A Theory of Imitation in Plato

American Philological Association
A Theory of Imitation in Plato's Republic Author(s): Elizabeth Belfiore Reviewed work(s): Source: Transactions of the American Philological Association (1974-), Vol. 114 (1984), pp. 121146 Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/284143 . Accessed: 07/12/2012 16:39
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Transactions of theAmericanPhilological Association114 (1984) 121-146
A THEORY OF IMITATION IN PLATO'S REPUBLIC

ELIZABETH BELFIORE University of Minnesota
Plato's discussion of imitation in Republic 10 has often been called or at least inconsistent with the treatment of mimesis self-contradictory, in Republic 3. It is argued, for example, that while Republic 3 banishes only some imitativepoetry,Republic 10 opens with the statementthat all imitativepoetryhas been excluded fromthe ideal state (10.595A), but then nevertheless allows some formsof imitation,namely hymns and encomia (10.607A).1 Others claim that Plato fails to define important terms,such as "imitation,"which he uses inconsistently. For example, criticshave said that "imitation"means "impersonation" in Republic 3, but "representation" in Republic 10.2 The most extremepositionis that Plato has no coherentconcept of the imitationhe attacks,but simply a seriesof bad arguments.3 strings together Numerous attempts have been made to resolve or explain these alleged inconsistencies. Some deny that Plato reallymeans everything he seems to be saying,4 or argue that Book 10 expressesa different view
1 See especially C. Brownson, Plato'sStudiesand Criticism of thePoets(Boston 1920) 88-94. More recentlyL. Moss, "Plato and the Poetics," Philological Quarterly 50 (1971) 533-42 argues against various attemptsto reconcile Books 3 and 10. For othersurveysof views about the problem of consistency see also T. Gould, "Plato's Hostility to Art,"Arion 3 (1964) 70-91; G. Sorbom, Mimesis and Art (Stockholm1966) esp. 129-51; M. Partee, Plato's Poetics (Salt Lake City 1981) 1-22; A. Nehamas, "Plato on Imitationand Poetryin Republic 10," in Plato on Beauty, Wisdom, and the Arts,eds. J.Moravscikand P. Temko (Totowa, N.J. 1982) 47-78. Unless otherwisenoted,I followBurnet'sOCT. 2 For the view that Plato uses mimeisthai in several different senses see P. Vicaire, Platon. Critique litteraire (Paris 1960) 221-25 and E. Schaper, Prelude to Aesthetics (London 1968) 42-48. Some of those who hold that Plato uses mimesis in the sense of "impersonation" in Republic 3 and in that of "representation" in Republic 10 are Brownson (above, note 1) 92-93; F. M. Cornford,The Republic of Plato (Oxford 1941) 324, note 1; E. Havelock, Preface to Plato (Cambridge, Mass. and London 1963) 20-26. 3 See, for example, J.W. H. Atkins,Literary Criticismin Antiquity(Cambridge 1934) 1.48-51 and J.Annas,An Introductionto Plato's Republic (Oxford 1981) 336-44. 4 Representatives of this view are W. C. Greene, "Plato's View of Poetry,"HSCP 29 (1918) 56; A. H. Gilbert,"Did Plato Banish the Poets or the Critics?"Studies in Philology 36 (1939) 1-19; I. M. Crombie, An Examination of Plato's Doctrines (London 1962) 1.147.
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Othersbelieve thatthe later.5 fromthatof Book 3 because it was written aims of the two are due to the quite different apparent inconsistencies books.6Still othersargue that Plato definesand discussesa good and a Or again, certainscholarsclaim that Plato's aesbad kind of imitation.7 thetictheoriesin otherdialogues can explain some apparent inconsistencies in the Republic.8 It has not been noticed,however,that Republic 3 and 10 contain a contheoryof imitationin the visual and poetic arts that is remarkably sistentand detailed in certain respects. In these books Plato defines, imitaof different manycharacteristics or by clear implication, explicitly area of among thesearts.This important tive artsand manyrelationships and relationships has never been adequately investigated.9 definitions applied definitional There are many indications of a consistently strategy,with Book 10.595A-608B elaborating and explaining ideas statedor merelyimplicitin Book 3.392C-398B. For example, the briefly discussionof style (lexis) in the Republic 3 passage definesimitation(to mimeisthai) as "likeningoneself to someone else" (3.393C5-6), distinguishes genres of poetryfromone anotheron the basis of their use of imitation(3.394B-C), and concludes with the condemnationof one particular kind of imitation.Republic 10 opens with a referenceto the Republic 3 discussionof imitation:"We did well ... in not admitting the formulates thatis mimetike"(10.595A2-5) and explicitly any [poetry] a view strongly imitatesthe worksof craftsmen, theorythatthe imitator and relationships among the suggestedat Republic 3.397Eff. Definitions in the Republic 10 passage as theyare in Republic artsare as important 3. Plato begins the discussionof mimesis in Republic 10 by askingfora of "mimesis in general," statingthat this has not yet been definition adequately given (10.595C). Plato then suggeststhat this definitionis at 10.599D3-4, that"we given withinthe nextfew pages, forhe remarks, of an eidolon." Book 10 goes on to as the craftsman definedthe imitator definethe subject matterof one kind of imitativepoetry(603c) and to
5 This is the view of, for example, R. Nettleship,Lectures on the Republic of Plato (London 19012) 341 and G. Else, The Structureand Date of Book 10 of Plato's Republic (Heidelberg 1972). 6 Some interpretations along this line are those of W. Jaeger,Paideia: T'he Ideals of Greek Culture, transl.G. Highet (New York 1943) 2.215; R. G. Collingwood,"Plato's Philosophyof Art,"Mind n.s. 34 (1925) 163-64; Nehamas (above, note 1). 7 The best known proponentof the view that Plato distinguishes between a "good" and a "bad" kind of imitationis J.Tate, "'Imitation'in Plato's Republic," CQ 22 (1928) 16-23 and "Plato and 'Imitation',"CQ 26 (1932) 161-69. 8 See, for example, W. J.Oates, Plato's View of Art (New York 1972) and W. J. Verdenius, Mimesis. Plato's Doctrine of ArtisticImitation and Its Meaning to Us (Leiden 1962). 9 Vicaire (above, note 2) 236-60, thoughhe does not examine the Republic in sufficient detail, is one of the few who have undertakena studyof Plato's views on poetic genres.
A Theoryof Imitation
123
give an account of the reactionsof the audience to different genres of poetry (605C-606D). ThroughoutBook 10 Plato is also concerned with the relationshipbetween painting and poetry and with that between imitation and craftsmanship. of the Nevertheless,Plato's views on the defining characteristics imitativearts are, in Republic 3 and 10, oftenobscured by his not presenting them formally and explicitly. Classificationis not, after all, Plato's primary concern in these books, as it is in portions of his concerns.It will Sophist,'0but is subordinateto ethical and psychological therefore be helpful to reorganize Plato's material,collectinghis sometimes scattered remarks in Republic 3.392C-398B and 10.595A-608B, assigninga single label to each kind of imitativeart and explicitlydescribingrelationships that Plato sometimesleaves his reader to infer.The followingexaminationbegins with the most general definition of imitation (Section I), proceeds to two importantkinds of imitationwhich Plato distinguishes and which we will call "versatileimitation" and "imitation with knowledge" (Section II), considersthe two kinds of versatile imitationwith which Plato is concerned: painting and poetry (Section III), and concludes with a study of the genres of versatilepoetryPlato mentions:epic, tragedy,lyric,and comedy (Section IV). Our studywill, as far as possible,limit itselfto the two passages, Republic 3.392c-398B and Republic 10.595A-608B,thatforma structural and thematicunity.11 The diagram on p. 124 outlinesour procedure. I. Imitation
make oneselfsimilar to someone else in sound or in shape is to imitate that personto whom one makes oneselfsimilar?"(OV'KOViVTO' YE OMOLOVV ' ' EaVTOV aAAW Kaaa a VV Kara OX-a ayLALGtaL EOTLV EKELVOV w av
TL9 01AOLOL' )
tation(T-OjAtjA0EaL)
Republic 3.393c5-6 gives the most comprehensive definition of imi-
we findin our two passages: "Is it nottruethatto
10 The many parallels between the treatments of imitationin the Sophist and in the Republic have been studied in detail by Else (above, note 5) 26-41. See also B. Bosanquet, A Companion to Plato's Republic (London 19062) 85, who notes a parallel between Plato's introduction of "huntersand imitators" into the "feverish city" at Republic 2.373B and his divisionsof huntingand productionin the Sophist. It is not,then,surprising if the Republic is also similarto the Sophist in its concernwithclassification. 11 This restriction means, forexample, that we will not attemptto studyPlato's views on music, an importantimitative art. For more comprehensivestudies of mimesis in the worksof Plato and other Greek writers see R. McKeon, "LiteraryCriticismand the Concept of Imitationin Antiquity," Modern Philology 34 (1936) 1-35; H. Koller, Die Mimesis in der Antike (Bern 1954); G. Else, "'Imitation' in the Fifth Century,"CP 53 (1958) 73-90 and addendum 245; Sorbom (above, note 1).
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It has not been noticed that thispassage anticipatessome important featuresof Republic 10. First,it implies that since the imitatorimitates by makingsomething thatis similarto something else in sound or shape, he is both an imitator of soundsor shapes and a makerof (othersimilar) soundsor shapes. Plato failsto spell thisout, and it is of littleimportance in Republic 3. It does become significant, however,for our understanding of Book 10, where Plato calls the imitator both an imitator of eidola (sounds or shapes), at 10.600E5, for example, and a maker of eid6la, at 10.599A7.12 In usingthe conceptsof sound and shape to defineimitation Republic 3.393c5-6 also anticipatesRepublic 10.603B6-7, which distinguishespaintingand poetryby theirrespectiveuse of sightand sound.
Imitation
making something similar to something else in sound or shape
Imitation with Knowledge imitation in poetry of the works of craftsmenas they are, to produce what is useful
Versatile Imitation (Mimetike) ignorant imitation of the works of craftsmenas they appear (= making of eid&la), to produce what gives pleasure
Versatile Painting versatile imitation dealing with shapes, that makes eidola of physical objects
Versatile Poetry versatile imitation dealing with sounds, that makes eidola of actions, using imitative narrative
Lyric
Comedy versatile poetry using only imitative narrative to produce laughter
Tragic Poetry versatile poetry that makes eidola of arete to produce pity
tragic poetry using mixed narrative in epic verse
Tragedy tragic poetry using only imitative narrative in iambic verse
12 See Nehamas (above, note ]) 62 fora good discussionof thisaspect of Republic 10.
125
Republic 3.393c5-6 also anticipates another importantconcept of Republic 10: mistake.To imitatein sound (voice) is to make oneselfsimilar to someone else in voice (3.393C5-6), and this, Plato tells us at 3.393cl-3, is to speak as though one were someone else. To speak as thoughone were someone else is, in turn,to tryto make people believe that one is someone else (3.393A8-B2), that is, to try to make people mistakeone for someone else. Thus, to make oneselfsimilarto someone else (to imitatesomeone else) is to tryto make people mistakeoneselffor someone else. On the other hand, Plato writes,there is no imitation when the poet does not hide himself(3.393Cll-D2) or tryto deceive us (3.393A6-7). In Republic 10 also, imitators tryto make people mistakeimitations forsomething else. At 10.600E7-601A2,forexample, an imitationis said to be mistakenforthe truthby those "judgingfromcolorsand shapes."'13 In Republic 10, however, Plato does not follow the linguisticusage of Republic 3, in which the relationship between artifacts and imitations is said to be one of similarity. This may be because he wishesto reservethe vocabulary of similarity for the relationship between artifacts and Forms;at least,artifacts are said to be TOLOVTOV OLOV TO Ov at 10.597A5. However we interpret this latter relationship, we should not confuse it with that between imitationsand artifacts.Imitationsare mistakenfor artifacts, but artifacts are never mistakenfor Forms in Republic 3 and 10. Further,Forms could not be imitatedin the sense definedat Republic 3.393c5-6, "makingsimilarin sound or shape," fortheydo not have these sensiblequalities. At Republic 5.476B, forexample, Plato explicitly the Form Beauty from"the beautifulsounds . . . and colors distinguishes and shapes and everything thatis craftedfromsuch things."''4 In one respect, however,3.393c5-6 mightat leastappear to contradict Plato's view of imitation in Republic 10 and elsewherein Republic 3. Since it describesonlya kindof imitation in whichone humanbeing useshimself to imitate (Eavrov) another humanbeing(,KEZVOv and aAAX are masculine),it cannotdefinethe imitation of animalsor of inanimateobjectsmentionedfrequently in the two books (forexample,at 3.396B5-7, 3.397A4-7, 10.598A1-3). Many have in fact thoughtthat Plato uses "imitation"to
13 Plato frequently stressesthe imitator'sabilityto cause his audience to make mistakes. See, for example, Republic 10.598c1-4, 598D2-3, 598E5-599A3, 601A4-B1, 602B1-4, 602c1O-D4, 605B6-c4. On the kinds of mistakesinvolved, and on audience psychology generally, in Republic 10, see Belfiore, "Plato's Greatest Accusation Against Poetry," Canadian Journalof Philosophysuppl. vol. 9 (1983) 39-62. 14 This passage was called to my attentionby G. Vlastos, "Self-Predication and SelfParticipationin Plato's Later Period," in his Platonic Studies (Princeton1973) 338, note 9. We should note that since imitationin the sense defined in Republic 3 is imitationof sensible qualities, when Plato writesat Republic 6.500c5 of imitationof "that which is always the same" he cannot be using the term"imitation" in the sense of Republic 3.393c.
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(in whicha human being uses his own body to imimean "impersonation" (as tateanotherhumanbeing) in Republic 3, and to mean "representation" in however,risksimputingto Plato a distinction This interpretation, While it is true that in his Sophist (267A3-4) which he is not interested. imitationusing one's own body (acting,forexample) Plato distinguishes forexample), in the Republic (painting, usingimplements fromimitation imitation he also failsto distinguish Plato not onlyignoresthisdistinction, shifting of animalsor of inanimateobjects, imitation of humanbeingsfrom of theone to theother.Thus,in Republic warningfromdiscussion without of the soundsof animalsand of naturalphenom3, Plato equates imitation of madmen (3.396B5-9); and in Republic 10 he shifts ena with imitation of craftsmen," fromthe painterwho imitatesthe "products unexpectedly (10.598A2-3) to the painter who paints "a shoemaker,a carpenter,the othercraftsmen" (10.598B8-Cl).16The masculinesin 3.393c5-6, then,do and may be replacedby moregeneral significance nothave any theoretical What Plato consistently (Tro' of "imitation" termsin a definition t4LyL/ELoOaL). means in Republic 3 and 10 is that "To imitateis to make one thing(or to another thing(or person)in soundor shape." person)similar II. VersatileImitationand ImitationwithKnowledge A. VersatileImitation(Mimetike) Mimetike, "versatileimitation,"is Plato's technical term for imitais the termfor "versatileimitator," and mimetikos, tion of many things, of thisart. That the -ike formsof mimeisthaireferonly the practitioner to imitationof many thingsand that this helps to reconcilethe account of Republic 3 with that of Republic 10 has been noticed only by Victor to which the firstpart of this Menza, in an unpublished dissertation, sectionowes much.'7 Like otherGreek -ike words,mimetikedesignatesan art or science, and mimetikosrefersto the expertin this art. As far as we know,these used by him at Republic 3.395E1.18 termswere coined by Plato and first
15 See above, note 2. 16 p. Shorey cites this shift as an example of "inconcinnity" in his "Illogical Idiom,"
a bed)inRepublic a painter imitates 10.15 for example, when,
TAPA 47 (1916) 207. 17 V. Menza, "Poetryand the Techne Theory,"Diss. Johns Hopkins 1972. 18 P. Chantraine,Etudes sur le vocabulaire grec (Paris 1956) 98, findsmore than 350 -ikos words in Plato, of which more than 250 are not attestedearlier. Chantraine notes that these words are often used with the termstechne or episteme, expressedor understood, to describe an art or science (141-42). Accordingto the exhaustivestudyof A. N. Ammann, -IKOY bei Platon (Freiburg 1953), mimetikos does not occur before Plato (127). Else, "'Imitation,"'(above, note 11) also fails to findany occurrencesof mimetikos or mimetike in the Fifth Century. L. Brandwood's computer study,A Word Index to Plato, Compendia Series, vol. 8 (Leeds 1976) indicates that Plato uses the -ike formsof
127
There, as Menza notes, Plato asks whether the guardian should be a and immediatelyafter,at 3.395A2,he gives what amountsto mimetikos, a definition of thisnew term:"A personwill imitatemany thingsand be a mimetikos"(7roXXh U.l?)m-rEaL KaL eo-TraL /LUL/?T7LKOS). fIoXXa IuL?,o-,ETraL explains the new -ike form: the mimetikos is someone who imitates many things.19 AlthoughPlato also uses other formsof mimeisthaiand its cognates in this way, mimetikos always has this meaning in the Republic, and mimetike always designates the art of imitatingmany Plato characterizes versatileimitation as imitation of many things, or as imitationof the works of craftsmen, or as imitationand making of eidola. As we will see, these different all referto the same descriptions aspect of the imitator's activity.
things.20
1. Imitation of Many Things

In Republic 3, as Menza pointsout,21 Plato condemnsonly the versatile imitator.The young guardians are not allowed to be mimetikoi, imitating the many things(artisans, women, slaves, vicious people) they shouldnot themselves become (3.395D-396B), but they are allowed to imitatethe one "craftsman of freedom"(3.395B8-C5) theyare to become as adults. Plato also findsacceptable the poet who imitatesthe one good thing (rov rov E7TLELKOVS9 MLM?)T?v aKpaTrov: 3.397D4-5), exiling only the poet who "is able to become everything because of his clevernessand to imitateeverything" (3.398A1-2), thatis, the mimetikos. Republic 10 is, as Menza notes,consistent withBook 3 in condemning only the versatileimitator.The technical vocabularyat the opening of Book 10 alertsus to the factthatversatileimitation alone is being consid[poetry] that is mimetike" (10.595A2-5). This is entirelyconsistent with Book 3, which,as we have just seen, also rejectedonly the mimetikos.22 Plato departsfromthistechnicalvocabularywhen he goes on to ask what in general"is (10.595c7). This departureis explainedby the fact "mimesis
mimesis only in his Republic (where the first instanceis that at 3.394E1), Sophist, Laws, Epinomis, Statesman and Timaeus. Thus, since at least the first books of the Republic are generallyagreed to have been writtenbefore these other dialogues, Republic 38394E1 is the earliestoccurrenceof an -ike formof mimesis in Plato and in extantGreek. 19 See Menza (above, note 17) 132. Chantraine (above, note 18) 141-42 notes that Plato oftendefinesthe -ike wordsas he introducesthem. On the use of kai to introduce"a more accurate definition" see J.D. Denniston,The Greek Particles (Oxford 1934) 291 (4). 20 According to Brandwood's data (above, note 18) these formsoccur in the Republic only in Republic 3 (the two instanceswe have just mentioned)and in Republic 10, in 12 otherinstances:595A5, B5; 598B6; 602A11, B7, B10; 603A11, B4, cl, c5; 605A2, B7. In all of these cases Plato is writing about the unacceptable imitator of many things. 21 Above, note 17, 126-33. 22 See Menza (above, note 17) 252 and note 1, p. 362.
ered: "We founded the city well ...
when we did not admit all of it
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that,since 10.595c-598c is a proofthatthe painter(or at least one kindof Plato does notwantto use the technicaltermuntil painter)is a mimetikos, comparesthe painterto a the proofis complete. In this proof,Plato first Because the man withthe around everywhere. man who carriesa mirror althoughhe does not tryto deceive people, he is not an imitator,23 mirror resemblesan imitatorin that he "makes" many things.He can make makes"(10.596c2), "everyartifact," "everything thateach ofthecraftsmen that growsfromthe earth,""everylivingcreature,""every"everything under the earth" (10.596c4-9). thing in the heavens," and "everything Next, Plato establishesthat the painter is an imitator (mimetes, not in an argument "We have agreed on the endingat 1O.597E1O: mimetikos) imitator(mimeten)." Finally, Plato proves that paintingimitateseidola mimetike (10.598A-C). The technical term mimetike and is, therefore, in the at 10.598B6,afterwhichit is used frequently reappearsin thisproof, who Book 10 condemnsis themimetikos, the imitator dialogue. Hereafter, (forexample at 10.598C5-D1, to imitateand know "everything" pretends 10.598E1). At 10.603A11,in fact, Plato replaces the earlier "mimesis in in general." general"with"mimetike 2. Imitationof the Worksof Craftsmen The many thingsthe versatileimitatorimitatesare the many works That Plato's main concern is with craftsof many kinds of craftsmen. and is obvious fromhis constant opposimanshiphas oftenbeen noted,24 In Republic 10 the painteris said to be "an to craftsman. tionof imitator imitatorof that which those othersmake." Plato then concludes: "This, and all the then,is what the tragedianalso will be, if he is an imitator, someone who is by nature thirdfromthe king and the otherimitators: truth.... Then we have agreed on the imitator"(10.597E2-10). The painter is then said to imitate "the works of the craftsmenas they appear (10.598A-B). Plato also writesthat Homer will be shownto be a if he provesnot to have done versatileimitatorratherthan a craftsman kindsof craftsmen (10.599B3-7) but only to the deeds (erga) of different have imitated their words (10.599c2). As we will see below (Section III.B.2), imitationof ethos in Republic 10 is also imitationof the works who have knowledgeof how to act wisely. of craftsmen
23 This differencebetween the man with the mirrorand the painter is not usually noticed: see, for example, Partee (above, note 1) 113-14; Annas (above, note 3) 336; R. Cross and A. Woozley, Plato's Republic (New York 1964) 274. There is no question of deception in Republic 10 until598c, where the painter,"if he is a good painter,"is said to be able to deceive "childrenand fools"by showinghis works"froma distance."Imitation, a mirror, requiresskilland intentto deceive. unlikethe act of carrying 24 Some good discussions of this topic are those of Menza (above, note 17) and J.Moravcsik,"Noetic Aspirationand ArtisticInspiration,"in Plato on Beauty, Wisdom and the Arts (above, note 1) 29-46.
129
imitatesthe worksof craftsIn Republic 3 also the versatileimitator men,thoughPlato is less explicitabout thisthan he is in Republic 10. The ideal stateof Republic 3 is foundedon the principleof one man one work. There must be no "double man" or "manifoldman" in this state,writes Plato,since "each one does one work"(3.397E1-2). Only in thisstateis the shoemakera shoemakerand not a pilot in addition,the farmera farmer and nota juryman as well (3.397E4-7). For thisreason,the personwho can "become all sorts of things and imitateeverything" mustbe senton hisway (3.398A-B), and theguardiansmustnotbe mimetikoi (3.394E-395D). Plato could onlywritein thisway if he thought of the versatile imitator as someone who triesto imitateall the crafts. If the versatile imitator were himself a real craftsman, he would be doing one work,like the others. If,however, he were no craftsman at all, he would be an idler rather thana "manifold man." Instead, the versatileimitatoris exiled because he is a pseudoa meddlerin everysortofcraft.25 craftsman, 3. Making of Eidola That the mimetikosis a pseudo-craftsman who imitatesmany things has been well understoodin the literature, but Plato's concept of imitation of eidola has been much misunderstood.26 On our presentaccount, "imitation of eidola" is simplya more accurate,technicaltermfor"imitationof many things" and "imitation of the worksof craftsmen." At Republic10.599D2-4 Plato remarks, as he cross-examines Homer, thatthe imitator has been defined: 'fl 4LXE Ò1?)p, EL7TEp ATpLTos ro
T7jr
arete, the craftsmanof an eidolon, whom we defined as an imitator [mimetes]. . ."). Since, as we will see below (Section IV.C), arete' is the subject matterof only one kind of versatileimitator, Plato's question to Homer tells us that the mimetikos(mimeten obviouslyhas thismeaning here) has been defined as "third from the truth, craftsmanof an eid&lon." Plato must be referring, first,to the argument ending at 10.597E10 (above, Section II.A.2), where the imitator was "agreed" to be "thirdfromthe truth" about craftsmanship. (WMoXAoy Next, 'KaIAEv)
25 N. White, A Companion to Plato's Republic (Indianapolis and Cambridge 1979) 96-97 notes that Plato's condemnationof imitativeart in Republic 3 is based on his "Principle of the Natural Division of Labor." See also P. Shorey, What Plato Said (Chicago 1933) 219, and Bosanquet (above, note 10) 99 (cited by White, p. 97). 26 For example, the eidola of Republic 10 have been connected with the images (eikones) of the Divided Line (Republic 6.509-11) by, among others,H. J.Paton, "Plato's Theory of Eikasia," Proc. AristotelianSoc. 22 (1921-22) 69-104; S. Ringbom,"Plato on Images," Theoria 31 (1965) 95-96; J.-P. Vernant, "Image et apparence dans la theorie platonicienne de la mimesis," Journal de Psychologie 72 (1975) 136. Other common errorsare discussedbelow, in thissection.
cpLo-ajEGa ("Dear Homer, if you are not thirdfromthe truth concerning
a?OEL'as
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a9prET7
7TEpL, EL&LWXOV 87?y/LOVpyOs, OrV
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130
Elizabeth Belfiore
"craftsmanof an eidolon" at 10.599D3 can only refer to 10.597E10598B8, where Plato introducedthe technical term eidolon (eidola) to explain "in what way" (oL'a 7OV7O: 10.598A7) the mimetikosis able to Afterit was agreed that the mimetikosimitatesnot make "everything." (10.598A1-4), Plato asked whether the Form but the worksof craftsmen oLa he imitatesthese works"as they are or as they appear" (o'La EO7TLL V in the paragraph at 4)aLVEraL: 10.598A5), and explained this distinction 10.598A7-9: "It's like this.A couch, if one sees it fromthe side or from at all itselffromitself, does it differ the front or in any way whatsoever, KALLV'7, EaVTE E(K ('Q?E at all but appears different?" or does it not differ 8\ aA\oL'a;)The couch was then (10.598A10) and paintbut only to appear different agreed not to differ ing was said, at 10.598B1-5, to imitate not "that which is" (ro o'v) but "that which appears" (ro (PaLvdoEvov), and to be imitationof a "phantasm" (PavraTioaTosq), not of "truth"(aA,E0ELasg). The conclusion then followed:"Mimetikeis, then,far fromwhat is true,and, as it seems,for because it graspssome small part of each this reason makes everything, thingand thatan eidolon"(foppw a'pa rov Tov aAnoVs 7) MU/L7/TLK7/
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ffMLKpov
TL
of "that which In this passage (10.598A1-B8) eidolon is a synonym and of a thing of "appearance" (qPavTaco-Ma), appears" (\ SbaLvoMEvo0V), "as it appears" (ol'a SbaLvETaL). It is the oppositeof "thatwhich is" (To o'v), of "truth" (&Ak&Lda),and of a thing"as it is" (ol'a E'oTLv). basis.The on an epistemological Plato distinguishes eidolon fromtruth couch "as it is," or the truthabout the couch, is the object of the craft knowledgeof the useror of the truebeliefofthe maker(10.601C-602B). It how no matter cannotbe perceivedby thesenses:the couch looksdifferent the "as it "appearcouch appears," one sees it (10.598A7-9). The (0rn1oViv) ance" (to phainomenon) or eidolon, on the other hand, is the object of ignorantversatile imitation.The versatile imitatorcan imitate eidola "thoughhe does not know about the craftsof any of these [craftsmen]" knowl(10.598c1);27he deceives the personwho is "notable to distinguish edge and ignorance,that is, imitation"(10.598D4-5);28he neitherknows beliefabout whathe imitates (10.602A).His ignorancedistinnorhas right forhis imitacondition and is a necessary guisheshim fromthe craftsman, and between mimetikos tionofeidola (10.599A6-B7). The same contrast
27
EKaOTov
KaL TOVTo E';wAov:
10.598B6-8).
28 / O'O KaL MLMT) Ka avE7rnrT7o1vv?v ecva EflOT/V T' 'eETacaLt. The second kai in this passage links "appositionallyrelated ideas": on this use of kai see Denniston (above, note 19).
TEXvLTWv. ofhisearlier conjecture way,reading this TEXvVv instead
the passage in J. Adam, The Republic of Plato (Cambrige 19632) 2.394-95, interprets
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was strongly craftsman suggestedat Republic 3.394E-395B, where Plato stated that it was impossibleto do or imitatemany thingswell: only the ignorant he implied,could attempt person, to do this.At 10.601B9-10 Plato clearly indicates the epistemological basis for his distinctionbetween eidolon and "truth" when he characterizes the mimetikos as someonewho does not know the truthbut only [perceives]the "appearance" (eidolon): "The makerof an eidolon, the imitator, we say, knowsnothingabout the truth, but [perceives] the appearance" (o TO?V EL83W?OV O 1LIp7)T7)S, o7roL0T)S9, 4a/JEk, TOV ov OVTOv EovraLEL, TOV Of fa&oeov). OVs The eidolon, then,is sound or shape as perceived by someone ignorantof anything but sound and shape. The makerof eidola makes eidola that may be mistaken,by someone as ignorant as himself,for "that which is." "That which is," on the other hand, is a sensible artifact, a couch or a table, as understoodby someone with knowledge of craftsmanship. The person with knowledge, like the mimetikos,directs his attention to sensibles;however,by also "lookingto the Form" (10.596B7), and consultingthe user about what is trulyfine (10.601D8-E2), he has come to understand and not merelyperceive sensibleartifacts. Because, then, an eidolon is any object perceived by an ignorant person, it is a mistake to think, as Else does, for example, that the mimetikos will be betteroffif he happens to finda well-made artifact to imitatethan if he imitatesa poorlymade one.29Plato's point is thateven if,as in the examples in Republic 10, the "model" is a well-made product of craftsmanship, the ignorantmimetikosis only capable of grasping, imitating, and makingeidola. Another commonmistakeis to confuseimitation of eidola in Republic 10 with phantastike in the Sophist235D-236c.30 Plato distinguishes eikastike,which gives imitationsthe true proportions and colors of the originals (Sophist 235D6-E2), fromphantastike whichgivesthemthe proportions thatmerelyappear fine,"letting the truth go" (Sophist 236A4-6). It makes,forexample,theupper partsof verylargestatuesproportionately larger,and the lower partsproportionately smallerthanthoseof the originals (235E5-236A6). The products made by phantastike, Plato writes, only appear to resemblewhatis fine"because of our view froma poor position" (&aA TnV OVK EK KaIoV 6Eav), but ifsomeonecould "view themadequately" (LKavw-s opav),theywould not appear to resemblethe originals(236B4-7). Thus, while the Sophistdistinguishes poor and good viewingconditionsgood conditions being sufficient to tell us whetheror not the truth is adequatelyrepresented-theRepublic opposesan unchanging "thatwhichis,"
29 Else, The Structureand Date . .. (above, note 5) 35.
30 The connectionis made, for example, by Adam (above, note 27) ad 598B; K. Gilbert and H. Kuhn, A History of Esthetics (1939; rpt. Bloomington,Indiana 1953) 33; J. P. Maguire,"The Differentiation of Artin Plato's Aesthetics," HSCP 68 (1964) 393.
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changing"thatwhichappears,"that to a constantly thatcan be understood, no matter can only be seen. The couch in Republic 10 appears different 10.598A8)one sees it,and one view is as bad as another.And how (o7r)oi3v: imitationof eidola from again, unlike the Republic, which distinguishes imitationof that which is on the basis of craftknowledge,the Sophist makes no distinction between phantastikeand eikastikeon thisbasis: the of theorigitwo artswould requirethesame knowledgeof theproportions products. nal in orderto make theirrespective we can also Once we have rid ourselvesof these misunderstandings his concept of eidola. In see anotherof Plato's motivesfor introducing Republic 3 Plato had characterized the mimetikos as someone who things.Now, Plato adds that the mimetikosalso imitatesmany different appearances of a single thing.He then uses this imitatesmany different of the apparent breadth of the mimetikos'field to very demonstration prove its trulynarrowscope, for he concludes that the mimetikosdoes but only one thing over and over: an not really imitate "everything" eidolon,which is a "small part of each thing" (598B7). The versatile claim to universalskillhas been demolishedin a neat elenchus. imitator's Plato's concept of mimetike thus remains the same throughout makingof eidola of is the ignorant Republic 3 and 10: versatileimitation as they appear. This concept is, however,elucithe worksof craftsmen the mimetikosis said to be someone who dated only gradually.At first, shownto be imitatesmany things.These many thingsare then explicitly and finally, to be these works"as they appear," the worksof craftsmen, that is, eidola as opposed to "that which is." The mimetikosis consisfromthe craftsman by his ignorance.He is ignorant tentlydistinguished of the truthabout that which he imitates,and he leads othersequally to mistakehis eidola for"thatwhich is." ignorant As many passages indicate,the aim of mimetikeis to produce pleais sure. At 3.397D6-8 Plato notes that the "mixed man," the mimetikos, 10.605D3 and 606B4 pleasing,especiallyto boys and the crowd. Republic speak of the pleasure we get from imitations;10.607A5 refersto the "sweetened Muse"; 10.607C4-5 mentions "that poetry and imitation [which is] devoted to pleasure," and 10.607D6-E2 asks the defendersof poetryto prove that it is not only pleasant but also useful.This associahas oftenbeen noted.31 tionof pleasureand imitation B. ImitationWith Knowledge Plato's views on the possibilityof a "good" kind of imitationare much less clear and coherentthan his theoryof mimetike.He says very
31 On the opposition of pleasure and the useful in Plato's aesthetics see Moravcsik (above, note 24) esp. 30, and V. Goldschmidt, "Le Probleme de la tragedie d'apres Platon,"REG 61 (1948) 23.
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little about it, and when he does, he seems at one time to imply that there is or can be a good kind of imitation, while at anotherhe appears to deny or ignore this possibility. our analysisof mimetike Nevertheless, is helpfulhere also. As we will see, Plato's views on mimetikeand craftsmanship imply that there cannot be a good kind of imitation(in the sense of "imitation" definedabove, Section I) in painting.In the case of poetry,however, his views do allow for a good kind of imitation,the antithesis of imitation of "things as theyappear." Those who argue for a Platonic theory of a "good" kind of imitation32 can point to a number of passages in Republic 3 and 10 in which Plato opposes the kind of imitation he condemns not only to craftsmanship but also to imitationof "that which is," or of the good. Thus, in Republic 3 he exiles the mimetikos, but writesthat "if they[the guardians]imitate,they should imitate. .. brave, self-controlled, pious and freemen" (3.395c3-5). He also permits the poet who is an "unmixed imitatorof the good man" to remain (3.397D4-5). Plato is most explicit about a good kind of art at 3.40Aff., a passage outsidethose with which we are primarily concerned. Here, Plato commends poets who can "put the image of the good dispositioninto their poems" (3.401B1-3), and craftsmenwho can "track down the nature of the beautiful and the graceful" (3.401C4-5), whetherin painting"images of living creatures" or in makinghouses (3.401B5-6). In Republic 10 also, Plato opposes versatile imitationof the worksof craftsmen "as they appear" to the possibilityof imitationof the worksof craftsmen "as they are" (10.598A-B), and he contrasts imitation of the "complainingethos" withthe possibility of imitating the "wise and calm ethos" (604E). In themselves, however,these passages offerlittlesupportfor a Platonic theoryof good imitation.In all of Republic 10 Plato says nothing about this kind of imitationexcept to deny that the mimetikosengages in it. In the passage at 3.395C he discusses this kind of imitationin merelyhypothetical terms:"if theyimitate...." Again,in the passage at 3.40Aff., mimesis and its cognates occur only once, in a usage apparently quite different from that in the earlier discussionof mimetike.33 The same passage subsumes both artists and other craftsmenunder demiourgoi,34 though elsewhere imitatorsand craftsmenare strongly
32 See above, note 7. 33 At 3.401A8 Plato writesthat grace and harmonyare "kin and mimemata" of the wise and good ethos. Though imitationof ethosin Republic 10 can involve the idea of mistaking one thing for another it is hard to see how this can be true of the mimemata of 34 In Republic10 the mimetikos is called a "craftsman," but he is always clearly just a "craftsmanof an eidolon"(10.599D3, for example), as opposed to a craftsmanof the things we use. At 3.401B3-4, however, rots aAXXOLs indicates that Plato 819,uLOVpyOLTs includes poets,painters,and housebuildersin the same category.
3.401A8.
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Thus, it is doubtfulthat Plato is discussingimitationat all at contrasted. What he is praisingmay insteadbe a kind of craftsmanship. 3.401Aff. offereven less evidence of a theoryof a Plato's explicit statements and mimein painting.The account of imitation good kind of imitation and while tike in Republic 3.392C-398B is concernedsolely with poetry, we find that the painter and musician are indeed said to produce mimemata (3.400A7, 3.401A8), no account is given of these products.In to give such an account,for fact,Plato seems to be deliberatelyrefusing he leaves considerationof musical mimesis up to the expert Damon (3.400B), and he writesin only vague termsof grace and harmonyin the visual arts (3.401A1-8), saying nothingthat mightdefinegrace and harthem from their opposites. Thus, no theoretical mony and distinguish account of imitation in the visual arts, good or bad, is given in
3. Republic
In Republic 10 also Plato fails to give an account of imitationin the visual arts of "thingsas they are." Here, moreover,his more detailed mustimplythattherecannot be account of mimetikeand craftsmanship in the visual arts. a good kind of imitation claims: At 10.598A-CPlato makes the following (598A1-3); 1. The painterimitatesthe worksof craftsmen not as they are but as 2. Painting imitatesthe works of craftsmen they appear, and is imitationnot of the truthbut of that which appears (598A5-B5); and graspsonly an 3. Therefore(apa) mimetikeis far fromthe truth eidolon (598B6-8); 4. For example (olOv) the painterwill paint a shoemaker,a carpenter, though he does not know about the craftsof any of these In this passage Plato concludes (apa, ol'Ov) that the mimetikosin general and (at least one kind of) painter in particularare ignorantof craftknowledgeof what they imitate. He arrivesat this conclusionby Plato arguing that the painter fails to imitate the truthabout artifacts. implies,then,thatthe personwho could imitatethe truthabout artifacts would have craft knowledge about that which he imitates.Thus, the who had knowledge of a couch "as it is" would be a carpenter, imitator (or truebelief) about what makes a usefulcouch (1O.601c-602B). If such an imitator existed,however,he could not,Plato also implies, thata painting imitatea couch "as it is" by paintinga couch. Plato insists like the artifact (1O.597B5-11). He also holds of a couch is a couch, just that: 1. All of the many thingswhich we call by the same name have the same unique Form (10.596A5-7); this Form has the same name
35 On thisinterpretation of the text,see above, note 27.
[people] (598B8-CI).35
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(for example, "couch") as the many of which it is the Form (10.597B5-11); 2. The Form is that which determineswhat is the proper function (chreia)36 of thatof which it is the Form (10.596B6-9, 601D4-6).37 From these views it followsthat both the paintingof a couch and the artifactmustbe judged by the same unique standardof function. But if, as we may reasonablyassume, a couch functions as somethingto sleep on, any paintingof a couch must,Plato's statements imply,be a useless couch, a mere apparentcouch. The same argumentwould apply to sculpture.If a sculpturedoes not have the functionalcharacteristics of a couch, it must be an "apparent couch." If it does functionperfectly as a couch, on the other hand, it could hardlybe called an imitation of a couch. Plato is not,however,committedto the same negativeconclusionin the case of poetry. The craftsmanof the thingsimitated by the poet knows "what pursuitsmake people better or worse" (10.599D4-5) and makes productsusefulfor this purpose. There is no reason why a poem could not have the same use as these products,if made by a craftsman. The poet would also be an imitator, however,if he triedto make people think he was another good man in different circumstances, instead of himself. This view of the poet who imitatesthings"as theyare" is supported by Plato's example at Republic 3.396C. The good man, Plato writes, when he reaches in his narrative"some speech or action of a good man,"
wishes to "relate it as if he himself werethatperson" (s
EavTov) to an inferior (3.396D4-5). This is surelyimitationin the same sense as that of 3.393A-C: making oneself similar to (tryingto make othersmistakeone for) someone else in sound or shape. Compare especially 3.393A8: ò-7rcpaV9 -sWV Ov XpVtI1 AEyEL and 3.396C7: cS av Tbo
WV EKELvOS a7rayyEAAELV.
" ,
voo a7rayyEAXXv) and he will not be ashamed of this kind of imitation (3.396C5-8). But he does not wish seriouslyto liken himself(a7TELK'4ELV
aiVrTs OV
EI Jt-
Our study of the implicationsof Plato's theories,then, leads us to conclude that Plato would admit imitationof the good as a separate categoryof imitation in poetry, but not in the visual arts.Plato, however, says littleto definethiskind of imitation, mentioning it chieflyin order to contrast it with mime'tike'. For this reason,we mustconclude that his
36 As White pointsout (above, note 25), 251-52 [D] and 87 [F], Plato uses the termergon for"function" in Republic 1, while in Republic 10 he uses chreia. In Republic 10, as I note below, Section III.B.2, ergon refers not to "function"but to the product made by a craftsman. 37 For thisinterpretation of the Form of the Bed see N. R. Murphy,The Interpretation of Plato's Republic(Oxford 1951) 238; Crombie (above, note 4) 143-44; Moravcsik (above, note 24) 38-39.
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of imitationof views imply that imitationof the good is the antithesis "thingsas they appear." We will, then,define imitationof the good as as they imitationwith knowledge,in poetry,of the worksof craftsmen are, to produce what is useful. III. VersatilePoetryand Painting versatile painting and two kinds of mimertike, Plato distinguishes accordingto medium and objectsimitated. versatile poetry, A. Medium Plato explicitly distinguishespoetry and painting at 10.603B6-7: ... concerned with sight,or that concerned with ".. that [mimettike] sound, which we call poetry...." The two media, sounds and shapes, of two kinds imitation in the mostgeneralsense (above, SectionI) distinguish and makesthatwhichhas of mime'tike' fromeach other.Paintingimitates poetry characteristic of versatile colorand shape. While the distinguishing is imitationand makingof that which has sound, it also, of course,uses in thesenseofgestures or motions (3.397B2). shapes,"schetmata, speaking,paintingis just one kind of imitationdealing with Strictly shapes and colors. Weaving and embroideryare other visual arts mentioned (2.373A7, 3.401A2) but nowhere formallydistinguished.Again, dealing Plato seems to indicate that poetryis only one kind of imitation . .. dealing with music, with sound when he writesof "those[imitators] dancers,and contractors" thatis,poetsand theirhelpers:rhapsodes, actors, (2.373B5-8), and when he distinguishes poets, rhapsodes,and actors at are blurredin Republic 10. At 10.605C10-D2 3.395A. But thesedistinctions the poems, "Homer" would appear to be a rhapsodeor actor performing and cl "Homer"is thelong-deadauthorofthepoems. at 1O.600A10 though We will,then,ignoring distinctions among the variousvisual and musical that uses colorsand arts,let versatilepaintingbe that kind of mime'tike shapes,and versatilepoetrythatwhich uses,as Plato tellsus at 1O.601A8, and harmony. rhythm, speech,meter, B. Objects Imitated Both versatilepaintingand versatilepoetryimitatethe eidola of the sortofcraftsman. thoseofa different buteach imitates works ofcraftsmen, 1. VersatilePainting imitatethe eidola of In mostof Plato's examples,the versatile painters mentions tablesand couches (10.596B1ff.), then skeue. Plato first artifacts, bits and reins (10.601C6ff.). But there are indicationsthat the versatile painteralso imitatesthe bodies of livingcreatures.He is, afterall, often
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called zographos,literally, a painterof livingcreatures.38 At 10.598B9 he is said to paint a shoemakerand a carpenter, and 10.601D4-6 suggeststhat livingcreatures, like artifacts, are objectsof craftsmanship, since theyalso have excellence and beauty dependenton use. Justas a horsemanknows whatmakesreinsbeautiful and useful, so he also knowswhatmakesa horse beautifuland useful,and could, by breedingand training, help to produce a usefulanimal. A versatile paintermight, then,imitatethisanimal.39 2. VersatilePoetry It has long been recognized that the subject matter of (versatile) poetryis action, praxis, or more exactly,human beings acting.40 Plato explicitlymakes this point in Republic 10.603C4-8: "Mimetike'[sc. in doing forcedor voluntary actions,and as a resultof thisacting thinking they have fared well or ill, and in all these cases feeling pain or pleasure." In a sectionof Republic 3 outside that with which we are primarily concerned Plato also mentionsimitationof lexis or praxis (3.396c6). Plato then draws a distinction similarto that between forcedand voluntaryactions made at 10.603c, when he writesthat the ideal state should retain"the harmonythat would imitatethe tonesand accents of a brave man in warlike action and in every forced deed . . and another harmony that would imitate his accents in a peaceful and not forced but A numberof aspects of Plato's view thatpoetryis imitation of action become clear when we treat it as an integralpart of the theoryof the imitativeartswithwhich we are now concerned.
38 Graphein and cognates occur 9 times in Republic 3 and 10; zographein and cognates occur 12 times. At Gorgias 453c6-8 Plato definesthe zographos as "he who paints living creatures." 39 For a parallel see Gorgias 464B-466A,where Plato contrasts the crafts,medicine and thatare concerned with what is best forthe body, withthatbranchof flattery gymnastics, thatmerelypretendsto have thisconcern. 40 7rTp7rrovras, opa1.dv,'avOpclrovs... (10.603c4-5). Contrast Aristotle 7rp4ets... Poetics6.1450A16-17: X' yap rpaycp La plp4tja EorLv OVK aVGpCo'ZTCOV aAAa 7Tpa4ewscKaL R. Dupont-Roc, "Mimesis et enonciation,"in Ecriture et theorie poe'tiques (Paris ,/L'ov. 1976) 11, note 14, notes this differencein phraseologybetween Plato and Aristotle. See the excellentinterpretation of thisdifference by G. Finsler,Platon und die Aristotelische Poetik (Leipzig 1900) 42-43. Plato's remarkat 10.603c4-5 is also interesting because it restricts poetic mimetiketo imitation of humans, and does not mention imitation of gods. Although at 10.598E2 Homer is said to claim to know all divine things, and at 10.596c8 the man withthe mirror "makes" all thingsin the heavens,Plato is exclusivelyconcerned withimitationof humans in the passages in which we are primarilyinterested. This restriction followsfromPlato's definition of mimetike as imitationof the productsof craftsmen, and not of the Form made by a god (10.598A).
poetry: 7
T7T W'0OL)TE
/LLL7TLK7j:
603c1] imitates, we say, human beings
voluntary action . .
." (3.399A-B).
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First,Plato's concept of imitationof action in Republic 10 is anticiof imitation(TO MLMELZTOaL)in Republic 3.393c as pated by the definition "making oneself similar to someone else in sound (or shape)" (above, Section I). This is evident from the fact that Plato uses "sound" and in Republic 10. Thus, he introducesversatile "action" interchangeably concerned with sound (KaT'za Thzv poetry,at 10.603B6-7, as mimettiket aKo7)v)and then goes on to write that versatilepoetryimitatesaction (10.603c). Moreover,the analogy between versatilepaintingand versatile poetry in terms of vision and sound (10.603B6-7) is restated at 10.603D1-3 in termsof visionand action. In Plato's view, praxis,action, "sound,"that is, the logos, speech, that communicatesand is essentially of true or false human beliefs.41Thus, at 10.599c the "imitator expresses of medical praxeis. In medical logoi" is clearlyequivalentto the imitator the Republic, Plato, unlike Aristotle,does not consider any formal Even when he propertiesof a plot in writingof imitationof praxis.42 ratherthan "speech of a human being" he is uses logos to mean "story" concerned only with truth value. Logoi are true or false (Republic middles,and ends. 2.376E11), not plotswithbeginnings, Second, action is the subject matterof all versatilepoetry,and not Plato discussesversatilepoetryas a whole ("that[imijust of one kind.43 tation]concerned with sound, which we call poetry. . ." (10.603B6-7) just beforehe tells us, at 10.603C, that versatilepoetryimitateshumans they acting. He mentionspleasure as well as pain at 10.603C: "thinking have fared well," "feelingpleasure,"and would thusseem to be thinking of comedy as well as tragedy.At 10.606D1-3 Plato statesthatpoetrystirs up "all the desires and pains and pleasures in the soul, which we say followupon every action of ours." That comedy, at least, is included in at 10.606c2-3 that"the is shownby Plato's statement thisgeneralization, to of same account" (as thatgiven tragedy)applies "comic imitation." which ofcraftsmen, as works like artifacts, actions, Finally,Plato treats in view was This well.44 implicit to be made (done) require knowledge
41 Plato is not departingfromaccepted Greek usage when he treatslogos as a formof praxis (ergon). See, on this subject, A. M. Parry,Logos and Ergon in Thucydides (New York 1981) Part I. 42 At Phaedrus 268D4-5, on the other hand, he writes that tragedy is the "proper 7rpewovo'av) of parts. (orVo'Tao'Lv arrangement" for of tragedy,as has been thought, or description 43 Republic 10.603c is not a definition example, by Dupont-Roc (above, note 40) 7 and Goldschmidt(above, note 31) 42. 44 T. Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory (Oxford 1977) 177-248, argues that in the Republic Plato rejectsthe Socratic analogy between virtue (or virtuousactions) and craft. Irwin's to Republic however,is weakened by his failureto give adequate consideration argument, evidence that at least those 3 and 10. The passages I discuss below seem to me sufficient passages in Republic 3 and 10 with which I deal do assume an analogy between craftsand virtuousactions. (I thank the anonymous refereeof TAPA for remindingme of Irwin's views.)
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of the guardiansas "craftsmen Republic 3's characterization of freedom" (3.395cl). In Republic10 Plato is more explicit.First,he uses the same word,erga, "works," "deeds,"to describeboththe artifacts imitatedby the versatile painter (10.598A2-3) and the deeds imitated by Homer (10.599B4-6), and he usesergaand praxeis at 10.600A4-5. interchangeably at 10.598E,thatthe defenders Again,he states, of Homer and the poetssay that "these people know all the craftsand all human thingsconcerning arete'and vice, and divine things." He thenstatesthathe will notbotherto questionHomer concerningmedicine or "the othercrafts"(10.599B9-c6) but will instead examine whetherHomer has knowledgeof "the greatest and finest things," that is, generalship, government,and education (10.599c6-D2). The makersof theseactionsor activities, Plato writes, use knowledgeof "what pursuits make humansbetteror worse"(10.599D4-5) in the particularcircumstances of war, government, etc. The poet, however,knowsnothing about what he imitates, but only"paintson the colors of each of the craftswith words and phrases,"whetherhe writesabout generalship or about anything else (601A-B). Moreover,at 601D4-6, Plato includes praxeis with artifacts and livingcreaturesas thingswhose arete' and beauty depend on use and of which thereis a user and maker. Now because pain and pleasure attendeveryaction of ours (10.603c, 10.606D) and because dealing withpain or pleasurealso requiresknowledgeof what is good forhumans(10.604B-D), acting well in every circumstance would seem to be, at leastin Republic 10, a kindof craft, and all fineactions(kala erga) would seem to be craftproducts.Plato suggeststhat acting well in painfulcircumstances is a techne when he compares it with medicine at 10.604D1-2. This comparison also links the discussion of acting well (10.603-604) withthe previous(10.599Bff.) consideration of Homer's craft knowledgeof medicineand othertechnai. Like othercraftproducts, fineactionshave two "aspects":actions"as theyare," and actions "as theyappear," that is eidola. Like the versatile painters, the versatile poets imitate things "as they appear," making eidola (Ei~Aa ELb8AO7TOLOVvTa: 10.605C3).45They are "imitators of the eidola of arete and of the otherthingstheywriteabout" (10.600E5-6). In praxisas in the visual world, writes Plato at 10.603C10-D7, a human being is at war with himself,and has contraryelements in his soul at the same time (aà: 10.603D2). For example, a "reasonableman" (a7vp 'TLELK'S) who loses a son will bear his misfortune "most easily," but he will nevertheless grieve (10.603E3-8). When he is in the company of his equals he will fight and resistpain more (MaAAov), but when alone he will "dare to say many things... and he will do many thingshe would not want someone to see him doing" (10.604A1-8). We know,
45 This reading,followed by Burnet'sOCT and Adam (above, note 27) is much preferable to the alternateEiLW0o7rolovTLt. See Adam's note ad loc.
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then, Plato writes,that there are two contrarythingsin his soul at the same time (a`,a: 10.604B4). One part of his soul, which is ready to obey pain (10.604A10), is the "wise and reason and law (10.604B6-7), resisting calm ethos,being always nearly the same itselfto itself"(10.604E2-3). Anotherinferior part,which draws him to pain (10.604B1), is the "comimitates plaining ethos"(10.604E2). Plato concludes that the mimetikos much and varied imitaonly the complaining ethos, which "furnishes tion"and thathe does not imitatethe wise ethos because it is not easy to when it is imitated(10.604E1-6).46 imitateor to understand Enduring the loss of a son, the praxis in Plato's example, is a craft the "reasonable man," and it has product(ergon) made by a craftsman, to the carpenter'scouch "as it is" and "as it two "aspects,"corresponding appears." The praxis "as it appears" consistsof the many sounds and that pain forcesthe man to make. Though he will give in to movements pain more in solitude,perhaps beating his breast and wailing, even in company he will be unable to avoid some outward signsof grief:a sorsighs,etc. These signsof pain are the eidola imitated rowfulexpression, by the versatilepoet. No matterwhen or where the ignorantmimetikos hears the reasonableman who is enduringgrief,he will grasp only these many and varied eidola. On the other hand, the praxis "as it is," the with knowledge,is resistanceto and endurance of griefby a craftsman struggle against pain. This struggleremainsthe same, like the couch "as and imitatedby anothercraftsman. it is," and can onlybe understood Plato's example is of emotional reactions in tragic circumstances. However, since pain and pleasure attend all our actions (10.603C6-7, 10.606D1-3), in comic and other circumstancesas well, someone with knowledgewill create craftproductsand will also exhibitoutwardsigns of emotion that may be mistakenfor "that which is" by the ignorant. Certain kindsof actionsalso require otherspecificapplicationsof knowledge: thatof how to make people betterin war, forexample. The craftsmen of these actions or activitieswill not only give outward signs of emotion,they will also make sounds and movementsthat may be mistaken for the practice of their specificcraft,for example, generalship. We will discussimitation of thissortof action in SectionIV.C. two kinds of mimeWe have found, then, that Plato distinguishes tike, versatilepaintingand versatilepoetry.Versatilepaintingimitates,
46 Plato's use of thistermis significant. Ethos means both dramatis persona and "delineation of character"in the visual arts (LSJ). 1thos was also a traditionalsubject matterof poetry,as Havelock notes (above, note 2) 62-64. Havelock defines ethos as "a man's proper feelings and reactions to intimatesand enemies" (63): it thus includes both an Plato has a similarconcept of ethos in 10.603-5, "inner"state and "outer"manifestations. where he treatsit as both a part of the soul and as actions and speech. On the lack of a distinctionbetween "inner" and "outer" in Greek drama see also J. Jones,On Aristotle and Greek Tragedy (London 1962) 43-46.
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and makes, visible things.It imitatesthe eidola of the works (erga) of those craftsmenwho have knowledge of artifactsand living creatures. Versatile poetry,which is Plato's main concern, imitatesand produces sound (speech) and imitates the eidola of the works (erga) of those craftsmenwho are concerned with actions (praxeis).Versatile poetry uses meter,rhythm, and harmony. IV. CriteriaforDistinguishing Genres of VersatilePoetry Plato mentionsfourkindsof versatilepoetry:epic, tragedy(together these are oftencalled "tragicpoetry"),comedy, and lyric.Epic, tragedy, and comedy are distinguished on the basis of style(lexis), meter,actions imitated, and specificeffects on the audience theyaim at. A. Style(Lexis) In all imitativepoetry,whethermimetike or not,the poet of Republic 3 uses imitativenarrative, that is, he "makes his speech (lexis)similar to that of someone else" (3.393c1-2). This is true in Republic10 also,
where sound is the medium of poetryand human speech is what imitative poetryimitates. Different poeticgenres,however, in theiruse of imitative differ narrative,thatis, of dramaticdialogue. Plato liststhreekindsof lexis:(1) "plain narrative" (a'rA7 bLt/y o-EL: 3.392D5), narrative "by reportof the poet himself,"which the dithyrambuses exclusively(3.394c2-3);47 (2) "imitative narrative"(bL'qy 'o-EL bLaMLM?juae-)E; 3.392D5), in which the poet speaks "as thoughhe were someoneelse" (3.393c1), the kindof narrative tragedy and comedy use exclusively(3.394C1-2); and (3) "mixed narrative," a combinationof (1) and (2), used by epic (3.392D6, 3.394c4). Plato then uses a second lexisclassification to distinguish the versatile poet fromthe non-versatile poet (3.396B10-397D5). There are two "unmixed" styles(3.397D1-2): (4) plain narrativewith littleimitativenarrative (3.396E4-8), the style of the "unmixed imitator of the good" (3.397D4-5), and (5) "imitationof everything" (3.397A3), that is, either imitativenarrativealone or imitativenarrativewith littleplain narrative (3.397B1-2). There is also (6) a "mixed" style(3.397C8-10, D6), a combination of (4) and (5). Plato accepts only the person who uses (4), the "unmixedimitator of the good" (3.397D4-5), and he bans the user of (5) and (6) on the grounds that the imitatorof everything is a "manifold man" who is not in harmonywith the ideal state (3.397D10-398s4). The
47 Plato's treatment of the dithyramb as purelynarrativepresentsa problem,since it was in fact dramatic in the classical period. See the discussion of this problem by Vicaire (above, note 2) 240-42. Partee (above, note 1) 7, note 15, calls attention to Plato's ambivalent attitudetowardthe dithyramb.
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is, then,someone that is, the personwho imitateseverything, mimetikos, or (6), which includessome (5). of everything, who uses (5), imitation It is obvious that these two classificationsare very different.48 our present Though Plato never attemptsto clarifytheir relationship, studyallows us to draw some conclusionswith confidence.First,poetry that is mimetikemust have at least some imitativenarrative.Thus, the which does not contain any imitativenarrative,cannot be dithyramb, epic as mimetike,in Republic 10 mimetike.Again, since Plato classifies (10.602B9-10), and since (5) and (6) include some plain narrative,a genre may be mimetikeeven thoughit containssome plain narrative. We cannot, however, tell whether every poetic genre using only imitativenarrativeis mimetike.Plato tells us, in Republic 10 (602B9-10, 606c), that tragedy and comedy are mimetike, and (5), which is mimetike,includes some genres using only imitativenarrative.But it is not clear whether(5) includes all genres of this sort. How would Plato classifya drama with only good characters?Nor do the lexis classifications help us to classify lyric. The genre's inclusion with epic at 10.607A5, however, indicates that it is mimetike,and the fact that it speeches and actions of men and containsmuch imitationof unworthy gods pointsto the same conclusion.49 In sum, use of some imitativenarrativeis a necessaryand sufficient conditionfor imitativepoetry.It is a necessaryconditionfor mimetike, to decide whetheror not exclubut we do not have enough information condition for mimetike. sive use of imitative narrativeis a sufficient of eidola. Plato is much less concernedwithstylethan withimitation B. Meter Epic and tragedydifferin meter as well as style. At 10.602B9-10, Plato speaks of "those dealing with tragic poetry in iambic or epic The same verse," naming the metersof tragedyand epic respectively. phrase also indicates that he oftentreatstragedyand epic as the same genre of "tragic poetry."Plato is littleconcerned with meter and says more about differences in meter.50 nothing
48 For a helpful summaryof Plato's discussionof the lexis classifications see Cross and Woozley (above, note 23) 272-73. Dupont-Roc's attempt(above, note 40) 13-14, note 51, worthnoting. is, thoughunsuccessful, to coordinatethe two classifications against Stallbaum that Plato did 49 Brownson(above, note 1) 94-96 argues convincingly not intend to admit all lyric when he allowed hymnsand encomia. R. G. Collingwood, The Principles of Art (Oxford 1938) 48 draws the erroneousconclusion that after Plato excludes all drama "he findshimselfleftwith that kind of poetrywhose chief representative is Pindar." A glance at the Odes (e.g. 01. 1, Pyth. 4 and 9, Nem. 10) showsthat Plato would have foundlittleto choose between Pindar and Euripides. 0 See also 10.595B10-c2, 598D7 and 607A1-2, where Homer is called the "leader of between tragtragedy."Havelock (above, note 2) 8 notes that Plato does not distinguish edy and epic. Vicaire (above, note 2) 243-44 argues that this assimilationof the two genresin Republic 10 was a currentidea taken up by Plato.
A Theoryof Imitation C. ActionsImitated
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As we have seen (above, Section III.B.2), all versatilepoetryimitates actions (praxeis). Presumably, different kinds of genresimitatedifferent actions,but Plato is specificonly in the case of "tragicpoetry"(tragedy and epic). Tragedy and its leader Homer are said by theiradvocates to know "all the craftsand all human thingsabout arete and kakia, and all divine things"(10.598D7-E2). This list includes the entire range of the subject matterof tragic poetry.In the paragraph at 10.599B9-E4, however, Plato says that he will not examine Homer on medicine and the othertechnai (10.599B9-C6) and proposesinstead to question him about "wars and generalshipsand the government of cities and the education of human beings" (10.599C7-D1). These are the "greatest and finest things"Homer writesabout (10.599C7). Plato thenbeginshis questioning of Homer by asking him if he is someone with knowledgeor merelyan "thirdfromthe truth imitator, arete" (10.599D2-3). It is clear concerning that arete refersto the "greatestand finestthings"just mentioned,that is, to a particularpart of Homer's total subject matter.The less important technai, such as medicine, are excluded, but important discoveries and inventions are included,at 10.600A4-7. In the conclusionat 10.600E, Homer and the poets are again said to be "imitators of the eidola of arete and of the otherthingstheywriteabout." While it has been recognized that arete' (the "greatestand finest things")is Homer's subject matter,our analysis suggeststhat, because Homer is the representative of only one kind of poetry,tragic poetry, arete is the subject matterof this kind of poetry,markingit offfrom other kinds of poetry.51 This inferenceis supportedby some unnoticed of Plato's use of the termarete in Republic 10.598E-600E. features This section of the Republic deliberatelyplays on several different meanings of arete. Arete, in the technical,Platonic sense, refersto the order in the soul (Republic 4.444D13-E2) and not to activity.In a less strict Platonicsense it can referto usefulactionsdone withknowledgeof moral excellence,and would include activitiessuch as enduringthe loss of a son, which are certainlynot among the "greatestand finest" things Plato discussesin the passage at 10.599C-600E. In the "Homeric" sense, on the other hand, arete is the excellence of someone with high social standing,successfulin war and leadership.52 Arete in this sense is the subject matterof the epic poets who sing the klea andron.53In showing
51 Thus, arete is not the subject matterof poetryin general,as is suggested,forexample, by Else, The Structureand Date . . . (above, note 5) 34. 52 A. W. H. Adkins,Merit and Responsibility (Chicago and London 1960) 32-33 defines "Homeric" arete in thisway, and distinguishes it froma Platonic use of the termin which the cooperativeexcellencesplay a much largerpart (Chapters 13 and 14). 53 Havelock (above, note 2) 64 argues that the poets' subject matteris "the mighty deeds
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that Homer is an imitatorof the eidola of arete, Plato is not concerned withthe orderin the soul but withthatkind of arete belongingto useful actions that he mentionsat 10.601D4-6. He plays on both the less strict Platonic sense and on the "Homeric" sense of arete. Afterrestricting the scope of arete to those activitiesin which "Homeric" arete is chiefly exhibited,he asks (10.599D4-6) whetheror not Homer had arete in the Platonic sense, knowingwhat makes people betterin public and in private. He then demonstratesthat Homer did not have arete in the "Homeric" sense,since he was not remembered as a successful general or statesmanbut was "much neglected in his own lifetime"(10.600B9-cl). This allows him to conclude that Homer is an imitatorof the eidola of arete not only in the Platonic sense (he has no craftknowledge)but also in the "Homeric" sense (he did not leave behind him memorialsof fine works:10.599B6).54 Arete, then, as it refersto the objects imitated by tragic poetry, retainsmuch of its Homeric sense, though with a Platonic twist.Plato accepts the traditionalview that tragic poetrydeals with arete in the sense of the important and memorableactionsrecordedby the singersof the klea andron. However, he insiststhat since arete depends on use (10.601D4-6), true arete requires craftknowledge of what is useful. A of freedom, general with arete in this sense is one of Plato's craftsmen who uses for purposesof war his knowledgeof what makes people better. Someone with no knowledgeof thiskind can only imitatethe eidola of arete: the shoutingof commands,the waving about of weapons, all the sounds and gesturesof someone who happens to be in charge of an army. He will also, as we have seen, imitatethe man's outwardsignsof emotion. D. Effects on Audience55 While all versatilepoetry aims at producing pleasure, it can also arouse more specificemotionsin the audience. Mimetike,Plato tells us, arouses and increasesall the desiresand pains and pleasures in the soul (10.606D1-7). Specifically, tragedy arouses pity (10.606B3, c5) and
of former men / And the blessed gods" (Hesiod, Th. 100-101). Compare Plato's statement at Republic 10.598E1-2 that some people claim that Homer knows "all human things and see Ion 531c. On the close connection concerning arete and kakia, and divine things," between KAEos and poetryin the Greek traditionsee G. Nagy, Comparative Studies in Greekand Indic Meter (Cambridge 1974) 229-61. 54 In fact,Plato argues at 10.598E-601Athat Homer was not successful, not that he was of Homeric, but not of Platonic arete, Plato has only ignorant.Since success is a criterion proved that Homer lacks Homeric arete, not Platonic,as he leads us to believe. The demonstration that he lacks Platonic arete is given in a later section of Republic 10 (603-6), "a man claimingto be good, who lamentsout of when Plato argues thatHomer represents season" (10.606B2-3). 55 For a detailed analysisof thistopic see Belfiore(above, note 13).
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comedy arouses laughter (10.606C2-9). While Plato links pity and fear elsewhere,in Republic10 he says that tragic poetryarouses "pity and praise" (10.606B3) and omitsfear.56 Conclusion In Republic 3.392C-398B and 10.595A-608B Plato maintainsa clear and consistent view of the relationships and distinctions among the visual and poetic imitativearts.To imitatein the mostgeneral sense is to make somethingsimilarto somethingelse in sound or shape, that is, to tryto make people mistakethe imitation forsomething else. Plato distinguishes in thisgeneral sense froma particularkind of imitation, imitation imitation of many things,for which he inventsa technical vocabulary,the -ike forms of mimesis (mimetike, Mimetikealone is mimetikos). attacked in Republic3 and 10. In Republic10 Plato explains what he only suggests in Republic 3, that mimetike imitatescraftproducts, in the sense of thingsmade or done withknowledgeof the useful.Then, introducing another technical term, Plato shows that mimetike can imitate and make only eidola,the worksof craftsmen as they appear. This art thus turnsout to imitate not many different things,but only one thing over and over, an eidolon.Plato also implies that therecan be a kind of imitativepoetry, different frommimetike in that it imitateswithknowledge, but that there cannot be a kind of painting that imitates with knowledge. Plato adopts the traditionalview that epic and tragedy, which he classifiesas kinds of mimetike, deal with the "greatestand finestthings,"arete. But his theoryallows him to condemn them for imitating only the eidola of arete,which are the mere soundsand shapes the ignorantassociate with arete. Finally, Plato holds that the aim of mimetike is to produce pleasure,and that the aim of tragedyis also to produce pity. In sketchingthis outline of Plato's theoryof the imitativearts we have deliberatelyleftmany problemsunexamined,even in thosesections of the Republicto which we have restricted our inquiry. Our outline may nevertheless providea usefultool withwhich to studysome of these
56 Republic 3.387c mentionsfear (OpbKv) as an effect of tragic poetry,but no mentionis made of this reaction in Republic 3.392C-398B or 10.595A-608B.Althoughat 10.606c5-6 pity and fear are indeed closely connected,fear is the reactionof reason to the desire for excessivelaughter.Plato linkspityand fear in the Ion (535c) and Phaedrus (268C-D), and this was of course Gorgias' view in his Encomium of Helen (9), a work with which Plato was certainly familiar. See M. Pohlenz, "Die Anfange der griechischenPoetik," NGG 1920, 167-72 = Kleine SchriftenII (Hildesheim 1965) 461-66, fora discussionof Gorgias' influenceon Plato. Plato's omission of fear in Republic 10 may thus be deliberate and significant.
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otherproblems.It will in any case have served its purposeif it has demonstrated that Plato's theoretical treatment of mimesisin Republic 3 and 10 is, however obscurelypresented,at least much more consistent and coherentthathas oftenbeen thought.57
57 Portionsof this paper were read at the annual meetingof the Classical Associationof the Middle West and South,Columbus, Ohio, April, 1983. I wish to thankmy colleagues, George Sheets and Marcia Eaton, and the anonymous refereesand editor of TAPA for of an earlier draftof this paper, and the University theirhelpfulcriticisms of Minnesota for a Faculty Single Quarter Leave in the fall of 1982, during which this paper was completed.

A Theory of Imitation in Plato

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A Theory of Imitation in Plato

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American Philological Association

Transactions of theAmericanPhilological Association114 (1984) 121-146

A THEORY OF IMITATION IN PLATO'S REPUBLIC

Republic 3.393c5-6 gives the most comprehensive definition of imi-

we findin our two passages: "Is it nottruethatto

making something similar to something else in sound or shape

Comedy versatile poetry using only imitative narrative to produce laughter

tragic poetry using mixed narrative in epic verse

Tragedy tragic poetry using only imitative narrative in iambic verse

a bed)inRepublic a painter imitates 10.15 for example, when,

1. Imitation of Many Things

ered: "We founded the city well ...

when we did not admit all of it

cpLo-ajEGa ("Dear Homer, if you are not thirdfromthe truth concerning

7TEpL, EL&LWXOV 87?y/LOVpyOs, OrV

Ka-rav7-LKpV 71 o7r/ov, 0L caLvETaL

,~~~~~~~ KaL, W S EOLKEV,

KaL TOVTo E';wAov:

TEXvLTWv. ofhisearlier conjecture way,reading this TEXvVv instead

wishes to "relate it as if he himself werethatperson" (s

603c1] imitates, we say, human beings

A Theoryof Imitation C. ActionsImitated

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