JEAN HYPPOLITE
in which man, as liberty, humanistic philosophy gives unto himself his mode of being in the world and rejects any fossilizedformof existence.At that time, Sartre dominatedthe whole philosophical generation, one was eitherfor him or against him. He appeared not only as the philosopher, in the traditional meaningof the word, but also as themoralist and thewriter who had succeededin embodying his thought in creativeworks: a play like No Exit, a storylike The Room are, in my opinion, especially noteworthy. Finally, in Luciferand the Lord, Sartre'sphilosophy as a whole passes on the stage. THIRD PERIOD: This was Existentialism's period of decadence. It began a few years ago and is now, I believe, nearingits end. A fashionis over: philosophy students no longerfeelthe need to define is still to themselves relatively to Sartre.To be sure, his influence be felt, but less conspicuously. There are stillChristian and atheistic Existentialists and Marxists,all more or less closely connectedto Hegelian philosophy, but enthusiasmhas waned and some minds are pursuing of life otherpaths.A feware returning to a philosophy and hark back to Bergson;otherswonderabout the extentto which the positivesciencesmustbe giventheirdue place in contemporary philosophy; othersstill,chiefly among medical men, are discovering the depthsof psychoanalysis as a knowledgeof man. It is not just by chance that the title "Psychoanalysisand Philosophy" was chosenindependently by threelecturers: Merleau-Ponty, Dr. Juliette Boutonnierand myself. A psychoanalyst who is also a doctor,Dr. Lacan, has organized an eagerly attended seminar on that very question at the Sainte-Annehospital. FOURTH PERIOD: It seems to me that we are now entering upon the fourthperiod. AfterExistentialism's high tide and ebb comes sober reflection, the balance sheet of the whole movement is established. Time lends perspective, and the scope and importanceof FrenchExistentialism are now appraisedmore sanely.In thisrespect, the recentbook by Merleau-Ponty, Les Aventures de la dialectique (1955), assumes greatimportance. It indicatesa break with Sartre (Sartre and ultra-Bolshevism). The reflection of many of us seems now to be directedto the problemof historyand of the relations between historyand philosophy.Merleau-Pontyaccuses Sartre of neglecting history itselfand all that, in history, is objective,as he blames Marxism,on the otherhand, for attributing importance only to objective history, while showingno genuine concern for man's freedom.It seems that the problem becomes that of the relations between objective historyand the meaning which our freedom bestows upon that history.Several works by Raymond Aron and Henri Marrou have latelyposed thisquestionof objectivehistory as of historicalinterpretations. opposed to the subjectivity Such an 101
Yale French Studies orientation of our present-day debatesaroundthe significance of history is readily comprehensible. Finally, thosewho drawup the balancesheetof Existentialism reproach it withnot taking scienceand even biological problems sufficiently intoaccount. The young philosophers seemto be turning to Husserl's philosophy, expecting from it bothrigor and a senseof theconcrete. I am no prophet and I cannot claimto foresee what the philosophy just now in the process of beingbornwillhave to offer. It is no longer theExistentialism of a fewyearsago, but it givesfullcredit to thatveryimportant It is intellectual movement. moving toward a new reflection on history as and its significance muchas toward therelationship and between human consciousness life, and it is determined notto overlook of sciences theimportance and techniques. The above sketch is extremely schematic, and is of courseonly an approximation. I do not meanto imply thatExistentialism was only a passingfashion. It was that,but as a philosophical and literary movement it is also muchmore,and its truesignificance into a new be revealedas Existentialism is merged mayperhaps orderof reflection. That reflection, as I seem to sense it among young philosophers, may be defined byitstwopoles:theproblematics of history of a history and of themeaning (subjective-objective) which is,byitsvery essence, always unfinished; andtheproblematics ofa transcendental logic(notin theKantian sense, butin Husserl's) of all possible which unites therigor of an analysis oftheconditions This logic existence and the concrete savorof a Phenomenology. a becomes But from theIdea of Philosophy. thesetwoproblematics between thirdis born,thatof theirrelation, i.e. of the relation turns which History, everunfinished, and transcendental philosophy back to theessential. and Transcendental logicand History-Being Time!
REFERENCES CalmannLvy, 1953. Raymond Aron. L'Opium des intellectuels. Editionsdu Seuil, 1955. historique. Marrou.De la connaissance Henri-Irenee Gallimard,1955. Les Aventures de la dialectique. MauriceMerleau-Ponty. Payot, 1953. JeanWahl. Traitede metaphysique.
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