PUS

O-Pf.ce of

13. Non-detained docket: The Detention and

Removal program does not have a
program to effectively manage its non-
detained docket. The appearance rate of
individuals released from ICE custody is
estimated to be 15 percent and the
program does not have the resources to
identify, locate, apprehend and process
the remaining 85%.
 Page 1 of2

Susan Ginsburg

From: Walter Hempel

Sent: Wednesday, March 31, 2004 10:57 AM
To: Susan Ginsburg
Subject: RE: Alien Absconder Initiative

Yes. Previously, ICE Special Agents were the main players in finding absconders. However, with the small
number of Special Agents available, other priorities were established and few cases were assigned. (Historical
note: Dan Cadman led the attempt to raise the concern that criminal aliens were on the street and a threat to
public safety. He devised ACAP "Alien Criminal Apprehension Program" to first insure that all incarcerated
criminal aliens were interviewed prior to their release from correctional facilities and secondly to institute a system
for targeting the worst criminal aliens at large and finding them. This led to some changes but the number of
Special Agents never increased and most of the effort became a locally (District) decided matter.) A number of
years ago, while still INS, the Deportation and Detention Branch (now DRO-Deportation Removal Operations)
stated that they would be taking over the identification and interviewing of all detained criminal aliens. However,
they needed more resources to do it. This led to a long and at times bitter battle within INS on whether INV (ICE)
would give positions and bodies to deportation. It has been resolved under DHS that it will go to DRO but the
majority of incarcerated criminal aliens are still interviewed and in some cases transported by ICE special agents.
DRO wants more fugitive operation teams to locate absconders. I don't know if they are targeting the worst
criminals or the easiest removals. I do know that a week after they issued their first 10 most wanted list, they had
found them all (unlikely in the real world).

I have really only spoken of criminal aliens because with 400,000 absconders, criminal aliens are the major
concern if there are not sufficient resources to attempt to locate all absconders.

DRO has formulated a ten year plan called "End Run" that addresses these problems. The goal of "End Run" is to
remove every alien under final orders and to interview every alien arrested and detained by law enforcement.

Original Message
From: Susan Ginsburg
Sent: Tuesday, March 30, 2004 5:44 PM
To: Walter Hempel
Subject: RE: Alien Absconder Initiative

Walter,

This information will certainly allow us to assess the CT benefits of this program as announced and derive
lessons learned!

It would be good to know if they have ended the program and why. I thought that the new budget request
does ask for FTEs for a number of new teams to find absconders - did you see this in the budget
testimony?

Thanks.

Original Message
From: Walter Hempel
Sent: Tuesday, March 30, 2004 5:18 PM
To: Vincent.archibeque@dhs.gov'
Cc: Susan Ginsburg; Janice Kephart-Roberts
Subject: Alien Absconder Initiative

Vince,

3/31/2004
 Page 2 of2

I enjoyed talking with you. Hope things are working out for you in Fugitive Operations. I am on
the 9-11 Commission team that is studying border control, travel documents, terrorist travel etc.
We are looking at the Alien Absconder Initiative that was launched after 9-11. Specifically we
would like to have a contact at ICE/DRO who handled the AAI and can provide information on:

1. Who was targeted in the original list of 5,900 aliens? What was the mechanism
for determining who was to be included in the original list? How many had identifiable terrorist
indicators? How many were from countries identified as supporting terrorism? How many were
criminal aliens and what definition was used to define a "criminal alien"? How many were males
and how many were females? What were the age groups? How many were located through
direct INS/ICE investigations? How many were located through referrals from other law
enforcement agencies? How many were located through the LESC (lAQs or NCIC) hits? How
many were charged criminally after being located? How many of these criminal prosecutions
were related to immigration violations? How many of these criminal prosecutions were related to
terrorist violations? How many were removed administratively? Of these, how many were
granted voluntary departure and how many were actually deported? To what countries were they
removed? Is the original list still being actively investigated? Of the original 5,900, how many
were located outside the United States having left the country on their own? Are any of these
aliens currently in custody (criminal or administrative)? Did any of these aliens receive an
immigration benefit after they were located?

2. What efforts were used to locate and apprehend the 5,900 aliens? What worked
and what did not? If this type of action was taken again, how would you execute it in light of your
experience with AAI?

My telephone number is 202-358-3253. Thanks for your assistance.

3/31/2004
Absconder Apprehension Initiative

Commissioner Ziglar, shortly after September 11, began to lay the groundwork for a new
immigration enforcement initiative - to locate, apprehend, and remove non-citizens who
had been ordered removed by an immigration judge, and failed to surrender to INS for
removal.1 Someone who has been notified of an order of deportation, and willfully fails
to surrender, is in violation of the deportation order and susceptible to federal felony
prosecution. These were known as absconders.

The INS estimated that there were at least 314,000 absconders. The Ziglar plan was to
have INS' Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC) review the absconder files to make
sure the individual had received formal notice of the deportation order, prioritize them by
date of the oldest orders, and place the information in the National Criminal Information
Center (NCIC) database which is accessible by State and local law enforcement.
According to NCIC standards, biographic data could be placed in NCIC only if the INS
could guarantee that if there was a hit on the name, the INS could confirm the identity of
the subject within 10 minutes. To meet this standard, the INS required that any entry into
NCIC be supported by a set of fingerprints and a photograph so that the LESC could
electronically transmit them to the querying law enforcement official if necessary.
Whereas NCIC already maintained a growing database of deported non-citizen felons, its
database of non-felon absconders was small. Both databases were in the NCIC Wanted
Persons file3. DOJ Doc. Request #9 Item 9 NCIC REQUESTS INFO ON HOW AAI
CASES WERE ENTERED INTO NCIC.

Under the Ziglar plan, State and local authorities who routinely queried the NCIC would
also receive a "hit" for the absconders. The Law Enforcement Support Center would
then contact the law enforcement agency to confirm the identity and place an INS
detainer or arrange for an INS agent to take the individual into custody and proceed with
removal. Finding terrorists was not a focus of the program.4 Attorney General Ashcroft
liked the idea and Commissioner Ziglar announced it on December 5, 2001, at an
appearance before the House Judiciary Committee and Chamber of Commerce.5

Shortly thereafter, an aide of the Attorney General learned of the initiative and re-cast it
as a counterterrorism program.6 Attorney General Thompson on January 25, 2002
provided guidance for the newly named Absconder Apprehension Initiative (AAI). He
explained that the object of the initiative was to deport 314,000 alien fugitives known as
absconders, in two phases. The first phase was to focus on several thousand priority
absconders "who come from countries in which there has been al Qaeda terrorist
presence or activity . . . because some of them have information that could assist our

1 Ziglar MFR p.
8 USC 1253 (failure to depart, imprisonment up to four years, 10 years if a criminal); 8 USC 1324d
(failure to depart, civil fine of $500 a day); 8 USC 1326 (reentry after deportation, imprisonment from two
to 20 years).
3 NCIC 2000, Operating Manual, Section 5.6
4 Ziglar MFR p.
5 Ziglar MFR p. [can we find Congressional testimony?]
6 how do we know it's Kobach?
Enforcing the Immigration Laws - Recommendations
Team 5 Walt Hempel 5/3/04

• Match immigration policy with immigration resources

Any changes in immigration policy need to consider the resources available to

properly administer and enforce the law. Currently there are 5,510,553 pending
applications for immigration benefits. There are also 621,794 pending petitions for
naturalization and 262,101 and 262,102 political asylum requests. As the backlog
grows, there is always the temptation to lower the standard or the security background
checks when faced with massive backlogs.

• Decrease the number of adjustment of status cases

In 2001, 1,064,318 aliens received immigrant status. There are two avenues for
obtaining immigrant status and getting a "green card". Traditionally America has
welcomed persons coming to the United States as immigrants. This means that a
pending immigrant is processed and approved outside the United States and enters as
an immigrant. The other method is to adjust to immigrant status after entering the
United States. 411,059 aliens immigrated to the United States while 653,239
adjusted their status while in the United States during 2001 \y of the aliens who
adjusted their status in the U.S. entered the U.S. illegally, obtained entry by fraud or
have violated non-immigrant status. In many cases, illegal aliens can get temporary
legal status while their application is pending. This encourages people to apply even
if they are not eligible. Thirdly, if the benefit is denied, the alien will be ordered to
leave the U.S. and if they don't leave, then the difficult, costly and time consuming
effort of trying to locate an absconder begins2. Screening for potential terrorists who
may try to immigrate to the United States is best done before they enter.

• Stop individuals from filing additional fraudulent benefit petitions

If an alien files a fraudulent application, they should not be allowed to continue filing
additional petitions. Some of the terrorists have had up to three marriages in the
United States before they could obtain their "green cards". One benefit application
denied because of fraud should bar the filing of new applications and set in motion
the removal of the alien from the United States.

• Increase pre-flight inspections outside the United States

Pushing the border out can increase security and decrease fraudulent claims to
political asylum. Pre-inspection of passengers before they can board flights to
America also prevents the problem of detaining and returning passengers who have
been denied entry. Some countries will also prosecute persons who present
counterfeit or altered documents when they are presented to U.S< officials at overseas
airports. It is better to deny terrorists space on an airplane then to turn them around
after they have entered the United States.

• Alien "A" files should be available electronically to all law enforcement and to
other agencies such as Consular Affairs at State Department.

Immigration files should be available electronically. Currently the millions and

millions of immigration files ("A" files) are paper files. They can be in a number of
locations. The National Files Center (NFC) holds the majority of these paper files.
The transfer of paper files is costly and time consuming. It prevents the rapid review
of files. It inhibits the expeditious removal of alien violators and slows down the
adjudication of immigration benefits. The State Department Consular officer should
be able to review "A" files relating to an applicant for a visa. The transition to
paperless files will be costly and require some changes in regulations.

• "A" files need to be linked to a biometric identifier to prevent multiple files

"A" files are name based. In many cases an alien can change his name and get a new
file. The current limited use of biometrics has reduced this problem but not
eliminated it. DHS, Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS), has expanded the
biometric collection requirement. However, to the extent possible, an "A" file must
be anchored to a biometric identifier.

• Privacy issues impede law enforcement

We have been told that "A" files of legal permanent residents (immigrants) and
naturalized citizens were not available to the Commission because they were covered
under the privacy act. In a number of cases, the files we requested were those of
convicted terrorists who are serving long sentences in Federal prisons. Immigrants
convicted of terrorist acts should be placed in deportation proceeding immediately.
Naturalized citizens who are convicted of terrorism should have their naturalizations
reviewed to see if they are subject to revocation of naturalization. If these actions are
not taken, the convicted terrorists retain their ability to remain in the United States
after they are released. They also may be able to petition other family members.

• Separate immigration data systems must be integrated and accurate

Many immigration data bases are not integrated. There is no easy way to make one
query and find the data from all the systems. (The Law Enforcement Support Center,
LESC, has created computer programs that unite some of the systems but this
programming is not available system-wide)

• Scale the amount of time permitted at entry to fit the actual needs of the traveler

Foreign visitors entering the United States with a B-2 tourist visa are currently given
six months to remain in the United States. Those entering under the visa waiver
program receive three months to remain legally in the United States, hi some cases
this is a reasonable time if matched to their economic resources, purpose of stay or
family relationships in the United States. However, to tour the United States for three
to six months is beyond the means of most travelers. The fact that these time periods
are basically automatic reduces the role of the Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
inspector and reduces effective interviewing which is needed at the primary
inspection level. The amount of time authorized for stay in the United States should
be more carefully determined. Potential terrorists need time to embed into the
country and in many cases they want to maintain a cover of legal immigration status.

• Better control of basic identity documents such as birth certificates, driver's

licenses, and government issued identification cards etc.

It is very difficult to determine if a government issued document is valid when there

are no national standards. There are hundreds of different birth certificates. Illegal
aliens are able to get valid driver's licenses in many states (and then can use them to
board an airplane). Some states issue state IDs that can be obtained easily in
fraudulent names3. The Federal government needs to set a minimum standard for
verification of the applicant's identity. It also has to set a minimum standard for the
security features that are incorporated into the document. A national match of births
and deaths would also help eliminate an imposter from using a deceased person's ID
to get new documents.

• Simplification of the deportation process

Many immigration violators are located far from our international borders. They are
given a charging document (Notice to Appear) that states the immigration violation
and when and where the alien's deportation hearing will be held. Whether the alien is
detained or released under bond or other conditions is largely dependent of the
criminal history and whether there is detention space or funds available for detention.

The Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR) then schedules a deportation

hearing. It the alien is not detained, the hearing may not be held for weeks or months.
In the mean time the suspected illegal alien is permitted to remain in the United
States. He can delay the hearing by the use of delaying tactics, changing attorneys,
feigned illness, etc. In many cases the outcome of the deportation hearing is not in
doubt as the alien has no legal relief available. The result is that the aliens can remain
in the United States for years before there is a decision.

The final step is that the alien gets a final order of deportation and a letter that they
have to surrender at some future date (called the run letter). If they don't surrender,
they become an absconder. Enforcement of the immigration laws must be fair and
timely. It makes no sense to release to the street any immigration violator who has no
reason to comply. It just turns a relatively simple process into a costly and time
consuming game.
• Better training of law enforcement on issues relating to immigration law,
document fraud, visas, immigration documents, naturalization, DHS ICE
resources, terrorist travel patterns, etc.

The immigration laws and regulations are complex. State and local law enforcement
agencies want and need better training to understand them. They need to know how
to examine documents to detect counterfeits and alterations. They want to know who
is legally in the United States and who is in violation of their immigration status.
They need to know alien rights, consular warnings and proper procedure. They need
to know how to contact ICE. State and local law enforcement are the first line of
defense against terrorism within the United States.

• Better integration of watch lists, lookouts etc. so that law enforcement does not
have to access multiple gateways

There are about 80,000 state and local law enforcement agencies in the United States.
They encounter hundreds of thousands of individuals every day. When an APB needs
to be issued for a suspected terrorist, state and local law enforcement must be
included. These officers routinely run about 3.5 million NCIC checks a day4. NCIC
is the most used gateway.

• Expand the delegation of immigration authority to state and local law

enforcement

The 1996 amendments to the INA5 permit ICE to enter into memorandums of
understandings with state and local law enforcement agencies to delegate immigration
authority. This has been used effectively with the Domestic Counter Terrorism Task
Forces in Florida and a small number of Alabama State Troopers. All participants
are carefully selected and the lengthy training mirrors that given to ICE Special
Agents at FLETC6. This results in a working relationship that benefits both the
Federal government and the state or local agency.

• Better integration of Federal immigration law enforcement and state and local law
enforcement

There has to be a better understanding of the role that state and local law enforcement
can play in the enforcement of immigration laws. Currently there is much confusion
as to what, if any, authority state and local law enforcement has in enforcing
immigration law. Yet most immigration administrative violations are also Federal
criminal violations7. This authority may vary from place to place depending on state
law. However, immigration status should always be considered after the alien is
arrested. It makes little sense to return a deportable alien to the street after they have
committed a crime. Public safety should be a consideration in reducing the number
of criminal aliens.
• Increased enforcement of benefit fraud violators

Immigration benefit fraud is big business. It is sophisticated and widespread. It also

defrauds many aliens who think they are dealing with a legitimate business.
Terrorists will use the opportunities of immigration benefits to remain in the United
States to carry out their operations. There are many instances of previous terrorists
filing fraudulent immigration benefit claims. The benefit fraud program that is being
developed by CIS needs to be supported by DHS8.

• Decrease the alien absconder rate

At the current pace, the number of aliens who abscond9 will continue to grow at an
alarming rate. Currently the estimate is about 400,000 and growing daily. In fact the
rate may actually increase as the policy of the Citizenship and Immigration Services
(CIS) is to refer all illegal aliens who are denied immigration benefits to deportation
court. The removal rate for aliens with final orders of deportation who were not
detained was 13%. Only 35% of non detained criminal aliens were removed. The
removal rate for detained aliens was 94%10. The lack of detention space, low bail or
release on recognizance and the lengthy time it can take to get a final order of
deportation all add to the problem.

• Border enforcement must be balanced with interior enforcement

The lack of interior enforcement encourages illegal entry either by crossing the border
without inspection or by entering legally and then staying beyond the authorized
length of stay. Once an alien sneaks across the border or gets through primary
inspection, there is little to no chance that they will ever be encountered by an ICE
officer. The difficult part is getting in, staying in is easy.

• Deny immigration benefits to aliens who violate our laws

Aliens who violate our immigration laws should not be permitted to apply for
immigration benefits. Rewarding those who violate our immigration laws only
encourages others to disregard the law.

• Increase CBP inspectors training and awareness of terrorist travel methods

We have interviewed many INS/CBP inspectors. They all want increased training in
fraudulent documents, terrorist travel profiles, interviewing techniques, country
profiles and sources of information. We think that this training needs to become
routine11. Train the trainers programs and/or contract instructors may be useful. For
instance if a flight was arriving from a country that had a history of document
violation, a briefing prior to the arrival of the flight may assist in preventing the entry
of fraudulent document holders.
• All aliens arrested by DHS should be fingerprinted and a ten print arrest card
should be sent to the FBI

The ICE/INS IDENT system which uses two fingerprints is not totally integrated with
the FBI LAPIS criminal record system that uses ten fingerprints12. Additionally, alien
absconders cannot be entered into the National Criminal Information Computer
(NCIC) without ten prints, a photograph and the proper immigration orders. NCIC is
routinely used by law enforcement and ICE places lookouts wanted aliens in NCIC.

• Expand expedited removal

Expedited removal is a procedure used for aliens who are inadmissible for fraud, false
or improper documents, or no documents at all. These inadmissible aliens can be
placed in expedited removal which does not require an EOIR hearing. Currently
expedited removal is used at ports of entry but could be expanded to the border
between ports of entry. There were 34,326 expedited removals in 200213. In many
cases, aliens are permitted to withdraw their application for admission and are not
placed in expedited removal.

• Information on students and schools should be available to the primary

immigration inspector

Primary inspectors should be able to quickly check whether a school is currently

approved for foreign students. Currently this information is only available in the
secondary inspection area.

• Sanctuary cities (Commissioner Lehman has asked about this at the hearings)

We are a nation of laws. When cities or counties order their law enforcement officers
not to work with Federal immigration authorities, they diminish the respect for the
laws of the United States. Aliens who commit crimes should not be afforded
protection from deportation because they receive a benefit from their immigration
violations. Many law enforcement agencies work effectively with ICE and still keep
the lines of communication open with their ethnic communities14. This disregard for
Federal law should be opposed by the Federal government.
1 2001 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service
2 WTC 1 conspirator Mohammed ABOUHALIMA entered the U.S. in 1985 as a B-2 visitor, he overstayed
his authorized time and worked illegally as a taxi driver. In 1987 he received temporary resident status
under the Special Agricultural Worker (SAW) program. He claimed in his application to INS that he had
picked beans in Florida for Lee Breedlove. A separate investigation determined that Breedlove had
provided over 260 fraudulent employment records for applicants to the SAW program. Breedlove pled
guilty in Federal court. Abouhalima's SAW application was denied 7/15/92. There is no indication in the
INS file that any effort was made to locate Abouhalima.
3 Seven of the 9-11 terrorists had State of Virginia issued identity documents.
4 FBI Facts for 2003
5 Section 287g delegation of authority
6 "FLETC" Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, Glynco, GA
7 Code of Federal Regulations
8 MFR CIS, William Yates, CIS started a fraud analysis of immigration benefits applications but ICE, who
was doing the field work, terminated the study before it was completed.
9 This refers only to aliens who have been placed in deportation proceedings and have a final order of
deportation
10 USDOJ/OIG Report Number 1-2003-004, February 2003, The Immigration and Naturalization Service's
Removal of Aliens Issued Final Orders
1' Even briefings prior to the arrival of flights from certain countries to provide the inspectors with the
latest information on lookouts, document fraud, country backgrounds to assist in the examination, etc.
12 USDOJ, OIG Report no. 1-2002-003, December 7, 2001 Status of IDENT/IAFIS Integration
USDOJ, OIG, March, 2004, IDENT/IAFIS: The Batres Case and the Status of the Integration Project
13 Immigration Law Handbook, 2003A edition, Gould Publications
14 ICE has community outreach programs and officers trained in witness assistance and domestic abuse
who can assist in those instances where a victim of crime is an illegal alien.
 Page 1 of2

Walter Hempel

From: Susan Ginsburg

Sent: Sunday, April 04, 2004 10:49 AM
To: Chris Kojm
Cc: Tom Eldridge; Walter Hempel
Subject: Absconder Apprehension Initiative - your q's answered

Chris,

Attached is what we originally sent you - with changes responsive to your questions in bold. We do plan to
discuss Phase 2 briefly in our longer write-up, to provide context for a discussion of the different goals and
overlap of immigration and CT-immigration enforcement policy, but since Phase 2 was not a counterterrorism
initiative there is no need to say much here.

Am here for any further q's.

Will send detainee and Condor issues next.

Susan

Absconder Apprehension Initiative

INS Commissioner James Ziglar, shortly after September 11, proposed that 314,000 absconders' names be placed in the
National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database. Absconders were non-citizens who had failed to depart the United
States after receiving a final order of deportation from an Immigration Judge. This program was not focused on terrorism
and did not include any increased effort to locate the individuals. The office of Attorney General Ashcroft decided to
name the program the Absconder Apprehension Initiative (AAI) and break it into two parts. Phase 1 was to be a
counterterrorism initiative, to locate and remove a smaller number of non-citizen males from al Qeada supporting
countries. The INS National Security Unit mobilized extensive resources to mount a nationwide search for over 5,000 non-
citizens. These priority absconders' names were to be entered into National Crime Information Center (NCIC) so that when a
State or local officials encountered someone during an investigation, the names of the absconders would be in the databases
against which they ran checks. The Commission is still trying to determine how many of the NSU-tracked absconders were
IU
actually entered into NCIC. By spring 2003, the entries had resulted in 32 positive hits in NCIC; only 1,139 of the
approximately 5,000 designated absconders had been apprehended; immigration authorities had removed 803 of these, and
01
224 were in custody and awaiting removal, and U.S. Attorneys were criminally prosecuting 45. The Commission has
sought to confirm the final accounting of Phase I of the Alien Absconder Initiative. Our information is incomplete. So far,
the Commission has not learned that any of the absconders who were removed as part of the Phase I group were deported
under a terrorism statute, prosecuted for terrorist related crimes, or indeed being linked in any way to terrorism. With
respect to the remaining absconders, from non-al Qaeda linked countries, ICE continues with limited success to work
to meet NCIC standards for the placement of names in the system. A limited number of fugitive operations teams are
targeting and searching for selected individuals on this list. The targeting priorities are unclear. The number of
absconders continues to rise. Approximately 85 percent of individuals who are ordered deported fail to surrender.

01
Testimony of Joe Green, INS Assistant Commissioner for Investigations, before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on
Immigration, June 19, 2002.
121
Testimony of Mike Dougherty, Director of Operations, Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE),
Department of Homeland Security, before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, May 8, 2003.

4/5/2004
 COMMISSION SENSITIVE
[Unclassified]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Telephonic Interview with Louis Nardi

Type of event: Telephone Interview
Date: April 1,2004
Special Access Issues: N/A
Prepared by: Walter T. Hempel
Team Number: 5
Location: Telephone
Participants - Louis Nardi, Former Deputy Director of the INS National Security Unit
Participants - Commission: Walter T. Hempel, Staff

Background
Lou Nardi was Deputy Director of the INS National Security Unit (NSU) from to .
During that time the Alien Absconder Initiative (AAI) Phase 1 was initiated. The AAI was run
out of the NSU in HQ and they had the responsibility to report the results, through channels, to
DOJ.

Nardi did not know how the initial 6,000 non-citizens were extracted from the pool of 314,000
that INS Commissioner Ziglar had announced as absconders. Nardi believed that the 314,000
were a computer search of the Deportable Alien Control System (DACS) which maintains
information on aliens that are in the deportation process, in INS custody, or who have been
deported from the United States. The DACS system, like all INS information systems, was well
known to have unreliable data. With at least eight "stovepipe" computer data bases, DACS
frequently would reflect that the alien was deportable when in fact there was a benefit
application under consideration. Also some deportable aliens in DACS had been granted
permanent residence or had been naturalized. INS often created multiple "A" files that were not
consolidated. This was because of poor recordkeeping, the use of names instead of biometrics to
open new files and the incompatibility of the various recordkeeping systems.

The AAI project was considered a critical task at NSU. This was at a time when over 50% of the
2,000 INS Special Agents in the field had been assigned to the FBI for post 9-11 investigations.
The NSU did not have the personnel to handle the initial 6,000 target files. It was necessary to
bring in intelligence officers from the Office of Intelligence and assign them to reviewing the
files. This was at a time when there was an increased demand for products from the Office of
Intelligence. Many Special Agents from the field were detailed for extended periods of time to
work on the mechanics of the AAI project. The Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC) was
tasked with entering the AAI cases into the National Crime Information Center (NCIC). The
LESC is the only 24/7 computer link between law enforcement agencies and INS for criminal
alien record checks. After 9-11, the number of daily record check queries increased greatly as
the nation's law enforcement agencies tried to prevent another terrorist attack.

COMMISSION SENSITIVE
 COMMISSION SENSITIVE

The initial 6,000 non-citizens were selected based on three criteria:

1. Males
2. Final orders of deportation
3. Place of birth or citizenship was in al Qaeda supporting countries

The list of non-citizens was run through the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF).
There numerous databases were checked for information. The FTTF also diverted some cases
out of the AAI project and provided them directly to the FBI. This process and other data
searches conducted by the NSU and the LESC resulted in a final target population of
approximately 5,000 to 5,200 non-citizens.

The NSU took these files and determined the last address of record. A work file was then sent to
the INS Investigations Office having jurisdiction over the last known address. Each District
office had a Supervisory Special Agent as a POC. The file was then checked again against
national and local databases. (Note: Many local databases such as public utility records, parking
violations, welfare records, etc. could not be searched from HQ). This required considerable
effort at the local office when the services of every INS office were severely taxed. The work
file was then usually assigned to a Special Agent (some were handled by SA's assigned to the
Joint Terrorist Task Forces, JTTF). There was a thirty (30) day call up on all assigned cases.
Thirty day extensions were only given when there were other open leads that had been developed
locally or there was a probability that the case could be closed by an arrest within the next thirty
days. All extensions had to be approved by NSU. The targeted population was not distributed
evenly throughout the United States. Some cities like Detroit and New York had a large number
of assigned AAI cases and did not have enough Special Agents to work them. In many cases, the
location of the deportable alien was determined to be in another city. The work file would have
to be completed, returned to NSU and reassigned to another office.

Copies of significant documents in the "A" file were made and sent to the LESC. The LESC
would review the data and enter accepted cases into the NCIC wanted person file. However the
majority of the AAI cases were not entered into the NCIC because the "A" files did not contain
the required fingerprint card, photograph, or other data. These were needed to meet the NCIC
standard for "hit" confirmation.

Nardi stated that most of the selected cases were not criminal aliens. Some of the cases were
quite old and had few local leads. He did not remember any that had terrorist identifiers and to
the best of his knowledge, none of these cases resulted in terrorist prosecutions.

Lessons Learned

The AAI project was a costly, time consuming and labor intensive project. INS was not prepared
to undertake a nationwide investigation of this size.

Intelligence officers, who were critically needed to evaluate information in the Office of
Intelligence, were instead detailed to NSU to do clerk level data checks.

COMMISSION SENSITIVE
 COMMISSION SENSITIVE
NSU, which had the lead in INS' counter terrorism efforts, was forced to divert many of their
Special Agents and administrative staff from more critical counter terrorism investigations to the
AAI.

Many Special Agents were detailed to the HQ NSU in Washington, DC from throughout the
nation. This reduced the availability of local INS investigations offices to assist in the many
demands for their services after 9-11. It also reduced the number of SA's available to conduct
the local AAI investigations.

There was no available computer program available to handle this type of stand up project. NSU
had to create a stand alone computer data system that did not interface with the existing INS
systems. This was time intensive and required daily maintenance.

All INS "A" files are paper files. Only a small amount of the information is in a database. None
of the INS databases contained electronic copies of the required documents for the work files.
The result was that the handling of the 5,000 or so AAI files was done by hand. Handling and
storing the files was a problem as there was no dedicated office space for a project of this size.

Many of the tasks that had to be done with each file, should have been done with contract
employees. Using contract employees to do the data searches, data input, copying and filing
would have eliminated the need to detail intelligence officers, special agents and other skilled
officers. This would have resulted in a much better use of very limited investigative personnel.
It would also have been mush more cost effective.

INS needs to prepare in advance for this type of a situation even if it is not terrorist related.

[Classification]

COMMISSION SENSITIVE
In response to questions submitted in Department of Justice request No. 9, and based on
an interview with officials from the Detention and Removal (D&R) and Office of
Investigations (INV) sections of ICE, the Commission would like to receive:

Special interest detainees program

• The Microsoft database of special interest aliens (9-11 detainees) maintained by
D&R

• In addition, for each of the 768 detainees identified by last name, first name, and
A number, their citizenship country, destination country, and "decision code"
(referring to final disposition of their immigration charges)

• The final summary of the special interest program prepared by D&R

Alien Absconder Initiative (AAI)

• The final closing report on AAI prepared by INV before turning the program over
to D&R

• The total number of aliens in AAI placed in NCIC

/•
• The number of intelligence reports sent to the Department of Justice pursuant to
the memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Thompson to the Commission,
[date]

NCIC generally
• The total number of aliens currently entered into NCIC

NSEERS
• The closing report prepared by INV on NSEERS

National Security Law Unit docket

• The number of immigration cases in the National Security Law Unit docket
W:\Datmdb Monday, April 19, 2004
Table: SIC Page: 1

Columns
Name Type Size
ANumber Text 9
LName Text 30
FName Text 30
MName Text 50
Alias Text 50
DOB Date/Time 8
POB Text 50
Minor Yes/No 1
Sex Text 50
Age Text 50
V«iy i\{^ Yes/No
FBIList- Lo^*« I,;i-f7frfl 1
1 MH.V? Yes/No
1
OtherAgencylnt*.
ArrestLocation Text 50
ArrestAgency Text 50
ArrestDate Date/Time 8
ImmigCharge Text 50
ImmigCharge2 Text 50
ImmigChargeS Text 50
CaseCategory** ft-* Kelvin j i^/ Text 50
NTARequired •» Yes/No 1
NTAServedonAlien Yes/No 1
NTAdtServed Date/Time 8
ChargDocServed Yes/No 1
ChargDocDt Date/Time 8
ChargDocServedCmts ., Text 50
EOIRdt- Date/Time 8
EOIRComment- Text 50
FinalOrderofRemoval Yes/No 1
FORDate Date/Time 8
Region Text 3
DistSect Text 50
CaseAgent Text 50
CaseAgentTel Text 50
FBIInterest - Text 50
CustodyLocation* Text 50
ThreatAssessmentDt» S^t,^t^~/ Date/Time 8
ReviewOfficer- Text 50
DetentjonRecommendation — Text 50
Bondlnfo Text 50
SegregatedWant *~ Yes/No 1
Segregation^— Yes/No 1
TransferAuthEAC •• R*t. A***^ C*» *». flC/f 1 Date/Time 8
FinalCustodyLocation Text 50
JTTFComments * Memo -
INSCrim» Title. # Yes/No 1
CounselComments ~ Memo -
DROComments " Memo -
LegallySufficientDte ^ Date/Time 8
LegallySufficient > Text 50
W:\Datmdb Monday, April 19, 2004
Table: SIC Page: 2

LegallysufficientAttorney Text 50
NextHearingDt Date/Time 8
NextHearingType Text 50
DtlastUpdate Date/Time 8
CustodyAgency Text 50
ThreatClassification Text 20
ThreatclassificationDraft Text 20
CourtAction Memo -
RecordCreationDate Date/Time 8
RecordCreationTime Date/Time 8
InDETs _ DCV~«rh«»</ Yes/No 1
InDACs Yes/No 1
NeedUpdate- Yes/No 1
CallUpDt - fcttntftttr Date/Time 8
ImmigStatus Text 50
BondSet Yes/No 1
BondHearingSched Date/Time 8
BondHearingCompleted Date/Time 8
Released Yes/No 1
ReleaseDt Date/Time 8
ReieaseType Text 50
Removed Yes/No i
Ren-.ovedDi. " T^te/Time - .^- - -
CustTransfSecure -. "^ Yes/No 1
CustTransfSecureDt •• Date/Time 8
CrimChg - Text 150
DtAlienAdvised *» Date/Time 8
DtConsulateNotified * Date/Time 8
DoNotCount » Yes/No 1
RollinceDt «• q^/««£.c Date/Time 8
FBINoticeDt „ Date/Time 8
VDGranted Yes/No 1
VDGrantedDt Date/Time 8
VDGrantedUntilDt Date/Time 8
VDGrantedExtendedDt Date/Time 8
Who*r Text 50
Absconder - Yes/No 1
TDRequested - Yes/No 1
TDDt- Date/Time 8
DtToHQ.»~n> f«0 V H& Date/Time 8
DtTDReceived Date/Time 8
CaseOnAppeal Yes/No 1
CaseOnAppealDt Date/Time 8
FreeLegalSvc Date/Time 8
OperationCode Text 50
AlertCode Text 50
1323* Yes/No 1
SaseLS,- L^«> Yes/No 1
CaseAAI •»• Yes/No 1
CasePentBomb - Yes/No 1
CaseOther^ Yes/No 1
.CacoHH ••• Yes/No 1
Commissioner Ziglar, shortly after September 11, began to lay the groundwork for a new
immigration enforcement initiative ~ to locate, apprehend, and remove BeR-crrtzen^
criminals who had absconded, that is, non-citizens who had been [indicted or convicted?]
for violating federal criminal laws, been released on bond by a federal court, been
ordered removed by an immigration judge, and failed to surrender to INS for removal.1
Commissioners since 19xx had made the removal of criminal aliens a priority and INS
enforcement cases had [increased %] since 19xx.2 But the INS had not undertaken to
find missing federal criminals; the focus was the removal of non-citizens directly from
prisons. The INS estimated that there were 314,000 absconders. The Ziglar plan was to
review the absconder files to make sure [what?], prioritize them by date of the oldest
orders, and place the information in the National Criminal Information Center (NCIC)
database accessible by State and local law enforcement. State and local authorities
encountering such convicted criminals would then be able to contact the INS to send an
agent to take the individual into custody and proceed with removal, [was Ziglar planning
to send any INS agents to look for them?] Finding terrorists was not a focus of the
program. Attorney General Ashcroft approved the program and Commissioner Ziglar ' ' f
announced it in an appearance before Congress.4 7

1 Ziglar MFR p.

3 Ziglar MFR p.
4 Ziglar MFR p. [can we find Congressional testimony?]
Once someone has notice and fails to show up that they are then in violation of a
federal criminal statute. As long as they had final notice, did not matter whether
they were out on bond or not.

If there was not a greeny in the file (return receipt) got put aside for more actual notice
investigations.

We want you to go through and identify persons from Condor countries, put them in
NCIC, send files to US Attys in the districts, pursue them with FBI.
Susan Ginsburg
m-mmmmm—m mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm^^^ personal Privacy

From: Cadman, Dan I "T

Sent: Wednesday, March 31, 20044:42 PM
To: Susan Ginsburg
Subject: Re: Wed

Today (Wed) is pretty much shot for me; I'm just getting back into the office after a day out in the field, etc. and have a
fierce headache, so I hope to leave in the next few moments. Sometime tomorrow? My tel is 011-34-91-587-2332 direct
and -2323 via secretary. (We don't have voice mail here.) Fax no. is 587-2257. There is at the moment a 7-hour
difference in time, because Spain has begun daylight savings a few days earlier than the U.S. does.

Reply Separator
Subject: Wed
Author: "Susan Ginsburg" <SMTP:sginsburg@9-11commission.gov>
Date: 3/30/2004 7:00 PM

Dan,

may need to call you Wed-Thur. Will you be available? Would you tell me your tel and fax number?

Thanks.

Susan
 Page 1 of2

Walter Hempel

From: Walter Hempel

Sent: Wednesday, March 31, 2004 10:57 AM
To: Susan Ginsburg
Subject: RE: Alien Absconder Initiative

Yes. Previously, ICE Special Agents were the main players in finding absconders. However, with the small
number of Special Agents available, other priorities were established and few cases were assigned. (Historical
note: Dan Cadman led the attempt to raise the concern that criminal aliens were on the street and a threat to
public safety. He devised ACAP "Alien Criminal Apprehension Program" to first insure that all incarcerated
criminal aliens were interviewed prior to their release from correctional facilities and secondly to institute a system
for targeting the worst criminal aliens at large and finding them. This led to some changes but the number of
Special Agents never increased and most of the effort became a locally (District) decided matter.) A number of
years ago, while still INS, the Deportation and Detention Branch (now DRO-Deportation Removal Operations)
stated that they would be taking over the identification and interviewing of all detained criminal aliens. However,
they needed more resources to do it. This led to a long and at times bitter battle within INS on whether INV (ICE)
would give positions and bodies to deportation. It has been resolved under DHS that it will go to DRO but the
majority of incarcerated criminal aliens are still interviewed and in some cases transported by ICE special agents.
DRO wants more fugitive operation teams to locate absconders. I don't know if they are targeting the worst
criminals or the easiest removals. I do know that a week after they issued their first 10 most wanted list, they had
found them all (unlikely in the real world).

I have really only spoken of criminal aliens because with 400,000 absconders, criminal aliens are the major
concern if there are not sufficient resources to attempt to locate all absconders.

DRO has formulated a ten year plan called "End Run" that addresses these problems. The goal of "End Run" is to
remove every alien under final orders and to interview every alien arrested and detained by law enforcement.

Original Message
From: Susan Ginsburg
Sent: Tuesday, March 30, 2004 5:44 PM
To: Walter Hempel
Subject: RE: Alien Absconder Initiative

Walter.

This information will certainly allow us to assess the CT benefits of this program as announced and derive
lessons learned!

It would be good to know if they have ended the program and why. I thought that the new budget request
does ask for FTEs for a number of new teams to find absconders - did you see this in the budget
testimony?

Thanks.

—Original Message—
From: Walter Hempel
Sent; TilffiriaY. March 30, 2m 5\}8 PM 9/11 Personal Privacy
Tol I
Cc: Susan Ginsburg; Janice Kephart-Roberts
Subject: Alien Absconder Initiative

Vince,

3/31/2004
QFR's

Alien Absconder Initiative

Who was targeted in the original list of 5,900 aliens? What was the mechanism for determining
who was to be included in the original list? How many had identifiable terrorist indicators? How
many were from countries identified as supporting terrorism? How many were criminal aliens and
what definition was used to define a "criminal alien"? How many were males and how many were
females? What were the age groups? How many were located through direct INS/ICE
investigations? How many were located through referrals from other law enforcement agencies?
How many were located through the LESC (lAQs or NCIC) hits? How many were charged
criminally after being located? How many of these criminal prosecutions were related to
immigration violations? How many of these criminal prosecutions were related to terrorist
violations? How many were removed administratively? Of these, how many were granted
voluntary departure and how many were actually deported? To what countries were they
removed? Is the original list still being actively investigated? Of the original 5,900, how many
were located outside the United States having left the country on their own? Are any of these
aliens currently in custody (criminal or administrative)? Did any of these aliens receive an
immigration benefit after they were located? How many of the AAI targets were entered into
NCIC?

2. What efforts were used to locate and apprehend the 5,900 aliens? What worked
and what did not? If this type of action was taken again, how would you execute it in light of your
experience with AAI?
 Page 1 of 1

Waiter Hempel
From: Walter Hempel
Sent: Tuesday, March 30, 2004 5:18 PM 9/11 Personal Privacy
To: I I
Cc: Susan Ginsburg; Janice Kephart-Roberts
Subject: Alien Absconder Initiative

Vince,
I enjoyed talking with you. Hope things are working out for you in Fugitive Operations. I am on the 9-11
Commission team that is studying border control, travel documents, terrorist travel etc. We are looking at the
Alien Absconder Initiative that was launched after 9-11. Specifically we would like to have a contact at ICE/DRO
who handled the AAI and can provide information on:

1. Who was targeted in the original list of 5,900 aliens? What was the mechanism for determining
who was to be included in the original list? How many had identifiable terrorist indicators? How many were from
countries identified as supporting terrorism? How many were criminal aliens and what definition was used to
define a "criminal alien"? How many were males and how many were females? What were the age groups?
How many were located through direct INS/ICE investigations? How many were located through referrals from
other law enforcement agencies? How many were located through the LESC (lAQs or NCIC) hits? How many
were charged criminally after being located? How many of these criminal prosecutions were related to
immigration violations? How many of these criminal prosecutions were related to terrorist violations? How many
were removed administratively? Of these, how many were granted voluntary departure and how many were
actually deported? To what countries were they removed? Is the original list still being actively investigated? Of
the original 5,900, how many were located outside the United States having left the country on their own? Are
any of these aliens currently in custody (criminal or administrative)? Did any of these aliens receive an
immigration benefit after they were located?

2. What efforts were used to locate and apprehend the 5,900 aliens? What worked and what did
not? If this type of action was taken again, how would you execute it in light of your experience with AAI?

My telephone number is 202-358-3253. Thanks for your assistance.

4/1/2004
 Texas police Department, fall 20020.) Main Justice attempted to resolve
this problem with a legal opinion that permitted state and local authorities
to arrest both civil and criminal absconders. (DOJ Office of Legal
Counsel....)
Second, there was a concern over adequate resources to complete the
project. For example, the NY US Attorneys had 20 percent of the cases,
with 1,100 assigned. A request was made for doubling of their staff.
(Letter to Larry Thompson from Alan Vinegrad, EDNY and James
Comey, SONY.)
Third, the second phase of the Initiative was suffering a "95% rejection
rate due to various A-file deficiencies... even eliminating (certain proof of
notice requirements) the rate is still likely to remain below 50%."

In May 2003, the new DHS ICE stated that of the "5,000 priority absconders1',
only 1,139 had been apprehended. These individuals should be, as described by
Thompson previously, convicted felons from countries with a connection to al
Qaida. Of those, 803 had been removed, 224 were in custody and awaiting
removal, and 45 were being criminally prosecuted by US Attorneys. (Testimony
of Mike Dougherty, Director of Operations, ICE, before the House Judiciary
Subcommittee on Immigration, May 8, 2003.) ^

Of the remaining 300,000 plus absconders, 80,000 had criminal records. Without
voluntary departures tracked (yet), ICE does not know how many remain in the
U.S. ICE was moving the Initiative from Investigations section to Detentions
and Removal. (Same as above.)

Moreover, in the 2003-2012 Detention and Removal Strategic Plan, D & R states
that for those persons let out on bond, only 15% reappear for their hearing, and
that ICE hasn't the resources to locate the remaining 85%. (Section 2.5, August
15,2003.)
Another result question for Director Mueller:

Pursuant to the Absconder Apprehension Initiative guidance from DAG Larry

Thompson to the FBI Director Jan. 26, 2002:
• how many absconders has the FBI prosecuted under this program that had a
nexus to terrorism! (beyond being from a particular country)
• how many absconders did the FBI interview and obtain evidence/information
concerning terrorism?
• how many absconders were offered S visas at the request of the FBI?

(Per memo January 26, 2002 from Larry Thompson to FBI Director and others
Re: Guidance for Absconder Apprehension Initiative
• Memo directs investigators to conduct interviews and provide written results to
the Anti-Terrorism Coordinator in the US Attys Office who will ensure that the
information is entered into the Computerized Reporting System that was
developed and used in the Interview Project
• Anti-Terrorism Coordinator will provide EOUS A regular reports on the number
of absconders apprehended and interviewed in each district and the status of any
prosecutions arising from this Initiative.)