Once More on Laclau and Mouffe

Paper to be Presented at the Political Studies Association, Annual Conference, University of Swansea, 1-3 April 2008

David Bates

Department of Applied Social Sciences, Canterbury Christ Church University

david.bates@canterbury.ac.uk

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Abstract

The publication of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy in 1985 marked the birth of post-Marxism as a counter-hegemonic philosophical movement. This movement considered the critique of essentialism as the sine qua non of a new vision for the Left conceived in terms of a radical plural democracy.(See Mouffe, 1993: frontis.) The response from the old left was robust. For Wood (1998) Laclau and Mouffes work was representative of a form of retreat of the left, a retreat evident initially in the work of Poulantzas. And Geras (1990) provocatively maintained that Laclau and Mouffes approach ought not to be viewed as post-Marxism so much as a form of ex-Marxism, and an ex-Marxism without substance to boot. In this paper I evaluate Laclau and Mouffes anti-foundationalist philosophy in the light both of these criticisms and more recent debates and interventions. Specific attention will be given to their arguments pertaining to hegemony, articulation, and discourse. These issues will be addressed primarily through an exploration of the significance of Laclau and Mouffes work for an understanding of the political role of the intellectual both in relation to the socialist tradition and radical democracy.

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Once More On Laclau and Mouffe

David Bates

The Post-Marxist approach of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe comprise in one respect one of the most original attempts to reformulate socialist categories in light of the crisis of Marxism, and the various defeats experienced by the European Left from the late 1970s. In this paper I explore some of the central tenets particularly (though not exclusively) of Laclau and Mouffes early work around three main interrelated themes hegemony, objectivity, and the political role of intellectuals. Given the focus of this session, attention will also be given to the Gramscian heritage of Post-Marxism.

1. Marxism and Hegemony For Laclau and Mouffe, Marxism has throughout its history been largely essentialist, mechanistic, and foundationalist.1 For example, the authors insist that for Marx, the ideological superstructure is a simple effect of the economic base; that is an epiphenomenal expression of mechanistic one way causal relations. So, Laclau writes of this model that: History, in its ultimate determining level, is explained exclusively in terms of the contradiction between productive forces and relations of production. (Laclau, 1990a: p. 6) Thus historical necessity rather than contingency becomes the focus in the Marxist model, however such an approach presents Marxism with a problem for not all social phenomena can be brought within such a monistic explanatory structure. This meant that Marxism was either to attempt to produce a reductonist form of explanation in which everything can be understood in terms of its basic categories (the gender struggle is simply an expression of the class struggle etc.), or on the other hand a dualistic explanation acknowledging that economic necessity cannot explain all social phenomena that is there is a space for contingency. And the work of those Marxists who acknowledged a space for such contingency particularly though not exclusively Gramsci is regarded as the high point of Marxist thought; indeed, this is perhaps a little misleading, for their real achievement Laclau and Mouffe seem to believe, was that such authors started to reach beyond Marxism. To this extent they were forerunners of Post-Marxism, but forerunners who failed to embrace contingency. A logic of necessity was for Laclau and Mouffe to be rejected, and along with it the base-superstructure model (see Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: p. 12); for there can no longer be a demarcation between economic and the ideational both being a product of discourse. It is not simply the case therefore that ideology was all-pervasive, penetrating all human relations, whether they were economic, social or political (Tormey and Townshend, 2006);

For Discussions of this theme see Geras, 1990a; Mouzelis, (1988); Smith, 1998; Wood, 1998; Townshend and Tormey, 2006)

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rather the very category of ideology it would seem must be rejected. Contingency, not necessity was the state of the present social formation. Gramscis Marxism is far removed from crude variants. Indeed, he famously proclaimed the October Revolution to be a revolution against Capital. Marxs later thought was contaminated by positivist and naturalist encrustations. (Gramsci, 1994: p. 40) Of the Bolsheviks, he wrote: They are living out Marxist thought which continues the heritage of German and Italian idealism Marxist thought has always identified the most important factor in history not crude, economic facts, but rather men themselves, and the societies they create, as they learn to live with one another (Gramsci, 1994 p. 40) Leaving aside the relative merits of this characterisation of Marxisms achievements, we might note Gramscis enthusiasm for the Bolsheviks. Gramsci after all believed his theory of hegemony to be an adaptation of the Leninist one, though as Fiori (1970) et al. have noted, he understated the originality of his achievement. Laclau and Mouffe definitely consider Gramscis conception of hegemony to be an advance on the Lenins, a watershed in the history of Marxist thought - Gramsci sowed the seeds for radical democracy. Alas, their enthusiasm is short-lived: For Gramsci, even though the diverse social elements have a merely relational identity achieved through articulatory practices - there must always be a single unifying principle [an essentialist core] in every hegemonic formation, and this can only be a fundamental class. (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: p. 68) Before assessing Laclau and Mouffes theory of hegemony, I want to pause in order to make some critical comments. I leave aside the question as to whether the authors present an accurate picture of the Marxist position. Indeed, given the specific philosophical tradition from within which they operate, they would no doubt argue that they are engaged not in an accurate act of representative reading, but rather a deconstruction. Moreover, much has been said about this issue elsewhere, not least in Gerass critique. (See Geras, 1990a) I do however think it is important to make a remark. Despite their philosophical leanings, Laclau and Mouffes comments on Marxism are often curious. For example, their account of Marxist monism often seems to presuppose that Marxism and Second International Marxism are one and the same. Hence, any move away from the Marxism of the Second International is a move away from Marxism.2 Moreover, and related directly to this point, they seem also to presuppose that Cohens analytical defence of Marxs theory of history that is the defence of productive force (technological) determinism is the last word on the topic. Wood (1998) in particular, has criticised the authors for providing an account of Marxism by proxy the most they provide in the way of primary textual analysis is a reference to the 1859 Preface, an important text indeed, but a problematic one which can hardly be looked on as Marxs last word on this topic. We might also point out this is a curious move for two authors who emerged largely from the Althusserian school (particularly the case with Mouffe), a school of thought which sits at odds with the arguments of Cohen. Moving on to their points about the Gramscian advance, this watershed? It is correct to note that in Gramscis theory of hegemony there is an attempt to move beyond a form of hegemony as class alliance conceived as a simple external relation
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For a critique of Second International Marxism, see Blackledge, 2006.

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between pre-constituted dominant and subordinate class identities. This is because, for Gramsci classes (as with all objective entities are as much constituted at the ideological (and hence relational) as they are at the economic level. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss this issue in detail. (See Bates, 2007) However, though Gramsci makes frequent reference to the 1859 Preface in his work and hence to the base superstructure model, he does not really take the usual message from this text. Namely, that to understand the driving dynamic of human society, it is necessary to have a comprehensive theory and analysis of production. No doubt this would comprise a reference to crude economic facts about which Gramsci was so scathing. But without this we are left with an understanding of class location which lacks a firm material basis and then to what extent can classes be viewed as fundamental social groups? And this must lead us to think in a different way about Laclau and Mouffes accusation of essentialism against Gramsci; for the single unifying principle in every hegemonic formation is arbitrary to the core. What then comprises the content of the Post-Marxist theory of hegemony? They argue that a theory of hegemony is essential for understanding politics in contemporary societies. Elaborating their theory they reach beyond Marxism to continental philosophy, structuralist linguistics, and psychoanalysis. In so doing, they maintain that all political identities be those based on gender, ethnicity, sexuality (and class) - are radically unfixed; there exists no essential identity, no single unifying principle of every hegemonic formation. Radical unfixity comprises the conditions of possibility for contemporary hegemonic formations. Mention must be made of the category of articulation, being as it is central to Laclau and Mouffes approach. The authors write we will call articulation any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice. The structured totality resulting from the articulatory practice, we call discourse. (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: p. 105) The practice of articulation elsewhere is conceived as that practice whereby effort is made to create a partial fixity of meaning around nodal points so as to attempt always impossible - to suture the open character of the social. Such an attempt is impossible owing to the constant overflowing of every discourse by the infinitude of the field of discursivity. (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: p. 113) Laclau and Mouffe note that: The social is articulation insofar as society is impossible. (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: p. 114) Here they introduce a crucial distinction between elements on the one hand, and moments on the other, writing: The differential positions, insofar as they appear articulated within a discourse, we call moments. By contrast, we will call element any difference that is not discursively articulated. (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: p. 105) Elements can be equated with what Saussure refers to as floating signifiers (See Townshend and Tormey (2006).) As for Saussure, all identity is relational, signifiers have no meaning outside specific discursive formations (that is, they have no internal positivity). And within discursive formations, the meaning of such signifiers is only partially fixed - to the extent that it comes to be overdetermined around a given nodal point. This process of overdetermination operates through the interrelationship between a logics of equivalence and a logic of difference. (See Lieberman and Gray, 2007; Smith, 1998; Tormey and Townshend, 2006) The first pertains to where dislocated3 elements are rendered by
3

Laclau and Mouffe write every identity is dislocated insofar as it depends on an outside which both denies that identity and provides its conditions of possibility at the same time. (Laclau, 1990a p. 39)

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an oppressed group as equivalent representations of that groups subordination. The authors give the example of a colonized country where the subordinate population come to associate such elements as differential attire, skin colour and customs as together representative of their oppression. The second is where differential identities come to be articulated together, thus forging a new form of non-essential political subjectivity in the process. This is possible as a negative process that is through reference to a constitutive Other; this process they term regularity in dispersion. (See Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: pp. 105-6) Laclau and Mouffe write: if contingency and articulation are possible, this is because no discursive formation is a structured totality and the transformation of elements into moments is never complete. (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: pp. 106-107) Following the structuralist theme, the authors write: The sign is the name of a split, of an impossible suture between signified and signifier. (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: p. 113) A correspondence theory of meaning, where meaning is established through reference to an external domain (say the notion of objective interests) is ruled out. Central to the Post-Marxist approach is the category of antagonism, a theme discussed by the authors, particularly in the context of their argument that society is impossible. Antagonism is not an objective relation in the usual Marxist sense of that term; it is rather a relation wherein the limits of every objectivity are shown (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: p. 125) And linking this to another central Post-Marxist theme, the authors write: Strictly speaking, antagonisms are not internal but external to society, or rather, they constitute the limits of society, the latters impossibility of fully constituting itself. (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: p. 125) Therefore, an understanding of antagonism must be a necessary condition of any social scientific discourse. However: Antagonism escapes the possibility of being apprehended through language, since language only exists as an attempt to fix that which antagonism subverts. (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: p. 125) It is worth exploring what we might characterise as some Post-Marxist terminological couplets at this point: the social/society and the political/politics. The authors seek to address the way in which the political has come in contemporary thought to be absorbed by the social. (Laclau, 1990b; Marchant, 2007); indeed, they seek to return the political back into the field of intellectual investigation and indeed, to stress its crucial role in relation to the social. Let us look at these couplets, starting with the distinction between the social on the one hand and society on the other. The social is precarious, and lacking in self-referential positivity; for positivity implies an antagonism free closure which the social cannot achieve. Laclau and Mouffe write: As the social is penetrated by negativity that is, by antagonism it does not attain the status of transparency, of full presence, and the objectivity of its identities is permanently subverted. (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: p. 129) The attempt to establish society on the other hand, as we have seen above, is an attempt to establish fixity in the contingent arena of the social. What of the distinction between politics and the political? Mouffe characterises the political as the dimension of antagonism inherent in human relations, antagonism that can take many forms and emerge in different types of social relations. On the other hand, politics is those discursive practices which attempt to establish order over the political (and hence the social). (Mouffe, 2000: p. 101) Here, the political is not to be regarded simply as a subset of the social; for, though the political is an aspect of the social, it is also a crucial and driving antagonistic force

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therein. Laclau for example goes so far as to write of the eminently political character of any social identity. (Laclau, 1990c: p. 160) Or more recently, to characterise the political as the instituting moment of society. (Laclau, 1996: p. 47) Moreover, it is precisely because of this that politics assumes an important role within their thought; for, politics is the practice which attempts to constitute the impossible object of society.

There are crucial political points which comes out of Laclau and Mouffes conception of articulation specifically (and theory of hegemony more generally) which socialists would be ill advised to neglect. In particular we ought not to reduce a priori all demands within a counter-hegemonic politics to an essential class centre. Any counter-hegemonic struggle which begins from such a position of reductionism is likely to appear only as dogmatic to many of those identities which it attempts to articulate. This said, there is also a need to avoid the opposite of this; that is, the absolute pluralism within Laclau and Mouffes conception of the social and the political tends ultimately - to view any hegemonic formation as an arbitrary construction in which there is an a priori refusal to acknowledge crucial economic centres of political power. In his early work Laclau had extended further than any Marxist writer the idea that class was determined ideologically.4 By the time of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, the very idea of class struggle is pushed aside; the socialist project comes to be displaced by the project of radical democracy. Accordingly, there is an extent to which Laclau and Mouffes desire to theorise the possibility of a radical democratic form of hegemonic articulation which goes beyond Marxist class essentialism and the base-superstructure model - leads them to adopt a form of a priorism of their own; that is, the idea that class may be the centre of any hegemonic formation is ruled out from the start in the name of anti-economism. The authors response to this criticism would state that class cannot be viewed as an economic category rather class as a form of identity is itself a precarious never wholly positive discursive product. Indeed, given the role played by politics in their most recent work, class identity is a product not of determinate economic forces but of politics. Thus, economic categories are reduced into politics to the extent that all discourse comes now to be politically constituted. It is important to note that any counter-hegemonic project which attempts to address the form(s) of exploitation endemic to capitalism is unlikely to succeed if it does not first recognise the point that without a due regard to class actors, struggles are likely often to remain toothless. Class forces bring into the political arena (and are transformed by their engagement in that arena) a power which is likely to be lacking in a counter-hegemonic configuration where class is absent. Large multinational corporations will no doubt find a hegemonic struggle with a political movement that has succeeded in moulding together the differential claims of environmental activists, feminists, gay rights activists (and thus forming a new type of radical subjectivity in the process) to be a formidable force indeed; but so much more formidable they are likely to be if they have the force of a working class movement behind them which brings with it the ability to attack at the heart of capitalist surplus appropriation by withholding the exercise of its labour (power).

See Laclau (1977). Also Wood (1998)

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Moreover, there is an extent to which the exploitation of a group which we typically refer to as a class of workers, comprises the differentia specifica of capitalism. It is difficult to think of how capitalism could constitute itself without the Other which is wage-labour. For, this is no arbitrary Other which comprises capitalisms conditions of possibility; there is no Other which could perform this constitutive role. As such the antagonism between capital and labour must surely be regarded foundational. (See Eagleton, 1991) Moving on to make some critical comments about the authors conceptual distinction between elements and moments. 5 As already implied, it would be misleading to draw a clear distinction between elements on the one hand and moments on the other. For, to write of pure elements is to consider identities as existing in a pre-discursive state that is a state of positivity outside of relations of articulation. Elements must (at least) be considered a product of dislocation. On the other hand, to think of a hegemonic formation as comprising moments of a wider unfolding totality is to fall prey to the type of essentialism which Althusser castigated Hegel (and historicist Marxism) for. The first position leads to an understanding of hegemony as pure contingency, the second as pure necessity. (Geras, 1990a: p. 102) Given that absolute contingency or necessity (as with absolute particularity and universality) are not possible, the loci of hegemonic articulation must be the (non)space between the elements and the moments. I want to sidestep the detail of Gerass critique here. Rather I want to state a political worry. That is, regardless of what may be viewed as theoretical opacity on the part of the authors, Laclau and Mouffes arguments are symptomatic of the wider right wing drift both in European and increasingly global society which occurred particularly from the late 1970s, but which can be traced back to what Hobsbawn terms the forward march of labour halted. Take the authors remarks about the impossibility of society, and the critique of all forms of positive identity therein. At one point Laclau and Mouffe pronounce that Society is not a valid object of discourse. (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: p. 111) Wood (1998) has noted how there are echoes of Mrs Thatchers no such thing as society here. Of course no one would maintain that that Laclau and Mouffe were latent Conservative/neo-liberal sympathisers; few could read their work without noting a genuine commitment to reinvigorating the politics of the left in what were challenging times. At the heart of Thatchers remark is a crucial methodological point which separates socialism from the classical and neo liberal approach to politics. Somewhat ironically given what Thatcher said about sociology being a socialist science, one of the founding fathers of the discipline was largely in agreement with her point. Weber set out to exorcise the spectre of collective concepts from the realm of social scientific discourse. (Weber, quoted in Sandri, 1992: p. 6) Concepts such as society (and we might note classes) were to be regarded as solely the resultants and modes of organisation of the particular acts of individual persons. (Weber, 1968: p. 13) Such a line of argument is also evident in the work of Popper.6 Neither of these interventions can be regarded as objective; they were rather definite political interventions Weber against SPD politics in the early part of the twentieth

5 6

See Geras (1990a). See Lukes (1973) p. 121

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century and Popper against Soviet Communism. Thus, the only valid methodological orientation for these authors was methodological individualism. Now, Laclau and Mouffe cannot be thought of as methodological individualists for methodological individualism (and the approach to agency therein) is surely a reductionist philosophy of the elements par excellence. Indeed, one thing that their Althusserian training no doubt taught them is that the liberal conception of political agency which corresponds to such a methodological orientation is to be resisted as bourgeois ideology. But the vehemence of the authors critique of forms of explanation which invoke a conception of totality is evocative of those liberal critiques of totalitarianism with which we are all familiar; of antiMarxist currents, from Weber to the Cold War; for it is the essentialism of the moment, rather than the essentialism of the elements which Laclau and Mouffe feel themselves most committed to attacking. See for example Laclau and Mouffes point that the possibility [admittedly not the necessity] of this authoritarian turn was present from the beginnings of Marxist orthodoxy. (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: p. 57) See also when Mouffe writes It is unlikely that Marxism will recover from the blows it has suffered, citing among other things the discredit brought upon the Soviet model by the analysis of totalitarianism. (Mouffe, 1993: p. 9) Of course there is an extent to which the analysis of totalitarianism (though advanced by the writings of Arendt) was largely a product of American political science totalitarianism being the mirror of liberal capitalist democracy. (See Geras, 1990a: p. 119) It is worth noting Laclau and Mouffes reference to their political theory as not just radical democracy, but also radical, libertarian and plural democracy. Perhaps their approach then is more Nozick than Marx! However, the fact that Laclau and Mouffe focus their critical attention more on Marxist than liberal essentialism does not mean that they are committed to the latter. Thus their libertarian pluralism is radically anti-foundationalist. We might even propose as a Post-Marxist political slogan: There is no such thing as society, there is just a hegemonic formation characterised by partial and precarious fixity; not quite as catchy as the Thatcherite alternative! But this leads me into a very important point viewed from the perspective of a broadly emancipatory philosophy, there is an extent to which Laclau and Mouffes Post-Marxism represents the worst of all (or at least these two) possible worlds. Namely, on the one hand in attacking totalitarianism they undercut the case for the urgency, significance and efficacy of socialism - by removing any wider reference to the development of historical forces or indeed substantive moral commitment; on the other hand they undermine any strength of the emancipatory liberal claim; that is liberalisms commitment to a substantive (though also partial and repressive) rights based conception of political and moral agency a conception of agency advanced by Kant and which achieved its highest expression in the work of Rawls becomes groundless in the worst sense of that term.

2. Discourse and Objectivity A key focus of critique by those Marxist writers who to a significant extent remain committed to Enlightenment values is Laclau and Mouffes conception of discourse. In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Laclau and Mouffe advance what is really the Foucauldian thesis that all objects (and therefore not only social objects) are constituted through discursive practices. Foucaults critical focus was of course practices of normalisation (penal, medical, sexual etc.) And the claims he made have

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been and continue to be contentious and unsettling. In The Archaeology of Knowledge, for example, he wrote: mental illness was constituted by all that was said in all the statements that named it, divided it up, described it, explained it (Foucault, 1967: p. 32). Such an approach to knowledge is elaborated in detail also in a view persistent also in The Order of Things.7 The radical implication here is that the discursive practices of a given episteme, in the words of Habermas, constitute the unsurpassable horizons of basic concepts of knowledge. Different epistemes are accordingly to use Kuhns term - incommensurable. Indeed, Foucaults approach may be viewed as more radical even than that typically associated with Kuhn. As Rorty noted in his critique of Kuhn, Kuhn retained a faith in the possibility of a form of rational reconstruction (see Kuhn, 1977) through which different scientific practices at least could be rendered commensurable. For Foucault, there is seemingly no such hope; so, there is an extent to which we are forced to stare into the abyss of Nietzschean Godlessness. Not it would seem as a particularly promising starting point for two thinkers, who one would hope at least would wish to retain some kind of emancipatory dimension in their work given their previous commitment to a socialist project which they claimed to reach beyond.8 Nevertheless, it can be argued that the Foucauldian claim about the constitutive character of discourse is the first principle (if we dare use such a term in this context!) on which Laclau and Mouffe build their often (it should be noted rather opaque) theoretical vocabulary. Accordingly, there is no outside to discursive practices; no residual extra-discursive domain comprising the ontological conditions of possibility for the language games which serve to constitute the world around us. Objectivity is precariously constituted, the result of articulatory practices which seek to transform disparate elements into moments, condensed around given nodal points. There is no final suture, no a historical objectivity. Though this language of discourse is largely Foucauldian, the epistemological conclusions embraced by the authors exist at least in embryonic form in the work of Gramsci.9 Gramsci for example argues for the need to reject what he regarded as nave objectivism (evident at the point he was writing in the work of authors such as Bukharin). For who is the judge of such objectivity? Who we might ask is the agent endowed with the capacity to speak the language of selfcontained objectivity? Gramscis critique is not only of nave objectivism, but all forms of objectivist philosophy. For, he reconfigures the very meaning of objectivity when he declares that objectivity is humanly objective which can be held to correspond exactly to historically subjective: in other words, objective would mean universally subjective. (Gramsci, 1971: p. 445) When we speak of reality external to man, or a reality which would exist if man did not, so this argument goes, we are at best speaking metaphorically, and at worst lapsing into mysticism. Admittedly Gramsci himself lapses into a form of speculative idealism when he writes that reality is knowable only in relation to man, where man is historical becoming; thus Laclau and Mouffe would no doubt claim that he remains trapped within a rationalist eschatology. That said, Gramsci also considers objectivity as a political construct, a result of hegemonic practices; as he puts it: There exists a struggle for
See Foucault (1966) p. xvi For Laclau the rejection of the epistemological commitments of the Enlightenment necessitates the move beyond emancipation, where emancipation is equated with a linear conception of progress. (See Laclau, 1996: esp. p. 11) 9 See Femia (1981).
8
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objectivity and this struggle is the same as the struggle for the cultural unification of the human race. (Gramsci, 1971: p. 442) As such, politics as ontologically constitutive practice is central to Gramscis approach, as it is for Post-Marxism. The central thrust of Gramscis epistemology is what we might term a radical consensus approach. Consensus is important because there is no truth for Gramsci beyond the realm of inter-subjective agreement. And I use the term radical to characterise Gramscis view that such inter-subjective agreement is itself a product of power and its exercise, a point clearly made when Gramsci refers to science as an aspect of the superstructure. Indeed, as an aside, we can see a close connection between Gramscis view that power is constitutive of objectivity, and the Foucauldian conception of knowledge/power. (See for example Holub, 1992; Smith, 1998). Even though anti-objectivism can be regarded as nothing new in the history of Marxism, the claims in Laclau and Mouffes work were for a number of authors not so much a move beyond as a move too far. Indeed, in dropping the Enlightenment commitment to the pursuit of truth, the authors have become anti-Enlightenment relativists; post-Marxism is an idealist philosophy, a philosophy sitting significantly at odds therefore with Marxist materialism. The line of reasoning here is pretty much as follows discursive practices constitute our world; discursive practices are reducible to linguistic practices; the world is therefore the creation of language (which shares the same ontological space as thought). For Geras et al., once this notion of extra-discursivity is jettisoned, one simply slides into a bottomless, relativist gloom, in which opposed discourses or paradigms are left with no common reference point, endlessly trading blows. (Geras, 1999: p. 99)10 It strikes me that there is some ambiguity in Laclau and Mouffes response to Geras. First they repeat their opposition to any attempt to draw a separation between a discursive and extra-discursive domain. Discursive practice remains the constitutional practice. Here they claim to go beyond the materialism-idealism dichotomy. Second, they insist that Geras is making an elementary confusion between the being (esse) of an object, which is historical and changing, and the entity (ens) of that object which is not. (Laclau and Mouffe, 1990a: p. 103) What can be said here? Interestingly, it might be remarked that Laclau and Mouffes distinction between esse and ens embodies too a certain dualism; a dualism not evident say in Marxs writings. For in the Theses On Feuerbach Marx clearly develops an internal relations approach in which the very notion of being is embedded in a process of transformation this is in many ways the meaning of praxis. There is no recourse to a static mystical realm entirely external to practice; rather Marx criticises Feuerbach for failing to understand that human activity itself is objective activity. (Marx, 1994: p. 116) Indeed, in the eighth thesis, Marx writes of how: All social life is essentially practical. All mysteries which lead theory in the direction of mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice. (Marx, 1994: p. 118) This brings us to the materiality of discourse. Claiming to go beyond the material/ideal dichotomy, the argument is that discourse cannot be reduced to language; for discourses are as much material as they are linguistic. But it is not clear what kind of advance such a shift embodies. I am mindful of Althussers rather slippery evasion of the charge of idealism Thus he wrote at one point ideology is
See Hall who criticises Laclau and Mouffe for failing to address the conditions of existence of discourse which, although they cannot fix or guarantee particular outcomes, set limits or constraints on the process of articulation itself. (Hall, cited in Smith, 1998: p. 56) See also Joseph (2002).
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itself endowed with a material existence where a single subject is concerned, the existence of the ideas of his belief is material in that his ideas are his material actions inserted into material practices governed by material rituals which are themselves defined by the material ideological apparatus from which derive the ideas of that subject. (Althusser, 1994: p. 43) As Eagleton (1991) has noted, to simply repeat the word material over and again, ultimately strips the word of all its distinctive power.

3. Intellectuals Lenins approach is on the one hand praised by the authors for containing at least an embryonic theory of hegemony, as such it comprises a prima facie departure from economism; however, they contend that this departure (which we might claim embodies a shift from the economic to the political) nevertheless leaves intact the essentialist problematic that is the ontological privilege granted to the working class by Marxism was simply transferred from the social basis to the political leadership of the mass movement, which consequently produced a rigid form of authoritarianism. (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: p. 56) Accordingly, Lenins theory of hegemony failed to account for the fact that political (and presumably economic?) identities are the products of and therefore not pre-existent to hegemonic practices. The relationship between the democratic demands of the masses on the one hand and the working class and its vanguard on the other, was for Lenin (so the authors contend) one in which the historical role of the proletariat was guaranteed apriori (that is, it was not itself a product of hegemonic articulation); thus, the proletariat and their vanguard (or should we say, the proletarian vanguard?) regard these demands as stages, as necessary yet transitory steps in pursuit of their own class objectives. (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: p. 56) Laclau and Mouffe insist: Under such conditions, the relations between vanguard and masses cannot but have a predominantly external and manipulative [pedagogical] character. (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: p. 56) What is the alternative model of the intellectual presented by the authors? The authors do not map this out in detail. Accordingly, my comments draw on some of those points where they do at least attempt to address these issues. For example, in a response to a question raised in interview by Robin Blackburn, Laclau declares that his view of the social/political role of the intellectual is an extension of Gramscis conception of the organic intellectual. Gramsci as is well known attacked the uncritical distinction between intellectuals and non-intellectuals, proclaiming that: All men are intellectuals but not all men have in society the function of intellectuals, that is all human beings perform specific intellectual activities, but this does not extend to the level of ideological and moral leadership. (Gramsci, 1971: p. 9) A key goal of socialism ought to be the extension of the intellectual function as widely as possible, a goal which necessitated the creation of organic intellectuals on the part of (to the extent that they emerge from) those groups seeking (self) emancipation. Gramscis reflections on this issue are routed in a particular problematic within Marxism. This is the problematic of proletarian self-emancipation. In the wellknown Circular Letter to members of the International, Marx and Engels had set out the case for proletarian self-emancipation; indeed, they proclaimed that no revolutionary worth their salt would cooperate with those who believe that the

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working classes are not capable of bringing about their own emancipation, and must therefore be reliant on bourgeois and petty bourgeois intellectuals. The Lenin of What Is to Be Done? had argued something quite different. The working class, left to the daily grind of the capitalist labour process, would never reach beyond the level of trade union consciousness beyond that is an awareness of the economic struggle. (See Geras, 1986) Social democratic consciousness that is revolutionary political consciousness could only come from outside the limitations of the economic struggle; and its vehicle was bourgeois and petty bourgeois intellectuals. Now I leave aside the question pertaining to the accuracy of Laclau and Mouffes claim that Lenin conceived the relationship between the vanguard and the masses as largely a relationship of exteriority, however the historical role of the proletariat was itself far from guaranteed a priori. That is, Lenin did not view the role of the working class as defined by a type of self-contained positivity (or as a specific moment in the unfolding of a wider totality); rather the formation of radical revolutionary agency was only possible (and in no way inevitable) through the working class engaging with groups in this case intellectuals outside of the specificity of its economic experience. However, it is true to say that for Lenin this was not a relationship of complete exteriority. (It is not simply that an economically pre-constituted class are made aware of their historical mission by intellectuals that is the uncovering of an essential and historically teleological identity.) For, the proletariat would undergo a fundamental transformation through their encounter with the structure of the party; and Lenin was to revise his views on party membership, arguing for a more extensive level of democratic participation. Consequently, we ought not to overestimate the significance of What Is to Be Done? in Lenins oeuvre. (See McLellan, 2007) Thus Lenin wrote that our party has stagnated while working underground. There was a need he insisted to his fellow revolutionaries to extend your bases, rally all the worker social democrats round yourselves, incorporate them in the ranks of the party organisation by hundreds and thousands. (Lenin, cited in McLellan, 2007: p 95) So too, it was necessary for the intellectuals to leave all their petty bourgeois prejudices at the door, and submerge themselves in revolutionary proletarian politics; there was no going back for the intellectual who became subsumed in the arena of proletarian politics.11 Put simply, it is clear that for Lenin hegemony is a political process in which the agents therein undergo a radical transformation on the basis of their encounter. It is not therefore entirely correct to maintain that the attitude towards the working class [on the part of the intellectuals] is purely pedagogical (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: p. 59 - my emphasis) though so too there is undoubtedly an elitism in his work. To return to this extension of Gramscis conception of the intellectual (function). In the first place, the intellectual for Gramsci is not a segregated social group but that which establishes the organic unity of a set of activities, which, left to their own resources, would remain fragmented and dispersed The intellectual function is, as a consequence, the practice of articulation. (Laclau, 1990d: p. 195)

11

See Althussers (1984) discussion of this issue. See also Montag (2007).

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Accordingly Gramscis approach to this issue is considered to be compatible with anti-essentialism that is, it embodies the extension of this articulatory [itself constitutive of objectivity] to growing areas of social life. (Laclau, 1990d: p. 195) Does this critical reading and use of Gramsci fare any better than the reading of Lenin? Specifically, we might ask what is organic about Laclaus organic intellectual? I do not have the space to explore this issue in detail so briefly stated it would seem not very much. But this is also a difficulty with Gramsci, given both his anti-objectivism and his ideological account of social class in which the realm of production comes largely to be neglected. In this account there is a residual elitism, and a reinstatement of the role of traditional intellectuals by the back door. The same difficulty is evident in the work of Laclau and Mouffe, despite their claim that no group therefore can best represent the interests of another (or to use Baumans term, legislate for them12), and the need for fewer great intellectuals and more organic intellectuals. Once the social is regarded as constituted by (intellectual) articulation there is an important way in which the concerns of the workers and the masses cannot gain the type of voice which they had achieved in mass movements. Thus it would seem that one of the groups best situated to bring hegemonic order to the social and the political is intellectuals (or we might say traditional intellectuals). Of course, Laclau would no doubt maintain that we are all intellectuals the process of radical democracy involves the extending of the intellectual function outwards, to give as many people as possible a fair share in the constitution of this reality. This is an admirable (utopian) goal. However, I find it difficult to avoid the other side of this claim; this is a worry which is well expressed in the work of Wood (1998): In the final analysis, everything depends on intellectuals in conducting a complex of discursive hegemonic operations. And so we have it: In the beginning (and the end) was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God, the ultimate Subject made incarnate in Laclau and Mouffe? (Wood 1998: p. 75) But we might say that this is just one group best situated to generate this precarious hegemonic order. We have noted how Laclau and Mouffe set out to critique what had become for them a tendency in contemporary thought to subsume the political within the social. Thus the practice of politics comes to the forefront of hegemonic practice; the new agents of hegemony become politicians. And as there can be no essential relationship of representation between politicians and specific social groups (for the notion of representation implies an essentialist relation). True if we can all be intellectuals, then so too we can all be politicians. But stated thus, this is no more than a utopian commitment. That is, the contemporary frameworks of power - at least those embedded in the liberal democratic state - are ones which structurally prioratise professional politicians and accordingly serve to debar large sections of the population from articulating their own voice. (And given the denial of correspondence, what is the nature of this voice anyway?) Thus even if the political is comprised of the infinite play of differences, political practice is not so open.

12

See Baumans (1987) distinction between intellectuals as legislators and interpreters.

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Conclusion A few points in the way of a conclusion - First, Laclau and Mouffes theory of hegemony whilst representing an important contribution to socialist debate, rules out with no adequate argument, accounts of socialist struggle which consider class to be of fundamental importance; and one does not have to be an essentialist to level such a criticism one can rather simply refer to the practical exigencies of socialist struggle. Second, the argument pertaining particularly to the impossibility of society undercuts rather than enhancing the emancipatory potential of socialism specifically, and radical politics more generally. Third, the discursive account of objectivity does not escape the materialist-idealist dichotomy, since materiality plays no substantive role in the Post-Marxist epistemology. As such, more orthodox Marxist criticisms hold. Fourth, the organic intellectual (function) defended particularly by Laclau has below its radical democratic appearance a residual elitism and a danger of traditional intellectuals being prioratised over other members of society.

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Karabel, J. (1976) Revolutionary Contradictions: Antonio Gramsci and the Problem of Intellectuals, Politics and Society, pp. 123-172 Kuhn, T. (1977) The Essential Tension, Chicago University Press, Chicago Laclau, E. (1977) Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory, New Left Books, London Laclau, E. and Mouffe, C. (1985) Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, Verso, London Laclau, E. (1990a) New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time, in E. Laclau (ed.), New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time, Verso, London, pp. 97-134 Laclau, E. and Mouffe, C. (1990) Post-Marxism without Apologies, in E. Laclau (ed.), New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time, Verso, London, pp. 97-134 Laclau, E. (1990b) The Impossibility of Society, in E. Laclau (ed.), New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time, Verso, London, pp. 89-92 Laclau, E. (1990c) A Letter to Aletta, in E. Laclau (ed.), New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time, Verso, London, pp. 159-174 Laclau, E. (1990d) Theory, Democracy and Socialism, in E. Laclau (ed.), New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time, Verso, London, pp. 197-245 Laclau, E. (1996) Emancipations(s), Verso, London Lukes, S. (1973) Methodological Individualism Reconsidered, in A. Ryan (ed) The Philosophy of Social Explanation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 119-129 Lenin, V. I. (1947) What Is To Be Done?, Progress Publishers, Moscow Lieberman, S. and Gray, T. (2007) The Role of Political Myth in the International Conflict Over Genetically Modified Food and Crops, European Environment, 17, pp. 376-386 Marchant, O. (2007) Post-Foundational Political Thought, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh Marx, K. (1994) Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, in L. Simon (ed.), Karl Marx: Selected Writings, Hacket, Indianapolis/Cambridge, pp. 209-213 Marx, K. (1970) Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. I, S. Moore and E. Aveling (trans.) F. Engels (ed.) Lawrence and Wishart, London Marx, K. (1977) Circular Letter, in D. McLellan (ed.), Karl Marx: Selected Writings, Macmillan, Oxford pp. 620-622 Marx, K. (1994) On Feuerbach, in J. OMalley (ed.), Marx: Early Political Writings, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Marx, K. (1994) Capital, Vol. 1, Chapter 1, in L. H. Simon (ed.), Selected Writings, Hacket, Indianapolis, pp. 214-243 McLellan, D. (2006) Marxism After Marx, Palgrave. London Montag, W. (2007) Intellectuals and the Conjuncture, in D. Bates (ed) Marxism, Intellectuals and Politics, Palgrave, London, pp. 107-118 Mouffe, C. (1993) The Return of the Political, Verso, London Sadri, M. (1992) Max Webers Sociology of Intellectuals, Oxford University Press, Oxford Saussure, F. D. (1960) Course in General Linguistics, Fontana, London Smith, A-M (1998) Laclau and Mouffe: The Radical Democratic Imaginary, London: Routledge Townsend, J. and Tormey, S. (2006) Key Thinkers from Critical Theory to Post Marxism, Sage, London Weber, M. (1968) Economy and Society, Bedminster Press, New York Wood, H. M. (1998) The Retreat From Class, Verso, London

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