Gorgias de Presocr A Isocrat PDF

From Simonides to Isocrates: The Fifth-Century Origins of Fourth-Century Panhellenism Author(s): Michael A. Flower Source: Classical Antiquity, Vol.
19, No. 1 (Apr., 2000), pp. 65-101 Published by: University of California Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25011112 Accessed: 31/07/2009 11:43
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MICHAEL A. FLOWER
From Simonides
to Isocrates:
The Fifth-Century Origins of Fourth. Century Panhellenism
If someone is not merely making a rhetorical display but also wishes to accomplish something, it is necessary for him to seek out those arguments which shall persuade these two cities [Athens and Sparta] to share equally with each other and to divide the hegemony and to exact from the barbarians those advantages which they now desire to obtain for themselves from theGreeks. (Panegyricus 17)
So wrote the word Isocrates in 380 BC about What the dual hegemony by of Athens and Sparta term and,
and the great panhellenic crusade against Persia. Isocrates, however, never uses
"panhellenism." do we mean it? It is a modem
like somany modem creations, it is variously used by scholars tomean different things.' The ancient Greek word "panhellenes" or "all theGreeks" did not have any particular ideological connotation.2 Inmodem usage "panhellenism"has two distinct, but related,meanings. In one sense, it refers to the notion of Hellenic ethnic identity and the concomitant polarization of Greek and barbarianas generic opposites which rapidlydeveloped as a resultof thePersian invasions.3 In itsother
sense, panhellenism is the idea that the various Greek city-states could solve their
political disputes and simultaneously enrich themselves by uniting in common

Karen Bassi, Joel Farber,Harriet Flower, Christopher Pelling, and an anonymous Iwould like to thank reader for Classical Antiquity for their criticisms and suggestions. A much abbreviated version of this paperwas delivered atBryn Mawr College in March, 1997. 1. As Green 1996: 6 and 28 n. 7 points out, the term seems to have been coined by Grote in his History of Greece. 2. See Perlman 1976: 4 andDillery 1995: 42 and 260 n. 3. 3. See especially E. Hall 1989: esp. 3-13; E. Hall 1993; J.Hall 1997: 44-48. Classical Antiquity. Volume 19, Number 1, pages 65-101. ISSN 0278-6656(p); 1067-8344 (e). Copyright ? 2000 by The Regents of theUniversity of California. All rights reserved. Send requests for permission to reprint to:Rights and Permissions. University of California Press, 2000 Center Street, Ste 303, Berkeley, CA 94704-1223.
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Volume 19/No. 1/April 2000
cause and conquering all or part of the Persian empire. The justification for such an enterprisewas revenge for thePersian invasions of Greece in 490 and 480-79 BC. It is this second sense of panhellenism, the ideology of a unitedGreek crusade
against Persia, that I am concerned with here.4 This paper is an attempt to trace the
evidence for panhellenism, so defined, throughout the fifth century by combining different kinds of evidence: that is, both poetic and historical texts, as well as the testimonia formonuments which are no longer extant. Iwill argue that any thoughtof a panhellenic crusadewas impossible before thePersian invasions, but that such an expedition was espoused by Cimon. After his death it remained an item of popular talk for the rest of the century and this talk intensified during the second half of thePeloponnesian War. I. PANHELLENISM IN THE EARLY FIFTH CENTURY
During the fourth century BC Isocrates was the foremost advocate of a panhellenic crusade for the purpose of territorialexpansion intoAsia. This idea was older than Isocrates, as he himself readily admitted.5The scholarly consensus is that the origins of this scheme to invadeAsia belong to thewaning years of the fifth century at the earliest, andmore probably to thebeginning of the fourth.6 It is often seen as an ideology born of desperation and defeat. Some have connected its genesis specifically with the sophisticmovement.7 But panhellenism had amuch longer pedigree than that, far longer in fact thanmost modern scholars realize. It is easy for us to be misled because the first explicit evidence comes from the end of the fifth century.Gorgias may well have been the first to devote an entire oration to panhellenist views when he delivered his Olympic Oration in 408 (see below), but he was not the first to espouse or hold them.8 Such views, even if only implicitly and fragmentarily,can be found in a large number of fifth-century writers. The newly published papyrus fragments of Simonides' elegiac poem on the
Battle of Plataea suggest that the idea of invading by the seer Tisamenus, the interior of the Persian has argued empire 14 had already preserves been voiced in the 470s. Martin West that fragment
part of a prophecy
who had been hired and given
4. Important discussions of panhellenism in this sense are Kessler 1911; Sussmann 1921; Mathieu 1925; Ryder 1965 for the general background; Dobesch 1968; Perlman 1976; Sakellariou 1980; andGreen 1996. See also n. 118 below. 5. At Paneg. 3 he writes: "I have come for the purpose of giving advice concerning the war against the barbarian and concord amongst ourselves, not being unaware thatmany of those who have claimed to be sophists have set out upon this topic." 6. E.g. Cartledge 1993: 43; de Romilly 1992: 225-33, Perlman 1976; andGreen 1996. 7. De Romilly 1992: 225-33. 8. Typical isMarkle 1976: 80: "(Isocrates) did not invent the so-called Panhellenic idea; it was first proposed by Gorgias in 392 and again celebrated by Lysias in 384." But see Cawkwell 1982: 324-26.
From Simonides to Isocrates FLOWER:
67
citizenship by the Spartans (Hdt. 9.33-36). Even if the attribution to Tisamenus as speaker is incorrect, some sortof prophecy is being reportedhere.9 In lines 7-8, as restored byWest, we find the following: "He [perhapsAres?] shall drive [the Medes, or Persians] out of Asia, [Zeus] having nodded in approval, favoring a [new or common] alliance."10 Restorations have an unfortunate tendency to takeon a life of their own; but if this restoration is correct, Simonides must be referring to the future conquest
of the Persian heartland by an alliance of Greek states. That is to say, to "drive out
of Asia" entails the dissolution of the Persian empire.What else can this phrase mean? West asserts that"'Asia' will heremean 'Ionia,' and the referencewill be to driving thePersians out of thatpart of theworld."" Every article on this poem to date accepts this interpretationwithout question.'2 But this cannot possibly be right. At the time when Simonides was writing, "Asia" was used to denote the landmass which was coextensive with the entire Persian empire, apart from
Egypt which was considered part of Africa. It is always used in that sense by
Herodotus and Aeschylus, and in two epigrams attributed to Simonides (Page, FGE XXIV andXLV) Asia stands for the entire continent.'3To my knowledge no
9. It is possible that the prophecy in Simonides is not delivered by Tisamenus, but by a divine speaker (as suggested by Rutherford 1996: 185). It strikesme that the prophecy, asWest restores it, is too elaborate to be the result of divination by the examination of entrails, which was the usual method of campground divination in the fifth century. Perhaps Simonides had Tisamenus divine in some other, less prosaic, manner. (West 1993: 9 cites the example of Helenus, who somehow intuits or overhears the deliberations of the gods at Iliad 7.44-53.) On the other hand, inHerodotus' account Tisamenus was only concerned with whether theGreeks should cross theAsopus river or not; and that is the standard type of question which a seer was competent to answer. Moreover, the fame of Tisamenus rested on his five victories, of which Plataea was the first.At the timewhen Simonides composed his poem Tisamemus' rolemay not have seemed as significant as it did a generation or so later.The role and function of themilitary mantis in the Classical period, of which Tisamenus is the outstanding example, is thoroughly examined by Pritchett 1979: 47-90; see also Jameson 1991. 10. West 1992: 118-22 and 1993: 8-9. He offers two different restorations of lines 7-8. In the former publication (= IEG 112, p. 121) he restores the text as: si A]rL[rj]q zX&(a)sL, vEuCvro[
/ 1VYV UA X[X]LTnv (pLXEG4V. In the apparatus criticus he suggests j age xal at the beginning
of line 7 and Zinvo6 at the beginning of line 8. But in his article "Simonides Redivivus" (1993: 8) he proposes: M'Bouq 8' E 'A]gL[-q] ED&(o)et, VeU'aov1[q A0ijv, / 4e4 AtOc, xXLt]v7 au,uIc4[x]LTv teX&.[v / 'ApTr. In either case, the general sense is clear. Christopher Pelling has suggested tome thatPlutarch Comparison of Aristides and Cato 2.3 may be a reminiscence of this line: "For that victory (i.e. the battle of Thermopylae in 191 Bc), which was manifestly thework of
Cato, drove Asia out of Hellas (Ei'Xotae 'EXX68oq -c'v Aoov) and in turn made it accessible
to Scipio." 11. Furthermore, in reference to his restorations of lines 7-13 (that of 9-13 being farmore speculative), he comments (1993: 9): "Unless this is completely on thewrong track, it appears that Simonides' poem was composed sometime after the establishment of theDelian League, whose aspirations or achievements are here summarized." 12. Boedeker: 1995: 219; 1996: 236 n. 39. Rutherford 1996: 184-85 seems to accept that Asia equals Ionia, but n. 61 makes his position unclear: "But a fifth-centuryGreek might well have imagined defeated Persians being driven out of Asia back to their homeland in southern Iran, far to the southeast." Yet what fifth-centuryGreek did not consider Iran to be part of Asia? 13. See Hdt. 1.4 and 4.44-45; Aesch. Persians 12, 57, 61, 73, 249, 270, 549, 548, 763, 929. It was perhapsHecataeus ofMiletus who definitively gave Asia this broad sense; his Periodos ges was
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ancient authorunambiguously uses Asia to refer to Ionia in a limited geographical

sense. 14
The date and occasion for the first performance of Simonides' poem have already been the subject of much speculation,'5 but few would disagree that the occasion was panhellenic and that it fell within a few years of the battle. Thus during the very period when theDelian League, underAthenian leadership, was attacking the territory of the King of Persia, Simonides, at a panhellenic gathering, could indulge inwhat has aptly been labeled "panhellenist big talk."'6
The fact that this poem was meant for a wide audience, and may well have been a
Spartan commission, undercuts thenotion thatpanhellenism was especially, if not exclusively, connected with the ideology firstof theDelian League and thenof the Athenian empire.'7On theother hand, ifAntonio Aloni is correct inhis suggestion that the poem was specifically commissioned by the regent Pausanias, the victor of Plataea, thenSimonides may be reflecting Pausanias' own personal aspirations for the future operations of theHellenic League.'8We would then have a further indication thathisMedism was an invention of his enemies (whether Spartan or Athenian),'" and thatPausanias himself was fully intending to prosecute thewar against Persia as vigorously as possible. Is this fragmentary line of the Plataea elegy our only evidence for this "big
talk" at such an early date? If the Oath of Plataea (as quoted by later authors)
representswhat theGreek allies actually swore in 479 BC, it is possible thateven before the battle itself theywere thinking of future revenge.20For the stipulation that theGreeks would not rebuild the templeswhich the Persians had destroyed,
but "allow them to remain as a memorial for future generations of the impiety of
divided into two books, called Europe andAsia (which for him included Africa). In the seventh century "Asia"was sometimes used to denote Lydia, as in the reference at Iliad 2.461 to the "Asian meadow," apparently a district inLydia (see Leaf: 1900 andKirk: 1985 ad loc.), and inArchilochus F 227 (West, IEG 12). 14. Pace Georgacas 1969: 22-24 and 1971: 27-28, it is not at all clear that inMimnermos F 9 (West, IEG 112) Asia stands for the "areaaroundColophon in Ionia," and inSappho F 44 (Campbell 1982) for "Cilicia." In theMimnermos and Sappho passages Asia may just as well stand for the entire continent. If the subject of Archilochus F 227 isGyges (likely, but uncertain) thenAsia equals Lydia: "He is themaster of sheep-rearing Asia." Archilochus would here be influenced by Homer Iliad 2.461. The earliest attestation of Asia inGreek literature is probablyHesiod F 180 (Merkelbach and West, OCT3), but the geographical designation is unclear. 15. The main discussions to date areAloni 1997 (arguing for a Spartan commission); Boedeker 1995, 1996, and 1998. 16. The phrase is used in reference toAgesilaus andXenophon by Cawkwell 1978: 193n. 17. See E. Hall 1989: 59-60. 18. 1997: 25-27. The way in which Pausanias is introduced is emphatic (fr. 11, lines 33-34): "[The son of excellent Cleo]mbrotus led them out, the best man ... Pausanias." 19. See esp. P. J. Rhodes 1970 and Badian 1993c: 130-33. Hornblower 1985: 25 plausibly suggests thatPausanias planned to supplement Sparta's supplies of manpower by drafting helots into the army.That would be the truthbehind the allegation (Thuc. 1.132.4) that he was intriguingwith the helots. 20. The textof the oath is recorded by LycurgusAgainst Leocrates 81; Diod. 11. 29. 3; Tod GHI ii 204 (which does not mention the temples); with Siewert 1972.
From Simonides to Isocrates FLOWER:
69
the barbarians" may also have been intended to remind theGreeks of the revenge which they owed to theirAsian foes.21Be that as itmay, the idea that theGreeks could derive profit by ravaging the territory of the Persian King goes back to the very foundation of theDelian League. As Thucydides writes at 1.96: "The Athenians fixedwhich cities were to contributemoney against the barbarian, and which ships, a pretext being to revenge themselves for what they had suffered by devastating the territoryof theKing."22The notion of profit, here as well as in Isocrates, is inseparable from thatof revenge. The Greeks would exact vengeance by enriching themselves at the expense of Persia.23
If there was indeed talk of invading Asia by land as early as the 470s, one
might expect some corroboration to be found in Aeschylus' Persians, which was produced in 472 BC and thus is very close in date to Simonides' elegy. In thePersians much ismade of the total destruction of Persia's youth and of the expectation of imminent rebellion by the peoples of Asia (584-90). But there is only one vague reference to invasion by outsiders. At lines 751-52 the ghost of Darius exclaims, "I fear lestmy great wealth, the fruit of my labor,may become formen theprey of the first comer."This vagueness is not really surprising, since there is no explicit reference in the entire play to the operations of the Delian League. All thatwe get is the chorus' description of theGreek cities which were conquered by Darius (lines 852-907), which ends with the elusive words (lines 904-907): "the reversal of this (our former prosperity) by the hand of God we now suffer through our wars, laid low by the crushing disasters at sea."24For a more explicit statement of panhellenist ideology we need to turn to awriter from later in the same century. II. PANHELLENIST DISCOURSE
Several his Histories My approach passages in Herodotus indicate some
IN HERODOTUS
he was writing of Asia. of the material attempt to infer
that at the time when
there already was to these passages of Herodotus' own
talk of a future Greek
conquest
is not to argue for the historicity times. In other words, I will
(which is doubtful), but rather to interpret them as revealing the thoughtpatterns

and agenda
fromHerodotus' own account the contemporary preoccupations with which his account is interacting. Although Herodotus' literary activity probably spanned
21. This is suggested by R. F.Rhodes 1995: 32-33. The northernwall of theAthenian Acropolis was actually built with fragments of destroyed temples conspicuously displayed: column drums, frieze blocks, and cornices which were neatly ordered by type so as to be easily recognizable by anyone in the agora below. 22. For translation and interpretation, see Hornblower 1991: 144-45, although he underesti ("devastating" or mates the notion of "getting booty" which is implicit in the participle -noi3vacoq "ravaging").As Fornara and Samons 1991: 81-82 point out, "vengeance carried recompense." 23. For the theme of revenge against Persia, see Bellen 1974 andGehrke 1987. 24. The translation is thatof Broadhead 1960: 222-23.
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the period between 450 and 426 BC, the specter of the Peloponnesian War had a perceptible impact on the way he viewed the past.25As Robin Osborne has recently emphasized, an oral tradition reflects the concerns of the last person to tell it.26 Herodotus claims that at the time of the IonianRevolt in 499 BC,Aristagoras, tyrantof Miletus, with a bronze map of theworld in hand, tried to induceKing march on Susa (5.49-50). Cleomenes of Sparta (apparently in a privatemeeting) to By stressing the feebleness of the inhabitantsand the extraordinarywealth of the land, he hopes to entice Cleomenes not merely to assist the lonians inAnatolia, but to capture Susa itself (5.49.3-9, omitting 5-6): Now, therefore, in the name of the gods of theGreeks, save the lonians from slavery,men who are of the same blood as yourselves. These things
are easily able to turn out well for you. For the barbarians are not strong
matters warriors, while you have reached thehighest level of excellence in

pertaining to war. Their style of fighting is as follows: they use a bow and a short spear; and they go into battle wearing trousers and having caps
on their heads. So easy are they to be subdued. The people who inhabit this continent have more good things than all other peoples put together: with gold, there is silver and bronze, embroidered clothing, beasts starting of burden, and slaves. If you desire these things, they can be yours. [In sections 5-6 Aristagoras gives a description of the lands between Ionia
and Cissia, and we are meant to imagine him pointing at his map.] The next country along is Cissia and it is in this land that Susa lies along Here in Susa dwells the great King and here are his the river Choaspes.
treasurehouses. Once you have seized this city you will be bold enough to vie with Zeus himself concerning riches. But is it really necessary for
you to wage wars over small borders, gold nor silver for territory that is neither large nor very good and who are your equals and to do so against Messenians, a man to fight and die)? When
in strength, and against Arcadians and Argives, men who have neither
(the zeal for which moves
you might so easily rule all of Asia, shall you choose something else?
This claims passage is truly remarkable for the way in which it anticipates so many are
of the themes of fourth-century thought about the Persian empire.27 Aristagoras

that the defeat of Persia will not be difficult could have because the barbarians
unwarlike and, given their equipment and method of fighting, easy to defeat.
It is inconceivable that any Greek thought this before the battle of
25. I here accept the traditional view that theHistories were published in final form no later than 426 BC; contra Fomara 1971a and 1981, who argues for publication at a date close to 414. For the influence of theArchidamian War on Herodotus' perspective, see Fornara 1971b: 75-91 and Raaflaub 1987. 26. 1996: 7. 27. Cf. esp. Xen. Anab. 1.5.9; 1.7.3-4; 3.1.21-23; 3.2.24-26; Isoc. Paneg. 133-56. On the panhellenism of Xenophon, see most recently Dillery: 1995: 41-119 and on that of Isocrates. Masaracchia 1995: 47-79.
FLOWER: From Simonides to Isocrates
71
Marathon, andmore probably not before Plataea.8 Before Marathon no Greek land force had ever defeated thePersians and Medes. Indeed, a force of Athenians, Eretrians, and lonians were thoroughly trounced by the Persians outside of Ephesus in 498 (Hdt. 5.102). So until the battle of Plataea had demonstrated what the Spartan hoplite could do in hand to hand combat on open ground with themuch more lightly clad Persians, Aristagoras' pronouncements would not have been likely to persuade anyone.29 As Herodotus said ofMarathon (6.112.3): "Up to this time it frightened theGreeks even to hear the name of the Mede."
What then did Aristagoras do and say at Sparta? That he brought a bronze map
with him to Sparta is just the sort of striking and unusual detail thatoral tradition is likely to preserve. Herodotus indeed attributes this story to a Spartan source (5.49.1): "He had ameeting with Cleomenes, as theLacedaemonians themselves say, having a bronze tablet (pinax) on which was engraved the circuit of the entire earth, including every sea and all the rivers." The existence of such maps in Ionia during this time period is strong circumstantial evidence thatAristagoras actually brought one to Sparta; but it does not constitute proof.30Three things need to be kept inmind. First of all, when Herodotus says "theLacedaemonians
say" this does not necessarily entail an oral tradition. It may mean no more
than that someone toldHerodotus that a Lacedaemonian had told him about this incident.3' Secondly, Herodotus claims to be reporting a private conversation between Aristagoras and Cleomenes. There is, therefore, no reason to believe
that the details his map at Athens of that meeting were generally made known to other Spartans. the assembly.
Perhaps it is suspicious that Herodotus makes nomention of Aristagoras showing

(5.97), which would have been a public act before
Thirdly, this particularHerodotean logos fits a Near Eastern story patternwhich was widely diffused. There are substantial fragments of anAkkadian epic poem of ca. 1400 BC (known inBabylonian, Hittite, and Assyrian versions), which tells
28. This was recognized long ago by Grote 1884: IV 214-15 andMacan 1895: 95. See also Cawkwell 1982: 325; Starr 1976: 58-59; and Austin 1993: 203. Osborne 1996: 324, by contrast, implies thatAristagoras really did seek Spartan support for a campaign against Susa. 29. As Grote 1884: IV 215 aptly comments: "To talk about an easy march up to the treasures of Susa and the empire of all Asia, at the time of the Ionic revolt, would have been considered as a proof of insanity. Aristagoras may very probably have represented that the Spartans were more than amatch for thePersians in the field; but even thusmuch would have been considered, in 502 BC, rather as the sanguine hope of a petitioner than as the estimate of a sober looker-on." 30. According to a traditionwhich goes back to theHellenistic scholar Eratosthenes of Cyrene, the firstmap of theworld (engraved on apinax, or tablet)was made by Anaximander ofMiletus (ca. 610-540). This was later "mademore accurate" by Hecataeus of Miletus (perhaps only by way of a drawing), a contemporary of Aristagoras. For testimonia and discussion, see Kirk, Raven, and Schofield 1983: 104-105. For a discussion of what Aristagoras' map may have looked like, see Myres 1953: 34-37 andDilke 1985: 22-24. Fehling 1989: 144, on the other hand, not only argues that Herodotus made up themap, but thatEratosthenes later inferred the existence of Anaximander's map from this very passage of Herodotus. That goes too far; see the comments of Dover 1998: 221-22. 31. This observation about the nature of source citations inHerodotus iswell made by Dover 1998: 222.
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how Semitic merchants petitioned Sargon I of Akkad (ca. 2334-2279) tomake an expedition againstNur-Dagan, the king of Burushhanda (in centralAnatolia), who was oppressing them. By way of persuasion, they detail thewealth which lies en route: a mountain containing gold and lapis lazuli and a land abundant with timberand exotic fruits. Ithas been claimed that this is the literaryprototype for the story of Aristagoras' mission to Sparta.32 The resemblance between these narratives is not exact: themerchants do not display amap, the road is difficult, and Sargon successfully makes the expedition.33 Nevertheless, thegeneral pattern is similar: the petitioning of a king to attack a wealthy but distant land in order to deliver the petitioners from oppression. With orwithout amap, Aristagoras did go to Sparta and it is legitimate to ask what he is likely to have said in order tomake his case for assistance.We cannot, of course, know this, but the following is a conjecture. What the occasion and circumstances demandedwas not a demonstration of how close Ioniawas toSusa, but how far away. Ionia, in fact, is some four to five times farther from Susa than it is from Sparta. Aristagoras should have known (if the report is true) that the Spartans had warned Cyrus to leave the IonianGreeks alone in 546, but were reluctant to intervenemilitarily (Hdt. 1.152-53). Although the Spartans were ready enough tomake an alliance with Croesus and to send an expedition to aid him against Cyrus (Hdt. 1.69, 83), his rapid fall must have shocked them into a more cautious stance. Aristagoras had now to convince them that Ionia was defensible. If indeed he had amap, itwould have been logical for Aristagoras tomake an argument something like this: "Perhapsyou Spartans think thatPersia is close to Ionia and that the Persians can attackwithout warning. Well have a
look at this map! Do you see how far away Susa is? It takes three months tomarch
from Susa to the Ionian Sea."At the time, nomatter what Cleomenes himself may have thought, the Spartans as a whole were unwilling again to venture overseas
after the Samian debacle of the late 520s.34 Fifty or more years after his visit all
thatwas rememberedwas the bronze map itself and the anecdote about Gorgo warning her father not to be corrupted by the stranger.As conditions inGreece changed, the point of the story was altered in order to reflect present concerns. The details in Herodotus' version reflect the concerns of a later age when the
question was no longer "can we defend Ionia" (which was a still a concern in
479; cf. Hdt. 9.106) but rather,"canwe penetrate the interiorof Asia." That the
32. See Nenci 1995: 225, who gives amisleading paraphrase of the fragments of this poem (e.g. the textmakes no reference to themerchants displaying a map). Nenci cites themuch fuller discussion by Pizzagalli 1937, but he too wrongly believes that themerchants have a map. An English translation can be found in Foster 1993: 250-56 and,with greater accuracy, in Westenholz 1997: 102-39. There is a brief discussion of Akkadian epic byWest (1997) 70-71. 33. Westenholz 1997: 119-21, Text 9B: "King of Battle," lines 28-35. The text, however, is fragmentary. 34. See Hdt. 3.46-47, 54-56 with Cawkwell 1993: 520-23. Some twenty or so years before the visit of Aristagoras, Cleomenes had already refused to assistMaeandrius of Samos (Hdt. 3.148).
73
latterwas indeed possible can only have been confirmed by the crushing defeat of Persian land and naval forces at theEurymedon in 466 (discussed below). Finally, Herodotus' own attitude to this narrative is telling. Because of Gorgo's intervention,Aristagoras did not get a chance to describe the royal road from Sardis to Susa which an invading armywould want to traverse.Herodotus himself then does this forAristagoras in two pages of theOxford Classical Text. On one level this gives him an excuse to show off his knowledge of the royal road, but his description is far from being rhetorically neutral. He emphasizes the obstacles thatwould face an invading army: he details the three gates, the four forts, and the seven rivers thatneed tobe passed. For Herodotus thenotion of taking this road for an attack on Susa was utterly absurd. When Cleomenes had asked how long the tripwould take, we are told (5.50): "Aristagoras, although being wise in other respects and deceiving him well, stumbled on this point; for although therewas no need for him to tell the truth (at least if he really wished
to lead out the Spartans into Asia), he said that itwas a journey of three months."
Later when Aristagoras went toAthens he tried the same argumentswith greater success (5.97): "Aristagoras went before the people and said the same things
which ... he had said in Sparta that it is easier about the good many things men in Asia and the war against
Persians, that they use neither shield nor spear and would be easily subdued.
It seems to deceive than just one, if he had not
been able to deceive Cleomenes the Lacedaemonian but had deceived 30,000 Athenians." Herodotus clearly believed thatAthenian assistance to the lonians had evil consequences; for he concludes his discussion of Aristagoras atAthens by saying of the fleet which theAthenians voted to send to Ionia: "These ships proved to be thebeginning of evils for both Greeks and barbarians."35 Nonetheless, why did
he feel the need to emphasize the folly of marching at whom inland on a three month trek in an attack on Susa? Or to put it another way, are these remarks aimed? An
obvious candidate are those Greeks, contemporaries or near contemporaries of Herodotus himself, who argued that itwould be better for theGreek cities to stop
fighting wealth over trifles and to invade Asia Herodotus' narrative to undercut for the purpose goes of seizing the enormous demonstrating in the by of Asia of the King. far beyond merely and Eretrian and Sparta, was story of Media,
the futility a coalition proposed entering
and evil consequences it also attempts states, 6.84 we of of Greek
of Athenian
participation feasible.
Ionian revolt; In Book
the notion
that an invasion that Scythian with marching
including Athens
are told the incredible the Phasis River and
ambassadors the Scythians inland from
to this same Cleomenes by way
a joint invasion
the Spartans
Ephesus:
35. This line, with its epic tone of foreboding, marks the first, fateful point of contact between Athenians and Persians. Compare with Iliad 5.63, 9.604; Hdt. 5.30.1, 6.98.1; and Thuc. 1.12.3.
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The Argives say that for this reasonCleomenes went mad and perished basely (i.e. because of his impiety), but the Spartans say thatCleomenes went mad from no divine cause, but because he became a drinker of neat wine after consorting with Scythians. For the Scythian nomads desired to punishDarius because he hadmade an invasion into their land;and so, make an alliance and to conclude having sent toSparta, theywere trying to an agreement that itwas necessary for theScythians themselves to attempt to invadeMedia from the Phasis river, whereas they were bidding the Spartans, setting out from Ephesus, tomarch inland and to rendezvous with them. They say thatCleomenes, when the Scythians had come for this purpose, spent toomuch timewith them and, consorting with them more thanwas proper, he learned from them to drink neat wine. The Spartans believe that he went mad for this reason. As a result of this, as they themselves say, whenever they wish to drink purer wine, they say to pour a Scythian. Thus the Spartans explain what happened to Cleomenes. But it seems tome thatCleomenes paid back this retribution toDemaratus. I have translated the entire anecdote because several striking features deserve mention. First of all, in only 17 lines of Oxford Classical textHerodotus tells us five times that the Spartans themselves are his source for this story. Secondly, it is Herodotus does not specify whether or not theScythians actu crucial to note that oUVTL'OeaOL, ally succeeded inmaking the alliance.36The infinitives (TCOLea6at, and xeXeULv) probably represent imperfects ("trying to") in direct discourse. Nevertheless, Herodotus uses language that is ambiguous, and he certainly does not claim that the proposal was rejected out of hand.Moreover, the suggestion mission thatCleomenes spends a lot of time in their company indicates that their was taken seriously. That, of course, is incredible, and it is difficult to conceive of Scythians being in Sparta on any official business whatsoever. Thirdly, andmost obviously, this story is inconsistentwith theAristagoras episode discussed above. Why should Cleomenes have been willing to invade Asia when the Scythians approached him (sometime between 512 and 500 BC?), but then be unwilling to do so at the prompting of Aristagoras? The two episodes are formally incompati ble and reflect different concerns. At one level, the Scythian anecdote explains a Spartan drinking custom (to drink neat wine in Scythian fashion); and on another it exonerates the Spartans of any complicity in their king's apparent suicide by providing an explanation for his madness. And this explanation, unlike the three otherswhich Herodotus records (cf. 6.75-83), does not involve any imputationof Cleomenes Yet, theSpartans need only have related that impiety or divine anger.37 had learned to drink neat wine from Scythian guest friendswithout mentioning anything at all about negotiations for an offensive alliance. In other words, it
36. Hammond CAH2 IV: 497 states it as a fact that an alliance had been made. 37. See Gould 1985: 12-13.
75
looks as if the "invasion of Asia" motif has been grafted onto an older storywhich served different purposes.When Herodotus heard this tale (regardless of whether we can trusthis source citation here), panhellenist talkwas, or had recently been, in the air.Herodotus himself can mention it fairly casually; perhaps, of course, with the implicit suggestion that talkof this kind belongs in a context of drunken excess. Near the beginning of Book 7 (11) Xerxes, who is eager to invadeGreece, says toArtabanus, who has just spoken against the idea: Iwould not be born the son of Darius, the son of Hystaspes, the son of Teispes, the son of Cyrus, the son of Cambyses, the son of Teispes, the son of Achaemenes, if Iwere not to punish theAthenians, knowing well that if we shall keep quiet, they shall not, but in very truth they shall attack our land, if it is right to form an estimate on the basis of what they did first, theywho both burnt Sardis andmarched intoAsia. Therefore, it is not possible for either of us to retreat, but the contest before us is either to take the initiative or to suffer, in order that either all of Asia should become subject to theGreeks, or all of Greece to the Persians; for there is no middle course in this quarrel. When Themistocles attempted to persuade theGreek commanders to break down thebridge across theHellespont after theirvictory at Salamis, theSpartan admiral Eurybiades argued otherwise and concluded with a recommendation for the future (8.108.4): "after the Persian had returned to his own country, thenwould be the time to contend with him for the possession of that."At Book 9.2 the Thebans warn Mardonius that "if theGreeks are of one mind, as theywere previously, it would be difficult even for thewhole of mankind to overpower them by force."38 And finally, the ending of theHistories (9.122) may also be relevant to this topic.The work ends with the curious anecdote of Cyrus advising thePersians not tomove to a soft land lest they become soft themselves. Recent interpretershave seen this as containing a warning to theAthenians about the dangers inherent in imperialism.39 Might itmore specifically be a warning, directed not just to Athens but to Sparta and her allies as well, about territorialexpansion intoAsia? The IonianGreeks had a reputation for luxurious living which theywere thought to have acquired from the Lydians; this, as much as anything, was thought to
38. At 5.3, in an authorial comment, Herodotus expresses a similar sentiment about the Thracians, but with the qualification that they are incapable of unanimity.What Herodotus leaves implicit, that a united Greece could not only resist conquest but conquer all others, Aristotle later statedmore openly in his Politics (l327b29-33): "TheGreek race is both spirited and intelligent; and this is why it continues to be free, to be governed in the best way, and to be capable of ruling all others if it attains a single constitution." 39. See Moles 1996; Pelling 1997a; and Dewald 1997. Moles takes the ending as a "waming to theAthenians," in the sense of Herodotus seeking to influence contemporary behavior; Pelling sees itmore as a use of contemporary realities to add an extra perspective to the treatmentof the PersianWars; Dewald seems closer toPelling than to Moles, but regards thepotential "contemporary perspective" as a shifting one, depending on how contemporary events turnout.
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Volume 19/No. 1 /April 2000
have caused the failure of the Ionian revolt.' Thus Herodotus may have come to believe andmay be subtly indicating that itwas dangerous formainland Greeks, both Athenians and Spartans, to subjugate either Ionia or any part of Asia, lest they adopt Eastern luxury and become corrupted by it. All of these passages arewell known, to be sure; but theircombined implica tion has been noticed only once before, and that very briefly.41I find it extremely unlikely thatAristagoras really advocated an expedition into the heart of thePer Xerxes really thought that theGreeks would invade sian empire in 499 BC,or that Asia unless he attacked them first, or thatScythians had proposed a coordinated invasion of Asia to the Spartans. Aristagoras' alleged reference to how easy it would be for Spartans to defeat turban-wearing, trouser-clad,bow-shooting Per sians clearly was written with hindsight after thebattle of Plataea. So toowas the Theban claim toMardonius about the invincibility of a united Hellas. Herodotus is reflecting contemporary concerns and a contemporary debate as to the proper goals of Greek imperialism.What these stories tell us is thatwhen Herodotus was composing his Histories during the third quarter of the fifth century, some Greeks believed that the conquest of the Persian empire was possible, desirable, and the logical consequence of Xerxes' failure to subdue Greece. There are, to be sure, other ways inwhich to "read" these passages individually.42Even so, taken together, they presuppose that the idea of Greeks conquering the interiorof Asia had been voiced (however silly itmay have seemed toHerodotus, or, for that matter, to us) well before the end of the fifth century. Herodotus' own attitude to this idea is negative and that in itself tells us something importantabout his views. In a famous passage (8.3) he claims that the Athenians did not dispute the command of the fleet in 480 because they realized
that such a quarrel would comment: Herodotus advocated "They thought itself united war as war lead to perdition correctly, is worse for Greece. strife He then adds an authorial worse than a have expected than Greeks for internal is as much we might less evil
than peace." Although
to feel that a grand coalition such a war.43
against Persia was
fightingGreeks, he could not condone themoral and practical folly of thosewho
40. See Xenophanes F 1 andHdt. 6.11-15, with Flower 1994: 130-32 and 1997: 256-57. 41. By Cawkwell 1997b: 38-39. Starr 1976: 58-59 realized the importance of the speech of Aristagoras, but gives only a partial explanation for its genesis: "one might postulate that the combination of the themes of Persian ineffectiveness in battle and luxurious wealth was a compensatory release after thewar with Xerxes, designed at once to explain and also tomagnify that victory." That may be true,but itdoes not account for the further theme of aGreek invasion of Persia. may merely be Herodotus' 42. The concept of tisis is the guiding theme in two of them, but that own thematic overlay upon what his sources told him. The theme of retribution and vengeance (tisis) is pervasive in theHistories. See Lateiner 1989: 140-44, 193-96, 203-205. For the notion of reciprocity, of which retribution is a component, see Gould 1989. Raaflaub 1987: 228 thinks that 7.11.2-3 refers to the "them or us" attitude (in Athens and Sparta) which was current around the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. 43. See Fornara 1971b: 75-91 forHerodotus' attitude towardswar. Note also Raaflaub 1987: 247-48.
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III. CIMON AND DUAL HEGEMONY Assuming that these passages do reflect talk that was current either prior to or duringHerodotus' own time of writing, whose talkwas it?There must have been some Greeks, perhaps many, who even in the early years of the Peloponnesian War believed that theAthenians and Spartans should have been fightingbarbanrans rather than each other. But Athens and Sparta had clashed long before 431 BC, most notably at the battle of Tanagra in 457, and the Spartans had previously invadedAttica in 446." So popular talk of a reconciliation between these two cities could easily have preceded theoutbreak of thePeloponnesianWar in 431. In fact, there is only one person whom we know of whose policy was panhellenic in the sense of waging incessant war on the possessions of the King of Persia andwho was simultaneously well-disposed towards cooperationwith Sparta, and thatwas Cimon, the son of Miltiades.45 In 466 Cimon won his most famous victory at the river Eurymedon in Pamphylia;" it was the equivalent of Salamis and Plataea on a single day, or as Plutarch says (Cim. 13.3), "Cimon surpassed the victory at Salamis in the battle on land and thevictory at Plataea in thebattle at sea."There is exaggeration inPlutarch'swords, but not asmuch as onemight think.According toThucydides, two hundred enemy shipswere either captured or destroyed; Plutarch adds thatan Not even the additional eighty Phoenician ships were sunk shortly afterwards.47 King of Persia could sustain defeats on this scale, and itmay not be coincidental that Xerxes was assassinated in earlyAugust 465. Moreover, the amount of booty captured was immense and this battle can only have whetted Cimon's appetite for even more ambitious ventures.48The dedication at Delphi from the tenth of
the spoils was a gilded statue of Athena placed on a bronze palm tree; this is an
unusual image and symbolizes victory over theEast, since thepalm was a Persian symbol of domain.49 Strangely, we do not hear of renewedAthenian operations against Persian ter ritoryuntil Thucydides (1.104) mentions that in460 anAthenian fleet abandoned operations against Cyprus in order to intervene in the revolt of Egypt from Persia. This lull should not be attributed to a diplomatic settlement between Athens and the King of Persia following the battle of the Eurymedon.50 The explanation
44. See Thuc. 1.107-108 and 1.1 14 respectively. 45. A recent survey of Cimon's entire career can be found inPodlecki 1998: 35-45. 46. The date is controversial; Badian 1993a: 6-10 argues for 466. Schreiner 1997 implausibly places the battle in 462. 47. For accounts of the battle, see Thuc. 1.100.3; Plut. Cimon 12-13; and Diod. 11.60-61; with Miller 1997: 12-13, 38-40. Thucydides is extremely brief andDiodorus is confused. 48. Miller 1997: 38-40 discusses the booty, but note especially Plut. Cimon 13.5-7. 49. Paus. 10.15.4-5; Plut. Nicias 13.3 andMor. 397f; andDiod. 11.62.3; with Stiihler 1989. 50. 1cannot accept Badian's (1993a) theory thatAthens had concluded a short-lived Peace with Persia in ca. 465, which was then renewed in 449; this is compellingly refuted by Cawkwell 1997a, who makes the crucial observation thatuntil 462/1 Athens and Spartawere still allies against Persia.
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may be that theAthenians were otherwise occupied, especially with the revolt of
Thasos. And if Cimon, as I am about to suggest, had intended to seek Spartan
assistance for renewed attacks on Persia, thatwould have been postponed by the great earthquakewhich devastated Sparta in 465 and the attendant revolt of theMessenian helots. In 462, when urging theAthenians to help the Spartans put down this helot revolt, he uttered his famous dictum "thatGreece should not be lamed nor Athens deprived of her yoke-fellow" (Plut. Cimon 16.8-10). Modem scholars, ignoring the context in Plutarch, have taken this to refer to themaintenance of a dual hegemony or "dyarchy"over Greece:51 theAthenians
ruling the Greeks by sea and the Spartans by land. But if that were the meaning,
Ion of Chios, Plutarch's source, would not have quoted itwith approval; for Ion greatly admiredCimon and is citing this dictum to his credit.52"Laming" in itself implies a weakening of Greece. Why talk about weakening except in a context of contention against someone else? Plutarch also quotes a few lines of the comic poet Cratinus about Cimon in which theword "Hov?XXivcv" (of all theGreeks) nearly has the resonance of the modem "panhellenism": "in all things the best leaderof all theGreeks."53Lastly, the fact thatCimon gave his three sons thehighly unusual names Lacedaemonius, Thessalus, and Oulius also attests to his panhellenic outlook and inclinations.54 Lacedaemonius and Oulius were twins, born sometime in the 470s. If the name Oulius (which was a cult title of Apollo in Miletus, Delos, and Lindus) refers to Athens' new role as Ionic hegemon of theDelian League,55 thenperhapsCimon's choice of names was already intended to reflect his belief in the partnership and dual hegemony of Athens and Sparta. The concept of dual hegemony, which in elaborated form is the central tenet of Isocrates' Panegyricus of 380 BC, is already found in Book 9 of Herodotus.
At 9.26-28 more worthy there is a dispute to hold between the Tegeans and Athenians as to who was that the Spartans one wing of the army (both conceding
should hold the other). If this debate actually took place, the Tegeans could
Thucydides (1.102.4) says that after the Spartans dismissed theAthenians from the siege of Ithome theAthenians "gave up the alliance thathad been made with them against the Mede." As Cawkwell observes (p. 115): "If Thucydides is to be trusted, it is inconceivable thatAthens could earlier have made peace with Persia even if itwas a very short-lasting peace, without thereby renouncing her alliance against the Mede." For other cogent objections, see Briant 1996: 574-75. More generally, I find it inconceivable thatCimon would have wanted to put an end tomilitary operations against Persia after his overwhelming victory at theEurymedon. 51. E.g. Fomara and Samons 1991: 126. 52. Plut. Pericles 5.3. On Ion's attitude to theAthenian empire, seeDover 1986 and Strasburger 1990. 53. Cimon 10.4 (= Cratinus F 1): xat 7t&vt' apL'TCO All mss. xtxivHIavre)X vcv tpo,uco. have the unmetrical np6tc at the end of the line; I here accept the emendation 1top6lI, but this is far from certain. See Kassel andAustin 1983: 122 and Blamire 1989: 131. 54. Plut. Per. 29.2 has Pericles assert that these names were outlandish. On the significance of their names, see Barron 1980. 55. See Davies 1971: 306-307 for the suggestion.
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hardly have made an argument less calculated towin the sympathy and support of their Spartan allies. They begin by relating how their king had killed Hyllus, the son of Heracles, in single combat, an action which kept the Heracleidae from returning to the Peloponnese for a hundred years; and they conclude with the boast that they had beaten the Spartans in many subsequent battles. The Athenian response ismuch more persuasive, laying stress on how they alone of theGreeks had given refuge toHeracles' children and had defeated the Persians atMarathon. We cannot know if Herodotus entirely made up these speeches himself or adapted them from a source; but in either case they seem to reflect a contemporary sentiment that the Spartans had better reason to be friendswith Athenians, who had preserved the ancestors of their kings, thanwith Tegeans, who had done theirutmost to prevent those same ancestors from returninghome. The Spartans, not surprisingly, did not find theTegean argument very appealing; for at 9.28 we are told that "the entire army of the Lacedaemonians shouted aloud that theAthenians were more worthy to hold the left wing (of the army at Plataea) than the Arcadians." Later, when the Spartans and Tegeans were being attacked by the Persian cavalry during the final confrontation at Plataea, Pausanias sent amessage to theAthenian contingent, which Herodotus represents as follows (9.60): Men of Athens, with the greatest contest lying before us as towhether Greece is to be free or enslaved, we Lacedaemonians and you Athenians have been abandoned by our allies who ran away during the previous night. It is clear, therefore, what we must do in the future, to defend
ourselves as best we can and to protect each other. If, then, the cavalry
had attacked you first, itwould indeedbe necessary for us and theTegeans
to you. But now, to give assistance (who with us are not betraying Greece) inasmuch as the entire cavalry has advanced against us, it is right that you
come and defend that portion which is being most of all hard pressed. If somethingmakes it impossible for you to assist us, earn our gratitude
by sending us your archers. We are aware that throughout this present war you have been by far the most zealous of all, and so you will also pay
heed to this request. The Athenians attempted to help theSpartans, but theywere prevented from doing
so by the Greeks so much through else who were fighting War on the Persian have side, to wit, ironic, since the Thebans. it was Like living in the Histories, this would struck the reader who was
the Peloponnesian who were among Perhaps
as particularly
the Thebans
who literally began thatwar with the surprise attack on Plataea. Furthermore, the
Corinthians, War, were at Plataea. attempt and his to do the most who the reader to push the Spartans into the Peloponnesian and Athenians the Greeks also, rebuff, had "abandoned" the Spartans
in 462
to help the Spartans
subsequent
(or listener) would have recalled Cimon's in their siege of the rebel helots on Mt. Ithome of the Spartans were suspicious because allegedly
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Athenian intentions.56To anyone who knew the future, Pausanias' words were not only ironic, but also pathetic. Yet it is highly unlikely that a messenger, at the critical moment of the battle, would have delivered so rhetorically and emotionally charged an address. The notion of dual hegemony here expressed, thatAthens and Sparta should always stand together and protect each other as the true leaders of Hellas, dates from a period later than Plataea and is consistent with the ideology of Cimon as expressed in his dictum of 462. It would be going too far to suggest that Cimon invented this concept, but in the period 481 to 477 dual hegemony was never seriously discussed. In480 the allies would not even countenanceAthenian command over the naval forces of theHellenic League (Hdt. 8.3) and in 478 Sparta handed over command of those forces toAthens without any thought of furtherparticipation. According to Thucydides (1.95.7), the Spartanswanted to be free of the "war against the Mede," and believed that theAthenians were both competent to command and friendly to themselves.57 Whether or not Thucydides has underestimated Spartan disquiet, therewas no outright breach between the two states until 461, when Cimon was ostracized and theAthenians renounced theirwartime alliance with Sparta, choosing instead to ally with Sparta's arch enemy Argos. Dual hegemony could, of course, be expressed in farmore cynical terms thanwhat we find inHerodotus: to wit, thatAthens and Sparta were scheming to enslave Greece in their own interests. Thucydides (4.20.4) has the Spartans cynically propose in 424 that they and theAthenians should together dominate the Greek world: "If you and we say the same things, you can be certain that the rest of Greece, being much inferior,will pay us the greatest honor."58The evidence, to be sure, is scattered and piecemeal; yet it is sufficient to indicate that what Cimon had inmind was not simply the self-interested division of Greece between the two hegemonic powers for the purpose of preserving the status quo, but an expedition against thePersian empire, by both land and sea, under thedual leadership of Athens and Sparta (the very policy advocated by Isocrates in the next century)."9
56. Thuc. 1.102. 57. Despite Thucydides, it is far from clearwhether Spartawillingly acquiesced in the formation of theDelian League or whether thiswas forced on her. The evidence is surveyed by Hornblower 1985: 21-24. Note also Hornblower 1991: 142-43. If the "Hetoemaridas debate," recorded by Diod. at 11.50, has an historical core, this probably should be dated to 478/7 against Diodorus' date of 475/4 (see Cawkwell 1997: 132 n. 55 ); it shows that some Spartans were willing to contend with Athens for naval hegemony. Fornara and Samons 1991: 114-29, on the other hand, dismiss all the evidence for tensions between Athens and Sparta during the period from 481 to 462 as later invention. 58. On this passage, seeHornblower 1996: ii, 176-77. Cf. Thuc. 5.29.3 andAristophanes Peace 1080-82. 59. For the suggestion, see Cawkwell 1997b: 38-39. He comments: "It is reasonable to suppose thatCimon ... was thinking of a great joint assault on Persia under the joint hegemony of Athens and Sparta."
81
After Cimon returnedfrom exile in451, he helped tonegotiate a five-year truce between Athens and Sparta (Diod. 1.86.1),? and then resumed thewar against Persia by attackingCyprus and Egypt in 450.What did he hope to accomplish? 61 Diodorus (12.4) implies thatCimon's purpose in attempting to reduceCyprus was
to force the King of Persia to end the war and make peace. That is surely a case of
inferring the motive from thepresumed result, sinceDiodorus sees this expedition as precipitating the Peace of Callias in 449/8. It is reasonable to look for another explanation. Quite apart from the island's enormous wealth in timber,grain, and metals, itwould be difficult to overestimate the strategic importance of Cyprus for any power wishing to control the easternMediterranean, as recent history still testifies. If theAthenians had captured Cyprus, itwould have served as an ideal base for attacking theLevantine coast, intercepting thePhoenician fleet, and intervening inEgypt. Of course, Cimon's operationsmay have had no furthergoal than the consolidation and expansion of Athens' naval empire. But thatwould not have solved the problem of how theAthenian empire and thePeloponnesian League could co-exist nor could it prevent a repetition of the Athenian defeat
by Sparta at Tanagra in 457. Or to put it differently, what did Cimon expect to
happen when the five-year trucewith Sparta expired? Did he foresee another short-term truce or renewed confrontation with Sparta? His concern both with future inter-Greek relations and with Persian interference in those relations is
indicated by the decree that he passed at this time against Arthmius of Zelea for
takingPersian gold into the Peloponnese.62 After thewastage of thePeloponnesian andCorinthianWars, Isocrates came to the realization that the only solution to antagonism between Sparta andAthens and to theproblem of Persian interference inGreek affairswas jointmilitary action
against a common foe. It is not altogether could yield. Cimon fanciful have that this solution realized had occurred forces
to Cimon as well, especially given his direct experience of the immense booty
that such a war Athens would that Athenian
could never proceed inland without Spartan assistance; for just as in 480-79
was preeminent intended its naval on sea and Sparta on land. The five-year to give bases him enough time to annihilate and Egypt in the Levant, Cyprus, truce established the Persian before fleet inviting in 451 was and capture Sparta
and her allies
to participate
in an invasion
into the interior.63 Although
60. Cf. Thuc. 1.1 12. 1;Andocides 3.3-4; Theopompus FGrHist 115 F88; and Plut. Cimon 18.1. On the problems of chronology raised by these sources, see Blamire 1989: 177-78; Fornara and Samons 1991: 138-39; and Podlecki 1998: 43-45. 61. The strategic importance of Cyprus and the limited success of the campaign iswell analyzed by Parker 1976. For the chronology of the campaign, see Badian 1993a: 58-60. 62. Ibelieve that this decree should be dated to 451/50. Meiggs 1972: 508-12 thinks it genuine, but associates itwith the intrigues of Pausanias in the 460s. Cf. Thuc. 1.109.2-3 for a failed Persian attempt in 457 to bribe the Spartans to invadeAttica in order to bring about the recall of Athenian forces from Egypt. 63. Cimon, of course, could not have issued an invitation to Sparta on his own authority; but he could have attempted to persuade theAthenian Assembly to send an embassy to Sparta for the
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Cimon
CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY
did not live to see it, the major

naval victory off Cypnan Salamis in the
spring of 449 proved yet again thatAthenian naval forces were more than equal to the task. Two literary sources lend support to this reconstruction, neither of which, it must be admitted, are unproblematic. That Cimon foresaw friendly relations and cooperation between Athens and Sparta is suggested by an elegy composed by Ion = Athen. 463a). This poem, which is inpraise of wine, of Chios (F 27West IEG 112 contains the lines: "Makingholy libation toHeracles andAlcmena, toProcles and to thedescendants of Perseus, beginning with Zeus, let us drink, let us play." West has plausibly argued that this poem was performed at a symposium held in Sparta in the presence of theEurypontid king Archidamus, who was a descendant of the individualsmentioned throughProcles.' The most probable occasion was in 451 when Cimon negotiated the five-year trucewith Sparta.Although one cannot rule out Cimon's expedition to Sparta in 462, when Ionwas only 18 or 20 years old, his subsequent visit in 451 would have been an especially suitable occasion in which to sing of pouring libations to all of the king's ancestors. This praise of Sparta's Eurypontid house in themouth of anAthenian poet who was in the circle of Cimon is remarkable.To be sure, it is not what we would call "propaganda," but it does reflect themood of cooperation and goodwill which was characteristic of Cimon's dealings with Sparta. The only explicit piece of ancient evidence thatCimon's ultimate goal was the complete destruction of the Persian empire is a passage in Plutarch's Cimon (18). Plutarch claims that Cimon's purpose in450 was "to get profit fromGreece's natural enemies" and that "he had inmind nothing less than the totaldestruction of theKing's power."65 He then adds an intriguing detail: "Cimon himself, about to set mighty conflicts inmotion and keeping his fleet together off Cyprus, sent
men to the shrine of Ammon to put some question to the god. No one knows the purpose of their visit nor did the god deliver to be with him."' an oracle to them, but as soon as Cimon was dead by the he would need Spartan
the sacred ambassadors approached he ordered them to leave; forCimon, he told

them, already happened were preliminary In other words, for which
time the envoys had arrived. But what if he had lived? If Cimon's operations
to a land invasion of Asia,
purpose of arranging coordinated military operations, or he could have asked some of his Spartan friends to approach theCouncil atAthens. 64. West 1985: 74. Contra Jacoby 1947: 9, who argues for 462. 65. Cimon 18.1 and 18.6: ou8ev ltxpo6v, &X' ?XiUT&tn\o&v trtO , maLwe'w() 'ye,uovrL' This assessment of Cimon's plans was accepted byWade-Gery 1945: 219-22. Parker xouraxuOLv. 1976: 32, on the other hand, dismisses Plutarch's version of Cimon's goals as unrealistic on the grounds that the Athenian expedition (200 ships in Thuc., 300 in Plut.) was too small to effect the complete destruction of Persian power in the easternMediterranean. But surely Cimon did not believe that he could accomplish that in a single campaigning season. The conquest of Cyprus was the necessary preliminary to anythingmore ambitious. 66. Cimon 18.7.
83
aid, perhaps thatwas the subject of his attempted consultation of the oracle of Zeus Ammon at Siwah Oasis.67 Plutarch's version of Cimon's aims is important formy reconstruction, but it would be naive not to query where Plutarch obtained his information for Cimon's last campaign. The source question is indeed critical. Since there were no detailed contemporary accounts of thePentecontaetia (cf. Thuc. 1.97.2), Plutarch's information is likely to have come fromwriters of the fourth century. Thucydides (1.112.1-4), Diodorus (12.3-4), and Plutarch (Cimon 18-19) all give divergent accounts of this campaign.68Thucydides is highly compressed; Diodorus is confused and quite capable of distorting his source for this period, who was Ephorus of Cyme. Still, it does seem that Plutarch and Diodorus are following different authorities and thusEphorus cannot be Plutarch'smain source here. That leaves Callisthenes of Olynthus as a likely source, whom Plutarch twice cites in his life of Cimon (12.5 on the battle of the Eurymedon; 13.4 on Peace with Persia). It has been suggested, not unreasonably, thatCimon's plan to destroy the Persian empire and his attempted consultation of the oracle of Zeus Ammon at Siwah Oasis, possibly about that very topic, were invented by Callisthenes of Olynthus for inclusion in his Deeds of Alexander in order to make Cimon a precursor to Alexander the Great.69 The reverse, however, may rather be true. Alexander may have been consciously evoking the example of Cimon, whom Plutarch (Cimon 19.5) calls "theGreek hegemon," by consulting Ammon.
Alexander may have wanted the Athenians and other Greeks to see him as
which Cimon had begunmore thana century earlier.This issue completing the task might be clearer if we knew where Callisthenes had narratedCimon's campaign
to Cyprus between (if in fact he narrated 386 and 356) it at all), since his historical of Alexander? My works necessarily had
different biases and emphases. Was it in his Hellenica (which dealt with events
or in his Deeds own view is that the
Hellenica is themore likely venue, but this cannot be proved.70

67. Thuc. 1.1 12.4; Diod. 12.3. The epigram on this battle, which Diodorus (1 1.62.3) mistakenly refers to the Eurymedon, confirms that 100 Phoenician ships were captured with their crews. See Badian 1993a: 20,64-66. 68. See Meiggs 1972: 124-28. 69. Schreiner 1977: 21-29. Even if this is correct,Callisthenes attributed toCimon an undertak ingwhich he must have assumed would have been believable to his contemporaryGreek audience. Parke 1967: 215 suggests thatCimon may have tried to consult Zeus Ammon in an attempt to get oracular support for his aid to Egyptian insurgents against Persia (Thuc. 1.112.3), but that the story, as Plutarch tells it, is a later invention. Thomas 1989: 203-205 points out thatCimon was little remembered in fourth-centuryAthenian oral tradition and I suppose thatmight have made it easier forCallisthenes (or indeed someone else) to elaborate the details of his attempted consultation. 70. Bosworth 1990 (following Schwartz 1900: 109) argues thatCallisthenes' account of the Eurymedon campaign appeared as a digression in his Deeds of Alexander and not, as is usually claimed, in his Hellenica. If Bosworth is right, then the Cyprus campaign and the associated consultation of Ammon probably also appeared in theDeeds of Alexander. But Bosworth's theory is not unproblematic. Callisthenes was writing up events as they occurred and must have been
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most likely. Plutarch Callisthenes, however, isnot theonly candidate, only the (19.2) mentions a source by name for Cimon's death, Phanodemus, a fourth century atthidographerwhose fragments display an extreme Atheno-centrism.71 On the one hand, it may be that neither Callisthenes nor Phanodemus, both
of whom were writing at the end of the fourth century and who had very
particular biases, are very good sources for what Cimon was thinking in 450. It is also a distinct possibility thatPlutarch has himself suppliedCimon's motives without any authorization from a source, Plutarch's intention being to underscore the pairing of Cimon with Lucullus, who attempted unsuccessfully to destroy Mithridates of Pontus.2 Matters aremade more complicated still by Plutarch's own panhellenist inclination and bias;73for this sometimes leads him to rhetorical exaggeration of the intentions of his subjects.74 On the other hand, extreme skepticism in source criticism can be as unwarranted as excessive optimism. It must be remembered thatwe know very little about the sources available to Plutarch, much less to Callisthenes. Either of them could have drawn on works contemporary with Cimon, such as Ion of Chios' Epidemiai (which is cited three times by Plutarch in his Cimon and twice in his Pericles). Although theEpidemiai was a work of reminiscences and anecdotes, Ionmight well have includedmaterial, such as Cimon's dictum in 462, which highlighted his friend's panhellenic aspirations. Yet, even if one is hesitant to accept Plutarch's attribution of motive, the consultation of Ammon ismost likely to be historical. For it is one thing to invent or infermotives, quite another to fabricate the event itself. At aminimum Cimon should have inquired about his chances of success in Egypt, which would not have been an unreasonable question given theAthenian disaster inEgypt in 455/4 (Thuc. 1.109-10). But like Philip II in 336 (Diod. 16.91.2), he could have asked a more far-reachingquestion, "whetherhe would conquer the king of thePersians."
pressed for time, especially if, as seems likely, his narrative of Alexander's deeds was published in installments (perhaps in the form of dispatches) for an audience back inGreece. Would he have had the leisure to describe Cimon's expeditions of 466 and 450 in any detail? Bosworth (p. 6) argues that therewould have been little space in the first book of theHellenica for a preliminary digression into the fifth century. But one should also keep inmind the possibility that theDeeds of Alexander only comprised a single book (as suggested by Parke 1985: 63), and as such could not have contained any but the sparsest of digressions. For the standardview that theHellenica opened with a survey of relations between Persia andGreece up to theKing's Peace of 387/6 BC, see esp. Pedech 1984, 27-31 and Prandi 1985: 53-54. 71. FGrHist 325. Cf. F 13 and 14. 72. Note, in particular,Comparison of Lucullus and Cimon 2.5: "Both had attempted to destroy great empires and to subdue thewhole of Asia and both left theirwork unfinished." 73. Plutarch's own attitude towards panhellenism is revealed atAges. 15.3-4 and Flam. 10-11. Cf. Shipley 1997: 45-46. 74. For example, Plutarch claims atAges. 15.1 that Agesilaus had decided "to fight for theperson of theKing and thewealth of Ecbatana and Susa." No other sourcementions so grandiose a scheme and I doubt if it is based on anything more substantial thatXenophon's assertion in his encomium (Ages. 1.36) that Agesilaus "was expecting to destroy the empire thathadmade an expedition against Greece." Cf. Shipley 1997: 202.
85
IV. A STRANGE PASSAGE IN DIODORUS AND THE CIMONIAN MONUMENTS There is, moreover, another literary source which bears on the question of Cimon's panhellenic propaganda and aims andwhich can be used to corroborate Plutarch's assessment of them. We are told by Diodorus (10.27), whose source for the PersianWars was Ephorus of Cyme,75 that the following conversation took place between Miltiades and the Persian general Datis on the eve of the battle of Marathon:
Datis, the general of the Persians, being a Mede by race and hav
ing received the tradition from his ancestors that the Athenians were the descendants of Medus who had established Media, sent a mes sage to theAthenians explaining that he was present with an army for the purpose of demanding back the sovereignty which had belonged
to his ancestors. For he said that Medus, who was the oldest of his
own ancestors, having been deprived of his kingship by theAthenians, moved toAsia and foundedMedia. If, therefore, they should return the sovereignty to him, they would be released from this accusation and from their expedition against Sardis. But if they should oppose him, they would suffer farmore terrible things than had the Eretrians. Mil tiades, giving the opinion of the ten generals, replied that according
ans to the argument of the envoys it was more appropriate for the Atheni to hold the mastery over the empire of the Medes than for Datis to hold it over the city of the Athenians; for an Athenian man had es no man of Median race whereas tablished the kingdom of the Medes,
had ever controlled Athens. After Datis had heard this reply he prepared for battle.
Ephorus centuries consulted a wide variety of sources in both prose It does, and poetry,76 and it in the fifth or fourth however, fit in with
is impossible
for us to be certain whether it actually
this story originated happened.77
or even whether
75. This is generally agreed. See Volquardsen 1868; Schwartz 1903: col. 679; Hornblower 1994: 36-38; and Stylianou 1998: 49-50. 76. On Ephorus' sources for his Persian War narrative, see Flower 1998. Although Ephorus may be reflecting the panhellenist concerns of his own time (the fourth century), it is unlikely that he was either a student of Isocrates or a cipher for Isocratean panhellenism. See Flower 1994: 42-62. 77. Georges 1994: 66-68 believes that this anecdote preserves authentic Persian diplomatic propaganda: "If the Isocrateanmot ofMiltiades is discarded from the Ephoran account of Diodorus, what is left is a straightforward Persian diplomatic approach toAthens very like thatmade to the Argives in 481." At Hdt. 7.150 Xerxes is said to have despatched a herald toArgos to inform them that the Persians were descended from Perses, the son of Perseus and Andromeda, and so were Media was named after descendants of theArgives; andHecataeus (FGrHist 1F 286) claimed that Medus, the son of Medea (presumably by Aegeus, the king of Athens). These passages indicate thatGeorges may well be right that the anecdote is based on an actual message of Datis, but the mot, inmy view, is not Isocratean, but Cimonian.
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Volume 19/No. 1/ April 2000
the way Cimon was commemorating (and perhaps exaggerating78) his father's achievements through large scale works of art atDelphi andAthens. The public commemoration of Miltiades on thesemonuments indicates thatCimon himself may ultimately have been the author of the response which his father gave to Datis. If so, the anecdote was intended to bolster his policy of invading the Iranianheartland; for theAthenians had a "historical" claim to rule Media. One of thesemonuments was a group of thirteenstatues atDelphi, dating from either the 460s or the 450s, which was "dedicated from a tithe of the spoils from Marathon" (Paus. 10.10.1-2). The group included the gods Athena andApollo, Miltiades, most of theAttic phyle heroes, and Theseus. The near-heroization of Miltiades is remarkableand, in conjunctionwith thedate of the monument, makes ithighly probable that thiswas Cimon's private dedication.79Theremay also have been a statue of Cimon's eponymous ancestor, Philaeus, the son of Telamon.80 The otherwork of art is, of course, thedepiction of the battle ofMarathon in the Stoa Poikile.81 This building must have been in some way commissioned by Cimon's brother-in-law Peisianax, since it was originally called the Stoa Peisianacteios.82 If nothing else, this indicates thatPeisianax must have paid for most of the construction or decoration, perhaps fromCimon's share of the spoils from the Eurymedon campaign.83Both the literary and archaeological evidence indicate that theStoawas constructed sometime between 470 and460 BC.84 Among the figures represented on the Marathon painting, including Theseus rising from the ground, pride of place was given toMiltiades; he was depicted stretching out his hand and urging theGreeks on against the Persians.85The glorification ofMiltiades by the circle of Cimon is obvious enough. Can one go further? The artistic program of the Stoa, which comprised four separate paintings, was unusual for its juxtaposition of mythic and historic subjects. Pausanias (1. 15)
78. See Lazenby 1993: 57-58. Modem scholars arewont to speak of Cimon's "rehabilitation" of his father's reputation, since Miltiades died in disgrace (Hdt. 6.136; Plut. Cimon 4.4); but "glorification"more aptly describes the tenor of the artistic representations described below. 79. See Castriota 1992: 81 andMiller 1997: 31-32 who cite earlier bibliography. 80. But this depends on emending the text of Pausanias from the otherwise unknown "Phileus/ Phyleus" of the manuscripts to "Philaios." This emendation is highly probable: asVidal-Naquet 1986: 304-305 points out, Phileus (which is the reading of the best manuscripts) is an easy corruption of Philaios. See alsoMills 1997: 40-41 and n. 174. 81. See Castriota 1992: 76-89, 127-33; Mills 1997: 40-42; and Holscher 1998: 166-67. Pausanias 1.15 gives the fullest description of the four paintings; the literary testimonia is collected byWycherley 1957: 31-47. 82. On Peisianax, see Castriota 1992: 259 n. 84 with Plut. Cim. 4.6 andDiogenes Laertius 7.1.5. 83. See Holscher 1973: 74. Boersma 1970: 55-56, on the other hand, implausibly argues that Peisianax merely was theman who proposed the building of the Stoa in theAthenian assembly. 84. For the date, see the excavation report in Shear 1984: 13-15, 18. Note that the pottery fragments found in the red-earth foundation fill give a terminus ante quem of ca. 460 for the building's completion; they do not prove that the building was actually completed in 460. This is an importantdistinction and is usually overlooked. 85. See Aeschines Against Ctesiphon 186; Aelius Aristides On the Four 174; scholiast on Aristides On theFour 174; Nepos Miltiades 6.3; with Harrison 1972: 356-57.
87
describes thepaintings in this order: thebattle ofArgive Oenoe between Athenians andLacedaemonians, thebattle of Theseus and theAthenians with theAmazons,
the trial of Ajax for the rape of Cassandra after the fall of Troy, and the battle
of Marathon.86The first painting does not fit inwith the others. The latter three imply the continuity of Athenian victory over barbarians from the heroic age to the present, but the first painting represents a victory over fellow Greeks. The standard interpretation is that the battle of Oenoe was between Argos (with Athenian assistance) and Sparta, that it took place during the period 461 to 451,
and that the painting depicting itwas a later addition to the Stoa and celebrated the
successful reversalof Cimon's foreign policy.87 What I findparticularly interesting about this ensemble (although it is notmentioned by anyone in the vast literature on this topic) is that the original three paintings may each have depicted the ancestors of Cimon: Theseus in the Amazon painting; perhaps Theseus' sons Acamas andDemophon in the sack of Troy;88and both Theseus andMiltiades in thebattle ofMarathon. Might theoverall effect of this family portraithave been to suggest a future invasion of Asia by landunder the leadershipof Cimon, thedirect descendant of Theseus and Miltiades?89 I say "suggest"because the meaning either of this or of any other monument is never fixed, but may "mean" significantly different things to different viewers (regardless of the creator's intention). When the paintings were first displayed the ensemble may have suggested to those viewers who were sympathetic to his policies what Cimon could still achieve by
86. We should reject the radical interpretation of Francis and Vickers 1985a and 1985b (and Francis 1990: 85-89) that the battle of Oenoe was not a battle at all, but rather a meeting of the Athenian and Plataean forces in the vicinity ofMarathon soon after thePlataeans had departed from theAttic village of Oenoe. The Francis-Vickers theory is accepted by Castriota 1992: 78-79, 260-61, but rejected by Badian 1993b: 210 n. 39, Bollansee 1991, Develin 1993, and Holscher 1998: 166, among others. Castriota, however, seems to think (p. 78) that the painting depicted a meeting in theAttic village of Oenoe itself (which would be amore compelling argument), but that is not what Francis andVickers are claiming, nor could such ameeting have taken place. 87. This view is best represented byMeiggs 1972: 96-97, 469-72. This battle is alsomentioned by Pausanias at 10.10.2 in reference to an Argive dedication at Delphi. Pritchett 1994, however, argues that Pausanias' original text read "Omeai" and that this was subsequently miscopied as "Oinoa"; he further suggests that the painting depicted the battle of Orneai in 417 BC, which is briefly narrated at Thuc. 6.7.1-2. But it should be noted thatThucydides merely mentions a siege (not a pitched battle) and specifies that only a few troops from the Lacedaemonian army were involved. 88. They are not actually mentioned by Pausanias, who describes the painting thus: "theGreeks have assembled on account of the outrage of Ajax have captured Troy and the kings (PocaLXEbr) against Cassandra." Yet itwould be unusual if theywere not depicted: forAcamas andDemophon, despite their absence in the Iliad, figure prominently as the representatives of Athens at Troy in fifth-century Athenian art and literature (for the evidence, see Mills 1997: 9-10). Furthermore, Polygnotus, who painted the Troy picture in the Stoa, included them in his much more detailed depiction of the capture of Troy in the Cnidian Lesche at Delphi (Paus. 10.25-27; with Castriota 1992: 127-28). 89. Barron 1980makes a strong, but circumstantial case, thatPherecydes of Syros made Theseus an ancestor of Cimon by substituting Theseus forTelamon as the father of Ajax by Eriboia. Cimon's family, the Philaids, claimed descent from Philaeus, the son of Ajax.
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comparisonwith the exploits of his ancestors,whereas after his death, itmay have brought tomind what Cimon might have done had he lived. In either case, the contemporary viewer's interpretation would have been informed by knowledge of Cimon's public utterances and speeches, of which we have only the faintest glimpse. Lastly, at the timewhen theoriginal threepaintings were completed, probably between 466 and 462 (for the archaeological evidence does not preclude a date before Cimon's ostracism in 461), enough space was left for at least one more painting on the same scale as the others. Although Pausanias' description of the disposition of the paintings is ambiguous, it is likely enough thatall fourwere on the rearwall. Why was a fourthpainting not commissioned right from the start? Other considerations aside, reasons of artistic coherence are sufficient to account for the absence of Salamis; for sea battles are "hard to portray in successful art, at least with the sort of human detail which would have dominated the other scenes.")9 Itwould have been just as difficult to portray the double victory at the Eurymedon, especially if the land battle, as Diodorus (11.61.2-7) describes it, took place at night. Nor was theEurymedon campaign conclusive in theway that the capture of Troy was; itwas a great achievement to be sure, but there was still much to be done. So perhaps the intentionwas to fill this space with a depiction of a joint Spartan andAthenian victory, with Cimon as an Athenian general, over the land armies of the Persian king, in a battle thatwould result in the breaking up of the Persian empire. Such a scene would have completed the symmetry of the ensemble, with two decisive victories over barbarians taking place inGreece and two inAsia. If thiswas the original intention of the Stoa's sponsors, the eventual addition of a painting showing thevictory of Athenian over Spartan hoplites was an ironic insult indeed toCimon and his supporters. After Cimon's death in 450 BC any realistic hope of cooperation between
Athens and Sparta for a war against Persia came to an end. In 449 the Peace of
Callias between Athens and Persia was negotiated by Cimon's own brother-in law,Callias the son of Hipponicus.9' The Delian League's war against Persia was now over and the original justification for the League's existence was rendered null and void. Pericles may have tried to divert attention away from the policy of Cimon, while at the same time giving a new justification for theDelian League, by means of the Congress Decree.92 In practical termsCimon's death and the subsequent Peace were providential for Persia, for therewas no longer the threat
90. So Pelling 1997b: 11 explains the absence of Salamis from the Stoa, while arguing (9-13) against the tendency to explain the choice of scenes in terms of aCimonian pro-hoplite ideology. 91. The existence of this peace (which is first mentioned by Isocrates in thePaneg.) is one of the most famous cruxes in the study of Greek history. Among recent treatments, see Badian 1993a: 1-72 andCawkwell 1997a. 92. But since the authenticity of this decree (for which Plut. Per 17 is the sole authority) is exceptionally problematic, this cannot be pressed. Cawkwell 1997a makes as strong a case for its purpose and authenticity as one possibly can. For a different view, see esp. Bosworth 1971, who
89
of major battles with Hellenic forces. This situation is well encapsulated in the rebukewhich Plutarch (Per. 28.6) claims thatElpinice directed at Pericles in 439 BC on the occasion of his funeral oration for theAthenians who had died in the reduction of Samos: that Pericles had lostmany brave citizens, not inwaging war with Phoenicians andMedes, as had her brother Cimon, but in subduing
an allied and kindred city. But the Peace of Callias did not mark the end of
panhellenist discourse, in the sense of Athens and Sparta jointly leading their respective alliances in an attack on the Persian empire. V. PANHELLENISM AT THE END OF THE FIFTH CENTURY
Although we have no means of quantifying public opinion inAthens, much less in otherGreek cities, panhellenist sentiments seem to have intensified during the last decade of the fifth century. As the Peloponnesian War dragged on, and as internal civil strife became endemic, and especially when the Persians began
to aid Sparta, we may suspect that ever more Greeks began to wonder if instead of
fighting each other theywould be better off attacking a common enemy. Spartan acceptance of Persian aid in particular, beginning in 412, must have caused wide-spread resentment, and not only among Athenians. For Callicratidas, the Spartan admiral in 406 BC, resented having to beg Cyrus formoney and vowed to reconcile Athens and Sparta.93Such sentiments are reflected in a wide range of contemporary literature in various genres. Two texts often cited inmodem discussions areAristophanes' Lysistrata of 411 BC and Euripides' Iphigenia at
Aulis here, of ca. 407 I wish BC.94 Towards you the end of the former play, Lysistrata says to at
theAthenian and Spartan delegates (lines 1128-34): "Now that I have got you
to reproach in common, (how many and justly other places so. You who could at Olympia, Thermopylae, a single although Lysistrata's and at Delphi I mention if it were cities,
necessary forme to speak at great length?) purify the altars, like kinsmen, with
sprinkling enemies words of lustral water, are at hand with are a warning are destroying a barbarian that Greece Greek men and Greek strictly army."95 Although speaking
should not be laid open
to barbarian
argues that itwas forged by Anaximenes of Lampsacus in order to suit the propaganda needs of Philip of Macedon in 338/7. 93. Xen. Hell. 1.6.7. His words seem to be echoed by Agesilaus' brother Teleutias at Xen. Hell. 5.1.17. Perhaps, as Cawkwell (1979: 79, 250) suggests, both Callicratidas and Teleutias were panhellenists. Xenophon's portrayal of Callicratidas is subtly analyzed byMoles 1994. 94. Lines 1128ff. and lines 1259-75, 1375-1401. On the panhellenism of Aristophanes, see Hugill 1936, which is an unjustly berated study. For my purpose here, it does not matter whether Aristophanes himself was a panhellenist or was simply putting an oft-repeated sentiment into Lysistrata's mouth. Does this have a 95. The significant phrase is eXOpJv ntcapo6vv ocxpf3&pp oxpaTep axTL. specific reference? Sommerstein 1990: 213 suggests that the "enemies" are the Persian satraps Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, who were seeking to detach the Greek cities in Asia from the Athenian empire and bring them back under Persian rule. Hugill 1936: 16-20 surveys other less persuasive interpretations.
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attack, the implicitmessage is that itwould be farbetter to destroy barbarian men and barbariancities thanGreek men andGreek cities. The Iphigenia at Aulis is a difficult play to interpret,not least of all because changes of mind occur more often in this play than in any other extant tragedy.96 When Agamemnon decides once and for all to sacrifice his daughter (lines 1269 75) his reason is interesting:he claims thathe is under constraint to do so in order to ensure thatGreece should be free and to prevent the rape of Greek wives by barbarians.His words soundmore like a patently specious pretext thana genuine appeal to the concept of Greeks uniting against barbarianswhich Euripides hoped would move his audience.97 Moreover, any "triumphalist"reading of these lines is undercut by Euripides' treatmentof noble Trojans and ignoble Greeks in his earlier plays Hecuba, Andromache, and TrojanWomen.98At the end of the play Iphigenia steels herself to sacrifice her life for the greater good of Hellas; but here again it is not so clear thatEuripides meant his audience to commend her decision.99Her declaration that the life of one man isworth more than the lives of ten thousandwomen seems perverse, even by Athenian standards.Yet leaving aside thequestion of what Euripides intendedhis play tomean, he is surelyplaying with commonly held biases and opinions; and thusAristotle quotes with approval the last line (1400-1401) of Iphigenia's last speech: "It is reasonable, mother, forHellenes to rule barbarians, and not for barbarians to ruleHellenes; for they
are a slave kind, men here are free."100
The Persians of Timotheus of Miletus and the epic Persica of Choerilus of Samos may also have reflected a growing anti-Persian, panhellenic sentiment.'0' Timotheus' Persians, a citharodic nome on the battle of Salamis, is actually one of themost fascinating of all Greek poems, and one of themost neglected. It was probably composed between 412 and 406, just at the time when Sparta had betrayed the Greek cities in Asia to the king of Persia in exchange for financial support in the Peloponnesian War.102Although we do not have the whole poem, what we do have is a brilliant polymetric tour de force. What emotional reaction did he hope to elicit from his audience when he described one barbarian begging formercy in broken Greek and another regurgitating sea
96. See Gibert 1995 for an analysis of Agamemnon's and Iphigenia's changes of mind. 97. This is the opinion of Gibert 1995: 220-21, who calls it "sloganeering." See his notes 38-39 for furtherbibliography on this controversy. 98. Croally 1994: 103-19 analyzes Euripides' subversion in these plays of theGreek/barbarian polarity which was central to anAthenian citizen's sense of identity. See also Said 1989. 99. Knox 1979: 246-47 takes her speech (lines 1378-1400) at face value and claims that in this play Euripides was promoting a panhellenic holy war against the barbarians.Gibert 1995: 252-54. by contrast, supplies new arguments for an ironic reading of Iphigenia's decision. 100. Politics 1252b, citing only part of it. 101. A recent excellent treatment of Timotheus is E. Hall 1994; the fragments of Choerilus' Persica are collected inLloyd-Jones and Parsons 1983: 146-51, frags. 314-23. 102. For the poem's date and place of first performance (both of which are controversial), see Bassett 1931; Hansen 1984; Janssen 1984: 22; andHose 1994.
to Isocrates FLOWER: From Simonides
91
water as he drowned (82-85): "he spoke, exhausted with panting, regurgitating an awful foam, spitting out from his mouth brine from the depths of the sea"? Did Timotheus hope to whip up patriotic sentiment against Persia at the very time when Persian money was financing the Peloponnesian fleet? Or was he evoking sympathy for the defeated, helping his audience to see "self in other The former, panhellenist, interpretation is suggested by the and other in self"?103 context inwhich lines from the poem were later quoted. According to Plutarch, theGreeks of Asia were so impressed by Agesilaus' humbling of elite Persians that many were moved to cite thewords of Timotheus, "Ares is lord;Greece has no fear of gold."'" Moreover, Timotheus made an appearance at Sparta, and although the Spar tansdid not approve of his new fangledmusic (allegedly one of the ephorswanted to cut off the extra four strings from his cithara), one wonders which of his poems Was it an earlier version of the Salamis poem, whereas he performed there.'05 our version was performed atAthens (inwhich case lines 202-20 will be either new or reworkedmaterial)? Was Timotheus attempting, through his music, to reconcile Sparta andAthens by reminding them of their former victories against thePersians and the ease with which the barbarians could be crushed? The poem ends with a wish for peace, prosperity, and civic order (eunomia): "Come, far shooting Pythian, to this holy city and bring prosperity with you, sending to this people, unharmed, peace which flourishes through good civic order.""? Is the implication that these things could be achieved by ending hostilities between
Greek cities and transferring the war to Asia? If Timotheus went on tour with to this poem, then the tag "this holy city" could might reasonably have supposed given refer to wherever he happened
be giving a performance at the time.

Timotheus that a poem about Salamis would that a representation "Persian Stoa" of Artemisia, in the Spartan appeal to Spartans 88), was as well as toAthenians,
the tyrantof Halicarnassus who had distinguished herself at Salamis (Hdt. 8.87
one of the column statues of the famous
103. The phrase comes from Greenblatt 1991: 127. This notion has been fruitfully applied to Aeschylus andHerodotus by Pelling 1997b and 1997a respectively. Hose 1994: 86 suggests that the Persians "displays a sensitivity to humanity by representing Persians suffering" and that "under the surface of stereotypes barbarians are shown as human beings-as in some way 'naturally' ((pUCGEL) me, however, that thecontemporary listener, desensitized toviolence equal to the Greeks." It seems to by the brutality of thePeloponnesian War, would have come away with a ratherdifferent impression: towit, in the good old days of theHellenic League we Greeks made thebarbarians feel the anguish of violent death; now we are imposing this upon ourselves. 104. Ages. 14.4. and E. Hall 1994. Ironically, it was Persian gold which forced Agesilaus to give up his campaign inAsia in 394 Bc after theCorinthianWar had broken out inGreece. Agesilaus himself realized this, and proclaimed that theKing was driving him out of Asia with ten thousand "archers,"meaning the gold darics (stampedwith the figure of an archer) that had been sent to the leadingmen in various Greek cities. See Plut. Ages. 15. 8 with Shipley 1997: 208-10. 105. For his experience at Sparta, see Timotheus T 7 (Campbell 1993) (where he competes at theCarnea festival) and F 791 (Campbell 1993), Persians, lines 202-12. 106. Lines 237-40 (Campbell 1993).
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It is even fair to suppose

that all those Greeks whose ancestors had
agora.'07
participated in the battle of Salamis would have taken an interest in his poem. We now at last come to the authorswho have been the traditionalstartingpoint in modem discussions of panhellenism. Gorgias in408 andLysias in 388 delivered speeches at theOlympic Games on the theme of a panhellenic expedition against Persia. Unfortunately, their orations have not survived intact. It has become a "fact" inmodem scholarship thatGorgias' speech was delivered in 392; yet this assertion depends on nothing more than the authority of Blass, who thought that themost likely date on purely prima facie grounds.Wilamowitz had placed the speech in 408, and for good reasons.108 As he points out, Gorgias would have been around one hundred years old
in 392, and so too old to perform at Olympia, and Sparta was war weary in 408
and annoyedwith thePersians. This reasoningwas rejected by Blass andBeloch, both of whom simply assert that no one could possibly have proposed a war against Persia during the last years of the Peloponnesian War.1" Their authority lies behind the almost universal modem acceptance of 392.110 Yet it should be obvious that it is poormethodology to let the conclusion dictate the evidence. The main reason for preferring 392 is the a priori assumption that such talk could not
have predated is quite enough the end of the Peloponnesian to show that such talk was War; already and yet, as we have current in 411. seen, that
assumption is itself extremely dubious. In fact, the passage from theLysistrata Philostratus, in his Lives of the Sophists 1.9 (= Diels-Kranz 82, Al), sum marizes Gorgias' Olympic Oration as follows: "His Olympic Oration dealt with
a political matter of sedition, barbarians same of the greatest importance. For seeing that Greece cities was in a state the to this not he became an advocate of concord and tried to turn them against one another's the prizes renewed he was Gorgias
and to persuade
them not to make Oration
be won by their arms, but rather the land of the barbarians." theme in his Funeral or was written spoken inciting over for the Athenian
war dead. Since The change
anAthenian citizen, he could not have delivered this speech himself; itwas either
a show piece at Athens, for someone else to deliver. in emphasis at public
is important;for as Philostratus says: "TheFuneral Oration, which he delivered

was the war dead whom against the Athenians buried
expense with words of praise, and is composed with extraordinarycleverness. For

though he was concord with the Athenians theMedes and Persians and was con longing
tendingwith the same intention as in his Olympic Oration, he said nothing about
the Greeks, since he was speaking to Athenians who were
for empire, something which itwas not possible to acquirewithout choosing an
107. Paus. 3.11.3: cf. Vitruvius 1.1.6. 108. Wilamowitz 1893: 172-73, and esp. n. 75. 109. Blass 1892: 58-59; Beloch 1922: 521 n. 3. 110. E.g. de Romilly 1992: 228, and n. 5. "408 used to be suggested but thathypothesis has been, apparently correctly, abandoned."Ostwald and Lynch CAH2 VI: 598, however, have opted for 408.
93
energetic policy. But he dwelt upon the praises of the trophieswhich they won in theirwars against theMedes, pointing out to them that trophies erected over barbariansdemand hymns of praise, while trophies over Greeks demand dirges." Philostratus' comment about the Athenians' longing for empire ( p>I
EpCo)v-ar) and their need to acquire one (xrla'caa6aL), superficially suggests a
date of composition during theCorinthianWar of 395-386, a timewhen theAthe nians were trying to recreate their fifth-century empire. But a date between 408 and 405 is equally possible, since during thatperiod theAthenians were adamant about regaining the possessions which they had lost since 431; so adamant, in fact, that in 410 and 406 they turneddown Spartan offers of peace on the basis of On the latteroccasion, according toAristotle, peace negotiations the status quo.11' were thwartedby the demagogue Cleophon who "wentbefore theassembly drunk andwearing a breastplate and said thathe would not yield unless theLacedaemo nians should let all of the cities go (i.e. which they had captured in the war)." In that tense atmosphere an outsider likeGorgias might well have been reluctant to talk orwrite of reconciliation between Athens and Sparta, even if he knew that some Athenians would support the idea. If, therefore, both theOlympic Oration and the Funeral Oration date from the period 408 to 405, then both speeches reflect the growing desire in theGreek world for a cessation of warfare between Asia. Although our ev Athens and Sparta and a transferof hostilities to barbarian idence is piecemeal, thenumber of authors (Aristophanes,Euripides, and perhaps Timotheus) who reflect this theme, sometimes quite casually, between 411 and
405 is enough to show that it was much talked about.
VI. ISOCRATES AND THE CULMINATION OF THE PANHELLENIST MOVEMENT Lysias' Olympic Oration, unlike the panhellenist writings of Gorgias, does
indeed belong war against to the fourth century."2 and he seems He wrote and delivered it near the end of to renounce against pages which their the we the Corinthian War, barbarians. possess said to have the Olympic to be calling upon the Spartans of the two OCT
other Greeks
and take the lead in a common Isocrates published and Lysias his Panegyricus
expedition
Or at least that is the implication spent either orations
of his speech.
in 380 BC and he is have known to surpass theme; but he surely
five or ten years composing that he was addressing
it. He would a well-worn
of Gorgias
and his aim was
them. Isocrates
indeed admits
I 1. According
to Diod.
13.52-53
there was
a Spartan
appeal
for peace
in 410
after
the battle
of Cyzicus. Aristotle (Ath. Pol. 34.1-2) claims that therewas such an offer in 406 after the battle of Arginusae. It is not unreasonable (pace P. J.Rhodes 1981: 424-25) thatboth are right and that the Spartansmade similar offers on two occasions. 112. This is Lysias 31, on which see Kleinow 1988. Green 1996: 30 n. 39 makes a strong case for accepting Diodorus' date of 388, as against the common modem redating to 384. See Diod. 14.109 andDion. Hal. Lysias 29 for the background.
94
CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY
asserts that although concord and unity of purpose among theGreek cities was a good thing, none of the previous speakers on this subject had explained how to achieve it.His innovation, so he claims (15-17), was to call for the reconciliation
of Athens argued, and Sparta and their shared dual hegemony was leadership in this great crusade. As I have the not a new idea at that time; and thus neither
general theme nor the particular thesis of thePanegyricus entailed anything new. Where Isocrates did break new ground was in the extremely high finish of his style and in the careful elaboration of supporting arguments.'13 He was the premier prose stylist of the fourthcentury and thePanegyricus is his masterpiece. At Panegyricus 9-10 he asserts thepower of oratory to enable one to speak better thanone's predecessors; better not just in termsof style, but also in the mustering of appropriatearguments.Yet what has struck modern critics as being highly unusual about thePanegyricus is the apparentdiscordance between its stated purpose, to reconcile Sparta andAthens, and the body of thework, which consists of a long and eulogistic defense of Athenian claims to leadership and a correspondingly severe condemnation of Spartan policy."4 Should we interpret this tomean that Isocrates has really written a veiled justification for a new Athenian hegemony over Greece?"' Such an interpretation,however, fails to appreciate the rhetorical strategywhich the political situation inGreece imposed upon Isocrates. Given thatSparta,with Persian support,had held theundisputed leadershipof theGreek world ever since theKing's Peace of 387/6, Isocrates needed to argue as strongly
as possible that Athens deserved an equal share in power with Sparta. The most
effective way of doing that rhetoricallywas to demonstrate that Athens was more worthy of hegemony thanwas Sparta. By claiming thatAthens deserved more (sole hegemony; cf. 18-20, 99) he might hope to obtain for her something less (sharedhegemony; 17, 185, 188). This is not to deny that Isocrates exploited the ill will in theGreek world against Sparta or that he attempted to enhance goodwill towardsAthens; it is
only to point out that these goals were be tempted not incompatible her ties with with Persia. a genuine advocacy Peace,
of shared hegemony. Nor was it completely unrealistic and naive to imagine

that Sparta might to abandon The King's
whereby the Spartans sold out theGreeks of Asia in exchange for the supportof thePersianKing in maintaining theirhegemony overmainland Greece, apparently earned Sparta considerable ill will in theGreek world (Diod. 15.9.5, 15.19.4). If we can believe Diodorus (15.9.3-5, 15.19.1, who is drawing on Ephorus), the
Spartans so regretted what they had done (probably that they gladly made an alliance with the rebel Persian admiral Glos in 383 or 380 BC), and were looking
113. Both of these points arewell made by Photius (Bibl. 487a), who begins by observing that "the Panegyricus of Isocrates is littlemore than an adjustment and rearrangementof the arguments and demonstrations used by Gorgias of Leontini and Lysias." 114. See Buchner 1958: 1-10. Photius (Bibl. lOlb) too seems to have found this peculiar. 115. So Ryder 1965: 50 andDillery 1995: 56.
95
for a plausible excuse to resume their war with King Artaxerxes; but when Glos was assassinated, they reverted to their former policy. No other source records this alliance, and it is impossible to know whether an agreement was actually reached or whether amere rumorhas been reported as a fact. The story in itself, however, does indicate that it was not wholly incredible to Greeks of the fourth century that the Spartans, if given the right incentives, would be willing to renounce the King's Peace and to resume military operations in
Asia Minor.' 6
When Isocrates' plan of cooperation between Athens and Sparta came to naught, he later hoped that a single leader, such as Philip ofMacedon (towhom he addressed the Philippus in 346 BC), could first reconcile and then lead the united Greeks against the barbarian."7Although it has been the fashion among modem scholarswriting inEnglish to deny the sincerity of Isocrates' statements about his panhellenist program, his careerwas punctuated by efforts to promote the panhellenic crusade, and when he deviated from this course, there were
practical main reasons for his doing so."18 It is significant to exhort the Greeks that in his last major work, to achieve concord among
the Panathenaicus of 339 BC, Isocrates states unambiguously (13-14) that the
theme of his career had been
themselves and towage war against the barbarians. Even more striking are the lastwords which Isocrates is known to have written: in theconcluding sentence of his brief letter to Philip after theAthenian defeat at Chaeronea he expresses his delight in seeing the ideas which he had conceived in his youth, and which he had attempted towrite down in his Panegyricus and Philippus, being brought to fulfillment."9 In any case, a detailed examination of the sincerity and consistency
of Isocrates' views over the course of his long career is beyond the scope of this paper: what has concerned us here are their antecedents.
most studies of theperiod, perhaps because nothing 116. This interesting story is notmentioned in came of it.A full discussion is provided by Ryder 1963, who dates the alliance to 380/79. Stylianou 1998: 185-86 thinks that such an alliance was not at all unlikely, places it in 383 or early 382, and suggests that itwas made secretly. The most detailed treatment of Glos' career isRuzicka 1999, who speculates (35 n. 25) thatGlos himself may have been more concerned to spread the rumor of an alliance than actually to conclude one. For Ephorus as Diodorus' source here, see Stylianou 1998: 49-50, 147-49. 117. We have the introductions to letters which he wrote to Dionysius I, tyrant of Syracuse, perhaps in 368, and to King Archidamus of Sparta in 356 (Letter 1, To Dionysius and Letter 9, ToArchidamus respectively). Speusippus (Letter to Philip 13: in Bickermann and Sykutris 1928) claims that Isocrates sent virtually the same letter toAgesilaus, Dionysius of Syracuse, Alexander of Pherae, and then toPhilip (the Philippus). Too (1995: 199) argues that the letters toDionysius and Archidamus were deliberately left unfinished because of a calculated strategy of silence, but she is unaware of Speusippus, who claims that Isocrates' other letterswere on a parwith thePhilippus. 118. E.g., Baynes 1955; Kennedy 1963: 198-203; Markle 1976; Dillery 1995: 54-58; and Too 1995: 129-50. The consistency of Isocrates' commitment to Panhellenism is well defended by Cawkwell 1982: 324-26. The German bibliography on Isocrates is immense, and in the past tended to overvalue his influence. Bringmann 1965 andDobesch 1968 are fundamental. 119. Letter 3, ToPhilip 6 (338 BC).Note also Philippus 9 (346 BC).There is a fuller discussion of his relationswith Philip inFlower 2000.
96
CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY
In conclusion, Panhellenism had been around a long time before it was championed by Gorgias and Isocrates as the panacea to solve all of Greece's problems. To be sure, the exploits of Xenophon and theTen Thousand, recounted so vividly in theAnabasis, seem to have impressed upon theGreek imagination that the Persian empire was weak and ripe for conquest.120 But that should not obscure the fact that for earlier generations of Greeks the battles of Plataea and had Eurymedon, as the so-called Eurymedon vase so graphically illustrates,121 already demonstrated the same thing.The expedition of Agesilaus (396-94) was proclaimed to be, and that of Alexander theGreat (334-323) at least partially was, the fulfillment of panhellenist dreams.122 Whether any purely Hellenic army would have been capable of successfully penetrating the interiorof Asia is highly unlikely.'23Nevertheless, Cimon's experience fighting Persians on both land and seamay have convinced him otherwise. Thus when Isocrateswrote atPanegyricus 9 that"many sophists have already spoken on this theme"he was not exaggerating and referringonly toGorgias andLysias. Not only hadmany sophists broached the subject of the panhellenic expedition, but ever since the end of the Persian wars such an enterprise had been the subject of popular talk.Yet even if panhellenism trulywas a broadly popular ideology, itwas not powerful or dominant enough to transcend those cultural and political forces which kept the cities of mainland Greece divided against each other.Whatever their personal motives may have been, itwas left toPhilip andAlexander, kings ofMacedon, to transform this talk into successful action by imposing the requisite unity upon Greece and arranging for theLeague of Corinth to declare war on thePersian empire.124 Franklin andMarshall College MiFlower@acad.FandM.edu
120. The SpartanLysander (Xen.Hell. 3.4.2), Jason of Pherae (Xen.Hell. 6.1.12), andAlexander theGreat (Arr.2.7.8-9) all believed that themarch of theTen Thousand had proved theweakness of the Persian empire. They were probably wrong: see Cawkwell 1972: 26-33; Starr 1976; Austin 1993: 203-204, esp. 204 n. 1; and in general Briant 1996. 121. This is a red-figure oinochoe of 465-460 which shows a young Greek, wearing only a cape and holding his penis in his right hand, about to penetrate a fully dressed Persian who is bending over. The inscription identifies the Persian as the loser: "I am Eurymedon. I stand bent over." See especially Schauenberg 1975 andWinkler 1990: 51. It is also illustrated in Miller 1997: figs. 1-2. For a different interpretation, see Pinney 1984. 122. On Agesilaus' campaign in Asia Minor, see Cartledge 1987: 180-202; Hamilton 1991: 86-119; and Shipley 1997: 41-46, 116-210. By sacrificing atAulis as Agamemnon had before him, Agesilaus, whatever his real intentions, represented himself as leading a panhellenic crusade against Persia. 123. See Cawkwell 1978: 150-65. Greek forces would have been hampered by lack of cavalry and siege equipment, the two things that made Alexander's conquest possible. 124. Their motives are discussed in detail by Flower 2000. See also Seibert (1998), who surveys earlier scholarship.
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From Simonides to Isocrates: The Fifth-Century Origins of Fourth-Century Panhellenism Author(s): Michael A. Flower Source: Classical Antiquity, Vol.

The Fifth-Century Origins of Fourth. Century Panhellenism

political disputes and simultaneously enrich themselves by uniting in common

Volume 19/No. 1/April 2000

who had been hired and given

From Simonides to Isocrates FLOWER:

Volume 19/No. 1/April 2000

ancient authorunambiguously uses Asia to refer to Ionia in a limited geographical

From Simonides to Isocrates FLOWER:

that at the time when

there already was to these passages of Herodotus' own

talk of a future Greek

is not to argue for the historicity times. In other words, I will

(which is doubtful), but rather to interpret them as revealing the thoughtpatterns

Volume 19/No. 1/April 2000

matters warriors, while you have reached thehighest level of excellence in

of the themes of fourth-century thought about the Persian empire.27 Aristagoras

FLOWER: From Simonides to Isocrates

Perhaps it is suspicious that Herodotus makes nomention of Aristagoras showing

Volume 19/No. 1/April 2000

FLOWER: From Simonides to Isocrates

the futility a coalition proposed entering

and evil consequences it also attempts states, 6.84 we of of Greek

Ionian revolt; In Book

that an invasion that Scythian with marching

are told the incredible the Phasis River and

ambassadors the Scythians inland from

to this same Cleomenes by way

Volume 19/No. 1/April 2000

FLOWER: From Simonides to Isocrates

Volume 19/No. 1 /April 2000

than peace." Although

to feel that a grand coalition such a war.43

against Persia was

fightingGreeks, he could not condone themoral and practical folly of thosewho

FLOWER: From Simonides to Isocrates

Volume 19/No. 1/April 2000

FLOWER: From Simonides to Isocrates

the Peloponnesian who were among Perhaps

to help the Spartans

Volume 19/No. 1/April 2000

FLOWER: From Simonides to Isocrates

and her allies

into the interior.63 Although

Volume 19/No. 1/April 2000

the sacred ambassadors approached he ordered them to leave; forCimon, he told

FLOWER: From Simonides to Isocrates

Hellenica is themore likely venue, but this cannot be proved.70

Volume 19/No. 1/April 2000

FLOWER: From Simonides to Isocrates

for us to be certain whether it actually

this story originated happened.77

Volume 19/No. 1/ April 2000

FLOWER: From Simonides to Isocrates

Volume 19/No. 1/April 2000

FLOWER: From Simonides to Isocrates

should not be laid open

Volume 19/No. 1/April 2000

to Isocrates FLOWER: From Simonides

be giving a performance at the time.

Volume 19/No. 1/April 2000

them not to make Oration