EN BANC [G.R. No. L-21897. October 22, 1963.] RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner, vs. RUFINO G.

HECHANOVA, as Executive Secretary, MACARIO PERALTA, JR., as Secretary of Defense, PEDRO GIMENEZ, as Auditor General, CORNELIO BALMACEDA, as Secretary of Commerce and Industry, and SALVADOR MARIO, as Secretary of Justice, respondents. Ramon A. Gonzales in his own behalf as petitioner. Solicitor General and Estanislao Fernandez for respondents. SYLLABUS 1.PARTIES; REAL PARTY IN INTEREST; SUFFICIENCY OF PETITIONER'S INTEREST AS RICE PLANTER AND TAXPAYER TO SEEK RESTRAINT OF ALLEGEDLY ILLEGAL RICE IMPORTATION. The status of petitioner, as a planter with a rice land of substantial proportion, entitled him to a chance to sell to the Government the rice; it now seeks to buy abroad and, as a taxpayer affected by the purchase of the commodity effected with public funds mainly raised by taxation, gives said petitioner sufficient interest to file the instant petition seeking to restrain the allegedly unlawful disbursement of public funds to import rice from abroad. 2.ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; EXCEPTIONS APPLICABLE TO CASE AT BAR. The principle requiring the previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable: (1) where the question in dispute is purely a legal one, or (2) where the controverted act is patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or (3) where the respondent is a department secretary, whose acts as an alter-ego of the President bear the implied or assumed approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by him, or (4) where there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. The case at bar falls under each one of the foregoing exceptions to the general rule. 3.RICE IMPORTATION LAWS; ILLEGAL IMPORTATION WHERE CONDITIONS FOR IMPORTATION NOT COMPLIED WITH. Since the Rice and Corn Importation Laws (Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452) set conditions for the importation of rice, and in the case at bar such conditions have not been complied with, it is held that the proposed importations are illegal. 4.ID.; IMPORTATIONS "MADE BY THE GOVERNMENT ITSELF." The provisions of Republic Act Nos. 2207 and 3452, prohibiting the importation of rice and corn by any "government agency", apply likewise to importations "made

by the Government itself," because each and every officer and employee of our Government, are government agencies and/or agents. 5.ID.; PROTECTION OF LOCAL PLANTERS OF RICE AND CORN TO FOSTER SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN LOCAL PRODUCTION. The protection of local planters of rice and corn in a manner that would foster and accelerate selfsufficiency in the local production of said commodities constitutes a factor that is vital to our ability to meet a possible national emergency. 6.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EXECUTIVE POWERS; AN EXECUTIVE OFFICER CANNOT DISREGARD THE LAW EVEN IF HE BELIEVES THAT COMPLIANCE WILL NOT BENEFIT THE PEOPLE. Respondents' trend of thought, that, if an executive officer believes that compliance with a certain statute will not benefit the people he is at liberty to disregard it, must be rejected we still live under a rule of law. 7.ID.; ID.; PRESIDENT MAY NOT, BY EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT, ENTER INTO A TRANSACTION WHICH IS PROHIBITED BY STATUTES ENACTED PRIOR THERETO. Although the President may, under the American constitutional system, enter into executive agreements without previous legislative authority, he maynot, by executive agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto. 8.ID.; ID.; MAIN FUNCTION OF EXECUTIVE IS TO ENFORCE LAWS ENACTED BY CONGRESS, NOT TO DEFEAT SAME. Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of the veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of laws, by indirectly repealing the same through an executiveagreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws. 9.STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; THEORY THAT IN A CONFLICT BETWEEN TREATY AND STATUTE, THE LATEST IN POINT OF TIME SHALL PREVAIL, NOT APPLICABLE TO EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS; CASE AT BAR. The American theory that in the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar, for respondents not only admit, but, also, insist that the contracts in question are not treaties. Said theory may be justified upon the ground that treaties to which the United States is a signatory require the advice and consent of the Senate, and, hence, of a branch of the legislative department. No such justification can be given as regards executive agreements not authorized by previous legislation, without completely upsetting the principle of separation

of powers and the system of checks and balances which are fundamental in our constitutional set up and that of the United States. 10.COURTS; JURISDICTION; POWER TO INVALIDATE TREATIES. The Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled the question of whether an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts in the affirmative, by providing in Section 2 of Article VIII thereof, that the Supreme Court may not be deprived "of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in (1) all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question." In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also when it runs counter to an act of Congress.

import the aforementioned foreign rice; and that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered making said injunction permanent.

Forthwith, respondents were required to file their answer to the petition which they did, and petitioner's prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction was set for hearing, at which both parties appeared and argued orally. Moreover, a memorandum was filed, shortly thereafter, by the respondents. Considering, later on, that the resolution of said incident may require some pronouncements that would be more appropriate in a decision on the merits of the case, the same was set for hearing on the merits soon thereafter. The parties, however, waived the right to argue orally, although counsel for respondents filed their memoranda. I.Sufficiency of Petitioner's interest.

DECISION

CONCEPCION, J p: This is an original action for prohibition with preliminary injunction. It is not disputed that on September 22, 1963, respondent Executive Secretary authorized the importation of 67,000 tons of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources, and created a rice procurement committee composed of the other respondents herein for the implementation of said proposed importation. Thereupon, or on September 25, 1963, herein petitioner, Ramon A. Gonzales a rice planter, and president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, whose members are, likewise, engaged in the production of rice and corn filed the petition herein, averring that, in making or attempting to make said importation of foreign rice, the aforementioned respondents "are acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction", because Republic Act No. 3452 which allegedly repeals or amends Republic Act No. 2207 explicitly prohibits the importation of rice and corn by "the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency"; that petitioner has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; and that a preliminary injunction is necessary for the preservation of the rights of the parties during the pendency of this case and to prevent the judgment therein from becoming ineffectual. Petitioner prayed, therefore, that said petition be given due course; that a writ of preliminary injunction be forthwith issued restraining respondents, their agents or representatives from implementing the decision of the Executive Secretary to

Respondents maintain that the status of petitioner as a rice planter does not give him sufficient interest to file the petition herein and secure the relief therein prayed for. We find no merit in this pretense. Apart from prohibiting the importation of rice and corn "by the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency", Republic Act No. 3452 declares, in Section 1 thereof, that "the policy of the Government" is to "engage in the purchase of these basic foods directly from those tenants, farmers, growers, producers and landowners in the Philippines who wish to dispose of their products at a price that will afford them a fair and just return for their labor and capital investment. . . ." Pursuant to this provision, petitioner, as a planter with a rice land of substantial proportion, is entitled to a chance to sell to the Government the rice it now seeks to buy abroad. Moreover, since the purchase of said commodity will have to be effected with public funds mainly raised by taxation, and as a rice producer and landowner petitioner must necessarily be a taxpayer, it follows that he has sufficient personality and interest to seek judicial assistance with a view to restraining what he believes to be an attempt to unlawfully disburse said funds. II.Exhaustion of administrative remedies. Respondents assail petitioner's right to the reliefs prayed for because he "has not exhausted all administrative remedies available to him before coming to court". We have already held, however, that the principle requiring the previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable "where the question in dispute is purely a legal one" , or where the controverted act is "patently illegal" or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or where the respondent is a department secretary, whose acts as an alter-ego of the President bear the implied or assumed approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by him, or where there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial

intervention. The case at bar falls under each one of the foregoing exceptions to the general rule. Respondents' contention is, therefore, untenable. III.Merits of petitioner's cause of action. Respondents question the sufficiency of petitioner's cause of action upon the theory that the proposed importation in question is not governed by Republic Act Nos. 2207 and 3452, but was authorized by the President as commander-in-chief "for military stock pile purposes" in the exercise of his alleged authority under Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 1; that in cases of necessity, the President "or his subordinates may take such preventive measure for the restoration of good order and maintenance of peace"; and that, as Commander-in-Chief of our armed forces, "the President . . . is duty-bound to prepare for the challenge of threats of war or emergency without waiting for any special authority." Regardless of whether Republic Act No. 3452 repeals Republic Act No. 2207, as contended by petitioner herein on which our view need not be expressed we are unanimously of the opinion assuming that said Republic Act No. 2207 is still in force that the two Acts are applicable to the proposed importation in question because the language of said laws is such as to include within the purview thereof all importations of rice and corn into the Philippines. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 2207, "it shall be unlawful for any person, association, corporation or government agency to import rice and corn into any point in the Philippines", although, by way of exception, it adds that "the President of the Philippines may authorize the importation of these commodities through any government agency that he may designate", if the conditions prescribed in Section 2 of said Act are present. Similarly, Republic Act No. 3452 explicitly enjoins "the Rice and Corn Administration or any government agency" from importing rice and corn. Respondents allege, however, that said provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452, prohibiting the importation of rice and corn by any "government agency", do not apply to importations "made by the Government itself", because the latter is not a "government agency". This theory is devoid of merit. The Department of National Defense and the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as well as respondents herein, and each and every officer and employee of our Government, are government agencies and/or agents. The applicability of said laws even to importations by the Government, as such, becomes more apparent when we consider that: 1.The importation permitted in Republic Act No. 2207 is to be authorized by "the President of the Philippines", and, hence, by or on behalf of the Government of the Philippines;

2.Immediately after enjoining the Rice and Corn Administration and any other government agency from importing rice and corn, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3452 adds " that the importation of rice and corn is left to private parties upon payment of the corresponding taxes", thus indicating that only "private parties" may import rice under its provisions; and 3.Aside from prescribing a fine not exceeding P10,000.00 and imprisonment of not more than five (5) years for those who shall violate any provision of Republic Act No. 3452 or any rule and regulation promulgated pursuant thereto, Section 15 of said Act provides that "if the offender is a public official and/or employee", he shall be subject to the additional penalty specified therein. A public official is an officer of the Government itself, as distinguished from officers or employees of instrumentalities of the Government. Hence, the duly authorized acts of the former are those of the Government, unlike those of a government instrumentality which may have a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the Government, as such. The provisions of Republic Act No. 2207 are, in this respect, even more explicit. Section 3 thereof provides a similar additional penalty for any "officer or employee of the Government" who "violates, abets or tolerates the violation of any provision" of said Act. Hence, the intent to apply the same to transactions made by the very government is patent. Indeed, the restrictions imposed in said Republic Acts are merely additional to those prescribed in Commonwealth Act No. 138, entitled "An Act to give native products and domestic entities the preference in the purchase of articles for the Government." Pursuant to Section 1 thereof: "The Purchase and Equipment Division of the Government of the Philippines and other officers and employees of the municipal and provincial governmentsand the Government of the Philippines and of chartered cities, boards, commissions, bureaus, departments, offices, agencies, branches, and bodies of any description, including government-owned companies, authorized to requisition, purchase, or contract or make disbursements for articles, materials, and supplies for public use, public buildings, or public works, shall give preference to materials . . . produced .

. . in the Philippines or in the United States, and to domestic entities, subject to the conditions hereinbelow specified." (Emphasis supplied.) Under this provision, in all purchase by the Government, including those made by and/or for the armed forces, preference shall be given to materials produced in the Philippines. The importation involved in the case at bar violates this general policy of our Government, aside from the provisions of Republic Act Nos. 2207 and 3452. The attempt to justify the proposed importation by invoking reasons of national security predicated upon the "worsening situation in Laos and Vietnam", and "the recent tension created by the Malaysia problem" and the alleged powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces in the Philippines, under Section 2 of the National Defense Act (Commonwealth Act No. 1), overlooks the fact that the protection of local planters of rice and corn in a manner that would foster and accelerate self-sufficiency in the local production of said commodities constitutes a factor that is vital to our ability to meet a possible national emergency. Even if the intent in importing goods in anticipation of such emergency were to bolster up that ability, the latter would, instead, be impaired if the importation were so made as to discourage our farmers from engaging in the production of rice. Besides, the stocking of rice and corn for purposes of national security and/or national emergency is within the purview of Republic Act No. 3452. Section 3 thereof expressly authorizes the Rice and Corn Administration "to accumulate stocks as a national reserve in such quantities as it may deem proper and necessary to meetany contingencies". Moreover, it ordains that "the buffer stocks held as a national reserve . . . be deposited by the Administration throughout the country under proper dispersal plans . . . and maybe released only upon the occurrence of calamities or emergencies . . . (Emphasis supplied.) Again, the provisions of Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, upon which respondents rely so much, are not self-executory. They merely outline the general objectives of said legislation. The means for the attainment of those objectives are subject to congressional legislation. Thus, the conditions under which the services of citizens, as indicated in said Section 2, may be availed of, are provided for in Sections 3, 4 and 51 to 88 of said Commonwealth Act No. 1. Similarly, Section 5 thereof specifies the manner in which resources necessary for our national defense may be secured by the Government of the Philippines, but only "during a national mobilization" 9 , which does not exist. Inferentially, therefore, in the absence of a national mobilization, said resources shall be produced in such manner as Congress may by other Laws provide from time to time. Insofar as rice and corn

are concerned, Republic Act Nos. 2207 and 3452, and Commonwealth Act No. 138 are such laws.

Respondents cite Corwin in support of their pretense, but in vain. An examination of the work cited 10 shows that Corwin referred to the powers of the President during "war time" 11 or when he has placed the country or a part thereof under "martial law". 12 Since neither condition obtains in the case at bar, said work merely proves that respondents' theory, if accepted, would, in effect, place the Philippines under martial law, without a declaration of the Executive to that effect. What is worse, it would keep us perpetually under martial law. It has been suggested that even if the proposed importation violated Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452, it should, nevertheless, be permitted because "it redounds to the benefit of the people". Salus populi est suprema lex, it is said. If there were a local shortage of rice, the argument might have some value. But the respondents, as officials of this Government, have expressly affirmed again and again that there is no rice shortage. And the importation is avowedly for stockpile of the Army not the civilian population. But let us follow the respondents' trend of thought. It has a more serious implication that appears on the surface. It implies that if an executive officer believes that compliance with a certain statute will not benefit the people, he is at liberty to disregard it. That idea must be rejected we still live under a rule of law. And then, "the people" are either producers or consumers. Now as respondents explicitly admit Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452 were approved by the Legislature for the benefit of producers and consumers, i.e., the people, it must follow that the welfare of the people lies precisely in the compliance with said Acts. It is not for respondent executive officers now to set their own opinions against that of the Legislature, and adopt means or ways to set those Acts at naught. Anyway, those laws permit importation but under certain conditions, which have not been, and should be complied with. IV.The Contracts With Vietnam and Burma. It is lastly contended that the Government of the Philippines has already entered into two (2) contracts for the purchase of rice, one with the Republic of Vietnam,

and another with the Government of Burma; that these contracts constitute valid executive agreements under international law; that such agreements became binding and effective upon signing thereof by representatives of the parties thereto; that in case of conflict between Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452 on the one hand, and the aforementioned contracts, on the other, the latter should prevail, because, if a treaty and a statute are inconsistent with each other, the conflict must be resolved under the American jurisprudence in favor of the one which is latest in point of time; that petitioner herein assails the validity of acts of the executive relative to foreign relations in the conduct of which the Supreme Court cannot interfere; and that the aforementioned contracts have already been consummated, the Government of the Philippines having already paid the price of the rice involved therein through irrevocable letters of credit in favor of the sellers of said commodity. We find no merit in this pretense. The Court is not satisfied that the status of said contracts as alleged executive agreements has been sufficiently established. The parties to said contracts do not appear to have regarded the same as executive agreements. But, even assuming that said contracts may properly be considered as executive agreements, the same are unlawful, as well as null and void, from a constitutional viewpoint, said agreements being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. Although the President may, under the American constitutional system, enter into executive agreements without previous legislative authority, he may not, by executive agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto. Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of laws, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws. The American theory to the effect that, in the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar, for respondents not only admit, but, also, insist that the contracts adverted to are not treaties. Said theory may be justified upon the ground that treaties to which the United States is signatory require the advice and consent of its Senate, and, hence, of a branch of the legislative department. No such justification can be given as regards executive agreements not authorized by previous legislation, without completely upsetting the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances which are fundamental in our constitutional set up and that of the United States. As regards the question whether an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts, suffice it to say that the Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by providing, in Section 2 of Article VIII thereof, that

the Supreme Court may not be deprived "of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in (1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question". In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress. The alleged consummation of the aforementioned contracts with Vietnam and Burma does not render this case academic. Republic Act No. 2207 enjoins our Government not from entering into contracts for the purchase of rice, but from importing rice, except under the conditions prescribed in said Act. Upon the other, Republic Act No. 3452 has two (2) main features, namely; (a) it requires the Government to purchase rice and corn directly from our local planters, growers or landowners; and (b) it prohibits importations of rice by the Government, and leaves such importations to private parties. The pivotal issue in this case is whether the proposed importation which has not been consummated as yet is legally feasible. Lastly, a judicial declaration of illegality of the proposed importation would not compel our Government to default in the performance of such obligations as it may have contracted with the sellers of the rice in question, because, aside from the fact that said obligations may be complied with without importing the commodity into the Philippines, the proposed importation may still be legalized by complying with the provisions of the aforementioned laws. V.The writ of preliminary injunction. The members of the Court have divergent opinions on the question whether or not respondents herein should be enjoined from implementing the aforementioned proposed importation. However, the majority favors the negative view, for which reason the injunction prayed for cannot be granted. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that respondent Executive Secretary had and has no power to authorize the importation in question; that he exceeded his jurisdiction in granting said authority; that said importation is not sanctioned by law and is contrary to its provisions; and that, for lack of the requisite majority, the injunction prayed for must be and is, accordingly, denied. It is so ordered. Paredes and Regala, JJ ., concur in the result.

EN BANC [G.R. No. 42821. January 18, 1936.] JUAN BENGZON, petitioner-appellant, vs. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE and THE INSULAR AUDITOR, respondents-appellees. Mario Bengzon for appellant. Solicitor-General Hilado for appellees. SYLLABUS 1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; ORGANIC ACT, SECTION 19, AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES, ARTICLE VI, SECTION 11(2), CONSTRUED; VETO POWER OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE; DEFINITIONS. Section 19 of the former Organic Act, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, established the practice for the enactment of a law, including the sanctioning of the veto power by the Governor-General. Specifically it provided: "The Governor-General shall have the power to veto any particular item or items of an appropriation bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object." The Constitution of the Philippines, article VI, section 11(2) contains an exactly similar provision, except that the words "The President" are substituted for the words "The Governor-General." An appropriation as here used is the setting apart by law of a certain sum from the public revenue for a specified purpose. An item is the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts of the appropriation or of the bill. No set form of words is needed to make out an appropriation or an item. 2.ID.; ID.; ID.; CHIEF EXECUTIVE AS PART OF THE LAWMAKING POWER. The former Organic Act and the present Constitution of the Philippines make the Chief Executive an integral part of the lawmaking power. His disapproval of a bill, commonly known as a veto, is essentially a legislative act. 3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. The Constitution is a limitation upon the power of the legislative department of the government, but in this respect it is a grant of power to the executive department. The Legislature has the affirmative power to enact laws; the Chief Executive has the negative power by the constitutional exercise of which he may defeat the will of the Legislature. 4.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. In exercising the veto power the Chief Executive may not be confined to rules of strict construction or hampered by the unwise interference of the judicial department. The courts will indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto the same as they will presume the constitutionality of a veto the same as they will presume the constitutionality of an act as originally passed by the Legislature. 5.ID.; ID.; ID.; CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSTRUCTION. While contemporaneous construction is not decisive for the courts, yet where

a construction of statutes has been adopted by the legislative department and accepted by the various agencies of the executive department, it is entitled to great respect. Where legislative intent and executive purpose is evident, it devolves upon the judiciary to give deferential attention to the attitude assumed by the other two branches of the Government. 6.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. It was never intended by a mere process of reasoning, however plausible, for the courts to breathe life into a portion of an Act which has not been given life by the other departments of the government acting in conformity with the Constitution. 7.ID.; ID.; ID.; INSTANT CASE. Held, That the veto by the Governor-General of section 7 of Act No. 4051 was in conformity with the legislative purpose and the provisions of the Organic Act.

DECISION

MALCOLM, J p: This case was brought by a former justice of the peace to test the validity of the veto by the Governor-General of section 7 of Act No. 4051, the Retirement Gratuity Law. In the trial court the petition for a writ of mandamus directed to the Secretary of Justice and the Insular Auditor was dismissed. Thereupon the losing party appealed. The facts, as stipulated disclose the following: Juan Bengzon, the petitioner was appointed justice of the peace for the municipality of Lingayen, Pangasinan, on March 7, 1912. Having reached the age of sixtyfive, he ceased to hold this position on January 14, 1933, by reason of the provisions of Act No. 3899. On the date, acting pursuant to instructions received from the Judge of First Instance for the district, he turned over the office of justice of the peace to the auxiliary justice of the peace of the municipality. Subsequently the petitioner addressed communications to the Secretary of Justice, the Governor-Genera, and the Insular Auditor applying for gratuity under Act No. 4051, but all of these officials advised him that he was not entitled to the benefits of the Act. Accordingly, on March 7, 1934, the instant complaint was filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila. Act No. 4051 is entitled, "An Act to provide for the payment of retirement gratuities to officers and employees of the Insular Government retired from the service as a result of the reorganization or reduction of personnel thereof, including the justices of the peace who must relinquish office in accordance with the provisions of Act Numbered Thirty-eight

hundred and ninety-nine, and for other purposes." The body of the Act provides in several sections for the officers and employees who may be granted gratuities thereunder, the rates of gratuities to be paid, and other matters. Among these sections, as the bill passed the Philippine Legislature, was section 7, reading: "The justices of the peace who must relinquish office during the year nineteen hundred and thirty-three in accordance with the provisions of Act Numbered Thirty-eight hundred and ninety-nine, shall also be entitled to the gratuities provided for in this Act." Following this is section 10, reading: "The necessary sum to carry out the purposes of this Act is hereby appropriated out of any funds in the Insular Treasury not otherwise appropriated," and section 12 reading: "If, for any reason, any section or provision of this Act is disapproved by the Governor-General or is challenged in a competent court and is held to be unconstitutional or invalid, none of the other sections or provisions hereof shall be affected thereby and such other sections and provisions shall continue to govern as if the section or provision so disapproved or held invalid had never been incorporated in this Act." The Act was "approved" by the Governor-General, "section 7 excepted, February 21, 1933." The Philippine Legislature accepted the veto. Section 19 of the former Organic Act, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, established the practice for the enactment of a law, including the sanctioning of the veto power by the Governor-General. Specifically it provided: "The Governor-General shall have the power to veto any particular item or items of an appropriation bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object." The Constitution of the Philippines, article VI, section 11 (2) contains an exactly similar provision, except that the words "The President" are substituted for the words "The Governor-General," and except that succeeding sentences in the Constitution prescribed the procedure for vetoing one or more items of an appropriation bill in a more explicit manner. The first thought that occurs to one in resolving the appeal of the petitioner is that, within the meaning of section 7 of Act No. 4051, on the assumption that it be restored to the law by the judiciary, he has not shown himself to be a justice of the peace who was forced to relinquish office during the year 1933. At least, he did not take steps to vindicate an alleged right as did the justices of the peace of the municipality of Malinao, Albay, and the municipality of Alabat, Tayabas. (Regalado vs. Yulo [1935], 61 Phil., 173; Taada vs. Yulo [1935], 61 Phil., 515.) However, this point has not been advanced by the Government either in the lower court or on appeal, and so it would seem to be inappropriate to manufacture a defense for the respondents. Something might also be made of the proposition on which the trial judge relied for dismissal and which is brought into view by the first assigned error. In other words, since the duty which the petitioner claims is enjoined by law upon the respondents not only does not exist but would require the

intervention of the Governor-General, who is not a party, to exist, no cause of action is made out. This, however, merely results in hiding behind a technicality to keep the parties from securing the opinion of the courts on the main issue. We prefer to satisfy the petitioner by ruling on the question suggested by the first sentence of this decision and which is raised squarely by the second assigned error. The Governor-General purported to act pursuant to the portion of section 19 of the Organic Act which is above quoted. The key words of that sentence are "appropriation bill" and "item or items." An appropriation is the setting apart by law of a certain sum from the public revenue for a specified purpose. An item is the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts of the appropriation or of the bill. No set form of words is needed to make out an appropriation or an item. (State vs. Moore [1896], 50 Neb., 88; Callaghan vs. Boyce [1915], 17 Ariz., 433.) Within the meaning of these words, is Act No. 4051 an appropriation bill? Are there particular items in that bill which the Governor-General could constitutionally veto? We are led to answer both questions in the affirmative. The former Organic Act and the present Constitution of the Philippines make the Chief Executive an integral part of the law-making power. His disapproval of a bill, commonly known as a veto, is essentially a legislative act. The questions presented to the mind of the Chief Executive are precisely the same as those the legislature must determine in passing a bill, except that his will be a broader point of view. The Constitution is a limitation upon the power of the legislative department of the government, but in this respect it is a grant of power to the executive department. The Legislature has the affirmative power to enact laws; the Chief Executive has the negative power by the constitutional exercise of which he may defeat the will of the Legislature. It follows that the Chief Executive must find his authority in the Constitution. But in exercising that authority he may not be confined to rules of strict construction or hampered by the unwise interference of the judiciary. The courts will indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto the same as they will presume the constitutionality of an act as originally passed by the Legislature. (Commonwealth vs. Barnett [1901], 199 Pa., 161; 55 L. R. A., 882; People vs. Board of Councilmen [1892], 20 N. Y. S., 52; Fulmore vs. Lane [1911], 104 Tex., 499; Texas Co. vs. State [1927], 53 A. L. R., 258.) In determining whether or not the Governor-General stepped outside the boundaries of his legislative functions, when he attempted to veto one section of Act No. 4051, while approving the rest of the bill, we are not without the aid of the construction placed on his action by both legislative and executive departments. That the Philippine Legislature intended Act No.

4051 to be an appropriation measure with various items is apparent from a reading of section 12 thereof whereby the Legislature anticipated the possibility of a partial veto of the bill by the Chief Executive. Not only this, but after the Chief Executive took action, the Legislature made no attempt to override the veto or to amend the law to bring into being the section which the Governor-General had eliminated. Then the same question came again before the executive department, and all of its officials united in sustaining the validity of the Governor-General's veto. While contemporaneous construction is not decisive for the courts, yet where a construction of statutes has been adopted by the legislative department and accepted by the various agencies of the executive department, it is entitled to great respect. It is our understanding that it has been the practice of the Chief Executive in the interpretation of his constitutional powers to veto separate items in bills analogous to that before us, and that this practice has been acquiesced in previously without objection, so that it would require a clear showing of unconstitutionality for the courts to declare against it. Since, therefore, legislative intent and executive purpose is evident, it devolves upon the judiciary to give deferential attention to the attitude assumed by the other two branches of the Government. Viewed from another direction, there can be no doubt that Act No. 4051 is an appropriation bill. That is manifest from its provisions, and particularly from section 10 by which the necessary sum to carry out the purposes of the Act was "hereby appropriated out of any funds in the Insular Treasury not otherwise appropriated." It has, however, been faintly suggested that by an appropriation bill. We are shown nothing substantial to support this allegation. Unlike in other constitutions, the word "general" was omitted, and we presume intentionally, from the Organic Act and the Constitution. Under such conditions, the courts would not be authorized to insert a word and by so doing amend the law. The same considerations hold true with regard to the question of whether or not there was a particular item which the Governor-General could validly veto. No further action by the Legislature was contemplated. The accounting officers would have experienced no difficulty

EN BANC [G.R. No. 114783. December 8, 1994.] ROBERT V. TOBIAS, RAMON M. GUZMAN, TERRY T. LIM, GREGORIO D. GABRIEL, and ROBERTO R. TOBIAS, JR. petitioners, vs. HON. CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, CITY TREASURER WILLIAM MARCELINO, and THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD, all of the City of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, respondents.

this Act. The remainder of the former legislative district of San Juan/Mandaluyong shall become the new legislative district of San Juan with its first representative to be elected at the same election." Petitioner's first objection to the aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 7675 is that it contravenes the "one subject-one bill" rule, as enunciated in Article VI, Section 26 (1) of the Constitution, to wit: "Sec. 26 (1).Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the assailed Section 49 in the subject law resulted in the latter embracing two principal subjects, namely: (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts. Petitioners contend that the second aforestated subject is not germane to the subject matter of R.A. No. 7675 since the said law treats of the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city, as expressed in the title of the law. Therefore, since Section 49 treats of a subject distinct from that stated in the title of the law, the "one subject-one bill" rule has not been complied with. Petitioners' second and third objections involve Article VI, Sections 5 (1) and (4) of the Constitution, which provide, to wit: "Sec. 5 (1).The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations." "Sec. 5(4).Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in this section." Petitioners argue that the division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts under Section 49 of the assailed law has

DECISION BIDIN, J p: Invoking their rights as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, herein petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong." Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional representative of this legislative district, sponsored the bill which eventually became R.A. No. 7675. President Ramos signed R.A. No. 7675 into law on February 9, 1994. Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994. The people of Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved of the conversion of the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as provided under R.A. No. 7675. The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no." By virtue of these results, R.A. No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect. Petitioners now come before this Court, contending that R.A. No. 7675, specifically Article VIII, Section 49 thereof, is unconstitutional for being violative of three specific provisions of the Constitution. Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 provides: "As a highly-urbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative district with the first representative to be elected in the next national elections after the passage of

resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5 (1) of the Constitution. Furthermore, petitioners contend that said division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the subject municipalities have attained the minimum population requirements. And finally, petitioners assert that Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5 (4) as aforecited. The contentions are devoid of merit. Anent the first issue, we agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that the statutory conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city with a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand indubitably ordains compliance with the "one city-one representative" proviso in the Constitution: ". . . Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative" (Article VI, Section 5 (3), Constitution). Hence, it is in compliance with the aforestated constitutional mandate that the creation of a separate congressional district for the City of Mandaluyong is decreed under Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675. Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675. "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong" necessarily includes and contemplates the subject treated under Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong. Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation. Thus, in Sumulong v. Comelec (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), we ruled that the constitutional requirement as now expressed in Article VI, Section 26(1) "should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject." The liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule had been further elucidated in Lidasan v. Comelec (21 SCRA 496 [1967]), to wit: "Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the

minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation" (emphasis supplied). Proceeding now to the other constitutional issues raised by petitioners to the effect that there is no mention in the assailed law of any census to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two legislative districts, the same does not suffice to strike down the validity of R.A. No. 7675. The said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular congressional processes, including due consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum requirements for the establishment of separate legislative districts. At any rate, it is not required that all laws emanating from the legislature must contain all relevant data considered by Congress in the enactment of said laws. As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5 (1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law." The inescapable import of the latter clause is that the present composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional. Thus, in the absence of proof that Mandaluyong and San Juan do not qualify to have separate legislative districts, the assailed Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 must be allowed to stand. As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts, the said argument borders on the absurd since petitioners overlook the glaring fact that it was Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself. Aside from the constitutional objections to R.A. No. 7675, petitioners present further arguments against the validity thereof. Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative district. The contention is bereft of merit since the principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of

Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter of separate district representation was only ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of status of neighboring Mandaluyong. Similarly, petitioners' additional argument that the subject law has resulted in "gerrymandering," which is the practice of creating legislative districts to favor a particular candidate or party, is not worthy of credence. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, it should be noted that Rep. Ronaldo Zamora, the author of the assailed law, is the incumbent representative of the former San Juan/Mandaluyong district, having consistently won in both localities. By dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora's constituency has in fact been diminished, which development could hardly be considered as favorable to him. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur. Feliciano, JJ., is on leave. in setting up the different items provided for under Act No. 4051. It would have been a facile matter to eliminate the money needed to make section 7 thereof effective. The Chief Executive had the right to object to the expenditure of money for a specified purpose and amount without being under the necessity of at the same time refusing to agree to other expenditures which met with his entire approval, and that intention was unequivocably expressed. We have gone to the trouble to examine all of the authorities cited by the parties and other authorities not brought to our attention by them. It will be found that in practically all of these cases there was a conflict between the legislative and executive departments which the judiciary had to decide. Here there is no such conflict, but unison between the two. Here on the contrary the judiciary is asked to take the initiative and to restore a section to a law against the explicit confirmation of executive authority by the Legislature and against explicit action taken by the Chief Executive . In our opinion, it was never intended by a mere process of reasoning, however plausible, for the courts to breathe life into a portion of an Act which has not been given life by the other departments of the government acting in conformity with the Constitution. Deciding, therefore, the main issue as requested by the petitioner and appellant, we are constrained to rule against him and to hold that the veto by

the Governor-General of section 7 of Act No. 4051 was in conformity with the legislative purpose and the provisions of the Organic Act. For this reason, the judgment brought on appeal will be affirmed, without special pronouncement as to the costs in either instance. Avancea, C. J., Abad Santos, Hull, Imperial, Diaz and Recto, JJ., concur.