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The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law (1758)
Emmerich de Vattel
MayS, 2013 1 El Print 1 Em"ll 1 * Bookmari<
BOOK 2, CHAPTER 10
How a Nation Is to Use Her Right of Domain, in Order to Discharge Her Duties Towards
Other Nations, with Respect to the Innocent Use of Things
131. General duty ofthe proprietor.
SINCE the law of nations treats as well of the duties of states as of their rights, it is not sufficient that we have explai ned, on the subject of
innocent use, what all nations have a right to require from the proprietor: we are now to consider what influence his duties to others ought to
have on their proprietor's conduct. As it belongs to him to j udge whether the use be really innocent, and not productive of any detriment or
inconvenience to himself, he ought not to give a refusal unless it be grounded upon real and substantial reasons: this is a maxim of equity; he
ought not even to stop at trifl es, - a sl ight loss, or any little inconvenience: humanity forbids this; and the mutual love which men owe to each
other, requires greater sacrifices. It would certai nly be too great a deviation from that universal benevolence which ought to unite the human
race, to refuse a considerable advantage to an individual, or to a whole nation, whenever the grant of it might happen to be productive of the
most trifling loss or the slightest inconvenience to ourselves. In this respect, therefore, a nation ought on all occasions to regulate her conduct
by reasons proportioned to the advantages and necessities of others, and to reckon as nothing a small expense or a supportable
inconvenience, when great good will thence result to another nation. But she is under no obl igation to incur heavy expenses or
embarrassments, for the sake of furnishing others with the use of any thing, when such use is neither necessary nor of any great utility to
them. The sacrifice we here requi re is not contrary to the interests of the nation: - it is natural to think that the others will behave in the same
manner in return; and how great the advantages that will result to all states from such a line of conduct!
132. Innocent passage.
The introduction of property cannot be supposed to have deprived nations of the general right of traversi ng the earth for the purposes of
mutual intercourse, of carrying on commerce with each other, and for other j ust reasons. It is only on particular occasions, when the owner of
a country thinks it would be prejudicial or dangerous to allow a passage through it, that he ought to refuse permission to pass. He is therefore
bound to grant a passage for lawful purposes, whenever he can do it without inconvenience to himself. And he cannot lawfully annex
burdensome conditions to a permission which he is obliged to grant, and which he cannot refuse if he wishes to discharge his duty, and not
abuse his right of property. The count of Lupfen having improperly stopped some merchandise in Alsace, and complaints being made on the
subject to the emperor Sigismund, who was then at the counci l of Constance, that prince assembled the electors, princes, and deputies of
towns, to examine the affair. The opinion of the burg rave of Nuremberg deserves to be mentioned: "God," said he, "has created heaven for
himself and his saints, and has given the earth to mankind, intendi ng it for the advantage of the poor as well as of the rich. The roads are for
their use, and God has not subjected them to any taxes." He condemned the count of Lupfen to restore the merchandise, and to pay costs
and damages, because he could not justify his seizure by any peculiar right. The emperor approved this opinion, and passed sentence
accordi ngly.
1
133. Sureties may be required.
But, if any apprehension of danger arise from the grant of liberty to pass through a country, the state has a right to require sureties: the party
who wishes to pass cannot refuse them, a passage being only so far due to him as it is attended with no inconvenience.
134. Passage of merchandise.
In like manner, a passage ought also to be granted for merchandise: and, as this is in general productive of no inconvenience, to refuse it
without j ust reason is inj uring a nation, and endeavori ng to deprive her of the means of carryi ng on a trade with other states. If this passage
occasions any inconvenience, any expense for the preservation of canals and highways, we may exact a compensation for it by toll duties.
135. Residence in the country.
In explai ning the effects of domain we have said above that the owner of the territory may forbid the entrance into it, or permit it on such
conditions as he thinks proper. We were then treating of his external right, - that right which foreigners are bound to respect. But now that
we are consideri ng the matter in another view, and as it relates to his duties and to his internal right, we may venture to assert that he cannot,
without particular and important reasons, refuse permission, either to pass through or reside in the country, to foreigners who desire it for
lawful purposes. For, their passage or thei r residence bei ng in this case an innocent advantage, the law of nature does not give him a right to
refuse it: and, though other nations and other men in general are obliged to submit to his j udgment, he does not the less offend against his
duty, if he refuses without sufficient reason: he then acts without any true right; he only abuses his external right. He cannot, therefore without
some particular and cogent reason. refuse the liberty of residence to a foreigner who comes into the country with the hope of recovering his
health, or for the sake of acquiring instruction in the schools and academies. A difference in religion is not a sufficient reason to exclude him,
provided he do not engage in controversial disputes with a view to disseminate his tenets; for, that difference does not deprive him of the
rights of humanity.
136. How we are to act towards foreigners who desire a perpetual residence.
We have seen how the right of necessity may in certai n cases authorize a people, who are driven from the place of their residence, to settle in
the territory of another nation. Every state ought, doubtless, to grant to so unfortunate a people every aid and assistance which she can
bestow without being wanting to herself: but to grant them an establishment in the territories of the nation, is a very delicate step, the
consequences of which should be maturely considered by the conductor of the state. The emperors Probus and Valens experienced the evil
effects of their conduct in having admitted into the territories of the empire numerous bands of Gepidre, Vandals, Goths, and other
barbarians.
2
If the sovereign finds that such a step would be attended with too great an inconvenience or danger, he has a right to refuse an
establishment to those fugi tive people, or to adopt, on thei r admission, every precaution that prudence can dictate to him. One of the safest
will be, not to permit those foreigners to reside together in the same part of the country, there to keep up the form of a separate nation. Men
who have not been able to defend thei r own country, cannot pretend to any right to establ ish themselves in the territory of another, in order to
maintai n themselves there as a nation in a body.
3
The sovereign who harbors them may therefore disperse them, and distribute them into the
towns and provinces that are in want of inhabitants. In this manner his charity will turn to his own advantage, to the increase of his power, and
to the greater benefit of the state. What a difference is observable in Brandenburg since the settlement of the French refugees! The great
elector, Frederic William, offered an asyl um to those unfortunate people; he provided for thei r expenses on the road, and with truly regal
munificence established them in his states; by which conduct that beneficent and generous prince merited the title of a wise and able
politician.
137. Right accruing
When, by the laws or the custom of a state, certain actions are generally permitted to foreigners, as, for instance, travelling freely through the
country without any express permission, marrying there, buying or selling merchandise, hunting, fishing, etc., we cannot exclude any one nation
from the benefit of the general permission without doing her an injury, unless there be some particular and lawful reason for refusing to that nation
what is granted indiscriminately to others. The question here, it is to be observed, only relates to those actions which are productive of innocent
advantage: and, as the nation allows them to foreigners without distinction, she, by the very nature of that general permission, affords sufficient
proof that she deems them innocent with respect to herself; which amounts to a declaration that foreigners have a right to them: the innocence of
such acts is manifested by the confession of the state; and the refusal of an advantage that is manifestly innocent, is an injury. Besides, to
attempt without any reason to lay one nation under a prohibition where an indiscriminate permission is enjoyed by all others, is an injurious
distinction, since it can only proceed from hatred or contempt. If there by any particular and well-founded reason for the exception, the advantage
resul ting from the act in question can no longer be deemed an innocent one with respect to the excepted nation; consequently no injury is done to
them. The state may also by way of punishment, except from the general permission a people who have given her just cause of complaint.
138. A right granted as a favor.
As to rights of this nature granted to one or more nations for particular reasons, they are conferred on them as favors, either by treaty, or through
gratitude for some particular service: those to whom the same rights are refused cannot consider themselves as offended. The nation does not
esteem the advantage accruing from those acts to be an innocent one, since she does not indiscriminately allow them to all nations: and she may
confer on whom she pleases any rights over her own property, without affording just grounds to anybody else, either for uttering a complaint, or
forming pretensions to the same favor.
139. The nation ought to be courteous.
Humanity is not confined to the bare grant of a permission to foreign nations to make an innocent use of what belongs to us: it moreover requires
that we should even facili tate to them the means of deriving advantage from it, so far as we can do this without injury to ourselves. Thus, it
becomes a well-regulated state to promote the general establishment of inns where travelers may procure lodging and food at a fair price, - to
watch over their safety, - and to see that they be treated with equity and humanity. A polite nation should give the kindest reception to
foreigners, receive them with politeness, and on every occasion show a disposition to oblige them. by these means every citizen, while he
discharges his duty to mankind in general, will at the same time render essential services to his country. Glory is the certain reward of virtue; and
the good-will which is gained by an amiable character, is often productive of consequences highly important to the state. No nation is entitled to
greater praise in this respect than the French: foreigners nowhere meet a reception more agreeable, or better calculated to prevent their regretting
the immense sums they annually spend at Paris.
1. Stettler, vol. i. p. 114. Tschudi, vol ii. pp. 27, 28.
2. Vopiscus, Prob. c. sviii. - Ammian. Marcell. lib. xxxi. - Socrat. Hist. Eccles. lib. iv. c. 28.
3. Cresar replied to the Tenchtheri and Usipetes, who wanted to retain possession of the territories they had seized, that it was not j ust for them to invade the
territories of others, since they had not been able to defend their own. - Neque venm1 esse, qui s1ws fines rueri 11011 poruerint, aliC!I os occupare. De Bello Gallico,
lib. iv, cap. vi.