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HY424 Essay 2 05.12.2011 Arne Muis 3159 words Enlightened Oppression.

The Sinews of the Napoleonic Empire On the 15th of November 1807 Napoleon wrote to Jrme, newly imposed king of Westphalia that it is necessary for your subjects to enjoy a degree of liberty, equality and prosperity hitherto unknown among the peoples of Germany as well as wise and liberal administration Concluding that he must be a constitutional king, because the Germans, like the French, Italians and Spanish desire[d] equality and demand[ed] liberal ideas.1 Enlightened as these ideas may appear, they are a well-constructed fiction. Napoleons benevolent declarations were propaganda, what he in fact was trying to achieve was the ability to impose his will on conquered peoples, and squeeze his imperial possessions for the greater glory of France.2 Napoleon thoroughly understood that he required a mantle of legitimacy to establish imperial rule over a foreign people, but he never lost sight of the actual nature and goals of French imperial rule. Extraction and exploitation were the defining elements of imperial subjecthood, and neither were ever far from his mind.3 In another telling letter, to Eugne, on the 23rd of August 1810, he wrote that you should take for your motto: France first!4 There were three features that characterize the Napoleonic Empire. First it was a shortlasting Empire, with an imperial experience of only some twenty years. Second, Napoleonic imperialism was a continental affair, land-based, or more accurately, land-locked in mainland Europe by the Royal Navy. Third, Napoleonic imperialism was geared towards the exploitation of the subject peoples in both a military and an economic sense.5 The first two premises can be accepted quite uncritically, but the last might be a point of contention, certainly when juxtaposed with Napoleons imperial declarations. Although propaganda can obviously never be taken at face value. Napoleons correspondence indicates that in time, he came to see first France, then the formal Empire, and later the Grand Empire as extensions of himself, legitimised by the

Napoleon to Jrme, as quoted in Wright (1984) p. 106-7 Parsons (2010) p. 236 3 Ibid. p. 233 4 Napoleon to Eugne, as quoted in Wright (1984P p. 110 5 Ellis, in Dwyer (2001) p. 113-4
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ineluctable force of his destiny.6 Guided by such hubris, Napoleon held fast to the imperial ethos that France invariably came first, and that Napoleon decided where Frances interest lay. The Empire was established and maintained purely in the interest of Napoleon and France and amounted to little more than an extraction operation whereby the rest of Europe served as tax base and recruitment stations for the French war machine. The Napoleonic Empire had few ways in which it endeared itself to its subjects, conscription, tax, cultural and economic imperialism being just several, if the moist poignant, in a long list of grievances against the Empire. In short, Napoleon attempted to construct what was by the early nineteenth century already a bygone possibility, the establishment of a colonial Empire in Europe. The very ideas unleashed by the French revolution had made this neigh impossible. Yet oddly enough ideas of nationalism and enlightenment constituted the spectre of legitimization in Napoleons Empire, making for an interesting case-study of conflicting rhetoric and reality. Empire Established In 1790 the Constituent Assembly declared that The French nation renounces any intention of engaging in a war of conquest and will never employ its forces against the liberty of any people.7 The Girondins were quick to abandon this principle, followed by the National Convention, which offered the incredulous guarantee of fraternity and assistance to all peoples who seek to recover their liberty. 8 A belligerent promise that brought together the first coalition. When France declared war on Austria on 20 April 1792 it unleashed a wave of armed conflict that would only end at Waterloo. During the war of the first coalition France pursued a policy of considerable territorial expansion, establishing an Empire with its revolutionary armies. These newly acquired lands would later form the core of its European Empire: the Austrian Netherlands, the Netherlands, the Rhineland, and Italy.9 France stabilised under the Directory, but showed no sign of relinquishing its recent conquest, or of keeping its the pledges of nonviolence and assistance in recovering liberty. Instead it annexed the possessions it deemed to be within its natural borders, maintaining the imperial conquests of the Revolution. As the Directory fell prey to the coup dtat of the 18th Brumaire, France came under the sway of its most belligerent general, Napoleon Bonaparte. Throughout the years of the Consulate he signalled no change of course in the imperialist policies of the Directory, and unsurprisingly continued both the incessant wars and its territorial
Ellis, in Dwyer (2001) p. 113 Quoted in Dwyer (2002) p. 60 8 Quoted in Best (1982) p. 82-83 9 Esdaile (2001) p. 1-14
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expansion. In December 1804 the senate declared Napoleon emperor, quite unsurprisingly confirmed by a plebiscite. France had already been an imperial state since its first conquests, and the ideological as well as practical leap from republic to Empire was not great, even less so in the day-to-day running of the Empire.10 France now dispelled only the mere illusion of benevolent republicanism.11 The newly acquired territories were immensely expensive to maintain and defend. So France was forced to mobilise the required resources by building powerful centralised state institutions. Hence the new territories were transformed into either dpartment runis or sister republics, both of which were forced to reimburse French expenses for their liberation.12 As the dpartment runis were incorporated into the French state it comes as no surprise that they were forced to contribute men and revenue to Paris. The sister republics, which were as dominated by the Empire as the dpartment runis in all but name, compare quite unfavourably. These were spared the most blatant forms of imperial overrule and extraction, but utter dependence upon France was a humiliating and usually disadvantageous affair nonetheless. In any case, the newly formed French client states were given no illusion as to the meaning of their sovereign status. Napoleon demanded literally stunning payments in terms of money, food, military supplies an men of his allies. The Italian experience is a case in point, but similarly, the Dutch Batavian Republic was obliged to pay one hundred million guilders to gain Frances diplomatic recognition, a state which the former had forced upon the latter to begin with.13 An Empire with a nationalistic and aggressive France at its heart could not afford to be too tolerant or endearing. Napoleon had conquered his Empire by harnessing the powers of French nationalism, and those who followed him expected the new state to bring material rewards for themselves and France.14 The French people would understandably refuse to bleed for imperial gains if these amounted to nothing more than martial acts of international fraternity. Therefore the Empire had to make itself pay, and that had to be justified. Nature of Napoleonic Imperialism All Empires possess a civilizing mission, an imperial ideology that justifies the aggressive conquest and colonialism that constitutes imperial expansion, and the Napoleonic Empire was no exception. Although Napoleon wilfully and consciously nurtured the national ambitions of the
Dwyer & Forrest (2007) p. 4 Parsons (2010) p. 247 12 Ibid. p. 243 13 Ibid. p. 245 14 Ibid. p. 233
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populations he subjected, the Italians and Germans being an excellent example, this pre-modern form of self-determination was little more than a thin veneer of legitimacy covering conventional imperial expansion.15 Napoleon seemed to hold out the promise of a humane and inclusive imperial system. One that offered equality before the law and respect for private property through the Code Napoleon. As well as a certain form of national pride within the wider context of a continental Empire in which the outreaching hands of ralliement and amalgame offered real opportunities for local elites and men of ability.16 The ideas of the French revolution and the beginnings of nationalism may have changed the legitimizing ideology of imperialism, but the motivations for, and nature of it had not. Although policies of ralliement and amalgame aimed to foster the loyalty of local elites, and vague ideals of nationalism and enlightenment were provided to keep the populations in line, these were a long way away from disguising the harsh reality of imperial rule. Extraction and exploitation were still its core values.17 Furthermore, this nascent nationalism offered perils beside benefits, as the strength of a nation state rests on its ethnic homogeneity. Whereas imperial overlords are usually forced to tolerate and to a certain extent respect local elites, customs and minorities to maintain effective rule in their newly conquered territories, the process of nation-building is usually more aggressive. To achieve homogeneity minorities are generally offered a choice between assimilation, marginalization, persecution, or immigration, a process that was fuelled by employing ideas of nationalism as a mantle of imperial legitimacy.18 Also,because of nationalism Empires would eventually come to be seen as foreign and therefore illegitimate.19 Napoleon casting himself as the great patron of the Italian nation even after he had transformed it in an autocratic state run with a nepotistic rationale, being an excellent example. The primary function of Napoleonic imperialism, indeed of his reformist agenda, was instead to create an efficient and centralized auxiliary state, so as to better extract wealth and military conscripts from these subjected societies.20 Soldiers, money and supplies rather than advancing social equality or enlightened ideals were the mainsprings of Napoleons reforms.21 There was a significant difference in the nature of Napoleonic rule between the inner and the outer Empire. The Latter was under French rule for a shorter period of time, and hence French rule left less of an impression in these areas than in the territories of the inner Empire.
Parsons (2010) p. 232 Ibid. p. 232-233 A good overview of the historiography of this discussion is given by Ellis (2003) p. 89 - 106 17 Ibid. p. 233 18 Ibid. p. 240 19 Ibid. p. 235 20 Ibid. p. 238 21 Ellis (2001) p. 111
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The experience of imperial rule however was no less profound for being almost wholly negative, as these states were to suffer the highest demands from a modern Empire. Heavy taxation, adherence to the continental system (and the subsequent British blockade) as well as cultural imperialism would hit them simultaneously.22 Sinews of Empire France was the power base of Napoleons Empire, and the harnessed power of French nationalism was the key to its expansion. Napoleon therefore couldnt afford for his imperial project to be anything less than an expression of French greatness, one that was beneficial for France, as there was little point for France to engage itself militarily on behalf of foreign nations, unless there was profit to be gained through tribute, taxes and conscription. Hence the large indemnities imposed on foes and liberated territories alike. Napoleon explained this system with sufficient candour in 1805 to Eugne: My motto is: France first. You must never lose sight of the fact that, if English commerce triumphs on the seas, that is because the English dominate the oceans; it is therefore logical that, since France is superior on land, she should make her trade dominant there; otherwise all is lost. [] Italy is independent only with the goodwill of France; that this independence has been gained by French blood and French victories, [] France ought to obtain significant commercial advantages.23 That she did. In 1807 the combined income for France from the dpartements runis and the sister republics amounted to 359 million francs, half of Frances income that year.24 Empires had always revolved around extraction, but seldom had it been so effective or intrusive. The Kingdom of Holland took out a loan of 40 million florins to meet the required payments, and Westphalias annual spending on tribute and obligatory military expenses surpassed its revenue by 6 million francs a year.25 French revenue from Berg tripled between 1808 and 1813, whereas in Naples it increased by 50% during the first years of Murats reign.26 Garrison duties were an equally burdensome intrusion, imposed similarly on all subjected societies. During its occupation, a full two-thirds of the Neapolitan budget was spent on upholding French garrison troops. Equally harmful to the economies of subject states was the commercial exploitation employed by the Grand Empire. French merchants were allowed to trade freely throughout the Empire. All areas beyond the 1799 borders had to pay excessive duties on exports both the each
Broers (1996) p. 202 Napoleon to Eugne, 23 aug. 1810, as quoted in Wright (1984) p. 109-110 24 Parsons (2010) p. 257 25 Esdaile, in Dwyer (2001) p. 138-9, and Parsons (2010) p. 257 26 Esdaile, in Dwyer (2001) p. 139
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other and to France. These measures created a French export zone rather than a protected continental trading block, so states that had already seen both British and non-European markets closed to them were now forced into a system that squeezed out every European market in favour of the tariff-protected French centre.27 The tribute levied on conquest territories in terms of conscription and forced military expenses and contributions were as considerable and invasive as the fiscal contributions and trade limitations. Napoleon conscripted approximately one million non-French subjects into the Grande Arme. Different estimates exist, but anywhere between 25 % - 50 % of the army that invaded Russia in 1812 was not French.28 In the Rhineland, Napoleon conscripted 80,000 men out of a population of 1.6 million. 30 % of the all men within the age groups called up were bound to serve, in the dire year of 1813, however, this number had risen to 60 %. Less than half of these conscripts would eventually return home, and therefore constituted an incredulous drain on the Rhinelands resources.29 Conscription also imposed a heavy duty on territories with no prior experience of forced conscription or citizen armies. The Netherlands are a case in point, although they were spared the direct brunt of Napoleons extractive requests by the semibenevolent, semi-incompetent rule of Louis. Something that did not endear him to his brother who reprimanded him for his perceived weakness and favouritism for the Dutch in military and economic policy: Your Majesty, in ascending the throne of Holland, has forgotten that he is French, and has used all his powers to persuade himself that he is Dutch, adding that I have sufficient grievances against Holland to declare war on her.30 This was naturally quite unnecessary seeing that Holland was already a client state. When the Netherlands were incorporated into France direct extraction of its economic and military resources to the benefit of France became considerably easier, much to the detriment of the Dutch. Throughout the Empire, French culture became a benchmark for subjected elites and populations. Those who emulated French culture were deemed worthy of the imperial project, those who didnt required lessons in civilization before they could qualify for amalgame.31 It was this civilizing project that Napoleon dubbed liberation. Nations formerly subjected to the narrow superstitions of Church and feudalism would be able to realize their national destinies under Napoleon.32 Hence French rule brought rational secularism, a certain legal equality, created a uniform administrative system, and removed aristocratic and feudal institutions. Napoleon

Broers (1996) p. 224 Parsons (2010) p. 236 29 Rowe. Historical Journal 42 (1999) p. 665-6 30 Napoleon to Louis, 21 December 1809, as quoted in Wright (1984) p. 107-8 31 Parsons (2010) p. 237 32 Ibid.
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insisted on the application of the Code Napoleon in all subject territories to remove barriers to his direct rule.33 Rather than the enlightened measures these presented themselves to be, they were measurements that strengthened Napoleons ability to impose his will on conquered subjects.34 The idea that the Napoleonic Empire was a benevolent civilizing and modernizing operation aimed at the general good of Europe is as antithetical as the idea that the British established themselves in India to civilise its populations, and the greatest expression of that hypocrisy surfaced with the continental system. The continental system and the abuses of Empire When Napoleons last hope of subduing Britain by force had been smashed off the coast of Trafalgar, he hoped to strangle it economically instead. This was both a destructive and constructive measure, taken to wear down the British war effort by undermining the commercial base of its economic system, and to advance within Europe a new commercial, industrial and economic order under the hegemony of France.35 Although the policies and blockade initiated by the 1806 Berlin Decrees were designed to support and benefit the Empire, the exploitative and self-destructive policies that were the reality of the continental system would eventually undermine it, and create enmity among the trading nations of Europe under French dominion.36 Discriminatory internal tariffs and relocation of industry transformed the continent into a French export market, deeply impoverishing the disadvantaged areas. Key markets that now fell within the departments runis now became inaccessible to non-French producers, who were also unable to trade with Britain, nor anywhere else for that matter, at the courtesy of the royal navy.37 The foreseeable result of this was that serious overproduction, and resultantly falling prices, wrought economic havoc on the subject territories. France, however, came first, and imperial revenues continued to stream from periphery to the centre, directly financing Frances standard of living to the detriment of other nations. to add insult to injury, French merchants violated the blockade when it suited them.38 Eventually the continental system just became a mechanism for France to bleed the rest of Europe white. Napoleon invaded Russia on the pretext of forcing it to conform to the system, asking it to relinquish virtually its entire foreign trade. While at the

Parsons (2010) p. 249 Ibid. p. 236 35 Aaslestad in Dwyer & Forrest (2007) p. 115 36 Aaslestad in Dwyer & Forrest (2007) p. 115 37 Parsons (2010) p. 257 38 Ibid. p. 258
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same time he gave French traders increasing license to avoid the system. It even occurred that the occasional French ship attempted to sell British goods to the Russians.39 By 1813 large parts of the Empire were in open revolt to the emperor. The continental system was falling apart under its self-defeating policies, destructive inconsistencies, and continuous warfare. The continental system heralded popular hostility against imperial exploitation and the resulting economic depression. The Hamburg police director wrote to his Paris superiors that public dissatisfaction was caused by concrete economic grievances rather than political conspiracy.40 Popular hatred of the French erupted from economic depravity rather than nationalist aspirations. The French were hated and despised because their imperial rule had brought misery and poverty, in this case to Hamburg. On the day of the Hamburg uprising the aforementioned police director wrote that this is the spark that started the fire.41 Conclusion If Napoleon ever fully understood the forces and difficulties that obstructed his imperial project he was either possessed of the confidence that force of arms could subdue these, or of the hubris that his was such unsurpassed genius that he could treat Europe exactly as it served him. This, altogether, made the Napoleonic Empire one of the shortest-lasting in a long succession of imperial states, and confirmed a seeming new reality, that both a colonial Empire and a universal monarchy were concepts that could no longer be applied on the European continent. The Napoleonic Empire was a conquest state, and it is doubtful that many of its subjects considered the privilege of being ruled by the French sufficient compensation for the men and wealth the Emperor demanded in return.42 Ralliement and amalgam failed because they did not offset the drawbacks of occupation with sufficient benefits, and failed to protect nations and elites alike from the full weight of imperial extraction.43 there was simply no disguising the exploitation that imperial subjecthood entailed. In Italy, for example, Napoleon might have gotten away with his cynical manipulation of nascent Italian nationalism, but the French policy of transforming Italy into a mercantilist colony serving as a base of extraction made the lives of many Italians measurably worse, and therefore fostered resentment against French imperial rule.44 Had the Empire existed for a longer period of

Lieven (2009) p. 79 Aaslestad in Dwyer & Forrest (2007) p. 128 41 Ibid. 42 Parsons (2010) p. 238-9 43 Ibid. p. 257 44 Ibid. p. 274
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time it might have developed the imperial institutions that would have consolidated French rule and found a balance between acceptable levels of extraction and benefits. The brief episode that was Napoleons Empire never achieved that, and the imperial project therefore remained a French operation of extraction. Sources Best (1982). War and Society in Revolutionary Europe, 1770 1870. Leicester: LUP Broers (1996). Europe Under Napoleon 1799 1815. London: Arnold. Dwyer (2002). The French Revolution and Napoleon: a Sourcebook. London: Routledge. Dwyer (2001). Napoleon and Europe. London: Longman. Dwyer. Napoleon and the Universal Monarchy. History, 95:319 (2010) 293 307. Dwyer & Forrest (2007). Napoleon and his Empire. Europe 1804 1814. New York: Palgrave Macmillan Ellis (2003). The Napoleonic Empire. New York: Palgrave Macmillan Esdaile (2001). The French Wars 1792 1815. London: Routledge. Lieven (2009). Russia against Napoleon. London: Penguin. Parsons (2010). The Rule of Empires. Oxford: OUP. Rowe. Between Empire and Home Town: Napoleonic Rule on the Rhine, 1799-1814. Historical Journal, 42 (1999) 643-674. Wright (1984). Napoleon and Europe. London: Longsman.

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