentsthattheyhave provided at various stages of thisproject. 1. For an overviewof neoliberalreforms throughout the region,see Varas (1995). For case studies thatemphasize the changingrole of big business, see Bartelland Payne (1995) and Durand and Silva (1998). Latin American 2 ? 2000 Research Review volume35 number

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Review Research Latin American ofstate-societal relapatterns havedisrupted long-standing making policy ofrepresentation and prompted socialactors to developnew forms tions 1997). and Korzeniewicz participation (Smith andpolitical difparticularly and 1990s havepresented ofthe1980s Thechanges neoliberal toward Theirorientation to smallbusinesses. ficult challenges ofanalyses thetypical focus from largefirms, them reforms distinguishes accessto firms have minimal generally ofbusiness and politics. Smaller information andmarket on lessproduct credit andtechnology and operate often lackimofsmallbusinesses than firms. Owners and managers larger their emto train and retrain skills and theresources portant professional adjusting havemoredifficulty typically Thussmallindustrialists ployees. inforeign threatened bydirect and aremore competition to international and thereIn addition, theelimination ofmany state subsidies vestment.2 trade in government that have tendedto accompany ductions purchases programs anti-inflationary as partoflarger and investment liberalization In short, market. small powerin thedomestic dampenmass purchasing promise ofneoofthepotential advantage difficulty taking firms havemore in obstacles facegreater and they opportunities, liberalism, suchas export inthedomestic competition thechallenges posedbyincreased overcoming market. in response to neostrategies willcontrast thepolitical Thisarticle in Mexsmallindustrialists representing liberalism oftwo organizations dimenalongthree underanalysis can be considered ico.3 The strategies to foror opposition of support sions:organizations' publicexpression workwithin existing economic theextent towhich organizations policies; outside or for as opposedtoworking interest representation arrangements andthepolitical alliances formed bysmall evenseeking todismantle them; strategies Thesetwocompeting business and their leaders. organizations arelabeledhere accommodationist and dissident. inMexicosought toacofsmallindustry Themainrepresentatives occasioned tothechanging environment. Whilethis commodate response acwhenexpressed and in safeforums, somepubliccriticism, cautiously neolibertolerated and even endorsed has commodation characteristically and workwithinexisting alism.Accommodationists seek to preserve
see and technology, access to credit ofdifferential on theeffects statements 2. For important Evans (1979), Maxfield (1990), and Berry(1993). For discussions of the impedimentsto adjustment facedby smallproducersin Mexico,see RufzDuran and Kagami (1993),Ruiz Duran view thatexand Schadtler(1992),Alarc6n(1994),and CONCAMIN (1991). For a contrasting see Rubio (1988). to demonstrate flexibility, pects Mexican small firms have been classifiedby the Secretariade Comercio y 3. Mexican business establishments FomentoIndustrialas "micro" with 1 to 15 employees, "small" with 16 to 100 employees, "medium" with 101 to 250 employees,and "large" withmore than 250 employees (SECOFI to micro,small,and medium-sizedbusinesses (those with250 em1991). I use smallto refer ployees or fewer).

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bentoextract andtouse them interaction for state-business arrangements articulation for interest channels evenas theprincipal thestate, from efits and more internalarger representing byorganizations dominated become ofthelong-ruling remain supportive firms. Accommodationists tionalized mofrom byrefraining Institucional (PRI).In sum, Revolucionario Partido to attempting changes, policy economic tothreatening opposition bilizing relaof state-societal and old patterns old tiesto stateofficials preserve PRI,theaccommodationists theincumbent supporting and loyally tions, theefminimize andthereby atthemargins policy havesought toinfluence ofneoliberalism. fects with identified clearly most theorganization Inthe1980s and 1990s, de Transhas beentheCamaraNacionalde la Industria accommodation official representawhichhas monopolized formacion (CANACINTRA), reaccommodationist CANACINTRA's tothestate.4 tion ofsmallindustry economic extensive toimplement allowedtheMexican government sponse from smallbusinesses. only tepidopposition reforms with ofthe to thechallenges responded A secondgroupofindustrialists thecontent ofneoliberal economic strongly bycriticizing 1980sand 1990s Thesedissinature ofeconomic policymaking. policyand theexclusive whatthey and they assailand seektodismantle neoliberalism, dents reject forrepresenting businessinterests. institutions regardas undemocratic new thedissidents haveoptedfor accessto policy minimal making, With orwith nongovernmental mobilization bycollaborating modesofpolitical an opand supporting socialmovements and anti-neoliberal ganizations thePartidode la Revolucion of theCenter-Left, party political position Democratica (PRD). ofrebel smallindustrithis group years, Formostofthelasttwenty Butin recent the ofMexicanpolitics. years, alistsremained at thefringe as wellas community thesmallbusiness oftheir base within broadening actors haveconwith various nonbusiness haveformed thealliances they detothePRI and theneoliberal tobroader multiclass opposition tributed model. velopment and dissident, accommodationist To explainthesetwo responses, busibasesofsmall andorganizational onthematerial willfocus this article small economic In addition to difficult challenges, activism. nesspolitical them thatfurther distinguish challenges firms also facea set ofpolitical to delacktheresources ordinarily from Smallindustrialists bigbusiness. tohavedirect contacts arelesslikely their interests fend They individually. haveminiinvestment decisions individual and their with makers, policy havea consequently as a whole.Smallfirms mal impact on theeconomy
4. Small manufacturing firms are notexclusivelymembersofCANACINTRA, nor does its has servedas theofofsmall firms, but thechamberhistorically consistentirely membership in Mexico. of small industry ficialrepresentative

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yetcollective interests, their todefend organization formal needfor greater them.5 difficult for is more action withless combined organization offormal importance The greater action yieldsignificant to collective theimpediments to overcome ability Smallbusiactivism. of political strategies forsmallfirms' implications regulate that institutions state by"corporatist" affected may be more nesses state For smallfirms, representation.6 and interest organization interest such as compulframeworks, corporatist through delivered concessions impediforsurmounting ingredients can be essential sorymembership, organizacangenerate however, Suchconcessions, toorganization.7 ments ofsuchconcessions to theremoval and vulnerability tionaldependence, retheir to modify smallfirms representing organizations can encourage is thusa dependence Organizational changes. toeconomic policy sponses ofaccommodation. a strategy underlying keycondition aspectsof smallbusinessactivism organizational Two additional and organizations ofbuilding processes First, thedifficult merit attention. mayeninstitutions linksto policy-making cultivating and maintaining thedevelopand thusdiscourage in political strategy continuity courage to theextent Second, channels. ofnew alternative ment and exploitation to accruedisproportionately thatconcessions gainedby accommodation in thestate ofsupporting a strategy ofa given organization, theleadership members from backlash togenerate is likely suchconcessions for exchange canhave however, Failedprotest, fewer ofthebenefits. who arereceiving reinforcand subsequently dependence effect ofexacerbating theperverse accommodation. underlying conditions ingtheorganizational on how state focuses Thefirst sections. offour consists Thisarticle acandpolitical organization business ofsmall shapedpatterns institutions theemerThisperiodwitnessed the1970s. the1940sthrough tivism from that has playedan ima business organization genceofCANACINTRA, thechallenges Thesecond section analyzes roleinMexican politics. portant becamedividedoverthe and 1990s, whensmallindustrialists ofthe1980s howthecorporatist and illustrates to neoliberalism, response appropriate toestablish a more efforts dissidents' small business thwarted framework the dissiexamines The third section of form autonomous representation. anafourth section and the defeat, to their organizational dents'response
forsmall firms has also emphasized thatcollectiveactionis moredifficult 5. Michael Shafer ofcollectiveaction,see Olson (1965). For analy(1994,chaps. 1-2). On thegenericdifficulties processesof organizationinvolved in business associationsand the distinct ses thatcontrast labor unions,see Offeand Wiesenthal(1980),Traxler(1993),and Van Waarden (1991). in the studyof Latin Americanpolitics, 6. For a discussion of the conceptof corporatism (1974),Williamson(1989),and Collierand Collier(1979). see Collier(1995). See also Schmitter would appear to have more in common with sense, then,small firms 7. In thisimportant workersand peasants thanwithbig business.

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for thedissidents lyzeshowtheanti-corporatist campaign openedavenues toestablish tieswith other societal movements.
BACKGROUND: CORPORATISM, SMALL. INDUSTRY, AND CANACINTRA

Thecornerstone ofMexican business corporatism hasbeenthe1941 Ley de las Camarasde Comercio y de las de Industrias (theChambers all Mexican Law). It required firms to joinofficial business organizations ("camaras")that wouldbe regulated bythestate. Thislaw had differential thebusinesscommunity. effects throughout Whileorganizations repreremained autonomous from thestate, theorsenting largefirms generally andarticulation ofsmallindustrialists' interests tobe ganization continued to stateconstraints. in turn Theseconstraints divisions subject produced within thesmallbusiness thatsignificantly affected Mexican community in the1980sand 1990s. To understand political economy thesedivisions, willprovide ontheassociative this section ofMexican background patterns with a specialfocus ontheeffect oftheChambers Law onthepobusiness, litical oftheorganization smallindustry. trajectory representing The 1941Chambers Law made a statutory indistinction between a dimension ofcommerce) andcommerce services considered dustry (with to join industrial In sectors and required industrialists chambers. where did notexist, industrialists weretorequest suchorganizations permission from toform newchambers. Atthesametime, thestate thestate sponsored thecreation in 1941, ofCANACINTRA. Whenitwas established CANACINTRAwas designated for as a mixed-activity catchall chamber newand that oftheir own.Itwas sectors lackedchambers emerging manufacturing notdesignated as a chamber for smallindustrialists perse. The pattern ofinterest the1941Chamorganization thatfollowed bersLaw transformed CANACINTRAintothede factorepresentative of smalland domestic-oriented Mexicanindustrialists. The organization underwent ofinthepostwar rapidgrowth throughout era,as thousands inunorganized dustrialists sectors became tojoinandpay legally obligated dues to thechamber. in 1941, CANACINTRA Foundedwith93 members had 6,700 some9,000 members about11,500 members by1945, by1950, by and closeto30,000 Whileitwas growing, CANA1960, by1970. however, CINTRAalsolostmembers tonewindustrial chambers that wereaffiliated withtheConfederacion de CamarasIndustriales directly (CONCAMIN). in Theconfederation's offive ofindustry consisted chambers membership 1941(including anditgrew to24chambers CANACINTRA), by1944,35 by and 43by1960. 1950, This pattern of fragmentation-from CANACINTRAintosectorchambers-wasmostpronounced in the sectors dominated specific by firms. Three canbe adducedfor reasons this trend. firms larger First, larger
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that typiaction to collective thebarriers havean easiertimeovercoming firms larger Mexican Second, oforganizations. theformation impede cally the to satisfy prepared firms werebetter offoreign and localsubsidiaries and theyweremore new chambers, forestablishing legal requirements to sway theappropriate and resources to have adequatecontacts likely of new chambers. thecreation forauthorizing responsible stateofficials with larger firms smallfirms, cameto represent as CANACINTRA Third, ownorganitheir wanted services different and needsfor distinct interests leavingCANAbig firms reinforced each other: zations.8 These factors and of smallfirms, intotherepresentative thechamber CINTRAturned heightened ofsmallfirms as therepresentative vocation CANACINTRA's toleave. desire bigfirms' thematerinCONCAMINincreased ofnewchambers Thecreation on thestate. Because ofCANACINTRA dependence ial andorganizational in thefastest growth togenerate tended CANACINTRA thesectors leaving cametorepresent CANACINTRA areasoftheeconomy, dynamic themost ledtoasymThisoutcome capital. ofMexican segment from a weaker firms withthestatein thatits relationship in CANACINTRA's material metry and for subsidies, protection, trade cameto dependon thestate members smaller morethanthestate far dependedon these purchases government firms of manufacturing activity. Mexican toeconomic contributions firms' andas a result, this during period, state concessions allsizesbenefited from cametodependonthestate andtransnational capital allMexican virtually howfirms, 1963).Larger 1970;Vernon in thismaterial sense (Reynolds and activity to economic withtheir assetsand contributions greater ever, lacked. Thus that smaller firms a degree ofleverage enjoyed employment, on capital was diminished ofthestate dependence" "structural thetypical grewas the Thesedifferences with firms byCANACINTRA.9 represented in thedecades internationalized becameincreasingly Mexicaneconomy WorldWarII, and thegap widenedbetweenlargefinancialfollowing firms.10 manufacturing and smallindependent conglomerates industrial the for state on dependent also became increasingly CANACINTRA harder to hold the orin made it fragmentation support that organizational imless in general are stymied by typical Capitalists together. ganization ofredistribution to collective action becausean asymmetrical pediments will firms that larger thelikelihood increases within thecollectivity sources 1991). building (VanWaarden oforganization be able tobeartheburdens
(1958). 8. On thisthirdpoint,see Brandenburg ofthestate's dependence on capital,see Lindblom (1977,1982),Offeand 9. For statements Wiesenthal (1980), and Przeworski and Wallerstein(1982). The material dependence of by Mosk (1950),Vernon CANACINTRA's membersduringthisperiod has been highlighted (1963),and Elizondo (1992). in the 10. See Jacobsand Mattar(1985) foranalysis ofthe changingpositionofsmall firms sector. Mexican manufacturing

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was growing, whilethechamber's membership CANACINTRA, Butwith and facilitated havesimplified firms that might thelarge itwas also losing beCANACINTRA also hurt ofnewchambers Thecreation organization. in itssector-not thedues ofall firms captured cause eachnew chamber CANAfora new chamber. ofbig firms thatpetitioned justthehandful ofnewindustrial chambers. thecreation therefore actively opposed CINTRA forthe theChambers Law required stateauthorization Although exofthelaw left stateofficials thevagueness creation ofnew chambers, control over intosubstantial which then translated traordinary discretion, de la Law, the Secretaria to the Chambers CANACINTRA.According and couldbe created whena new chamber Economia was to determine Butthelaw did notspecify the chambers.11 firms should joinwhich which nordid it define industrial chambers, separate for establishing requisites ofmanuthestate woulddetermine whether a group thecriteria bywhich of CANAor remain members their own chamber facturers shouldform had to conform to thereinternal statutes CINTRA.Also,eachchamber's as wouldany ofthelaw and be approved bythegovernment, quirements forauthorization of As secessionist groupspetitioned statutory changes. thepribecame and thestate CANACINTRA objected, neworganizations, couldnotbe chambers Becauseseparate ofthese conflicts. mary arbitrator andthelaw was vagueas tothe authorization without created government of existence and viability newchambers, thecontinued for criteria creating on thestate's discretion. cametodependlargely CANACINTRA Law, CANAthe 1941Chambers Thus in the decades following intwomajor ways. organizationally CINTRAcametodependon thestate toguarantee on compulsory membership CANACINTRA depended First, members. Secondand an expanding base ofdues-paying theorganization creating newchamitdepended onthestate's rulings against more critical, to save CANACINTRA in sectors withmany smallfirms, especially bers, ofmembers. massive hemorrhaging from suffering thetoolsto state theChambers Law gavetheMexican Thefact that tomake chamber leadership CANACINTRA's fate encouraged determine ofaccommodaThestrategy an important smallindustry allyofthestate. supperiod.CANACINTRAreadily tionwas developedin thisearlier issues.The and political portedthestateon a wide rangeof economic such benefited its members, chamber policiesthatgenerally supported local subsidiesthatbolstered and consumption as thetradeprotection from thechamber refrained strong demand. At thesame time, however, to smallfirms, such as inofpoliciesthatwereless favorable criticisms inthemanufacturing sector and taxand credit creased investment foreign oflarge multisectoral conglomerates. that facilitated theemergence policies
11.Jurisdiction in the1960sto theSecretaria de Industriay Comercio(SIC), was transferred and in the early1980s to the Secretariade Comercioy FomentoIndustrial(SECOFI).

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of on an array thestate outofitswaytosupport also went CANACINTRA enviinMexico's postrevolutionary tookon specialsignificance issuesthat defendedgovernment For example,CANACINTRAactively ronment. thestate and joinedwith theCubanRevolution supporting proclamations offoreign purchase in celebrating thenegotiated laborunions and official achieverevolutionary as Mexico'smostsignificant companies electrical (Alcazar1970,53; Puga 1984,199; sincethe1938oil expropriation ment of supportive was notentirely CANACINTRA 1964,85-90). andWionczek strong critifrom refrained generally butitsleaders thestate on all issues, errors toward tobe directed tended andtheir fewcriticisms cisms ofpolicy, would artfully Thatis,thechamber thancommission. rather ofomission "revootherwise ofthestate's intocelebrations advocacy policy integrate political In sum,CANACINTRAexchanged achievements."12 lutionary protection.13 and organizational for both material support accommodationist era,CANACINTRA's the postwar Throughout tension with issueamong smallindustrialists, remained a divisive strategy critmore whoadvocated andthose leadership the between pro-government Theleaders ofautonomy. sacrifice thechamber's andresented icalpositions was growmembership to theresults: their actions by pointing defended Although makers. accessto policy was afforded and CANACINTRA ing,14 the official status provided economic policy, did notdrive CANACINTRA makers.15 with state policy with a reliable setofcontacts chamber leadership
THE CHALLENGES OF THE 1980S AND 1990S: SMALL INDUSTRY DIVIDED

enviand political havefaceda new economic Smallindustrialists pressure crisis and intense wheneconomic 1980s, ronment sincetheearly governcommunity obligedtheMexican theinternational financial from liberalization beganinthewakeof Economic ment toopentheeconomy.16 thedecade (Lustig1992). throughout and continued the1982debtcrisis
12. For examples,see CANACINTRA (1952,1961a, 1961b) and Lavin (1960). of therootsof a coincideswithMiddlebrook's (1995) interpretation 13. This interpretation Mexican state and organized labor. In both similaralliance between the postrevolutionary developed notjust as an impositionofthe statebut as a function relationship cases, thetight to seek politicalalliances. of a weak sector'sstrategy 14. CANACINTRA became the largest single industrialchamber in Mexico, with over eightythousand membersby the 1980s. over policy.An 15. Analystshave disagreed over the extentof CANACINTRA's influence with enteringthe issue that has drawn substantialattentionhas been Mexico's flirtation GATT in 1979-1980,whichCANACINTRA opposed. Story(1982) citedCANACINTRA's opattributed positionto explain in partthedecision notto join GATT. Mares (1985),in contrast, the decision to changes in Mexico's oil reserves,arguing thatCANACINTRA's opposition revealed their PresidentJos6L6pez Portilloand otherstate officials was most notable after and indicatedthatMexico would mostlikelynotjoin. about GATT membership reservations cited,my analysis in thissectionis based on extensivein16. In addition to the references

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in1986 Mexico entered theGeneral Agreement onTariffs andTrade (GATT) and thefollowing yearunilaterally accelerated thepace oftrade liberalizathe tion most and lowering byeliminating quantitative import restrictions maximum tariff from 100to20 percent. Bytheearly 1990s, import barriers moststate had beenreduced, foreign investment deregulated, enterprises privatized, and Mexicowas negotiating theNorth American FreeTrade with Agreement (NAFTA) theUnited States and Canada. The majorchangesin economic policywereaccompanied by the inwhich ofa newalliance between thestate andbusiness, a coemergence hesivegroupoftechnocratic collaborated withthe policymakers closely oftheMexican thestate, a closely topstrata business community. Within knitgroupof officials withextensive linksto theinternational financial cameto control ofeconomic community keyaspects policy making (MaxIn theprivate field 1991; Centeno andMaxfield 1992; Centeno 1994). sector, thepeak representatives ofthebusiness community cameundertheconofMexican which trolofthemostinternationalized was segment capital, toconsolidate for thenewdevelopment anxious business support strategy (Tirado and Luna 1995; Schneider 1997; Garrido and Puga 1990). ofthenewalfiance Eachfeature diminished CANACINTRA's capactechnocratic nature ofpolicy ity toaffect policy making, as theincreasingly ofthemainchannels ofinterest making andbigbusiness's monopoly articulationdevaluedsmallindustry's traditional pointsof accessto thestate. inthetwomost ofthepeThesetendencies wereevident important events riodunder study: a series oftripartite economic pacts that served as the prinofeconomic and NAFTA.Both after cipalmechanism policy making 1987, featured andelite intense collaboration between thestate private-sector proofthe neoliberal model. Forexample, the economic ponents when pacts were being formulated, business was chiefly represented bythepeak-level Conthe NAFTA consulsejoCoordinador Empresarial (CCE).17 Similarly, during business was monopolized de tations, representation by theCoordinadora
actorsinvolved in theconflict, includingMireles,Moreno, terviewswiththemostprominent Romo, and a numberof his closest supportthreeadvisers to CANACINTRA's presidents, ers in the 1986 CANACINTRA election.The analysis is also based on interviewswithlesssections (some involved membersof CANACINTRA in the capital goods and metallurgy partialto theleadership,some partialto the opposition). Bazdrasch,and Heredia (1994).For 17. On the makingof the economicpacts,see Kaufman, for CANACSTRA, see Shadlen(1997,chap.4). analysisofthedilemmathatthepactspresented theactivities The Consejo CoordinadorEmpresarial(CCE) was foundedin 1975 to coordinate thisnetwork, theorganization sectoral Within organizations. ofMexico's variousnational-level representing industry was CONCAMIN (of which CANACINTRA is a member).The other membersincluded theConfederaci6n de Camaras Nacionales de Comercio(CONCANACO, theConsejo Nacional Agropecuario(CNA, agricoveringcommerce, services,and tourism), theAsociaci6n Mexiculture),theAsociaci6n Mexicana de Casas de Bolsa (AMCB, finance), organizations,the cana de Institutosde Seguro (AMIS, insurance),and two multisectoral Confederaci6n Patronal de la Republica Mexicana (COPARMEX) and the Consejo

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Research Review American Latin organiExterior (COECE),a related de Comercio Empresariales Organismos issues.18 on trade business bytheCCE torepresent created zation andCANACINTRA Neoliberalism by presented to thechallenges leadersresponded CANACINTRA byinpolicies ofneoliberal introduction and exclusionary thetechnocratic developedover the previous strategy the accommodationist tensifying influence, waning wereawareofthechamber's they Although forty years. lacked Thechamber ofpublicdissent. feared theconsequences theleaders policyandelite andthetechnocratic directly, policy thepower toinfluence was predmakers accesstopolicy evenresidual meant that process making theleaders'perspective, Thusfrom policy. economic icatedon endorsing themostprudent weakness madeaccommodation and political economic CANACINTRAremained analysis, After considerable internal strategy. toextract inorder framework within thecorporatist toworking committed as possible. benefits as many weredemonstrated ofthisstrategy themerits In theleaders'view, NaofthePrograma thecreation ofthe1980s, challenge major bythefirst Exterior (PRONAFICE).When Industrial y Comercio cionalde Fomento ofits tookadvantage CANACINTRA was beingdeveloped, thisprogram tobecomean within thestate rifts apparatus and exploited status official leadCANACINTRA in 1983-1984.19 inthenegotiations active participant stratoftheaccommodationist as a vindication PRONAFICE erscelebrated CANACINTRA trade, onliberalizing makers intent Facedwith policy egy. toa procommitment thestate's and secure toswaytheoutcome managed A moreconfrontational reduction. tariff gramofgradualsector-by-sector theiraccess to the would have minimized theycontended, strategy, making.20 onpolicy influence their andlimited PRONAFICEconsultations
Mexicano de Hombres de Negocio (CMHN). The Asociaci6n de Banquera Mexicana (ABM), a foundingmember,was replaced afterthe 1982 bank nationalizationby the AMCB, the association. When the commercialbanks were reprivatizedin 1991-1992,the stockbrokers' and theAMCB changed eightmembers, ABM rejoinedtheCCE, givingthepeak organization Bursatiles(AMIB). For an overviewof its name to theAsociaci6n Mexicana de Instituciones see Luna and Tirado (1992). For an analysis of the CCE's public "acthe CCE's structure, tions,"see Tirado and Luna (1995). business associaMexico's export-oriented 18. As its name suggests,COECE integrated organizationremained tions into a single organization.Although this ad hoc coordinating COECE intothemostimportant transformed subordinateto theCCE, stateofficials formally on Mexican business organizationby grantingit a de facto monopoly of representation NAFTA. For more detailed analyses of COECE, see Luna (1992), Puga (1993), Rubio (1992), and Thacker(1996). and Blum (1989) see Rubio, Rodrfguez, 19. For analyses of the PRONAFICE negotiations, and Hobbs (1991). See also Garza (1993,465). 20. InterviewswithCANACINTRA officials.

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Response TheDissidents'

committed to theaccomleadersremained WhileCANACINTRA a advocated in the organization ofdissidents a faction strategy, modationist and poeconomic inresponse tothechanging strategy confrontational more the capital from emerged movement The dissident liticalenvironment. the lamented frequently whereproducers sectors, goods and metallurgy and firms energy steel and state-owned coming from ofinputs low quality to the reacting merely For theseindustrialists, thehighcostof credit.21 thattheappropriate Theymaintained was notenough. state'sinitiatives active industrial policy a more wouldbe topropose for thechamber course of domestic recovery would be based on stimulation in whicheconomic liberalization, trade resisting wouldinclude manufacturing. Sucha strategy thequaltoimprove enterprises ofsomestate theprivatization advocating credit policies.In 1982 moreproductive and demanding ityof inputs, opgeneral the business community's itself from distanced CANACINTRA expecting banking system, ofthecommercial tothenationalization position When accesstocredit. smallfirms' wouldimprove that thenationalization to obtain instead, becameharder and credit was notrealized thisobjective strategy22 with their leaders' dissatisfied increasingly became thedissidents apas the accommodation regarded leaders CANACINTRA Whereas as a viewedaccommodation toweakness, thedissidents response propriate thatthe Theycharged weakness. the chamber's factor thatperpetuated theleadandassailed members adequately torepresent chamber was failing niche as interlocutor. CANACINTRA's withpreserving ers'preoccupation as indias a wholeand itsleaders that thechamber Thedissidents believed onit. andtoodependent thestate hadbecome tooclosely alliedwith viduals from susCANACINTRA wereimpeding relationships In their these view, far from asserted that Thedissidents tothegovernment. taining opposition as the ofthechamber, andinfluence capacity therepresentational improving withorganizational preoccupation CANACINTRA's claimed, leadership the As a result, towardpassivity.23 thechamber statushad predisposed haddeteriorated.24 relations as anactor instate-business chamber's presence evaluation oftheleaddifferent a radically Thedissidents advanced PRONAFICEas anythestate. Theyregarded vis-a-vis strategy ership's was ofgradualliberalization As soonas theprogram buta success. thing
21. For analysisof small producersin thesesectors,see Villalobos (1989). ofcreditin on theavailability 22. For a discussion oftheimpactofthebank nationalization the 1980s,see Maxfield(1990, 153-62). is also a commongrievanceofworkerswithregardto of corporatism 23. This generictrait structures. union leadershipworkingwithincorporatist 18 Dec. 1985,in which the dissidentslamented,"CANA24. See, forexample, La Jornada, but withthe CINTRA has disappeared; it has lost its presencenot only among industrialists destinyof the country."

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Latin American Research Review theBancode Mexico and theSecretaria de Hacienday Credito announced, Publico promised ina March 1985letter ofintent totheInternational MonFund "a complete etary revision oftradepolicy"in order"toreducethe levelofprotectionism."25 WhileCANACINTRA leaderswerecelebrating the"PRONAFICE victory," protection was largely from themetal stripped and capital goodssectors.26 The dissidents regarded as proof suchevents ofthechamber's decayand amplified their callsfor overhauling theorganization's to thestate.The dissidents' relation criticisms the heightened tensions within thechamber. Forexample, atonepoint, a representative of themetallurgy section admonished chamber leadersfornotresponding moreforcefully to "crucially important changes in our government's industrial policywhoseconsequences will be veryharmful forus." In rehe was calledbefore sponse, thechamber's boardofdirectors and accused ofprovoking divisiveness.27 CANACINTRA under Siege Thetensions of produced bytheeconomic and political conjuncture the1980scrystallized thebitter during campaign leading up tothechamIn November ber's 1986elections. 1985, CANACINTRA's outgoing president, CarlosMireles Garcia, designated Juan JoseMorenoSada, thefirst vice-president and director to offoreign trade, as hischoice for a successor be elected inFebruary was opofthecoming The"official year. candidate" In hislong RomoSantillan, theowner oftwofoundries. posedbyRoberto ofinvolvement in CANACINTRA, history Romohad served as president ofthechamber's council and thefoundry metallurgy section. The dissidents arguedthatMoreno'sclose personaland professionaltiesto theSecretarfa de Comercio y Fomento Industrial (SECOFI) and membership inthegoverning PRIcompromised himtoomuch toconfront state In fact, policy makers. several inthe newspapers reported early that two had instructed PresSECOFIundersecretaries campaign outgoing identMireles to selectMorenoas his successor.28 Although theseallegationsremained Moreno'sclose relations withSECOFI unsubstantiated, wereneverin dispute.One businesscolumnist ventured thatMoreno's close ties to the statewould "weighheavilyin the finaldecisionof
25. Journal 28 Mar. 1985. ofCommerce, 26. For a sector-by-sector breakdown of trade liberalizationduring this period, see Ten Kate (1992). 27. See La Jornada, 5 July 1985,and 2 Aug. 1985.CANACINTRA's sectoralstructure consists of approximately115 sections integratedinto ten councils. Foundry is one of the sections withinthe metallurgy council. 28. See El Universal, 5 Nov. 1985;and La Jornada, 6 Dec. 1985.By theseaccounts,Morenowas "a productof the dedazo,"thePRI's mechanismforpresidentialsuccession wherebythe outgoing presidentpersonallyselectsthe party'scandidate. See Excelsior, 5 Nov. 1985.

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are that demonstrated they whohaverepeatedly members CANACINTRA on thepartofthedipositions and independent ofthelackofstrong tired independence candidate's abouttheofficial rectors...*"29Thusquestions polarized autonomy erosion ofthechamber's overfurther and concerns thecampaign.30 in widened and thedissidents CANACINTRA Thedividebetween whenRomoand foursup1986elections, oftheFebruary theaftermath that They charged was fraudulent.31 victory Moreno's claimed that porters to buysupport, thatstate funds Mireles and Morenohad used chamber votes,and to changetheir officials paid someCANACINTRAdelegates that theprotoensure process theelectoral that SECOFI had manipulated of noneoftheseaccusations wouldwin.Although candidate government contributed they were proved, inchamber elections interference government attributed Thatis,Romo'ssupporters formation. political tothedissidents' in CANAtheirelectoralsetbackto the state's capacityto intervene a keycharacterofdocileleaders, thevictory toguarantee CINTRAaffairs ofcorporatism. istic were thechamber defaming accusedofpublicly dissidents Thefive by CANACINTRA. Theyresponded suspendedand thenexpelledfrom Nacionalde InoftheAsociacion theformation announcing immediately that wouldrespond (ANIT),an association de la Transformacion dustriales that truly tohavean organization ofmany entrepreneurs "totheyearning as a civilassociation legalregistration Whengranted them."32 represents ofthedissident and thefounders 94 members, ANITcounted later in 1986, of3,000 byyear'send.33 a membership association expected did andthedissidents leaders CANACINTRA between Theconflict of ANIT. creation andthe ofthe leaders opposition the not endwith expulsion assaulton CANACINTRA's a frontal mounted The new groupquickly "onacthat inMexico. Stating industry as therepresentative ofsmall status theorganization and manipulated havecontrolled count ofthepeoplethat itsmemhas stopped serving thelastseveral for [CANACINTRA] years, outthosethings to throw itwas "necessary that Romoproclaimed bers," as "oneof tobyone observer Referred no longer servea purpose."34 that a offices ANITopeneditsfirst that exist today,"35 thetwoCANACINTRAs in office complex immense nine-story blockawayfrom CANACINTRA's Mexico City.
4 Nov. 1985. 29. HerminioRebollo Pineda, "De IP," El Universal, each and theyeven threaten looks,theyshoutat each other, 30. "Theygive each otherdirty 27 Jan.1986. other."See La Jornada, 26 Feb. 1986. 31. La Jornada, 24 Apr. 1986. 32. Romo, as citedin La Jornada, 33. El Nacional,14 Aug. 1986. 14 Aug. 1986. 34. La Jornada, 7 July1986. "Empresa,"La Jornada, 35. AlbertoBarrancoChavarrfa,

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thedission behalf ofCANACINTRAstymied Stateintervention CANAof displacing and ANIT's ambitions however, dents'challenge, oftheways in whichtheMexican Analysis dissipated. CINTRAquickly willhelpexplain why challenge backthis turn state helped CANACINTRA by theend of the anti-corporatist becameso vehemently thedissidents off in fending assistance appealedto SECOFI for decade.CANACINTRA insevbehalf on thechamber's and SECOFIintervened ANIT'schallenge, instrueconomic coercive deployed thestateapparently eralways.First, stunt the and thereby industrialists ments to harasssomeofthedissident Second,SECOFI officials businessorganization. of thefledgling growth Law to bytheChambers afforded prerogatives used a setofdiscretionary SECOFIemployed Third, chamber. industrial thecreation ofa rival prevent of Law to uphold the legal standing aspectof the Chambers another making, ANITaccesstopolicy leaders. Fourth, bydenying CANACINTRA torepresent small industry. efforts undermined thedissidents' state officials to subject themselves ofANITfound members prominent Themost and denials ofperthat included inspections, audits, reprisals government at officials, that government maintained mits.36 One ANIT director in his and Romo's firms.37 laborproblems Moreno'sbehest, instigated and movedto Houstonto pursuea Romoeventually -soldhis foundries that tosuggest onecolumnist venture a colleague, prompting business with Like at CANACINTRA.38 intoexileby "hisenemies" he had beendriven the elections, 1986chamber offraud theFebruary following theallegations The is hardtodocument. difficulties industrialists' inthese roleofthestate did ordid notdo butthedissidents' is notwhatthestate point significant intervention this and that wouldhelpCANACINTRA belief that thestate tothegovernment. indebted wouldmakethechamber evenmore toprevent thedissialso calledon thegovernment CANACINTRA thehistory Throughout chamber. industrial a separate from creating dents and had left theorganization ofCANACINTRA, groupsofindustrialists them with more specialized chambers that provided formed sector-specific to ANIT sought The dissidents who formed and services. representation Nacionalde la Into create theCaimara thesamepath, attempting follow a fearing CANACINTRA, de Bienesde Capital(CANABICA).39 dustria their ownchamplantoform opposedthedissidents' drain onitsrevenues, formembers, buton and ANIT werein competition ber.CANACINTRA
36. La Jornada, 27 Oct. 1986. 37. Excelsior, 2 Jan.1987. 38. La Jornada, 24 Nov. 1986. 39. The initialefforts to createthischamberoccurredwhen the eventual leaders ofANIT ANIT foundersaimed to were stillmembersof CANACINTRA. Its titlenotwithstanding, attract producersof capital goods and metal goods.

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Law BecausetheChambers status. due toANIT'sunofficial uneven terms dues to a single joinand pay membership eachindustrialist that required indusrecognized was an officially chamber and becauseCANACINTRA source and a robust itsmembership guaranteed chamber, corporatism trial madememas a fledgling association ANIT'sstatus Incontrast, ofrevenue. to werepaid inaddition andanyduespaidbymembers voluntary, bership would Becausea new chamber thedues already paid to CANACINTRA. away sectors in thecapital goodsand metal ofsmallfirms takethousands a chamber ANITinto toconvert effort thedissidents' CANACINTRA, from dues-paying to retain its substantial ability CANACINTRA's threatened the therefore appealedtoSECOFI toprevent CANACINTRA membership. chamber.40 industrial from a separate creating dissidents was stillchamber a separate to create movement The dissidents' IfANITwere didnotreceive state authorization. becauseCANABICA born itwouldhavetodo so as a for CANACINTRA members, with tocompete of small capitalgoods and Producers association. industrial voluntary their dues totheoffitocontinue paying obligated metal remained legally memrefused topaytheir ANITmembers most Although cialorganization. members couldbe exnotall potential dues to CANACINTRA, bership toengageinsuchcivildisobedience.41 pected autholeadersand blocking thedissident In addition to harassing thestate intervened onbethethird wayinwhich ofCANABICA, rization a changein the chamber's halfof CANACINTRAwas by authorizing of of a number thatclearedup doubtsaboutthelegal standing statutes 1986 contested theFebruary Whenthedissidents officials. high-ranking in thepresidenvictory notjustMoreno's challenged election they results, boardas well.They ofthechamber's executive butthelegality tialcontest own statutes violatedthechamber's thattheelection results maintained board. executive on theCANACINTRA limit on service a two-year setting
to gain official 40. A second reason why CANACINTRA objected to the dissidents' effort and attacksto be lestatuswas thatthe chamberdid not want a constantsource of criticism problems.The disserious public-relations ANIT caused CANACINTRA officials gitimated. sidents were determinedto embarrassthe chamber and its leadership publicly and were positions equipped to do so. The leaders of ANIT had been active and risen to prominent ofsectionsand councilsand membersoftheexecutive withinCANACINTRA. As presidents board, theyhad become familiarwith the innerworkingsof the chamber.Their criticisms recognized industrialchamberthatmight could be damaging if coming froman officially But ANIT critiattention. compete with CANACINTRA formembershipand government cisms would be much more manageable so long as CANACINTRA's leadership could disof a small associationformedby a group of dissidentsdisgruntled miss themas the ranting bid forpower. Concerned withthe damage thatthe dissidents'criticisms by theirfrustrated on CANACINTRA's image, the chamber's leaders also appealed to other were inflicting 18 May 1987. business organizationsto repudiateANIT. See La Jornada, dues included fines, 41. The sanctionsforthosewho did not pay theirannual membership to conductbusiness withthe public sector. of the right and forfeiture blockingof permits,

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be would allegedly and thetreasurer twoofhisvice-presidents, Moreno, the Morethana yearafterward, oncereelected.42 theselimits exceeding The new thestatutes. modifying considered assembly general chamber's term regarding theambiguity wouldclarify byMoreno proposed statutes totheChambers According inthefuture. suchcriticisms and deflect limits by was tobe resolved statutes ofCANACINTRA's Law,anyinterpretation SECOFI approval. also required statutes SECOFI,and therevised in what chose not to remainpassive bystanders The dissidents andSECOFI.ANITwas CANACINTRA havebeenan issuebetween might small overwhowouldrepresent in a battle with CANACINTRA engaged byhaweakened being after thebattle werelosing Thedissidents industry. The controversy chamber. a separate to form inability and their rassment thechamber chance toundermine was their statutes over CANACINTRA's CANACINTRA'sproposed ANIT called forSECOFI to reject in return. the in a MexicoCitynewspaper, In a full-page letter published changes. recognized toreform thestatutes that Moreno's attempt argued dissidents board thepresident andtheexecutive wereaccurate, that ANITclaims that conTheletter in violation ofthechamber's statutes. wereindeedserving grievthedissidents' organizational a statement summarizing cludedwith of 'leadership' ofthecurrent repudiation ourcomplete ances:"Weexpress in addition to notrepreSada, which headedbyMoreno CANACINTRA for obstacle an important hasbecome ofindustrialists, theinterests senting Weemphasize onceagainoursupofspecific organizations. theformation whobylaw,areobliged ofMexican industrialists, oftheimputations port chamber."43 tobelong tothis in Law making SECOFI thereferee with theChambers Onceagain, appealed forhelp.Again,the such a dispute, CANACINTRAofficials ofCANAThelegality on behalf ofthechamber. intervened government statutes andthechamber's revised boardwas upheld, executive CINTRA's wereapproved.44 the failure torecognize from thestate's ANIT also suffered Finally, itwith accessto andprovide representative as a business neworganization weakfelt that their leaders forums. While CANACINTRA policy-making for with little room left them to making access policy nessand contingent dissidents were effectively The ANIT was lockedout altogether. dissent, bothCANACINTRA's assailing critic, to theroleofpermanent consigned
requestedthatSECOFI Romo's campaignhad formally 42. In theweek priorto theelection, 17 Feb. 1986. invalidateMoreno Sada's slate of candidates on these grounds.See La Jornada, to the chamber's board of diThe dissidentsalso argued that113 of the 190 representatives See El Sol deMexico, 24 Apr. 1986. rectors were also in violationof thechamber's statutes. 28 Apr. 1987,capitalizationin original. 43. El Universal, 21 Jan.1988. 44. See DiarioOficial,

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process and exclusionary and thecentralized accommodation continuing to gain access to thestateprompted ANIT's failure ofpolicymaking.45 Memto CANACINTRA. within or return to remain manyindustrialists accessto at leastminimal toprovide continued inCANACINTRA bership own affecting their problems resolving and somemeansfor makers policy Thusdespite itsconsiderin thisregard. nothing firms. ANIT couldoffer ANIT storm itcreated, and thepublicrelations efforts able organizational members. itsstated goalof3,000 neared never ANIT,appealed undersiegefrom CANACINTRA, To summarize, and thestate byusing responded for protection, organizational tothestate challenge. wardoff thedissidents' tohelpthechamber instruments various withecoblocksas its leadersbecameburdened ANIT facedstumbling chamindustrial ofa separate firms andthecreation attheir troubles nomic wereupheld by leaders CANACINTRA berwasblocked. Atthesametime, moitsvirtual and thechamber managedto retain statues, thereformed ANIT'sprojindustry tothestate. ofsmall representation onofficial nopoly failed. todisplace CANACINTRA organization ecttocreate a rival business
THE TRANSFORMATION ANIT'S CAMPAIGN OF DISSIDENCE: CORPORATISM

AGAINST

Thewaythat didnotdemobilize intervention ANIT,however. State witnessedtheirchallengeto the leaders of the dissidentmovement them on theissueofcorpodefeated servedtoradicalize CANACINTRA to CANAchallenges to notethatANIT's initial ratism. It is important bythecorporatist CINTRAconformed totherulesofthegameestablished within positions to win leadership thedissidents attempted framework: and an official industrial chamber, theorganization, theytriedto create Law to oftheChambers touse therequirements appealedtothestate they Failure to displace CANACINTRA regulateCANACINTRA statutes. their todedicate thedissidents thecorporatist framework motivated within busiLaw and dismantle torepealtheChambers resources to a campaign losing wereinitially "anti-CANACINTRA," Whilethey nesscorporatism. madethem with chamber "anti-corporatist." theofficial theconflict
45. Good examples are ANIT's regular referencesto CANACINTRA's leadership as "pseudoleaders," as is the followingcommentby ANIT PresidentAdolfo Valles Septfen (1991-1993) op the NAFTA consultations:"It is worrisomethatin the face of NAFTA, two by the group,represented groups have been formedin Mexico: on one side the institutional studies,and monographsoftheCOECE; and [on and fedwithinformation, tradeauthorities, the otherside] the legislative,consistingof the chambersof senatorsand deputies,together about the proposwithsmall and medium businesses,who have notbeen properlynotified 16 als because theyhave no directinput intothe process and the discussions." See Excelsior, June1991.

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Review Research Latin American Waging War onCorporatism theleadersofANIT aimed framework, Defeated bythecorporatist ANIThadbeentransformed andearly 1990s, toabolish it.Bythelate1980s in repreexternal support a fledgling organization seeking from business movement smallindustrialists to theleaderofan anti-corporatist senting torepealing Law.ANIT used themediatowage theChambers committed waronthecorporatist the Holdingregular pressconferences, framework. natureof statecriticized the unrepresentative dissidents consistently attacks on theofficial ANIT leadersmadeinsistent business interaction.46 for and theycalledrepeatedly CANACINTRA, organizations, especially memcry was that compulsory Law.Their rallying reform oftheChambers of andthe Universal Declaration violated Constitution bership theMexican a ANIT leadersalso organized which Mexicohad signed. HumanRights, a revised Law anddevelop forums toanalyze theChambers series ofpublic totheMexican Congress. law tobe submitted ANIT leadersused themediasuccessfully and beganto direct sigcorpomembership and business ofcompulsory nificant publicscrutiny in February A significant occurred 1989,whenthe breakthrough ratism. in Expansi6n, magazinein theleadingbusiness dissidents werefeatured Law theChambers their toreform Mexico. Thisexposelikened campaign more press Thearticle attracted Goliath.47 to thestruggle ofDavid versus assertion whenthedissidents' undocumented (andexaggerated) coverage to pay memthat thousand business owners wererefusing nearly twenty inLaJornada business columnist bya prominent bership dueswas reported in March1989.ThusANIT leadersmanagedto keepthemselves and the Law inthepublic as July rumors Chambers 1989, begantocireye.As early culate that wouldconvoke "a forum ofpopular consultaSECOFI officials to Contion"to consider in thelaw that SECOFI would present changes inNovember.48 gress The dissidents' withtheChambers Law was notentirely concern ANITin 1986, hadbeendemanding they new.From thetime they founded ANIT membe abolished,49 and eachyear, thatcompulsory membership
and 46. Rub6n BarriosGraff (presidentfrom1989 to 1991) held weeklypress conferences, Valles Septien(1991-1993)attempted to do thesame, accordingto Puga (1992,42). Since 1993 the last Thursdayof each month. ANIT has held a regularpress conference 15 Feb. 1989. 47. "Microindustriales: De la disidencia a la organizaci6n,"Expansi6n, 48. La Jornada, 19 July1989. The dissidents' immenseskill in using the press also brought themlimitedattention from theacademic community. See, forexample,theopeningsentence in Mexico: "The curiosity of CristinaPuga's monograph on small business representation awakened by the political activity of a business group-the Asociaci6n Nacional de Industrialesde la Transformaci6n (ANIT), which since 1989 has led a visible and well-directed media campaign in defenseof the country'ssmall industrialists-was theoriginof thisproject" (Puga 1992,11). 49. See, forexample,El Universal, 14 Aug. 1986.

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of as another year"indefense anniversary theassociation's berscelebrated theChambers campaign toreform Butthemultipronged free association." goals.In theimmediate change inthedissidents' a significant Law marked theChambers repealing CANACINTRA, aftermath ofANIT's splitfrom Bythelate CANACINTRA. meansofundermining Law was an attractive tobecome with had caused"the means" thestate ANIT'sexperience 1980s, "theend." The broadening of the dissidents'campaignfromanti-CANAbaseofdissent. a wider toanti-corporatist allowed them totapinto CINTRA sector who had nothing to do withCANACINTRA Manyin thebusiness interest orgaofbusiness against thesystem harbored their owngrievances shared businessassociations Manyregional and representation. nization TheChambers and confederations. chambers this resentment oftheofficial almost excluinorganizing theindustrial sector Law largely ignored regions rather Themembers ofproductive than bylocation. activity sively bytype Where industry national organizations. ofCONCAMINaresector-specific involuntary unoffitoregion, itis for themost part is organized according these canjoinCONCAMINand take While associations cialassociations.50 arenotallowedtovotebethey oftheconfederation's services, advantage of members chambers can be fullvoting cause onlyofficially recognized aboutthe associations becameconcerned Manyregional confederations. statuswithin theirsecond-class stemming from lack of representation was exacerbated bythe CONCAMIN.51 Thissenseofunderrepresentation ofthe1980s and 1990s and bytheexclusionary pateconomic dislocations on thetriparwith organizations terns ofstate consultations peakbusiness various business orga1990s, Bytheearly pactsandNAFTA. tite economic had come ofindustry a mixofregions andbranches nizations representing interests wereorgaresentment oftheway business to sharea common intheMexican system. political nizedand articulated at thecoreofa broad Smallbusiness dissidents found themselves that a multitude ofvoluntary business coalition included anti-corporatist An important actor in uniting and from Mexico. associations throughout was theConsejo coalition thisheterogeneous anti-corporatist mobilizing
50. Exceptionscan be foundto both thesegeneralrules.CANACINTRA, forexample,is a Similarchambersexistin thestatesofJalisco(theCamara industrial chamber. mixed-activity or CAREINTRA) and Nuevo Le6n (Camara de Regional de la Industriade Transformaci6n, regionalindusor CAINTRA), as well as a few single-sector la Industriade Transformaci6n, trialchambers(thefootwearindustries of Guanajuato and Jaliscohave theirown chambers). with thatin the ratherthan location contrasts The basic patternof organizationby activity regionalorganizations. where chambersare strictly commercialand servicesectors, represenpattern of interest 51. For a morecompletediscussion of how the activity-based see Hernandez (1991) tationin the industrialsectorleftregionalgroups underrepresented, and Luna and Tirado (1992).

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Latin American Research Review Coordinador de Asociaciones Industriales Inaddition (COCAI).52 toANIT, COCAI's membership consisted of a variety of voluntary associations. COCAI thus bridged various ofdiscontent sources overhowprivate-sector interests wereorganized and represented, uniting them aroundthecampaigntoreform theChambers Law.53 The anti-corporatist coalition became increasingly activein the 1990s via pressconferences, forums, newspaper announcements (desplegados),and, critically, thedrafting of an initiative to reform theChambers Law,which was submitted totheMexican Congress. Theseactivities made the Chambers Law, particularly compulsory membership, a prominent issueinMexican politics. Manyofficial organizations felt compelled toundertake studies to evaluate theChambers Law,to launchpublicrelations campaigns todefend compulsory and to lobby membership, state officials toforestall major revisions ofthelaw.54 The 1941law was replaced inJanuary 1997bythenewLeyde Ca'marasEmpresariales y Sus Confederaciones.55 Rather thandefusing the opposition tobusiness corporatism, law only however, the1997 heightened theconflict. Although thenewlaw complied with formally ofthe thewords Court's Supreme ruling by abolishing chamber compulsory membership, it required in a national participation business and awardedthe registry chambers control overthefunds generated by theregistry. Manyregard thisapproach as a disguised effort toretain state control oroverbusiness ganizations and havemobilized to repealthe1997law as well.Dissidents prepared hundreds oflegalcomplaints that thenational is unconregistry
52. AlthoughCOCAI was foundedin 1982,it was inactivefornearlya decade and has received even less scholarlyattention thanANIT. Hernandez, forexample,noted thatCOCAI was formed in protest ofthebank nationalization but said virtually nothing else about theorganization (1991,461-62). Puga dismissed COCAI in a footnote as "ghostlike"(1992, 37, n. 37). These observers'lack of attention is warrantedgiven the dates of theirpublications.Accordingto a former president, COCAI was merelya social club formost of the 1980s (interview withSergio Rico,Mexico City, 6 Dec. 1993). I foundlittleevidence oftheorganization's activityuntil 1992. In the February 1989 Expansion featureon private-sector dissidence, COCAI was the outlier, stilllauding theunityof theprivatesector.This once-dormant organization was awakened in the early 1990s and united various business associations in the campaign againstthe ChambersLaw. 53. Nearly halfof COCAI's membershipconsistedof associationsfromindustrialregions in Mexico Cityand the stateofMexico, such as Azcapotzalco, Iztapalapa, Tlalneplantla,and Vallejo. 54. See, for example, CANACINTRA (1992), CONCAMIN (1992), and CONCANACO (1995). 55. In 1992 the Mexican Supreme Court ruled thatcompulsorymembershipin business chambersviolatedArticle9 of theMexican Constitution, which guaranteeseveryindividual freedom ofassociation.In Mexico,thesame aspect ofa law mustbe declaredunconstitutional fivetimesto establisha legal precedent. Althoughthefirst rulingagainsttheChambersLaw came in July1992,it was not untilAugust 1995 thatthe five-ruling thresholdwas reached.

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a prominently conremained stitutional, and thusbusinesscorporatism politics.56 tested issueinMexican and1990s andAccommodation inthe 1980s CANACINTRA, Corporatism, inbeganwith thestate's which overcorporatism, Thecontroversy depenCANACINTRA's with ANIT,increased intotheconflict tervention strategy. theleaders'accommodationist and reinforced denceon thestate from ANIT,SECOFI exIn helpingthe chamber fendoffthe challenge and legal concessionsto financial, tended numerousorganizational, organidependent on this evermore making thechamber CANACINTRA, and thelegality ofitsleaderfor itssurvival, revenues, zational protection any to present unableand unwilling was therefore ship.CANACINTRA libertoneoliberalism. After itsinitial protests against effective opposition onlyweakopposiweredisregarded, CANACINTRA presented alization in the1980s and 1990s. ofeconomic tiontotheradical reorientation policy to decision in suchinstances as thechamber's was evident Thisresponse theNAFTA consultations, Also,during theeconomic pacts. ratify regularly ofexwarned ofthethreats owneconomic analysts evenas thechamber's to nevermobilized anyopposition CANACINTRA liberalization, tensive agreement. thefree-trade toneoliberalsector's Thisexplanation ofthesmall business response that smallindusto arguments twist organizational ismadds an important itas part welcomed liberalization because they trialists didnotopposetrade andWise1994). While lackofinofa larger strategy (Pastor anti-inflationary to formation many small businessowners'ability may have affected theleaders of stabilization, oftrade liberalization from separate theeffects andwereawareofthethreats that had enough information CANACINTRA chamber's dependence industry. Rather, the liberalization presented tosmall The onstate from mobilizing opposition. itsleaders concessions discouraged toward accomchamber's position pushedthem organizational precarious to CANACINTRA modation. Thestate delivered organizational protection
repealed. The outcomemerelymeantthatinEven then,the 1941 law was not automatically long courtbattles. withoutgoing through were able to obtain injunctions dividual plaintiffs 30 Sept. 1992; and SIID (1996). The plaintiff See "La rebeli6nde los empresarios,"Expansi6n, withANIT. But thedissidentswere quick in thefirst SupremeCourtrulingwas notaffiliated intotheirown campaign,which forcombatingcorporatism to integrate thisjudicial strategy shaping public opinion, and having had consisted mainly of holding press conferences, Theybecame activelyinvolved in manyof thecases thatfollowed meetingswithlegislators. legal servicesto businesses thatwere sanctionedby the the 1992 ruling.COCAI even offered dues. government forviolatingtheChambersLaw by not paying theirmembership 56. See, forexample, "Rechazan dos millones de pequefios empresariossu afiliaci6nal 9 Oct. 1997. SIEM," Excelsior,

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over debate and theprotracted framework, thecorporatist through mainly comespecially this framework, that the possibility Lawraised the Chambers ofa revised threat Theimminent couldbe removed. membership, pulsory leaderslikethe Law hungovertheheads of CANACINTRA Chambers ofDamocles.57 sword
SHIFTING ELECTORAL ARENAS OF POLITICAL ACTIVISM: FROM BUSINESS POLITICS TO

POLITICS

totake allowedthem corporatism against campaign Thedissidents' Mexicowas experiencing that democratization oftheelectoral advantage as had served channels corporatist State-dominated and 1990s. inthe1980s in thepast.Now,democratizaarticulation forms ofinterest theprincipal especially alternatives, moreeffective new and potentially tionpresented the bycultivating their constituencies tobroaden sought parties as political politics. inelectoral lowprofiles with historically ofsocialactors support to theopportunities responded and thedissidents CANACINTRA depenin distinct ways.CANACINTRA'sincreased of democratization of advantage taking from theorganization discouraged denceon thestate chamtheofficial Instead, bydemocratization. presented theopportunities and thusthebondbetween PRI as itsprotector, bercameto see theruling and thePRItightened.58 leaders CANACINTRA Law opened theChambers against thecampaign Forthedissidents, ultimately community, thebusiness outside alliances building avenuesfor presented oftheopportunities totakeadvantage ANITleaders positioning a targeted from ofANIT's struggle, The broadening by democratization. an unconsticlaimagainst to a moregeneral to CANACINTRA challenge of citizens and deprives representation interest law thatdistorts tutional to thedissidents for opportunities created association, offree their rights was no longer struggle Thatis,their movement. theappealoftheir expand
While thechamused thisphrasein myinterviews. 57. Numerous CANACINTRA officials ber's externalresponse was to defend compulsory membership,internallythe chamber to prepare forthe possible loss of thissubsidy.These reforms began to implementreforms the chamber'ssources of revenueand reduce itsdependence on dues. soughtto diversify 58. Story(1986) providedevidencethatindividualCANACINTRA leaders did nothave inclose relationswiththe PRI fromthe 1940s throughthe 1970s. But a new pattern ordinately had emerged by the late 1980s and early 1990s. For example, Juan Moreno, presidentof in the Camara de Diputados CANACINTRA (1986-1988), became a PRI representative (1988-1991) and then an officialin the Secretariade Pesca. PresidentVicente Guti6rrez (1992-1994) was appointed by PresidentZedillo as a Mexico Cityborough president(deleKawaghi (1988-1990) participatedin Jorge President gado). BetweenMoreno and Gutierrez, the PRI's 1994 campaign,and JuanSinchez de la Vara (president1990-1992) even pledged (the Luis Donaldo Colosio thesupportof eightythousand small industrialists PRI President roughsize ofCANACINTRA's membership)on the eve of theAugust 1991 elections.

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ofsmallindustrialists limited totherepresentation butnowaddressed the to form moregeneral issue of theability associations freeof stateconThiscrusadeagainst straints. corporatism resonated withother socialactors'struggles to democratize Mexicoand could be integrated intothe larger effort.
and PAN SmallIndustry

One might thatthedissidents' expect grievances would have resonatedmost with thePartido Accion Nacional(PAN),a traditionally antiYetPAN's onlyformal corporatist political force. supportforthe anticoalition camein1991, whena deputy submitted an initiative in corporatist torepeal theChambers Law.Presented attheendofthe1988-1991 Congress this initiative was never legislative session, considered bythefull Congress. Nor did PAN representatives in the1991-1994 and 1994-1997 legislatures In fact,a PAN deputywas president of the proposenew initiatives. de Comercio whentheCamarade Diputados received theexecuComision a revised Chambers Law in 1996, and PAN suptivebranch's for proposal thenewlaw. ported PAN's unwillingness to support thedissidents' campaign against of strategic theChambers Law is bestunderstood as an instance partySincethe considerations building overshadowing ideological principles. from active the early 1980s, participation bybusiness leaders, particularly north ofMexico, had givenPAN increased financial visibility, resources, and fresh and had contributed to professionalizing theparty.59 leadership from thecommercial and service sectors ManyofthesenewPanistas parinlocalchambers ofcommerce andtheConfederacion de ticipated actively CamarasNacionalesde Comercio (CONCANACO). This confederation, which collected dues from hundreds ofofficial chambers across thecounwas one ofthebusiness in mostthreatened try, organizations bya change ofcompulsory thelaw.CONCANACO was therefore a leadingdefender inthe thedebatesparked membership throughout bytheanti-corporatists PAN proceeded 1990s.Reluctant to alienate thisimportant constituency, On one hand,party on thequestion of theChambers Law.60 cautiously declarations thelaw,and PANofleaders madepublic consistently against ficials criticized thegovernments ofPresidents CarlosSalinas(1988-1994) and Ernesto Zedillo(1994-2000) fortheir new longdelaysin submitting
59. For analyses of the relationshipbetween business and PAN, see Arriola (1994) and Mizrahi (1994). 60. Based on interviews with PAN officials, Sept.-Oct. 1993 and June1997,also on an interviewwithCONCANACO's presidentofbusiness development,9 Feb. 1994.The factthat the dissidentsalso opposed the neoliberal economic model, which PAN has strongly supported,made it easier forPAN to disregardthem.

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Butwhenpush threats to bypassCongress. constant legislation and their by thenewlaw proposed PANsupported cametoshoveinthelegislature, tobe an PAN for claiming ANIT then criticized President Zedilloin 1996. whilesupportparty "anti-corporatist," and "pro-business" "democratic," opposed as of thebusinesscommunity thatone current ing legislation In thedebatesin theCamarade and anti-democratic.61 beingcorporatist assailedPAN'sinofthenewlaw repeatedly critics Diputados inlate1996, consistent position.62
and thePRD SmallIndustry

thedissidents' corporatism, overbusiness Throughout theconflict critiarenawas thePRD. Theparty advocate in thepolitical mostreliable excessive capacity and assailedthestate's membership cizedcompulsory inthechambers' affairs. thedissidents' grievEchoing tointervene internal business theofficial thelackofrepresentation within thePRD linked ances, as 1993, As early on thestate. to thechambers' dependence organizations reform oftheChambers Law,arguing PRD deputies a proposed presented law" produced unrepresentative and anti-democratic that the"corporatist freeoftheir in thebusiness sector and deprived Mexicans organizations domtoassociate.63 inthe alsobe considered tocorporatism should ThePRD'sopposition in 1989, thePRD has faced oftheparty's Sinceitsfounding context history. from constituenobstacles popular-sector considerable toobtaining support to wereattributable and peasants. Thesedifficulties cies,suchas workers PRI and Mexico's between thegoverning linkages corporatist-engendered de Trabajadores theConfederacion organizations, largest laborand peasant Nacional de Campesinos (CNC).64 de Mexico Confederacion (CTM)andthe as a means ofdisofcorporatism PRD leaders the elimination cametoregard andthePRI.65 thelink between sectors popular solving PAN'sparty-building conWhereas from strategy arising imperatives and its tradicted anti-corporatist building anti-corporatism principles, party
17 Sept. 1996. 61. Among the manyexamples,see Excelsior, of Diputado Mauro Gonzflez Luna Mendoza, Diariode see thetestimony 62. In particular, los Debates, 5 Dec. 1996. presentedin the Cfi63. The quotation is fromthe preamble to the PRD's 1993 initiative, mara de Diputados. organizationshave historically 64. Difficulties establishingalliances with popular-sector helped the PRI capture "their" been a problemforpartiesof the Mexican Left:corporatism constituencies. document(PRD in a June1996 internal is reflected 65. The PRD's positionon corporatism 1996),in whichpartyleaders soughtto reconcilepartypositionson collectiverepresentation in thebusiness and labor sectorswiththe Supreme Court rulings.

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and forthePRD. Partyleaders were anti-corporatist were complementary The class-based popularso were some of the PRD's key constituencies. sectorlinkagesthatthe PRD managed to establishwere attainedthrough alliances with dissident labor and peasant organizations.In the urban forexample,thePRD founda reliablesource of support labor movement, in the FrenteAutentico de Trabajo (FAT), an advocate of independent unionism since the 1960s. In the rural sector,the PRD obtained support from the Union Nacional de Organizaciones Regionales Campesinas whichantedatedthePRD, (UNORCA).66These autonomousorganizations, intotheparty. of struggleagainstcorporatism broughttheirown histories organizations Like ANIT, theyhad emerged in opposition to the official charged with representingtheir interestsin the Mexican corporatist regime. campaign Supportforthesmallbusinessdissidents'anti-corporatist would help thePRD broadenitscoalition.Since thelate 1980s,thePRD has to amass an arrayof grievancesagainstthePRI and theauthorattempted of small inthe representation itarianpolitical system.By incorporating into its campaign against dustryand oppositionto business corporatism seized freedom"67-PRD officials "to grant themtheir thePRI-by offering to broaden theparty'sbase of supportto include a potenan opportunity was regardedby many faction ofbusiness. This faction tiallysympathetic in the PRD as yet another"victimof neoliberalism."Thus the PRD intecampaign with their dissidents'anti-corporatist gratedthe private-sector A passage fromthe 1993 proposal of PRI authoritarianism. own criticisms critito integrate thisPRD attempt theChambersLaw illustrates to reform and theneoliberaleconomicmodel: cismsofcorporatism [ANIT] de la Transformacion Nacionalde Industriales theAsociacion Recently, affiliation obligatory havecriticized business autonomous organizations andother into for Mexico'sentry withthenegotiations Beginning chambers. with business ofNAFTA, ofthenegotiations framework within thecurrent theGATT, and later, mediumand small,that particularly have been groupsof entrepreneurs, there incorporation ofourcountry's totheterms with respect criticisms haveexpressed reofdistinct havebeen declarations there Furthermore, intotheseagreements. ofconsultain forums expressed someofthem organizations, gionaland sectoral business autonomous bythese presented intheSenate, where what was being tion topolicies tothefavorable positions andcontradictory was different organizations thepeakbusithat adjustment liberalization andstructural trade ofindiscriminate havedefended.68 nessorganizations
66. For discussion of FAT,see Cook (1995). For discussion of UNORCA, see Foley (1995) and Fox (1994). 9 Feb. 1993. Calder6n,citedin El Economista, 67. PRD Deputy Jorge de Diputados, oftheChambersLaw, presentedto theCfimara 68. PRD proposal forreform 17 Feb. 1993.

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Review Research LatinAmerican and thePRD SmallBusiness, Crisis, Economic

inDethepeso devaluation followed that crisis Thedeep economic dissibetween for collaboration opportunities greater 1994created cember mobilizasmallbusiness spurred and thePRD. Thecrisis dentsmallfirms and widespreadsocial discontent to neoliberalism, tion in opposition coalition. itselectoral for thePRD tobroaden newopportunities created backtotheforefront analysis policy brought in1995 crisis Economic withpromitojoinforces thedissidents ofANIT's agendaand prompted modeland deeconomic theneoliberal opposing nentsocialmovements ANITbegan in 1995 Forexample, reforms.69 political manding accelerated such as organizations withnongovernmental intensively to collaborate al LibreComercio de Accionfrente and theRed Mexicana AlianzaCfvica ANITserved as comodel. economic an alternative (RMALC)inproposing ecoin whichtheproposed de la Libertad, oftheReferendum organizer in campaign ina publicsignature-gathering planwas disseminated nomic ANIT helpedcoordiyear, 1995.70 The following and October September policy economic de Condenaofthegovernment's Jornada natea national in setup tables organizations popular 1996. Morethan fifty on8 September their tovisit and register for citizens thecountry placesthroughout public when 1997, continued through The collaboration economic grievances.71 a book (RMALC copublished organizations ANIT and sixpopular-sector evaluations ofNAFTAand theneoliberal critical Thisbookfeatured 1997). crisis and thegoverneconomic thepost-1994 diagnosed economic model, economic policies. a setofalternative and proposed ment's responses, with El Barzon, a debtors' organizaANITalsobegantocollaborate policies.El ruralcredit to protest in 1993by smallfarmers tioncreated rates as highinterest in 1995, urbangrowth dramatic Barzonexperienced families and ofmiddle-class saddledthousands anda contracting economy ANIT InJuly 1995, unserviceable debtobligations.72 with smallbusinesses
69. The dissidentsembarkedon an intenseoutreachprogram"to make friendswith half the world" and establishlinkswithvarious sources of oppositionin Mexican politics.Inter23 June1997. view withANIT PresidentAdan Rivera (1997-1999),Mexico City, and ANIT's role,see Arroyoand Monroy(1996). 70. For morediscussionofthereferendum 24 June1995; and para el cambio," La Jornada, See also Enrique Calder6n, "Un refer6ndum 30 June1995.Some of the "Hacia un modelo econ6mico alterno,"La Jornada, JulioBoltvinik, priorto 1995,but theydid so as individuals. in RMALC activities dissidentshad participated Afterthe crisis,clearerlinkages were establishedbetween RMALC and organizationssuch as ANIT and theForo de Cambio Empresarial(fromPuebla). 9 Sept. 1996.ANIT's press release to accompany theJornadade Con71. See El Universal, dena stated,"Only collectivesocietal actionwill be able to forcethe changes thatare so nececonomicmodel, which to modifythecurrent essaryand will be able to get the government crisis...." is thecause ofthe difficult a from 72. For backgroundon the originsand growthof El Barz6n and its transformation formiddlepoliciesto a broader"clearinghouse" on ruralcredit focusing localized movement see Williams(1996). class grievancesagainstneoliberalism,

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and fourothersmall business associationsjoined El Barzon in declaringa suspension of paymentsto banks.73Later thatyear,the dissidentsand El Barzon repudiatedthe state'sprogramfordebtors.ANIT PresidentPedro Salcedo describedtheZedillo administration's Programade Apoyo a Deuthatwould serve only to "improve dores de la Banca as "a financial trick" theeconomicsituation ofthebanks through thesocializationoftheir losses and thedisappearance ofindebtedfirms."74 In thecontext ofeconomiccrisisand increasedsmallbusinessmobilizationagainstneoliberalism, thecontinuing conflict over business corporatismpresentedthe PRD with a valuable instrument forbroadeningits a segmentof small business. The PRD inelectoralcoalitionby attracting itsactivities tensified on behalfofthedissidents'challengeto theChambers thesummerand fallof1996,withadvance copies ofPresLaw. Throughout identZedillo's revisionofthelaw circulating thebusinesscomthroughout in theforums PRD officials thecountry ormunity, participated throughout ganized by the anti-corporatists, harshly criticizingthe government's One day beforethe presidentofficially subproposed national registry.75 mitted his initiative in November, thePRD sponsoredanother proposed rewithanti-corporatist but written in collaboration small industrialists, form, In theDecember1996 thisproposal was notconsideredby thefullcongress. congressionalhearingson the president'sproposal, PRD deputies voiced of the new legislation,assertingthatthe new law impassioned criticisms theundemocratic theconstitution and buttressed circumvented corporatist systemofbusiness interest organization.76 By late 1996 and early 1997,then,neoliberalism, corporatism, and economiccrisishad broughttogether a segmentof small business and the PRD. Withnationalmidterm electionsscheduled forJuly1997,ANIT proposed explicitelectoralcollaboration, requestingthatits president, Pedro Salcedo, runas a PRD candidate.ANIT leaders declared, It is left tothePRD to defend ofsociety, and ourgoalis tocontribute theinterests and medium busito yourefforts....Weneedyourhelpto attract micro, small, oftheaffinity ofideasandprinciples nessmen tothePRD,toconvince them among inthecountry towork toreestablish us.... ThePRD has calledon all socialforces indefense ofourgenuine thesovereignty ofournational institutions interests. We andwe wishtocollaborate from inside theParty and areresponding tothese calls, ofoursector.77 thesupport ofthemany members bring
73. La Jornada, 14 July1995. 74.La Jornada, 1 Sept. 1995. 75. For thePRD's positionon theproposed law, see Propuesta (thePRD newspaper),17 Oct. 1996. The president'sinitiative was officially submitted to Congresson 13 Nov. 1996. 76. Diariode los Debates, 5 Dec. 1996.Notwithstanding the PRD's opposition,the initiative was convertedinto law, published in the Diario Oficialof 20 Dec. 1996,and went into effect on 1 Jan.1997. 77. Letter from ANIT to PRD, 12 Dec. 1996.In July 1997,Salcedo was electedto theCamara de Diputados as PRD representative 21 ofMexico City(FederalDistrict). He defrom District

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CONCLUSION

bytwoorganithestrategies developed Thisarticle has contrasted to the forresponding zationsrepresenting Mexicansmallmanufacturers ofthe1980s and 1990s. Ithas foand political economic changes sweeping orientation ofsupport oropposition topolicy, cusedon public expressions political aland extra-organizational corporatist state institutions, vis-a-vis to strategy entailed publicacquiescence liances.The accommodationist resources to policy, deployment ofsignificant radical changes ineconomic PRI.In and support for theincumbent preserve thecorporatist framework, ofneothedissident strategy entailed persistent publiccriticism contrast, corporatism campaign against business liberalism, spearheading a national and ultimately alliances withtheCenter-Left PRD. The accomoforming organized thegovernment by mitigating dationist strategy strengthened mostofthe1980sand 1990s. to economic reform throughout opposition inMexico democratization strategy deepened Morerecently, thedissident itselectoral coalition. a Center-Left opposition party broaden by helping and in terms ofthematerial havebeenexplained Thesedistinct strategies activism. basesofsmallbusiness political organizational howininMexicoillustrates politics Theanalysis ofsmallbusiness ofregime stitutional political economy during periods legaciescan affect thestate between neoliberalism and a newrelationship change. Although in for smallmanufacturers andbigbusiness challenges posedconsiderable a creeping offered opporthe1980sand 1990s, process ofdemocratization ofelectoral tunities newavenues ofinterest articulation. Theemergence for the avenuesfor interest does notnecessarily imply however, articulation, obsolescence ofcorporatist channels. Different institutional arrangements candominate indifferent realms ofstate-societal relations 1992). (Schmitter Thedurability institutions, evenina time ofdemocratization, ofcorporatist for incanmakeitdifficult weakactors toshedold patterns ofstate-societal incena changed array ofmaterial and political teraction, notwithstanding of corporatist channelsprovided tives. In Mexico the perseverance thanreto intensify rather leaderswithstrong incentives CANACINTRA had sustained theorgavisetheaccommodationist strategy. Thisstrategy nization fordecadesand,theleadership brought significant maintained, the thedissidents evaluated benefits to smallindustrialists. Eventhough a stronger and advocated accommodationist much more critically strategy thesamecorpodefense ofsmall industrialists' did so within interests, they in.Thusthe dissidents' framework that CANACINTRA was operating ratist was nottocorporatism strategy perse buttotheleaders' original challenge
featedthe PAN and PRI candidates by receivingsome 36 percentof the votes. By maintainSalcedo ing thedissidents'ongoinganti-corporatist campaign in his new capacityas deputy, quicklyearned a reputationas "el Diputado del SIEM," in reference to the name of the nationalregistry included in the 1997 ChambersLaw. 100

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in After failing to theconstraints by corporatism. imposed and responses later wagedwaron thesameinstitutions. thedissidents this campaign, between thedifferences exacerbated overinstitutions Thisconflict droveCANACINTRA overcorporatism The conflict thetwo strategies. of totakeadvantage inno position thechamber and left tothestate closer and early inthelate1980s begantoemerge that alternatives thesignificant to eswell positioned themselves found thedissidents In contrast, 1990s. The inMexico. movements opposition democratizing alliances with tablish moveandpopular-sector groups business small alliances formed between inthecontext bestunderstood after the1994 economic crisis arethus ments further crisis conflicts. Economic and institutional oftheselarger political conditions ofboththeMexicanpopularsectors theperilous aggravated were onlythedissidents sector, butamongthelatter and smallbusiness, suchalliances. toform prepared collaboration between instrumental Froma broaderperspective, In Latin is notunprecedented. smallbusinessand popularmovements in periods of regularly alliances" haveemerged America, such"defensive over conflicts away as moretypical onlyto wither economic contraction, economic resumed expanand unionization accompany wages,benefits, in Mexicotoo.Butbyplacing to reemerge arelikely sion.78 Suchtensions and thePRD in thecontext smallbusiness dissidents thealliance between the has highlighted thisarticle ofpolitical activism, ofa longer trajectory is not ofthealliance. Thebasisofopposition politics dimensions political issuessuchas political eminently policy butincludes to economic limited to structure patthestate's capacity association and limiting offree rights organization. terns ofinterest

see O'Donnell (1978) of such alliance patternsin Argentina, 78. For excellentillustrations regularly pacts ofconvenience"thatformed and Smith(1991). Smithwroteofthe "transitory industryin the 1950s and in Argentinabetween organized labor and domestic-oriented between labor and 1960s. He emphasized, "once expansion was under way again, conflicts capital eroded thealliance's cohesion" (Smith1991,38). 101

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