Nuclear Iran 5

Chapter 1

Introduction to the topic

Iran’s nuclear program that has triggered such a fierce response from the West –
particularly from the United States - was launched not recently, but in 1953. Interestingly
enough, at that time the wisdom of pursing an alternative source of energy was undoubted and
Iran not only received the support of America but also their earnest encouragement. Over time
however, many events took place that led to the serious deterioration of relations between what
came to be known as the Islamic Republic of Iran and today’s superpower. Now, Iranian
President is viewed as the biggest threat since Hitler1 and Iran’s plans of uranium enrichment to
meet their energy needs a suspected conspiracy to promote terrorism.

Uranium enrichment can be used for both peaceful (nuclear fuel) and military (nuclear
weapons) uses. Iran is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (since July 1968) and
this permits them to develop nuclear energy for civilian purposes2. Any involvement in pursuing
nuclear weapons has not only been denied but also condemned by Iranian officials.
“…We consider the acquiring, development and use of nuclear weapons inhuman, 

immoral, illegal and against our basic principles. They have no place in Iran’s 

defense doctrine.”3

Despite such declarations, the United States has managed to influence the opinion of the
international community, using the argument that up until the IAEA investigation Iran had not
revealed the uranium enrichment facility constructed at Natanz and a heavy water production
plant near Arak. The NPT requires that countries must declare the existence of such facilities and

1
German Chancellor, Angela Merkel has compared the Iranian President and warned the world not to appease the
Nazis. www.reuters.com
2
Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to
develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. (Article IV,
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, http://disarmament.un.org/wmd/npt/npttext.html)

3
Statement given by Mr. G. Ali Khoshroo, Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and International Affairs, in
May 2003 at the NPT PrepCom in Geneva. www.acronym.org.uk/wmd/iranpres.htm
 Nuclear Iran 6

keeping the nuclear program secret from the outside world has made Iran’s motives susceptible.
The debate now is centered on who should enrich uranium for Iran’s nuclear facilities. The
Iranians have been insisting on their right to continue whereas the West, (primarily America and
the E.U) being distrustful of Iran’s intentions, is pressurizing that the enrichment process should
be done in another country i.e. Russia. This dispute is unlikely to be easily resolved and Iran’s
insistence on its position on the program could serve as a pretext for the USA to take military
action. There have already been two rounds of sanctions imposed on Iran and but for Russian and
Chinese opposition that Iran has a legal right to harness nuclear energy; a third round of
sanctions which are currently under discussion would already have been imposed.

Statement of Problem

Iran has a nuclear program that dates back to the time of the Shah and is currently being
developed to help cope with Iran’s energy needs. Nuclear power plants will save Iran more oil
for export, increasing its oil revenue and will also have a stabilizing effect on the global oil
market by increasing supply. Despite apparent benefits, the program is controversial with the
West as it is suspected that Iran might be pursuing a nuclear weapon under the guise of uranium
enrichment to meet its energy requirements. This paper explores the perceived threat that nuclear
Iran poses to the US and why it is expected of Iran to use a nuclear weapon even if it acquires it
less responsibly than other nuclear states.

Research Questions

• Is Iran’s claim to produce nuclear energy justified given its substantial natural energy
reserves?
• How do events since after the Iranian revolution justify the two countries current standing
on Iran’s nuclear issue?
• Is the US response to Iran’s nuclear program a wise one?
• Is Iran really a potential threat?
• How is it in American interests to portray Iran in a bad light?
 Nuclear Iran 7

Hypothesis

The null hypothesis is that the US has full right to feel threatened by the Iranian nuclear
program and its current position is a reflection of its true state. The alternative hypothesis for this
research will be that there are hidden dynamics to the situation at hand. We expect to find that
US concerns about Iran’s nuclear program is part of political rhetoric, designed for consumption
by the masses. It should be noted that exploring the ‘hidden dynamics’ of the clash between the
two countries is little more than intelligent guesswork on part of the researchers and the
information collected is of such a nature that nothing can be proved or disproved conclusively.
Thus the ultimate thesis is hugely theoretical in orientation.

Rationale for Study

The Middle Eastern region is of undoubted significance in world politics and Iran is
emerging as a major player in this region. The US is responding to this critical situation by
considering either military action or hard-nosed diplomacy against Iran, with focus laid upon
halting its nuclear program. Whatever course of action the US takes, it is clear that the dynamics
of power in the Middle East are influenced by this tension between the two respective states. To
the researchers, the fact that these developments were leading to a major event was of primary
interest.

Rationale for Time Frame

This paper has covered stages of Iran’s nuclear program since its inception in the early
1950s. More emphasis however, has been laid on the severity of the American response after the
Iranian President’s declaration in 2005 regarding nuclear enrichment, as it is this event that gave
urgency to the situation that we see today.
 Nuclear Iran 8

Chapter 2

Review of Literature

MacLeod (2006, p.14-17)4 presents an American point of view in a 45-minute interview

with Ahmedinejad published in TIME Magazine. Ahmedinejad’s 1.63 m frame is stressed upon;
he is called a ‘slippery debater… gifted in the art of spin and misdirection’ and ‘serious, smiling
and cocky’. According to the article his efforts for peace are doubtful. The interview begins with
Ahmedinejad’s opinion about the US government and the American people, exploring possible
causes for the conflict between the US and Iran. The general impression given is that the Iranian
government and the Iranian people are unfair in their opposition (display of hatred) to the US.
Ahmedinejad questions US authority:
‘The US government should not interfere in our affairs. They should live their

own lives.’

These lines emphasize important points about the way the Iranian Prime Minister thinks.
First of all, he is questioning US authority and secondly, he does not want to believe that the
world is increasingly interdependent. Iran’s nuclear program and Ahmedinejad’s Holocaust
denial are discussed in one paragraph, designed to emphasize how dangerous the combination is.
Ahmedinejad has better opinions about Americans than Israelis, making room for dialogue with
Bush and praising the American people. Ahmedinejad’s meetings with Chavez, Mugabe and the
Cuban President are also cursorily mentioned, linking him with the ‘irritants to the West’. When
questioned about nuclear arms, he replies that every country should be disarmed. Ahmedinejad
makes statements like, ‘The US administration is not the entire world’ and consequently says that
he does not need to build US confidence over the nuclear issue and that he is not afraid of an
attack. When questioned about Israel, he says that Zionists are different from Jews and that he is
against the Zionist regime but not against Jews.

Michael Duffy (2006, p.20-24)5 examines the geo-political position of Iran, how the US
army could possibly attack it and whether such attacks would be feasible or not. The article states
at the outset that military planning at the Pentagon does not prove that the US is going to attack
4
MacLeod, S. (2006, September 25). A Date with a Dangerous Mind. Time, 14-17.
5
Duffy, M. (2006, September 25). What Would War Look Like?. Time, 20-24
 Nuclear Iran 9

Iran; ‘it is nothing more than a prudent step’. Iran is in an important position in the Middle East.
It can control the Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately 40% of the world’s oil has to
pass, it is close to Israel and opposed to its existence, in addition it ‘bids for dominance in the
world’s richest oil region’. Another war after Iraq and Afghanistan seems absurd however failure
of dialogue could lead to war. This war is going to have dire consequences and the chances that it
might succeed in dulling Iran’s nuclear ambitions are just as high as chances of igniting anti-
American rage. ‘Asymmetrical relations’ with Iran will be a nightmare because Iran could wreak
havoc in the neighboring states of Israel, Afghanistan and Iraq, all crucial to American interests.
Iran could cause a raise in oil prices and events could ultimately lead to US troops invading Iran.
The article maintains that an attack against Iran’s nuclear facilities has a chance of succeeding
but at a high cost. A nuclear Iran would also be a problem because it could incite other Middle
Eastern countries to pursue nuclear technology, making the region unstable. Nuclear Iran would
also be bolder than it is now, influencing the politics of the world’s richest oil region to a great
extent. The two options of whether to accept Iran’s nuclear capability or to cripple it are equally
formidable, creating a dilemma for the US government. Ending the conflict through dialogue
seems to be the best available option but for all the diplomatic work that has been done, little has
been achieved. Imposing continued sanctions increasingly poses a problem since Russia and
China have signaled that they are opposed to the action. So the US is left secretly hoping for a
change in government. ‘Distrust runs both ways’ the article states in the end. If diplomacy fails,
war will have to follow and that war might not go according to plans.

A similar article in the Economist6 presents a more conservative point of view to an

attack on Iran. It is harsher on Iran’s position as a regime, quoting the words of Israeli former
Prime Minister, Binyamin Netanyahu,
‘The Iranian regime is basically a messianic apocalyptic cult’.

It presents three scenarios that might unfold keeping present circumstances in mind: Iran
could acquire nuclear weapons and spark off a war with Israel, Iran could be attacked
preemptively but such an attack would have grave consequences or an attacked and enraged Iran
could retaliate and be all the more defiant in its chase for a nuclear weapon. It states that false
intelligence is not leading to war in this case, all is out in the open and attacking Iran is well
6
‘The Riddle of Iran’, Anonymous, July 21, 2007, the Economist.
 Nuclear Iran 10

within the reach of America and Israel. But this attack would be too much of a chance to take as
could worsen relations between the US and the Muslim world, ignite a hard to control retaliation
and stopper oil traffic. The ‘containment’ of a nuclear Iran is seen as a better option than
attacking Iran and counterproductively strengthening the regimes resolve to acquire a nuclear
weapon. The scenario where Iran has a nuclear bomb could easily worsen Middle Eastern
politics as Iran would be able to follow a more aggressive foreign policy and cause other Muslim
countries to follow in its wake of acquiring nuclear weapons, making ‘one of the world’s least
safe neighborhoods’ into ‘a cat’s cradle of nuclear tripwires’. Since imposing sanctions or
diplomacy is not working, an internal rebellion that overthrows the Iranian regime might just be
the key to the solution.

There is also a special report on Iran in the same issue of the Economist7 that examines
and analyses the present government’s construction of power and its functioning. Among the
important areas it discusses are Ayatollah Khomeini’s supreme authority and Qom, a city of
religious activity that has considerable influence over the country’s politics. The report also
discusses the state of the economy under Ahmedinejad and the sanctions imposed, bringing to
light that the economy is almost solely functioning on oil revenue and foreign investment is
dwindling fast. The last in the series of articles presents a view of the nation’s youth; even
though finding a job is increasingly hard, there is little possibility that the youth of Iran will turn
against their own government. They might have no immediate memory of the Revolution but it
not likely that they will rebel against the present government, and in doing so side with the US.

In his book Tehran Rising: Iran’s Challenge to the United States, Ilan Berman8 examines
US policies toward Iran. It is divided into two parts, the first focuses on how Iran has behaved
and the second focusing on how America has responded. The first chapter starts off with
recording Khomeini’s rise to power and the anti-American sentiment that resulted. The record is
not very complete since it does not mention US policy blunders that resulted in the same
sentiment. The Mossad had been involved in setting up the Shah’s SAVAK (secret police) and the
7
Special report on Iran, the Economist, July 21, 2007.

8
Berman I. (2007) Tehran Rising: Iran’s Challenge to the United States. Rowman and Littlefield.
 Nuclear Iran 11

US had sponsored an $18 million program to install a dictator. The irony here is that the very
same person, who proposed the program, reviews the book on its back, talking about democracy.
The chapter also fails to mention that the US sold Shah Iran’s first nuclear research reactor and in
fact approved uranium enrichment during his regime. The chapter studies how Khomeini’s
radical ideas about Islam, oppression and its position in the world began to appeal to like minded
Muslims. It then follows to cover Hezbollah’s rise in Lebanon, an area with thousands of
displaced Palestinian refugees. Iran’s funding of militia groups is also covered in addition to
Iran’s relations with Syria. The book goes on to somewhat exaggeratedly state what
consequences the ‘terrorist’ network that Iran sponsors combined with the radical ideology at its
roots could result in. The second chapter covers the threat of a nuclear Iran and US concerns over
the issue. Post 9/11, American foreign policy changed to incorporate Iran’s growing threat as one
of its major issues. Here it is mentioned that Iran’s nuclear program started under the Shah and
that the US and the West were comfortable with it because Iran had signed the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). A complete picture is not presented in the chapter as many
details about American action are left out. It is not explained why relations suddenly turned sour
after the Shah and such reasoning for explanation is left to the imagination of the readers. The
next chapter is designed to talk about Iran’s sphere of influence in the Middle East. After the
Iran-Iraq war, Iran began to build up its military but its efforts were not as successful as they
could have been with American help. Iran was being ‘isolated and sidelined’. It covers Iran’s
economy and the effects oil trade and relations with Russia had on its armament. It contains
details about Russian, North Korean and Chinese sale of military equipment to Iran. All this
helped Iran consolidate its influence in the Middle East. The fourth chapter covers how Iran
wants to spread its Islamic Revolution to countries in its north and rid them of American
philosophy. It also claims that the remnants of nuclear Soviet Union in the Central Asian
countries helped Iran to pursue its nuclear program. Chapter five examines the response of the
Clinton administration to Iran’s early nuclear ambitions under Khatami. The author is of the view
that the Bush administration has handled Iran better than the Clinton Administration and
expresses approval for Bush’s ‘axis of evil’ speech. In following chapters the book becomes
heavily, and almost irresponsibly, biased. Exploring the sentiments of the Iranian people who
want peace and dialogue with America, the author assumes that the public is not with its
government. The chapters goes further on to examine Iran’s poverty and unemployment,
 Nuclear Iran 12

unwittingly ignoring that Iran is a developing country and unlike America it is bound to have
people unemployed and living below the poverty line. But all of this is taken and heaped upon
Iran’s theocratic regime. Similar claims in the chapters are hard to believe. Overall, the book is a
selective memory account, even viewing present events as beneficial and spelling out victory for
the Americans with disregard to the true state of affairs. It is very hard to believe that Iranians
will side with a foreign power that has meddled with them in the past and is trying its best to
overthrow their current regime even now, not to mention the sanctions it is pushing for and the
economic hardship it has caused to Iran.

An article published online in digitaljournal.com (David Silverberg)9, examines the cause

of tension and distrust that has built up at both sides. It makes similar points as all previous
articles with the exception that it states: in 1996 the US sponsored $18 million, covert program to
overthrow the Iranian regime. Relations have been strained ever since. It says that talks are not
likely to produce viable results very soon but does not stress the urgency of the situation. Other
articles nearly always mention that time is precious, and diplomatic talks should produce definite
results soon or Iran would acquire a nuclear weapon10.

The BBC News website contains a special series of articles on Iran. Amongst these is
‘Iran: Energy Overview’. According to this article, Iran has the second largest reserves of oil and
natural gas both. Iran is a key player in the energy world. Iran has not been able to make optimal
use of energy since the revolution. Oil revenues make up 50% of the Iranian budget. Iran
supplies 5% of the world’s oil. US sanctions have undermined Iran’s oil and gas sectors. These
sanctions have shut doors to foreign investment. Petrol subsidies in Iran have led to smuggling
and high consumption. A shortage of refineries and high consumption induces Iran to actually
import oil. There is disagreement amongst experts as to whether Iran needs nuclear technology or
not.
9
Digital Journal. (2007, July 29) Rebel Nation: Inside Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions and Why a War Could Spell

Disaster. www.digitaljournal.com
10
Public opinion presented beneath the article offers interesting insight into the situation, questioning Israel’s right

to occupy foreign land and says that Iran’s policies grow out naturally out of ‘abuse’ from the west.
 Nuclear Iran 13

Another article on the site examines the lost opportunities for ending the conflict and how
the US missed these. It starts with the missed opportunity of 9/11 where the Iranian public felt
sympathy for the American. Bush’s 2002 ‘axis of evil’ speech followed this opportunity
nullifying any chances of cooperation that the two nations had. The invasion of Baghdad led
Iran to write a letter to the US, offering ‘to bring everything on the table’, including its nuclear
program. The letter was ignored in Washington. The article goes on to state that America’s
rejection shifted the balance of power in Tehran towards the ‘hardliners’11.

Chapter 3

Research Methodology

11
The Tehran Times article, ‘Iran Voices Concern over Israeli Clandestine Nuclear Program’, dating back to 1990

states that Israel is the only country in the region that has not signed the NPT.
 Nuclear Iran 14

This paper is primarily an analysis of what the researchers have gathered from different
book, papers and articles. The approach was analytical and an attempt has been made at
incorporating different points of view of journalists, professors of political theory and of the
forces governing the two countries. We begin with a brief history to make the reader familiar
with the sequence of events that has led to the currently hostility and distrust between the two
countries. The paper then goes on to answer the other questions which were set initially in
context to the prevailing situation.

Qs: Is Iran’s claim to produce nuclear energy justified given its substantial natural energy

reserves?

Iran has the fourth largest oil presence and the second largest natural gas reserve in the
world. The latest figures put Iran’s crude oil reserves at 137 billion barrels, 11.6% of the world’s
total reserves. It also has about 29,000 billion cubic meters of natural gas. In light of these
figures, the argument against Iran’s nuclear energy programme seems to be a fairly valid one.
The irrefutable reality, however, is that since the revolution the population has more than doubled
to 70 million, while the oil production is now about 70% of the pre-revolutionary level. Iran’s
need for increased energy production can be gauged by a set of figures given by energy experts:
“...Since the early 1990s, Iran’s consumption of oil has increased eight percent. If

this trend continues Iran will become a net oil importer by 2010 a gigantic

catastrophe for a country which relies on oil for thirty percent of her foreign

currency and forty-five percent of the total annual budget.”

Iran’s known uranium ore reserves can produce as much electricity as 45 billion barrel of
oil. The country’s ability to produce nuclear energy rather than rely solely on its natural energy
reserves will not only enable it to pay for the county’s economic development for the next
several decades but will also have a positive side-effect for oil and gas consuming countries. The
more Iran can produce nuclear energy for its domestic consumption the more it can export oil
and gas to the West, thus better stabilizing the prices of these commodities and assuring a higher
level of employment in the ever-increasing energy demands in the industrialized world.
 Nuclear Iran 15

Qs: How do events since after the Iranian revolution justify the two countries current standing

on Iran’s nuclear issue?

The Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who had been installed on his throne by a
CIA-backed coup in 1953, was regarded as an ally of the West. Iran had 2000 miles of common
border with the USSR and it was as an important shield against communism in the region and
also as amour against the Arab nationalism at the time thought to be a threat to Israel’s security,
just as the Islamic Republic is at present a threat to Israel. During much of the cold war era, Iran
was a pillar of Western power in the Middle East and also a reliable supplier of oil. In short, the
Shah was, from Western perspective, a deserving candidate for assistance in acquiring the
technology necessary for providing nuclear energy and thus reducing its own energy needs for
oil reserves.

Iranian revolution – Hostage Crisis

The Iranian Revolution however, transformed Iran from a monarchy under Shah
Mohammad Reza, to an Islamic republic under Ayatollah Khomeini. During this revolution,
supporters of Khomeini invaded the embassy compound and took 52 American hostages.
Khomeini supported the hostage-taking not only out of his enmity for the ex-Shah but to advance
the cause of theocratic government. The American had to give in to many of the conditions put
forward Iranian leader while negotiating the return of these hostages. On April 7, 1980, the
United States broke diplomatic relations with Iran.

Iraq’s invasion of Iran (1980-1988)

During the eight years that Iraq invaded Iran; the west not only did not condemn Saddam
Hussein’s aggression against its neighbor but in fact helped Iraq. Iran felt isolated, aggrieved and
betrayed by the West. Adding insult to injury was that Western politicians and media blamed Iran
for the war and thus vindicated Iraq from its aggression. The war left an indelible negative
impact and bitter memory on the psyche of the Iranians.
Iran’s position as an Islamic Republic
 Nuclear Iran 16

If it is true that Iran intends to build nuclear weapons, then the reason for its doing so
might be that Islamic regime has since its inception been under constant military threat, even
nuclear threat from the USA and Israel. The US military victory in the Gulf war of 1991; the
invasion of Afghanistan; and the occupation of Iraq in 2003 has made Iranians feel ever more
vulnerable to external threat. Fred Halliday12 believes that if Iran wants a nuclear capability, or at
least to be in the position of “nuclear ambiguity”, then the reason has less to do with launching
missiles against its foes and more with strengthening its political and diplomatic hand across
west Asia.

Apart from this, when Iran reactivated its nuclear energy program after the end of the
war, the Iranian leadership was conscious of the West’s distrust of Iran and of its negative image
abroad, particularly in the USA. It was inevitable, the Iranian reasoned, that the West would react
with enmity by making a big issue about Iran’s intentions in restarting the program. To neutralize
such a reaction, Iran invited Americans and Europeans to participate in the construction and
development of the nuclear reactors in Bushehr. The invitation was ignored. It was then that Iran
turned to Russia for help.

Furthermore, Iran’s president in his speech at the UN General Assembly in September

2005 reiterated Iran’s earlier invitation to the private and Public sectors in the West to participate
in the country’s nuclear program. Again the invitation was ignored. If the invitation had been
taken up, the West would have had a chance to influence the direction of Iran’s nuclear program
and at the same time the opportunity to test Iran’s sincerity and truthfulness in claiming that it is
engaged only in civilian use of nuclear energy. A major stumbling-block, however, in the
resolution of Iran’s nuclear issue is US mistrust of Iran engaging in any kind of nuclear
technology, whether or not it is conducted under regular and very intrusive inspections of the
IAEA. The following comments by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice would support the
above assertion. In rejecting Russia’s argument that Iran has the right to nuclear technology as
long as it is for civilian purposes, she said:
“…this is not an issue of rights but of whether or not Iran can be trusted.”

12
Fred Halliday is the author of the book “Myths about the Middle East”
 Nuclear Iran 17

This implies that the West finds it more convenient, politically speaking, to distrust the
Islamic Republic on most issues other than giving it the benefit of the doubt. Iran’s international
image is devastatingly negative and this makes it easier for Western policy makers and the right-
wing think-tanks to brush off its compromises and assurances, such as accepting additional IAEA
safeguards, as ingenuous, devious and a political ploy.

Qs: Is the US response to Iran’s nuclear program a wise one?

The American President declared Iran as part of the ‘axis of evil’ in his famous speech in
2002. This was after Iran had experienced a bout of cooperation with the US over the Taliban
issue. After the 9/11 event Iranian people had lit candles and observed minutes of silence at the
Tehran football stadium to demonstrate the respect and sympathy they felt for the Americans. A
letter was also sent to the US in which Iran offered to hold talks about everything, including its
nuclear program. Iran received a cold response.
Iran’s efforts at reconciliation were met with suspicion and consequently turned down. The
American President is quoted to have said (about Ahmedinejad), “I’m not going to meet with
him.”13.

Thus the US-Iranian relationship unfolds into a series of missed opportunities and tacit
diplomacy. The BBC website14 says ‘The US and Iran almost never talk to each other.’
After the actions of both states, sponsored regime change from the US and a revolution that
spread ideas that opposed American interests from Iran, mistrust runs deep on both sides. To add
to the superficial political situations of both countries there is a deeper divide that separates the
two. Ever since the Iranian revolution, Iran has proved hard to influence, both politically and
ideologically. The divide of cultures, of ideology that comes near to clashing, has shaped the
people of each country. What is significant about this situation is that people in power in both
governments are almost diametrically opposed to each other. Iran is a hindrance to the
globalizing power that, whether deliberately or not, brings every other country into its influence.
It alters their cultures and effects their modes of thinking.

13
MacLeod, S. (2006, September 25). A Date with a Dangerous Mind. Time, 14-17.

14
BBC News (2007) Middle East: Iran’s Gulf of misunderstanding with the US. www.bbc.co.uk
 Nuclear Iran 18

The issue at hand is that of American foreign policy towards Iran, the factors that have helped to
shape it and whether such policy is beneficial to the state of both countries.

America under the Clinton administration and Iran under Khatami never experienced the
problems that the present day America and Iran face. Iran is a rich cultural civilization that has
never seen the oppression of colonizers and thus has, what other developing countries
increasingly lack, a sense of identity. Iran is clearly not used to be treated rashly and hence has
responded to American mistrust and hostility with almost equal measure. The image that the US
has built abroad in Iran is not a very positive one, in fact the US has felt little the need to rectify
its image abroad. The Americans were responsible for installing a dictator and helping Iran’s
enemy in a state of crisis. Iran on the other hand does not have, for all high claims that are made,
the capability to influence the US like the US can influence Iran.

Consequently Iranian foreign policy has largely been defensive. Iran is not in a position
to be able to pursue expansionist or offensive foreign policies; security is much too important.
Iran’s behavior can easily be explained. It is not used to bending or bowing when pressurized.
Iran retaliates. It can be concluded from the above arguments that Iran’s aggressive position can
be attributed to America’s failed foreign policy in the region.

Qs: Is Iran really a potential threat?

Iran is a developing country. In the present world, Iran’s economy, all shortcomings aside,
cannot be crippled because it relies on oil which is a commodity in demand. Foreign investors
have shied away from Iran and petrol subsidies given by the government have adversely affected
the economy15. Iran’s economy may be functioning but it is nothing compared to the booming
economies of China, India or Russia.
There is of course the possibility that the Iranian funded Hezbollah will acquire nuclear
technology via Iran, making the Israel’s position in the Middle East more instable. The Iranian
President has let known to the world that he thinks Israel should not exist. In addition to this if
Iran does acquire a nuclear weapon it would pursue a more aggressive foreign policy and would

15
Special report on Iran, the Economist, July 21, 2007
 Nuclear Iran 19

be in a position to raise oil prices. A nuclear Iran would also incite neighboring Muslim states to
follow suit, upsetting the regions balance of power.

Iran and the US experience an ideological divide that is deepened by past events and the
foreign policies of both countries. Whether they like it or not both countries are wary of each
others moves. Thus when Iran tests surface-to-ship missiles, it is followed by the discussion and
evaluation of possible scenarios of attacks on Iran in the Pentagon16. In light of the mistrust that
is being cultivated in the situation it safe to say that the US response to Iran’s nuclear program is
motivated, not by rationalism, but a caustic form of mistrust that the Iranian government finds
hard to swallow.

The IAEA has repeatedly told the International community that Iran has shown no signs
of developing nuclear weapons. Khomeini has passed a fatwa making Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMDs) forbidden17. The Iranian President mentions over and over in his interview
that his problems lie with the US government only and not the US people18. Ahmedinejad’s
holocaust denial and his refusal to accept Israel’s right to exist might appear harsh statements but
they are not out of place once his situation is re-examined. Ahmedinejad lives in a region where
thousands of Palestinians were displaced to create room for a people that did not belong there.
Ahmedinejad stresses the fact that Zionists are different from Jews. The Zionist regime occupied
land that was never theirs and in doing so created a problem of instability that rocks the Middle
East even now. For all portrayals the Western media has given the Iranian President, he is a
rational man. And on a more serious note, very unlike Hitler – very unlike the Americans, the
only ones guilty of having used the atom bomb.

A nuclear weapon is never actually used in today’s politics. Rather it is a used as a threat
to deter enemies and make them think twice before an attack. Even if Iran does acquire a nuclear
weapon there is very little possibility that it will actually use it.

16
What Would War look like?, Michael Duffy, time, September 25 2006
17
Special report on Iran, the Economist, July 21, 2007
18
Date with a dangerous mind, Scott Macleod, Time, September 25, 2006
 Nuclear Iran 20

The only perceived threat that has any form of truth in it is that a nuclear Iran would affect the
Middle Eastern balance of power. The Middle East is the world’s richest oil region in addition it
houses Israel, a country the US has unexplained ties to. So the US interest in this region’s
balance of power can be understood.

Qs: How is it in American interests to portray Iran in a bad light?

Looking at the state of affairs today, a new world order seems to be emerging. The US
seems to be tied up inextricably to every nation’s culture, politics and economics. Though it is
not given much emphasis in the international media, the fact that lies beneath the surface is
almost common sense: the US is fast becoming the ruler of the uni-polar world. Americans are
aware of this position and accordingly formulate their policies, using their influence in regions
far from their homeland to meet their needs.

These needs are usually disguised under causes that appear just to the mind unfamiliar
with the US. The US does not believe in democracy enough to fight another nation’s war for
them. If the US truly did believe in democracy and liberation enough to fight for it in every
corner of the world, it would have invaded many countries in addition to Iraq and would not have
installed a dictator in Iran. The bitter fact of the matter is that the US is not ideologically driven;
materialism is what lies behind most moves that the US makes, and there is very little subtlety to
their actions. It is famously said that as millions starve in Africa, the US dumps wheat into the
sea (to stabilize its price).

For Iranians, Americans have been very little help; imposing sanctions on their economy,
barring their progress, planning military attacks against them and openly discussing how to
topple their theocratic regime. The US pressurizes states that offer help to Iran to take a harsher
stance on the ‘rogue’ state19. It is little wonder then that Iran would view the US as an enemy.
Nuclear weapons or not, there are three main factors that make the Iranian situation what it is.
The first of these is the position of the US in the uni-polar world. The second, Iran’s deep
mistrust for the US (that makes the US speculative of Iranian action) and third, the ideological
and cultural divide that both countries experience.
19
As was advised to the Russian President after his visit to Iran.
 Nuclear Iran 21

Oil is an important resource in today’s world as it is a form of energy that runs most
vehicles. Controlling an oil rich region, or at least pursuing that position seems very likely on the
part of a super power. At this point it may be argued that Iran is vying for the same position. This
might be the case and is consistent with argument posed. The US and Iran clash over who will
control the Middle East and in doing so control oil supply.

Chapter 4

Conclusion

The conflict between the two states goes beyond the nuclear issue. The hostility is likely
to continue even if Iran’s nuclear program is dismantled. The real situation is perhaps best
summarized by Adam Tarock:
 Nuclear Iran 22

“…there is a clash here between a super power intolerant of a perceived dissident

and rouge state and an assertive and old, but glorious civilization that has had the

temerity to challenge that super power in a region where Washington demands

submission.”20

Since the establishment of Islamic Republic more than a quarter of a century ago, the
hostility between Tehran and Washington has hardly abated: sometimes it has been more intense
than it other times as at the present. USA in the past three years has been using Iran’s nuclear
energy program as a pretext for achieving its long cherished objective: to replace the present
regime with a “Washington friendly” one. Iran has been put under pressure on two fronts:
keeping the military option on the table and launching anti-Iran propaganda worldwide. Judging
by the polls published recently, the administration’s tactic seems to have been successful. A poll
shows that over the past 15 years, an average of only about 6% of respondents rated Iran as the
greatest threat to the USA but a survey in January 2006 found the percentage had increased to
27%, much higher compared with China, Iraq, North Korea and Al-Qaeda. According to the new
polls the image is now worse than ever and this makes it easier for US government to make a
case for yet another war.

The present conflict between Iran and the USA seems not so much about Iran’s alleged
intention to become a nuclear state but more about the type of regime that governs Iran.
Beginning from the 1950s to the fall of the Shah in 1979, Western Europe and the USA helped
Iran’s nuclear program; and although there was a possibility that the Shah’s might try to acquire
nuclear capability, there is no evidence to suggest that the West discouraged, let alone prevented
him from pursuing that ambition. That is a vastly different stance from the one the West is now
taking towards Iran. There are media reports that USA might take military action against Iran.
Occupying all of Iran which is much larger than Iraq, is something that the Pentagon may find
very difficult to achieve considering that the US military is over-stretched in Afghanistan and
Iraq. Also, Muslim hatred across the globe would deepen and retaliation is possible. However, if
an attack is carried out, the reasons would have less to do with the spread of nuclear weapons
and more with the superpower’s fixation with maintaining its control over the Middle Eastern
20
Tarock, A. (2007), Iran’s Nuclear Program and the West
 Nuclear Iran 23

countries. The reason would be that Israel and America are exposed to the possibility of an
emerging nuclear power which might Israel’s position in the region tough. The reason for
conflict is the hostage crisis of the Iranian revolution which serves as a reminder of the threat of
an Islamic theocracy and to the capitalistic system of the West.

Results from Hypothesis Testing

The conclusion we have derived, rejects the null hypothesis. This means that the US is
posturing and Iran’s doubtful nuclear program is just an excuse for reasons that are not apparent.
The origin of the clash is clear but why it is gaining momentum is a question that has no correct
answers.

Recommendations

A realistic approach to Iran is not to change the regime through military action but to
offer the Iranians prospects of integration into the international community by supporting its
accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), unfreezing Iran’s assets in the USA, lifting
sanctions and respecting its sovereignty.
 Nuclear Iran 24

However, that sort of approach to a Third World country like Iran would be contradictory
to the principles of American sovereignty. In the words of the author of “America Right or
Wrong” the NSS (National Security Strategy) maintains that all real power and freedom of action
must remain in the hands of the USA. By insisting that it is exercising its rights under the NPT,
Iran too is insisting that the enrichment of uranium must remain in its own hands. Reconciling
these conflicting positions, arising from strong religious and nationalistic sentiments on both
sides, is unlikely in the near future.