Critical Thinking Paper

Bioterrorism
By Ben Lickerman

Bioterrorism is an immediate threat to the safety of the people of the United States - a fact that is not fully acknowledged by the United States Government - and the ease with which an attacker can acquire bioterrorist chemical agents and lack of prevention and preparation on the part of the United States call for more federal attention to be placed on bioterrorism prevention. This attention should come in the form of funding for Government programs, such as the Center for Disease Control (CDC), and research into possible vaccine administration programs to prevent another, possibly more deadly attack from happening in the future. Bioterrorism is defined as terrorist acts involving the use of harmful agents and products of biological origin such as disease producing micro-organisms or toxins. These biological agents could range from Anthrax to Salmonella. The purpose of bioterror attacks varies, but the general idea is to scare a group of people into a paranoia-like state by use of these harmful agents. Even if only a few people are actually affected by the attacks, many more are fearful that they will be targeted next. Bioterrorism has been around for centuries. Bioterrorism has grown increasingly deadly as technology and human knowledge of chemical substances evolves, and, as a result, the United States needs to upgrade bioterrorism prevention to fit the times. Biological warfare is different from bioterrorism. Biological warfare is the use of biological agents in a war, while bioterrorism is the illegal use of biological agents to terrorize the public. Although they are not the same, there are many similarities, and bioterrorism would not exist if biological warfare was not first used. The first signs of biological warfare came around the 6th century B.C. in the form of poisoning the wells of enemies, and throwing pots of venomous snakes onto enemy boats. These attacks, however did not affect a large amount of the population due to the rudimentary technology of the time period. Biological warfare tactics evolved into using known diseases such as smallpox around 18th century A.D. The use of biological and chemical agents in a war was
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banned in the Geneva Protocol of 1925; however the protocol did not address production, storage, or transfer of biological agents. This topic was not addressed until the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972 and the Chemical Weapons convention of 1993. Mass bioterror attacks started during World War II when a prisoner camp filled with SS officers was infected with arsenic, causing thousands to become contaminated. During World War II, the Japanese government authorized experimentation on Chinese prisoners, and some 580,000 Chinese died due to controlled biological outbreaks (Riedel). Bioterrorism was a large part of the threat of the Cold War along with nuclear terrorism. Although neither the United States or Russia ever used bioterror agents, both conducted research into manufacturing them, and the United States even set up a research/production facility in Pine Bluff, Arkansas during the Korean War. Bioterror became prominent once again in the 1970s with a series of attempts during this decade. Attempts ranged from using typhoid strains to nerve agents. Although none of these attempts were successful, they prompted the 1972 Biological Warfare convention (BWC), which prohibited the stockpiling and use of biological agents. Since then, seven known bioterror attempts have been made within the United States, and two have succeeded. The United States must recognize that, as our society becomes more interlinked and our technology improves, the possibility of a massive bioterror attack is becoming more and more likely, and the security and preparedness of the United States to resist a bioterror attack must be improved to match the technological advancements of the time period. The United States government has not done enough to ensure that a potential bioterrorist attack would be stopped, as the attacks are swift and extremely hard to contain. In Bob Graham and Jim Talents 2010 Washington Post article, they reference a National Security Council document which states that the effective dissemination of a lethal biological agent in an
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unprotected population could place hundreds of thousands of people at risk. The unmitigated consequences, the NSC paper noted, could overwhelm our public health capabilities, causing untold numbers of deaths. Economic costs could exceed $1 trillion for each such incident (Graham). The United States is unclear on exactly how deadly a bioterror attack could be, but they do have a concept of how detrimental such an attack could be to our economy. The government did conduct a series of experiments in 2001 investigating the possibility of smallpox attacks. In the simulation, known as Dark Winter, the researchers concluded that an attack likely would initially go unnoticed. Unlike a nuclear attack with its immediate effects (Slocombe). Both sources mention the fact that the public would be unprotected and unsuspecting, due to the lack of attention and funding placed on the subject of bioterrorism attack. The possibility of an attack could also reach major proportions, if 5,000 individuals are infected at five different sites, that equates to 25,000 initially infected people who will then infect three or four more apiece. With these numbers it is not difficult to see how hundreds of thousands or even millions can become infected in a very short period of time (Slocombe). The mathematics of an infection is such that a small, unnoticed virus can end up affecting millions of people in a short amount of time. Research conducted by Oxford Analytica also yielded the information detailing how a large number of suitable pathogens exist naturally in the world, while the equipment to multiply stocks and then 'weaponize' them can be obtained relatively easily as it is of a dual-use nature, and the knowledge of how to cultivate and then disperse these agents is widely known, especially within the agricultural and insect-control sectors (Bioterrorist). With the possible infection rates, the large impact on the economy, and the ease with which attackers can access the required chemicals to pull off a bioterror attack, the United States has a large problem on their hands should a deadly virus be unleashed into the public.

The 2001 Anthrax attacks highlighted flaws in the postal system, and government funding should be increased in this department to prevent other mail-borne bioterror attacks. In the 2001 Anthrax attacks, envelopes lined with Anthrax were sent through the mail to prominent government officials. None of the targets were infected, however over 2 dozen mail inspectors and housing servants were infected or killed by the spores. Although funding for protection against bioterror attacks was increased after the 2001 anthrax attacks, the United States Postal Service (USPS) has since been drastically reduced. This increases the possibility for another mail-borne attack to occur. Instead, the government needs to increase funding for the USPS in order to properly protect and inform mail inspectors of the dangers of mail-borne bioterror attacks. In the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, an increase in the Health and Safety of workers responding to such an emergency is guaranteed (Public). However, the cut in USPS funds is not guaranteeing the health and safety of postal inspectors. According to this act, funding should be raised, not cut from the USPS to prevent an outbreak from happening. The Rajneesh Bioterror Attacks of 1984 showed the ease with which terrorists have access to bioterror chemical agents, and how fast those agents can spread without proper protection, protection that the United States government has yet to supply. The Rajneesh attacks occurred in Oregon and were meant to influence a local election. During the attack, salad bars around town were infected with salmonella bacteria, affecting over 750 people with food poisoning. Because of the sickness, the elections were faulty, as the infected could not make it to the polls to vote. These attacks were reliant on the fact that Salmonella is easy to obtain. If the government were to make such bioterror agents difficult to obtain, a repeat of these attacks might be less possible. Another reason that these attacks were so successful is the lack of public
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awareness. If more government funding were placed into institutions such as the Center for Disease Control (CDC), awareness of possible bioterror attacks would increase. Between the 2013 and 2014 fiscal year, a $432 million decrease in budget authority, a $54 million decrease from prevention and public health fund, a $246 million decrease in public health services evaluation funds, and a $30 million decrease in public health and social services emergency funds are all projected due to the sequestration of 2013. If awareness were to increase then early identification and treatment limit additional exposures and thus the spread of disease. Correct actions taken immediately reduce individual pain and suffering and provide the best chances for effective treatment and return to health (Slocombe). If access to harmful agents was restricted and public awareness was increased through government attention and funding, which they are not currently projected to, the possibility of a major bioterror attack would be drastically reduced. Research into vaccines for harmful chemicals could prevent a possible outbreak from spreading, once it occurs. Many bioterror attack attempts have used various strains of diseases such as anthrax and smallpox. These two diseases each have their respective vaccines, but the swiftness with which each of these fast-moving diseases can spread may be faster than the vaccine can be administered. If government funding were to be placed into research for a way to administer the vaccine with speed, a major bioterror attack could be avoided. Although, according to the Public Health Security and Bioterror Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Government funding has increased on Accelerated research and development on priority pathogens and countermeasures, progress has been slow, and such research must remain to be a top priority. Hasty administration of the vaccines could not only help stop a bioterror outbreak in progress, but could deter bioterrorists for initiating an attack in the first place. The reason that
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disease strains such as anthrax and smallpox are used is because the attackers know that they spread quickly, possibly quicker than the vaccine. If there were quicker methods of administering the vaccines for these diseases, bioterrorists would be hesitant to use these strains because there would be a quick cure. Vaccines could possibly contain the solution to the threat of bioterror attacks, and should remain to be a top priority for government spending. If none of these preventative and reactive measures are taken, the possibility of a bioterror attack increases, and the resulting outbreak could have an extreme impact on the lives of American citizens. In a worst-case scenario, a particularly well-planned and well-carried out bioterror attack could wipe out a major portion of the population. As government funding leans more towards nuclear terrorism protection, and away from bioterrorism protection, a bioterrorist attack against the United States becomes more likely. If smallpox were to be the chemical agent used, it is likely that many of the first wave of smallpox cases would be misdiagnosed (Slocombe). The disease could then spread to infect thousands of people due to its misdiagnosis. Once the diagnosis of smallpox is made, the reaction from the public would be one of extreme alarm. The public would have no knowledge of how to protect themselves, and the result would be an extremely unstable society. According to Walter Slocombe and Daniel Gernstein, Eventually, the isolation of victims and vaccination of those potentially exposed would defeat the attack, but not until the casualties had mounted and the economic damage had been done (Slocombe). There are many agents that could be used to this same effect, and the outcome would be extremely similar. Another, potentially more deadly threat is the chemical agent ricin. Ricin is so deadly that just a speck can kill if it is inhaled or reaches the bloodstream (Schmitt). Ricin was used in bioterror attacks in other countries such as Japan. According to a 2011 New York Times article, Al Qaeda was attempting to acquire enough Ricin
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to create Ricin Bombs to drop on the United States. Such an attack would be extremely deadly due to how fast Ricin works. If such a bomb were to be detonated in a major civilian center, it could inflict disproportionate psychological terror on big-city transportation systems (Schmitt). The potential repercussions, should no federal action be placed toward preventing a bioterror attack, could have both physical and psychological impacts on American citizens, and potentially wipe out a large number of the population. The potential of a major bioterror attack happening in the near future, becomes increasingly great as terrorists attempt to acquire agents, and government funding for programs such as the CDC decrease. Although government funding for prevention of such an attack was increased after the 2001 Anthrax attacks, the 2013 sequestration drastically reduced the government funds for bioterrorism prevention. If the government does nothing to prevent such an attack, the potential repercussions could be extremely deadly and psychologically massive. Bioterrorism is an immediate threat to the security of the United States and the ease with which an attacker can access chemicals and lack of prevention and preparation on the part of the United States call for more federal attention to be placed on bioterrorism prevention. This attention should come in the form of increased funding for Government programs, such as the CDC and USPS, and research into possible vaccine spreading programs to prevent another, possibly more deadly attack from happening in the future.

Annotated Bibliography "Bioterrorist Threat Dwarfs Nuclear Risk." OxResearch Daily Brief Service. 30 Jul 2010: 1. SIRS Issues Researcher. Web. 02 Mar 2013. Shows the lack of action by the government to take on the issue of bioterrorism, and how it is way more urgent than the nuclear threat. Graham, Bob, and Jim Talent. "We're Still Unready for Bioterrorism." Washington Post. 03 Aug 2010: A.15. SIRS Issues Researcher. Web. 02 Mar 2013. An article that is written describing how unprepared the United States is for a bioterror attack. Mentions some past bioterror attacks as well as the simulation Dark Winter. Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act. 28 C.F.R. Sec. 101. 2002. Print. A Government Act from 2002 in response to the 2001 Anthrax attacks. Attempts to help prevent another Bioterror attack from occurring again. Bush Administration. Reidel, Stefan. "Biological Warfare and Bioterrorism: A Historical Review." US National Library of Medicine. National Institute of Health, n.d. Web. 14 Apr. 2013. <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/>. Schmitt, Eric, and Thom Shanker. "Al Quaeda trying to harness toxins for bombs, U.S. officials say." The New York Times [New York] 13 Aug. 2011: n. pag. Web. 3 Mar. 2013.<http://www.nbcnews.com>. A Newspaper Article detailing how Al Quaeda is reportedly Attempting to obtain Ricin to make Bioterror bombs to drop on the United States. Slocombe, Walter, and Daniel Gerstein. "The Day Before." Proceedings. Oct 2010: 40. SIRS Issues Researcher. Web. 02 Mar 2013. A full detailed worst-case scenario in which a Bioterror attack is made. Outlines what could possibly happen, and what needs to be done in advance to stop the spread of the disease.

Works Cited "Bioterrorist Threat Dwarfs Nuclear Risk." OxResearch Daily Brief Service. 30 Jul 2010: 1. SIRS Issues Researcher. Web. 02 Mar 2013. Graham, Bob, and Jim Talent. "We're Still Unready for Bioterrorism." Washington Post. 03 Aug 2010: A.15. SIRS Issues Researcher. Web. 02 Mar 2013. Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act. 28 C.F.R. Sec. 101. 2002. Print. Reidel, Stefan. "Biological Warfare and Bioterrorism: A Historical Review." US National Library of Medicine. National Institute of Health, n.d. Web. 14 Apr. 2013. <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/>. Schmitt, Eric, and Thom Shanker. "Al Quaeda trying to harness toxins for bombs, U.S. officials say." The New York Times [New York] 13 Aug. 2011: n. pag. Web. 3 Mar. 2013.<http://www.nbcnews.com>. Slocombe, Walter, and Daniel Gerstein. "The Day Before." Proceedings. Oct 2010: 40. SIRS Issues Researcher. Web. 02 Mar 2013. A full detailed worst-case scenario in which a Bioterror attack is made.

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