Held: The law makes no distinction between a carrier offering its services to the general community or solicits business

only from a narrow segment of the general population. Note that the transportation of goods holds an integral part of Calvos business, it cannot indeed be doubted that it is a common carrier. FILING OF NOTICE OF CLAIM; ONE-YEAR PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD BELGIAN OVERSEAS CHARTERING AND SHIPPING N.V. VS. PHIL. FIRST INSURANCE CO., INC. G.R. No. 143133. June 5, 2002 Facts: On June 13, 1990, CMC Trading A.G. shipped on board the M/V Anangel Sky at Hamburg, Germany 242 coils of various Prime Cold Rolled Steel Sheets for transportation to Manila consigned to the Philippine Steel Trading Corporation. On July 28, 1990, M/V Anangel Sky arrived at the port of Manila and within the subsequent days, discharged the subject cargo. Four coils were found to be in bad order, and the consignee declared the same as total loss. The respondent filed its Notice of Claim only on September 18, 1990. the complaint was filed by respondent on July 25, 1991. Petitioners, on the other hand, claim that pursuant to the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA), respondent should have filed its Notice of Loss within three days from delivery. They assert that the cargo was discharged on July 31, 1990 but respondent filed its Notice of Claim only on September 18, 1990. Issue: Whether or not failure to file a Notice of Claim shall bar respondent from recovery. Held: First, COGSA provides that the notice of claim need not be given if the state of the

goods, at the time of their receipt, has been the subject of a joint inspection or survey. In this case, prior to unloading the cargo, an Inspection Report as to the condition of the goods was prepared and signed by representative of both parties. Second, a failure to file a Notice of Claim within three days will not bar recovery if it is nonetheless filed within one year. The one-year prescriptive period also applies to the shipper, the consignee, the insurer of the goods or any legal holder of the bill of lading. The cargo was discharged on July 31, 1990, while the Complaint was filed by respondent on July 25, 1991, within the one-year prescriptive period.

FGU INSURANCE CORP. VS. G.P. SARMIENTO TRUCKING CORP. (GPS) G.R. No. 141910. August 6, 2002 Facts: GPS is an exclusive contractor and hauler of Concepcion Industries, Inc. One day, it was to deliver certain goods of Concepcion Industries, Inc. aboard one of its trucks. On its way, the truck collided with an unidentified truck, resulting in damage to the cargoes. FGU, insurer of the shipment paid to Concepcion Industries, Inc. the amount of the damage and filed a suit against GPS. GPS filed a motion to dismiss for failure to prove that it was a common carrier. Issue: Whether or not GPS falls under the category of a common carrier. Held: Note that GPS is an exclusive contractor and hauler of Concepcion Industries, Inc. offering its service to no other individual or entity. A common carrier is one which offers its services whether to the public in general or to a

limited clientele in particular but never on an exclusive basis. Therefore, GPS does not fit the category of a common carrier although it is not freed from its liability based on culpa contractual. STIPULATION IN THE CHARTER PARTY EXEMPTING LIABILITY HOME INSURANCE CO. VS. AMERICAN STEAMSHIP AGENCIES 23 SCRA 24 Facts: A Peruvian firm shipped on board its vessel certain goods with San Miguel Brewery as its consignee and Home Insurance Co. (HIC) as its insurer. The cargo was found to have shortages when it arrived. HIC paid for said shortages and thereafter, demanded recovery of the amount from American Steamship Agencies (ASA). The trial court ordered ASA to reimburse HIC since according to the Code of Commerce, the ship agent is civilly liable for damages in favor of third persons due to the conduct of the carriers captain and that the stipulation in the charter party exempting the owner of the ship from liability is against public policy. Issue: Whether or not the stipulation in the charter party exempting the ship owner from liability for negligence of its agents is valid. Held: The stipulation in the charter party exempting the ship owner from liability for negligence of its agents is valid and not against public policy considering that the ship was totally chartered for the use of a single party, hence, the public at large is not involved and strict public policy governing common carriers cannot be applied.

FORTUITOUS EVENT: EXEMPTION FROM LIABILITY FORTUNE EXPRESS, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS 305 SCRA 14 Facts: A bus of Fortune Express, Inc. (FEI) figured in an accident with a jeepney which resulted in the death of several passengers including two Maranaos. It was found out that a Maranao owns said jeepney and certain Maranaos were planning to take revenge by burning some of FEIs buses. The operations manager of FEI was advised to take precautionary measures but just the same, three armed Maranaos were able to seize a bus of FEI and set it on fire. Issue: Whether the seizure of the bus was a fortuitous event which Fortune Express, Inc could not be held liable. Held: A fortuitous event is an occurrence which could not be foreseen or which though foreseen, is inevitable. This factor of unforeseen-ability is lacking in this case for despite the report that the Maranaos were planning to burn FEIs buses, nothing was really done by FEI to protect the safety of the passengers. Fabre vs. Court of Appeals Facts: Petitioners Engracio Fabre, Jr. and his wife were owners of a Mazda minibus. They used the bus principally in connection with a bus service for school children which they operated in Manila. It was driven by Porfirio Cabil.

On November 2, 1984 private respondent Word for the World Christian Fellowship Inc. (WWCF) arranged with the petitioners for the transportation of 33 members of its Young Adults Ministry from Manila to La Union and back in consideration of which private respondent paid petitioners the amount of P3,000.00. The usual route to Caba, La Union was through Carmen, Pangasinan. However, the bridge at Carmen was under repair, so that petitioner Cabil, who was unfamiliar with the area (it being his first trip to La Union), was forced to take a detour through the town of Ba-ay in Lingayen, Pangasinan. At 11:30 that night, petitioner Cabil came upon a sharp curve on the highway. The road was slippery because it was raining, causing the bus, which was running at the speed of 50 kilometers per hour, to skid to the left road shoulder. The bus hit the left traffic steel brace and sign along the road and rammed the fence of one Jesus Escano, then turned over and landed on its left side, coming to a full stop only after a series of impacts. The bus came to rest off the road. A coconut tree which it had hit fell on it and smashed its front portion. Because of the mishap, several passengers were injured particularly Amyline Antonio. Criminal complaint was filed against the driver and the spouses were also made jointly liable. Spouses Fabre on the other hand contended that they are not liable since they are not a common carrier. The RTC of Makati ruled in favor of the plaintiff and the defendants were ordered to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Issue: Whether the spouses Fabre are common carriers?

Held: Petition was denied. Spouses Fabre are common carriers. The Supreme Court held that this case actually involves a contract of carriage. Petitioners, the Fabres, did not have to be engaged in the business of public transportation for the provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers to apply to them. As this Court has held: 10 Art. 1732, Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air for compensation, offering their services to the public.

The above article makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local idiom, as "a sideline"). Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the "general public," i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population. We think that Article 1732 deliberately refrained from making such distinctions