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Marx's Aufhebung of Philosophy and the Foundations of a Materialist Science of History Author(s): Joseph Fracchia Source: History and Theory, Vol. 30, No. 2 (May, 1991), pp. 153-179 Published by: Wiley for Wesleyan University Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2505538 . Accessed: 27/09/2013 17:29
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MARX'S AUFHEBUNG OF PHILOSOPHYAND THE FOUNDATIONS OF A MATERIALISTSCIENCE OF HISTORY

JOSEPH FRACCHIA

The relationbetweentheory and historicalanalysisis perhapsthe most often acknowledged,yet least preciselydefined, element of Marx'sproject. Marx and Engelsboth wrote severallettersinsistingon the tentativenatureof their theoreticalworksand on the need for continuedstudy of history. Since, howand unambiguously definedthe exact purpose ever, they neversystematically andplaceof historical studiesin theirlargerproject,the debateoverthisrelation seemsto have been renewedevery generation. The most recentround of this debate began with the publicationof Louis Althusser's worksin the mid-1960s. Althusser's structuralist Marxismfocuses on "synchronic" structures and dialecticalmaterialist philosophyand includes - history - and its study. This attackquicklyled an attackon the "diachronic" in defenseof the diachronic to several as a necessary elementof Marx's responses historical-materialist project. In his Geschichteund StrukturAlfred Schmidt to Althusser the historical contentof Marx's replied by explaining "structuralist" categories. In performingthis importanttask Schmidt concentratedon the theoretical dimension,and althoughhe alludedto the relationbetweenthis and Marx'shistoricalwritings,he did not explainthe place and role of historical to the constructionof categories.Insofaras he studiesbeyondits contribution focusedon thisissue,E. P. Thompson's polemicagainstAlthusser,ThePoverty Schmidt's of Theory,complements analysis.AlthoughThompsonconvincingly shows the need for continuedhistoricalstudy as the means of makingMarx's theory concrete, he does not derive this need from a systematicanalysis of Marx'swritings.He maintains,on the contrary,that "thetime has gone by for this kind of textual exegesis."' In view of the recent treatmentof Marx'stheory by poststructuralists or postmodernists, however,the time for such a textual exegesismay have come of the intentionally tentativecharacter again.Theinadequate of understanding Marx'stheoreticalworks, of the accompanyingepistemologicaldemand for historical analysis,of the dialectical tensionbetweentheoryandempirical analysis, and, therefore,of Marx'sopen-endeddefinitionof historicalknowledge
1. E. P. Thompson,ThePovertyof Theoryand OtherEssays(New York, 1975),25.

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has enabledsuch criticsto dismissMarx'stheory as an archaic,"essentialist" approachto history.This is the case, for example,in a recentarticleby F. R. Unlike the "essentialAnkersmiton "Historiography and Postmodernism."2 ists,"amongwhom he includesMarx,Ankersmitarguesthat "withinthe postmodernistview of history, the goal is no longer integration,synthesis, and in the totality."3 Instead, he maintains,the only thing left for historiography "historical the is to concentrateon wakeof postmodernism scraps," "leavesof tree"which"arerelatively the historical loosely attachedto the tree"and which And to the "whenautumnor wintercomes ... are blown away by the wind."4 questionthat mighthave been asked "fifteenor twentyyearsago" of what the point of studyingthese "leaves" mightbe, he repliesthat this questionof sense or meaning"haslost its meaning."5 Such a summarydismissalindicatesthat thereis still (or once again)a need for a textualexegesiswhichwill showthat Marxdid not take suchan essentialist to history,that he did not reducethe "leaves" to manifestations of the approach of the historical essential"trunk" tree,that, rather thantryingto writea "history of sense,"he was tryingto make sense out of history, that, in short, there is anotherpossibilityfor historicalanalysisbesidesthe extremesof essentialism and postmodernism.It mightbe addedthat the two best-knownpostmodernists, Foucaultand Derrida,acknowledgedmore in Marxthan Ankersmithas implied: Foucaultmaintained that"itis impossible to writehistoryat the present time without using a whole range of concepts directlyor indirectlylinked to Marx'sthought and situatingoneself within a horizon of thought which has been definedand described by Marx"; and he wondered"whatdifference there couldultimatelybe betweenbeing a historianand being a Marxist."6 And Derridaemphasized the need for a theoreticalelaborationof the relationbetween his own "limited" work and Marx's,an elaborationwhich was "stillto come" (thoughhe still has not undertakenit).7 Thisessay, of course,cannotevenbeginto undertake suchtheoretical elaborations.It can, however,contribute to suchan undertaking by analyzing Marx's own critiqueof the essentialistt" tradition-his Aufhebungof philosophy-his materialist conceptionof history,the epistemological dilemmasresultingfrom thatconception,andhis solutionof those dilemmas. Throughsucha reconstruction of Marx's project,it will be possibleto definethe relationbetween,andthe valueof, thetwo essential epistemological elementsof hisproject: the theoretical inquiriesand the historicalstudies. As a result of such an analysis,I hope to showthat the "mature" Marxmadeno universalist or essentialist claims;rather

2. F. R. Ankersmit,"Historiography and Postmodernism" in History and Theory28 (1989), 149.


3. Idem. 4. Idem. 5. Idem.

6. MichelFoucault,Power/Knowledge (New York, 1980),53. 7. JacquesDerrida,Positions (Chicago,1981),62-63.

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and openhe laid the epistemologically modestfoundationsof an experimental Geschichtswissenschaft8). endedmaterialist scienceof history(materialistische

conceptionof history MarxbasedhisA ufhebungof philosophyand materialist redefinitionof the concepts of subject and object. Conseon a fundamental is to look at the foundation of the quently,the first step of this undertaking philosophical traditionas Marxsaw it and againstwhichhe developedhis own theory. Althoughthey differedin their evaluations,both Hegel and Marx felt that the unity of the philosophicaltraditionlay in its consistentdefinitionof the subject-object relationship.SinceSocrates,Westernphilosophyhad differentiatedhumanbeingsfromanimalson the basisof the humancapacityfor Reason. In so doingphilosophychose to focus only on the differences and excludedthe For the philosophers,humanbeingsin their materiality cannotbe similarities. distinguishedfrom animals, and the body (and everythingpertainingto it: material needsandmanuallaboras the meansof satisfyingthoseneeds)is mired in the realmof necessity.As Socratesstated in no uncertaintermsin Phaedo and as Plato graphicallydescribedin the "Allegoryof the Cave,"the body is enslavementof the mind and manual labor a life-sentenceof servitudeand ignorance.9 Aristotle, at least, admittedthat the leisurenecessaryfor philosophizingwas dependenton the satisfactionof materialneeds, and he attributed in Egyptto the fact thatthe priestlycaste the earlydevelopment of mathematics He neglectedto mention,of course,that the veryearlybecamea leisureclass.10 precondition for the philosophizing manuallaborof the manywasthe necessary of the few. The legacy of the first philosophers,then, was a particularistic definitionof the human subjectas the knowingsubject and the object as the

8. The Germanterm Wissenschaft, of course, cannot be directlytranslatedinto Englishas "science." Whereas the Englishtermis ladenwithconnotations of lawfulregularity, predictability, and so on, the Germantermrefersto the systematic study of, and body of knowledgeabout, a givensubject. 9. In Phaedo Socrateslauncheda rathervehementattack on the body, which he saw as an "imperfection" contaminating the soul, the sourceof "innumerable distractions" from the search for truthand of diseases,it "fillsus with loves and desiresand fears and all sorts of fanciesand a greatdeal of nonsense," and "warsand revolutions and battlesare due simplyand solelyto the body and its desires." "we are in fact convincedthat if we are ever to have pure Consequently, knowledge of anything,we mustget ridof the body and contemplate thingsby themselves withthe in CollectedDialogues, soulby itself."Plato,Phaedo,transl.HughTredennick, ed. EdithHamilton and Huntington Cairns(New York, 1961),49, 95. See also the "Allegory of the Cave,"Republic VII, transl.Paul Shorey,in ibid., 747ff. 10. Aristotle,Metaphysics, transl.Richard Hope (AnnArbor, 1980),5. Theconsistency of this philosophical attitudeis indicatedby Hegel'sapprovingcitationof Aristotle'scommentson the underlying but immediately forgottensocial prerequisite of mentallabor. And in the Philosophy of Right Hegel goes to greatlengthsto justify this forgetfulness by exposingthe irrelevance of material needsandlaborto a philosophical of freedom(seethetransition definition frombourgeois societyto the state).

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human objectof knowledge,and, in short,of philosoi by as the only essentially activity.Natureand the body wereimportantto the philosophersonly insofar as they could be known. Any othermaterialattributes,physicalneedsand the elements praxisof satisfying thoseneeds,wereat bestsubordinate of the analysis and ultimatelyphilosophically irrelevant. For this reason, moreover,the first philosophersalso concludedthat the materialdimensionof life was ultimatelyirrelevantpolitically.Becauseof its innate dependenceand mortality,the body and its needs could have only a subordinateplace in the philosophicalanalysis of society and no place in a philosophical of freedom;for the philosophers definition the notion of material or economicfreedomwas a contradiction in terms.Withthe body and material needsdeprivedof any essentialplacein the definitionof freedom,so, too, was the questionof social and economic equality.The locus of freedomwas thus effectively displaced onto, andlimitedsolelyto, the politicalspherein whichthe individual could appearas a free citizen, not as a materiallydependenthuman animal.Thus, along with the definitionof the relationship betweensubjectand objectas one of knowledge,the definitionof freedomin purelypoliticalterms becamepart of the legacy of philosophy. sawhimselfas a directdescendant Hegelunquestionably of the Greekphilosophers. He also saw himself as fortunatein living in the historicalperiod in whichthe socialworldwason thevergeof becomingrationalandthusknowable. The problemwith Greeksociety, he argued,was that freedomwas limitedto a certainclassof people, andthis lackof universality contradicted the definition of freedomitself. With the spreadof the ideas of the FrenchRevolution-the ideasof universal politicalfreedom,eliminationof arbitrary privilege,and the universalapplicability of the law-however, Hegel believedhe was witnessing the dawning of an age in which political institutionswould finally become rational,that is, would finallyfulfillthe criteriaof philosophy."And sincethe realhad becomerational,philosophycould becomeabsolute;this is why Hegel felt justifiedin depictinghis work as leading, finally, to absolute knowledge. Hegel'snotionof teleology,then, wasbasedon the assumption thatthe promise of political freedomfirst raised by the Greekphilosophershad been (or was about to be) realized;and since he saw his age as the one in whichhistoryhad reachedits goal, he could look back and comprehend the entireprocess. This is the modestmeaningof his statementabout the owl of Minervabeginningits flight at dusk.'2 As Kierkegaard pointedlyremarked, however:"Thephilosophershave built themselvespalacesof ideas, but they live in hovels."And Marxgave this statement the materialisttwist impliedin Kierkegaard's wording. While not at all the of denying importance politicalfreedomand civil rights,Marxcameto feel that such freedomswereinadequateas long as the needs of the body werenot
undhistorischeReflexion, GesellschaftswissenschaftlicheBegrundung Psychopedis, 11. Kosmas (Gottingen,1981),72. an der GeorgAugustUniversitat Habilitationsschrift 1975),VII, (Frankfurt, derPhilosophiedes Rechts,in Werke 12. G. W. F. Hegel, Grundlinien 28.

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... the embarrassment of having satisfied.Thus, as he said, he "experienced to take part in discussionson so-calledmaterialinterests"''3 This realization that politicalfreedomwas merelyformalas long as material needs were not satisfied,and thereforethat the satisfactionof materialneeds of freedom,ledMarxto concludethatit wasnecessary is an essential prerequisite to go beyondphilosophyin orderto realizeits promiseof freedom.This transcendenceor Aufhebungof philosophyis what Marxclaimedhis own theory to be. But the matteris far more complexthan a simplematerialistinversion A ufhebungof philosophywas basedon a radical of Hegel'sphilosophy.Marx's tradition, elementof the Westernphilosophical redefinition of the fundamental the subject-object relationship,and it consistedof workingthroughthe consefor the natureof intellectuallabor. quencesof this redefinition at this issue, the point should be made that most Beforelookingspecifically focus of the interpretative confusionabout Marx'stheoryand the off-centered divisionbetweenthe so-called of muchof the debateis a resultof a problematic and the "mature economist"Marx. The dividingline is "youngphilosophical" periodof 1848-1850.This is, generally drawnat the close of the revolutionary periodMarxhad already however,a false opposition;for by the revolutionary become(and would remain)firstand foremosta theoreticianand practitioner not of philosophyor economics. of historicalscience(Geschichtswissenschaft), And it was in that "youthful"work of 1845, the GermanIdeology, that he groundedhimself firmlyin history and laid the foundationsfor his "mature" analyses.As he then announced:"Werecognizeonly one science, the science of history."'4 Although the GermanIdeology is often uncriticallylumped together with the Economic-Philosophical of the previousyear, there is a vast Manuscripts difference betweenthe two. Both were based on a materialistredefinitionof however,was not yet complete subjectand object. The processof redefinition, philosophy. in the Manuscripts; their framework was still that of a materialist In the GermanIdeology, on the other hand, Marx drew the necessaryconseredefinition of subjectandobject;he madehis "epistequencesof his materialist past"andbeganto develophismateriwithhis philosophical mologicalrupture"

13. Marx, Preface to Critique of Political Economy, in Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert Tucker

(New York, 1978),3. Hereaftercited as MER.


14. Marx, GermanIdeology in Marx-Engels Werke [MEW] (Berlin, 1973), 18. In the manuscript

Marxcrossedout this statement andseveralfollowingsentences of elaboration.Whileit is unclear why he did so, I will attemptto show that this statementperfectlysummarizes Marx'sproject. 15. In borrowing the conceptof "epistemological rupture" from LouisAlthusser,I agreeboth with its applicability and with Althusser's determination of the GermanIdeologyas the work in whichMarxaccomplished it. I also agreewithhis claimthatthoughMarxin the German Ideology hadmadesucha fundamental break,he hadnot yet completely developed his newproject.Beyond thesepointsof chronological agreement, mypositionon whatthisnewprojectwasis fundamentally different fromAlthusser's. Whilethereis no timeto discussthe difference in detail,its outlinescan be summarized briefly. Althussermaintainsthat "by foundingthe theory of history(historical materialism), Marxsimultaneously brokewithhis erstwhile ideological philosophy and established

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alist science of history. In order to understandMarx's project, then, it is necessary to begin with the GermanIdeology. The followingbrief look at the framework and conceptualapparatus of the Manuscripts and the German Ideandevaluating ologywillexplainwhythisis so andprovidethe basisfor defining Marx'smaterialist scienceof history. In the Manuscripts Marx,followingFeuerbach's lead, definedthe subjectas the sensually-acting (sinnlich-tdtig) subjectand the object as the object of that action. But he went beyondFeuerbach and definedsensualactivitymore concretelyas interactionwith naturein the process of reproducing humanlife.'6 Withthis definition,then, workhad movedonto centerstagein Marx'stheoretical project. At this stage, however,the conceptualframework of his theorywas still that of Feuerbach.Although he focused on work, he did not view the primary needs.Rather,he viewed purposeof workas the satisfactionof humanmaterial laboras a meansfor peopleto realizetheir"species-essence" (Gattungswesen17) and criticized the structure of workinsofaras it preventspeople from realizing thatessence.Therefore,anddespitehis ownconcernwithinequality andoppression, he definedthe capitalist structureof work not as exploitative, but as or "estranging" "alienating" humanbeingsfrom theiressence.'8 Becauseof this conceptualframework,the "poverty" which Marx discussedin 1844 was not primarily the materialproblemof scarcity,starvation,and so on; rather,it was the "idealist" poverty of an alienatedhumanityunable to realize its essence throughits labor. This allowedthe powerfulcritiqueof the stuntedgrowthof humanbeingsin capitalistsociety which he developedin the Manuscripts and whichremaineda themethroughouthis entirework;however,this conceptual frameworkof essence and alienatedappearancewas extremelyproblematic. The main problemwas that Marx had only one foot on historicalground: becauseof his Feuerbachian in the Manuframework, the analysishe presented scriptswas static and a priori. He describedan historicalproblem,but he did

a new philosophy(dialectical materialism)." (In LouisAlthusser,For Marx,transl.Ben Brewster [London, 1977],33). My position, however,is that Marx'sepistemological breakwas his break with, or Aufhebungof philosophyin general,and that his new project was not to develop a dialecticalmaterialist philosophyof historybut a materialistscienceof historywhich certainly contained a theoretical dimension that willbe discussed below. SeeFor Marx.For Althusser's own summary of his position,see his introduction to this work.For furthercommenton this issue, see note 26. 16. See Marx,Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in MER, 75-76. 17. While Wesen can be translated as either"being" or "essence," the use of the formerdiverts fromthesignificance attention of the sixthThesison Feuerbach for the direction of Marx's development.In thisthesis,Marxrejected theconceptof the "human essence" (menschliches Wesen), which is essentially the sameas the conceptof "species-essence" usedin the Manuscripts. (Gattungswesen) BothGattungswesen andmenschliches Wesen denotean a prioridefinition of a fixedhumannature or essence; andit is precisely the fixedanda prioricharacter of theseconceptswhichMarxrejected withthe notionof the "ensemble andreplaced of socialrelations." Thiscrucialconceptual shiftcan easilybe overlookedby definingGattungswesen as "species-being" ratherthan "species-essence." in MER, 70-81. 18. Marx,Manuscripts,

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so in ahistoricalconcepts. He began with what he called "an actual economic fact,"that "theworkerbecomesall the poorerthe more wealthhe produces."'9 Then he proceededto analyzethis povertyin terms of a humanityalienated from its essence. He did not and could not explain, however,the historical originsof the problemnor show clearlywhy there is a concretepossibilityof overcoming it. At this point, he saw alienationas a necessarystep in the evolution of humanity;and the basis of his anticipationof going beyondthat alienation was a philosophical is the logicalnecesdialecticwhosedynamicprinciple sity of the negationof the negation,the abstractneedfor an alienatedhumanity to recapture its essence. This philosophicalframeworkand conceptualapparatus preventedthe developmentof the insights gained from the materialist redefinition of subjectand object.20 Marx'sfocus on work, however, quicklyled him to the realizationthat its essentialgoal was not to realizea "humanessence,"but to make possiblethe existenceof any "humanessence."This, in turn, forced him to acknowledge that the contentof his materialist definitionof subjectand object as a relation of humanbeingsinteracting with naturein orderto satisfytheirmaterialneeds could not be contained by his philosophicalframework,to realize that his new definitionof subject and object demandeda commensurately historical conceptualapparatus.This work of planting both feet firmly on historical groundis whatMarxtogetherwith Engelscarriedout in the German Ideology, the unpublished work intended"to settle accountswith [their]erstwhilephiloand in which they "hadachieved[their]main purposesophicalconscience"
self-clarification."2'

The most obvious and most often overlooked element of this "selfclarification" is the fate of the two centralcategoriesof the Manuscripts. First, in the "Theseson Feuerbach," which serve as the prefaceto the GermanIdeIn criticizing Feuerbach's ology, Marxrejectedthe conceptof Species-Essence. from the historicalprocess,he wrote:"Feuerbach resolvesthe reliabstraction gious essenceinto the humanessence.But the humanessenceis no abstraction inherentin each single individual.In its realityit is the ensembleof the social HereMarxclearlyand categorically notion relations."22 rejectedthe ahistorical of any fixedand a prioriessenceof humanbeings. And he replacedit with a notion of "reallivingindividuals"23 who are conditionedby the worldin which
19. Idem.

20. Sincethe publication of theManuscripts therehasbeena widespread tendency to viewthem as the basis of all of Marx'ssubsequent works.To mentiononly a few, but widelyreadanalyses
of this kind: Shlomo Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx (Cambridge, Eng., 1968); Bertell Ollman, Alienation: Marx's Concept of Man in Capitalist Society (Cambridge, Eng.,

1971);andmorerecently,SeylaBenhabib,Critique, Norm, and Utopia(NewYork, 1986).As will be shownbelow, however,this attemptto base all of Marx'sworkson the Manuscripts overlooks Marx'sown critiqueof them, particularly of theircentralcategories,in the GermanIdeology. 21. Marx,Preface,5-6. See also Marx'sletterto KarlLeske,in whichhe wrote:"It seemedto me very importantthat a work polemicisingagainst Germanphilosophyand currentGerman socialismshould precedemy positiveconstruction[of an economicanalysisof capitalism]." in MEWXXVII, 448. 22. Marx,"Theseson Feuerbach" in MER, 145.
23. German Ideology, MER, 155.

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Withthis historiproduceand reproduce.24 they live and whichthey themselves cized definitionof the formationof humannatures,Marxhad clearedthe way to begin an analysisof real humanbeings in their concretehistoricalactivity. on humanbeings also forced Marx This thoroughlyhistoricizedperspective to rethinkthe causesof, and to redefine,the unhappystate in whichhe found the other centralconcept of them. Accordingly,"alienation" (Entfremdung), the Manuscripts,also disappearedor, at least, lost its previous position of it is virtuallynonexthe Manuscripts, primacy.Althoughthis conceptpervaded Ideology.Marxputthe termin quotationmarks istenta yearlaterin the German to stated,"onlyin orderto remaincomprehensible andusedit, as he sarcastically the conceptof exploitationwhich In its placehe introduced the philosophers."25 rootedin the ensembleof humansocialrelationsand whichwould is concretely not throughany logical necessity,but only throughthe political be eliminated based on the practicalnecessityof self-emancipation. action of the proletariat Having discardedthe inheritedphilosophicalterminologyof essence and alienationand his fixed a priori framework,Marx had cleared the way for in the the consistentmaterialistanalysisof the content of historyundertaken is somewhat Ideology. Thiswork, as an attemptat "self-clarification," German repetitiousand gropingand often seemsto contain leaps in logic. Althoughit took Marxover two decadesto develop satisfactorysolutions to some of the problemsraisedhere, the GermanIdeology does markthe end of one stagein Marx'sevolution and the beginningof another. For in it he completedhis attemptto develop a fully materialistand historicizeddeterminationof the conceptsof subjectand object and therewithof the contentof history, and he made a first attemptto definethe epistemologicaland methodologicalconsequencesof his new conceptionof history.26
24. Two pointsneedto be madeaboutMarx's replacement of the conceptof "species-essence" with the "ensemble of social relations." First,the ensembleof social relationsis meantin neither elementin this a deterministic nor an economically reductionist sense. The singlemost important causal ensembleis, for Marx,class. But it is not the only factornor, necessarily, the determining event.Incontrast individuals arenot defined factorin a givenhistorical to a Hegelian-like approach, simplyas manifestations of their "classessence."Rather,the ensembleof social relationswhich shapepersonality, consciousness, and behaviorencompasses not only the relationsof production, but all socialrelations: education,socialization,culture,and so on. (See OskarNegt, "Whatis a of Revivalof Marxismand Why do We Need One Today?,"in Marxismand the Interpretation Culture[Urbana,Ill., 1988],221, 227-230). live and The "ensemble of socialrelations," then, definesthe specificworldin whichindividuals whichgives structure to theirchoices, but does not determine how they will choose. The second or "nature" of humanbeings.This pointis that sincesocialrelations change,so does the character does not meanthat thereare no constantsin humanlife. As PerryAndersonhas argued,Marx's conceptionof thoseconstants "clearly has a biologicalorigin,in the sensethatthe humanphysiogpotentials, physical nomicstructure is thatof a specific animalspecies[which] endowsus withcertain powers, and certaindispositionsas well"(See PerryAnderson,Discussion,in Marxismand the of humanbeingsin a Interpretation of Culture,334). It simplymeansthat the specificcharacter givenera cannotbe determined a priori,but only in reference to the ensembleof socialrelations. 25. Marx, GermanIdeology,in MER, 161. 26. How sharpwas this break?Thatdepends.If the focus is on Marx'sevolutionas a thinker, (naturhis intellectual biography,then it is clearthat the German Ideologydevelopedorganically of the problemof humanfreedom formulation wuchsig) fromthe materialist dimension of Marx's

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Developinghis materialist conceptionthrougha critiqueof GermanphilosMarx began the first section of the German ophy as "devoidof premises,"27 "arenot arbitrary ones, not dogmas, Ideologyby statinghis own. Thesepremises can only be madein the imagination. but realpremisesfrom whichabstraction They are the real individuals,theiractivity,and the materialconditionsunder whichthey live, both those whichthey findalreadyexistingand those produced of livinghumanindividuals" is the first by theirown activity."28 This "existence namely: premiseof historyand pointstoward"thefirstfact to be established," "thephysicalorganization of theseindividuals and theirconsequentrelationto A total analysisof humanhistorywould includestudies the rest of nature."29 of the humanspeciesand of the "geological,orohyof the anatomical structure of the naturalworldwithwhichhumanbeings climatic" structure drographical, Marx, however,felt justifiedin not going into interactin the labor process.30 such detail becausehe assumedthat the historicallyrelevantdata from such analyses would automatically assert themselves in a concrete historicalmaterialist study of the mode and relationsof production. is theessential to arguethatproduction As in theManuscripts Marxcontinued of the human species. His purposehere, however, was not to characteristic from a "humanessence."Rather,because measurethe degreeof estrangement he had dissolvedthe categoryof humanessence into the "ensembleof social relationships," his primaryconcern was to explain that social relations are developedand given structureaccordingto the ways in which human beings satisfytheirmaterialneeds. Havingestablishedthe crucialimportanceof the relationsof production,Marxin this firstsectionthen gave specificexamplesof is theirvariousforms.Theseexamples neednot concernus here.Moreimportant the generalstatementexplainingthe successionof these forms whichhe stated in the second section. the first premiseconcerningthe existenceof living human After reiterating beings with real materialneeds whose life-activitydepends on and revolves aroundthe satisfactionof those needs, he madea "secondpoint":"thesatisfaction of the firstneed(theactionof satisfying,andthe instrument of satisfaction "3IImplicithereis thatthisdynamic whichhasbeenacquired) leadsto newneeds.
in theManuscripts and fromthe inadequacy of the solutionspresented there.As I indicated above (note 15), the difference betweenthe epistemological standpointsof the two works is far more drastic andis accurately use of theterm"epistemological characterized by Althusser's For rupture." Althusser the German Ideologypresentsan entirelynew "problematic" (ForMarx, 66-67) and a newepistemological standpoint fromwhichto engagethisproblematic; andtogether thesetwo new elements constitute the inauguration of a new science.Despitemy disagreement in withAlthusser terms of how this new scienceis constituted,I agree that the GermanIdeology represents an "epistemological rupture" insofaras it rejectsthe essentialand essentialist categories of theManuscripts, providesa materialist definitionof the content of history, and, as I will show below, recognizes and attemptsto come to terms with the epistemological dilemmaresultingfrom an historical-materialist delineation of the social locus of mentallabor. 27. Ibid., 155. 28. Ibid., 149. 29. Idem. 30. Ibid., 149-150. 31. Ibid., 156.

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of new needs and the developmentof new technologiesto satisfy them is the necessary(but insufficient)force behind the evolution of social forms. This to lendcredence to thosewho wantto viewMarxas a technological pointappears determinist.32 Marx'spurpose,however,was not to establisha law of necessary technological development and socialevolution;ratherhe wassimplydelivering a materialistexplanationof the impetus for technologicaldevelopmentand, consequently,social evolution. As will be shownbelow, he intendedthis commentonly as a generalstatementfor purposesof orientation,not as an ironlaw of historicalchange.
The "third circumstance which . . . enters into historical development is

that people, who daily remaketheir own life, begin to make other people, to propagatetheir own kind:the relationbetweenman and woman, parentsand children,the family."33 The family, howeveris not just a biological entity. It is "inthe beginningthe only social relationship"34 -whence it follows that "the productionof life, both of one'sown in labourand of freshlife in procreation, now appearsas a doublerelationship: on the one handas a natural,on the other as a social relationship."35 With this analysisof the socioeconomicfunctionof socialbeingslinkedthroughboth the familyandof humanbeingsas necessarily materialproductionand biologicalreproduction,Marx broke decisivelywith the notion of human beings as primarilypolitical animals and thus with the fetish of politicalfreedomin the philosophicaltradition.He also underscored his rejectionof classicalliberalism's view of humanbeings as originallyRobinson Crusoes,as isolated individualsin a state of nature. Finally, and only after having consideredthe materialpremisesof human life, did Marxbeginthe treatment of consciousness.Despitethe linearsequence of this presentation,Marx did not treat consciousnessas a mere epiphenomas a simplemirror of thematerial enon, thatis, he didnot conceiveconsciousness basis. Rather he simply established,against traditionalphilosophy, that all forms of consciousness,even the apparentlymost transcendent,derivetheir content from the concretemateriality of humanexistence.As he said: "Consciousnesscanneverbe anything elsethanconsciousexistence,andthe existence of men is their actual life-process."36 As mentioned earlier (note 24), "lifemeansthe totalityof the experience of a givenindividuaL The primary process" factorgivingstructure to an individual's andoutlookon the worldis life-process socialgeography, thepositionin the divisionof labor. Consciousness, however, to class;it mustbe treatedandanalyzed cannotbe reduced as thelivedexperience
32. In recentyears, the most meticulousdefenseof this interpretation is G. A. Cohen'sKarl Marx'sTheoryof History: A Defence (Princeton,1978).Cohen'sattemptto provethat Marx's projectresultedin a universalphilosophyof history of which the progressive developmentof technologyis the deterministic, drivingforce forcedhim into a difficultsituationwhenit cameto explaining the technological declineduringthe MiddleAges. See 154-155. 33. Marx, German Ideologyin MER, 156. 34. Idem. 35. Ibid., 157. 36. Ibid., 154.

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of human beings. This includes, of course, the consciousnessof those peroutlineof the social formingsuchanalyses,the mentallaborers.Thismaterialist thus has seriousimplications originsof the formsand contentof consciousness for the natureof intellectuallabor. the traditiondatingback to Socrates,Marxcame to view as selfReversing cavern"in which the deceptionthe claim that in escapingthe "subterranean commonpeopleweredwelling,the philosopherhad emergedinto the dazzling religion,metaphysics,all the rest of ideology light of truth(Plato): "Morality, forms of consciousness thus no longerretainthe semand theircorresponding butmen, develno no have history, development; They blanceof independence. alter,alongwith intercourse, productionandtheirmaterial opingtheirmaterial this their real existence,their thinkingand the productsof their thinking."37 link betweenideasand the material a (non-reductionist) HereMarxestablished he had to redefine the sociallocus of the knowingsubject world.Consequently, and of intellectuallabor. In contrast to philosophy, for which the knowing subjectwas in the centerand above the world it was observing,Marxhad, to that subject.And "decentered" borrowa termfrom modernpoststructuralism, as one branch among,rather labor he did so by definingthe locus of intellectual Aufhebung thanabove,theotherbranches of the socialdivisionof labor.Marx's then, conof philosophy,his versionof a critiqueof Western"logocentrism," sisted of exposingthe relationbetweenmental and manuallabor, the precise had overlookedby privileging natureof which his philosophicalpredecessors their own activity. This redefinitionof the social locus of intellectuallabor forced Marxto rejectthe conceptualabsolutisminherentin the philosophical positingof the primacyof mind over body. As a resultof this reductionof the dilemmawhichhe powerof thought,he confronteda difficultepistemological and recraftingof the tools triedto solve by carryingout a radicalreappraisal of the intellectualtrade. The epistemologicaldilemmaresultingfrom this is many-sided:historical materialistscience must necessarilyutilize the tools of thought in order to that those tools necessarilyabpresentreality,while knowingsimultaneously sciencerecognizesthe stractfrom its concretediversity.Historical-materialist wants not only to avoid limits on the power of thought, but simultaneously relativismand skepticism,but also to presenthistoricalrealityin its concrete sciencedefinesitself as one momentof the social totality. Historical-materialist in divisionof labor, but wantsto raiseitself above its own limitedperspective orderto gain knowledgeof the whole. In short, preciselybecauseits claims the a prioripowerof intellectual laborare muchmoremodestthan concerning those of traditional scienceconfrontsa much philosophy,historicalmaterialist more difficulttask in its attempt to reconstructreality in thought. This is a problemwhich,ironically,arisesalthough,and also becausethe startingpoint of this science is the concrete, materiallife-processof the real, historically existingand acting individuals.
37. Ibid., 154-155.

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The process throughwhich Marx solved this dilemmawas cautious, lengthy, and complex;it consistedof a two-stepdevelopmentof the epistemologyand methodologyof a materialistscience of history. The first step was the easier the dilemmaand, through sinceit was only negative.This was to acknowledge the limitson thought.Oncethistask a critiqueof philosophy,to defineprecisely had been completed,the very difficultsecond step was the positivebuildingof foundation. historicalscienceon a very modest epistemological on the powerof thoughtwaspart Thefirststepof ascertaining the restrictions in the GermanIdeology. Thinkingthroughto their of the "self-clarification" of a materialist logicalconclusionthe epistemological consequences conception of history,Marxin two extremely importantparagraphs presentedhis critique of the philosophical approachto knowledge.He arguedthat becausethe study of real materialhumanbeings in their interactionwith natureand with each otheris the only adequateapproachto the depictionof reality,"philosophy as Withthe an independent branchof knowledgeloses its mediumof existence."38 end of such"speculation," the way had been clearedfor "real,positivescience, . . .the representation of the practicalactivity, of the practicalprocess of "9 The mostthat remained of [people]. development to satisfythe philosophical propensity for universal statements is "asumming-up of the mostgeneralresults whichcan be abstracted from the observationof the historicaldevelopment of [people]."' However,he immediately added, "viewedapartfrom the study of realhistory,"these statements are only "abstractions whichhave in themselves no value whatsoever."'41 Their only remainingfunction is "to facilitatethe arrangement of historicalmaterial,to indicatethe sequenceof its separatestrata. But they by no meansafforda recipeor schema,as does philosophy,for neatly In contrastto the philosophers,for whom trimmingthe epochs of history."42 is one key criterionof truth,Marxsaw in universalstatements universality only abstractions which ignoredconcretehistoricalparticularity. He did not, however, dispensewith such statementsaltogether.He maintained that if consciouslyacknowledgedas abstractions,such statementsdo have a function,albeita limitedone, as "guiding threads" (Leitfaden)to orient his empirical And establishing research.43 the guidingthreadswas all that Marx
38. Ibid., 155.

hereto avoid is necessary science" use of thenotionof "positive on Marx's 39. Idem.A comment use of thistermis not to be confusedwith confusion.As thesepassagesshouldmakeclear,Marx's laws of social evolution.Rather, derivingfrom Comtewhichinsistson inexorable the positivism andcontemporaries predecessors of hisphilosophical it mustbe viewedin the contextof his critique whose worksMarxviewedas hopelesslyabstract;and it refers, of course, to the need to study and in the concreteprocessof of social relations" withinthe "ensemble humanbeingsempirically the meansto satisfytheirmaterialneeds. producing
40. Idem.

41. Idem, my emphasis.


42. Idem. inMER, 4. Marxusesthe term"guiding 43. Marx,Prefaceto the CritiqueofPoliticalEconomy, of summary and as a statementof the value of, his well-known immediately preceding, threads"

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was concernedto do in the generalsketchof historyin the GermanIdeology: the generaloverviewof the content of history and the considerationsof the natureof historicalchangeare intendedto be only a firstsketch, not a finished portrait.The generally overlookedconsequence of this modestdefinitionof the role of the universalstatementis that all of Marx'sstatementswhichappearto be makinguniversalclaimsare actuallyconsciousabstractions.As guides for the historical-materialist scientist they are useful abstractions;but, prior to beinggivencontentandcorrected by the resultsof concretehistorical-empirical andcertainlynot statements of universal analysis,they aresimplyabstractions, truth. In the German Ideology,then, Marxredefined the contentof historyto match his materialistdefinitionof the subjectand object. He not only turnedHegel rightside up, but also performed the critiqueof the philosophicalapproachto knowledgedemandedby that inversion.The next step would be to go beyond critiqueand to definethe positive content of a materialistscience of history. In his concludingcommentsto theseparagraphs, Marxpointedto the directions his futureworkwouldtake:"ourdifficulties beginonly whenwe set about - the real depiction - of our historicalmatethe observationand arrangement rial, whetherof a past epoch or of the present.The removalof these difficulties is governed by premises whichit is quiteimpossibleto statehere,but whichonly the study of the actuallife-processof the individualsof each epoch will make evident."44 Althoughit does not explicitly namethe difficulties, this passagedoes indicatethe two tasks involvedin this second step: first, conductingempirical researchand analyzingeach era on its own terms; and second, solving the reductionof epistemological problemsresultingfrom the historical-materialist the power of thought. Only upon having completedthese tasks could Marx publishCapital,andhis writingsof the nexttwo decadeswerethereforedevoted to this dualpurpose.Consequently, the firststudiesfor Capital,the Grundrisse and the Critique of PoliticalEconomy, and eventhe finalform of Capitalitself are to be viewednot only as excavationsof the capitalisteconomy, but also as in historical-materialist experiments epistemology. the In the remainder of this essay, I shallfocus on the secondtask. In defining elementsof hishistorical-materialist science,I shallarguethatMarxconstructed methodologicalsolutions to the epistemologicalproblemsresultingfrom his of the subjectandobject. Themostimportant redefinition historical-materialist are: 1) the delineationof the object of analysis;2) elementsof this redefinition of a logic of presentation the development (Darstellung); 3) the determination of the epistemologicalvalue of Capital; 4) the role of historicalwriting in Marx'sproject.Onlyafterhavingdiscussedtheseelementswill it be possibleto of Marx'sAufhebungof philosthe full meaningand significance understand science. ophy and the praxisof historical-materialist
into - a passage hypostasize nevertheless whichmanyinterpreters of historical change thedynamics philosophyof history. an allegedmaterialist Ideology,in MER, 155, my emphasis. 44. Marx, German

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to view each era in terms As mentionedabove, Marxarguedthat it is necessary of its own inner logic (or illogic as the case may be). Accordingly,the first methodological step in the analysisof any era is to delineateit, specifically,its of mode production.Sincecommodityproductionand exchangewerenot limited to the modern capitalist era, the delineationof the capitalist mode of is obviousfromthe two competing production wasnot an easytask. Its difficulty formulations found in the GermanIdeologyand the complexityof the chapter in the Grundrisse, "Pre-Capitalist Propertyand Production,"in which Marx the capitalistmode of productionfrom its predecessors. finallydifferentiated over this question,however,was a delineaThe resultof his long deliberations tion of capitalismwhich both exposedits historicityand specifiedthe limited rangeof his concept of teleology. As he first stepped onto historicalground, Marx was not yet certainhow precisely to definehis analytical object:bourgeoissocietybasedon the capitalist mode of production.In the German Ideology, thereare two mutuallyexclusive of the relationbetweencapitalistand precapitalist definitions societies. On the one hand, andclearlyinfluenced by his philosophical past, he definedbourgeois ThisperfectlyHegelianformulation societyas the "basisof all history."45 defines the bourgeois-capitalist presentas the telos of the entirecourseof worldhistory. Had Marx pursuedthis line of analysis, he would have writtena materialist philosophyof history showingthe logical necessityof the developmentfrom the firstmodeof production to the last, in whichcasehis theorytrulyandsimply would have been an invertedHegelianism.On the other hand, the German Ideology also contains a comment on the arbitrarynature of technological developmentwhich underminedthe possibility of a universalphilosophy of in the Grundrisse, historyand which, after Marxworkedout its consequences in Capital. becamethe basis of his presentation In discussing the evolutionof technologyMarxwrotethat "itdependspurely on the extension of commercewhetherthe productiveforces achievedin a locality, especiallyinventions,are lost for later developmentor not. As long as thereexists no commercetranscending the immediateneighborhood,every inventionmust be made separatelyin each locality, and merechancessuch as irruptionsof barbaricpeoples, even ordinarywars, are sufficientto cause a countrywith advancedproductiveforces and needsto have to startrightover again from the beginning."4' Because, then, of the contingent characterof technological development and of the constantthreatof the loss of technology for most of humanhistory,Marxfound it impossibleto posit bourgeoissociety as the telos of the entirecourseof worldhistory-impossible, therefore,to write a philosophyof history which is both materialistand universal.It is, on the contrary,only relativelyrecentlythat technologicaldevelopmenthas acquired
45. Ibid., 164. 46. Ibid., 180.

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its own immanent logic: "Only when commerce has become world commerce and has as its basis large-scale industry, when all nations are drawn into the competitive struggle, is the permanence of the acquired productive forces asHere Marx clearly indicated that only the capitalist mode of production sured."47 provides the material prerequisites for the preservation of technology and the material incentive for its development. With this differentiation of capitalism from previous modes of production, he was forced to limit both the historical application of categories derived from the capitalist mode of production and the range of his concept of teleology. In the Introduction to the Grundrisse Marx discussed this issue of the limited applicability of categories from a later society. Although his statement that "human anatomy contains a key to the anatomy of the ape"48 initially sounds as though he were repeating the formula about bourgeois society as the "basis of all history," his explanation shows that he now rejected the universal teleology inherent in earlier formulations. He was careful to emphasize that while the later society does provide a key to the character of its predecessorss, categories from the later society cannot be directly and immediately applied to the former. He clarified this with the example of the "modern concept of labor" which "shows strikingly how even the most abstract categories, despite their validityprecisely because of their abstractness - for all epochs, are nevertheless, in the specific character of this abstraction, themselves likewise a product of historic relations, and possess their full validity only for and within these relations."49 In conclusion he stated: "Although it is true ... that the categories of bourgeois economics possess a truth for all other forms of society, this is to be taken only with a grain of salt. They can contain them in a developed, or stunted, or caricature form etc., but always with an essential difference."50Any analysis which does not recognize this difference is bound falsely to posit the present era as telos: "The so-called historical presentation of development is founded, as a rule, on the fact that the latest form regards the previous ones as steps leading up to itself, and, since it is only rarely and only under quite specific conditions able to criticize itself . .. it always considers them one-sidedly.""5Here Marx presented a critique not only of bourgeois universalizing of its own categories but also of his own earlier tendency to do the same. By the time he wrote the Grundrisse, the combination of his analysis of the conditions of technological development and a differentiatedunderstanding of the applicability of historical categories led him to reject a universal application of the concept of teleology. In the well-known chapter in the Grundrisse, "Pre-Capitalist Property and Production," Marx explained specifically the limited range of the categories of

47. Idem. in MER, 241. 48. Marx, Grundrisse,


49. Idem. 50. Ibid., 242. 51. Idem.

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bourgeois society; in so doing he completed his delineation of the capitalist mode of production and specified the limits of his use of teleology. To summarize briefly this conceptually difficult "flight to other modes of production,"52 there are two interrelated results of methodological import. In prebourgeois modes of production the pursuit of wealth is never a purpose unto itself; there is, therefore, no inherent logic to economic activity, nor to economic development. Economic activity is always subordinate to extra-economic ends;53thus, such "superstructural"elements as the polis in ancient Athens or the personal relations of domination in medieval society can be as essential as the mode of production in determining the form of socialization (Vergesellschaftung). In precapitalist societies, then, the "base"and "superstructure"are so inextricably intertwined that it is impossible analytically to isolate the "base" or adequately to understand the "essence"of such societies by focusing solely on the mode of production. It is, on the contrary, the unique double characteristic of the capitalist mode of production that the pursuit of wealth is a purpose unto itself and functions according to the regularities of commodity exchange. For this reason the material or economic base can be isolated as an object of analysis. This is, it must be emphasized, a purely methodological consideration, not a reductionist theory of the relation between base and superstructure. It is, however, a crucial consideration which allowed Marx to determine the historical specificity of the capitalist mode of production. This methodological isolation of the economy from all other social spheres is nothing more than an explicit recognition of what all economists do. However as an explicit recognition based on an historical and qualitative differentiation between precapitalist and capitalist modes of production, it avoids hypostatizing those specifically capitalist characteristics (especially exchange value as the goal of production) into universal attributes of all modes of production and thereby reveals the historicity of capitalism. In contrast, then, to Hegel's philosophy of history which teleologically subsumed the entire course of history to its "result"and approached the past only as the prehistory of the present, Marx's new method is quite different. His

proceduredid not equatethe prehistoryof bourgeoissociety with the history


of prebourgeois societies in their own historical specificity. Because he viewed the history of prebourgeois societies as "arbitrary,"as subject to "merechances," he had to limit the extension of the concept of teleology to the earliest manifestation of a mode of production with its own immanent logic. He could not, therefore, write a universal philosophy of history. His goal was the more modest one of writing a genealogy and an anatomy of the capitalist mode of production

52. Marx, Das Kapital in MEW XXIII, 90.

53. HenceMarx'scommentthat "weneverfind amongthe ancientsa study of what form of etc. is the most productive, createsthe greatestwealth.Wealthneverappearsas landedproperty, the purposeof production.... The study is alwaysof what kind of propertycreatesthe best citizens."Grundrisse, transl.MartinNicolaus(New York, 1973),487.

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and an abstract biography of its life cycle. This life-cycle, beyond which Marx's concept of teleology cannot reach, began not with the protocapitalist exchange of the ancient world; rather, as he stated in the Communist Manifesto, it began with the rudimentary form of commodity production which emerged on the urban islands amid the medieval manorial economy and eventually, according to its own inherent dynamic, reclaimed the countryside. IV With this delineation of the capitalist mode of production Marx uncovered the foundation of bourgeois society and reached the starting point for the conceptual presentation which he developed in Capital. However, to understand the place of Capital in his project, it is first necessary to examine his considerations of the logic of the conceptual presentation and its epistemological value. In the Afterword to the second edition of Capital, Marx distinguished the mode of presentation (Darstellungsweise) from the mode of inquiry (Forschungsweise). The mode of inquiry consists of collecting data about the various historical epochs. For Marx, however, the data which appear to the observer, the phenomena, are not isolated and independent facts which have meaning in and of themselves. In contrast to a purely empirical approach, he felt that the task of inquiry is to penetrate beyond surface appearances and to find the essential structure, that is, the structure within which phenomena gain their meaning and can correctly be interpreted. The goal of the inquiry, then, is not only to "appropriate the material in detail, to analyze its different forms of development," but also "to trace out their innerbond (inneresBand)."54In his analysis of capitalist society, of course, the penetration of the manifold diversity of appearances led to the conclusion that the inner bond is the commodity: the socialization (Vergesellschaftung) of the apparently isolated property owners and the reproduction of the society are mediated through the production and exchange of commodities. Only after the inner bond has been grasped, Marx continued, "can the actual movement be adequately described."" In formal agreement with Hegel, Marx defined the logic, the "scientifically correct method," of presentation as the "unfolding" of the categories, the ascent from the simplest category to the most concrete.56Having arrived at the inner bond as a result of the inquiry, the next step is to turn around and retrace the steps. The inner bond, which is the end point or goal of the inquiry, is thus the starting point of the presentation, and the course of the presentation consists of developing the increasingly concrete categories out of the simplest. If this "unfolding" is successfully performed, Marx stated, "if the life of the

citedas Afterword) Editionof Capital,(hereafter to the SecondGerman 54. Marx,Afterword in MER, 301.
55. Idem. 56. Marx, Grundrisse, 100-101.

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subject-matter is ideally reflected as in a mirror, then it may appear as if we had before us a mere a priori construction."57This statement not only indicates that the conceptual presentation might have a deceptive appearance, but it also shows that the interpretative problem does not end here. For the formal logic of presentation explains only the sequence according to which the concepts are to be "unfolded" or analyzed. It does not, however, automatically define the epistemological value of the conceptual presentation, that is, its relation to historical reality. Thus, the formal identity of Hegel's and Marx's definition of the logic of presentation is not to be confused with epistemological evaluation. When the two are confused, the result is the illusion that Marx's Capital is identical to Hegel's Logic not only in structure but also in purpose, that Capital is Marx's presentation of the concrete totality of capitalist society. Because of their radically different evaluations of the content of the concept, however, they also differ radically in their epistemological evaluations of the conceptual presentation. Since Hegel had posited a priori the essentiality of the concept, he could happily conclude that the conceptual presentation is the concrete presentation of reality; and because in the Hegelian framework reality had come to correspond to philosophy, its presentation is literally a closed book. There remains little for historical science to do except perhaps the illustrative activity of subsuming the empirical data to its concepts, the activity of filling in the details. Any phenomena, however, which cannot be defined as manifestations of a conceptual essence are for that reason contingent and arbitrary; and insofar as philosophical logic is based on necessity, any contingent and arbitraryelements are philosophically irrelevant. As was shown above, however, Marx's materialist analysis of the mode of intellectual production limited the range of the concept by depriving it of its essentiality. As will be shown below, this limitation forced Marx to reconsider the criteria of scientific knowledge and the role of the "contingent." But it is first necessary to look at his critique of Hegel's evaluation of the conceptual presentation, for it is on the basis of this critique that he redefined those criteria. Marx discussed this issue in the section on "Method" in the Grundrisse. He first exposed Hegel's "illusion of conceiving the real as the product of thought concentrating itself, probing its own depths, and unfolding itself out of itself, by itself." He then rejected the generative power which Hegel attributed to the concept: "the method of rising from the abstract to the concrete is only the way in which thought appropriates the concrete, reproduces it as the concrete in the mind. But this is by no means the process by which the concrete itself comes into being."58Marx's goal, then, was not to subsume reality to the concept, but to reproduce it conceptually. However, those same historical-materialist tenets which allowed him to see through the philosophical fetishism of concepts also

57. Marx,Afterwordin MER, 301. 58. Marx, Grundrisse, 101.

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luxuryof positingthe primacyof the forcedhimto renouncethe philosophical epistemological concept. He was thus confrontedwith the above-mentioned he wasobligedto usethe conceptas the indispensandmethodological dilemma: abletool of intellectual labor, as the only meansto carryout the reconstruction of realityin thought;yet he also knewthat this tool and its productare necessarilyabstract. To solvethis dilemma,Marxhadto reducethe claimsattachedto the conceppresentation tualpresentation. He couldnot, as didHegel,definethe conceptual in its concretetotality.Thisby no of historicaldevelopment as the presentation is worthless,simply meansimplies,however,that the conceptualpresentation that it is limited. Althoughthe conceptualpresentationis reducedto a more a role which modestrolethanthat allottedto it by philosophy,it is nevertheless analysisof bourgeoissociety. Rather is essentialin the historical-materialist than posit the conceptualpresentationas that of the real, Marx definedits value in the limitedterms of an "abstract presentationof the epistemological fromreal temporarily abstracts essential."59 Thepurelyconceptualpresentation to the conceptof existing,but "contingent," elementswhichdo not correspond capitalin orderto constructa model of how the capitalistmode of production is constructed and how it functions. In so doing it presentsthe essentialin its pure, and thereforehistoricallyabstract,form. reprecharacter of theconceptual presentation Thisevaluation of the abstract sents, according to Kosmas Psychopedis, Marx's "methodologicalbreakfor whom philosophical predecessors, through."60 Fromtheviewpointof Marx's the essentialmust, by definition,be concrete,the notion of an "abstract presenin terms.WhereasHegel could maintation of the essential" is a contradiction tain that the ascent from the simplestto the most complexattainsthe essence and encompassesall that is relevantto the philosophical conception of the Theconceptual ascent concretetotality,Marxcouldmakeno suchassumptions. can show the essentialmomentsof the mode of production;and only through in the relations suchan analysisis it possibleto exposethe exploitationinherent of production,yet hidden by the illusion of the free marketand the formal equalityof capitalistand workerenteringinto the laborcontract.But the conreleas an abstractpresentation cannotincludeeverything ceptualpresentation vant to an historicalunderstanding of bourgeois societies in their concrete totality (the rest of the ensembleof social relationsand the effectivelingering of precapitalist elements). Because for Marx the conceptualpresentationis abstract,its long ascentreachesonly a plateau,the firststageof a muchlonger climb towardthe concretetotality. as an abstractpresentaSinceMarxconceivedof the conceptualpresentation tion, he couldnot simplyignorethat whichdoes not fit into it. This is diametridatawereeitherto be subsumed callyopposedto Hegel'spositionthatempirical

59. Psychopedis, 219. 60. Idem.

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to their concepts or ignored as merely "contingent."61In order to reach the to reintegrate concretetotality,however,Marxwas methodologically required thetemporarily factorswhichhaveno placein the abstract "contingent" conceptual analysis,but whichare essentialfactorsin the projectof movingfrom the abstractto the concretepresentationof a given society. froma materiIn order,then, to solvethe epistemological dilemmas resulting alist conceptionof historyand its relativizingof the power of thought, Marx recognizedand worked through the unavoidabilityof having to reconstruct realityin abstract categories.He showedthe necessityof theoreticalor conceptual analysis,but did not reduce reality to concepts. Instead, his "positive science"insisted on the need to include that which does not correspondto the purelyconceptualand, therefore,on the need for ever-renewed empirical analysisas theory'sself-critique.In short, he redefinedthe essentialvis-A-vis traditional philosophy.That which for Hegel was merelycontingentand thus to be eliminated fromconsideration was for Marxessentialto an understanding of the historyof a given society in its concreteand contradictory totality. Thisredefinition of whatis essentialto historicalunderstanding thuscontains an accompanying demand for empiricalanalysisas the means to reintegrate (notto excludeor subsume)the "contingent." The properunderstanding of the structureof the capitalist mode of production can only be gained through theoretical abstraction.But the completeunderstanding of the historyof bourgeois societiesdemandsempiricalanalysisof the "contingent" which does not to the conceptualmodel. This methodof gaininghistoricalknowlcorrespond the existenceof an inescapable edgerecognizes epistemological tensionbetween conceptualand empiricalanalysis,and it is a methodof dialecticalmovement between them.The roleof theoryis to reachthe innerbondbehindthe empirical data, and that of empiricalanalysisto correcttheoreticalabstraction.Each is necessary,and each alone is necessarilyinsufficient. This dialecticalmovementwhichacceptsthe tension, yet tries to reducethe gap, betweentheoryand empiricism,is movementin the directionof the concretetotality. For historical-materialist science, however,the presentationof the concretetotalitycannot be containedin a closed book at the end of which the readerhas attained"absoluteknowledge."On the contrary,Marx'sAufhebungof philosophymeansthat knowledgeis not the fulfillmentof a certain set of criteria.Rather,knowledgeis an open-ended projectwhichcannot, in the Hegeliansense, be completed.Marx'smajorwork, Capital,must thereforebe read as an open book.
V

In CapitalMarxwas finallyable to put his completedtheory of presentation into practice.In the firstchapterhe beganwith the simplestcategory,the com61. As Hegel says in the Naturphilosophie (WerkeIX, 35), since natureconsists of chance, arbitrariness, and disorder,"it is the greatestimpropriety (das Ungehorigste) to demandof the

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modity, and on the basis of his analysisof the commodity,he constructeda modelof the capitalistmode of production.Accordingto the preceding discussion of the logicof presentation, the epistemological valueof this entireanalysis from the simplestcategoryof the commoditythrough the three volumes of Capital is that of an abstractpresentationof the essential structureof the capitalistmode of production.Because,however,of the common divisionof his careerinto the above-mentioned "young,philosophical" and"mature, economist"Marx,Capitalis seldomread from the epistemological standpointfirst in the German developed Ideology.In analyzing its epistemological value,therefore, it is firstnecessaryto show that Marx did intend Capitalas an abstract presentation of the essential. Then it will be necessaryto specify the relation betweenCapitaland the actualhistoryof bourgeoissocieties.This latterissue has, in turn,two parts:an analysisof the historicalsignificance of the sequence of the categoriesin Capital,whichshows, too, the limits on Marx'sconceptof of what Marxtemporarily excludedin orderto teleology;and a determination developthis abstractpresentation. First,thatthe preceding epistemological andmethodological discussiondoes providethe necessary basisfor interpreting Capitalis shownclearlyin a number of places. In the Preface to the First Edition, Marx stated that althoughthe naturalscientistcan use microscopesor experiments, the historical-materialist scientistobviouslycannotand is, thus, forcedto rely on the powersof abstraction.62 And it is this conscioususe of abstraction to whichMarxpointedon the numerous occasionsthroughoutCapitalwhenhe positeda normalor pure,that is, an historicallyabstract, situation in order more sharplyto focus on the essential structureof the capitalist mode of production. Finally, and most clearly,in the thirdvolume of Capital,after mentioningthe existenceof local variationsof the profitrate, he temporarily dismissedthem because:"In such a generalstudyit will alwaysbe assumedthat the real relationscorrespondto theirconceptor, in otherwords,the realrelationswill only be presented insofar as they are expressionsof their own universaltype."63 Helmut Reicheltmaintains, I think correctly,that this passagemust be the startingpoint of every serious study of Marx'swork and that future interpretations will have to be judged accordingto the degreeto whichthey follow and develop its implications.64 What this passageclearlyimpliesis that all of Capitalis a conscious abstractionfrom historicalreality;and the purpose of this abstractionis to defineand delimitthe capitalistmode of production.
conceptthat it shouldcomprehend suchcontingencies For Hegelthis is truenot (Zufalligkeiten)." only of nature,but also of suchnatural in the socialworldas who owns how much "contingencies" (Rechtsphilosophie, WerkeVII, 112). 62. Marx,Prefaceto FirstEditionof Capital,in MER, 295. 63. Marx,Das Kapital,III, in MEW XXV, 152. My translation. 64. HelmutReichelt, Zurlogischen StrukturdesKapitalbegriffsbeiKarlMarx(Frankfurt, 1973) 76-77. AlthoughI agreewith Reichelt's evaluationof the importance of this passage,I disagree with one aspectof his conclusion:that it meansthat Marxhad the same conceptof truthas did Hegel(77).Thereasons willbe explained belowin thediscussion of Marx's definition of therelations betweenthe "essential" and the "contingent."

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By definingCapitalas an abstractpresentationof the essential, Marx was the relationship betweenthat conconfrontedwiththe problemof determining ceptual presentationand the historical reality for whose comprehensionit As mentioned,therearetwo elementsof this relationclaimedto be necessary. to the understanding of that ship:the degreeto whichthe categoriescontribute reality,and the degreeto which they abstractfrom it. AlthoughCapitalabstractsfrom the various, historicalcapitalistsystems,it nevertheless providesa genealogicalanalysisof the capitalistmode of producThis genealogicalanalysisis to be tion by exposingits historicalprerequisites. of the sequenceof the categories.In Capital foundin the historicalimplications Marxbeganwiththe conceptof the commodityas the cell of the capitalistmode of production.In his anatomicalanalysisof the commodity,he derivedfrom it the money form and, ultimately,capital itself. This "logical"sequenceof categoriesis also of historicalsignificance, though not in terms of a universal philosophyof history;it has, rather,a limitedsignificance applicableonly to the immediateprehistoryof the capitalistmode of production. In explainingthe historicalsignificanceof this categoricalascent from the simple to the concrete, Marx said that "the simplercategorycan expressthe dominantrelationsof a less developedwhole, or elsethose subordinate relations of a more developedwhole which alreadyhad an historicexistencebefore this in the directionexpressed wholedeveloped by a moreconcretecategory.To that extent the path of abstractthought, rising from the simple to the combined, would correspondto the real historicalprocess."65 Thus, as Helmut Reichelt argues,the sequenceof categoriesfromthe simplevalue-formto its finalmetamorphosis into capitalis to be understoodas the "abstract formof the presentaIn this sense the tion of that process which historicallyled to capitalism."66 dialecticalanalysisof the commodityform in the first chapterof Capitalalso portraysan economic developmentwhich must have taken place before the capitalistmode of productionbecamepossible;it presents,in short, the economic prerequisites of capitalism. of the limitedhistoricalvalidityof the logical categories This determination also definesthe limits beyond which Marx'sconcept of teleology cannot be extended.The possibilityof the capitalistmode of productionalreadylay in the in its exchangevalue. This does not mean, morespecifically, commodity-form, however,that the potentialinherentin the exchangevalue will be realizedin all of those societiesin whichcommoditiesareproduced:"Commodity production and commodityexchangecan exist even if the greatmajorityof productsare intendedfor immediate self-use,do not becometransformed into commodities, i.e. even if the processof social productionis not dominatedin its depth and breadthby exchangevalue."67 In short, it is not a foregone conclusion that the more developedforms of money and, especially,capital will evolve from
65. Ibid., 239. 66. Reichelt, 136. See also Alfred Schmidt, Geschichte und Struktur (Munich, 1977). 67. Marx, Capital, I, 188-189.

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commodity production. But where capitalism does exist, it must have these developments behind it as its prerequisites. Whether this purely economic transformation from commodity-production to capitalism will take place is, however, not an economic, but a social question. For money to be transformed into capital, its owner "must meet in the market with the free laborer, free in the double sense, that as a free man he can dispose of his labor-power as his own commodity, and that on the other hand he has no other commodity for sale, is short of everything necessary for the realization of his labor-power."68As a provisional explanation of why such a meeting can take place at all, Marx commented: this relationhas no naturalbasis, neitheris its social basis one that is commonto all historicalperiods.It is clearlythe resultof a past historicaldevelopment,the product of manyeconomicalrevolutions,of the extinctionof a whole seriesof older forms of existenceare by no social production.... [Tihe historicalconditionsof [capitalism's] of moneyandcommodities.It can springinto life, meansgivenwiththe merecirculation only whenthe ownerof the meansof productionand subsistencemeets in the market conditioncomprises And thisone historical sellinghis labor-power. withthe freelaborer a world'shistory.69 The completion of this process of the "emancipation" of the worker is thus the essential sociohistorical precondition for the realization of the developmental possibilities latent in the commodity form, the precondition for the transformation ofrmoney into production-capital. And only after the economic and social prerequisites for the meeting between money-owner and "free laborer" have been fulfilled does economic activity acquire an immanent logic which can be reconstructed teleologically. The range of Marx's concept of teleology, then, is limited by a "world history" to which it cannot be applied; it reaches back only to the appearance of a class of free wage-laborers. As Marx stated in the Grundrisse, "the dialectical form of presentation is only correct when it knows its own limits."70 And precisely because Marx's concept of teleology knows its own limits, it can specify those historical prerequisites, both social and economic, which make possible the transformation of commodity production from a subordinate to the dominant mode of economic activity; it can thus pinpoint the genesis and portray the historicity of the capitalist mode of production. Beyond this genealogical analysis and despite the many historical examples Marx employed, Capital is not an historical analysis. On the contrary, as an abstract presentation, it is an historical analysis. For in order to develop his conceptual presentation of the essential structure of the capitalist mode of production, Marx abstracted from at least four historical elements of bourgeois societies which must be reintegrated in the process of moving beyond the abstract to the concrete. First, because Marx conceived Capital as a general study of the "capitalist
68. Ibid., 187-188. 69. Ibid., 188-189, my emphasis.

70. Grundrisse, 945.

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mode of productionand the conditions of productionand exchangecorresin the evolution he abstracted fromnationalvariations pondingto thatmode,""7 of capitalism.This is why he took his historicalexamplesfrom Englandas the He felt that all (westernand central) classic or "pure"case of capitalism.72 the same generaldevelopment,but with Europeannations would go through the particular variationswhichwould be essentialto understanding historyof, and the particular natureof the class strugglein, each nation.73 Marxabstracted Second, for purposesof the purelyconceptualpresentation in he "word" to As a from real human beings. explained "preventpossible in the Preface to the first volume of Capital:"I paint the misunderstanding" capitalistand the landlordin no sensecouleurde rose. But hereindividualsare of economiccategories, dealtwith only in so far as they arethe personifications and class interests."74 This "word," embodimentsof particularclass-relations nor a reductionof the realhistorical however,wasneithera plea for forgiveness individuals to bearersof economiccategories.Rather,it was a methodological signpostthat Capitalis concernedonly with the basic structure,functioning, and tendenciesof the capitalistmode of productionin its pure, "uninhabited" form. Third, Marxabstracted from all classesin the societyexceptthose essential to the capitalistmode of production:the bourgeoisieand the proletariat.The lingeringpower of the nobility and the anxious volatility of the threatened in Capital,though essentialto understanding are irrelevant petite-bourgeoisie the concreteconstellationof politicalpowerin the variousbourgeoissocieties. Finally,Marxabstracted from the intervention of any "superstructural" elements in the workingof the economy. For example, he did not analyzethe relationbetweenstateand economy,thoughfully awareof the concreteimportanceandcomplexity of this relationship.75 Thewaysin whichstateintervention mightmitigatethe "laws" governinglaissez-faire capitalismor mightsoften the classstruggle someprotectionfor workers by instituting is an irrelevant question for the abstractpresentation, but an essentialone in understanding the various bourgeoissocieties. Throughtheseabstractions, Marxwas able to focus specifically on the essential structure of the capitalistmodeof productionandto constructa conceptual model. The many-sided purposeof this abstractpresentation was:to show how

71. Ibid., 13. 72. Idem.

73. Thisis whyMarxwroteintothe "General Rulesof the International Working Men's Association"that the International wouldbe a centralcoordinating committee,but that the development of politicaltacticswould have to be left to each nationalsectionbecauseof the peculiarlaws of
each country. See Karl Marx, On the First International, The KarlMarx Library (New York, 1973),

I, 15.
74. Marx, Capital, I, 15. 75. In Capital, especially in the chapter on the working day, Marx indicates his awareness of how

stateactioncouldaffectthelife-cycle of bourgeois societyso thatits historywouldnot correspond to the conceptualpresentation.

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the capitalist mode of production is constructed and how it functions; to show its historicity; to expose capitalism as an exploitative mode of production; to show the possibilities of restructuringproduction; and to show how the illogical logic of capitalism, combined with its revolutionary development of technology, makes possible a new socioeconomic form. Beyond that, however, the three volumes of Capital do not make any concrete statements about capitalist societies in their historical diversity. Methodologically, they represent only a first and necessary step in the historical-materialist project.76 This epistemological evaluation of Capital has important consequences for historical-materialist science. It means that historical-materialist science is not a dogmatic pseudo-science whose truth has been stated once and for all and for which no essential mental labor need be done. Rather it is an "experimental science" based on certain "guiding threads" about the content of history and historical change; and for the modern era it has been further specified in Capital with a fundamental theory of the nature of the capitalist mode of production. As shown above, however, it is an open-ended project whose process of inquiry is not, nor can ever be, complete. VI Because Marx's materialist conception of history and the abstract presentation in Capital represent not a universal philosophy of history, but elements of an epistemologically modest materialist science of history, his project contains a built-in epistemological demand for continued historical analyses as the praxis of that science. Such analyses are the necessary elements of the process of moving beyond the abstract presentation of the mode of production. They are crucial in a double sense: to correct the conceptual presentation itself, and to move from the mode of production to the totalities of bourgeois societies. After the publication of Capital in 1867, Marx and Engels both spent a great deal of time, mostly in letters, explaining that this conceptual presentation was abstract, that it had no universal validity, and that it needed to be refined and corrected through historical analysis. In a letter responding to the misuse of Capital by the Russian writer N. K. Mikhailovsky, Marx reiterated the theme present in his work since the German Ideology that theory is necessarily abstract and can present only the guiding threads for the study of each nation in its historical specificity. He protested Mikhailovsky's hypostatizing of the "historical sketch of the genesis of capitalism in Western Europe [the study of original accumulation in Capital] into an historico-philosophic theory of the general
76. This evaluation of Capitalas an abstractpresentation also explainsthe abstractstatusof Marx's"economic laws":suchlaws are intendedto describethe way capitalism would functionif it corresponded to the modeland if therewereno intervening ("superstructural") influences.On Marx'suse of "laws," see E. P. Thompson,ThePovertyof Theory,86, and "AnOpen Letterto LeszekKolakowski" in ibid., 330. Thompsonargues,I thinkcorrectly,that the term "law" (and despiteMarx'suse of it) shouldbe replacedwith the term "logicof process" as a more accurate of both historicalevolutionand Marx'sanalysisof it. description

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path of development prescribed by fate to all nations, whatever the historical circumstances in which they find themselves."77 Engels, in a review of Marx's Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, gave theoretical formulation to this recognition of the possibility of divergent paths of historical development. In discussing the role of the conceptual presentation in Capital he referred to the theoretical categories of the logical or conceptual presentation as "corrected mirror-images" (korrigierte Spiegelbilder) of historical reality, images "correctedaccording to laws provided Here Engels pointed to one of the essential roles by the real course of history."78 of historical-materialist science as an epistemologically necessary process of using the results of historical analyses to correct or update the purely conceptual analysis. In so doing he also pointed to the necessary epistemological tension in Marx's project between the abstract conceptual presentation and the specific analyses of existing bourgeois societies. In short, even the model of the capitalist mode of production is tentative and demands its own revision. As indicated above, the epistemological purpose of historical-materialist science is not only to correct the categories of the conceptual presentation, but also to provide the means of moving beyond it to the presentation of bourgeois societies in their concrete totality. As E. P. Thompson has noted, it was Engels, especially in his later letters (and despite his widespread reputation as the one who simplified and popularized Marx's theory), who most clearly defined the role of historical analysis in the Marxian project.79 In letters of August and September, 1890, to Conrad Schmidt and Joseph Bloch, Engels reaffirmed the position Marx and he developed in the German Ideology and emphasized the tension or gap between the materialist conception of history and historical-materialist analyses. To Schmidt he wrote of the "fatal friends" of the materialist conception of history who use the theory as an "excuse not to study history;" and he emphasized the tentative nature of the theory: "Ourconception of history is above all a guide to study, not a lever for construction after the Hegelian manner. All history must be studied afresh, the conditions of existence of the different formations of society must be examined in detail before the attempt is made to derive from them the political, legal, aesthetic, philosophical, religious etc., views corresponding to them."80And he concluded that little has been done in this "infinitely large" area.8' In the letter to Joseph Bloch, well-known for its insistence that "the production and reproduction of real life" was only "in the last instance" the determining moment, Engels emphasized the need to study history in all of its complexity. He did acknowledge that Marx and he were partially to blame for the widespread

77. Marx, letter to N.K. Mikhailovsky, November, 1877, in Marx-Engels: Selected Correspondence (Moscow, 1955), 293. in MEW XIII, 475. 78. Friedrich Engels,KarlMarx, "ZurKritikderpolitischenOkonomie" 79. Thompson, The Poverty of Theory, 162ff. 80. Engels, Letter to Conrad Schmidt, August 5, 1890, in Selected Correspondence, 393. 81. Ibid., 437

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practice of letting economic theory replace historical-materialist analysis. He made clear, however, that their own focus on economic theory was necessary to develop a model to expose the workings and exploitative character of the capitalist mode of production and to counter those who neglected altogether the role of economics in history.82 It is, of course, possible to minimize or discount altogether the import of these comments as retrospective disclaimers in private correspondence divorced from systematic theoretical elaboration. However, the foregoing reconstruction of Marx's Aufhebung of philosophy and the development of his historicalmaterialist science shows that they describe precisely not only the intent, but also the results of Marx's reflections on the materialist content of history and its epistemological and methodological consequences. This reconstruction of Marx's project shows furthermore that because of its fundamental redefinition of the subject-object relationship and its resulting experimental approach to intellectual production, particularly the study of history, it should not be thrown into the dustbin of "essentialism." Finally, such a reconstruction shows that Marx raised issues which should be of intense current interest because they are related to discussions initiated by Derrida's "decentering"of the knowing subject and his emphasis on the elasticity or "play" involved in intellectual production and by Foucault's attempt to develop a "genealogical" method of historical inquiry. In its dual character as an open-ended materialist science of history and as a discourse on historical epistemology, then, Marx's project continues, in Ernst Bloch's words, to occupy a place in that space which is not the space of the past (in jenem Raum . . , der nicht der Raum der Vergangenheit ist).A3

University of Oregon

82. Friedrich Engels,Letterto JosephBloch,September 22, 1890,in SelectedCorrespondence, 395-396. 83. ErnstBloch, UberMethodeund Systembei Hegel (Frankfurt,1975),8.

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