AMERICAN HEGEMONY

AND CHINAS U.S. POLICY

Baohui Zhang
This article challenges the premature assumption that a
power transition between the United States and China is
inevitable due to Chinas rapid rise. It argues that the United
States will remain the hegemonic power for the next half cen-
tury. Based on this projection, China must adopt a policy of
cooperation with the U.S.-dominated international order.
China also needs to actively participate in the various institu-
tions of the global system and learn the art of leadership. This
policy will allow China gradually to increase its global influ-
ence in ways that are more compatible with its rising power.
As a result, China will not need to become a revisionist state
and challenge the system from the outside. Recently, many
signs indicate that China is indeed moving toward a more
active role in regional and global affairs.
Key words: hegemony, China, United States, balance of power,
realism, cooperation strategy
Introduction
Chinas rapid modernization has increased its global influ-
ence at an impressive pace. However, this rising China faces the
question of how to manage its relations with the worlds great-
est power, the United States. Chinas national interests will be
ASIAN PERSPECTIVE, Vol. 28, No. 3, 2004, pp. 87-113.
tradition in world politics. It emphasizes the central role of
power in the choices of foreign policies. The article raises the
question, given the projected balance of power between China
and the United States, what is Chinas most realistic policy to
maximize its national interests and global influence? One policy
pursues rivalry and competition with the United States. The
other policy recognizes American global dominance and pro-
motes Chinas interests through cooperation with the United
States.
This article argues that the only realistic policy choice for
China is the cooperation strategy. This view is based on the pro-
jected balance of power between the two countries. In essence, it
recognizes that China will be unlikely to match the power of the
United States. The following sections will examine the Chinese
view of the future balance of power versus the United States and
the appropriate responses from China.
The Chinese Perception of American Power
Although nobody in China argues that it is now capable of
challenging the United States, many believe that in the near
future China will be increasingly capable of achieving this goal.
This optimistic view of balance of power between China and the
United States can be traced back to several influences.
The first influence is the Marxist-Leninist framework of
international relations that has profoundly shaped the Chinese
view of world politics. Lenins theory of imperialistic capitalism
allegedly uncovered the laws of world politics, namely, uneven
development among the world powers.
3
Due to different timing
of industrialization, state building, as well as technological
breakthroughs, some states may leapfrog ahead of more power-
ful countries in a relatively short period of time. Classic exam-
ples include the rise of Germany and Japan in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries.
Some contemporary Western scholars of international rela-
tions also subscribe to this view of dynamic change of power.
4
American Hegemony and Chinas U.S. Policy 89
3. Vladimir Ilich Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest State of Capitalism (New
York: International Publishers, 1984).
profoundly affected by that relationship. In recent years, the
bilateral relationship has seen much uncertainty and in fact, in
both countries there have been hot debates over policy choices
toward each other.
In the United States, the debate centers on whether a rising
China will be a revisionist state that seeks to change the world
order, or a status-quo state that will respect and play by interna-
tional rules. Some observers argue that China is a revisionist
state and thus the United States must contain China to suppress
its power. Most, however, believe that through engagement the
United States can influence China to play by the accepted rules
of the world community.
1
Chinese policymakers are concerned with a similar ques-
tion, which is how China should best pursue its interests in a
world dominated by American hegemony. Chinese policy choic-
es, they believe, should be based on both an interpretation of
American intentions toward China and a projected balance of
power between the two countries in the future. In theory, benign
or hostile U.S. intentions, and a favorable or unfavorable balance
of power, would result in rational choices of different policies
toward the United States.
Unfortunately, it is widely known that discerning one coun-
trys intention toward another is difficult at best. It is hampered
by prejudice, lack of information, and insufficient communica-
tion. Chinese policymakers and experts are inevitably divided
with regard to their interpretation of American intentions
toward China.
2
National capabilities or power, on the other
hand, are substantially easier to measure. This article argues that
Chinas policy toward the United States must incorporate the
power factor. In fact, this is the classic perspective of the realist
88 Baohui Zhang
1. A good summary of alternative U.S. policies toward China is available
in Ted Galen Carpenter, Confusions and Stereotypes: U.S. Policy
toward China at the Dawn of 21st Century, in Carpenter and James A.
Doran, eds., Chinas Future: Constructive Partner or Emerging Threat?
(Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 2000).
2. This is reflected by a special issue of Strategy and Management, a premier
Chinese foreign-policy journal. In its January-February issue in 2001,
the journal collected different and often conflicting views from noted
Chinese experts to discuss American hegemony and what China should
do about it.
argued that the American society and economy contained many
ills such as a poor educational system, weakening families, a
declining rate of productivity, rising crime, intensifying social
tensions, and a mammoth budget deficit and national debt.
8
Commentators from both liberal and conservative sides argued
that these ills inevitably led to the perceived American relative
decline in the 1980s.
To many Chinese scholars of international relations, the rela-
tive decline of the United States has been accompanied by the rise
of China. Due to economic reforms, China for two decades has
been able to maintain an average annual growth rate of over 8 per-
cent. The rapid rise of Chinas economic power was further con-
firmed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which in 1994
ranked China as the third-largest economy, using a new method to
measure GDP. Many predicted that if China could maintain its
high rate growth, in less than two decades it would surpass the
troubled Japan as the worlds second-largest economy.
9
In addition to the Chinese perception of the relative decline
of the United States and the comparative rise of China, another
very important Chinese analytical framework to understand
world politics is the concept of polarity. The study of polarity in
international politics was pioneered primarily by American schol-
ars. It focuses on the pattern of distribution of power on the glob-
al level. Each major country represents a pole of power. A system
with one dominant power is a unipolar system. A system with
two roughly equal powers is a bipolar system. Lastly, a system
with three or more major countries is called a multipolar system.
In the 1990s, Chinese policymakers and scholars alike tend-
ed to believe that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the bipo-
lar system of the cold war ushered in a transition toward a mul-
tipolar system. Many believed that although the United States
was enjoying a unique position of peerless power relative to
other countries, its dominance would be only temporary and
American Hegemony and Chinas U.S. Policy 91
8. For more discussion of how these problems affected U.S. power during
the 1980s, see Martin K. Starr, ed., Global Competitiveness: Getting the
U.S. Back on Track (New York: W.W. Norton, 1988).
9. For a recent analysis of Chinas rising economy, see a special report by
The Economist, Chinas Economic Power: Enter the Dragon, March 10,
2001, pp. 23-25.
Robert Gilpin emphasizes differential rates of growth among
world powers that can suddenly accelerate and result in a phe-
nomenon called power transition, in which a weaker challenger
gets stronger while the dominant hegemonic power gets weak-
er. The cycle of power transition is complete when the chal-
lenger surpasses the power of the former hegemon.
5
A Western scholar more familiar to China is historian Paul
Kennedy. His influential book The Rise and Fall of Great Powers
was translated into Chinese in the late 1980s and widely circu-
lated among Chinese readers.
6
Kennedy asks why no single
country has been able to hold onto a hegemonic position for
long. He focuses on the phenomenon of imperial overstretch. He
argues that a hegemonic power almost always tries to maintain
its global dominance by reaching into every corner of the world
through direct military involvement or alliances. This commit-
ment of resources to achieving external dominance results in the
neglect of domestic infrastructure, such as economy, education
and research, which ultimately determines a nations power.
Kennedy concludes that as a result of the weakening of domestic
foundations, the gradual decline of a hegemonic power is
inevitable.
The uneven development of world powers and specifically
the relative decline of the United States seemed for a while to be
confirmed by facts. Many argued in the 1980s that the rise of
Japan and Europe and the loss of the economic and technologi-
cal edge by the United States proved the theories of uneven
development and imperialistic decline.
7
Moreover, this view
was supported by criticisms by scholars, the media, and politi-
cians alike in the United States itself. Many commentators
90 Baohui Zhang
4. See Charles P. Kindleberger, World Economic Primacy, 1500-1990 (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); David S. Landers, The Wealth
and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and So Poor (New York:
W.W. Norton, 1998).
5. See Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1988).
6. Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers (New York: Random
House, 1988).
7. A well-known work on the subject is Lester C. Thurow, Head to Head:
The Coming Economic Battle among Japan, Europe, and America (New York:
Morrow, 1992).
Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the U.S.
invasion of Iraq, Chinese experts have continued their debates
about the extent of American dominance. The debates continue
to show Chinese ambiguity about American power. On the one
hand, Wang Jisi commented at a major conference in 2004 that
Even though the emergence of a multipolar system and the
decline of the United States are inevitable in the long term, in
the short term, it is difficult to identify signs that American over-
all power is declining.
14
Zhu Feng, a professor of International
Relations at Beijing University, concurred with this view by
observing that The U.S. superiority is comprehensive, covering
the entire spectrum of national power.
15
On the other hand, Lin Limin, an influential expert from the
China Institute of Contemporary International Relations that has
close ties with the Chinese military, argues that American domi-
nance is more limited. He describes the current world as one of
asymmetric multipolar system, in which the United States is
balanced by several weaker major powers. According to him,
due to balancing by these countries, While it is easy for the U.S.
to be the sole superpower, it is difficult to become the hegemon-
ic power.
16
He also claims that the current asymmetric system
is merely a transition stage toward a full multipolar system.
American Power and Its Future
A Relative Decline or Relative Preeminence?
The crucial question in this debate concerns American
American Hegemony and Chinas U.S. Policy 93
14. Wang Jisi, Meiguo quanqiu zhanlue di tiaozheng ji qi dui Zhong-Mei
guanxi di yingxiang (Adjustment in American Global Strategy and Its
Impact on Sino-U.S. Relations), paper presented to the Conference on
International Studies in China, Beijing, June 13, 2004.
15. Zhu Feng, Yilake zhanzheng yu guoji zhanlue geju xin taishi (Iraq
War and New Trends in International Security), in Fu Mengmei, ed.,
Fankong beijing xia Meiguo quanqiu zhanlue (American Global Strategy in
the Age of War on Terrorism) (Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 2004), p. 8.
16. Lin Limin, Shijie zai buduicheng duoji geju zhong jinxing(The World
Is Operating as an Asymmetric Multipolar System), Liaowang Weekly,
September 15, 2003, p. 58.
transitional. As argued by Liu Xuecheng, a senior research fel-
low at the China Institute of International Relations, After the
end of the cold war, the multipolar trend accelerated in the Asia
Pacific region. A new system with five mutually balancing pow-
ers (China, the United States, Japan, Russia, and European
Union) is gradually emerging. More specifically, this is a world
of multiple power centers.
10
A book by Hu Fan of the Institute of Strategic Studies of
National Defense University, also argues that Todays world is
in the process of great historical transformation. The bipolar sys-
tem has come to an end. Various forces are going through new
process of reconfiguration of power. The world is moving in the
direction of multipolarity.
11
In recent years, however, some in China have moderated
their view of the multipolar system. The dominance of the United
States is now being interpreted as more enduring. For example, a
recent article argues that The United States remains the critical
state that affects the relations among major powers.
12
Nonethe-
less, Chinese analysts still believe that the current system,
although not multipolar, is not unipolar either. They contend that
the United States does not have the power to act unilaterally,
since it is restrained by a group of other major powers. Beside
China and Russia, an integrated Europe has differences with the
United States on many issues. This system is called One Super-
power, Several Major Powers. As observed by Wang Jisi, a lead-
ing Chinese expert on the United States, Although the United
States will continue to enjoy advantages in power, it is isolated
and unable to impose hegemony.
13
92 Baohui Zhang
10. Liu Xuecheng, Zhongguo he Meiguo: duishou haishi huoban (China and the
United States: Foes or Partners) (Beijing: Jingji kexue chubanshe, 2000),
pp. 52-53.
11. Hu Fan, Daguo di zunyan (The Dignity of a Great Power) (Beijing: Haitian
chubanshe, 1999), p. 153.
12. Lin Yimin, 21 shiji chu guoji zhanlue huanjing di liu ge jiben quxiang
(Six Major Trends in International Security in the Early 21st Century),
Zhongguo guoqing guoli (May, 2000), p. 35.
13. Wang Jisi, Lengzhan hou Meiguo di quanqiu zhanlue he shijie diwei (Post-
Cold War American Global Strategy and Its Position in the World) (Bei-
jing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1999), p. 406. Wang Jisi is the Director of
Institute of American Studies, Chinese Social Science Academy.
major countries. Thus the key question here is whether the United
States has suffered from relative decline due to the narrowing
gap of power with other major countries, such as an integrated
Europe, Japan, and China.
The answer is no. Although the European economy picked
up speed in the 1990s, it is still hampered by its outdated labor
market, over-regulated business environment, and a burdened
tax system.
19
For Japan, the entire 1990s was lost to the longest
economic recession Japan has known. The much-feared Japanese
economy of the 1980s turned out to be constructed on very shaky
foundations.
20
Besides a few super-competitive industries that
are oriented toward export, the world found out that Japan in
fact has many inefficient and uncompetitive domestically orient-
ed sectors. Moreover, some even argue that Japan faces structural
constraints on its future growth. The problems include Japanese
business culture, over-regulation by the state, and labor practices
that prevent companies from restructuring. At the moment, there
is no sign that Japan can quickly regain any momentum in the
near future.
The continued U.S. dominance in economic, technological,
and military areas leads two American scholars to declare that
the American global position today is more dominant than any
other hegemonic power in history. For example, research and
development (R&D) spending by the United States is bigger
than the next seven countries combined. This ensures U.S. domi-
nance in science and technology. Moreover, the United States
only needs to make a modest effort of spending 3.5 percent of its
GDP to maintain global military dominance.
21
Can China Catch Up?
This leads us to the power of China. Will China be able to
American Hegemony and Chinas U.S. Policy 95
19. For more discussion of European economic troubles, see Joan Warner,
The Atlantic Century? Businessweek, February 8, 1999, pp. 64-67.
20. For more analysis of Japans economic woes, see Richard Katz, Japan,
the System that Soured: The Rise and Fall of the Japanese Economic Miracle
(Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1998).
21. See Stephan G. Brooks and William L. Wohlforth, American Primacy
in Perspective, Foreign Affairs, vol. 81, No. 4 (July-August, 2002), pp.
22-23.
power or more specifically, whether the United States will suffer
a relative decline versus China in the future. If the answer is yes,
then a rising China will be soon able to compete with and even
directly challenge the United States. I argue that American
power will not suffer a major decline. In fact, the United States
will remain the sole superpower for at least another half century.
As a result of this, the world will essentially remain a unipolar
system.
17
First, the perceptions of a declining America during the 1980s
and early 1990s, by those both inside and outside the United
States, turned out to be false. The United States in the 1990s
enjoyed the longest peacetime economic boom in history. Several
factors contributed to this phenomenon.
18
One is the technological
revolution. The United States was the first country that entered
into the computer age. It was the first country that widely
employed computer and information technologies in every aspect
of the economy and society. Moreover, American corporate
restructuring in the early 1990s, the infamous downsizing, made
American firms the leanest and most competitive in the world.
Both the technological revolution and corporate restructuring, in
turn, contributed to the rise of productivity of the U.S. economy,
which is regaining momentum as the worlds strongest. These
factors, together with the lowering of oil prices and generally
favorable world economic conditions, led the American economy
to achieve very substantial growth from the mid-1990s until
recently.
Secondly, other countries have not made substantial gains
in power relative to the United States. In recent years, Western
international relations theory has focused on the importance of
relative gains in national power. This is because a countrys
world influence is not just decided by how much power it has,
but how much more power it has than the next country. In a
word, what is important is the gap in power among the worlds
94 Baohui Zhang
17. For a recent discussion of current American global dominance, see
Bruce Cumings, Still the American Century, in Michael Cox, ed., The
Interregnum: Controversies in World Politics, 1989-1999 (New York: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1999), pp. 271-99.
18. For more details of these contributing factors to the renewal of American
economy, see Mortimer B. Zuckerman, A Second American Century,
Foreign Affairs, vol. 77, No. 3 (May-June, 1998), pp. 18-31.
that Todays world has entered an era of competition of inte-
grated national power that is defined by high technologies.
Whoever controls the high tech area will be able to rapidly
develop its economy, enhance its integrated power, and protect
its national security.
24
In this aspect of power, the United States is peerless in its
infrastructure for a high-tech driven economy. One component
of this infrastructure is human talent. The United States has an
open-door policy to attract the best talent from other countries
into its scientific and technological fields. Also, the American
graduate school system is the best in the world in its ability to
train the next generation of scientists and engineers. A second
component of American technological infrastructure is the orga-
nized research through numerous world-class research universi-
ties and huge corporations that also have world class in-house
research capabilities. We need only mention a few names, such
as Bell Laboratories, Intel, and Microsoft. The third component
of this infrastructure is the business environment and culture.
American culture encourages aggressiveness, personal achieve-
ment, and risk taking. This has given rise to generation after
generation of entrepreneurs who provide vital dynamism for
American economic and technological progress. The entrepre-
neurial spirit is also supported by the worlds freest capitalist
economy that offers opportunities for entrepreneurial success.
Americas technological leadership has also translated into
military advantage, another aspect of national power that is still
important in todays world. The United States is actively explor-
ing how to integrate the most advanced micro-electronic and
information technologies into the next generation of weapon
systems and combat doctrines. In the next ten years, the United
States will be able to turn its armed forces into the worlds first
digital military that is across-the-board much more advanced
than any other countrys military.
American dominance in military technology is clearly rec-
ognized by Chinese observers. For example, Major General
Wang Baochun of the Academy of Military Sciences comments:
The current military revolution is turning the United States
into the worlds top power with super capabilities.
25
Jin Yinan,
American Hegemony and Chinas U.S. Policy 97
24. Hu Fan, Daguo di zunyan, p. 215.
substantially narrow the power gap with the United States?
There is no doubt that in the last two decades China has been
able to achieve very impressive economic growth. As a result,
the overall power of China has dramatically improved. Howev-
er, this article argues that Chinas increasing power will not nec-
essarily improve Chinas balance of power against the United
States. To put it differently, while China has seen a major
increase in absolute power, its relative power versus that of the
United States has not increased.
The reason is that while Chinas power has been growing,
so too has American power since the 1990s. More importantly,
the United States has grown faster in key areas that will decide
national power in the future. While China has been making real
progress in promoting basic modernization and has been
excelling in low-tech, labor-intensive, and export-oriented
industries, the United States has become the undisputed leader
of a technological revolution that is based on the wide applica-
tion of computers and information technologies. As most econo-
mists agree, a countrys future competitiveness and power will
be mostly determined by these factors, not by industries based
on mass production.
Even Chinese economists widely recognize the central role
of technological elements in future economies. One article
argues that the world economy will be led by developments in
technology and not by growth in quantity. It even argues that by
2010 the quantitative gap between the developing and devel-
oped world will probably narrow but their gap in quality will
increase.
22
In another article titled High Technology: The Real
Determinant of National Competitiveness in the New Century,
the author argues that advanced technologies will constitute the
core of integrated national power: High technology is the most
critical factor that affects economic, military, and political areas.
Its development symbolizes the strength and weakness of inte-
grated national power.
23
Hu Fan, an analyst from the Chinese military, also argues
96 Baohui Zhang
22. Lin Limin, 21 shiji chu guoji zhanlue huanjing, p. 36.
23. Chen Qingxiu, Gaokeji: xin shiji zhenzheng di guojia jingzheng li
(High Technology: The Deciding Factor in National Competitiveness in
the New Century), Zhongguo guoqing guoli (January, 2001), p. 22.
macy and its potential challengers, two U.S. scholars argue that
even if Chinas overall GDP can gradually catch up with that of
the United States, it will still lag in technological aspects and, as a
result, in military power.
29
Chinas weakness in technology has even led a noted Chi-
nese economist to argue that it would be futile for China to try
to modernize through high-technology industries since it does
not have a comparative advantage in this area. Recently, there
have been debates in China about whether to adopt a leapfrog
strategy that directly competes with advanced countries in areas
such as information technologies. According to Lin Yifu, one of
Chinas best-known economists, this strategy would be unlikely
to succeed since China does not have the capital market, scientif-
ic foundation, and human resources to compete for high tech-
nology dominance. Instead, he argues that China should contin-
ue to focus on its comparative advantages, namely cheap labor
and labor-intensive industries.
30
If China is unlikely to catch up with the United States in the
quality of its economy, can China do it with quantity? To put it dif-
ferently, can China maintain a sufficiently high rate of growth in
its labor-intensive economy? This is again an open question since
historically no country has maintained very high growth speed for
half a century. The examples of South Korea and Japan prove that
once these miracle economies matured, their growth rates slowed
down as well. In fact, this trend has occurred in China, which has
seen its growth rate declining continuously since 1994. Thus,
according to Liu Guoguang, a leading Chinese economist, After
halting seven consecutive years of declining growth rate in 2000,
there are expectations that the Chinese economy will be able to go
back to the 10-percent average growth rate of the past. Although
this is possible for specific years, this kind of expectation is unreal-
istic for the medium and long term.
31
American Hegemony and Chinas U.S. Policy 99
Seven Largest Countries), Zhongguo guoqing guoli (November, 2000).
29. Stephan G. Brooks and William L. Wohlforth, American Primacy in
Perspective, Foreign Affairs, vol. 81, No. 4 (July-August, 2002), p. 26.
30. Lin Yifu, Xinxi chanye fazhan yu bijiao youshi (Comparative Advan-
tages and Development of Information Industries), Zhongguo guoqing
guoli (June, 2000).
31. Liu Guoguang, Jingji zengzhang quxian keneng wang nai li guai
(What Will be Chinas Economic Growth Trajectory), Zhongguo guoqing
a well-known scholar on military strategy at the National
Defense University, also bluntly observes: The military revolu-
tions greatest impact is that it has magnified American power.
It has brought unprecedented military, scientific, and technolog-
ical advantages to the United States.
26
While U.S. military power has been significantly enhanced in
the last ten years due to its technological dominance, China lacks
the foundation to make genuine progress in science and technolo-
gy, or in their applications in the economy. In comparison with
U.S. dominance in technology, China lacks the basic infrastruc-
ture to generate economy-wide technological advances. Although
there are pockets of indigenous technological progresses, China
does not possess the wide range of factors, such as education,
basic research, finance, and business environment that will allow
it to substantially catch up with the advanced economies.
This also means that Chinas recent economic growth has its
limits. It has been driven mostly by expansion of low-tech manu-
facturing industries that take advantage of Chinas cheap labor.
27
For China to move onto the next level and become a true eco-
nomic heavyweight in the world, it has to become a technology-
driven economy. On paper China has a sizable scientific estab-
lishment, mostly in the form of government-supported research
institutes. However, the efficiency and quality of this establish-
ment is dismal. As a result, according to a study by the influen-
tial China Institute of Contemporary International Relations,
Chinas scientific and technological capability is only one-sev-
enth that of the United States. Even when compared with major
European countries, Chinas situation is not any better. Its scien-
tific and technological capability is only one-fifth that of France,
Britain, and Germany.
28
Thus, in a recent study of American pri-
98 Baohui Zhang
25. Wang Baochun, Si da yingxiang riyi tuxian (Four Major Trends Are
Showing Increasing Importance), Liaowang Weekly, July 14, 2003, p. 20.
26. Jin Yinan, Shijie junshi geming yu Zhongguo guofang xiandaihua
(The Revolution in Military Affairs and the Modernization of Chinas
National Defense), paper presented to the Conference on International
Studies in China, June 13, 2004, Beijing, p. 2.
27. For this explanation of Chinas economic growth, see World Bank,
China 2020 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1999).
28. China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, Shijie qi da
guo zonghe guoli jiemi (Comprehensive National Power of the Worlds
relations scholar, points out that China does not really have the
option of not accepting American hegemony. Chinas interests
can only be served by cooperation with the United States. He pre-
scribes a policy of bandwagon, which means that China should
accept and participate in the U.S.-led global regimes.
35
The third
article in the debate, written by a scholar who received his gradu-
ate training in the United States, criticizes the optimistic view of
cooperation. It argues that cooperation policy underestimates the
U.S. hostility toward China and thus its threat to Chinese national
security. The author observes that supporters of the cooperation
approach are eager to overlook the threat from American unipo-
lar dominance, toward which they only emphasize cooperation
and concession, and not resistance and confrontation.
36
A Policy of Cooperation
The argument here is that China must recognize the reality of
continued American dominance in the twenty-first century and
adopt a policy that reflects the power difference between the two
countries. This is a policy of realism. According to the realist tra-
dition in international politics, power dictates foreign policies.
Indeed, in a special issue on American power, The Economist
noted that most countries in the world have rationally chosen to
bandwagon with the United States. In explaining why there is a
lack of global opposition to U.S. hegemony, the magazine
observes that Its rather better, in fact, to be on Americas side.
37
The balance of power between China and the United States
should result in a policy that realistically recognizes American
hegemony while at the same time enhances Chinas national
interests. On the one hand, it recognizes the leadership position
of the United States in world affairs. On the other hand, it seeks
American Hegemony and Chinas U.S. Policy 101
35. Shi Yinhong, Ershiyi shiji qianqi Zhongguo guoji taidu, waijiao zhexue,
he genben zhanlue sikao (Chinas Foreign Policy Philosophy and
Strategy in the Early 21st Century), Strategy and Management, No. 1
(2001), p. 17.
36. Zhang Ruizhuang, Chonggu Zhongguo waijiao suochu zhi guoji
huanjing (Reevaluating Chinas International Environment), Strategy
and Management, No. 1 (2001), p. 29.
37. Bill Emmoff, The Acceptability of American Power, The Economist,
June 29-July 8, 2002.
All this means that the United States has not suffered a rela-
tive decline compared with China. In particular, China will not be
able to significantly narrow the technological gap between the
two countries. It may not even be possible to catch up with the
U.S. economy in quantity. Thus, according to a major research
project undertaken by the China Institute of Contemporary
International Relations, Chinas total power ranks last among the
seven countries under study. The measurement of national power
uses four factors that include economy, military, science and tech-
nology, and resources. The order of ranking is: the United States,
Japan, France, Britain, Germany, Russia, and China.
32
Chinas Response to American Hegemony
The expected American dominance and the inability of China
to significantly narrow the power gap should have an important
impact on Chinas policy toward the United States. Essentially,
the choice for China is whether to accept and participate in the
U.S.-dominated global system or to remain outside of it or even
become a challenger to American hegemony. As observed by a
Chinese political scientist now teaching in the United States,
China is unclear about what to do about American hegemony.
33
This uncertainty about Chinas position toward American
hegemony is demonstrated by a debate in Strategy and Manage-
ment, an influential Chinese journal of international relations.
One article argues that U.S. global hegemony is detrimental to
Chinas national interests. It specifically contends that partic-
ipating in the Western-dominated global regimes will hurt
many aspects of Chinese economic and military security.
34
Another article in the debate, by a noted Chinese international
100 Baohui Zhang
guoli (August, 2000).
32. This research was organized by the Institute in 1997 and the results
were published in 2000. See note 28.
33. See Yong Deng, Hegemon on the Offensive: Chinese Perspectives on
U.S. Global Strategy, Political Science Quarterly, vol. 116, No. 3 (Summer,
2001), p. 355.
34. Ji Wenhui and Sun Hui, Hou lengzhan shidai di Zhongguo guojia
anquan (Chinese National Security after the Cold War), Strategy and
Management, No. 1 (2001), p. 17.
the current system with a new one.
Depending on the goals of the rising power, the status-quo
power has two broad options: containment and engagement.
39
If
the goal of the rising power is considered revolutionary, the sta-
tus-quo power has to pursue a containment strategy to balance
the power and influence of the challenger. This balancing can be
accomplished either by increasing its own power, or by creating
a coalition with other countries that also feel threatened by the
rising power.
If, however, the goal of the rising power is considered limit-
ed, the status-quo power should pursue a strategy of engage-
ment that seeks to encourage the rising power to accept the cur-
rent world order by accommodating its legitimate interests. The
engagement policy intends to convince the rising power that it
can successfully promote its influence by working through the
current order. To achieve this, the engagement policy of the sta-
tus-quo power relies on the promise of reward rather than
threats to influence the behavior of the rising power.
The engagement policy is the most sensible solution to the
challenge of a rising power. If it works, it can minimize conflicts
and chances of war between the status-quo power and the rising
power. It is also cost-effective, since it does not require the sta-
tus-quo power to commit additional resources to balance the ris-
ing power. However, the success of the policy is preconditioned
on the fundamental goals of the rising power. It will only suc-
ceed with a rising power that seeks limited revisionist goals.
The engagement policy promotes the rising powers integra-
tion with the world order through three specific measures:
recognition of the rising powers legitimate interests, mutual
accommodation, and shared international leadership.
40
Recognition of the rising powers legitimate interests by the
status-quo power is vital for the success of engagement policy.
The status-quo power must show that it understands the rising
powers quest for more influence and that it is ready to allow
American Hegemony and Chinas U.S. Policy 103
39. For the best study on the subject, see Randall L. Schweller, Managing
the Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory, in Alastair Iain Johnston
and Robert S. Ross, eds., Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging
Power (New York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 1-31.
40. See ibid.
to promote Chinas interests through cooperation with the U.S.-
dominated world order. In essence, this policy does not chal-
lenge U.S. hegemony and the world order but builds on top of
it. It recognizes that given the limitations of Chinas power,
China must pursue its interests through cooperation with the
rules and regimes of the current world order.
This realist approach then raises the question whether the
United States will allow China to promote its legitimate interests
through the American-dominated world order. I argue that the
current U.S. engagement policy toward China intends to pro-
mote Chinas integration with this world order. This policy
desires to increase Chinas access to world influence in exchange
for Chinas accepting the current rules of the game. Thus, the
United States should not oppose Chinas increasing role in
world affairs as long as China accepts the global political and
economic frameworks that are created and maintained by the
United States.
The U.S. Engagement Policy
The engagement policy represents the mainstream of U.S.
policy to China. It is a response to the challenge that has con-
fronted every dominant power in world history: how to deal
with a rising power that can potentially topple its hegemony. A
rising power poses a grave threat to the hegemon because of its
increasing capability and increasing demands for influence.
Increased influence naturally will come at the expense of the cur-
rent hegemon, which so far has dictated the rules of the game.
38
The hegemon represents a status-quo power. To increase its
influence, the rising power can be either a revisionist state with
limited goals, or a revolutionary state that seeks to change the
entire world order. In the first case, the rising power only seeks
to modify the current world order to promote its legitimate inter-
ests. It is willing to accept the current system if it is allowed
greater access to world influence. In the second case, the rising
power believes that it can only promote its influence by replacing
102 Baohui Zhang
38. For a recent study of power transition, see Ronald L. Tammen and Jack
Kugler, eds., Power Transition: Strategies for the 21st Century (New York:
Chatham House Publishers, 2000).
When George W. Bush became president, and after initial
hesitation, he embraced the engagement approach. Although
there are voices from the far right for a tougher U.S. policy
toward China, it is unlikely that the Bush administration will
switch its fundamental position.
42
As David Lampton observes
in a recent book on Sino-U.S. relations, many Chinese tend to
have a rather simplistic view of the American policymaking
process. They overlook the pluralistic nature of the America
political system in that at any given time there are many com-
peting views of U.S. policy toward China.
43
An anti-China view
does not mean it is going to become the official policy of the
United States. The U.S. decision-making system is one of checks
and balances. Voices of containment are counterbalanced by
voices of engagement. Recent Bush administration policies
toward China clearly show that Bush has embraced the engage-
ment approach.
44
The events of September 11 have pulled the two countries
into closer cooperation and thus increased Chinas role in
international and regional affairs. As noted in a recent article by
Abramowitz and Bosworth, two former U.S. ambassadors to
Asia, In a short order, Beijing has gone from Washingtons
strategic competitor to being its security collaborator and a major
trade and investment partner.
45
In particular, they note that the
United States, preoccupied by the war on terror and events in
Iraq, has also pushed China to play a bigger role in maintaining
Asian security.
46
The most notable of this effort is the involve-
American Hegemony and Chinas U.S. Policy 105
42. Some Chinese analysts were initially worried by Bushs early policy
toward China. See Chen Demin, Cong heping yianbian dao wuli qiangzhi
Meiguo tiaozheng dui Hua zhengce (From Peaceful Evolution to Military
Coercion: The United States Adjusting Its China Policy), Zhongguo guoqing
guoli (August, 2001).
43. David Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Rela-
tions, 1989-2000 (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 2001),
p. 282.
44. See Andrew Scobell, Crouching Korea, Hidden China: Bush Adminis-
tration Policy toward Pyongyang and Beijing, Asian Survey, vol. 42,
No. 2 (March-April, 2002), pp. 343-68.
45. Morton Abramowitz and Stephen Bosworth, Adjusting to the New
Asia, Foreign Affairs, vol. 82, No. 4 (July-August, 2003), p. 125.
46. Ibid., p. 126.
the rising power to promote its legitimate interests through the
current world order. This will show the rising power that it does
not need to radically modify the world order. Mutual accommo-
dation means that both sides must resolve any potential conflict
of interests through negotiations and compromise, thus promot-
ing and institutionalizing cooperation between the two sides. In
the end, institutionalized cooperation will help build confidence
and reduce mutual misperception. The collective outcome of
mutual accommodation will commit the two sides to peaceful
resolution of conflicts.
Shared international leadership is a step further from the
last two measures. The status-quo power recognizes that inte-
grating the rising power into the current world system requires
giving it an increased leadership role. The rising power, through
expanded access to leadership opportunities, in turn would rec-
ognize that it can effectively exercise influence in world affairs
through the established world order.
The engagement policy, however, must also be accompanied
by sufficient deterrence by the status-quo power. It must demon-
strate to the rising power that although it intends to increase the
latters influence in world affairs, it will not tolerate any efforts to
substantially modify the present world order. In a word, the ris-
ing powers increased access to power in the current system is
conditioned on its acceptance of the system. To maintain effective
deterrence, the status-quo power must retain a sufficient military
capability and possibly even an alliance with other countries that
may feel threatened by the rising power.
The current U.S. policy toward China demonstrates a strong
engagement orientation. Most American foreign-policy decision
makers believe that China has yet to demonstrate that it seeks to
overthrow the U.S.-dominated world order. They believe that
China is only a revisionist state with limited goals. Thus, by
engaging China it is possible to integrate it into the current world
order.
41
To achieve this, the United States must recognize and
accommodate Chinas legitimate interests. Moreover, the United
States must expand Chinas participation in the current world
order by promoting shared international leadership.
104 Baohui Zhang
41. Robert Ross, Engagement in U.S. China Policy, in Johnston and Ross,
eds., Engaging China, pp. 176-206.
promote its legitimate interests in world affairs. Thus, it is a sen-
sible policy for China to integrate itself with the current world
order, even though that world order is dominated by the United
States. China must show that it recognizes the reality that the
United States will remain the worlds hegemon. In exchange,
China must pressure the United States to allow Chinas partic-
ipation and leadership in the current world order to increase. It
must adopt policies that will convince the United States that
China is not a revolutionary state that seeks to overthrow the
present world order.
China can certainly take advantage of the U.S. policy of
engagement, since this policy intends to recognize Chinas legiti-
mate interests as a rising power and correspondingly, Chinas
sharing of world leadership. Thus, by responding to U.S. engage-
ment policy through mutual accommodation and cooperation,
China will be able to expand its global influence in a way that is
more compatible with Chinas growing power.
However, China cannot passively wait for America to con-
cede Chinas need for greater world influence, since the United
States has always preferred to share its global leadership as little
as possible. China must be more active in demanding participa-
tion and a leadership role in this world order. Thus, Chinas pol-
icy of cooperation with the United States involves both recogni-
tion of American leadership and bargaining for more roles for
China in world affairs.
China must actively seek to expand participation in all
kinds of global and regional regimes, even if they are largely
influenced by the United States. An important goal for China
should be membership in the G-8 organization, which is the club
of the worlds most powerful countries. Membership carries
great global prestige. The G-8 is also an important and institu-
tionalized forum for the worlds major powers to discuss global
issues and if necessary, to take action. Becoming a member of
this exclusive club would offer China an important stepping
stone onto the world stage. Chinas rapidly growing power
makes it more deserving of G-8 membership than some of the
groups junior members, such as Italy and Canada.
In the June 2003 summit meeting of the G-8, China was for
the first time invited to attend a companion conference of the G-8
meeting. President Hu Jintao completed his debut on the world
American Hegemony and Chinas U.S. Policy 107
ment of China in U.S.-North Korea nuclear negotiations.
The U.S. intention to integrate China into greater roles in
international affairs is perhaps best summarized by Colin L.
Powell, the U.S. Secretary of State. He has argued for a policy
toward China that is based on partnership, in recognition of
Chinas rising power and its interests. In return, China must
undertake greater and more responsible participation in global
affairs. Powell stated that the United States welcomes the rise of
a strong and prosperous China: Indeed, we welcome a global
role for China, so long as China assumes responsibilities that are
commensurate with that role.
47
U.S. engagement policy is perhaps best demonstrated by
American willingness to accommodate Chinas position on Tai-
wan. It has become increasingly apparent that the United States
intends to use its policy toward Taiwan to reward Chinas coop-
eration on regional and global issues. For example, in January
2004 both President Bush and Secretary of State Powell openly
rebuffed Taiwans recent attempts to change the status quo in
the Taiwan Strait. This shows that the U.S. engagement policy is
willing to accommodate the legitimate interests of China. China
can effectively take advantage of this policy to increase its influ-
ence in regional and international affairs.
These examples indicate that by cooperating with U.S.
engagement strategy, China can in fact increase its position in
global and regional affairs. Chinas cooperation should be wel-
comed by the United States since it can relieve some of the bur-
dens that the U.S. undertakes to maintain global security. China
could effectively become a partner and share the cost of U.S.
leadership.
Chinas Strategies for Increasing Global Influence
Undertaking a Leadership Role
I have been arguing that the U.S. engagement policy offers
an opportunity for China to increase its global influence and
106 Baohui Zhang
47. Colin L. Powell, A Strategy of Partnership, Foreign Affairs, vol. 83, No.
1 (January-February, 2004), p. 32.
ence has led both countries to try to continue to exercise global
influence even though they are no longer first-class powers.
Japan, by contrast, has never had experience with global leader-
ship. In fact, its post-World War II reliance on the United States
promoted a habit of dependency and passivity. As a result, even
though it is the worlds second most powerful country, Japan has
never been able to influence world affairs effectively, even during
the heyday of its power from the late 1980s to the early 1990s.
This led a noted U.S. expert on Japan to declare that Japan seems
to lag behind comparable European nations considerably as a
world power.
50
Global leadership is not only a reflection of a countrys objec-
tive economic and military capabilities. It is also determined by a
major powers willingness, confidence, and skills in exercising
them. China must more aggressively participate in both global
and regional organizations and increase its leadership roles.
Influencing U.S. Perceptions of China
China should take other measures to promote its expanded
roles in the current world order. This primarily means that
China must increase its influence in the United States to ensure
that America will stick to the engagement policy. To achieve
this, China must be able to influence the American perception of
China. It must convince the United States that China does not
intend to challenge American global influence. To this end,
China has a lot to learn from Taiwan, which runs a very effec-
tive foreign lobbying operation in the United States.
To influence American perceptions, China must skillfully and
effectively work with the U.S. Congress, where some members
still maintain a strong distrust of China, and the mass media,
which powerfully shapes American understanding of China. All
of these strategies require expert knowledge of the workings of
the American political system. Fortunately, a group of younger
American experts in China is emerging. They have intimate
knowledge of the political system and processes of the United
States. Many of them received graduate training in America.
American Hegemony and Chinas U.S. Policy 109
50. Edward J. Lincoln, Japan: Using Power Narrowly, The Washington
Quarterly, vol. 2, No. 1 (Winter, 2003-04), p. 113.
stage by attending this conference. Many analysts inside China
have begun to debate Chinas involvement with the G-8.
48
This is
an ongoing discussion and certainly could mean that China will
soon adopt a new position on this club of great powers.
Moreover, China must be more aggressive in playing a lead-
ership role in global organizations where it is already a member.
Historically, China has been too passive in global organizations.
It demonstrates neither the will nor the skills to take leadership
roles. David Lampton also points out this deficiency in Chinas
role in global institutions. For example, he quotes the comments
made by a Latin American diplomat about Chinas passive
behavior in the Security Council of the UN: They never take
part in the give and take of preparing resolutions. . . . If they can,
they let others weave together a resolution, then say they can
live with it.
49
A more active leadership role in international organizations
should include using Chinas considerable foreign currency
reserves in the worlds financial and economic organizations,
such as the World Bank and IMF. China should be willing to use
its financial resources to play a role in economic crises at both
the global and regional levels. China should also become a more
active participant in UN peacekeeping missions in various
regions of the world. So far China has chosen not to participate
significantly in these kinds of activities. Involvement with global
peacekeeping will help to project the image that China has con-
siderable power and is willing to deploy its military power in
world affairs.
In sum, to increase Chinas global influence, it must be more
willing to exercise a leadership role. Britain, France, and Japan
represent interesting examples of exercising leadership. Although
Britain and France have less power in absolute terms than Japan,
they possess greater world influence, since both countries exercise
leadership far more aggressively than Japan. Part of the reason is
national experience. Both Britain and France used to be world
powers of the first order and both controlled empires. This experi-
108 Baohui Zhang
48. For this discussion, see a full page discussion by Singtao Daily, Zhong-
guo jiaru G8 di li yu bi (Benefits and Costs of China Joining the G-8),
June 8, 2003.
49. See Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams, p. 168.
Conclusion
This article discusses alternative Chinese strategies to con-
front American global hegemony. It argues that the strategy of
rivalry will not succeed in promoting Chinas national interests.
The strategy will only work if Chinas power matches that of the
United States in the medium- to long-term future. However, the
United States is not suffering a relative decline versus other ris-
ing powers and as result, it will remain the worlds hegemon for
at least another half century. Thus, the strategy of rivalry with
the United States will not successfully promote Chinas interests.
Instead, a more sensible strategy for China is to recognize
American hegemony and promote Chinas interests through
cooperation with the United States. The argument here is that
cooperation is a realistic strategy, since the current U.S. policy
toward China can help the latter increase its access to global
influence. The U.S. engagement policy is designed to convince
China that by accepting the current world system, it can pro-
mote its interests through the system. To achieve this, the
engagement policy intends to accommodate Chinas legitimate
interests and increase its sharing of global leadership.
Of course, China cannot passively wait for American conces-
sions. It must aggressively demand increased participation in
global governance. This article argues that China should try to
first become a member of the G-8, which symbolizes global influ-
ence. China should also be more active in global and regional
organizations where it is already a member. This includes an
increased contribution to resolving international economic and
security crises at both the global and regional levels. Finally,
China must be more effective in influencing the American per-
ception of China. It must ensure that the United States does not
see China as a fundamental threat but rather as a responsible
power that will adhere to the current engagement policy.
Recent signs, such as Chinese initiatives with ASEAN, show
that China has indeed become proactive and confident in exer-
cising leadership in regional contexts and global organizations.
Recognition of Chinas rising role by other countries, especially
the United States, will only boost Chinas belief that its national
interests and influence in world affairs can be effectively pro-
moted through active participation in the current global political
American Hegemony and Chinas U.S. Policy 111
Working mainly in major government-affiliated think tanks, this
younger group of Chinese experts on the United States will allow
China to influence more effectively the American understanding
of China.
Fortunately, recent signs show that China has been indeed
exercising a more confident and engaging foreign policy in
world affairs. Not only has China been instrumental in the cur-
rent negotiations over the North Korean nuclear issue, it also
has been very active in other aspects of regional affairs of the
Asia-Pacific. For example, in 2000 China played the major role in
establishing the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which
includes Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikstan, and Uzbek-
istan. China has also been successful in initiating major coopera-
tive efforts with the ten-member Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN). Recently, Beijing signed the ASEAN-China
Free Trade Agreement to cement its rising role in the regional
economy. On the political front, China has worked closely with
Japan and South Korea to promote dialogues with ASEAN
through the so-called ASEAN Plus Three system.
This increasingly proactive Chinese foreign policy has
attracted wide attention. For example, Yuan Zongze, Deputy
Director of China Institute of International Relations, a think
tank for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, observes that Chinese
foreign policy thinking is clearly becoming more open, partic-
ipatory, and creative.
51
Two American experts also declare that
these changes represented a stark departure from more than a
decade of Chinese passivity and that China has become far
more nimble and engaging than at any other time in the history
of the Peoples Republic.
52
Echoing this view, Robert Sutter
observes that recent Chinese initiatives in the region indicate
that Although wary of the U.S. superpower and other impor-
tant regional states, Chinese leaders seem increasingly confident
of Chinas power and influence.
53
110 Baohui Zhang
51. Yuan Zongze, Zhongguo quanqiu shiye (Chinas Global Perspective),
Liaowang Weekly, June 20, 2003, p. 8.
52. Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel, Chinas New Diplomacy,
Foreign Affairs, vol. 82, No. 6 (November-December, 2003), p. 22.
53. Robert Sutter, Why Does China Matter? The Washington Quarterly,
vol. 27, No. 1 (Winter, 2003-04), p. 84.
Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1999.
World Bank. China 2020. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1999.
Zuckerman, Mortimer B. A Second American Century, Foreign
Affairs, vol. 77, No. 3 (May-June, 1998), pp. 18-31.
American Hegemony and Chinas U.S. Policy 113
and economic systems, and not by challenging these systems
from the outside.
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