Appendix 14-MiG-21 Airworthiness Certification

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Cover Photograph: Chris Lofting. Back Cover Photograph: USAF.
___________________________________________________________________________________ Introduction MiG-21 Airworthiness Certification This document provides information to assist in the airworthiness certification and safe civil operation of a Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-21 airplane. Attachment 1 provides a general overview of this document. Attachment 2 contains background information on the MiG-21 aircraft. Attachment 3 lists historic airworthiness issues with the MiG-21 for consideration in the certification, operation, and maintenance of these aircraft. The list is not exhaustive, but includes our current understanding of risks that should be assessed during in the certification, operation, and maintenance of these aircraft. Concerns regarding particular issues may be mitigated in various ways. Some may be mitigated via the aircraft maintenance manual(s) or the aircraft inspection program. Others may be mitigated via operating procedures i.e., SOPs) and limitations, aircraft flight manual changes, or logbook entries Not all issues in attachment 3 may apply to a particular aircraft given variations in aircraft configuration, condition, operating environment, or other factors. Similarly, circumstances with an aircraft may raise other issues not addressed by attachment 2 that require mitigation. Attachment 4 includes additional resources and references. Attachment 5 provides some relevant MiG-21 accident and incident data. Attachment 6 contains a glossary and a listing of abbreviations.
MiG-21 Airworthiness Certification Attachment 1 Overview of this Document Purpose
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This document is to provide all those involved in the certification, operation, and maintenance of the MiG-21 aircraft with safety information and guidance to help assess and mitigate safety hazards for the aircraft. The existing certification procedures in FAA Order 8130.2, Airworthiness Certification of Aircraft and Related Products, do not account for many of the known safety concerns and risk factors associated with many high-performance former military aircraft. These safety concerns and risk factors associated with many high performance former military aircraft include Lack of consideration of inherent and known design failures; Several single-point failures; Lack of consideration for operational experience, including accident data and trends; Operations outside the scope of the civil airworthiness certificate; Insufficient flight test requirements; Unsafe and untested modifications; Operations over populated areas (the safety of the non-participating public has not been properly addressed in many cases); Operations from unsuitable airports (i.e., short runways, Part 139 (commercial) airports); High-risk passenger carrying activities taking place; Ejection seat safety and operations not adequately addressed; Weak maintenance practices to address low reliability of aircraft systems and engines; Insufficient inspection schedules and procedures; Limited pilot qualifications, proficiency, and currency; Weapon-capable aircraft not being properly demilitarized, resulting in unsafe conditions; Accidents and serious incidents not being reported; and Inadequate accident investigation data. Research of MiG-21 Safety Data The aircraft, relevant processes, and safety data are thoroughly researched and assessed. This includes Aviation Safety (AVS) Safety Management System (SMS) policy and guidance; Historical military accident/incident data and operational history; Civil accident data; Safety risk factors; Interested parties and stakeholders (participating public, non-participating public, associations, service providers, air show performers, flying museums, government service providers, airport owners and operators, many FAA lines of business, and other U.S. Government entities); Manufacturing and maintenance implications; and Design features of the aircraft.
FAA Airworthiness Certification Branch (AIR-230)
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MiG-21 Airworthiness Certification This Document
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The document is a compilation of known safety issues and risk factors identified from the above research that are relevant to civil operations. This document is organized into four major sections: General airworthiness issues (grey section), Maintenance (yellow section), Operations (green section), and Standard operating procedures and best practices (blue section).
This document also provides background information on the aircraft and an extensive listing of resources and references. How to Use the Document This document was originally drafted as job aids intended to assist FAA field office personnel and operators in the airworthiness certification of these aircraft. As such, some of the phrasing implies guidance to FAA certification personnel. The job aids were intended to be used during the airworthiness certification process to help identify any issues that may hinder the safe certification, maintenance, or operation of the aircraft. The person performing the certification and the applicant would to discuss the items in the job aid, inspect documents/records/aircraft, and mitigate any issues. This information would be used to draft appropriate operating limitations, update the aircraft inspection program, and assist in the formulation of adequate operating procedures. There are also references to requesting information from, or providing information to the person applying for an airworthiness certificate. We are releasing this document as drafted, with no further updates and revisions, for the sole purpose of communicating safety information to those involved in the certification, operation, and maintenance of these aircraft. The identified safety issues and recommended mitigation strategies are clear and can be considered as part of the certification, operation, and maintenance of the air aircraft.
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MiG-21 Airworthiness Certification
Attachment 2
Attachment 2 Background Information on the MiG-21

The Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-21 (Russian: -21; NATO reporting name Fishbed) is a supersonic jet fighter aircraft, designed by the Mikoyan-Gurevich Design Bureau (OKB) in the Soviet Union. The MiG-21 was the mainstay of Soviet fighter aviation during the 1960s and 1970s. In the Vietnam War, the MiG-21 extensively used by the North Vietnamese Air Force against US air strikes. Although American forces lost about 50 aircraft to North Vietnamese MiG-21s, the U.S. Air Force shot down 68 MiG-21s in air combat. In the 1991 Gulf War, Iraqi Air Force MiG-21s were also engaged in combat operations, and at least two were shot down by U.S. Navy F/A-18 Hornets. In addition to Vietnam and the Gulf War, the aircraft served in numerous conflicts over the past four decades, including several middle-east actions (1967, 1973, and 1982), Angola (1980s), the Balkan wars (19921999), and the Indo-Pakistani conflict of 1999. Recently, in both the Libyan (2011) and Syrian conflicts (2013), MiG-21s were used operationally in the strike role. Early versions are considered first and secondgeneration jet fighters, while later versions are considered to be third and fourth-generation versions of the fighter. Some 50 countries over four continents have flown the MiG-21, and it still serves many nations a half-century after its maiden flight. It is the most-produced Above, an early MiG-21F- "Fishbed" in Vietnamese colors at the National Museum of the United States Air Force. Below, a later model MiG-21 PFM in Soviet Air Force service in the 1970s. Source: USAF. supersonic jet aircraft in aviation history and the most-produced combat aircraft since the Korean War. It also had the longest production run of a combat aircraft, 1959 to 1985 over all variants. As of November 2007, over 1,300 remained in service worldwide, while that number was reduced to 800 by late 2012. In 2013, some North Atlantic Treaty organization (NATO) countries continue to use the aircraft.
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Above and below, two unusual views of a USAF MiG-21F-13. The first MiG-21 was evaluated in the US in 1968-1969. Source: USAF.
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Development of what would become the MiG-21 began in the early 1950s, when the Mikoyan-Gurevich design bureau finished a preliminary design study for a prototype designated Ye-1 in 1954. This project was very quickly reworked when it was determined that the planned engine was underpowered; the redesign led to the second prototype, the Ye-2. Both these and other early prototypes featured swept wingsthe first prototype with delta wings as found on production variants was the Ye-4. The Ye-4 made its maiden flight on June 16, 1955 and made its first public appearance during the Soviet Aviation Day display at Moscow's Tushino airfield in July 1956. In the West, due to the lack of available information, early details of the MiG-21 often were confused with those of similar Soviet fighters of the era. The MiG-21, which entered service in March 1960 (first production MiG-21F), was the first successful Soviet aircraft combining fighter and interceptor characteristics in a single aircraft. It was a lightweight fighter, achieving Mach 2 with a relatively lowpowered afterburning turbojet, and is thus comparable to the American Lockheed F-104 Starfighter and the French Dassault Mirage III. In fact, the MiG-21 has been noted to deliver F-104-like performance.
A Croatian Air Force MiG-21bis photographed during take-off. Note that the landing gear is being retracted. Source: Chris Lofting.
Like many aircraft designed as interceptors, the MiG-21 had a short range. In fact, some have stated that the fuel emergency started at take-off This deficiency continues to plague the aircraft to this day. This was not helped by a design defect where the center of gravity shifted rearwards once twothirds of the fuel had been used. This had the effect of making the plane uncontrollable, resulting in an endurance of only 45 minutes in clean condition. The issue of the short endurance and low fuel capacity of the MiG-21F, PF, PFM, S/SM and M/MF variantsthough each had a somewhat greater fuel capacity than its predecessorled to the development of the MT and SMT variants. These had a range increase of 250 km (155 miles) compared to the MiG-21SM, but at the cost of worsening all other performance figures (such as a lower service ceiling and slower time to altitude).
FAA Airworthiness Certification Branch (AIR-230) Page 2-1
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The delta wing, while excellent for a fast-climbing interceptor, meant any form of turning combat led to a rapid loss of speed. However, the light loading of the aircraft could mean that a climb rate of 46,250 ft. /min was possible with a combat-loaded MiG-21bis, not far short of the performance of the later and more modern aircraft. Given a skilled pilot and capable missiles, it could give a good account of itself against contemporary fighters. Its G-limits were increased from +7 Gs in initial variants to +8.5 Gs in the latest variants. In the 1970s, it was replaced by the newer variable-geometry MiG-23 and MiG-27 for ground support duties. However, not until the MiG-29 in the 1980s would the Soviet Union ultimately replace the MiG-21 as a maneuvering dogfighter to counter new American air superiority types.
An Egyptian Air Force F-7B on final approach in 2011. The F-7B is a popular Chinese derivative of the MiG-21F. Source: Jiri Vanek. Copyright 2011.
The MiG-21 was exported widely and continues to be used in many parts of the world. Its low cost was attractive, and the price of a brand new MiG-21bis in the mid-1980s was quoted at between $1.2 and $1.5 million. In 1999, used MiG-21s were being sold for $1.3 million, depending on condition and life remaining. The aircraft's simple controls, engine, weapons, and avionics were typical of Soviet-era military designs. While technologically inferior to the more advanced fighters it often faced, low production and maintenance (relative to other military aircraft, not civilian aircraft) costs made it a favorite of nations buying Eastern Bloc military hardware. Several Russian, Israeli, and Romanian firms have begun to offer upgrade packages to MiG-21 operators, designed to bring the aircraft up to a modern standard, with greatly upgraded avionics and armament. A total of 10,645 MiG-21s were built in the USSR. They were produced in three factories: GAZ 30 (3,203 aircraft) in Moscow (also known as Znamya Truda), GAZ 21 (5,765 aircraft) in Gorky and at GAZ 31 (1,678 aircraft) in Tbilisi. Generally, Gorky built single-seaters for the Soviet forces. Moscow built single-seaters for export and Tbilisi manufactured the twin-seaters both for export and for the USSR,
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though there were exceptions. The MiG-21R and MiG-21bis for export and for the USSR were built in Gorky, 17 single-seaters were built in Tbilisi (MiG-21 and MiG-21F), the MiG-21MF was first built in Moscow and then Gorky, and the MiG-21U was built in Moscow as well as in Tbilisi. In the 1980s, more than 2,700 MiG-21s were flying with the Warsaw Pact forces (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania). As late as 1993, Russia (Commonwealth of Independent States) still had at least 3 fighter regiments (about 200 aircraft) equipped with the MiG-21. On the other hand, it is believed that the last MiG-21 built, was a Chinese FT-7 trainer delivered in late 2002. In 1968, the US was able to test fly a MiG-21 that defected to Israel. Later, the 4477th Test and Evaluation Squadron routinely operated the type (YF-110 designation). After the fall of the Soviet Union, many MiG-21s were imported into the US for private use. The first civil MiG-21 in the U.S. flew in 1990. By 1996, 3 were flying sporadically in the US. Although many came in, only a few were registered, and less became operational in civil hands. Many went to museums, but a few were acquired with the intent of seeking airworthiness certification. One, N21MF, was converted to a drone by Tracor System, but its operational history in that role is unknown.
A Romanian Air Force MiG-21MF Lancer C on final in July 2012. Source: Alexander St. Alexandrov. Copyright 2012.
There are currently 44 privately owned MiG-21s in the U.S. Of these, approximately 8-10 are believed to be operational. The only other country where a civil MiG-21 has operated is Australia, where VH-XII (a MiG-21UM) flew at several airshows in 1995. In 2001, an ex-Czech Air Force MiG-21US carried a French registration (F-ZAGR) while serving with the French Air Force test pilot school (EPNER). Three MiG-21s were registered in the UK, but airworthiness certificates were never issued, in part due to safety concerns. Two of them were eventually exported to the US. Although a late top of the line MiG-21 model is valued at about $6 million, those acquired by US operators were discarded by former Soviet Bloc countries at rock-bottom prices (under $50,000 in some cases, and essentially scrap value) after having reached the end of their 1,500-hours life-limit or very close to it. The difference in value is representative of not only their condition and equipment, but operational life remaining.
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Above, a Serbian Air Force MiG-21UM two-seater photographed in 2011. Source: Alexander St. Alexandrov. Copyright 2012. Below, a Bulgarian Air Force MiG-21bis taxing in October 2012. Source: Dimo Vichev.
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Dave Sutton, a well-know civil MiG operator notes when comparing the MiG-21 to other former military aircraft, that the MiG-21 is a completely different beastThey [MiG-21s] are a lot more complex to maintain, but can be done with some care. The flying characteristics are fairly straightforward, but I do not consider them to be "pleasant" to fly. The pilot really works, and the thing [aircraft] is just not happy below Mach-1. Look at the wing loading and you'll see why. It has very short range, and when the engine is started you are basically in a fuel emergency situation before you launch. I am glad that I have had the opportunity to fly the 21, but it would not be the first one out of the hanger for a Sunday flight. The MiG-21 does not have a good safety record. This is not uncommon with many second generation single-engine fighters.
An Indian Air Force MiG-21U during take-off. Note the flap position, the extended periscope for the pilot in the aft cockpit, and the afterburner. Also visible on the tips of the horizontal stabilizers are the anti-flutter weights. Source: Indian Air Force.
Above, an Indian Air Force MiG-21 Bison (upgraded type) during take-off. Below, the same aircraft type in flight displaying a light-attack configuration consisting of two external 490-liter fuel tanks and two S-24 heavy unguided air-to-ground rockets. Source: Indian Air Force.
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It is a difficult aircraft to operate in terms of maintenance and operational oversight. It certainly does not compare to trainers like the L-39. For example in operational service with the Finnish Air Force, a highly professional and respected entity, the MiG-21 required about 50 hours of maintenance per flight hour. As a by-product of its design, manufacturing, and operational philosophy, the MiG-21 incorporates many compromises between safety and operational flexibility. One issue that has always had an impact is the overall low life-limit of the aircraft, its engine(s), and many components and systems. Combined with a chronic shortage of spare parts, poor manufacturing techniques, high operating costs ($4,000- $6,000 per hour in 2001), and age-related low reliability, this characteristic of the aircraft can have serious safety implications. Many of these factors undermine the aircrafts suitability for civil operations unless adequately mitigated. The aircraft operational history illustrates these deficiencies, namely in terms of mechanical failures. Many were engine fires. Loss of control, mainly due to pilot inexperience or inattention, is another critical issue. The aircraft had mediocre slow speed handling characteristics and high pilot workload. The largest operator of the type outside of the former Soviet Union and China is India. Between 1966 and 1984, India acquired or built 830 MiG-21s. Over half those aircraft were lost to accidents. In March 2002, Indias Public Accounts Committee (PAC) (similar to the US General Accountability Office) released a report to Parliament noting that between 1991 and 2000, a total 221 MiG-21 aircraft (some reports indicate a total of 250) of several versions were lost with 100 pilots killed. Between 1997 and 2000, 55 MiG-21 crashed with the loss of 21 pilots, while in 2000 alone, of the 18 fighters lost in accidents, 10 were MiG-21s. Some data indicate that between 1990 and 1997, the average accident rate of the MiG-21 was 23.7 per 100,000 hours. Other data, presented by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG) released in June 2000, argues that the MiG-21 accident rates have indeed shown a steady downward trend. As
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per CAG report, the overall MiG-21 accident rate of the Indian Air Force (IAF) for the period 1991-92 to 1996-97 was down from 35.3 to 18.9 per 100,000 hours. Another analysis issued by the IAF in July 2003 shows that between 1993 and 2002, 98 MiG-21s were lost in 533,000 sorties or approximately 400,000 hours. This results in an accident rate of 24.56 per 100,000 hours.
A North Vietnamese MiG-21 deploys its drag chute during landing during the Vietnam War. The drag chute is an essential safety item for the operations of MiG-21 aircraft. Source: USAF.
Several factors contribute to the IAFs high MiG-21 accident rate: (1) aging aircraft of the 1970s vintage with design limitations difficult to overcome (in 2005, 70 older MiG-21s were retired because they had reached their design life-limit), (2) direct exposure of inexperienced pilots to highly unforgiving supersonic aircraft with limited transitional training, (3) the absence of flight simulators to train pilots on how to effectively handle emergencies, and (4) poor maintenance and inadequate quality control on spares and rotables. The operational experience by the IAF with the MiG-21 cannot be underestimated, not just because of the number of aircraft in service and their length of service, but also because the IAF is relatively transparent and its accidents are investigated and made public. In addition, the IAF publishes critical flight safety data as part of its operational programs. The availability of such data is not easily obtainable from former Warsaw Pact countries during the Cold War. The IAF is not the only entity that has had problems with the MiG-21. For example, between 1964 and 1999, the Czech Air Force (before 1993, the Czechoslovakian Air Force) lost 112 MiG-21s from a total of about 400 aircraft that entered service. The East German Air Force had a similar experience with 131 MiG-21s lost out of a total of 443, for an attrition rate of 29%-33% depending on the version of the aircraft. When combined with an estimated 500,000 hours flown, the Czech Air Force accident rate is about 22.4 per 100,000 hours. Between 1963 and 1990, the Bulgarian Air Force MiG-21 fleet flew for about 180,000 hours. About 40 aircraft were lost in accidents, which equates to an accident rate of 22 per 100,000 hours. This rate may have been reduced to 17.9 per 100,000 for the period 1990-1999, but the data is unclear with regards to aircraft accidents where the aircraft was not destroyed outright.
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While acquiring operational MiG-21 data while serving with the Soviet Air Force (the largest MiG-21 operator) is rather difficult, there is data that indicates that the accident rate for early MiG-21 (i.e., MiG21F) types ranged from 31 to 38 per 100,000 hours, with the majority being engine related. However, there is data that suggest that there were operational periods where the accident rate for the MiG-21 in Soviet Air Force service may have been below 15 per 100,000 hours, but this is difficult to verify. Against this background, there is data to suggest that the Finnish Air Force, which operated the MiG-21 from 1963 until 1998, may have achieved the lowest MiG-21 accident rate, at around 13 per 100,000 hours (11 losses, about 80,000 hours). Recently, other operators have had issues with the aircraft. For example, in 2010, Romania, now a NATO member and long-time MiG-21 operator grounded the aircraft because of concerns over its maintainability. One of the issues with the Romanian Air Force accidents is that it operates possibly the most modern MiG-21s, the Lancer. Despite of this, in 25,000 hours flown by the upgraded MiG-21 fleet since 1996, 12 aircraft have been lost, which equates to an accident rate of 48 per 100,000 hours. The rate had been computed at 30.76 at the 13,000-hour mark. The Romanian AF accident rate is likely to be higher if aircraft not destroyed are included. Relevant is the fact that although the Romanian MiG-21s are upgraded, they retain several of the MiG-21s weaknesses, including long takeoff and landing distances, difficult low speed handling, and high approach speeds.
Low pass of a Serbian Air Force MiG-21 UM during an airshow in 2012. Note the front and aft air brakes. Source: claudiu_ne, http://en.wikipedia.org.
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Although some of these data may be overstated, the range (a low of 17.9, a high of 48, and an accurate mean estimate at about 29-30 per 100,000 hours) creates concerns over the aircrafts suitability for certain non-combat tasks, and certainly civil operations. In other words, its risks and utility are not balanced. One common aspect of many MiG-21 operators has been the very low number of serviceable aircraft. Serviceability rates below 50% and even 40% are not uncommon, either today, or even 15 years ago. For example, in 1997, the Slovakian Air Force had a force of 59 MiG-21s, and of these, only 18 were operational due, primarily, to a shortage of spare parts and inadequate maintenance support. From an operational perspective, perhaps the situation involving the Bulgarian Air Force (a current NATO MiG-21 An US Navy F-14B Tomcat assigned to the Jolly Rogers of Fighter Squadron One Zero Three (VF-103) leads a formation operator) may with two Croatian MiG-21 fighter aircraft. U.S. Navy squadrons assigned to Carrier Air Wing One Seven (CVW-17) aboard the nuclear powered aircraft carrier USS George Washington (CVN 73) have sent a detachment to Croatia in summarize the order to participate in the exercise Joint Wings 2002. Croatia is now a NATO member and continues to field the situation involving venerable MiG-21 in the air defense role. Source: U.S. Navy. older airframes like the MiG-21. In 2011, a defense study found that the non-fulfillment of the planned total annual flight hours was due to spare parts shortages and delays in fulfilling aviation equipment repairs and refurbishment contracts. Not surprisingly, it was also found that although the number of accidents was reduced by 7% when compared to the previous year, the tendency of the past years was preserved, and approximately 64% of the aviation incidents were due to failures of aviation equipment. In 2006, it was reported that the Indian Air Force was only able to achieve a serviceability rate of 33% (about 55% by other sources) for their upgraded MiG-21 Bison aircraft. Although the rate may vary, the fact is that at any given time, over half of the aircraft are grounded due to spare parts shortages, maintenance issues, and insufficient overhauling. This is not an indication that the IAF is not knowledge on how to increase the serviceability rate, but it does show a tight oversight over the airworthiness of aircraft, that is, aircraft are not returned to operational status unless there is a highlevel of certainly over their condition and safety. Regardless, it is evidence that the aircraft is note easy
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or cheap to operate and maintain, and that as the aircraft continue to age, the situation is not likely to improve. Another aspect of MiG-21 safety is survivability. The aircraft has a high lethality rate, that is, the chances for the pilot surviving an accident are low when compared with other types. For example, Bulgarian Air Force data (1992) indicates that the lethality rate of MiG-21 accidents was a high 48%, the Indian Air Forces is about 45-49% (depending on the data set), while the Czechoslovakian Air Force lethality rate was a relatively low 39% when MiG-21 operations ceased in 2005. Essentially, a MiG-21 pilot has about a chance in two chance of surviving an accident. The safety record of the MiG-21 conducting civil aircraft operations in the U.S. is less than desirable. Since 1992, there has been two major accidents, one of which was fatal, plus another five serious incidents. During that period an estimated total of 3,500 hours were flown (average of five aircraft operational in any given year x 20 years x 35 hours per year) by civil MiG-21s. This equates to an accident rate of 57 per 100,000 hours, which is higher than any of the rates experienced by the military operators discussed above. MiG-21 operations in the U.S. are anticipated to increase in both the number of active aircraft and number of annual flight hours. One operator plans an active fleet of eight MiG-21s. Using the accident rate of 57 per 100,000 hours, the probability that in one Above, members of the USAF 4477th Tactical Evaluation Squadron standing in years time this operator will lose an aircraft in front of an Ex-Indonesian AF MiG-21F-13 in the 1980s. 1 an accident is 1.09. In summary, the MiG-21 does not forgive mistakes by inexperienced pilots or maintainers, and even those with experience had to stay alert and show superior airmanship and technical knowledge. Topnotch maintenance and operational procedures are the only way to mitigate many of the safety issues and risk factors with this unforgiving aircraft. As mentioned in the 1966 DDR Luftstreitkrfte (East German Air Force) DV-432/4a MiG-21PF Manual, it must always be remembered by the flying and technical personnel that a modern fighter, which flies at very highspeed, presupposes deep knowledge of the aircraft and the engine as well as the necessary understanding of the mode of operation and maintenance of the systems. Only excellent knowledge of all of the [military] regulations ensures reliable operation of all systems of the aircraft in the air. This cannot be ignored as part of any civil operation, and thus as part of the airworthiness certification process, which requires the ability to think critically about the hazards of operating such aircraft.
In other words, the operator will likely experience an aircraft accident in less than 12 months. Here is the computation. An accident rate of 57 per 100,000 flight hours means that 57 flights end in an accident every 100,000 hours flown. Given eight aircraft flying 20 hours per month, the number of hours per year is 1,920. (8 X 20 X 12 = 1,920) Therefore, if we have 1,920 flight hours per year with an accident rate of 0.00057 accidents per hour, the probability of having an accident in a year is 109%. (1,920 x 0.00057 = 1.09 or 109%).
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On this and the following page, four views of the July 12, 2012 overrun of N9307 at Eden Prairie, Minnesota. The pilot was slightly injured and the aircraft severely damaged. The aircraft was attempting to land on the airports 5,000-foot runway when it overrun the runway and ended its course across a public road. The drag chute failed after deployment. Source: FAA.
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A Romanian Air Force MiG-21MF Lancer A during take-off (full afterburner) in July 2010. Source: Alexander St. Alexandrov. Copyright 2012.
MiG-21 Aircraft in the FAA Registry (January 2013)

Mfr/Mdl Code
05616EZ
Number of Aircraft Assigned

OHIO - 1 Total = 1 ARIZONA - 1 CALIFORNIA - 1 DELAWARE - 3 FLORIDA - 3 ILLINOIS - 1 MINNESOTA - 1 OREGON - 1 TEXAS - 4 Total = 15 IDAHO - 1 Total = 1 FLORIDA - 1 MICHIGAN - 1 Total = 2 CALIFORNIA - 1 DELAWARE - 1 ILLINOIS - 1 VERMONT - 1 Total = 4 DELAWARE - 1 Total = 1 ALABAMA - 1 CALIFORNIA - 1 WASHINGTON - 1 Total = 3 DELAWARE - 1 NEW JERSEY - 2 OREGON - 3 TEXAS - 2 WASHINGTON - 1 Total = 9 DELAWARE - 1 Total = 1 MONTANA - 1 Total = 1 FLORIDA - 1 Total = 1 Total = 0
Manufacturer Name
STATE AIRCRAFT FACTORY
Model Name
F-7 MIG-21
056163Q
MIKOYAN GUREVICH
MIG-21
05603QV 056147T
MIKOYAN GUREVICH MIKOYAN GUREVICH
MIG-21F MIG-21MF
05616QY
MIKOYAN GUREVICH
MIG-21PF
05630JI 05615T6
CAMELOT AVIATION LLC MIKOYAN GUREVICH
MIG-21PF MIG-21R
056037S
MIKOYAN GUREVICH
MIG-21UM
05630IW 05602Q5 05602PQ 0560644
CAMELOT AVIATION LLC MIKOYAN GUREVICH MIKOYAN GUREVICH MIKOYAN GUREVICH
MIG-21UM MIG-21US MIG-21UT MIG-21VN
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Civil MiG-21s in US (2008) Registration 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. N21EV N21MG N21PF N21UT N22FR N57GS N63SG N121MG N121TJ N213DM N221GL N221MG N221YA N315RF N316DM N317DM N321LS N321ST N711MG N1011E N1101E N1121M N3751L N4318W N5179Y N621DM N6285D N6285L N6285U N7238T N7203S N7803Z N9149F N9242N N1165 N7708 N9307 N20739 N30421 N80634 N80639 Version & Variant MiG-21UM F-7 MiG-21PF MiG-21UM MiG-21US MiG-21UM MiG-21 MiG-21PF MiG-21U MiG-21PF MiG-21PFM MiG-21US MiG-21F-13 MiG-21U MiG-21PF MiG-21UM MiG-21 MiG-21UM MiG-21UM MiG-21F-13 MiG-21F-13 MiG-21US MiG-21UM MiG-21 MiG-21PF MiG-21PF MiG-21F-13 MiG-21F-13 MiG-21US MiG-21UM MiG-21UM MiG-21R MiG-21US MiG-21US MiG-21UM MiG-21MF MiG-21MF MiG-21UM MiG-21R MiG-21R MiG-21R Operational & Remarks Yes No No No Unknown Yes Unknown Yes No Unknown Unknown Yes No No Unknown Yes No No Yes No No No No Unknown Unknown Unknown (ex-G-BRAO) No No No Unknown Yes No Unknown Yes Yes No Yes Unknown Unknown No Unknown Page 2-7

Specifications (Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-21PFM) General Characteristics
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Crew: 1 Length: 14.5 (with pitot) m (47 ft. 6.86 in) Wingspan: 7.154 m (23 ft. 5.66 in) Height: 4.125 m (13 ft. 6.41 in) Wing area: 23.0 m2 (247.3 ft) Gross weight: 7,800 kg (17,195 lb.) Powerplant: 1 Tumansky R-11F2S-300, 38.74 kN (8,710 lb.) thrust dry, 60.54 kN (13,610 lb.) with afterburner each
Performance Maximum speed: 2,175 km/h (1,385 mph) Maximum speed: Mach 2.05 Range: 1,670 km (1,037 miles) Service ceiling: 19,000 m (62,335 ft.)
Armament One GP-9 cannon pod with 23 mm GSh-23 cannon, plus Two K-13A (R-3S) AAM or Two 500 kg (1,102 lb.) of bombs
Specifications (Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-21bis) General Characteristics Crew: 1 Length: 15.0 (with pitot) m (49 ft. 2.5 in) Wingspan: 7.154 m (23 ft. 5.66 in) Height: 4.125 m (13 ft. 6.41 in) Wing area: 23.0 m2 (247.3 ft) Empty weight: 5,339 kg (11,770 lb.) Gross weight: 8,725 kg (19,235 lb.) Powerplant: 1 Tumansky R-25-300, 40.21 kN (9,040 lb.) thrust dry, 69.62 kN (15,650 lb.) with afterburner each
Performance Maximum speed: 2,237 km/h (1,468 mph) Maximum speed: Mach 2.05 Range: (internal fuel) 1,210 km (751 miles) Service ceiling: 17,800 m (58,400 ft.) Rate of climb: 225 m/s (44,280 ft./min) FAA Airworthiness Certification Branch (AIR-230) Page 2-8
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Above, an Egyptian Air Force MiG-21 aircraft participates in a live-fire demonstration during BRIGHT STAR '82, a combined exercise involving the armed forces of the US, Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, and Oman. Below, a close-in view of a Soviet MiG-21 Fishbed fighter aircraft with UV-16 rocket pods attached to the wing pylons and a GP-9 23 mm cannon undercarriage. Source: http://www.defenseimagery.mil.
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Armament One internal 23 mm GSh-23 cannon, plus Two K-13A (R-3R) or 4x Molniya R-60 AAM or Two 500 kg (1,102 lb.) bombs
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Specifications (Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-21-93) General Characteristics Crew: 1 Length: 14.5 (with pitot) m (47 ft. 6.86 in) Wingspan: 7.154 m (23 ft. 5.66 in) Height: 4.125 m (13 ft. 6.41 in) Wing area: 23.0 m2 (247.3 ft) Gross weight: 8,825 kg (19,425 lb.) Powerplant: 1 Tumansky R-25-300, 40.21 kN (9,040 lb.) thrust dry, 69.62 kN (15,650 lb.) with afterburner each
Performance Maximum speed: 2,228 km/h (1,468 mph) Maximum speed: Mach 2.05 Range: (internal fuel) 1,210 km (751 miles) Service ceiling: 17,800 m (58,400 ft.) Rate of climb: 225 m/s (44,280 ft./min)
Source: USAF.
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Source: USAF.
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Above and below, and using training equipment, Romanian Air Force (NATO member) maintainers explain the inner workings of the R-13 MiG21 engine (above) and engine systems (below) to USAF personnel during a joint exercise in 2009. Source: USAF.
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R-11 engine diagram and sample R-11 engine data. Source: USAF.
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Two views of the R-11 engine. Top, the nozzle petals and seal arrangement. Above, the nozzle ring hydraulic actuator and ring. Source: USAF.
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Top, a view of the inlet cowl and cone detail on an R-11-equipped MiG-21F-13 aircraft. Above, the anti-surge door and suck-in door locations on a USAF MiG-21F-13. Note the low location of the long pitot and probe boom on this aircraft, a real danger to ground crew. Source; USAF.
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Above and below, close-up views of a USAF MiG-21F-13 during scheduled maintenance. The first MiG-21, an early F-13 version, was evaluated in the US in 1968-1969. Source: USAF.
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Above, a Romanian Air Force MiG-21bis being overhauled by Aerostar in Romania in 2003. Source: Chris Lofting. Below, a MiG-21F-13 instructional airframe in Romania in 2006. Note the air intake internal structure. Source: Chris Lofting.
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Two close-up views of the early MiG-21F-13 cockpit and ejection seat system. Note the forward-hinged canopy, the inner windshield panel, the ejection seat deflector, and the clear panel behind the cockpit. This cockpit and ejection seat layout differ significantly from the set up provided below, which is that of a late-model MiG-21. Source: Above, USAF. Below. Unknown.
Top and above, two close-up views of a Romanian Air Force MiG-21 Lancer C, probably the most effective and modern MiG-21 in operations today. Although out-classed in many respects, the aircraft is now integrated into NATO operations in the air defense role. Compare the later model ejection seat in this aircraft with the earlier seat in the MiG-21F-13 aircraft shown above. Source: FAA.
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Above, a view of the aft cockpit of a Serbian Air Force MiG-21UM Mongol B in 2012. Note the white line painted on the instrument panel, used as a reference to assist the pilot in recovering from a loss of control. Source: Alexander St. Alexandrov. Copyright 2012. Below, the right-hand console of a civil MiG-21. Note the English translation (labels) on most of the switches. Source: FAA
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Source: USAF.
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Initial MiG-21 Mass Production - Generation One (19571961)
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Ye-6 (1957) Three pre-production versions of MiG-21F. MiG-21F (1959; Izdeliye 72; NATO "Fishbed-B") Single-seat day fighter aircraft. It was the first production aircraft, with 93 machines being made (20 in 1959, 73 in 1960). The MiG-21F carried 2160 liters of fuel in six internal fuel tanks and was powered by an R-11F-300 turbojet engine with 5740 kg of thrust. The earliest units were fitted with one NR-30 and two NR-23 cannon, subsequent aircraft were armed with two 30-mm NR-30 cannons 60 shells each, it was also capable of carrying two bombs ranging from 50 to 500 kg each. Avionics included PUS-36D weapons sequencing module, R-800 communications radio, ASP-5NV-U1 computing gun sight, and SRD5MN Baza-6 radar rangefinder. Ye-6/9 (1960) A production MiG-21F was modified in 1960 to test nuclear strike capability on the MiG-21 airframe. Ye-6T (1958) Prototypes based on MiG-21F used for testing the Vympel K-13 (NATO: AA-2 'Atoll') missile system. The aircraft were later reused for other tests. Ye-6T/1 ("Ye-66") (1959) Ye-6T/1 prototype, number 31 Red, was refitted with R-11F2-300 engine to break the world speed record. "Ye-66" was a "fake" designation used on the documents submitted to the FAI; it was not the official designation. Konstantin Kokkinaki set a new world speed record on September 16, 1960 in this aircraft, reaching a top speed of 2,499 km/h (1552 mph) on a 100 km closed course. Ye-6T/1 ("Ye-66A") (1961) After setting a new world speed record, Ye-6T/1 "31 Red" was rebuilt again to try to set a new world altitude record. To this end it had a U-21 rocket booster added to a fairing in the tail, and kept the upgraded R-11F2-300 turbojet. "Ye-66A" was a "fake" designation used on the documents submitted to the FAI; it was not the official designation. On April 28, 1961, Georgi Mosolov set the new altitude record at 34,714 m (113,891 ft.), breaking the previous record set by an American pilot in an F-104 Starfighter by 2899 m (9511 ft.). Ye-6T/2 (1961) Second prototype Ye-6T reused to test skid-type landing gear for use on dirt strips.
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Above and below, two unusual views of a USAF MiG-21F-13. The first MiG-21 was evaluated in the US in 1968-1969. Source: USAF.
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MiG-21 Airworthiness Certification MiG-21P-13 (aka Ye-7) (1958)
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Two MiG-21s (Izdeliye 65) were converted to use K-13 missile system as part of a development project for an interceptor armed with the K-13 missile. Due to the MiG-21P-13 project lagging behind schedule, it was decided to produce the existing MiG-21F with the capability to use the K-13 missile system, resulting in the MiG-21F-13. The development continued, however, eventually resulting in the MiG21PF. MiG 21-F13 Short-range day fighter; the MiG-21F-13 was the first MiG-21 model to be produced in large numbers. Unlike the MiG-21F, the MiG-21F-13 had only one NR-30 cannon on the starboard side, with only 30 rounds; however, it added the capability to use the K-13 missile system, of which two could be carried on under wing hard points. On early-production MiG-21F-13s the launch rails were of the APU-28 type; later models had these replaced by APU-13 rails. The launch rails were removable, allowing the MiG21F-13 to carry two UB-16-57 unguided rocket launchers, two S-24 rockets on PU-12-40 launch rails or two FAB-100/250/500 bombs or ZB-360 napalm tanks. The F-13 had further upgrades: an improved ASP-5ND optical gun sight and upgraded SRD-5ND ranging radar. The MiG-21F-13 was also built under license in China as the Chengdu J-7 or F-7 for export, as well as in Czechoslovakia as the Aero S-106, though the S-106 designation was not used for long; subsequently, the Czech-built units were referred to as "MiG-21F-13" just like the Soviet-built aircraft. MiG-21FR Czechoslovak designation for MiG-21F and Aero S.106 (Czech-built MiG-21F) converted to carry reconnaissance pods. MiG-21F-13R (1974) Bulgarian designation for MiG-21F-13 aircraft locally modified to carry an AFA-39 camera. Ye-6V (1961; NATO "Fishbed-E") Experimental STOL version of MiG-21F-13 with JATO boosters.
Interceptors - Generation Two (19611966)
MiG-21PF (1961; Izdeliye 76; NATO "Fishbed-D") Production version of the all-weather interceptor. These were powered by the R-11F2-300 turbojet and, starting with the seventh production batch, fitted with the RP-21 radar (the first six batches used the older TsD-30T radar (aka RP-9-21). Further, the weapons control system was modified from that of the F-13 to allow use of the RS-2US (aka K-5MS) beam-riding AAM in addition to the IR-seeking K-13.
MiG-21 Airworthiness Certification MiG 21 PF (1961; Izdeliye 76A)
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Version for export to Warsaw Pact countries; only difference from domestic version was the IFF equipment. MiG-21PFL (1966; Izdeliye 76A) Version of MiG-21PF tailored to a Vietnamese requirement. The "L" designation may be short for lokator to reflect the different sensor suite in this version as compared to the standard PF. MiG-21PFM (Izdeliye 76A) Not to be confused with the "real" MiG-21PFM this is Izdeliye 94. This was an East German designation for MiG-21PF aircraft with upgraded RP-21 radars. MiG-21RFM (Izdeliye 76A) Romanian designation for the MiG-21PF. MiG-21FL (1965; Izdeliye 77) Export (Third world) model of the MiG-21PF. Downgraded from baseline MiG-21PF with older and less powerful R-11F-300 engine, no provision for carrying RS-2US beam-riding missiles and a simplified, downgraded version of the RP-21 radar, designated RILL. Wide-chord fin and brake chute fairing at its base. Built under license in India as the Type 77. Ye-7SPS (1961) Test bed to develop flap-blowing system, rebuilt from Ye-6V/2. MiG-21PFS (Izdeliye 94; NATO "Fishbed-D") The first nine production batches of the MiG-21PFS were externally identical to the MiG-21PF but with blown flaps and brake chute fairing at the fin's base. MiG-21PFS (Izdeliye 94; NATO "Fishbed-F") From batch 10 to batch 19, the large-chord vertical stabilizer first seen on the MiG-21FL was introduced, but the aircraft retained the SK ejection seat and one-piece, forward-opening canopy of the MiG-21PF. MiG-21PFS (Izdeliye 94; NATO "Fishbed-F") From serial no. 941314 onwards, MiG-21PFS aircraft had the wide-chord tail, a KM-1 ejection seat, and a two-piece, sideways-opening canopy.
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Several details of the MiG-21s characteristics are presented on this page. Top, the aft fuselage area, horizontal stabilizer, and wing stall fences are visible. Middle, the intricate set-up of the landing gear, external fuel tank, and one of the air brakes. Bottom, the Pitot tube, and air data vanes. Photos: FAA.
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MiG-21 Airworthiness Certification MiG-21PFM (1964; Izdeliye 94; NATO "Fishbed-F")
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The production version of the Ye-7M was a modernized MiG-21PF, with upgraded RP-21 M radar, SRZO-2 Khrom-Nikkel IFF transponder and other changes in avionics. Further, later-production MiG-21PFMs reintroduced cannon armament, in the form of the capability to carry the GSh-23 cannon and 200 rounds in an underbelly pod. Following tests in 1966, MiG-21PFM aircraft built after 1968 could carry the Kh-66 air-to-surface missile. MiG-21PFM (1964; Izdeliye 94A; NATO "Fishbed-F") Export version with a different IFF system and no capacity to carry S-24 rockets or ZB-62 napalm tanks. MiG-21PFM (Izdeliye 94N; NATO "Fishbed-F") Nuclear-capable version of MiG-21PFM. MiG-21PFMA (Izdeliye 94A) Polish designation of standard MiG-21PFM. MiG-21PFMN (Izdeliye 94N) Polish designation of nuclear-capable MiG-21PFM. MiG-21RFMM (Izdeliye 94A) Romanian designation for the MiG-21PFM. MiG-21SPS (Izdeliye 94A; NATO "Fishbed-F") To avoid confusion with the local "MiG-21PFM" designation given to the modified MiG-21PF (Izdeliye 76A), the East German air force re-designated the "real" MiG-21PFM of Izdeliye 94A as "MiG-21SPS." MiG-21SPS-K (Izdeliye 94A; NATO "Fishbed-F") East German designation for MiG-21PFM (Izdeliye 94A) aircraft wired for using cannon pods. MiG-21R (1965; Izdeliye 03/94R; NATO "Fishbed-H") Initially designated Izdeliye 03 to confuse outsiders, the MiG-21R official "type" designation was Izdeliye 94R. The first production unit was rolled out in early 1966 and production continued until 1971. For Recce missions, the MiG-21R could carry a Type D daylight PHOTINT pod, a Type N nighttime PHOTINT pod, a Type R general-purpose ELINT pod or a Type T pod housing a TV system, making the MiG-21R one of the first Soviet Recce aircraft to make use of ELINT equipment. Small changes were made throughout
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the production run. Early-production units had the R-11F2S-300 turbojet, which was replaced in later machines by the R-13-300 powerplant. In the air-to-air role, the MiG-21R could carry two RS-2US or R-3S air-to-air missiles, and in the strike role it could be loaded with two UB-16-57UM or UB-32 rocket pods, two S-24 heavy unguided rockets or two bombs of up to 500 kg weight (each). MiG-21R (Izdeliye 94RA; NATO "Fishbed-H") Export version of the MiG-21R, delivered with the Type D and Type R pods. MiG-21RF (Izdeliye 94RA; NATO "Fishbed-H") Egyptian designation for MiG-21R aircraft which had been locally modified by permanently mounting the cameras in a fairing under the nose. MiG-21RF (Izdeliye 96R; NATO "Fishbed-H") Not to be confused with the Egyptian local designation "MiG-21RF. This designation was used after some MiG-21Rs were upgraded with R-13-300 engines as in the MiG-21MF. MiG-21S (1964; Izdeliye 95; NATO "Fishbed-J") The production version of the Ye-7S. This was fitted with the RP-22 radar (production version of the Sapfir-21 radar) working together with an ASP-PF-21 computing gun sight. The airframe was different from that of the MiG-21PFM by using the same saddle tank as in the MiG-21R. The MiG-21S had an R11F2S-300 powerplant and an AP-155 autopilot featuring a 'panic button' auto recovery system. The MiG-21S could carry the GP-9 cannon pod. It had four under wing hard points, with the two outboard pods being "wet, that is, they could carry drop tanks. It could carry all weapons that the MiG-21PFM could, with the addition of the R-3R (K-13R) missile, the semi-active radar homing variant of the K-13. MiG-21S was produced from 1965 to 1968 and delivered only to the Soviet air force. MiG-21N (1965; Izdeliye 95N; NATO "Fishbed-J") Also known as MiG-21SN, this was a nuclear-capable variation of the MiG-21S. Modernization - Generation Three (19681972) MiG-21M (1968; Izdeliye 96; NATO "Fishbed-J") Export variant of the MiG-21S with two major differences: the RP-22 radar of the MiG-21S was substituted with the older RP-21MA radar, and featured a built-in GSh-23L cannon instead of a cannon pod. In the air-to-air role it could only carry the R-3S IR-seeking AAM on its four pylons, as the SARH variant, the R-3R, was not cleared for export. The type was also license-built in India, the first Indianbuilt example being delivered in February 1973.
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Above, a Bulgarian Air Force (NATO) MiG-21bis SAU Fishbed N in 2012. Source: Alexander St. Alexandrov. Copyright 2012. Below, an in-flight photograph of the MiG-21F that was flight tested by the USAF in 1969. Source: USAF.
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MiG-21 Airworthiness Certification MiG-21M (Izdeliye 96A, NATO "Fishbed-J") Export variant for Warsaw Pact countries. MiG-21MA (Izdeliye 96A, NATO "Fishbed-J")
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The Czechoslovak Air Force re-designated its MiG-21Ms that had been re-engined with the Tumansky R13-300 engine as "MiG-21MA," keeping the RP-21MA radar. Some of these were later re-equipped with the RP-22 radar - bringing it to MiG-21MF standard - and were then re-designated "MiG-21MF."
Top, an ex-Bulgarian Air Force MiG-21PF disassembled for shipping. Source: USAF. Above, a stripped down Bulgarian Air Force MiG-21bis Fishbed L during a recent depot-level overhaul in 2011. Source: Alexander St. Alexandrov. Copyright 2012.
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MiG-21 Airworthiness Certification MiG-21K (1969; proposal)
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This was a proposed variant of the MiG-21 for a dedicated ground attack role. It was withdrawn. MiG-21Sh (1969; Izdeliye 21-32"; project) This was another ground-attack project that was a "fusion" of the MiG-21 and the MiG-27; it was referred to alternatively as MiG-21Sh and MiG-27Sh. Cancelled. MiG-21SM (1969; Izdeliye 15/95M; NATO "Fishbed-J") Upgrade of the MiG-21S using the R-13-300 engine and with a built-in GSh-23L cannon, as well as a considerably updated avionics package. MiG-21MF (1970; Izdeliye 96F; NATO "Fishbed-J") Export version of the MiG-21SM, with RP-22 radar and R-13-300 turbojet. The choice of weapons loads was increased with the addition of the R-60 (NATO: AA-8 "Aphid") and later the R-60M IR-seeking AAM. These were also license-built in India by HAL as the Type 88. MiG-21MFR (1995) Bulgarian local designation for MiG-21MF modified to carry Recce pods after the retirement of the MiG21F-13R. MiG-21MF-75 Unofficial designation used in Bulgaria, East Germany, Romania and Czechoslovakia to refer to MiG21MF aircraft delivered with cockpit instrumentation identical to that in the MiG-21bis (the "75" refers to "1975", the year in which these entered production.) MiG-21MFN Czech Air Force designation for MiG-21MF upgraded with NATO standard avionics. MiG-21DF (1969) A production MiG-21 (S or SM) refitted with R-13F2-300 engine and Kvant radar rangefinder for test purposes. Though testing revealed an improvement in maneuverability, this variant was not produced. MiG-21SMF (1970) A test bed aircraft - a stock MiG-21SM refitted with the uprated R-13F2-300 turbojet. Though a prototype for what would have been a new model, it never entered production.
MiG-21 Airworthiness Certification MiG-21MT (1971; Izdeliye 96T; NATO "Fishbed-J")
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This was a MiG-21MF with increased fuel capacity. Though designed for export, only 15 were built and none were exported. MiG-21SMT (1971; Izdeliye 50; NATO "Fishbed-K") A development of the MiG-21SM with increased fuel capacity. This variant is easily spotted thanks to its larger spine. MiG-21ST (Izdeliye 50) Due to the extreme unpopularity of the MiG-21SMT amongst Soviet pilots, most were rebuilt with the smaller saddle tank of the MiG-21bis after that type entered production in 1972. Following the conversion, they were re-designated MiG-21ST and were externally indistinguishable from the MiG-21bis. MiG-21bis (1972; Izdeliye 75; NATO "Fishbed-L/N" The ultimate development of the MiG-21, fitted with the Tumansky R-25-300 turbojet engine and a great number of other advances over previous types. Those MiG-21bis for the Soviet PVO (Air Defense Force) were equipped with the Lazur GCI system (NATO: "Fishbed-L"), while those for the Soviet Air Force were fitted with the Polyot ILS system (NATO: "Fishbed-N"). MiG-21bis (Izdeliye 75A; NATO "Fishbed-L") Lazur-equipped version with a slightly different avionics package exported to some Warsaw Pact countries. In Bulgaria and East Germany these were designated MiG-21bis-Lazur. MiG-21bis (Izdeliye 75B; NATO "Fishbed-N") Polyot-equipped version with a slightly different avionics package exported to some Warsaw Pact countries. In Bulgaria and East Germany these were designated MiG-21bis-SAU (SAU referring to Sistema Avtomaticheskovo Upravleniya = "Automatic Control System"). This variant was manufactured under license by HAL in India from 1980 to 1987. MiG-21bis-D Upgraded in 2003 for the Croatian Air force with some elements of the Lancer standard. Modernized for NATO interoperability including a Honeywell ILS (VOR/ILS and DME), a GPS receiver, a new IFF system, and communications equipment from Rockwell Collins. MiG-21bis/T Finnish designation for MiG-21bis modified to carry reconnaissance pods.

Trainer Variants (19601968 Onward)
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Ye-6U (1960) Trainer prototype based on the Ye-6T. MiG-21U (1961; Izdeliye 66-400; NATO "Mongol-A") Two-seat training version of the MiG-21F-13. MiG-21U-400 East German designation for MiG-21U aircraft of Izdeliye 66-400. MiG-21UR (1961; project) This was an unrealized project based on the Ye-6U in which the rear cockpit was transformed into an extensive camera bay. MiG-21U (1965; Izdeliye 66-600; NATO "Mongol-B") Essentially the same as the 66-400, but with the wide-chord vertical stabilizer as on the MiG-21PFM. MiG-21U-600 East German designation for MiG-21U aircraft of Izdeliye 66-600. MiG-21US (1966; Izdeliye 68; NATO "Mongol-B") Two-seat training version; upgrade of MiG-21U 66-400 with blown flaps. MiG-21US (1966; Izdeliye 68A; NATO Mongol-B") Export version of MiG-21US with slightly modified avionics. MiG-21UM (1968; Izdeliye 69; NATO "Mongol-B") Two-seat training version of the MiG-21MF. Type 69 Indian Air Force designation. MiG-21UMD Croatian designation for four MiG-21UMs upgraded for NATO interoperability, similarly to the MiG21bis-D.
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MiG-21 Upgrade Programs
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MiG-21-93 This package provided an upgrade of the avionics suite that includes installation of the Kopyo pulseDoppler radar, smaller version of N010 Zhuk airborne radar used by the MiG-29, which enables the aircraft to fire a greater range of modern weapons such as the beyond-visual-range Vympel R-77 air-toair missile. Other upgrade features include installation of a dual-screen HUD, helmet-mounted target designator, and advanced flight control systems. MiG-21-2000 Single-seat 21st century version for export buyers by Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI). MiG-21 LanceR Upgraded version for the Romanian Air Force done by Elbit Systems of Israel and Aerostar SA of Romania. The LanceR-A version is optimized for ground attack being able to deliver precision guided munitions of eastern and western origin as well as R-60, R-73 and Python III air to air missiles. The LanceR-B version is the trainer version and the LanceR-C version is the air superiority version featuring 2 LCD MFDs, helmet mounted sight and the Elta EL/M-2032 Air combat radar. MiG-21 Bison Upgraded version for export, the Indian Air Force being the first customer. Equipped with the Phazotron Kopyo (Spear) airborne radar, which is capable of simultaneously tracking 8 targets and engaging 2 of them with semi-active radar homing air-to-air missiles, such as the Vympel R-27. The radar also enables the fighter to deploy active radar homing air-to-air missiles such as the Vympel R-77. MiG-21-97 MiG-21-93 upgrade. MiG-21-93 is re-engined with the Klimov RD-33 engine, the MiG-29 engine.
MiG-21 Foreign-Built Variants
China (Peoples Republic of China) Chinese-built variants of the MiG-21 are designated Chengdu J-7 and F-7 (for export). Only the initial version of the J-7 was a copy of a MiG-21 variant, namely the MiG-21F-13. Though an agreement had been reached between China and the USSR for license production of the MiG-21 in China, political relations soured between the two countries, causing Soviet assistance to stop. This forced the Chinese to reverse-engineer parts of the handful of MiG-21F-13s supplied from the USSR, in order to make up for blueprints and documentation that had not yet been shipped over from the USSR at the time of the political rift. All subsequent development of the J-7 was indigenous to China and different from Soviet-
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made versions. The Guizhou JL-9 trainer, first flown in 2003, is also based on the MiG-21 airframe. See Chinese J-7 below. Czechoslovakia Between 1962 and 1972 the MiG-21F-13 version was manufactured under license by Aero Vodochody, in Czechoslovakia. Aero Vodochody built a total of 194 planes during this period, under the cover designation article Z-159. It followed the MiG-15 and MiG-19S built in Vodochody factory from the fifties to sixties. The sole locally-built version of the MiG-21F-13 differed externally from the Soviet-built examples by the solid Dural sheet fairing behind the cockpit canopy, as opposed to the transparent one on the original Soviet MiGs. These machines were built for the Czechoslovak Air Force and also for export. The R-13-300 engines were imported from the Soviet Union. India The production of the MiG-21s in India under license by Hindustan Aeronautics in Nasik started with the MiG-21FL in 1966 in four phases starting with the assembly of CKD kits, moving on to subassemblies, parts, and finally advancing to production from scratch. 205 MiG-21FLs, designated Type 77 and nicknamed Trident, were built in India between 1966 and 1972; the first one built entirely from Indianmade components was delivered to the IAF on 19 October 1970, with the first Indian-made R-11F2S-300 powerplant leaving the assembly line on 2 January 1969. In 1971 HAL production was switched to an improved version of the MiG-21M (Izdeliye 96), which was designated Type 88 by HAL; as this variant was produced exclusively in India, no Izdeliye designation is applicable. The first Type 88 MiG-21M was delivered to the IAF on 14 February 1973 and the last on 12 November 1981, with a total of 158 built. The last variant to be produced by HAL was the MiG-21bis. A total of 75 were built in 1977 from CKD kits, and a further 220 were built from scratch by 1984. Despite a series of crashes during the 1990s, the Indian Air Force has decided to upgrade about 125 of the MiG-21bis in its inventory to the MiG-21 "Bison" standard. These will serve the Indian Air Force until 2018.
An Egyptian MiG-21 during joint operations with the US in 1982. Source: USAF.
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Czech Republic Air Force MiG-21MFN in 2005, just before retirement. Source: Georg Mader. Copyright 2013.
Photograph of an Indian Air Force MiG-21 Bison (modernized - MiG-21) seen during Aero India 2005 Show, in May 2007. Source: Sheeju at en.wikipedia.
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Current MiG-21 Operators
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Note: This list does not include operators of Chinese copies/licensed manufactured versions known as the Chengdu J-7 and export version, F-7. Azerbaijan: Azerbaijan Air Force. Around 12 received from Ukraine and to be withdrawn following purchase of MiG-29. Angola: Angolan Air Force. First MiG-21s in Angola were 12 MiG-21MF delivered in March 1976 from the USSR, followed by 8 MiG-21F-13 and two MiG-21US with Soviet pilots. In 1980, 12 more MiG21MF and two more MiG-21US were delivered to the Angolan Air Force, and four more MiG-21US and 12 MiG-21bis (Izdeliye 75B) in 1983. None remained operational by 2007, but 18 MiG-21bis and 4 MiG-21UM are reportedly still on the Air Force's lists. Bulgaria: Bulgarian Air Force. From 1963 to 1990 Bulgaria received: 224 MiG-21s. Six remain in service as of 2012. Bulgaria received 12 MiG-21F-13 in 1963; the surviving nine were converted to MiG-21F13R standard as reconnaissance aircraft. The last six were retired in 1988 as life expired. 12 MiG-21PF were delivered in 1965; four were lost in accidents, the other eight were retired in 1991. 12 MiG21PFM were received in 1965, followed by 32 more in 19771978 from Soviet surplus stock and two more in 1986; further, four MiG-21PFS were delivered from Soviet surplus; of the 46 MiG-21PFM and 4 MiG-21PFS, seven were lost in accidents and four were sold to Nigeria; the last active aircraft were withdrawn in 1992. Six MiG-21Rs were delivered in 1969 and retired in 1995. 15 MiG-21M were delivered in 1970 and retired in 1990. Twenty MiG-21MFs were delivered in 19741975; seven were converted to MiG-21MFR standard in 1995; all withdrawn by 2000. Thirty MiG-21bis Izdeliye 75B ("Fishbed-N") were delivered in 1983 and six more in 1985; Thirty-six MiG-21bis Izdeliye 75A ("FishbedL") were delivered in 1990 from Soviet AF stocks. 12 MiG-21bis Izdeliye 75B remain in service. A single MiG-21U Izdeliye 66-400 was delivered in 1966, and a single MiG-21US in 1969, followed by four more MiG-21US in 1970. 27 MiG-21UM were delivered between 1974 and 1982. A few of these remain operational after having gun sights and weapons pylons removed and being re-designated MiG-21UM2. Cambodia: Cambodian Air Force. Nineteen second-hand MiG-21bis (Izdeliye 75B) and three MiG21UMs delivered from the USSR in 1982, as well as three MiG-21UMs from Bulgaria in the same year. There are plans to modernize these in Israel, but so far only one MiG-21bis and one MiG-21UM have been rebuilt to MiG-21-2000 standard and returned to Cambodia. MiG-21s (MiG-21bis, MiG-21UM) in service are assigned to "The Fighter Squadron" based at Phnom Penh. Croatia: Croatian Air Force. Three MiG-21bis were taken up following defections of Croatian pilots from the Yugoslav Air Force; two of these were lost in combat. Forty MiG-21bis and MiG-21UM were bought from (former East) Germany in 1993, of which 16 and 4, respectively, were put into service, the rest used for parts. Eight MiG-21bis were upgraded to MiG-21bis-D standard and four MiG-21UM to MiG-21UMD standard in 2003 in Romania; these are currently in service.
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Above, a line of Bulgarian Air Force MiG-21 Fishbed aircraft parked on the flight line on Graf Ignatievo Air Base, Bulgaria, Nov. 11, 2008, during exercise Nickel Javelin, a 20-day long exercise where 230 U.S. Airmen conduct bilateral training with the Bulgarian forces. Note the packed drag chutes behind the aircraft. Source: USAF. Below: Croatian MiG-21 during low altitude maneuvering 2012. Source: Chris Lofting.
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Two Views of a Cuban MiG-21 fighter aircraft inside a Navy hangar. The aircraft was flown to Key West on September 20, 1993 by a defecting Cuban pilot. Note the afterburner ring in the bottom photograph. Source: http://www.defenseimagery.mil.
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Cuba: Cuban Air Force. 40 MiG-21F-13 and two MiG-21Us were transferred to the Fuerza Area Revolucionaria in 1962. At least one squadron of MiG-21PF was delivered in 1964, and either 24 or 36 MiG-21PFM were received in 19661967. Twelve MiG-21Rs were delivered in 1968. Sixty MiG-21MFs were delivered between 1972 and 1974; some of these were sent to Angola. Eighty MiG-21bis (Izdeliye 75A) were received from 1981. Five MiG-21U (Izdeliye 66-600) were delivered in 1966, and 20 MiG-21UM were delivered starting in 1968. According to Cuban sources, altogether 270 MiG-21s of all variants were received. 12 MiG-21bis and six MiG-21UMs are still operational. Egypt: Egyptian Air Force. By 1967, Egypt had received 235 MiG-21 fighters (MiG-21F-13, MiG-21PF, and MiG-21PFM) and 40 MiG-21U trainers. Almost all were destroyed in the Six Day War - no more than 10 of the 235 survived that war. 75 MiG-21PFS were supplied in 1970, followed by 12 MiG-21M, 110 MiG-21MF, 24 MiG-21US, and some MiG-21UM. Eighty Chinese J-7 were also received. The MiG21 remains in service. Eritrea: Eritrean Air Force. Old Ethiopian Air Force MIG-21bis aircraft are estimated to operate six. Ethiopia: Ethiopian Air Force. 48 MiG-21MF and MiG-21UM received 19771978; more - reports range from 50 to 150 - were delivered in 1982-83. Thirty MiG-21bis (Izdeliye 75A) delivered between 1986 and 1988. Eighteen are still in service, 18 fighters, and 6 trainers. India: Indian Air Force. India received its first MiG-21s in 1963, numbering 8 MiG-21F-13s. Two more F-13s and two MiG-21PFs were received in 1964. The MiG-21FL was designed by Mikoyan to fulfill an Indian requirement, and this was the first version to be license-built in India by HAL. The first 54 of these were built and test-flown in the USSR, then dismantled and shipped to India for reassembly; the first one built completely from scratch in India was handed over to the IAF in October 1970. All told, 205 MiG-21FL were built in India, of which 196 were built entirely in India; the last MiG-21FL was retired in 2005. In 1971, 65 MiG-21M were delivered to India; license production of an improved variant unique to India, designated MiG-21MF (Type 88), began in 1973, and lasted until 1981 - a total of 158 were built. It is important to keep in mind that the HAL MiG-21MF (Type 88) is not the same as the MiG-21MF (Izdeliye 96) that was made in the USSR for export to other countries. Kits for 75 MiG21bis Izdeliye 75A were delivered in 1977, and by 1984, 220 more were built from scratch in India. Contracts were signed in 1996 to upgrade 125 MiG-21bis (plus an option for 50 more) in a service life extension program to extend their useful life to 2017; the first two were upgraded by Sokol in Russia, the remainder by HAL; 94 were completed by January 2006. This upgraded version was known originally as MiG-21UPG and finally as MiG-21 Bison. A total of 45 MiG-21U of both Izdeliye 66-400 and 66-600 were delivered, including five bought from Ukraine in 1997. Seventy MiG-21UMs were received, including some received from Eastern Europe in the 1990s. Laos: Lao People's Liberation Army Air Force. Thirteen MiG-21PFMs and two MiG-21Us were delivered in 1975, followed by ten MiG-21MF in 1985; none are now airworthy. There are reports of 20 MiG21bis Izdeliye 75A having been delivered in 1983, though there is now no trace of these, likely meaning they are also retired. A second batch of trainers, probably MiG-21UM, was also delivered.
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Libya: Libyan Arab Air Force (LAAF). MiG-21 deliveries to Libya started in 1975 of 25 MiG-21UM trainers, followed by 50 MiG-21MFs; these were supposed to have been used to train and equip a proposed "Palestinian Air Force" once Israel had been occupied. This did not come to pass, and both types were used by the LAAF, though 30 of the MiG-21MFs were later sent to Syria in 1982. From 1980, 94 MiG-21bis (Izdeliye 75A) were delivered. 33 of these were still in service in 2006. The aircraft were extensively used during the Libyan uprising of 2011. Mali: Air Force of the Republic of Mali. Twelve MiG-21bis Izdeliye 75B fighters and two MiG-21UMs were delivered from the USSR in 1974, and two MiG-21MFs arrived in 2005 from the Czech Republic, along with another MiG-21UM. Only the three ex-Czech aircraft are still in service. Mongolia: Mongolian People's Air Force. It received 44 aircraft in 19771984. 8-12 MiG-21PFMs and two trainers - MiG-21UM - have reportedly been carefully been put into storage due to lack of funds and shortage of spares, though there have been no reports of their reactivation to date. North Korea: Korean People's Army Air Force (KPAAF). At least 200 MiG-21s, including 30 built in China, are generally accepted as having been delivered to the KPAAF. By 1966-67, 80 MiG-21F-13 were delivered, with the first 14 arriving in or before 1963. 65 MiG-21PFM were delivered 19681971 and 24 more in 1974. According to the US CIA, by 1977 there were a total of 120 MiG-21s in North Korean service, but by 1983 this number had dropped to 50; 150 MiG-21PFM and MiG-21MF were reportedly delivered in 1985. In 1999, 38 MiG-21bis Izdeliye 75A were delivered from Kyrgyzstan. According to one estimate, 150 MiG-21s are in service. 50 MiG-21 trainers of different variants were delivered, of which 30 are believed to be in service. Romania: Romanian Air Force. 24 MiG-21F-13 were delivered in 1962-63; they were withdrawn in 1976 but not officially written off until 1993. Deliveries of the MiG-21PF began in 1965, and a total of 38 were delivered; these were designated MiG-21RFM (Radar Fortaj Modernizat) in Romanian service. The survivors were grounded in the early 1990s and put into storage by 1999. The first MiG-21PFMs arrived in 1966. 29 of these were the standard Izdeliye 94A, and 23 nuclear-capable variants (Izdeliye 94N) were delivered as well. Both variants were designated MiG-21RFMM in Romanian service. The last of these were retired in 2002, replaced by MiG-21 Lancer As. Eleven MiG-21Rs, locally designated MiG-21C (Cercetare) were delivered in 1968, remaining in service until 1998. Starting in 1969, 60 MiG21M were delivered, and a total of 71 MiG-21MFs were delivered starting in 1972. MiG-21Ms formed the basis for the MiG-21 Lancer A upgrade and MiG-21MFs were rebuilt into MiG-21 Lancer Cs. A total of 73 Lancer A and 26 Lancer C were built, these are currently in service under NATO standards. In Romanian service, all variants of the two-seat trainer were designated MiG-21DC (Dubla Comanda). The first for were MiG-21U Izdeliye 66-400 arriving in 1965, followed by three of Izdeliye 66-600. From 1969, fourteen MiG-21US were delivered, and 31 MiG-21UM were delivered between 1972 and 1980, of which 14 were upgraded to the MiG-21 Lancer B standard. Serbia: Serbian Air Force. Inherited from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 2006. Possesses 31 MiG-21 aircraft, including MiG-21bis, MiG-21UM, and MiG-21M aircraft modified to carry reconnaissance pods. Some were still operational in September 2007.
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Syria: Syrian Air Force. 40 or 45 MiG-21F-13 were delivered around 1965 followed by 36 MiG-21PFs in 1966; six of the F-13s were lost in 1967 prior to the start of the Six Day War, and during the war itself, 32 of 60 F-13s and PFs were destroyed. These losses were covered by future deliveries from the USSR, as well as four MiG-21F-13s from Czechoslovakia and ten from Hungary. From 1968, 100 MiG-21PFM and MiG-21PFS were delivered, as were six MiG-21Rs in the 1970s. Sixty-one MiG-21MFs were delivered between 1971 and 1973, but massive losses during the Yom Kippur War (180 Syrian fighters of all types were lost) resulted in the delivery of 75 more MiG-21MFs from the USSR. During the Yom Kippur War, 12 MiG-21Ms were bought from East Germany. A total of 54 MiG-21s and MiG-23s are estimated to have been lost by Syria during the 1982 Lebanon War; and subsequently 198 MiG-21bis were supplied by the USSR through the 1980s. About eight MiG-21U trainers were delivered in the 1960s, and 20 MiG-21UMs around 1973. As of 2007, eight squadrons still operated MiG-21bis aircraft, about 200 in total, namely 8 Squadron (MiG-21MF) at Deir ez-Zor, 12 Squadron (MiG-21MF) at Tabqa, 679 and 680 Squadrons (all MiG-21MF) at Hama and 825, 826, 945 and 946 Squadrons (all MiG-21bis) at Al Qusayr. Another source says there are 142 MiG-21 in service. Uganda: Ugandan Air Force. Up to 18 MiG-21MF fighters and three MiG-21U variants were delivered in the early 1970s. Seven were destroyed in the Israeli raid on Entebbe in 1976 and the rest were destroyed or captured by Tanzanian forces in 1979; the wreckage of many of these was still visible in Entebbe as late as 2003. In 1999, six MiG-21bis Izdeliye 75A and one MiG-21UM arrived from Poland but were upgraded to MiG-21-2000 by Israel Aerospace Industries prior to delivery. One of these was lost in an accident, but the rest continue in service in what is called "The Combat Unit." Vietnam: Vietnam People's Air Force (VPAF). The VPAF received the first of its 20 or 30 MiG-21F-13 fighters in 1965; 30 MiG-21PFLs, a special variant for Vietnam, were delivered in 1966 (some historians refer to this variant as MiG-21PFV (V = Vietnam), but this is denied by the MiG OKB); either 100 or 110 MiG-21PFM were delivered starting in 1968; sixty MiG-21MF were delivered around 1970; several batches of MiG-21bis Izdeliye 75B were delivered starting in 1979, and 18 of Izdeliye 75A were received second hand from Poland in 2005 (the 18 included a few MiG-21UMs). An unknown number of all variants of the MiG-21 trainers were delivered, but MiG-21UMs were the majority. In 1996, six MiG21UMs arrived from the Ukraine. Some reports suggest that as many as 180 MiG-21bis, plus at least 24 MiG-21UMs, are still in service. Yemen: Yemen Air Force. Following the unification of North and South Yemen, the new air force received the MiG-21s in service with the former Yemen Arab Republic Air Force and the former People's Democratic Republic of Yemen Air Force. It is estimated that 21 MiG-21MF were available in 2006, though some reports cite as many as 60 fighters and 12 trainers. Still other reports claim the presence of MiG-21bis, but these are unsubstantiated. It is not known how many are still airworthy. Zambia: Zambian Air Force & Air Defense Command. It received 14 MiG-21bis (Izdeliye 75A) fighters and two MiG-21UM trainers in 1976. The two trainers and eight surviving fighters were upgraded in Israel in 1997-98 and are now in service.
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Former MiG-21 Operators
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Afghanistan: Afghan Air Force. The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan Air Force received 40 MiG-21F13 (Izdeliye 74) in 1973, and from 1979, 70 MiG-21MF (Izdeliye 96F), 50 MiG-21bis (Izdeliye 75A and 75B) and 6 MiG-21UM (Izdeliye 69A) were delivered. Small numbers of aircraft left behind by the Soviet Air Force after their withdrawal, including MiG-21PFS (Izdeliye 94A) and MiG-21PFM (Izdeliye 94A). Following the overthrow of the communist government, the armies of some warlords operated MiG-21s. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan Air Force was set up by the Taliban, and was known to have operated at least one MiG-21PFM, 8 MiG-21MF, 5 MiG-21bis, one MiG-21U (Izdeliye 66-400) and three MiG-21UMs. All are now out of service (derelict and/or destroyed). MiG-21s saw combat during the civil war in 1994 and 1995. Algeria: Algerian Air Force. First received MiG-21F-13 starting in 1965, a total of 40 delivered; 31 were 'lent' to Egypt in 1967 for the Six Day War. Of these, six landed at an airbase just captured by the Israelis in the war - one pilot destroyed his plane, the other five were captured, and four of these were shipped to the USA for evaluation by the USAF. In 19661967 30 MiG-21PF were received, followed by probably 40 MiG-21PFM. Six MiG-21Rs were reportedly delivered; there is no further information. Some MiG-21M and MiG-21MF were also received; these were all designated "MiG-21MF" by the air force. About 60 MiG-21bis of both Izdeliye 75A and 75B were delivered. Some MiG-21s were traded to Ukraine as part of a package for 36 MiG-29s; similar deals may have been made with Belarus, who provided Algeria with 36 more MiG-29s aircraft. The last MiG-21s were withdrawn from service by 2003. Bangladesh: Bangladesh Air Force. Received 12 HAL-built (Indian) MiG-21MF in 1973. All now retired, instead use Chengdu J-7. Belarus: Belarus Air Force. Burkina Faso: Burkina Faso Air Force. Eight MiG-21bis (Izdeliye 75A) and two MiG-21UM delivered in 1984; all non-operational by 1993. China: People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF). Three complete MiG-21F-13 and 20 kits were sent from the USSR to China in 1961; the rest used by the PLAAF were all locally built Chengdu J-7 aircraft. Though only 23 "actual" aircraft were delivered from the USSR to China, they did see active service in the PLAAF and/or PLANAF (Naval Aviation). Congo, Republic of the: Congolese Air Force: Reportedly 14 MiG-21bis (Izdeliye 75B) and two MiG21UMs were delivered starting in 1988; all out of use by 1997. Czechoslovakia: Czechoslovakian Air Force. All aircraft passed on to Czech Republic and Slovakia. First version to operate was the locally built Avia S-106 (= MiG-21F-13); 194 were built, and some were converted to MiG-21FR standard. 40 MiG-21PF were delivered from 1964, retired by 1990. MiG21PFMs, including nine nuclear-capable aircraft, were delivered between 1966 and 1969; all were
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retired by 1991. 25 MiG-21R were delivered between 1969 and 1972, retired between 1992 and 1994. 24 MiG-21M were delivered which were later upgraded to MiG-21MA standard. 102 MiG-21MF were delivered. Three MiG-21U Izdeliye 66-400 and eight of Izdeliye 66-600 were received, followed by 13 MiG-21US and 32 MiG-21UM. An Avia S-106 is credited with the downing of a US Air Force aircraft violating Czechoslovak airspace in September 1963. Czech Republic: Czech Air Force. Ten MiG-21MFs were upgraded to the MiG-21MFN standard with NATO avionics. These were retired in 2005, replaced by the Saab JAS 39 Gripen. East Germany: East German Air Force (LSK/NVA): 251 MiG-21s of seven versions were handed over to the Luftwaffe upon reunification; these were rapidly phased-out of service. The LSK/NVA received 75 MiG-21F-13' in 1962-64, 52 MiG-21PF, 83 MiG-21PFM without cannon (locally designated MiG-21SPS) and 56 with cannon (locally designated MiG-21SPS-K), 89 MiG-21M, 68 MiG-21MF, 14 MiG-21bis Izdeliye 75A and 32 Izdeliye 75B, 14 MiG-21U Izdeliye 66-400 and 31 Izdeliye 66-600, 17 MiG-21US and 37 MiG-21UM. Finland: Finnish Air Force. Fighters: MiG-21bis Fishbed-N (26; 19771998), MiG-21F-13 Fishbed-C (22; 19631986), Trainers: MiG-21UM Mongol-B (2; 19741998), MiG-21US Mongol-B (2; 19811997), MiG21UTI Mongol-A (2; 19651997). Six of the MiG-21bis were converted to MiG-21bis/T Recce standard. All aircraft were operated by HvLLv 31, Finland was the first country outside the Warsaw Pact to buy MiG-21, after Finland had rejected MiG-19 and Soviet Union offered the brand-new Fishbed-C, Finland chose Fishbed-C and training of pilots by Soviet air force began, only to stop after start of Cuban Crisis when Soviet Union ordered its pilots on stand-by, and Finnish Air force decided the training could be continued in Finland without Soviet trainers. Germany: Luftwaffe. Aircraft taken over from East German Air Force upon re-unification. All received Luftwaffe registration numbers, but only those that were in operation received the full Luftwaffe serials. Georgia: Georgian Air Force. Two MiG-21UMs were retained by Tbilaviamsheni factory and reportedly transferred to Georgian Air Force. Guinea: Air Force of Guinea: 8 MiG-21MF and one MiG-21U delivered in 1986. Five restored to airworthy condition in Russia and returned to service; one of these crashed into a TV tower in 2007. Guinea-Bissau: Air Force of Guinea-Bissau: Six MiG-21MFs and one MiG-21UM were delivered from Soviet surplus in the late 1980s. All are out of service. Hungary: Hungarian Air Force. Hungary was the first Warsaw Pact country to receive the MiG-21F-13, receiving 12 in 1961, followed by 68 more; all were retired by 1980. In 1964-65 24 MiG-21PF were delivered, the last of these being retired in December 1988. Hungary was the only Warsaw Pact nation not to receive any MiG-21PFM or MiG-21M; the next type received was the MiG-21MF, of which 50 were delivered between 1971 and 1974, and were retired in 1996. 39 MiG-21bis Izdeliye 75A and 24 of Izdeliye 75B were delivered from 1977, the last of these were retired in 2001. Of trainer variants, 12
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MiG-21U Izdeliye 66-400 and six Izdeliye 66-600, as well as 27 MiG-21UM were delivered; the last of them were withdrawn in 2001. Indonesia: Indonesian Air Force. Twenty MiG-21F-13s and two MiG-21U Izdeliye 66-400 were received in 1962. The aircraft were largely grounded in 1969 and removed from service in 1970. At least 13 of the F-13s and one U were transferred to the USA for test purposes. Iran: Iranian Air Force had purchased 2 MiG-21PFM and 37 MiG-21F (23 like for Chinese version for J-7) and some 18 aircraft and 5 MiG-21U (FT-7 for Chinese Version like 4 purchased aircraft). Iraq: Iraqi Air Force. Iraq received 35 MiG-21F-13 starting in 1963; one of these is the famous "007" aircraft that defected to Israel and was subsequently transferred to the USA. The first MiG-21PFs were delivered in 1966; 37 are known for certain to have been received, but some sources suggest 90. 55 MiG-21PFM are known to have been received in 1970, but the number purchased is likely over 100 when taking into account aircraft transferred from Iraq to Egypt and Syria, though it is possible that these sources have confused or "bundled up" the MiG-21PFs and MiG-21PFMs. Fifteen MiG-21R were delivered in 1979, and 40 MiG-21MF were received in 1973 with another batch of 40 in 1979. A total of 61 MiG-21bis (Izdeliye 75A) were delivered from 1983; some of these were found in 1990 in Dresden, Germany for overhaul, and four others at Batajnica, Yugoslavia. The East German Air Force (and subsequently, the Luftwaffe) had planned to sell surplus trainer variants to Iraq, but this fell through after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. At least 10 MiG-21Us, 8 MiG-21USs, and 11 MiG-21UMs were delivered between 1968 and 1985. 35 MiG-21s escaped to Iran during "Desert Storm" in 1991. Of those remaining in Iraq, none are operational, and most are likely destroyed or scrapped. Israel: Israeli Defense Force/Air Force (IDF/AF). A number of MiG-21s of various models have been captured in wars with neighbors, but the best-known example is the "007" aircraft, a MiG-21F-13 of the Iraqi pilot, who defected to Israel in 1966. This aircraft was examined and then shipped to the USA. A second MiG-21F-13 was later given the same number; this aircraft is now on display in an Israeli camouflage scheme with Israeli markings at the IDF/AF museum at Hatzerim AB. Kyrgyzstan: Air Force of Kyrgyzstan. A considerable number of MiG-21bis and MiG-21UM in storage near Bishkek. The Kyrgyz Air Force has no interest in operating them and has offered them for sale. Mozambique: Mozambique Air Force. 48 MiG-21bis were delivered from 1982 from Cuba, including pilots, for use against guerrillas; by 1990 only 18 were still operational. After the 1990 ceasefire they were all put into storage and neglected. Madagascar: Madagascar received eight MiG-21PFMs and one MiG-21U from North Korea in 1978. There are some unconfirmed reports of MiG-21 deliveries prior to the proven delivery of 12 MiG-21bis Izdeliye 75B and at least two MiG-21UMs from the USSR. All MiG-21s were placed in storage by 2000. Namibia: Namibian Air Force. At least two MiG-21bis and one MiG-21UM were delivered to the NAF in 2002 following an overhaul and upgrade in Israel. Namibia also operates twelve Chengdu J-7s since 2006.
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Above, a Bulgarian MiG-21bis taxis at Graf Ignatievo Air Base, Bulgaria during a bi-lateral exercise between the U.S. and Bulgarian air forces. More than 100 members of the Oregon Air National Guard are deployed to the 3rd Air Force Base in Graf Ignatievo to participate in exercise Sentry Lion. The exercise promotes cooperation and interoperability among NATO partners. Source: U.S. Army. Below, a Bulgarian Air Force MiG-21UM photographed in 2003. Source: Chris Lofting.
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Nigeria: Nigerian Air Force. 25 MiG-21MF and six MiG-21UMs were delivered in 1975. Three were lost in accidents, and one is preserved as a gate guard at Abuja air base. All were put into storage in the 1990s due to lack of spares and cash. By 2005, cash was available from increased oil production, but instead of refurbishing the MiG-21s, it was spent on new Chengdu F-NY fighters and three FT-NY trainers. Poland: Polish Air Force. Poland received its first MiG-21F-13 in June 1961. 24 more arrived in 196263, and all were withdrawn in 1971; twelve were sold to Syria in 1973. 84 MiG-21PF were delivered from 1964; the last ones were retired in December 1989. A total of 132 MiG-21PFM were delivered. Of these, twelve were the nuclear-capable Izdeliye 94N and were designated MiG-21PFMN by the Polish Air Force; the rest (Izdeliye 94A) were designated MiG-21PFMA. All were withdrawn by the mid1990s; the MiG-21PFMNs were retired in 1989 and stripped of their nuclear capability. Between 1968 and 1972 a total of 36 MiG-21Rs were delivered; the last of these were retired in 2002. 36 MiG-21Ms were delivered in 1969-70, with all retired by 2002. In total Poland received 120 MiG-21MFs from 1972, with the last survivors retired in 2003. 72 MiG-21bis Izdeliye 75A were delivered to Poland; the last of these were retired on December 31, 2003. The first trainers arrived in 1965 in the form of six MiG-21U Izdeliye 66-400; three were lost in accidents, and the other three were retired in 1990. Five MiG-21U Izdeliye 66-600 were delivered in 1966 and were retired by 1990. Twelve MiG-21US were delivered in 1969-70, the last being retired on December 31, 2003. Between 1971 and 1981 Poland received 54 MiG-21UMs; all were likewise retired at the end of 2003. Slovakia: Slovak Air Force. The assets of the former Czechoslovak Air Force were divided following the separation of the country into the Czech and Slovak Republics. Of MiG-21 variants, Slovakia received 21 MiG-21F-13s (actually Czechoslovak-built S-106s), three MiG-21PFs, eleven MiG-21PFMs, eight MiG21Rs, thirteen MiG-21MA, 36 MiG-21MFs, three MiG-21U Izdeliye 66-600, two MiG-21US and 11 MiG21UM. The last few MiG-21MFs and MiG-21UMs still in service were grounded on January 1, 2003. Somalia: Somalia Aeronautical Corps. The SAC received ten MiG-21MF fighters and four MiG-21UM trainers in 1974. The total number received is not certain, but most sources suggest that a maximum of 45 fighters and ten trainers were delivered. All were destroyed or damaged and subsequently abandoned. Eight MiG-21 wrecks can still be seen at Mogadishu airport. Sudan: Sudanese Air Force. Eighteen MiG-21PF fighters and two MiG-21U Izdeliye 66-600 trainers were delivered in 1970, followed by 18 MiG-21M fighters and four MiG-21US trainers in 1971. By 1992 there were only seven fighters and two trainers remaining, with perhaps half being serviceable; none are in service today. Twelve second-hand MiG-21s were to be delivered in 2007 from the Ukraine, apparently ordered because the Eastern European mercenaries employed by the Sudanese government preferred Russian-built aircraft over the Chinese-built F-7s in service. The only air-to-air action known to have involved Sudanese MiG-21s occurred on September 20, 1972, when several MiG21Ms forced a Libyan AF C-130H to land. Tanzania: Tanzania People's Defense Force Air Wing. 14 MiG-21MFs and two MiG-21UMs were delivered from the USSR in 1974. A few were lost before 1978, but the survivors took part in the war against Uganda; one was lost to enemy action and one to friendly fire.
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Seven Ugandan MiG-21MFs and one MiG-21U were captured and impressed into service. Four secondhand MiG-21MFs were bought from Ukraine in 1998, but by 2002 there were no MiG-21s in service. Turkmenistan: Military of Turkmenistan had 3 MiG-21 aircraft in service. USA: United States Air Force. In the 1960s around a dozen MiG-21s arrived to the USAF from various sources. Though from the American point of view the details are a closely held secret, from non-US sources it is well known that six ex-Algerian MiG-21F-13s landed at an airbase in Egypt and were captured by Israeli forces, and that four of these were given to the USAF. The famous "007" MiG-21F13 of an Iraqi defector to Israel was also handed over to the Americans; further, at least 13 MiG-21F13s were sent from Indonesia to the USA by President Suharto in the early 1970s. Most of these were not flown in the US, but were taken apart and examined in detail. The US Air Force is reported to have purchased at least 16 MiG-21MF Fishbed Js from Egypt in 1978 as from 1977 to 1988 Constant Peg Program saw USAF, Navy and Marine fighters flying against Soviet-designed MiG fighters as part of a training where American pilots could better learn how to defeat or evade the Communist bloc's contemporary fighters. It is believed that some few years later the USAF acquired from Egypt two additional Su-20 Fitters and two MiG-21Us. In 1986 a dozen MiG-21s were purchased from China, and Indonesian MiGs were retired. There was at least one MiG-21F-13, however, that was officially operated by the US Air Force as photographs prove. This MiG-21F-13 was given the USAF serial number 68-0965 and was intensively flight-tested in a program codenamed "Have Doughnut" that took place from January 23 to April 8, 1968. Ukraine: Ukrainian Air Force. None of the MiG-21s remaining in Ukraine after the breakup of the USSR were officially taken up by the Ukrainian Air Force, but Ukraine has refurbished aircraft for sale. North Yemen: Yemen Arab Republic Air Force (North Yemen). In 1968 it received an unknown number of MiG-21PF fighters via Syria or Egypt; no details of these survive, as after 1978 it switched to Western aircraft. Following the brief invasion by South Yemen and the subsequent intermittent fighting, the USSR supplied an additional 45 new MiG-21MF fighters and MiG-21UM trainers; it is interesting to note that the USSR provided arms and aid to both sides in the conflict, and was simultaneously doing what it could to unite the two Yemens. Any MiG-21MFs and MiG-21UMs that survived into 1990 were transferred to the new Yemen Air Force following unification of the two Yemens in 1990. South Yemen: People's Democratic Republic of Yemen Air Force. In 1971 the USSR delivered MiG-21F13s and according to some reports, some others were sent by Bulgaria. Exact numbers are not known, but it is known that at least one squadron was formed. In the late 1970s further MiG-21 fighters and trainers arrived, including MiG-21MF. Any MiG-21s that survived into 1990 were transferred to the new Yemen Air Force following unification of the two Yemens in 1990. Yugoslavia: SFR Yugoslavia. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia operated up to 200 MiG-21s in 9 variants from 1962 till 1992. During the war in western Yugoslavia, these aircraft were passed on to the newly established air force of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
Attachment 2
Top, Serbian Air Force personnel install a centerline fuel tank on a MiG-21 in 2009. Above, a multiple R-60 (NATO reporting name AA-8 'Aphid') missile installation on a Serbian Air Force MiG-21. The R-60 is a lightweight air-to-air missile designed for use by Soviet fighter aircraft, and very common in MiG-21s. Top, a Serbian Air Force MiG-21 during take-off. These aircraft continue to provide vital services to that air force. Source: Serbian Air Force.
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Attachment 2
Yugoslavia: FR Yugoslavia. The Air Force of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia inherited its MiG-21s from the former Socialist Yugoslav Air Force. A large number were destroyed during the 1999 NATO war against Yugoslavia; survivors were passed on to Serbia. These continue in service. Zimbabwe: Air Force of Zimbabwe received 48 MiG-21F and 2 MiG-21Us.
Chinese J-7 (MiG-21 Derivative)
The Chengdu Jian-7 (Chinese: -7; export versions F-7) is a People's Republic of China license built version of the Soviet Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-21. Though production ceased in 2008, it continues to serve, mostly as an interceptor, in several air forces, including China's. In the 1950s and early 1960s, the Soviet Union shared most of its conventional weapons technology with the People's Republic of China. One of these was the limited cooperation between the two countries in the early stage development of the famous MiG-21 short-range interceptor-fighter aircraft. Powered by a single engine and designed on a simple airframe, these fighters were inexpensive, but fast, suiting the strategy of forming large groups of 'people's fighters' to overcome the technological advantages of Western aircraft. However, the Sino-Soviet split ended Chinese early participation in the developmental program of the MiG-21 abruptly, and from July 28 to September 1, 1960, the Soviet Union withdrew its advisers from China, resulting in the project being forced to stop in China. However, Nikita Khrushchev suddenly wrote to Mao Zedong in February, 1962 to inform Mao that the Soviet Union was ready to transfer MiG-21 technology to China and asked the Chinese to send their representatives to the Soviet Union as soon as possible to discuss the details. The authorization was personally given by Nikita Khrushchev himself, and on March 30, 1962, the deal was signed. However, given the political situation and relationship between the two countries, the Chinese were not optimistic about gaining the technology and thus were prepared for reverse engineering. Russian sources stated that complete examples of the MiG-21 were sent to China flown by Soviet pilots, and China did receive MiG-21Fs in kits along with parts and technical documents. Just as the Chinese had expected, when the Soviets delivered the kits, parts and documents to Shenyang Aircraft Factory five months after the deal was signed the Chinese discovered that the technical documents provided by the Soviets were incomplete and some of the parts could not be used. China set about to reverse engineer the aircraft for local production and in doing so, succeeded in solving 249 major problems and came up with eight major technical documents that were not delivered. The mass production of the aircraft was severely hindered by an unexpected problemthe Cultural Revolutionthat resulted in poor initial quality and slow progress, which, in turn, resulted in full scale production only coming about in the 1980s, by which time the design was showing its age. J-7 only reached Soviet designed capacity in the mid 1980s. However, the fighter is affordable and widely exported as the F-7, often with Western systems incorporated like the ones sold to Pakistan. Based on the expertise gained by this program, China later developed the Shenyang J-8 by utilizing the incomplete technical information of the Soviet Ye-152 developmental jet.
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Specifications (J-7MG)
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General Characteristics Crew: 1 Length: 14.885 m (Overall) (48 ft. 10 in) Wingspan: 8.32 m (27 ft. 3 in) Height: 4.11 m (13 ft. 5 in) Wing area: 24.88 m (267.8 ft) Aspect ratio: 2.8:1 Empty weight: 5,292 kg (11,667 lb.) Loaded weight: 7,540 kg (16,620 lb.) (two PL-2 or PL-7 air-to-air missiles) Maximum takeoff weight: 9,100 kg (20,062 lb.) Powerplant: 1 Liyang Wopen-13F afterburning turbojet o Dry thrust: 44.1 kN (9,921 lb.) o Thrust with afterburner: 64.7 kN (14,550 lb.) Performance

Maximum speed: Mach 2.0 (2,200 km/h (1,189 knots, 1,375 mph)) Stall speed: 210 km/h (114 knots, 131 mph) Combat radius: 850 km (459 nmi, 528 mi) (air superiority, two AAMs and 3 drop tanks) Ferry range: 2,200 km (1,187 nmi, 1,367 mi) Service ceiling: 17,500 m (57,420 ft.) Rate of climb: 195 m/s (38,386 ft./min) Guns: 2 30 mm Type 30-1 cannon, 60 rounds per gun Hard points: 5 in total - 4 under-wing, 1 center-line under-fuselage with a capacity of 2,000 kg maximum (up to 500 kg each) Rockets: 55 mm rocket pod (12 rounds), 90 mm rocket pod (7 rounds) Missiles: air-to-air missiles: PL-2, PL-5, PL-7, PL-8, PL-9, Magic R550, AIM-9 Bombs: 50 kg to 500 kg unguided bombs
Armament

Foreign J-7 Operators
Bangladesh: Bangladesh Air Force: (As of February 2012), 23 F-7MB/BG in service with another 16 F-7BGI on order. China: People's Liberation Army Air Force: 290 J-7 plus 40 JJ-7 trainers remained in service (2012). China: People's Liberation Army Naval Air Force: 30 J-7D/E remained in service (2012). Egypt: Egyptian Air Force: 74 F-7 in service.
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MiG-21 Airworthiness Certification Iran: Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force: 21 F-7 in service.
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Myanmar: Myanmar Air Force: 24 F-7M and 6 FT-7 trainers remained in service (2012). Namibia: Namibian Air Force: Six F-7 and two FT-7 in service, 8 F-7NGs on order. Nigeria: Nigerian Air Force: 12 F-7 and 2 FT-7. North Korea: North Korean Air Force: As of February 2012, 180 F-7 remained in service. However, reports of dire levels of serviceability suggest an airworthiness rate of less than 50%. Pakistan: Pakistan Air Force: As of February 2012, 143 F-7P/PG (due for replacement by JF-17 from 2015) plus 7 FT-7 remained in service. Sri Lanka: Sri Lankan Air Force: 9 F-7/GS/BS and 1 FT-7 trainer remained in service (2012). Sudan: Sudanese Air Force: 20 F-7 in service. Tanzania: Tanzanian Air Force: 11 F-7 in service. Yemen: Yemen Air Force: 18 F-7 in service Zimbabwe: Air Force of Zimbabwe: 7 F-7 in service Albania: Albanian Air Force: Total 66 plus. 42 F-7A were in service from 1969 through 2004. Mozambique: Air Force of Mozambique. Aircraft were retired. Iraq: Iraqi Air Force: Up to 80 F-7s were received. All aircraft were retired.
Albanian Air Force Chengdu F-7A photographed in 2006. Source: Chris Lofting. http://www.airliners.net.
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MiG-21 Airworthiness Certification J-7 Variants Approximately 48 variants of the J-7 exist and are listed below.
J-7 Chinese Variants
Attachment 2
J-7 (A.k.a. Type 62) The first reverse-engineered copies of the MiG-21-F-13 "Fishbed-C" by Shenyang Aircraft Factory in 1966, powered by WP-7 engine (R-11F-300 copy). Only 12 were produced. J-7I An improved J-7 variant built by Chengdu Aircraft Industry Corp (CAC) in the 1970s, it differs from the J7 in that the fixed intake of the J-7 was replaced by a variable intake, the armament reverted to two 30 mm cannons, a brake parachute container was added to the base of the fin under the rudder, whilst the WP-7 engine was retained. Production and service with the PLAAF and PLANAF was very limited due to design flaws, quality control issues, and poor performance. In 1960s, as soon as PLAAF received PL-2 air-to-air missile, J-7Is started to attempt using PL-2 missiles to intercept USAF reconnaissance drones. Due to PL-2s' fuse is designed to target larger aircraft, these attempts were unsuccessful to some degree. J-7I (modified) One of the biggest flaws of the original J-7 was in its hydraulic system, which suffered leaks. As many as 70% of the J-7s in some PLAAF Squadrons were grounded due to this issue. An extensive redesign was implemented to solve this problem. The resulting J-7I (modified) had much better hydraulic systems, and although the system still did not reach the Western standard of the same era, the quality was greatly improved in comparison to the earlier system, and was considered acceptable by J-7 users. J-7II Improved J-7I variant built in the 1970s and limited all-weather fighter with two 30 mm guns and a WP7B engine. The forward-hinged canopy jettisoned with the ejection seat of the Soviet design proved to be unsuccessful and was replaced by a rearward hinged canopy jettisoned before the ejection seat. J-7IIA Improved J-7II variant in early 1980s with western avionics, such as the British Type 956 HUD, which became standard for J-7 fighters from then on. J-7IIM Conversion package to upgrade domestic Chinese J-7s to F-7M standard.
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Attachment 2
Two air-to-air views of Pakistani Chengdu F-7PG aircraft during training missions during a multinational exercise Dec. 9, 2009, in Southwest Asia. Source: http://www.defenseimagery.mil.
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MiG-21 Airworthiness Certification J-7IIH
Attachment 2
Improved J-7II variant with enhanced ground attack capability. First J-7 model to have a multi-function display, which is located to the upper right corner of the dashboard. J-7IIH is the first J-7 fighter that is capable of using PL-8 air-to-air missile. J-7IIK Conversion package to upgrade domestic Chinese J-7 to J-7MP/F-7MP/F-7P standard. J-7III Reverse-engineered copies of MiG-21MF "Fishbed-J," reportedly obtained from Egypt by Chengdu Aircraft Industry Corp. (CAC) with JL-7 fire-control radar. Liyang WP-13 turbojet engine, new HUD/avionics, and improved fuel capacity. The new avionics included Type 481 data link, which enables the ground-controlled interception centers to feed directions directly to the autopilots of J-7IIIs to fly "hands off" to the interception, and Type 481 data link was latter included as standard equipment of all later models. Only 20-30 were produced. J-7B The most obvious visual difference between this model and earlier models is that the smaller canopy and the small window behind it on earlier models were replaced by a larger canopy on this model, so that the small window no longer existed. J-7BS First J-7 to have 4 under-wing pylons. J-7E Improved variant of the J-7II developed in 1987 as a replacement for the J-7II/F-7B. A new doubledelta wing, WP-13F turbojet engine, British GEC-Marconi Super Sky ranger radar, increased internal fuel capacity, and improved performance. It is 45% more maneuverable than the J/F-7M, while the take-off and landing distance is reduced to 600 meters, in comparison to the 1,000 meter take-off distance and 900 meter landing distance of earlier versions of the J-7. J-7E is the first of the J-7 family to incorporate HOTAS, which has since become standard on the later versions. This version is also the first of J-7 series to be later upgraded with helmet mounted sights (HMS), however, it is reported that the helmet mounted sight is not compatible with radars, and air-to-air missiles must be independently controlled by either HMS or radar, but not both. J-7EB An unarmed J-7EB variant was used by the People's Liberation Army Air Force August 1 Aerobatic Team.
Attachment 2
Pakistan Air Force F-7PG fighters; on the ground, in flight, and landing. Source: Pakistan Air Force.
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MiG-21 Airworthiness Certification J-7EH
Attachment 2
J-7E derivative used by People's Liberation Army Naval Air Force with capability to carry anti-ship missiles such as C-802. However, the due to the limitation of its airborne radar, J-7EH cannot independently engage shipping targets and after the launching of the anti-ship missiles, the targeting information must be provided by other aircraft. J-7FS Technology demonstration aircraft built by CAC, with redesigned under-chin inlet and WP-13IIS engine. First flew in 1998, only two prototypes were built before being replaced by J-7MF. J-7G An improved variant of the J-7E by CAC. It first flew in 2002. Equipped with a new KLJ-6E PD radar, which is reported to be SY-80 radar with SY is short for Sheen Ying, meaning Celestial Eagle in Chinese. This radar a Chinese development of the Italian Pointer-2500 ranging radar used for the Q-5M, and the Italian radar itself was a development of Pointer radar, the Italian copy of Israeli Elta EL/M-2001. In comparison to the Italian Griffon series radar on Pakistani F-7s, the SY-80 weighs more at 60 kg, and the range is also shorter, at 30 km. However, the radar does have a feat that the Italian radars do not have: it is fully compatible with helmet-mounted sights (HMS) so that both the radar and HMS can be worked together to control PL-8/9 air-to-air missiles. One 30 mm gun was removed, and a more powerful engine installed. J-7G2 Improved J-7G with more powerful radar, capable of incorporating detachable conformal tanks. J-7GB Unarmed version of the J-7G used to replace the J-7EB for the August 1st Aerobatic team. J-7M Until the 2000s (decade), there was at least an F-7M used by Chinese as a radar and avionics test bed. Differs from other models in that there were no fixed radars and avionics due to the different equipment being tested. J-7MG J-7E armed with GEC-Marconi Super Skyranger radar with planar slotted array and Martin-Baker ejection seat for potential customers' evaluation. Pakistan and Bangladesh evaluated the aircraft, and evolved to F-7MG.
MiG-21 Airworthiness Certification J-7MP
Attachment 2
After nearly two years use of the F-7M, Pakistani Air Force (PAF) returned the 20 F-7M aircraft to China in the late 1980s with recommendations for 24 upgrades, including replacing the original GEC-Marconi Type 226 Skyranger radar with the Italian FIAR Grifo-7 radar, and AIM-9 Sidewinder capability. The Italian radar weighs 55 kg, had a slot antenna planar array, and had a range greater than 50 km, while the British radar only weighs 42 kg, with a parabolic antenna, but only had range of 15 km. Both radars have a mean time between failure rates of 200 hours. The J-7MP is the design specially tailored to Pakistani requirements. J-7PG Alternative to J-7MG, similar to the J-7MG except with Italian FIAR Grifo MG radar, which further increased the sector of scan to +/- 30 degrees from the +/- 20 degrees of Grifo-Mk-II on F-7P. The Grifo-MG radar has better ECM, look-down, and shoot-down capabilities than its predecessor GrifoMk-II, while the weight remained the same. The number of targets can be tracked simultaneously is increased from the original 4 of the Grifo-Mk-II to a total of 8 of the Grifo-MG. Pakistan and Bangladesh evaluated the aircraft, and evolved to F-7PG. JJ-7 Dual-seat J-7 trainer and Chinese equivalent of the MiG-21U Mongol-A design. Originally built by Guizhou Aircraft Design Institute and Guizhou Aircraft Company (now Guizhou Aviation Industry Group/GAIC) in 1981. JJ-7I Chinese equivalent of the Soviet MiG-21US trainer with domestic Type-II ejection seat. Only a very small number were built before converting to the JJ-7II. JJ-7II JJ-7I with Rockwell Collins avionics that became standard for later J-7 models. JL-9 (FTC-2000) Also known as FTC-2000 Mountain Eagle (Shan Ying), new two-seat trainer derived from the JJ-7 series. Built by GAIC in 2000s (decade) as the low-cost solution to JJ-7 trainer replacement. JZ-7 Reconnaissance version of the J-7, Chinese equivalent of MiG-21R. In addition to the photo reconnaissance, this aircraft was the first to have the domestically developed ESM reconnaissance pod.
MiG-21 Airworthiness Certification J-7 Drone Unmanned J-7 remote-controlled drones mostly converted from J-7I fighters.
J-7 Export Variants
Attachment 2
F-7IIA Export version of the J-7IIA, with the pitot re-located to the intake upper lip on the starboard side, a WP-7BM engine, stronger windscreen, improved zero-zero ejection seat and GEC-Marconi Type 956 HUD/ Weapons Aiming Computer, as well as reinforced landing gear. F-7IIN 22 modified F-7M sold to Zimbabwe, with the domestic Chinese avionics replacing the western avionics, originally believed to be fitted with JL-7A radar. There were reports in 2005 that radars on the fighters had been upgraded. F-7III Export version of the J-7III with different missile launching rails that are compatible with French R550 Magic Air-to-air missiles. No sales have been reported. J-7IIIA Improved J-7III/F-7-3 with JL-7A radar and WP-13FI turbojet engine, jointly developed by CAC and now Guizhou Aviation Industry Group/GAIC. Limited production of 20-30. Straight topped spine like that of MiG-21PF and PFMA. F-7A Limited export version of the J-7 with a WP-7B engine, one 30 mm gun, and 2 under-wing pylons. It was exported to Albania and Tanzania. F-7B Export version of the J-7II with re-wired pylons using the French R550 Magic Air-to-air missiles. Sold to Egypt (a total of 150 F-7Bs and F-7Ms), Iraq, and Sudan from 1982-1983. F-7BG 16 were delivered to Bangladesh in 2006 including with 4 two-seater FT-7BGs. The capability to carry reconnaissance pods and operate the equipment inside the pods from the cockpit of earlier F-7MB is retained.
MiG-21 Airworthiness Certification F-7BGI
Attachment 2
Upgraded version for Bangladesh Air Force ordered in 2011. Beyond-visual-range missile capability. F-7BS 4 export versions of the J-7BS units were sold to Sri Lanka. These aircraft did not a HUD (Heads-UpDisplay. F-7D Export version of the J-7IIIA with different missile launching rails that are compatible with the French R550 Magic Air-to-air missiles. No sales have been reported. F-7M Airguard Improved J-7II variant for export with western avionics, with British GEC-Marconi as the prime contractor. Program initiated in 1978 and took six years to complete, after 10 rounds of negotiation. Western avionics includes: British Type 226 Skyranger radar: Ranging radar that weighs 41 kg with a range of 15 km. British Type 956 HUDAWAC. This HUD has a built-in weapon aiming computer, hence the name Head-Up Display and Weapon Aiming Computer. British Type 50-048-02 digitized air data computer. British Type 2032 camera gun, which is linked to HUD with capability to interchange rolls of film while airborne. American converter that is over 30% more efficient in comparison to the original Chinese converter. American Type 0101-HRA/2 radar altimeter with range increased to 1.5 km in comparison to the original 0.6 km of the Chinese radar altimeter it had replaced. British AD-3400 secured radio with range in excess of 400 km at 1.2 km altitude.
Other improvement includes domestic newly designed CW-1002 air data sensor developed in conjunction with the western avionics, and WP-7B/WP-7BM engine. A totally different wing enabled the take-off and landing distance to be reduced by 20%, while increasing the aerodynamic performance in dogfights. According to customers' claims, F-7M is nearly 40% more effective than MiG-21 in terms of overall performance. It can use French R550 Magic and PL-7 Air-to-air missiles. It was sold to Myanmar, Egypt, and Bangladesh in 1980s. Pakistan contribution: Although Pakistan did not purchase any F-7M and later returned all 20 F-7Ms to China after evaluation to require China to provide a better fighter (which eventually resulted in F-7MP/P); Pakistan did provide important support for F-7M program. In the last quarter of 1982, test flights revealed that the radar was plagued by the problem of picking up ground clutter. China did not have any western radar assisted air-toground attack experience, and had no idea of conducting the necessary flight tests specifically designed
Attachment 2
for the western avionics to solve the problem. Pakistani Air Force provided pilots (including F-16 pilots) to China to perform these tests and helped in solving this problem. Chinese 630th Institute responsible for F-7M program lacked the facility and experience to conduct live round weapon tests with advanced western avionics, and it also lacked the capability to conduct mocked air combat with western aircraft. Therefore from June, 1984 to September, 1984, two F-7Ms were sent to Pakistan to conduct such tests. F-7MB 16 F-7MB units exported to Bangladesh, with the capability to carry reconnaissance pods and operate the equipment inside the pods from the cockpit. F-7MF Italian-proposed export version of the J-7MF armed with FIAR Grifo-M radar. The plan was abandoned in favor of the FC-1/JF-17, but the aircraft was reportedly used to test the FIAR Grifo-S radar for FC1/JF-17. However, it is rumored that of a total 80 F-7PG ordered by Pakistan, the last 30 were switched to the F-7MF, but this cannot be confirmed. F-7MG Export variant of the J-7MG, with the single piece windshield replacing the 3-piece windshield of the J7MG. Evolved to F-7BG. Zimbabwe bought at least 12 of these in 2004. F-7MP A J-7MP converted from the F-7M. 20 were delivered and are in Pakistani service. It is also known as the F-7P Skybolt like the F-7P. The Pakistani Air Force does not distinguish the two since the only difference was how they were produced. F-7N 18 export F-7MP version to Iran with domestic Chinese avionics replacing the western avionics. The radar was the SY-80 pulse Doppler radar. F-7P Newly built Skybolt for the Pakistani Air Force (PAF). A total of 60 were built. Starting with this model, F-7s in the Pakistani service began to be upgraded with the Italian FIAR Grifo-Mk-II radar license assembled by the ISO- 9002 certified Kamra avionics, Electronics and Radar Factory of the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC). In comparison to the Grifo-7, the new radar only weighs an extra 1 kg (56 kg total), but the sector of scan was increased to 20 degrees from the original 10 degrees of Grifo-7.
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Attachment 2
The newer radar also had improved ECM and look-down and shoot-down capability, and can track 4 targets simultaneously while engage one of four targets tracked. F-7PG Export variant of the J-7PG, with the single piece windshield replacing the 3-piece windshield of the J7PG. Pakistan ordered a total of 80 in two batches, with 50 and 30 respectively in each. According to the Pakistan Air Force, the performance at high altitude of the F-7PG has increased more than 83% in comparison to the F-7P/MP. Just like the earlier Italian FIAR Grifo-Mk-II radar on F-7MP/P, the Italian FIAR Grifo-MG radar of F-7PG will be assembled under license by the ISO - 9002 certified Kamra avionics, Electronics and Radar Factory of the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC). F-7W First J-7 export model with a HUD. The smaller canopy and the small window behind it were replaced by a larger canopy so that the small window no longer existed on J-7 models from then on. The first customer was Jordan, but the aircraft did not enter Jordanian service, instead, ended in Iraq. FT-7 Export version of the JJ-7. It used the domestic Chinese Type-II ejection seat, replacing the Chinese copy of the original Soviet design, because the Soviet design was less reliable. FT-7A Conversion package offered to Soviet MiG-21U trainer customers such as Egypt to replace the original Soviet-built ejection seats with Chinese built Type-II ejection seat, and a rear hinged canopy that would be jettisoned before the ejection seat instead of the forward hinged canopy jettisoned with the ejection seat. FT-7B Export version of JJ-7II, the first J-7 model to have a Martin-Baker ejection seat. FT-7M Trainer version of the F-7M. This is the J-7 trainer version on which HUD became standard. FT-7P Trainer version of the F-7MP and F-7P. Unlike most Chinese built J-7 trainers which lack radars, the FT7P was armed with the same radar on the single seat version and thus fully capable for combat.
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MiG-21 Airworthiness Certification FT-7PG
Attachment 2
FT-7 trainer variant of the F-7PG for the Pakistani Air Force. The rear seat is 0.5 meter higher than the front seat, so the periscope is eliminated. Super-7 It did away with British upgrades to the F-7M in the mid-1980s. After a successful deal with Chinese in the early 1980s resulting in the F-7M, the United Kingdom offered a further upgrade to improve the performance of the F-7M by adopting either General Electric F404 or Pratt & Whitney PW 1120 turbofan engines. The radar options would include the Red Fox, a repackaged version of the Blue Fox radar used on Sea Harrier FRS Mk 1, or the Emerson AN/APG-69. The upgrade was rejected before any engine tests, because of the cost of the radar, exceeding the cost of the new aircraft ($2 million). J-7 Exports Overview
Country Albania Egypt Tanzania Iraq North Korea Sri Lanka Sudan Bangladesh Burma Iran Burma Namibia Nigeria Zimbabwe Pakistan Pakistan Variants F-7A F-7A F-7A F-7B F-7B F-7BS FT-7 F-7B F-7M FT-7 F-7BG FT-7BG F-7M F-7M F-7M F-7NG FT-7NG F-7NI FT-7NI F-7M FT-7 F-7P Skybolt FT-7P Skybolt F-7PG FT-7PG Quantity 12 90 16 90 40 4 2 22 14 2 12 4 24 18 24 12 in total 12 in total 22 2 80 15 57 9 Notes Delivered in the early 1980s Delivered in the early 1980s Delivered in the mid-1980s Delivered in the early 1980s Delivered in the 1990s Delivered in the 1990s F-7M and FT-7 delivered in 1989; F-7BG and FT-7BG delivered in 2006
Delivered in the mid-1980s Delivered in 2006 Delivered in 2006 Delivered in the late 1980s F-7P and FT-7P delivered in 1988~90 F-7PG and FT-7PG delivered in 2001~02
Source: http://www.sinodefence.com December 2008.
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Attachment 3
Notes, Action(s) Taken, and Disposition
Issue(s)
Recommended, Action(s), and Coordination with Applicant
MiG-21 Preliminary and General Airworthiness Inspection Issues

Use the AVS SMS guidance as part of the airworthiness certification process, as it supplements the existing Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). FAA Order VS8000.367 (May 14, 2008) and FAA Order VS8000.369 (September 30, 2008) are the basis for, but not limited to (1) identifying hazards and making or modifying safety risk controls, which are promulgated in the form of regulations, standards, orders, directives, and policies, and (2) issuing certificates. 1. Aviation Safety (AVS) Safety Management System (SMS) Guidance Additional Information: AVS SMS is used to assess, verify, and control risks, and safety risk management is integrated into applicable processes. Appropriate risk controls or other risk management responses are developed and employed operationally. Safety risk management provides for initial and continuing identification of hazards and the analysis and assessment of risk. The FAA provides risk controls through activities such as the promulgation of regulations, standards, orders, directives, advisory circulars (AC), and policies. The safety risk management process (1) describes the system of interest, (2) identifies the hazards, (3) analyzes the risk, (4) assesses the risk, and (5) controls the risk. As Chris Kraft (NASA Flight Director) once put it the responsibility of managing risk meant that we had to understand failures and not repeat them. Kraft, 2001. Become familiar with the aircraft before initiating the certification process. 2. Aircraft Familiarization Additional Information: One of the first steps in any aircraft certification is to be familiar with the aircraft in question. Such knowledge, including technical details, is essential in establishing a baseline as the certification process moves forward. Conduct a preliminary assessment of the aircraft to determine condition and general airworthiness and determine whether assistance from another office is necessary. Additional Information: A Manufacturing Inspection District Office (MIDO) inspector may seek Flight Standards District Offices (FSDO) support as part of this process. Coordination between the offices may be essential in ensuring adequate technical expertise. The FAA inspector or authorized representative of the Administrator must evaluate the overall condition of the aircraft to determine it is in a condition for safe operation. Additional Information: This refers to the condition of the aircraft relative to wear and deterioration. This evaluation depends on information such as aircraft age, completeness of maintenance records, and the overall condition of the aircraft. The FAA will provide a letter to the applicant stating the reason(s) for denial and, if feasible, identify which steps may be accomplished to meet the certification requirements if the aircraft does not meet them and the special airworthiness certificate is denied. Additional Information: If this should occur, a copy of the denial letter will be attached to FAA Form 8130-6 and forwarded to AFS-750, and made a part of the aircrafts record. 6. FAA Records Review Review the existing FAA airworthiness and registration files (EDRS) and search the Program Tracking and Reporting Subsystem (PTRS) for safety issue(s) and incidents. Request and review the applicable military and civil aircraft records, including manual, aircraft, and engine logbooks. These must be in proper technical English. Additional Information: There have been many translated documents that are in fact not acceptable. Some of the issues are poor non-technical translation, misuse of conversion units, omitted material, and so on. For example, as told by an experience MiG operator, when the first Chinese MiGs were introduced in the US, operators hired a graduate student who agreed, for a substantial fee, to translate the manual from Chinese to English. After the resultant translations proved to be confusing, contradictory, or just outright nonsensical, [he] admitted that he made frequent trips to a local Chinese restaurant, manual in hand, asking What does this mean? Entrekin, 2012.
3.
Preliminary Assessment and Assistance from Another FAA Office
4.
Condition for Safe Operation
5.
Denial
7.
Aircraft Records
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Establish and understand the aircrafts ownership status, which sets the stage for many of the responsibilities associated with operating the aircraft safely. 8. Aircraft Ownership Additional Information: There are many cases where former military aircraft are leased from other entities, and this can cloud the process. For example, if the aircraft is leased, the terms of the lease may be relevant as part of the certification because the lease terms may restrict what can be done to the aircraft and its operation for safety reasons. The main goal of this document is to assist the FAA in eliminating preventable accidents and those accidents and incidents caused by well-known problems that were either not fixed operationally or require specific mitigation to be contained. In other words, unnecessary risks must be mitigated. Additional Information: This document addresses the following general safety concerns regarding former military high-performance aircraft: Lack of consideration of inherent and known design failures; Several single-point failures; Lack of consideration for operational experience, including accident data and trends; Operations outside the scope of the airworthiness certificate being sought; Insufficient flight test requirements, and unsafe and untested modifications; Operations over populated areas (the safety of the non-participating public has not been properly addressed in many cases); Operations from unsuitable airports; High-risk passenger carrying activities taking place; Ejection seat safety and operation not adequately addressed; Weak maintenance practices and engines and ignoring required inspection schedules and procedures; Limited pilot qualifications, proficiency, and currency; Weapon-capable aircraft not being demilitarized, resulting in unsafe conditions; Extensive use of unqualified Designated Airworthiness Representatives (DAR); Accidents and serious incidents not being reported; and inadequate accident investigation data.
9.
Main Safety Issues
Notify the applicant that certain modifications to the aircraft will invalidate Phase II. Additional Information: These include: (a) structural modifications, (b) aerodynamic modifications, including externally mounted equipment except as permitted in the limitations issued, and (c) change of engine make, model, or power rating (thrust or horsepower). The owner/operator may return the aircraft to Phase I to flight test specific items as required. However, major modifications such as those listed above may require new operating limitations. Phase I may have to be expanded as well. In August 2012, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) issued safety recommendations concerning a fatal accident of an experimental high-performance aircraft that had undergone extensive modifications. The NTSB noted the accident airplane had undergone many structural and flight control modifications that were undocumented and for which no flight testing or analysis had been performed to assess their effects on the airplanes structural strength, performance, or flight characteristics. The investigation determined that some of these modifications had undesirable effects. For example, the use of a single, controllable elevator trim tab (installed on the left elevator) increased the aerodynamic load on the left trim tab (compared to a stock airplane, which has a controllable tab on each elevator). Also, filler material on the elevator trim tabs (both the controllable left tab and the fixed right tab) increased the potential for flutter because it increased the weight of the tabs and moved their center of gravity aft, and modifications to the elevator counterweights and inertia weight made the airplane more sensitive in pitch control. It is likely that, had engineering evaluations and diligent flight testing for the modifications been performed, many of the airplanes undesirable structural and control characteristics could have been identified and corrected. As part of the probable cause, the NTSB stated that contributing to the accident were the undocumented and untested major modifications to the airplane and the pilots operation of the airplane in the unique air racing environment without adequate flight testing. As a result of this investigation, the NTSB issued safety recommendations, including requiring aircraft owners to provide an engineering evaluation that includes flight demonstrations and analysis within the anticipated flight envelope for aircraft with any major modification, such as to the structure or flight controls. See Modifications and Phase I Flight Testing below.
10.
Potential Reversion Back to Phase I
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Identify the series of the aircraft in question. There will be differences among and between the different series of the aircraft. These differences and their impact on the airworthiness of the aircraft are discussed throughout this document. Differences in designations are also an issue. Identify Aircraft Version and Sub-Variants Additional Information: For example, MiG-21 built in Czechoslovakia (about 200 were built) were designed S106s. Chinese MiG-21s carry the designation J-7 or F-7. The MiG-21 was produced in three different factories, Gorky (MiG-21F; MiG-21F-13; MiG-21PF; MiG-21PFL; MiG-21PFS/PFM; MiG-21R; MiG-21S/SN; MiG21SM; MiG-21SMT; MiG-21bis; MiG-21MF,) Moscow (MiG-21U; MiG-21PF; MiG-21FL; MiG-21M; MiG-21MT,) and Tbilisi (MiG-21; MiG-21F; MiG-21U; MiG-21US; MiG-21UM.) There were also MiG-21F-13s built under license in Czechoslovakia along with MiG-21FL, MiG-21M and MiG-21bis built in India under license. The Chinese Jian-7 (J-7) and the export versions F-7 may be mistaken as a MiG-21. The Soviet Union provided China with some of the MiG-21 design and the balance of the design was reverse engineered. Although the MiG-21 was designed by the Mikoyan-Gurevich Design Bureau (and built by related production facilities), and for many years, MiG could be designated as the manufacturer, since the fall of the Soviet Union, there have been significant changes in Russia with regards to the ownership of the MiG aircraft manufacturer. As such, it impacts the MiG-21 and the operators ability to support the aircraft. 12. Soviet/Russian Manufacturer(s) Additional Information: The most current designation for the MiG-21 manufacturer would be Russian Aircraft Corporation MiG (RAC-MiG). Previous names, many used in the 1990s and 2000s, include Moscow Aircraft Production Organization (MAPO), and Military Industrial Group-MAPO (MiG-MAPO). As a result, depending on the aircraft, and the circumstances, the manufacturer will be MiG, but the designation may change depending on the reference and timeline. Also, because some MiG-21s were manufactured in Czechoslovakia, references to its Czech manufacturer may still be found. In all cases, all Chinese MiG-21s, the J-7 and F-7, are not covered by the Soviet or Russian manufacturer. In those cases, the manufacturer is Chengdu Aircraft Industry Corp (CAC). A previous designation would be the Shenyang Aircraft Factory. Another possible designation (from the 1980s) that maybe be used as a manufacturer representative is CATIC or China National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation. Additional Information: Note: JJ-7s, a dual-seat J-7 trainer and Chinese equivalent of the MiG-21U MongolA, was also built by Guizhou Aircraft Design Institute and Guizhou Aircraft Company (now Guizhou Aviation Industry Group/GAIC). 14. 15. Major Structural Components Data Plate, Block Number and Serial Number Ask the applicant to identify and document the origin, condition, and traceability of major structural components. This is one of the earlier steps in assessing the level or restoration and hence, airworthiness. Verify the Soviet military identification plate is installed, and a translation available. Record all information contained on the identification plate, such manufacturing date, block number, and serial number. Use FAA Form 8100-1 to document the airworthiness inspection. Using this form facilitates the listing of relevant items to be considered, those items nomenclature, any reference (that is, NATO manual; FAA Order 8130.2, regulations, etc.) revision, satisfactory or unsatisfactory notes, and comments. 16. FAA Form 8100-1 Additional Information: Items to be listed include but are not limited to 1. FAA Form 8130-6; FAA Form 8050-1; 2. 14 CFR 21.193; 14 CFR 45.11(a); 14 CFR 91.205; 3. FAA Order 8130.2, paragraphs 4002a(7) and (10), 4002b(5), 4002b(6), 4002b(8), 4111c, and 4112a (2); 4. 14 CFR 91.417(a)(2)(i), airframe records and total time, overhaul; and 5. 14 CFR 91.411/91.413, altimeter, transponder, altitude reporting, static system test. Review the NTSB accident database and the FAAs Accident and Incident Data System for the aircraft type accidents and incidents. Refer to http://ntsb.gov and http://www.asias.faa.gov. Ask the applicant to provide any data concerning all accidents and/or incidents involving the aircraft. Accident, Incident Histories, and Risk Factors Additional Information: It is important to look at incidents and evaluate risks even when they are not clearly illustrated by accident data. The Indian Air Force operational experience with high-performance fighters shows that for every single fatal accident, there are 10 non-fatal accidents preceded by 30 reportable incidents which were further preceded by 600 unreported, unsafe acts. In other words, considering only accident data in evaluating safe operations is insufficient since much of the critical safety data mentioned above, including accidents precursors, is not considered... See Reporting Malfunctions and Defects below.
11.
13.
Chinese Manufacturer(s)
17.
FAA/NTSB Accident and Incident Data System
18.
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
19.
PTRS Entries
If the applicant reports malfunctions and defects, make a PTRS entry accordingly. See Reporting Malfunctions and Defects below. Ask applicants to provide the following: Airframe: import country (if applicable), N-Number, manufacture year and serial number, and airframe time and airframe cycles. Engine: type and variant, manufacture date and serial number, and overhaul data, location, provider, and engine time and cycles. Additional Information: Properly identifying the relevant and basic characteristics of the airframe and the engine are necessary to address the safety issues with the aircraft. The following excerpt from an NTSB report on a former military jet accident illustrates the seriousness of adequate records: On May 15, 2005, a British Aircraft Corporation 167 Strike Master MK 83, N399WH, registered to DTK Aviation, Inc., collided with a fence during an aborted takeoff from Boca Raton Airport, Boca Raton, Florida. The airplane was substantially damaged and the commercial-rated pilot and passenger sustained minor injuries. The pilot initially stated he performed a preflight inspection of the aircraft which included a flight control continuity check. He had the passenger disable the gust lock for the flight controls. He performed a flight control continuity check before taxiing onto the runway for takeoff; no discrepancies were reported. The takeoff roll commenced and at the calculated rotation speed (70 knots), he ...began to apply pressure to stick and noticed an unusual amount of load on the controls. I made a quick trim adjustment to ensure that the forces on the stick were not the results of aerodynamic loads. When the trim changes yielded no change, I initiated an abort (at approximately V r at 80 knots) by retarding the throttle, extending the speed brakes, and applying the wheel brakes. He notified the tower of the situation, briefed the passenger, and raised the flaps. He also opened the canopy after realizing that he was unable to stop on the runway. The airplane traveled off the end of the runway, rolled through a fence and came to rest upright. The pilot also stated that the airplane is kept outside on the ramp at the Boca Raton Airport. Examination of the airplane by an FAA operations inspector before recovery revealed the control column would only move aft between 1/4 and 1/2 inch. No determination was made as to the position of the control lock in the cockpit. Examination of the airplane following recovery by an FAA airworthiness inspector revealed that the elevator was free to travel through the full range but was noted to be ...very stiff. Additionally, the rudder was ...extremely hard to move in either direction. During movement of the elevator flight control surface, the rudder flight control surface was noted to move, and with movement of the rudder flight control surface, the elevator flight control surface was noted to move. A review of a United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority (U.K. CAA) Mandatory Permit Directive (MPD) No. 2002-001 R1, issued on January 16, 2003, indicates partial binding or complete seizure of the elevator/rudder concentric torque tube bearings causing an interconnect between elevator and rudder control systems. This interconnection has resulted in un-commanded rudder movement with the application of elevator control inputs and vice versa. Investigation has determined that bearing seizure was due to inadequate lubrication and water ingress in the elevator torque tube bearings. Aircraft subject to external storage are particularly prone to this occurrence. A review of the airplane maintenance records revealed the airplane was last inspection on June 29,2004, in accordance with, ...the scope and detail of the inspection program approved by the FSDO for BAC Strikemaster dated June 29, 2001, and found it to be in safe operating condition at this time. The logbook entry does not indicate airplane total time; therefore, the time since the inspection was not determined. There was no record that U.K. CAA MPD No. 2002-001 R1 had been complied with. Ask the applicant to prepare the aircraft for flight, including all preflight tasks, startup, run-up, and taxi. The procedures and technical guidance issued for the aircraft must be used. A MiG-21 should not be found to be in a condition for safe flight unless, at the very least, the basic functionality of the aircraft, engine, systems, and ground support can be verified.
20.
Airframe and Engine Data
21.
Functionality Check(s)
Additional Information: The reason for this is that in an aircraft like the MiG-21, the airworthiness of the aircraft cannot be ascertained simply by records review. The applicant should demonstrate that the aircraft is functional, and adequate pre-flight and post-flight support is provided. There are also engine specific procedures developed by operational units. For example, under Soviet guidance, the Egyptian Air force ran the R-11 engine on their MiG-21F-13s because if the engines were not powered up early every morning, it [the aircraft] tended to develop technical problems Cooper, Arab MiG-21, 2012. If the aircraft in question is a Chinese JL-9/JJ-7B aircraft, the guidance in this document is incomplete and further coordination with AIR-230 is necessary. This development of the J-7 is far too advanced/different.
22.
Chinese JL-9/JJ-7B Aircraft
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Ensure the existence of a complete set of the applicable MiG-21 manuals, such as flight manuals, inspections and maintenance manuals, and engine manuals. These must be in English. Additional Information: Typically, this may involve over 100 such documents. An operator also needs to have the applicable technical guidance, equivalent to USAF Technical Orders (T.O.) to address known issues related to airworthiness, maintenance, and servicing. The owner/operator is responsible for having complete list of all MiG-21 manuals [technical orders, maintenance manuals, parts catalogues, engine manuals, inspection schedules, flight manual(s), and checklists] with revisions if available, and ensuring they are added and properly referenced in any inspection program and operating guidance. Documentation must be provided in English. This is critical because (1) factory manuals are very ambiguous, and (2) many poorly translated documents are in circulation. Many earlier translations of Soviet military aircraft are inadequate and crude. Note: It is incorrect to assume that all MiG-21 manuals are interchangeable. Although the aircraft are similar in design, from a systems standpoint, and even from a flight characteristics perspective, there may be differences that have to be properly addressed. Examples include: 23. Adequate Manuals and Related Documentation MiG-21bis Operating Instructions, Aircraft, and Systems; Book I Airframe and Systems; Book II Aircraft Armament; Book III Radio and Radar Equipment; Book IV Aviation Equipment; Book V Ground Maintenance Equipment and Tools; MiG-21bis Technical Description Manuals; MiG-21 Technical Description, Part I, Books 1-5; MiG-21 Technical Description, Part II, Books 1-4; MiG-21 Technical Description, Part IV, Books 2-5; MiG-21 Maintenance Schedule, Part I- IV; MiG-21 Operation & Maintenance Instruction RK333, Books III & IV; MiG-21bis Pilot's Flight Operating Instructions; MiG-21 Type 69, Pilot Flight Operating Manual; MiG-21 UB Pilots Flight Operating Instructions, 1975 (USAF Translation); MiG-21-F-13, Flight Manual, 1963; MiG-21 (L-17) Flight Manual, Yugoslav Air Force, 1979; MiG-21UM (NL-16) Flight Manual, Yugoslav Air Force, 1980; MiG-21R, Tactical Manual, Polish Air Force, 1978; R-11F-F2K-300 Operations & Maintenance Instructions (several books); -21 112-300, 1975; Type 69 plane - Illustrated Catalog of Details (Illustrated Parts Catalogue) - Book, 1974; DDR Luftstreitkrfte (East German Air Force) DV-432/4a MiG-21PF Manual, 1966;
The field inspector may add any requirements necessary for safety. As provided in statute, under existing regulations and policies, FAA aviation safety inspectors have discretion to address any safety issue that may be encountered, whether or not it is included in the job aid. Additional Information: Of course, in all cases, there should be justification for adding requirements. In this respect, the job aid provides a certain level of standardization to achieve this, and in addition, AIR-200 is available to coordinate a review (with AFS-800 and AFS-300) of any proposed limitations an inspector may consider adding or changing. 49 U.S.C. 44704 states that before issuing an airworthiness certificate, the FAA will find that the aircraft is in condition for safe operation. In issuing the airworthiness certificate, the FAA may include terms required in the interest of safety. This is supported by case law. 14 CFR 21.193, Experimental Certificates: General requires information from an applicant, including, upon inspection of the aircraft, any pertinent information found necessary by the Administrator to safeguard the general public. 14 CFR 91.319 Aircraft Having Experimental Certificates: Operating provides the Administrator may prescribe additional limitations that the Administrator considers necessary, including limitations on the persons that may be carried in the aircraft. Finally, FAA Order 8130.2, chapter 4, Special Airworthiness Certification, effective April 16, 2011, also states the FAA may impose any additional limitations deemed necessary in the interest of safety. Verify that the maintenance and operation of the MiG-21 is based on NATO standards to the maximum possible extent. 25. MiG-21 NATO Guidance Additional Information: This is important because those standards mirror the USAF standards, and therefore, are acceptable to the FAA as a safety baseline. The MiG-21 is still in service with the NATO countries, Bulgaria, Croatia (to be retired by the end of 2013,) and Romania. Former NATO operators include Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. See Romanian MiG-21 Lancer below.
24.
Safety Discretion
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
26.
MiG-21 USAF Guidance
Ensure the applicant uses all of the relevant USAF technical and operational guidance that was declassified concerning the use of MiG-21 aircraft by the USAF between 1979 and 1988. This provides an acceptable baseline for the FAA and complements NATO guidance. See Project Have Doughnut Evaluation below. Although in this document NATO or USAF guidance concerning the MiG-21 is considered acceptable, technical and/or operational guidance used by the Finnish Air Force (FAF) when it operated MiG-21 (singleseat MiG-21F, MiG-21bis, and UB and UM two-seaters) is also acceptable.
27.
Finnish Air Force (FAF) MiG-21 Guidance
Additional Information: This is because of the high level of expertise inherent with that organization and operational history with the aircraft in 35 years of operations, ending in March of 1998. For all intended purposes, it would be equivalent to NATO standards, and thus provides an acceptable baseline for the FAA. In addition, many of the Finnish AF MiG-21 had Western cockpit instrumentation, in some cases similar to the Hawk Mk. 51. Because the German Air Force evaluated the MiG-21 after re-unification in 1990, some of MiG-21 technical and operational guidance may be acceptable and acceptable to the FAA. Additional Information: About 250 MiG-21s were transferred to the Luftwaffe after reunification but the type was not accepted as a standard type and they were rapidly phased-out. Ask whether the aircraft are Ex-Nigerian AF MiG-21s. If so, caution is required in the certification of these aircraft because of their past history. If certification is considered, additional requirements beyond the scope of this document may be necessary.
28.
Luftwaffe Guidance
29.
Ex-Nigerian Air Force MiG-21s
Additional Information: Nigerian acquired 25 MiG-21MF and 6 MiG-21U from the USSR in 1975. However, these aircraft were, from the start, not properly maintained and supported. Many have not flown in over 20 years and were, for the most part, stored outdoors in tropical conditions (Makurdi Air base). As stated by the Nigerian Air Force in 2007, most of our platforms were groundedand many of our maintenance facilities became dilapidated. Many have not been serviced in decades... Martin, 2012. Note: As of late 2012, 25 Ex-Nigerian Air Force MiG-21s have been for sale. Ask whether the aircraft are Ex-Serbia (and Yugoslavia) and Montenegro (since 2006, independent from Serbia) MiG-21s, locally designated as L-17s. If so, ask for the aircrafts documentation. Caution is advised. Many of these aircraft have been in open storage since 1998, expired life-limits, and are in poor condition. Additional Information: Only a handful (possibly 3) of aircraft was reported operational in September 2007. Ask whether the aircraft are ex-Kyrgyz Air Force MiG-21bis and MiG-21UM. If so, ask for the aircrafts documentation. Caution is advised since these aircraft may have been in open storage at Kant Air Base since 1991 and photographic evidence in 2003-2004 showed condition as questionable. Ask whether the aircraft are ex-Albanian Air Force early Chinese F-7As. If so, ask for the aircrafts documentation. Caution is advised since only a handful of these aircraft (about 5), which were retired in 2005, may be in a relatively fair condition and be low-time airframes (400-600 hours or so). Ask whether the aircraft are ex-Slovakian Air Force MiG-21s. If so, ask for the aircrafts documentation. Although these aircraft were adequately maintained, the fact that they were retired in December 2002 (and some offered for sale at scarp value), and storage is questionable (outdoors), caution is advised. Ask whether the aircraft are ex-Mongolian Air Force MiG-21s (MiG-21PFM/Lim. If so, ask for the aircrafts documentation. These aircraft are likely not in good condition since they were retired in 1993, although some reports state the aircraft ere mothballed, but this has not been confirmed. Although not produced en masse, (i.e., 8 aircraft upgrades for Zambia in 2000) upgrades by IAI/Lahav Division on the MiG-21-2000 project may be considered if properly documented and data available. The reason for this is that many of the upgrades to the aircraft met Western standards and may be relevant in some cases.
30.
Ex-Serbia and Montenegro Air Force MiG-21s Ex-Kyrgyz Air Force MiG-21s
31.
32.
Ex-Albanian Air Force F-7
33.
Ex-Slovakian Air Force MiG-21 Ex-Mongolian Air Force MiG-21
34.
35.
IAI/Lahav Division Upgrades
Additional Information: Specifically, the IAI/ Lahav's MiG-21 upgrade is based on the integration of an advanced Western avionics system and IAI/Elta's Fire Control Radar. It includes a reconfigured "Glass Cockpit" with new color displays and mission-driven operational modes that increase situational awareness and reduce pilot workload. The new avionics equipment for the MiG-21 includes a Mission and Display Processor (MPD), Head Up Display (HUD), Multi-Function Displays (MFDs), HOTAS, navigation sensors, Data Transfer System (DTS), and radio and communication systems. See http://www.iai.co.il.
Page 3-6
Attachment 3
Issue(s)
36.
Ex-Afghanistan Air Force MiG-21s
Ask whether the aircraft are ex-Afghanistan Air Force MiG-21s. If so, ask for the aircrafts documentation. Caution is advised since these aircraft have been extensively damaged and capability in terms of being restored is questionable. Ask whether the aircraft is a Chinese J-7 variant. This is extremely important because much of the Soviet MiG-21 guidance may not apply to Chinese versions and variants. If this is the case, all of the relevant documentation must be specific to the Chinese versions and variants and must be in English. Additional Information: The J-7/F-7 is essentially an updated Chinese-manufactured MiG-21. Many late model J-7/F-7s use of Western avionics. Chengdu F-7P aircraft are powered by a single Wopen WP-7B afterburning turbojet producing 59.8 kN (13,460 lb. thrust). This engine is a copy of the Soviet Tumansky R11 found in early production MiG-21s. Note: Although as of 2005, the PLAAF was still operating early J-7As, some have been sold to civilian buyers, including some in the US. Soviet MiG-21 vs. Chinese J/7F-7 CATEGORY
Unit cost in USD millions Fuel economy in NM/g Fuel tank capacity in liters Fuel tank capacity in gallon Range on internal fuel in NM Powerplant/Engines Dry thrust in kN Dry thrust in lb. Afterburner in lb. Max. Speed in Mach Max. Speed in mph Minimal thrust/weight ratio Normal thrust/weight ratio Maximal thrust/weight ratio Overall length in ft. Wingspan in meters Height in ft. Wing area in sq. ft. Empty weight in kg Empty weight in lb. Maximal take-off weight in kg Maximal take-off weight in lb. Maximal wing-loading in kg/m2 Rate of climb in ft./min
MiG-21 Fishbed (1956)

3-10 1,42 2600 686 853,2 1 Tumansky R-11F-300 1 x 37 1 x 8380 1 x 12650 2,05 1560 0,66 0,75 1,03 51,69 7,15 13,45 247,48 4870 10714 9400 20680 409 35,442
Chengdu F-7(1966)
2-3 1,21 2600 686 723,6 1 Liyang Wopen-13F 2 x 44 2 x 9500 2 x 14500 2,00 1522 0,65 0,77 1,02 48,54 8,32 13,48 267,71 5200 11440 9100 20020 408 35,442
37.
Chinese J-7/F-7 Versions and Variants
Source: http://www.kamov.net/versus/mig-21-vs-f-7/. Ask whether the aircraft are Ex-Cambodian AF MiG-21s. If so, caution is required in the certification of these aircraft because of their past history. If certification is considered, additional requirements beyond the scope of this document may be necessary. Verify whether the aircraft were upgraded and overhauled in 2000. 38. Ex-Cambodian Air Force MiG-21 Additional Information: Nineteen second-hand MiG-21bis (Izdeliye 75B) and three MiG-21UMs delivered from the USSR in 1982, as well as three MiG-21UMs from Bulgaria in the same year. Although in the later 1990s, there are plans to modernize these in Israel to the MiG-21-2000 standard, it would appear that only one MiG-21bis and one MiG-21UM have been rebuilt to MiG-21-2000 standard and returned to Cambodia. This effectively means that in all likelihood any MiG-21s potentially sold in the civil market would be relics (the non-upgraded aircraft), not operational aircraft. As whether the aircraft are Ex-Egyptian AF MiG-21s or F-7s. If so, caution is recommended as part of certification of these aircraft. 39. Ex-Egyptian Air Force MiG-21/F-7 Additional Information: This is because the Egyptian AF does not have a traditional history of disposing of equipment to civil operators, especially equipment that it still has in service. Both MiG-21s (MiG-21UM and MiG-21MF as of 2006) were and F-7s (2013) are still in operational use. In addition, the records should disclose the reason for disposal, i.e., accident history, life-limit expiration. This will likely be relevant as part of the certification process.
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
40.
Ex-Georgian MiG-21s
Ask whether the aircraft are ex-Georgian MiG-21s, likely, MiG-21UMs. If so, ask for the aircrafts documentation, in English. Although these aircraft may have been overhauled in 2000 by TAM (TbilAviaMsheni) Aircraft Plant, caution is advised because there did not entered service with the Georgian AF and there is no information that they were kept operational since. Ask whether the aircraft are ex-Congolese Air Force MiG-21s (MiG-21PF, MiG-21US). If so, ask for the aircrafts documentation. These aircraft are likely not in good condition since they may not have been operational since 1997 and stored outdoors. Ask whether the aircraft are ex-Romanian Air Force MiG-21R, MiG-21U, or MiG-21PFM, and whether they were not upgraded to the Lancer standard. See Romanian MiG-21 Lancer (General) below. If they were not, ask for the aircrafts documentation, in English. Caution is advised since these aircraft have been in open storage at Craiova, Romania, since 1992-2000 and their condition is questionable. The condition of these aircraft will not be the same as those of aircraft upgraded to the Lancer standard. Note: Although there are some indications that some of the ex-Romanian AF MiG-21s at Craiova were scrapped after storage, this cannot be confirmed for all of them, and thus some may have been sold or may be still be available. Ask the applicant whether the MiG-21 being certificated is an Ex-Romanian AF MiG-21 Lancer, also known as a MLU or Mid-Life Upgrade for the MiG-21. Lancer is an upgrade program for MiG-21 Fishbed fighter for the Romanian Air Force. In addition to being operational with NATO, the aircraft incorporates many improvements over the stock Soviet type, and its condition will certainly be superior to other MiG-21 types. It is for all intended purposes, a much more modern aircraft than older Soviet-era MiG-21s, and as such, more complex in terms of avionics and related systems. Stock MiG-21 guidance that is used for previous and earlier Soviet MiG-21s may not likely be acceptable for the maintenance of these aircraft. Additional Information: The Lancer upgrade program(s) was conducted by the Romanian company AEROSTAR S.A. and ELBIT SYSTEM Ltd. from Israel, and three versions are being built: - Lancer A - Air to Ground version single-seaters; - Lancer B - Air to Ground version two-seaters; - Lancer C - Air to Air version single-seaters; The MiG-21 Lancer upgrade provides modem combat capabilities and effective service life. Modifications have been introduced to the cockpit configuration, avionics architecture, and weapons systems, enabling the MiG-21 Lancer to compete with much costlier fighters and to make the transition to Western standards. The upgrade program keeps the existing airframe, which was retrofitted with an avionics suite and new weapons integrated around two MIL STD 1553B multiplex data buses. It includes a complete upgrade of the electrical system as well. To illustrate the aircrafts higher level of complexity, the Lancers systems include:
41.
Ex-Congo Air Force MiG-21
42.
Ex-Romanian Air Force MiG-21s
43.
Romanian MiG-21 Lancer (General)
Modular Multi-Role Computer; Elbit 1553B bus; Display and Sight Helmet DASH; Head Up Display - Elop 921; Multi-Function Display 5x5 in.; Multifunction Color Display 5x5 in.; Hybrid Navigation System - LISA-4000 EB; ILS/VOR/DME; Air data computer - Marconi ADC; Hopping frequency VHF/ UHF radio - ACR 435; VHF/ UHF radio - ACR 430; Radar Warning Receiver - Elisra SPS-20; Chaff and flare dispensers - TAAS/IMI; Range radar Elta EL/M 2001 B (Lancer A/B); Multi-Mode Radar - Elta EL/M 2032, with look-down / shoot-down capability (Lancer C); Data Transfer System - DTS; Flight data recorder - SAIMS; IFF transponder - Plessey (NATO Mk.-10 IFF compatible); Stores Management System; HOTAS; Electronic Countermeasure Pod - Elta EL/L-8222R; Laser Designation Pod - Rafael Litening LDP; Photo Reconnaissance Pod - Elbit/Aerostar Airborne Reconnaissance Pod ARP ; Smart weapons - Rafael Griffin laser guided bomb (LGB), Lizard LGB and OPHER - IR guided bomb; Dumb bombs and cluster bombs - Mk-82, Mk-83, FAB-100, FAB-250, FAB-500, BEM-100, CL-250; Air to Air missiles: R-73, R-60, R-3S, R-13R (semi-active), K-13M (infrared), R-13M, Magic II and Python-3; Unguided rockets : S-5 M/K, carried in UB-16-57; UB-32-57 rocket launchers and; Single large caliber rockets S-24;
The MiG-21 Lancer was the world's first widely used operational aircraft which incorporated the HMD (Helmet Mounted Display System) since 1995 in active service. Also, the MiG-21 Lancer was the first aircraft in the world to operate weapon pylons which are capable of use both Eastern as well as Western military equipment, bombs and missiles. http://www.abovetopsecret.com/forum/thread116620/pg1. See ExRomanian MiG-21 Lancer below.
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
44. 45.
Applicable Publications Manual Applicant/Operator Capabilities Scope and Qualifications for Restoration, Repairs, and Maintenance Limiting Duration of Certificate
Review the aircraft inspection program (AIP) to verify compliance whether there is a current version of the applicable publications manuals or equivalent document. Review the applicant/operators capabilities, general condition of working/storage areas, availability of spare parts, and equipment. Familiarize yourself with the scope of the restoration, repairs, and maintenance conducted by or for the applicant. Refer to 21.181 and FAA Order 8130.2, regarding the duration of certificates, which may be limited.
46.
47.
Additional Information: An example would be to permit operations for a period of time to allow the implementation of a corrective action or changes in limitations. In addition, an ASI may limit the duration if there is evidence additional operational requirements may be needed at a later date. Inform the operator that the aircraft is limited under this regulation. The aircraft cannot be operated for any purpose other than the purpose for which the certificate was issued.
48.
Compliance With 91.319(a)(1)
Additional Information: For example, in the case of an experimental exhibition certificate, the certificate can be used for air show demonstrations, proficiency flights, and flights to and from locations where the maintenance can be performed. Such a certificate is NOT IN EFFECT for flights related to providing military services (that is, air-to-air gunnery, target towing, electronic countermeasures (ECM) simulation, cruise missile simulation, and air refueling). Also refer to Military/Public Aircraft Operations below. Ensure the applicant submits information describing how the aircraft configuration is changed from one to the other in those cases involving multiple airworthiness certificates. Additional Information: This is important because, for example, some research, and development (R&D) activities may involve equipment that must be removed to revert back to the exhibition configuration (refer to R&D Airworthiness Certification below). Moreover, the procedures should provide for any additional requirement(s), such as additional inspections, to address situations such as high-G maneuvering that could impact the aircraft and/or its operating limitations. Similarly, it should address removing R&D equipment that could be considered part of a weapon system (refer to Demilitarization below). All applications for an R&D certificate must adhere to FAA Order 8130.29, Issuance of a Special Airworthiness Certificate for Show Compliance and/or Research and Development Flight Testing. The special airworthiness certificate and attached operating limitations for this aircraft are not in effect during public aircraft operations (PAO) as defined by Title 49 of the United States Code (49 U.S.C.) 40102 and 40125. Additional Information: FAA issued airworthiness certificates are not in effect during state aircraft operations, typically military support missions, or military contracts. Aircraft used in military services are deemed state aircraft. Also refer to Operations Overseas below. The 1999 accident of MiG-21US N9242N is a good example of the need to keep civil and military purposes separate: Privately-owned MiG-21US N9242N broke up in the mid-air on August 24, 1998, killing the pilot, Doug Schultz, and his passenger. The aircraft was engaged in radar-tracking exercises with a Canadian warship off the coast of Vancouver, Canada. Working on contract with the Canadian military forces, the MiG had regularly participated in military training exercises, as well as performing at airshows. Fatal MiG Accident, 1999. As an example, the following media release illustrates the intent of several operators to conduct military support missions: The transaction includes the advanced training version of the MiG-21, the MiG-21UM, as well as the front-line interceptor, the MiG-21BIS. This acquisition adds to the companys already expansive and highly capable fleet of fighter aircraft. Draken intends to operate these aircraft in conjunction with the Department of Defense for missile threat simulation, fleet defense, and adversary support. These MiG-21s, equipped with Jay Bird radar, will present a more tactically relevant threat than the present older generation aircraft being offered in the Contract Air Services arena. Similarly, with over 25 operational and highly supportable fighters, Draken will be able to present a cost effective and large quantity fighter environment for various branches of the armed services and Department of Defense. Draken International, Draken is committed to building the most capable fleet of aircraft and we have made some tremendous acquisitions to accomplish this goal. ttp://drakenintl.com/news-3#more-101.
49.
Multiple Certificates
50.
Public Aircraft Operations, State Aircraft Operations, Military Support Missions, DOD Contracts
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Following a public, state, or military aircraft operation, ensure the aircraft is returned, via an approved method, to the condition and configuration at the time of airworthiness certification. Additional Information: This action must be documented in a log or daily flight sheet. Ensure the applicant submits information describing how the aircraft configuration is changed from PAO, state aircraft, or other non-civil classification or activity back to a civil certificate. This is important because, for example, some military support activities may involve equipment or maneuvers that must be removed or mitigated to revert back to original Exhibition or R&D configuration. The procedures should provide for any additional requirement(s), such as additional inspections, to address situations such as high-G maneuvering and sustained Gs that could have an impact on the aircraft and/or its operating limitations. Similarly, it should address removing equipment that could be considered part of a weapon system. See Demilitarization below. R&D certification requires a specific project. A R&D airworthiness certificate should not be issued based on the applicants intention to possibly conduct unspecified R&D projects in the future. 52. R&D Airworthiness Certification Additional Information: Ensure the applicant provides detailed information such as (1) description of each R&D project providing enough detail to demonstrate it meets the regulatory requirements of 21.191(a); (2) length of each project; (3) intended aircraft utilization, including the number of flights and/or flight hours for each project; (4) aircraft configuration; (5) area of operation for each project; (6) coordination with foreign CAA, if applicable; and (7)contact information for the person/customer that may be contacted to verify this activity. Note: All applications for an R&D certificate should include review of FAA Order 8130.29. The certification process using an aircraft-specific job aid (such as this one) allows for the field offices to consider temporary extensions of existing airworthiness certificates, as appropriate. 53. Temporary Extensions Additional Information: This will enable AIR-200 to complete drafting the aircraft-specific job aid and allow the field inspector(s) and the applicant additional time to complete a full review with the job aid. Field inspectors are cautioned when issuing a temporary extension to ensure any safety issues they believe need to be addressed and corrected are mitigated as part of this process. FAA Headquarters (AIR-200, AFS-800, and AFS-300) will assist with any questions concerning issues affecting the aircraft. Verify the aircraft has been adequately demilitarized. This aircraft must remain demilitarized for all civil operations. Refer to the applicable technical guidance. A weapon, a weapon system, and related equipment can create safety of flight hazards under the jurisdiction of the FAA and must be removed. Demilitarized is not just the removal of the weapon(s), but also many related systems and components. Additional Information: Removal of the NR-30 or GSh-23L cannon alone does not suffice. Other systems include: gun sight, pylons and wiring (in the case of wiring, the firing circuitry must not have any continuity to it), radar (made INOP), chaff, flares or practice bombs, ECM/Jamming gear, firing control (armament) panel(s), switches and triggers, and combing computers and systems. Some of the specific MiG-21 weapons system, depending on the model include: RP-22S Saphir Jay Bird; SRD-5MN Baza-6 radar rangefinder; ASP-5NV-U1 computing gun sight; ASP-PFD-21 gun sight; Missile rack and rails: APU-7; APU-13; APU-13M1; APU-28; APU-68 rails; BDZ-60-21R pylons; MDB-2-67 multiple ejector rack; BD3-66-21N special weapon rack; GP-9 gun pod; UB-16-57 rocket launchers; UB-32 rocket launchers; SPS-141 ECM pod; R-3S, R-3R, RS-2, RS-2US, R-13M, R-55, K-13, and R-60 missiles; Matra R. 550, AIM-9P (French and US missiles); PL-2, PL-5, and PL-7 (on Chinese J-7/F-7); Ch-66, S-21, S-24, and S-5 rockets; FAB-100; FAB-250 bombs; ZB-360 napalm tank. OFAB-250-270 He/fragmentation bombs; M-5 bomb; UZR-60 pod (AA-8) training round): BVP-60-26 chaff/flare dispenser; Type 941-4C chaff and flare dispenser (Chinese); With these systems, there are many safety issues that can preclude a finding of condition for safe operation, and protecting people and property on the ground, as required by statute and regulations. These safety issues include accidental firing, compartment fires, inadvertent discharge of flares, toxic chaff, electrical overloads of the aircraft electric system, danger of inadvertent release, structural damage to the aircraft, complex flight limitations, and harmful emissions. Note: Some of these weapon systems could be permitted for a R&D airworthiness certificate, but the related safety issues still have to be addressed, especially if the aircraft reverts back to an exhibition certificate. TO 00-80G-1, Make Safe Procedures for Public Static Display, dated November 30, 2002, can be used as a reference as well. Also see SME and 22 CFR 121.3 below.
51.
Re-Conforming to Civil Certificate
54.
Demilitarization
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
The following (non-inclusive) is identified as "significant military equipment (SME)" in Category VIII of the U.S. Munitions List [22 CFR 121] of the International Traffic In Arms Regulations [22 CFR 120-130] and considered "sensitive." Additional Information: SME - Aircraft bearing an original military designation specifically designed, modified, or equipped for military purposes, including demilitarized aircraft, such as: Gunnery & Bombing; Rocket or Missile Launching; Electronic or Other Surveillance; Reconnaissance & Aerial Mapping; Airborne Warning and Control;
SME - Cartridge-Actuated Devices (CADs) specifically designed or modified for use with the above aircraft and engines utilized in emergency escape of personnel. SME - Inertial Navigation Systems, Inertial Measurement Units (IMUs) and Attitude and Heading Reference Systems (AHRS) specifically designed, modified, or configured for military use and all specifically designed components, parts and accessories. Non-SME - Developmental aircraft, engines, and components specifically designed, modified, or equipped for military uses or purposes, or developed with DoD funding. SME - Components and parts: 55. SME RAM-Radar Absorbing Material; Fuselage/airframe and empennage (tail assembly); Missile ablative shell; Impact detectors and circuitry; Missile guidance systems; Target selection programming data; Balanced material orifices; Gas generator (when used); Pylons for external stores (armament, fuel, etc.); Gun barrels; Launcher barrels; Tubes or pods; Receivers; Firing mechanisms; Gun rotor assemblies; Delinking and declutching ammunition feeders; Aircraft mounted cannon electric drive assemblies and mounts; Internal Aircraft ammunition storage assemblies; Ammunition crossover assemblies; Magazines and chute assemblies; Controllers; Intervalometers & Gunner control panels; Pilot wing control panels; Reflex sight; Technical data; Associated armament, equipment and subsystems;
See http://download.aopa.org/epilot/2012/120430warbird.pdf. 56. 22 CFR 121.3 As a references, 22 CFR 121.3, which in the context of the US Munitions List, distinguishes between aircraft designed and equipped for military purposes (even including demilitarized aircraft) and aircraft not specially equipped and not modified for military operations, such as certain cargo, trainer and observation aircraft.
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Recommend the accident report concerning the 2009 Lightning T5 ZU-BEX be reviewed in detail. This report, published by the South African CAA in August 2012, provides valuable insight into the consequences of operating complex and high-performance former military aircraft in an unsafe manner. 57. 2009 Crash of ZU-BEX Additional Information: The relevant issues identified in the report include (1) ignoring operational history and accident data, (2) inadequate maintenance practices, (3) granting extensions on inspections, (4) poor operational procedures, and (5) inadequate safety oversight. Many of the issues discussed and documented in the accident investigation report are directly relevant to safety topics discussed in this document. The South African CAA report can be found at http://www.caa.co.za/. Review any related documents from U.S. Customs and Border Protection and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) for the aircraft. If the aircraft was not imported as an aircraft, or if the aircraft configuration is not as stated in Form ATF-6, it may not be eligible for an airworthiness certificate. Military equipment may also jeopardize the aircraft. 58. Importation Additional Information: There are many cases in which Federal authorities have questioned the origin of former military aircraft and its installed weapon system. Some have been seized. For example, two T-28s were seized at the Canadian border by U.S. Customs officials in 1989. Refer to Federal Firearms Regulations Reference Guide, ATF Publication 5300.4, and Revised September 2005, for additional guidance. If an aircraft is imported for purposes such as display, parts, or scrap, it is not eligible for an airworthiness certificate. Verify the application for airworthiness does not constitute brokering. 14 CFR 21.191(d) was not intended to allow for the brokering or marketing of experimental aircraft. Many operators acquire aircraft, seek, and obtain experimental certification with the intent to sell immediately after certification (i.e., advertisement before certification). 59. Brokering Additional Information: This includes individuals who manufacture, import, or assemble aircraft, and then apply for and receive experimental exhibition airworthiness certificates so they can sell the aircraft to buyers. Section 21.191(d) only provides for the exhibition of an aircrafts flight capabilities, performance, or unusual characteristics at air shows, and for motion picture, television, and similar productions. Certificating offices must verify all applications for exhibition airworthiness certificates are for the purposes specified under 21.191(d) and are from the registered owners who will exhibit the aircraft for those purposes. Applicants must also provide the applicable information specified in 21.193. Inform the operator that operations may be restricted by airports because of safety considerations. The sponsor of a federally-obligated airport has not only the right and also the obligation to raise safety concerns with regards to operations at the airport. This is accomplished with FAA oversight and concurrence. Additional Information: As provided by 49 U.S.C. 47107(a), a federally obligated airport may prohibit or limit any given type, kind, or class of aeronautical use of the airport if such action is necessary for the safe operation of the airport or necessary to serve the civil aviation needs of the public. Additionally, per FAA Order 5190.6, FAA Airport Compliance Manual, the airport should adopt and enforce adequate rules, regulations, or ordinances as necessary to ensure safety and efficiency of flight operations and to protect the public using the airport. In fact, the prime requirement for local regulations is to control the use of the airport in a manner that will eliminate hazards to aircraft and to people on the ground. In all cases concerning airport access or denial of access, and based on FAA Flight Standards Service safety determination, FAA Airports is the final arbiter regarding aviation safety and will make the determination (Directors Determination, Final Agency Decision) regarding the reasonableness of the actions that restrict, limit, or deny access to the airport (refer to FAA Docket 16-02/08, FAA v. City of Santa Monica, Final Agency Decision; FAA Order 2009-1, July 8, 2009; and FAA Docket 16-06-09, Platinum Aviation and Platinum Jet Center BMI v. Bloomington-Normal Airport Authority). Inform the operator that operations may be restricted by airport noise access restrictions and noise abatement procedures in accordance with 49 U.S.C. 47107. As a reference, refer to FAA Order 5190.6. The operator also needs to ascertain how any noiserelated restriction has an impact on safety. 61. Environmental Impact (Noise) Additional Information: Some airports may have approved noise restrictions. The fact that the aircraft is experimental does not mean that noise restrictions are not applicable. In fact, the opposite is likely to be true. If an experimental former military aircraft is not restricted at the airport while a quieter corporate jet is, this could place the airport in violation of the applicable Federal law concerning unjust discrimination, and the airport will be required, by the FAA, to take corrective action.
60.
Federally Obligated Airport Access
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Inform the applicant/operator that operations may be restricted and permission must be granted by a foreign CAA. The applicable CAA may impose any additional limitations it deems necessary, and may expand upon the restrictions imposed by the FAA on the aircraft. In line with existing protocols, the FAA will provide the foreign CAA any information, including safety information, for consideration in evaluating whether to permit the operation of the aircraft in their country, and if so, under what conditions and/or restrictions. It is also noted any operator offering to use a U.S. civil aircraft with an experimental certificate to conduct operations such as air-to-air combat simulations, ECM, target towing for aerial gunnery, and/or dropping simulated ordinances pursuant to a contract or other agreement with a foreign government or other foreign entity would not be doing so in accordance with any authority granted by the FAA as the State of Registry or State of the Operator. Additional Information: On the issue of operations overseas: Under international law, the aircraft will either be operated as a civil aircraft or a state aircraft. The aircraft cannot have a combined status. If the aircraft are to be operated with civil status, then they must have FAA-issued airworthiness certificates. If the applicant/operator is seeking experimental certificates for R&D or Exhibition purposes for the aircraft, and if the FAA issues (or renews) those certificates for the aircraft, then the only permissible operation of the aircraft as civil aircraft in a foreign country, is for an R&D or Exhibition purpose. The applicant/operator cannot be allowed to accomplish other purposes during the same operation, such as performing the contract for a foreign air force. This position is necessary to avoid telling an operator that any R&D or Exhibition activity could serve as a cover for a whole host of improper activities using an aircraft with an experimental certificate for R&D or Exhibition purposes, rendering the R&D or Exhibition limitation on the certificate meaningless. The R&D or Exhibition activity would be a pretext for the real purpose of the operation. Accordingly, in issuing experimental certificates for an R&D or Exhibition purpose, the FAA must make it clear that any other activities or purposes for the operation are outside the scope of permitted operations under the certificate. The FAA must also make clear that the operation as a civil aircraft requires the permission of the foreign civil aviation authority (CAA). In requesting that permission, the applicant/operator should advise the foreign aviation authority that the operation will be for an R&D or Exhibition purpose only and for no other purpose, including performing a contract for any foreign military organization. The applicant/operator must understand that if the foreign CAA asks FAA about the operation, the FAA will state that the only permissible purpose of the operation is R&D or Exhibition, and an operation for any other purpose, even when conducted in conjunction with an R&D or Exhibition purpose, is outside the scope of the operations allowed under the certificate. If the applicant/operator operates the aircraft as state aircraft, then the national government of some country will have designated the aircraft as its state aircraft, and the host country, will have given the aircraft permission to operate through the issuance of a diplomatic clearance. That diplomatic clearance should include whatever terms and conditions that CAA deems necessary or appropriate for the operation. The aircraft, when operated as state aircraft, does not need an FAA airworthiness certificate, and the pilots of those aircraft do not need to hold FAA-issued airman licenses. Safety oversight responsibility for aircraft designated as state aircraft rests with the country that made the state aircraft designation.
62.
Restrictions on Operations Overseas
Page 3-13
Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Recommend that the August 2011 House Report 111-491 STUDY AND REPORT ON FEASIBILITY OF TRANSFERRING AIRCRAFT FROM A MILITARY DEPARTMENT TO A NON-FEDERAL ENTITY FOR THE PURPOSE OF RESTORING AND FLYING THE AIRCRAFT be reviewed for background purposes. Additional Information: The report provides relevant information on the issue of former military aircraft in civil use. For example, it notes that the safe operation of military aircraft is a complex engineering and logistical endeavor, and the challenges of safe operation are only compounded in various ways by the passage of time. Military squadrons, including military demonstration teams, operate within an environment of aggressive maintenance and continuous supervision. Maintenance is performed to rigorous standards by highly trained crews answerable to a clear chain of command and overseen by a cadre of engineering and supply chain professionals (see, e.g., Commander, Naval Air Forces Instruction, 4790.2A, Naval Aviation Maintenance Program). Even with such an aggressive program, mishaps within the Military Services do occur. The expertise, training and resources that would allow for an equivalent environment of safety may well be impossible in the private sector or prove to be prohibitively expensive for a NFE (non-Federal Entities). In light of the considerable costs of overhaul and routine maintenance for military and/or historic aircraft in private hands, the result could be unacceptable compromises in safety-related inspections, maintenance, and repairs. In addition to maintenance of the aircraft, public safety issues are implicated by standards for pilots of these types of aircraft. As with maintenance and repair standards, military pilots are subject to rigorous training, operational and readiness requirements to ensure safest possible flight scenarios. The Naval Air Training Operating Procedures Standardization General Flight and Operating Instructions, Chief of Naval Operations, or OPNAV, Instruction, 3710.7U, is a great example of the detailed and complex nature of maintaining and flying combat aircraft. Because military aircraft, including historic aircraft, present challenges above and beyond those involved with flying commercial aircraft, the Department strongly questions the possibility of NFE pilots being adequately trained or experienced in a particular type of aircraft to the extent necessary for safe flight. The ability of any private organization to maintain and safely fly a vintage Category C aircraft in accordance with modern standards is questionable at best. Experience shows that these aircraft will become increasingly more difficult and expensive to maintain as the years pass. The maintenance of these aircraft is compounded with limited availability of spare parts, repair manuals, technical data, ground support equipment, special test equipment, tooling, and test benches. There is no assurance that such resources are available to be transferred with historic aircraft or that the Services would recoup the substantial manpower cost of locating, collecting, and transferring such items - not to mention their initial cost to the taxpayers. In fact, it is unlikely that such resources are available, and extensive engineering analysis of a specific aircraft would be needed in order to determine the availability and suitability of these resources. Specifically with respect to spare parts, the Military Services have entire organizations dedicated to supply support for active inventory aircraft to ensure proper configuration control, safety of flight, and proper repair of parts. It is resource-intensive to maintain this supply support, and it is not continued once an aircraft leaves the active rolls. Given that DoD cannot guarantee such support, private organizations cannot reasonably be expected to have the resources of the DoD or equivalent access to a dwindling supply of parts. As age and wear related issues develop, the Services distribute Time Compliance Technical Orders (TCTO), or similar processes, to provide improved maintenance procedures, direct replacement of affected parts or limit operational envelopes in an effort to prevent equipment failure. This type of system program office (SPO) support, if required by legislative language, would require large expenditures by the Services to provide support to unique, one of a kind aircraft and necessitate the type of post-transfer involvement that would be fertile grounds for liability claims, as discussed above. Monitoring such aircraft for airworthiness would require long-term dedication of DoD resources and coordination with the FAA, DHS, and GSA. The FAA certification of discontinued aircraft operations may be difficult to obtain since there is no expertise to provide analysis and advice with regards to the airframe and its airworthiness. There are several examples illustrative of the risks involved with combat type aircraft in private hands.There are also concerns that the consequences could be exponentially compounded by a mishap over an inhabited area. Once an aircraft is in the stream of commerce, it would be extraordinarily difficult to control its ultimate disposition. In addition, while the greatest concern is the potential for loss of life and injuries, such mishaps would also represent an irreplaceable loss of a historical artifact. In the Department's experience, requests for flyable combat-coded aircraft are often from organizations that want to fly at air shows that charge admission or that want two-seat models in order to allow them to sell backseat rides. These proposed uses underscore the significant public safety considerations underlying any decision to transfer these types of aircraft. See http://download.aopa.org/epilot/2012/120430warbird.pdf.
63.
House Report 111-491 (Public Safety)
Page 3-14
Attachment 3
Issue(s)
The following is a sample of the contents of an initial contact by an FAA field office to an applicant concerning a proposed certification of a high-performance former military aircraft. It addresses many of the major safety and risk issues with the aircraft and will assist in (1) preparing an airworthiness applicant, (2) making corrections and updating any previous application, and (3) documenting the level of airworthiness review. Additional Information: 1. Discuss item missing from the application. a. Program letter setting the purpose for which the aircraft will be used. i. ii. iii. 2. Exhibition of aircraft flight capabilities, performance, unusual characteristics at air shows, motion picture, television and similar productions, and maintenance of exhibition flight proficiency, including flying to and from such air shows and productions. Aircraft cannot be certified if the intention is to broker or sell the aircraft. Aircraft photos.
Prepare aircraft and documentation for FAA inspection. a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. i. j. k. l. m. n. o. p. q. r. s. t. Maintenance and modification records. Aircraft history and logbooks (airframe, engine, and components). Have the aircraft maintenance program ready for review and acceptance. Have operations and maintenance and supplements. Have crew qualifications ready for review (pilot, mechanics, A&P, IA). Be prepared to show spare parts records. Be prepared to accomplish preflight, ground checks, run-up, and taxi checks. Be prepared to demonstrate the aircraft has been demilitarized. Have records on status of ejection seats. Be prepared to discuss required ground support equipment and specialized tooling for maintenance. Be prepared to discuss and document the airframe fatigue life program compliance. Be prepared to discuss engine thrust measurement process. Be prepared to demonstrate oxygen system checks. If G suits are used be prepared to demonstrate serviceability. Have records for any fabricated parts and engineering documentation if required. Have records on flight control balancing. Have weight and balance records. Be prepared to discuss external stores. Be prepared to discuss Phase I test flights (recommended 10 hours). Have record of installed avionics.
64.
Initial Contact Checklist
3.
Applicable regulations and ACs. a. 21.93, 21.181, 21.193, 21.191(d), 23.1441, 43.3, 43.9, 45.11, 45.23(b), 45.25, 45.29, 91.205, 91.307, 91.319(a) (1), 91.407, 91.409(f) (4), 91.411, 91.413, 91.417, 91.1037, 91.1109, and AC 43-9, AC 91-79.
4.
Items to discuss with applicant. a. b. c. d. Recommendation of establishing a minimum equipment list. Recommend establishing minimum pilot experience and proficiency, including (1) FAA PIC policy, NAVAIR training, (2) 10 to 15 hours of dual time, and (3) 3 hours per month, and five takeoffs and landings. Recommend establishing minimum runways length criteria for takeoff and landing. Discuss military use, that is, declaration of public use operations and operating limitations.
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Attachment 3
Notes, Action(s), and Disposition
Issue(s)
MiG-21 Maintenance Manual(s), Aircraft Inspection Program (AIP), and Servicing

Consider whether the FAA-accepted AIP is subject to revisions to address safety concerns, alterations, or modifications to the aircraft. 14 CFR 91.415, Changes to Aircraft Inspection Programs, requires that whenever the Administrator finds that revisions to an approved aircraft inspection program under 91.409(f)(4) or 91.1109 are necessary for the continued adequacy of the program, the owner or operator must, after notification by the Administrator, make any changes in the program found to be necessary by the Administrator. As provided by 91.415, review the submitted maintenance manual(s) and AIP. Additional Information: Work with the applicant to revise the AIP as needed based on any concerns identified in attachment 3 to this document. For example, an AIP can be modified to address or verify Consistency with the applicable military T.O.s for airframe, powerplant, and systems to verify replacement/interval times are addressed. All AIP section and subsections include the proper guidance/standards (that is, Technical Orders or Engineering Orders) for all systems, groups, and tasks. No on condition inspections for items that have replacement times unless proper technical data to substantiate the change, that is, aileron boost and oxygen regulator. Ejection seat system replacement times are adhered to. No on condition inspections for rocket motors and propellants. Make the distinction between replacement times, that is, shelf life vs. installed life limit. Any deferred log is related to a listing of minimum equipment for flight (refer to Minimum Equipment for Flight below, and AFI 21-103); Inclusion of document revision page(s). Ensure the AIP stresses it is not a checklist or just a table of contents. This is important in many cases because the actual AIP is only a simple checklist and actual tasks/logbook entries say little of what was actually accomplished and to what standard. Additional Information: This is one of the major issues with some FAA-approved inspection programs, and stems from confusion about the different nature of (1) aircraft maintenance manuals, (2) the AIP, and (3) inspection checklists. Unless a task or item points to technical data (not just a reference to a manual), it is simply a checklist, not a manual. Ensure the AIP directs the reader to other references such as technical data, including references to sections and pages within a document (and revision level), that is, AC 43-13, page 318 or inspection card 26.2. Records must be presented to verify times on airframe and engines, inspections, overhauls, repairs, and in particular, time in service, time remaining and shelf life on life limited parts. It is the owners responsibility to ensure these records are accurate. Refer to Classic Jet Aircraft Association Safety Operations Manual, Rev. 6/30/08. Refrain from assuming compliance with the applicable military standards, procedures, and inspections are sufficient to achieve an acceptable level of safety for civil operations, as part of the airworthiness certification and related review of the AIP. This may not be true, depending on the situation and the aircraft. Additional Information: For example, an AIP based on 1978 requirements does not necessarily address the additional concerns or issues 35 years later, such as aging, structural and materials deterioration, stress damage (operations past life limits), extensive uncontrolled storage, new techniques, and industry standards. As part of the AIP, ensure the applicant/operator retains a master list of all revisions (log of revisions) that can be reviewed in accordance with other dated material that may be required to be done under a given revision. Additional Information: The AIP should address revision history for manual updates and flight log history. Relevant data includes: revision number; date; page or reference numbers; and initials and/or signature. Consider AC 43.13-2, Acceptable Methods, Techniques, and Practices-Aircraft Alterations, and AC 43.13-1, Acceptable Methods, Techniques, and Practices-Aircraft Inspection and Repair, in addition to any guidance provided by the manufacturer/military service(s), to verify safe maintenance practices.
65.
Changes to Aircraft Inspection Program (AIP)
66.
AIP Is Not a Checklist
67.
AIP Limitations
68.
AIP Revision Records and Log of Revisions
69.
Maintenance Practices
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
70.
Qualifications for Inspections
Ensure only FAA-certificated repair stations and FAA-certificated mechanics with appropriate ratings as authorized by 43.3 perform inspections on the aircraft. Previous MiG-21 experience is recommended. The AIP should address maintenance responsibilities and functions in a clear manner. Additional Information: The AIP should address the difference between the aircraft owner and operator. The AIP also needs to address any leasing arrangement where maintenance is spilt or otherwise outside of the control of the applicant, that is, where maintenance is contracted to another party. The AIP should define the person responsible for maintenance. The AIP should address qualifications and delegations of authority, that is, whether the person responsible for maintenance has inspection authority and airworthiness release authority, or authority to return for service. In terms of inspection control and implementation, the AIP should define whether it is a delegation of authority, and if so, what authority is being delegated by the owner and operator. This has been an issue with the NTSB (and the Civil Aeronautics Board before it) since 1957. Caution is advised in accepting claims that the aircraft is overhauled or zero-timed. It is important to note that many operators misrepresent the true condition of the aircraft. Some advertise their MiG-21 as low time airframes, when in reality the opposite is true. Additional Information: For example, the seller of a MiG-21 advertised his aircraft as having only 1,500 hours since new Another report in 2000 noted that the MiG (MiG-21US) has logged about 1,800 hours This seriously misrepresents the aircrafts true condition and airworthiness in many respects. For one, 1,500 hours is high, not low. Depending on the aircraft version and variant, it either exceeds the 1,200 hour life-limit or is very close to the 1,600 hour life-limit. An overhaul does not eliminate or zero-time the aircrafts life-limit. In addition, representing the assembly and restoration as a complete overhaul is also inaccurate because that is a task (technically referred to as a factory refurbishment [Depot Level in the US] is performed by the manufacturer or a delegated facility, common in the Soviet days. Today, that function is provided only to some facilities. The cost of an Israeli (IAI) MiG-21 overhaul was $1.5 million in 1999, while an Ukrainian overhaul could cost slightly less. An overhaul is not a task that an FBO can accomplish in the US without manufacturers support. A MiG-21 overhaul is a significant undertaking which can take up to 3 months, and includes stripping the aircraft down, removing wings, and remove all components. It also involves replacement of life-limited components and a structural inspection and repairs, with an emphasis on corrosion. Despite this, many service providers and operators in the US claim that the aircraft was overhauled when it was not, and even if it were the case, it still does not eliminate the need to address the aircrafts life-limit. Another advertisement for a 1967 MiG-21U notes that the aircraft has 1,921 total hours with an R-11 engine having 595 hours since new and 144 since major overhaul. All three items are either high-time (engine since major overhaul) or actually passed their limit (airframe life-limit). This condition is actually reflected in the aircrafts $95,000 price tag. See http://www.aso.com. Verify the AIP includes the proper records and references to the required depot-level overhaul (common reference in former Soviet aircraft) at 450 hours and other required maintenance conducted before importation. See Overhaul Calendar Limitations below. Additional Information: These records must be translated into English. If the operator challenges this requirement, ask for technical data to corroborate and justify any deviation. If the aircraft is a MiG-21U, verify the AIP includes the proper records and references to the required depotlevel overhaul (common reference in former Soviet aircraft) at 300 hours or 5 years (rather than 450 as mentioned above) and other required maintenance conducted before importation. Additional Information: These records must be translated into English. If the operator challenges this requirement, ask for technical data to corroborate and justify any deviation. If the AIP notes that the aircraft overhaul is at 650 hours, verify that there is data and documentation. See Overhaul Calendar Limitations below. Additional Information: For example, in the Hungarian Air Force, by 1993, the overhaul had been raised to 650 hours under 1 0% extension program. It was not arbitrary. Some references (Bulgarian AF) note 800 hours as the overhaul period for the MiG-21bis, but data is needed to accept this. Ask whether the aircraft was overhauled by Aerostar in Romania. This is important because the company supports the Romanian AF MiG-21 fleet, the largest NATO operator of the MiG-21. It also overhauled and upgraded Croatian AF MiG-21s. For example in 2003, it upgraded 12 MiG-21s (MiG-21bis and MiG-21UM) for an $8.2 million. Such an overhaul, if properly documented, enhances the overall safety of the aircraft.
71.
Maintenance Responsibilities
72.
Misrepresentations of MiG-21 Overhaul and Condition
73.
Depot Level Maintenance and Overhaul (450 Hours) (General)
74.
Depot Level Maintenance and Overhaul (300 Hours)
75.
Depot Level Maintenance and Overhaul (650 Hours) Extension
76.
Aerostar Overhaul
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
77.
Bulgarian Air Force Life Extension and Ex-Bulgarian Air Force MiG-21s
Ask whether the aircraft was subjected to the Bulgarian Air Force life extension program (limited) in 20012002. If such a program was conducted on the particular aircraft, verify that it is properly documented in the original documentation. This is important because the Bulgarian Air Force conducted a limited life extension program (two months in duration) on some of its MiG-21bis in 2001-2002 in an attempt to keep the aircraft operational until 2007. Note: Many of the Bulgarian MiG-21bis were delivered new in 1983. This life extension program was limited in nature and cannot be compared to other factory-sanctioned programs which may extend the life of the aircraft well beyond its usual life limit from around 1,500 hours to 2,000 or even 3,000 hours. Note: In early 2000, these aircraft were reported as rapidly approaching [life expiration] and so the aircraft will require some upgrade work to be of significant use. Macedonian MiGs, (February 2000). If the aircraft in question is an Ex-Polish Air Force MiG-21, ensure that the AIP is based on the most recent applicable guidance and records by the Polish Air Force under NATO standards. The records for these aircraft are likely to be those issued by the Polish Military Property Agency (AMW), which disposes of all military equipment and armament withdrawn from Polish service. Poland joined NATO in 1999, and the MiG-21 was operated until December 2003. These aircraft had been stored outdoors since then, and their condition is unknown, and will need specific consideration. Stock MiG-21 guidance that is used for previous and earlier Soviet MiG-21s may not likely be acceptable for the maintenance of these aircraft. Additional Information: Also relevant is that the condition of these aircraft may have been misrepresented. In advertising its MiG-21s, an US operator noted the MiG-21bis is the last aircraft produced in the series and are extremely supportable. Considering the aircraft type is still in service among militaries around the globe, there is no shortage of spare parts and support. This ensures the ongoing supportability and safety of our low-time fleet of Mikoyan MiG-21 fighters. http://drakenintl.com/mig-21-2. However, it is known that Polish Air Force and Polish Navy MiG-21s were retired, in great part, due to insufficient funds for overhaul and purchase of additional spare parts, which had already grounded some aircraft(Polish MiG-21s Retired, April 2004) and that in 2002 the operational life of the majority of the MiG-21 is due to expire by the end of 2003 (Ciszek, Posnanian Fishbeds, 2002. A review of the disposal of Polish Air Force MiG-21s noted that a number of MiG21Rs, MiG-21MFs, and MiG-21UMs are stored at the base [Poznan-Krzesiny] and due to be [disposed]Sadly, none of the Fishbeds in storage could be restored to flying condition. Ciszek, Posnanian Fishbeds. More recently, a January 2013 FAA inspection of several ex-Polish Air Force MiG-21s being imported into the US noted that ... the aircraft were in bad shape and it appears that the aircraft were not in a flyable status before they were taken apart. This was evident due to the amount of corrosion found throughout the aircraft surface.Basically; everything looked very old and junky. Note: Although 7 ex-Polish AF MiG-21s (MiG-21bis and MiG-21UM) were delivered to the Ugandan AF in 2004-2005, these were refurbished and upgraded by IAI The aircraft had been stored at the WZL-3 factory at Deblin, Poland since 1999, but refurbishment in Poland has not been documented. Another 18 aircraft (likely not overhauled) were delivered to Vietnam in 20042005. These were likely MiG-21bis, MiG-21MF, and MiG-21 UMs. If the aircraft in question is an Ex-Romanian AF MiG-21 Lancer, ensure that the AIP is based on the most recent guidance by the Romanian AF under NATO standards. See Romanian MiG-21 Lancer (General) above. Ask if the aircraft was overhauled or upgraded by Nizhny Novgorod Aircraft Building Plant SOKOL (JSC NAZ SOKOL, aka ANPK-Sokol), Russia. If this is the case, request and review the related documentation (in English) concerning the inspection requirements for the aircraft, and the data concerning any upgrades. This type of data may be needed to establish the proper baseline, including demilitarization. Additional Information: SOKOL advertises the upgrading of MIG-21bis aircraft, which includes the replacement of avionics and equipping with modern combat armament and systems. As part of this process, all of the main aircraft systems are subject to upgrading, including power supply system, fuel system, air-conditioning system, air cooling system, and powerplant. See http://www.sokolplant.ru/en/spravka.shtml. Ask whether the aircraft was overhauled by Tkl-based DAC (Danubian Aircraft Company) in Hungary. This is important because the company supported the Hungarian AF MiG-21 fleet, and was a NATO operator of the MiG-21. Over the years, this company conducted over 500 MiG-21 overhauls. If the aircraft in question has had a DAC overhaul before disposal, and if properly documented, it would enhance the overall safety. Additional Information: Over the years, this company conducted over 500 MiG-21 overhauls. If the aircraft in question has had a DAC overhaul before disposal, and if properly documented, it would enhance the overall safety of the aircraft. This is particularly true if the aircraft is one of the last MiG-21UM and MiG-21bis disposed by the Hungarian AF in the early 2000s, and these still had some operational life remaining.
78.
Ex-Polish Air Force MiG-21s
79.
Ex-Romanian MiG-21 Lancer
80.
Sokol Upgraded Fighter MiG-21bis
81.
Danubian Aircraft Company Overhaul
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
82.
PAC Overhaul (F-7)
If the aircraft is a Chinese F-7, ask whether the aircraft was overhauled by Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC). This is important because the company supports the Pakistan Air Force F-7 fleet. Such an overhaul, if properly documented, enhances the overall safety of the aircraft. Ask if the aircraft was overhauled in the Czech Republic by LOK (Aviation Repair Plant) at Praha-Kbely. This state-owned company provided MiG-21 services. If this is the case, request and review the related documentation (in English) and how it compares with the inspection requirements for the aircraft in terms of hours and calendar times for example. The proper baseline needs to be established.
83.
LOK MiG-21 Overhaul
Additional Information: For example, in 2002, the company overhauled the last Czech Air Force MiG-21MFN, which was retired in 2004/2005 because they were time-expired. Note: A LOK overhaul is not an equivalent of a factory refurbishment, life extension, or zero time. Note: In 2005, 5 MiG-21MFs and 1 MiG-21UM may have been overhauled by LOK after being retired by the Czech AF and re-delivered to an unspecified West African country. Ask if the aircraft was overhauled in the Ukraine by Odesaviaremservice Odessa Aircraft Repair Enterprise (OARS), in the Ukraine. This company provides MiG-21 services for many of the former Soviet republics and other customers that still operate the aircraft. If this is the case, request and review the related documentation (in English) and how it compares with the inspection requirements for the aircraft in terms of hours and calendar times for example. The proper baseline needs to be established. Additional Information: For example, in 2011, the company overhauled Yemen AF MiG-21bis aircraft and several Egyptian AF MiG-21UMs. This company undertakes overhauls, life extensions, on-condition repairs (to standards), upgrade programs for airframe, engine, and avionics. Ask if the aircraft was overhauled in the Ukraine by Ukrainian Air Force Aviatsionnti Remont Zavod (ARZ Aircraft Repair Works), Lviv, Ukraine. This state factory provided MiG-21 services to the Ukrainian AF (last documented in 2005-2006) when the MiG-21UM was still operational in 2005-2006. If this is the case, request and review the related documentation (in English) and how it compares with the inspection requirements for the aircraft in terms of hours and calendar times for example. The proper baseline needs to be established. Ask if the aircraft was overhauled by VRZ Kahn Asparukh in Bulgaria. This company provided MiG-21 services for the Bulgarian Air Force and took over MiG-21 maintenance in 1990. If this is the case, request and review the related documentation (in English) and how it compares with the inspection requirements for the aircraft in terms of hours and calendar times for example. The proper baseline needs to be established. Ask if the aircraft was overhauled by VTRZ (Vazduhoplovno Techniki Remonti Zavod) at Zmaj, in Velika Gorica, near Zagreb (now Croatia). R-11, R-13, and R-25 engines were overhauled at the VTRZ Orao facility in Rajlovac, Sarajevo. This company provided MiG-21 services for the Yugoslav Air Force and other foreign air forces well into the early 1990s. If this is the case, request and review the related documentation (in English) and how it compares with the inspection requirements for the aircraft in terms of hours and calendar times for example. The proper baseline needs to be established. Additional Information: Many ex-Croatian AF and ex-Serbian, and ex-Republika Srpska MiG-21s have been in outdoor storage at Velika Gorica since 2004, and photographic evidence shows their condition to be marginal. See Ex-Serbia and Montenegro Air Force MiG-21s above. Ask if the aircraft was overhauled by Yugoslav Aircraft Repair Center (YARC) Moma Stanojlovic at BelgradeBatajnica. This company provided MiG-21 services for the Yugoslav Air Force and other foreign air forces well into the early 1990s. In fact, in 1998, the Moma facilities overhauled several Iraqi air force MiG-21s that were not delivered. If this is the case, request and review the related documentation (in English) and how it compares with the inspection requirements for the aircraft in terms of hours and calendar times for example. The proper baseline needs to be established. Additional Information: Many ex-Yugoslav AF MiG-21s have been in outdoor storage and photographic evidence shows their condition to be marginal. See Ex-Serbia and Montenegro Air Force MiG-21s above. Ask if the aircraft (airframe & engine) was overhauled (Main Overhaul or MO, Depot Level) in at TEREM GEORGI BENKOVSKI (Aircraft Repair Plant), Plovdiv, Bulgaria, previously known as VRZ Kahn Asparukh. If this is the case, request and review the related documentation (in English) and how it compares with the inspection requirements for the aircraft in terms of hours and calendar times for example. This will assist in establishing the proper baseline. A MiG-21 main overhaul (MO) is a lengthy process, up to 3 months, and cost $1 million. The last TEREM overhauled took place in 2002.
84.
Odesaviaremservice (Ukraine) MiG-21 Overhaul
85.
Ukrainian Air Force Aviatsionnti Remont Zavod (ARZ) (Aircraft Repair Works)
86.
VRZ Kahn Asparukh MiG-21 Overhaul
87.
Yugoslav/Croatia VTRZ Overhaul
88.
Yugoslav YARC Overhaul
89.
Bulgarian Overhaul (Depot Level) by TEREM
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
It should not be assumed that Chinese J-7 or F-7 parts or components are necessarily interchangeable with Soviet MiG-21. A Chinese J-7 may look like a Soviet MiG-21F, but is not. It should not be assumed that because there may have been a certain level of commonality between earlier MiG types (such as the MiG-15) between Soviet and Chinese variants that those similarities apply to the MiG-21/J-7 relationship. 90. Chinese J-7/F-7 Parts Additional Information: For the most part, Chinese parts and Soviet parts are not interchangeable. Although originally the Soviet Union did grant license to the Chinese for MiG-21 production, the transfer of technical data appears to have been incomplete. In addition, political tensions minimized the needed level of Soviet support early in the J-7 program. As a result, many technical aspects of the aircraft, including manufacturing techniques, were changed. The AIP should address this important issue and (1) properly document any such use, and (2) the necessary technical data in support of such use. Ask whether the aircraft was overhauled by Aerostar in Romania. This is important because the company supports the Romanian AF MiG-21 fleet, the largest NATO operator of the MiG-21. It also overhauled and upgraded Croatian AF MiG-21s. Additional Information: For example in 2003, it upgraded 12 MiG-21s (MiG-21bis and MiG-21UM) for an $8.2 million. Such an overhaul, if properly documented, enhances the overall safety of the aircraft. Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) in India manufactures and supplies the entire range of spares required for first and second-line servicing of certain MiG-21 aircraft at the IAF bases. Canopies, flexible rubber fuel tanks, main and nose undercarriages, ejection seats, and ground support equipment are examples. Additional Information: The use of the parts, along with their documentation, will likely be acceptable in some MiG-21 operations, depending on version and variant. In addition to other suppliers, especially in Eastern Europe, HAL may provide an alternative that will be acceptable. See http://hal-india.com. Ask if the aircraft was overhauled or upgraded by TASA (Tbilisi Aviation State Association) in Georgia (Georgia Republic), which was the main manufacturing facility for MiG-21U two-seaters. If so, request and review the related documentation (in English). This type of data may be needed to establish the proper baseline. Verify major changes conform to the applicable guidance (i.e., NATO) and do not create an unsafe condition, and determine whether new operating limitations may be required within the scope and intent of 21.93. Additional Information: In addition, the information contained in appendix A to part 43 can be used as an aid. Refer to Potential Reversion Back to Phase I above. Ensure the AIP follows the applicable requirements, as appropriate (i.e., NATO), concerning inspections. For example, under USAF standards, the proper reference is the most current version of MiG-21 NATO-6-1, (Aircraft Scheduled Inspection, and Maintenance Requirements) or equivalent. Additional Information: This is important when developing an inspection program under 91.409. The inspection program must comply with both hourly and calendar inspection schedules. The only modifications to the military AIP should be related to the removal of military equipment and weapons. Deletions should be properly documented and justified. A part 43, 100-hour, 12-month inspection program is not adequate. Ensure the AIP clearly defines who can return the aircraft to service and provides minimum criteria for this authority. Follow the intent and scope of 43.5, Approval for return to service after maintenance, preventive maintenance, rebuilding, or alteration; and 43.7, Persons authorized to approve aircraft, airframes, aircraft engines, propellers, appliances, or component parts for return to service after maintenance, preventive maintenance, rebuilding, or alteration. Ask if the aircraft was overhauled by Yugoslav Aircraft Repair Center (YARC) Moma Stanojlovic at BelgradeBatajnica. This company provided MiG-21 services for the Yugoslav Air Force and other foreign air forces well into the early 1990s. Today, it supports the Serbian Air Force. In fact, in 1998, the Moma facilities overhauled several Iraqi air force MiG-21bis aircraft that were not delivered. If this is the case, request and review the related documentation (in English) and how it compares with the inspection requirements for the aircraft in terms of hours and calendar times for example. The proper baseline needs to be established. Additional Information: Many ex-Yugoslav AF MiG-21s have been in outdoor storage and photographic evidence shows their condition to be marginal. See Ex-Serbia and Montenegro Air Force MiG-21s above.
91.
Aerostar Overhaul
92.
HAL Spare Parts & Logistics
93.
TASA Overhaul
94.
Modifications
95.
Adequate Maintenance Schedule and Program (i.e., MiG-21 NATO -6-1 T.O.)
96.
Return to Service
97.
Yugoslav YARC Overhaul
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
98.
Ex-Croatian Air Force MiG-21UMD
Ask whether the aircraft is an ex-Croatian AF MiG-21UMD. In 2002-2003, Aerostar (Romania) upgraded Croatias MiG-21s to the MiG-21UMD standard, which gave the aircraft another 10 years of airframe life. If this is the case, verify that there adequate documentation to validate the aircrafts origin and, times, and condition. Ask whether the aircraft is an ex-Laotian AF MiG-21s (PFM, MF, bis, and UM). In 2006, these aircraft were in open storage at the Xieng Khouang Air Base, in a humid and tropical environment. For this reason, caution is advised specially with regards to documentation and any work performed before and after storage. The AIP and related documentation needs to provide for the adequate conversion of all metric units (i.e., charts, tables) used in the aircraft, its maintenance, and operations. Below is a sample conversion chart.
99.
Ex-Laotian AF MiG-21s
100.
Metric Conversions
For more specific conversions, see http://www.wsdot.wa.gov/Reference/metrics/.
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Provided that adequate technical data is part of any proposal for an alternative, RCM or Reliability Centered Maintenance, may be considered for certain items covered in the aircrafts AIP. With RCM the owner/operator continually analyzes aircraft conformity and airworthiness through surveillance and analysis and makes adjustments to the equipments inspections and maintenance planning based on data. There must be data. Additional Information: With the adoption of RCM for certain components, the owner/operator of the aircraft, can continually adjust any program elements for operational safety and reliability and is evolving the inspections into a maintenance program by continually monitoring what needs to be inspected or replace at different times or in different ways or perhaps not at all. RCM is a program that needs to be properly documented and not a shallow determination that a particular inspection is not needed or an item need not be replaced. Moving to a RCM-based approach includes 4 objectives: (1) meet the designed safety and reliability expectations of the equipment, (2) restore safety and reliability to their required levels when deterioration of this has occurred, (3) obtain information needed for design improvement of items with reliability that is inadequate, and (4) compare these total costs and operational benefits with the former inspection program. RCM is based on: o o o o o o o o 101. Reliability-Centered Maintenance (RCM) A failure is an unsatisfactory condition; consequences of a functional failure determine the priority of maintenance effort; Safety Possible loss of equipment and occupants; Hidden-failure Multiple failures, resulting from undetected failure of a hidden function; Scheduled maintenance Required Failure could have safety consequences; Scheduled maintenance Required Failure not evident to the operating crew; Safety Consequences Reduced by the use of redundancy; Hidden functions Made evident by instrumentation or design features; Feasibility Effectiveness of scheduled maintenance depend on inspect ability;
Inherent reliability of equipment is the level of reliability achieved with an effective maintenance program. This level is established by the design of each item and the manufacturers processes that produced it. Scheduled maintenance can ensure that the inherent reliability of each item is achieved, but no form of maintenance supported by inspection and engineering data can yield reliability beyond that inherent in the design. A RCM program includes only what satisfies the criteria for applicability and effectiveness in terms of Applicability (determined by the characteristics of the item), and Effectiveness (defined by the consequences the task is designed to prevent). On-condition is also addressed, but data is used to determine and correct potential failures. Rework and overhaul, is an item at or before a specified limit, and has to be incorporated. Discard (an item at or before some specified life limit), and Failure-Finding (failures that occurred but not evident to the operator), are also part of a RCM program. The RCM includes Simple Items, which is one that is subject to very few failure modes, and frequently shows a decrease in reliability with increasing operational age or cycles, and Complex Items, which are those one whose failure may result from many different failure modes, shows little or no decrease in overall reliability with increasing age unless there is a dominant failure mode. RCM tasks are based on 1) Consequences of each type of failure; 2) Visibility of a functional failure to the operating crew (evidence a failure occurred); 3) Visibility or evidence a failure is imminent; 4) Age-cycle reliability characteristics of each item; 5) Tradeoff between scheduled maintenance criteria and sampling, and life limiting items; 6) Multiple failure Consequences that would not be caused by any one individual failure; and 7) Default strategy Provides for conservative initial decisions, revised with operating experience. 8) Finally, RCM programs must be dynamic. The operating organization must be prepared to collect and respond to real data throughout the operational life of the equipment. This requires surveillance and analysis of the performance of each item under actual operating conditions to determine refinements and modifications to the program and to determine needs for product improvements.
102.
Overhaul Calendar Limitations
Verify that the AIP makes references to the overhaul limitations, that is, (1) a maximum of two overhauls in the aircrafts service life, and (2) overhaul limit at 10 years. The 10 year limit reefers to the need to have an overhaul performed regardless of hours flown.
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Verify that the AIP includes the required inspections for the MiG-21. Additional Information: Required inspections include: Daily inspection; 25-Hour servicing; 50-Hour inspection; 100-Hour inspection; 200-Hour inspection; Annual (12 months) inspection; Time required inspections and replacements (see below); Recommended: Every 10 hours;
103.
Required Inspections
Verify compliance with required replacement intervals (replacement and overhaul) as outlined in appropriate and most current military inspection guidance. Ask the applicant/operator for source data validating that guidance. 104. Airframe, Engine, and Component Replacement Intervals Additional Information: If components are not replaced per the military guidance, ask for data to justify extensions. Applicants should establish and record time-in-service for all life-limited components and verify compliance with approved life limits. Set time limits for overrun of intervals and track cycles. Evaluate any overruns of inspection or maintenance intervals. Examples include, but limited to fuel pumps, hydraulic pumps, pressure tanks, booster, bladder fuel tanks, generators, pyrotechnics, valves, and actuators. CAUTION: Verify that any on condition item is not replacing a required life-limit or replacement 105. On Condition Inspections Additional Information: Adhere to the military/manufacturer program and/or provide adequate data to justify that practice for the applicable part or component if on condition inspections are considered. On condition must reference an applicable standard (that is, inspect the NR-21F fuel pump to an acceptable reference standard, not just it has been working so far). Each on condition inspection must state acceptable parameters. On condition inspections are not appropriate for all parts and components. Verify the AIP follows the applicable requirements (i.e., NATO) in terms of inspection tasks. It is imperative that no inspection tasks required by the military standard are removed, unless they are weapon system related. 106. Missing Inspection Tasks Additional Information: If any non-weapons system tasks are removed, there should be adequate justification, and it cannot be solely cost-related. There have been several cases where an AIP did not conform to the applicable military standard and tasks were removed without adequate justification, not because they are not needed, but because the operator cannot or does not want to pay for it. Verify that the AIP addresses cannibalization. This is likely to be an issue due to the chronic shortage of MiG21 spare parts, the number of non-flyable examples in the US, and most affecting those operators with more than one MiG-21. Unlike what some applicants may state, Soviet spare parts for the MiG-21 are very difficult to obtain, and this was already an issue for many of the Warsaw pact countries in the 1990s. There is no OEM support that an be validated. Additional Information: Cannibalization is a common practice for several former military aircraft operators and service providers. It is common in MiG-21s. In the case of the MiG-21 as with other Soviet types, cannibalization can be exacerbated by the fact that the Soviets replaced a significant number of spare parts with spare sub-assemblies. Operationally, this complicates the replacement of a failed component, but also encourages further brake down of the component from its sub-assembly often with inadequate documentation. The extent to which it takes place is not necessarily an issue, but keeping adequate records of the transfers, uses, and condition is. In 2001, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) published its findings on cannibalization of aircraft by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD). It found cannibalizations have several adverse impacts. They increase maintenance costs by increasing workloads and create unnecessary mechanical problems for maintenance personnel. The GAO also found that with the exception of the Navy, the services do not consistently track the specific reasons for cannibalizations. In addition, a U.S. Navy study found cannibalizations are sometimes done because mechanics are not trained well enough to diagnose problems or because testing equipment is either not available or not working. Because some view cannibalization as a symptom of spare parts shortages, it is not closely analyzed, in that other possible causes or concerted efforts to measure the full extent of the practice are not made. See Safety Implications of Spare Parts Shortage below. Also see Parts Fabrication below.
107.
Cannibalization and Spare Parts
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Verify that the drag chute is inspected and maintained as per the applicable guidance and the AIP reflects that installation. It is a critical safety of flight issue and needs to be inspected and maintained by trained personnel as per the applicable technical guidance and with adequate logbook entries. This includes re-packing after use, and those tasks properly documented. Known failures are: fuse pin failure, entangled lines (inadequate packing and inspection), and release mechanism failure (cable, door). Drag Chute (General) Additional Information: Repacking and re-installation of the drag chute is not a responsibility to be allocated to untrained personnel, and is not, as some operators have accepted a pilot responsibility, normally accomplished as part of the preflight inspection and not logged in the maintenance records. There are cases in US civil use (one in 1994) where the drag chute failed because the drag chute fuse stitching failed after deployment, causing the chute to separate. In 2012 a drag chute failure resulted in an overrun. There should be adequate technical data to validate the installation. The drag chute system includes the PT-12UK chute container mounted in the tail. In some earlier MiG-21s, the drag chute installation had an opening composed of twin-doors in the fuselage underside. This allowed the streaming of the chute, which pulled the cable from an under- fuselage channel, with stowage in the ventral fin, to which the end of the cable was attached. See Approved Drag Chute and Drag Chute Technical Guidance below. Verify that the drag chute installed in the aircraft is actually an approved type. Additional Information: Depending on the version of the aircraft, examples include: the PT-5759-58 (16 m2), PT-5281-62 (19 m2). Depending on version and variant, drag chute containers may include the PT-21U, PT21UT, and PT-21K (i.e., on late production MiG-21PF and MiG-21PFM) containers. The required technical guidance must be available and in English. The Chinese J-7 drag chute system differs from the Soviet type. For example, the parachute container is different. The MiG-21 had a drag chute container with a parabolic rear end that was split vertically to form both forms, while the Chinese fighters container was closed by a onepiece hemispherical fairing hinged at the top. A recent update from a MiG-21 restoration in the US points to several of the safety issues surrounding the drag chute in the MiG-21, especially when the applicable technical guidance is lacking: One of the things our MiG-21 was decidedly lacking was a drag parachute. Even with the new extension, lengthening the Lancaster Airport runway to 6,500 feet, stopping the MiG-21 without rapidly going through brakes and tires is going to take a little extra workWe looked around for parachute sources and, out of curiosity, checked with the importer that brings in things for the Nanchang CJ-6A. Since the Chinese make a MiG-21 copy, the J-7, it stood to reason that drag parachutes might be available at a reasonable price. To everyones surprise, he discovered that J-7 parts are even more plentiful than are CJ-6A parts. Eventually a box with a military looking bag and some funny nylon umbrellas showed up. Fortunately, the bag came with instructions... in Chinese. Step by step instructions were included for assembling the 14 individual pieces of the MiG-21 drag parachute. The system consists of a container bag into which a hook mechanism on a plate fills the base end. A 5 meter multi-part braided line then connects to the plate. The lines are covered with a protective canvas sleeve. One of the reasons that drag parachutes are hard to find in Eastern Europe is that the braided line makes an excellent tow rope for pulling cars. This line then connects to the base of the parachute itself. At each connection point, a canvas sleeve with drawstrings protects the parachute components from chafing on the runway. We were pleased that a completely new parachute set like the one wed acquired came with several extra protective sleeves. Last, but not least, a drag chute drogue chute connects to the top of the parachute to assist in deployment. The inner sleeve of the drogue houses a spring that leaps out into the world and pulls the main chute behind it. It is interesting to see the ratio of various spares... the kit came with three drogues; the drogue must take a lot of abuse. We havent acquired one of these machines but were told that its possible to manually pack the parachute into the housing bag with a little effort. The parachute is deployed manually by the pilot upon landing with a push of a button in the cockpit. The housing in the tail opens and pneumatic pressure opens the clamshell in the tail to let the drogue chute leap out into the world. After slowing to a speed where the parachute is no longer effective, a second button releases the chute to be picked up by ground crew. A final picture shows the parachute tied into the bag with a holding pin that keeps it all together until its been placed in the aircraft and armed. http://blog.cwam.org. Verify that, on the issue of the drag chute, the AIP provides for the correct documentation and records keeping. 110. USAF T.O. 00-25-241 (Chute Logs and Records) Additional Information: USAF T.O. 00-25-241, Parachute Logs, and Records, February 1, 1997, Change 2, July 15, 1999, can be used if no other acceptable process is provided. The purpose of this technical order is to explain how to prepare, replace, and dispose of AF T.O. Form 391, Parachute Log, and AF T.O. Form 392, Parachute Repack, Inspection and Component Record which are used to log and record parachute information. The use of these forms is highly recommended.
108.
109.
Approved Drag Chute
Page 3-24
Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Verify that the technical guidance concerning the installation, maintenance and repacking of the drag chute and its systems (not just the chute itself). The required technical guidance is available and must be in English. Drag Chute and Systems Technical Guidance Additional Information: Relevant technical guidance includes: MiG-21 Inspection references (Soviet Air Force); J-7/F-7 Inspection references (China); NATO standards (the system is used by several NATO countries, i.e., Romania); USAF T.O 391 and 392; USAF T.O. 00-25-241 (see below). MS 21249A, Military Standard: Handle, Control, Aircraft Drag Chute, September 7, 1987.
111.
In addition to the military guidance, and for the purpose of being able to ascertain if a poorly documented drag chute maintenance, inspection, and packing, civil standards may be consulted. Additional Information: Since 1971, the FAA has certificated several aircraft, such as the Learjet 24, Learjet 25, Learjet 28, Learjet 31, and Learjet 35/36 with optional drag chutes. The system was also available in some Learjet Series 50 aircraft and in the Falcon 20 (i.e. FedEx Falcon 20). As a result, there are FAA civil standards for this type of system, as well as maintenance procedures. In addition, there have been accidents where the malfunction of the system took place, and in some cases, failure of the drag chute contributed to the accident as a result of non-compliance with the prescribed maintenance and inspection procedures. Relevant guidance on civil drag chutes includes: 112. Civil Drag Chute Guidance Learjet 31 Airplane Flight Manual; Learjet FAA Approved Drag Chute AFM Supplement; Learjet Process Specification, LES-FT-1244, Drag Chute, Model 24, 25, 28, 29, 35 & 36; Learjet Process Specification, LES 1237 Drag Chute Packing, Inspection & Storage ; Learjet Process Specification, LES-FT-1219, Rigging, Fitting of M 55 Drag Chute System; NTSB Accident Report NYC07LA087, March 26, 2007, Learjet 36A, N527PA. Other accidents include: o ERA09LA282 Falcon - chute failed to deploy; o DFW05LA030 Falcon - no pilot action to deploy chute; o FTW03FA229 LJ25 - The drag chute was found partially deployed in the tail cone area; o NYC89FA085 Falcon - chute failed to deploy; o FTW98LA334 C500 - drag chute separated;
113.
Appendix G to 14 CFR Part 23
Recommend appendix G to part 23 be used as a tool (not a requirement) because it can assist in the review of the applicants proposed AIP and associated procedures and sets a good baseline for any review. Additional Information: NATO guidance should also contain instructions for the continued airworthiness of the aircraft. Appendix G to part 23 covers instructions for continued airworthiness. Recommend the adoption of a risk management system that reprioritizes high-risk maintenance actions in terms of (a) immediate action, (b) urgent action, and (c) routine action. Also refer to Recordkeeping, Tracking Discrepancies, and Corrective Action, below. Verify engineering (that is, Designated Engineering Representative) data supports any part fabrication by maintenance personnel. References to the original manufacturer should be provided. Unfortunately, many modifications are made without adequate technical and validation data.
114.
Prioritize Maintenance Actions
115.
Parts Fabrication
Additional Information: AC 43.18, Fabrication of Aircraft Parts by Maintenance Personnel, may be used as guidance. This is important because the Indian Air Force high MiG-21 accident rate has been traced, in part, to spare parts manufactured locally needed to keep MiG-21s operational, and many of these parts were not manufactured to specifications. See Cannibalization and Spare Parts above. Check applicant recordkeeping. The scope and content of 43.9, 43.11, and 91.417 are acceptable. Recommend the use the USAF Form 781 process (or NAVAIR MAF, or RAF Form 700) to help verify an acceptable level of continued operational safety (COS) for the aircraft. Additional Information: Three types of maintenance discrepancies can be found inside USAF Form 781: (1) an informational, that is, a general remark about a problem that does not require mitigation; (2) a red slash for a potentially serious problem; and (3) a red X highlighting a safety of flight issue that could result in an unsuccessful flight and/or loss of aircraftno one should fly the aircraft until the issue is fixed. For more information on recordkeeping, refer to AC 43-9, Maintenance Records.
116.
Recordkeeping, Tracking Discrepancies, and Corrective Action
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
It is essential to considered spare parts availability part of the AIP and the operation and maintenance of the aircraft as a whole. Current MiG-21 operators continue to suffer from a severe shortage of spare parts for the aircraft. This was already a well-documented issue in 1993 for many of the former Soviet Bloc countries soon after the Collapse of the Soviet Union. In fact, as early as 1992, the Hungarian Air Force predicted maintenance issue due to the shortage of MiG-21 spares from the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States). It is true for all of the NATO MiG-21 operators today, more so for other operators with less than sufficient funding. The issue is not just funding, but also OEM support. In civil use, this had been a serious issue ever since the first MiG-21 operated in the US in 1990. Additional Information: In fact, Warbird groups and forums constantly make reference to the lack of spare parts. This, in turn, leads to serious safety shortcomings, including the likelihood not to replace a time limited item, and use unapproved parts with undocumented origin. In addition, some parts are fabricated, but there is no evidence of conformity or basic DER data to the originals specifications. All combined, these present a serious drawback to ensuring the airworthiness of the aircraft. See Parts Fabrication below. Note: There are companies in the US that advertise MiG-21 spare parts support. For example, the ISO Group (Defense and Aerospace Sustainment Partner) notes that it provides military aviation spare parts, components, and MRO solutions for the MiG-21 and all variants. ISO Group has experience in the MiG-21 Engine Assemblies, Rotables, Consumables, Avionics, Hardware, Landing Gear, Electrical Assemblies, Fasteners, and Structural Assemblies.. http://www.iso-group.com/sustainment/military-aircraft/MIG-21/. A sample spare parts listing for a recent MiG-21U for sale included:

117. Safety Implications of Spare Parts Shortage
5 Main Tires and 2 Nose Tires ; One Engine Driven Fuel Pump NR-21F ; 4 Main Brake Sets ; 2 Nose Brake Sets ; 2 Main Wheels ; 1 Nose Wheel ; 1 Drop Tank ; 2 Ordinance Pylons ; 2 Missile Rails ; 10 Used but Serviceable Main Tires and a Custom Canopy Cover.
Source: http://www.aso.com/listings/spec/ViewAd.aspx?id=141764. Another MiG-21 for sale is advertised with the following: Manuals including, but not limited to POH, Performance, Technical Description Manuals (TDMs) for entire plane and engine; Manuals for inspections of airframe components including weapons/fire control; All logbooks for engine(s) and airframe from date of manufacturer; Current A/F and Engine logs with US FAA Approved MTX Program; All plugs, covers, gust lock and chocks and tow bar; Engine (R-11F2SK-300) complete with A/B assembly and nozzle control ring (currently in a hangar in Detroit, MI); 14 main tires, 9 nose; 2 retreaded mainsas yet uninstalled and tested for wheel well clearance; 1 complete set NOS tires mounted on wheels and ready for installation; 4 ea. KT-92b main wheel brakes, and 2 ea. KT-102 nose wheel brakes; 4 packed landing drag chutes (one is in the jet) including repacking cylinder, mallet and hydraulic pressure; 1 engine driven hydraulic pump; 1 emergency hydraulic pump (new brushes); 1 Starter/Gen. (new brushes); 2 A/B relay control boxes; Misc. ejection seat/headrest spares; Crew cockpit O-2 regulator; Battery start cart and new batteries (March 2009), charger installed; Metric tools; APU-7 missile rails; 490 l. Belly tank; PPK-1 Anti-G trousers; Hydraulic mule hoses with compatible adapters to service hydraulic system w/o starting engine.
Source: http://www.controller.com/listingsdetail/aircraft-for-sale/MIKOYAN-MIG-21-UM/1973-MIKOYANMIG-21-UM/1150503.htm.
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
The following is a sample list of MiG-21 spare parts. It is provided here as background. Additional Information:
Pos. 2 4 6 8 14 19 21 23 24 27 28 29 30 31 32 FG-11 4SN1 GA 184U GSR-ST1200WT ASP-5ND 2323-A 37039770 37169745 40 22 AT 520 676400M 698 800 723900-6AT 861400-055 8D2.966 0225 DP1-9M DW-15 GA-59 IKDRDA-830-520-0 KR26-1W2 & KR26-A KT 100 MA250KM MDD-TE1-780 MM-40 s1 MP 100-M SG 1F UA 27 UP 24 UP22 WS-1T DT-1 AWD 7-44-5 5505-1-75 CK3-9105-222 Part No. MPRF-1A Chip detector RPM Transmitter Engine Start Control Box Gaskets KM-1 (Various) Gaskets Pyromechanism Canopy Testing Device for Canopy Pyro Cylinder Hydraulic Filter Electromagnetic Hydraulic Valve Starter Generator Gun sight (museum purpose only) Turbo Cooler Engine Casing Part Combustion Chamber Jet Nozzle Metal Electro Valve Cockpit Pressure Regulation Valve Emergency Valve Electro Valve Non Return Valve Safety Valve Fuel Accumulator Filter Element G-Force Transmitter Altitude Transmitter Hydraulic Switch-over Valve Main/Emergency Pressure Relay Oxygen Reducer Valves Nose Wheel with Brake Oxygen Manometer Transmitter Manometer Electro Mechanism Potentiometer Inertia Switch Brake Valve Valve Description Landing Light Assembly Aircraft Type MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21
118.
Sample MiG-21 Spare Parts
33 35 36 37 38 39 42 43 45 46 47 49 51 52 53 54 57 60 62 63
Source : http://aero-contact.com/mig-21/. Check for appropriate qualifications, licensing, and type-specific training of personnel engaged in managing, supervising, and performing aircraft maintenance functions and tasks. 119. Qualifications of Maintenance Personnel The NTSB has found the use of non-certificated mechanics with this type of aircraft has been a contributing factor to accidents. Only FAA-certificated repair stations and FAA-certificated mechanics with appropriate ratings as authorized by 43.3 perform maintenance on this aircraft. Previous military experience in certain areas, i.e. engines, safety systems, needs to be considered. Recommend regular refresher training is provided to ground support, servicing, and maintenance personnel concerning the main safety issues surrounding servicing and flight line maintenance of the aircraft. Additional Information: Such a process should include a recurrent and regular review of the warnings, cautions, and notes listed in the appropriate technical manuals. Note: Ejection seat safety is paramount.
120.
Ground Support, Servicing, and Maintenance Personnel Recurrent Training
Page 3-27
Attachment 3
Issue(s)
121.
Parts Storage and Management and Traceability
Recommend establishing a parts storage program that includes traceability of parts. Additional Information: This is important in many cases because there is no original equipment manufacturer (OEM) support. Conduct a detailed inspection of maintenance records, as required by FAA Order 8130.2. Verify maintenance records reflect inspections, overhauls, repairs, time-in-service on articles, and engines. Ensure all records are current and appropriate technical data is referenced. This should not be a cursory review.
122.
Maintenance Records and Use of Tech Data
Additional Information: Maintenance records are commonly inadequate or incomplete for imported aircraft. In many cases involving MiG-21 aircraft, adequate records are essential because of the high likelihood that the aircraft and many of its components may have reached their life-limit. Many have absolutely no records describing its past military history. If the history of a life-limited component cannot be documented, it must be assumed to have reached its time/cycle limit. Verify whether the AIP addresses the aircrafts airframe limit, required overhauls (not the same), how total time is kept, and the status of any extension. Verify the appropriate data is available to consider an extension past the life limit for the airframe and wings. Verify that in addition to hourly times, the AIP addresses the required periodic inspections based on calendar time, i.e., the 24-moth periodic inspection. Verify that the AIP provides for the airframe overhaul at 300-350 hours depending on the MiG-21 version.
123.
Airframe Limitations and Durability (General) 24 Months Periodic Check
124.
125.
Airframe Overhaul at 300-350 Hours
Additional Information: For example, in East German Air Force service, this inspection was called pattern maintenance, and took place after 300-350 hours of flight. It was accomplished at depot level at VEB Flugzeugwerft Dresden (FWD). This inspection does not change the airframe life-limit. The MiG-21 is an aircraft that was designed with fatigue life limits as part of the process. Some of the airframes have a fatigue life (also referred to as service life) of 15-17 years or 1,500 hours, whichever came first. Any claim of airframe time above this mark needs to be verified and documented. The life remaining in an airframe is in fact a deciding point in the MiG-21 aircraft acquisition. Verify that the AIP is specific with regards to the airframe life-limit depending on the aircrafts type or (Izdeliye). Additional Information: Many of the MiG-21s acquired from former Soviet Bloc countries raise the issue of adequately determine the remaining utility life in the airframe. A simple claim that the aircraft has been overhauled or certified past the 1,500-hour limit is not sufficient. Additionally, various differences exist between aircraft; see Type 66, Type 96, and Type 75 MiG-21 Life-Limit and Other Types (Izdeliye) below. If the aircraft is a Type-66 MiG-21, verify whether the AIP addresses the aircrafts airframe limit (also referred to as service life) at 1,600 hours. If the aircraft is a Type-96 MiG-21, verify whether the AIP addresses the aircrafts airframe limit (also referred to as service life) at 1,500 hours. If the aircraft is a Type-75 MiG-21, verify whether the AIP addresses the aircrafts airframe limit (also referred to as service life) at 1,200 hours. Some references to the MiG-21bis note that the original service life of the MiG-21bis model was 2,400 hours or 30 years. If this claim is made, adequate data must be provided. If the aircraft has exceeded its life-limit, verify that any after-market airframe life-limit extensions, possibly up to 3,000 hours (as in the IAF MiG-21bis), includes adequate and approved documentation is required. There are no homemade extensions of de fact extensions because some other MiG-21 types or variants have had the extension performed. Additional Information: Although there is not homemade SLEP or Service Life Extension Program per se, there is manufacturers guidance. See MiG (Manufacturer) MiG-21 Life-Extension Bulletins and IAF MiG-21 Service Life Extension below. Note: Some references to the MiG-21UM note that the original service life of the aircraft was 3,000 hours or 30 years. If this claim is made, adequate data must be provided. If any extension to a life-limit is proposed, verify that the appropriate manufacturers Life Extension Bulletins (LEB) are available and followed.
126.
1,500 Hour (or 17 Years) Airframe Limit (General)
127.
Type (Izdeliye) 66 MiG-21 Life-Limit (Example) Type (Izdeliye) 96 MiG-21 Life-Limit (Example) Type (Izdeliye) 75 MiG-21 Life-Limit (Example)
128.
129.
130.
3,000 Hour Airframe Extension
131.
MiG (Manufacturer) MiG-21 Life-Extension Bulletins
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Verify that the AIP provides for the appropriate component nomenclature used in the MiG-21. Additional Information: This is necessary to avoid confusion, especially when US trained personnel are involved with unfamiliar terminology, designations, units, and components. It is also critical for handling spare parts. Examples of MiG-21F component nomenclature include: Fuse box 1A-115V; Front landing gear strut AYu, 3E-21; Turbo cooler KA-F; Electric motor F-37VT, 26v, 37 amps; Bell crank for stabilizer BU-51MS; Motor in vertical stabilizer (drives pump for elevator actuation) D-880T; Engine igniter control KNA-114M; Afterburner control unit KAF-13D-30ER; Afterburner ignition control KNA-114M; Emergency hydraulic pump NP-27T Series M; Main hydraulic pump NP34-2T; Compressed air bottle in wing K83D166; Engine fuel control relay DR-3A; Fuel indicator RTS-16-4; Relay regulator PT-5-56M; Fuel metering valve RTS-16A; Fuel flow meter RTO-13 (0-4 x 1,000 liters); Cabin pressure gage N17855; Electric motor for cooler Type 477D; EGT indicator TVG-1; Oxygen regulator KP-34; Oxygen pressure M-2000; Electrical control unit KNA-114M; 3-Position landing gear switch APN-45; Landing gear hydraulic valve GA-142/1; Hydraulic valve in nose well GS184U; Hydraulic cylinder in left landing gear door 3E-38; Hydraulic-electric valve in left landing gear well 5-4000116V; Pressure reducing valve for nose gear braking UP-24/1; Fuel or oil filter MKPT-9AF; Trim actuator MP-100MA Series 2; Trimmer ARU-3V; Voltage stabilizer in ignition circuit KP-50D; Electric motor in nose wheel well TR-115/36; Series resistor in ignition system AP 0.3; Piping in engine 4/63 72-6100-2200-2; Fire extinguisher NU63E97; Nitrogen bottle 3E-44; Nitrogen bottle 3D-26; Drag chute gun trigger 215P #303016; Shoulder harness adjust inertial lock 215P #303018; Main gear brakes UT23/2M1C; Nose wheel pneumatic cylinder 3A1048; Metering valve UP-24/1; Relay block RP-2 Series 2; G-Meter Mo-28A; Inertia transmitter 25M1; Automatic time control 1MB; Speed vs. altitude indicator ARU-3G; Voltmeter V-1;
132.
Appropriate Nomenclature
Page 3-29
Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Any claim that the MiG-21 has been cleared to a life-limit of 4,000 hours is not correct, and should not be accepted as part of any AIP proposal. 133. 4,000-Hour Life-Limit Additional Information: A life-limit extension to 4,000 hours was only a 1995 proposal by Sokol Nizhny Novgorod Aircraft Building Plant SOKOL (JSC NAZ SOKOL), Russia, and was not part of either the MiG-21-93 or MiG-21-98 upgrades. See Sokol Upgraded Fighter MiG-21bis above. If any extension of the airframes life limit is proposed, ask whether it is based on the extension project by Indian Air Force concerning the MiG-21bis service life extension program, handled by Indias National Aerospace Laboratories (NAL) until 2006. Additional Information: This program included full-scale fatigue testing. It was designed to extend the airframe life past 2,400 hours, possibly to 4,000 hours. However, fatigue cracks were experienced after only a further 1,000 hours of simulated flight time. In any event, if such claims are made, adequate data must be provided. In many cases operators have re-assembled aircraft, cleaning, checking, and servicing components as part of that process. It cannot be assumed that such work is equivalent to an overhaul or the equivalent of a Soviet Deport level refurbishment. As a result, all work accomplished for the re-assembly of the aircraft must be properly tagged or classified as such if it differs from required inspections per the applicable guidance. Additional Information: This is particularly important because some operators may classify, on their own, work on components as on condition and use that classification to later defer required inspections. That is not acceptable. Refer to On Condition Inspections above. The MiG-21, along with its powerplant (i.e., R-11 , R-13) had a very short service life, but in operational military use (combat ready), this was not an issue since the type was expected to remain with an operational unit for only a limited number of hours before a major, depot-level overhaul was required. This was common Soviet philosophy. Operational units were not expected to worry about repairing their aircraft, engines, equipment, and armament beyond the most elementary maintenance. Instead, they were to operate them through their relatively short allotted operational lifetime and then exchange them for reserve or newly overhauled aircraft or/and engine. Operationally, the aircraft is retired and disposed of after reaching their life-limit. As an example, the Indian Air Force retired nearly 70 MiG-21s fighters during 2005 as they reach the end of their design service lives. MiG-21 Retirements, International Air Power Review, 2004. Additional Information: The implication for civil use is not, as some have argued, that Soviet life-limits do not apply, but rather that safe operation must include tight compliance to not only the limitations themselves, but also the associated level of repair and overhaul, and guidance. There is no technical data (or operational data from MiG-21 past or current military operators) to suggest that an R-11 engine for example, with its very short life-limit (150 hours), can be safely operated for 500 before an overhaul. That overhaul, which under Soviet guidance is a MO or Major overhaul, is not a homemade in the back of the hangar process with manuals that have not be been translated into English, but a depot-level activity with adequate technical support. There is no other technical guidance to be used to assume the level of safety the aircraft had in frontline service and even more to assume a level of safety acceptable in civil use. Verify the AIP addresses the age of the aircraft. 137. Aging Additional Information: This means many, if not all, of the age effects have an impact on the aircraft, including: (1) dynamic component wear out, (2) structural degradation/corrosion, (3) propulsion system aging, (4) outdated electronics, and (5) expired wiring. Recommend the applicant/operator provide (in the AIP or SOPs) for differences training between MiG-21 models for all maintainers. Significant differences include engine, instrumentation, drag chute, CG variations, structural elements, and ejection seat system, and many others. Additional Information: This is especially true in any situation involving a Soviet MiG-21 and a Chinese F-7 for example, where the differences can be significant. As author Peter Davies notes, although externally the MiG-21bis resembled early versions of the Fishbed (MiG-21F), two decades of development and structural changes made it a very different aircraft. Davis, 2008
134.
IAF MiG-21 Service Life Extension
135.
Aircraft Re-Assembly Issues
136.
Soviet Aircraft Maintenance Philosophy
138.
MiG-21 Maintainers Differences Training
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Recommend the AIP provides for tracking cycles, such as airframe and engine cycles, in addition to time in service and in combination with inspections. This allows for the buildup of safety margins and reliability. Additional Information: In military jet aircraft, there is a relationship between parts failures, especially as they relate to power plants, landing gears, and other systems, and for that reason it is very important to track airframe and engine cycles between failures and total cycles to enhance safety margins. For example, tracking all aircraft takeoffs for full-thrust and de-rated thrust takeoffs as part of the inspection and maintenance program would be a good practice and can assist in building up reliability data. The occurrence of failures can be meaningfully reduced and cycles can play an important role. When rates are used in the analysis, graphic charts (or equivalent displays) can show areas in need of corrective action. Conversely, statistical analysis of inspection findings or other abnormalities related to aircraft/engine check and inspection periods requires judgmental analysis. Therefore, programs encompassing aircraft/engine check or inspection intervals might consider numerical indicators, but sampling inspection and discrepancy analysis would be of more benefit. A data collection system should include a specific flow of information, identity of data sources, and procedures for transmission of data, including use of forms and computer runs. Responsibilities within the operators organization should be established for each step of data development and processing. Typical sources of performance information are as follows, however, it is not implied that all of these sources need be included in the program nor does this listing prohibit the use of other sources of information: 140. Cycles and Adjustment Engine Replacement Intervals Pilot reports; In-flight engine performance data; Mechanical interruptions/delays; Engine shutdowns; Unscheduled removals; Confirmed failures; Functional checks; Bench checks; Shop findings; Sampling inspections; Inspection discrepancies, and Service difficulty reports.
139.
Use of Cycles (General)
Ask if both engine cycles and hours are tracked. If not, recommend it be done. Ensure the AIP addresses the required inceptions and functionality of the TS-27 periscope fitted to the MiG21U two-seaters.
141.
TS-27 Periscope
Additional Information: The rear cockpit was fitted with a retractable periscope to give the instructor a better view over the nose and the head of his pupil during takeoff and landing. Note: Some single-seat MiG-21 may have the system installed (i.e., TS-27AMSh) as a visual aid astern. Verify the AIP incorporates the inspection of the air intakes, intake spike, duct, and related system, and components, as per the applicable technical guidance, and as part of pre-flight. Related structures include (1) boundary layer bleed, (2) boundary-layer exit doors, (3) spill door, and (4) stone guard.
142.
Air Intakes and Ducts
Additional Information: In Finnish Air Force service, there were several instances where maintenance crews found lose rivets in intake ducts (some caused FOD damage to the engines), even in relatively new aircraft. In the MiG-21, the engine breathes through an asymmetric variable supersonic inlet air intake with a 3-position, 3-shock center body. The cone is driven by the air data system and also by power demand and engine rpm. Verify proper condition, deflection, cylinder condition, and warning signage of the air brakes. The dangers the air brake poses to ground personnel are lethal and should also be addressed.
143.
Air Brakes
Additional Information: In the MiG-21F-13, two lateral air brakes with a total area of 0.76 m2 are mounted low on the forward fuselage sides at frames 11-13, with a maximum deflection of 25. A third, ventral perforated air brake with an area of 0.47 m2 and a deflection of 45 is located at frame 22-25. These dimensions and deflection change depending on the type and variant, such as in the MiG-21PF. The twoseaters (i.e., MiG-21U) have a one-piece forward air brake.
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Verify that the AIP provides not only for the general inspection of the wings, but also of the inspection of the main spar and aux spars, and the attach points and bolts. The inspection procedures need to reflect the critical aspects of the wing. Additional Information: The basic MiG-21 wing is an all-metal cantilever mid-wing monoplane structure with a TsAGI S-12 series airfoil section and a clipped-wing delta configuration. It sweeps back at about 57 with an anhedral of -2. The thickness/chord ratio decreases from 5.0 percent at the root to 4.2 percent at the tip. Each of the two wing panels is a single structure mainly of D16-T Dural with machined skins that have a maximum thickness of 2.5 mm. These skins are machined but not integrally stiffened. The wing structure is based on one main spar (at 33.3 percent chord) and three auxiliary spars (each indexed 90 to the fuselage centerline), each having V-95 or VM-65 booms and 30KsGSA joints. See Skin Thickness below. The following narrative of an Indian Air Force MiG-21 provides insight into these critical wing inspections: On September 24, 2009, [a mechanic] was detailed for night storage servicing on a MiG-21 aircraft. During [the inspection, the mechanic] observed that the main spar skin attachment bolt at the end towards fuselage was missing. Under artificial lighting conditions of the night, it was barely possible to notice such a tiny bolt. Had it gone unnoticed, it could have led to a hazardous situation in air. [The mechanic] good observation averted a potential hazard. http://www.indianairforce.nic.in/fsmagazines/Jun10.pdf. Note: in 2003, and despite being recently overhauled, the Croatian Air Force grounded its MiG-21 fleet due to structural concerns involving the wings. It was only in 2007 when the aircraft returned to service. See Steel Components below. Verify that the AIP covers the varying skin thickness of the skin throughout the aircraft and that any repair or replacement is made to the applicable specifications. Additional Information: For example, in the wing top surface, there are no less than 10 different wing skin thicknesses, from 0.035 to 0.21.
144.
Wing Inspections
145.
Skin Thickness
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
146.
Inspect and Repair as Necessary (IRAN)
If an IRAN is utilized (or Soviet equivalent, which is unlikely), verify it is detailed and uses adequate technical data (that is, include references to acceptable technical data) and adequate sequence for its completion if it is proposed. Additional Information: An IRAN must have a basis and acceptable standards. It is not analogous to an on condition inspection. It must have an established level of reliability and life extension. An IRAN is not a homemade inspection program. Set time limits for overrun (flex) of inspection intervals in accordance with the applicable guidance (i.e., NATO). Verify the applicant has a program to address aircraft inactivity (more than 7 days) and specifies specific maintenance actions for return to service per the applicable inspection schedule(s) (for example, after 31 days). Additional Information: A daily inspection or preflight is not an acceptable equivalent to a detailed inspection to return the aircraft to flight after 30+ days of inactivity. The aircraft should be housed in a hangar during maintenance. When the aircraft is parked in the open, it must be protected from the elements, that is, full blanking kit and periodic anti-deterioration checks are to be carried out as weather dictates. Verify adequate tooling, jigs, and instrumentation is used for the required periodic inspections and maintenance per the maintenance manuals. Additional Information: Also, a MiG-21 assembly requires specialized equipment such as wing dollies, tail dollies, and engine dollies. Verify the AIP references and addresses the applicable technical guidance issued to the aircraft during military service to address airworthiness and safety issues, maintenance, modifications, updates to service instructions, and operations of the aircraft. Additional Information: For example, if the aircraft in question is a 1967 Ex-polish Air Force MiG-21U twoseater retired in 1993, the AIP should provided up-to-date information concerning technical data that was in effect in 2003 when the type was retired. This is necessary to ensure an adequate level of safety. Verify the applicant/operator has copies of the applicable safety supplements for the aircraft and they are incorporated into the AIP or operational guidance as appropriate. Ask whether a corrosion control program is in place. If not, ask for steps taken or how it is addressed in the AIP. Evaluate adequacy of corrosion control procedures. Additional Information: Age, condition, and types of materials used in many former military aircraft require some form of corrosion inspection control. This is paramount in the MiG-21 not only because of its age, but because of many of the materials used in the aircraft. See for Corrosion Control Guidance below. Verify that the AIP incorporates the adequate corrosion control guidance.
147.
Combining Inspection Intervals Into One
148.
Aircraft Storage and Returning the Aircraft to Service After Inactivity
149.
Specialized Tooling for Maintenance
150.
Technical Guidance Issued While in Service
151.
Safety Supplements
152.
Corrosion Due to Age, Inadequate Storage, and Materials Used
153.
Corrosion Control Guidance
Additional Information: This type of guidance includes: Refer to FAA Order 8083-30, Chapter 6; FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 43-4A, Corrosion Control for Aircraft; TO 1-1-691, Corrosion Prevention and Control Manual.
154.
Pylons (Structural)
If applicable and installed, verify the AIP addresses the inspection of the aircrafts pylons per the applicable guidance (i.e., NATO) from a structural standpoint, including checking them for cracks. Pylons have separated from the aircraft in flight and this constitutes not only a safety issue for the aircraft, but for people and property on the ground. Verify that the AIP provides for the inspection of any travel pod being used. Only pods originally modified by the military service that operated that MiG-21 is permitted, and this is limited to the modified 800-liter centerline tank, such as those used by the Czech Air Force. Verify the AIP adheres to the maintenance procedures requirements per the applicable engine guidance for the specific type and variant of the engine, i.e., R-11F-300 vs. R-11F2-300.
155.
Travel Pod Engine Maintenance Procedures
156.
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
The following provides a general overview of the MiG-21 engine(s). The MiG-21F is powered by one Tumansky (AMNTK Soyuz) R-11-300 (Izdeliye 37) axial-flow afterburning turbojet rated at 3,880 kg (8,550 lb.) dry and 5,110 kg (11,265 lb.) reheat. The MiG-21 engine is a two-spool turbojet with a fixed-area air intake, a three-stage supersonic low-pressure (LP) compressor, a three-stage transonic high-pressure (HP) compressor, a can-annular combustion chamber, single-stage HP and LP turbines, and an afterburner with a multi-petal axi-symmetrical variable nozzle. No inlet guide vanes or variable stators. The first compressor stage is overhung ahead of the front bearing, facilitating repair, and has a parabolic spinner; the second compressor stage has shrouded blades to prevent resonance vibrations. The HP spool has a speed limiter. The accessory gearbox driven off the HP spool is located ventrally aft of the sixth compressor stage and has nine drive faces, seven of which are normally occupied by the starter/generator, two hydraulic pumps, two fuel pumps, the air compressor and the tachometer-generator. The combustion chamber has 12 flame tubes, two of which feature high-energy discharge igniters. The afterburner has three spray rings. The nozzle is controlled by an electro hydraulic system with three rams driving the actuation ring. When the engine is cold the axis of the afterburner/nozzle assembly is angled slightly to port with respect to the engine spools; this angle disappears due to heat expansion when the afterburner becomes hot. The variable convergent nozzle is located behind the afterburner. The low-pressure shaft is hinged by three bearings (front main roller bearing, middle auxiliary ball bearing and rear auxiliary roller bearing). The high pressure shaft is hinged by two main ball bearings in the shaft center and one main roller bearing in the rear shaft section. The auxiliary gear box is driven by a high-pressure shaft. The front oil pump is driven by a low-pressure shaft. The starter/generator drives the engine by multiple disc clutches and by ratchet or roller clutch. Starting is electrical by means of a starter/ generator and is controlled by a single push button. Initial light-up is done using petrol from an auxiliary tank. Overall engine pressure ratio (EPR) 8.6; mass flow at take-off power 64.5 kg/sec (142.2 lb. /sec). Turbine temperature 1,175. http://www.kamov.net/general-aviation/mig-21-engine/.
157.
MiG-21 Engine Overview (R-11)
If the aircraft is equipped with a Chinese WP-7 engine verify the AIP adheres to the maintenance procedures requirements per the applicable engine guidance (in English) for the specific type and variant of the engine. Additional Information: There are many variations of the WP-7. Also, the WP-7 and Soviet engines are not de facto interchangeable nor are parts. There are manufacturing techniques and QA differences, many modifications, such as different materials, new combustion chambers liners, new bearings and seals, and redesigned afterburner and compressor sections, which went from 31 to 24 blades for example. Some of the modifications were implemented for standardization while others for durability and safety. The only known instance of such interchangeability (thee extent of which is not documented) may have happened when the Albanian Air Force received ex-East German Air Force MiG-21 R-11 engines for a possible upgrade to their Chinese F-7As. The related technical guidance is unknown. See Chinese WP-7B Modifications. If the aircraft is equipped with a Chinese WP-13 engine (fitted to the Chinese copy of the MiG-21MF) verify the AIP adheres to the maintenance procedures requirements per the applicable engine guidance (in English) for the specific type and variant of the engine. Additional Information: There are many variations of the WP-13. Also, the WP-13 and Soviet R-13 -300 engines are not interchangeable nor are parts. These engines were equivalent but not identical. There are major differences such as the use of different titanium allows for the compressor disc and casings. Verify the AIP addresses the incorporation of the manufacturer and military modifications to the engine installed. Additional Information: The NTSB and some foreign CAAs have determined a causal factor in some accidents is the failure of some civil operators of former military aircraft to incorporate the manufacturers recommended modifications to prevent engine failures.
158.
Chinese WP-7 Engine (General)
159.
Chinese WP-13 Engine (General)
160.
Manufacturers and/or NATO Engine Modifications
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
If the applicant considers an engine upgrade, ensure that the AIP addresses this. Only engine upgrades that have been approved by the manufacturer are permitted. Additional Information: It should not be assumed that an R-25 engine can be fitted to any MiG-21. Although, in some cases, the R-13 and the R-25 are interchangeable from an installation standpoint (the R-25 has the same dimensions and attachment points as the R-13), it can only be done with the OEM oversight and support. For example, the R-25 is a completely new two-spool turbojet with a compression ratio almost double that of the original R-11/13, and increased mass flow. The R-25 engine accessories may also be different and the same applies to the fuel supply system. The afterburner system is also different in that the R-25 has a soft cut-in and full modulation which does not exist with previous engines. No homemade upgrades should be permitted. The R-13-300 engine had extra airflow in comparison with that of the R-11 series and demanded the addition of debris guards (small deflector plates) under the auxiliary inlets by the leading edge of the wing roots. It is imperative that the AIP be specific to the type, versions, and variant of the engine installed in the aircraft. There are many variations. Additional Information: A sample of the engines used in MiG-21 variants are listed in the table below:
Model Ye-2 Ye-2A/MiG-23 (Izdeliye 63) Ye-50 Ye-50A/MiG-23U (Izdeliye 64) Ye-4 MiG-21 (Izdeliye 65) Ye-6 MiG-21F (Izdeliye 72) MiG-21F-13 (Izdeliye 74) Ye-6T (Ye-66) Ye-6T (Ye-66A) Engine Mikulin AM-9B Tumansky R-11 Tumansky RD-9E + Dushkin S-155 Tumansky R-11E-300 + Dushkin S-155 Tumansky RD-9E Tumansky R-11-300 Tumansky R-11F-300 Tumansky R-11F-300 Tumansky R-11F-300 Tumansky R-11F2-300 Tumansky R-11F2-300 + Sevruk S320M5A Tumansky R-11F2S-300 Tumansky R-11F-300 Tumansky R-11F2-300 Tumansky R-11F2-300 Tumansky R-11F-300 Tumansky R-11F2S-300 Tumansky R-11F2S-300 Tumansky R-11F2S-300 Tumansky R-11F2S-300 Tumansky R-13-300 Tumansky R-11F2-300 Tumansky R-11F2S-300 Tumansky R-11F2SK-300 Tumansky R-13-300 Tumansky R-13-300 Tumansky R-13F-300 Tumansky R-25-300 Thrust lb. (dry/reheat) 5730/7165 8380/ 11240 5730/7275 + 8380 8380/11240 + 8380 5730/7275 ?/11020 8600/ 12680 8600/ 12680 8600/ 12680 8258/ 13633 8258/13633 8710/ 13610 8600/ 12680 8710/ 13490 8710/ 13490 8600/ 12680 8710/ 13610 8710/ 13610 8710/ 13610 8710/ 13610 8970/ 14320 8710/ 13490 8710/ 13610 8710/ 13610 8970/ 14310 8970/ 14310 8970/ 14320 9040/15650 (21825*)
161.
Engine Replacements and Modifications
162.
Engine Type, Version, and Variant
Ye-6V Ye-7 1-2/MiG-21P Ye-7 34 MiG-21PF (Izdeliye 76, 76A) MiG-21FL (Izdeliye 77) Ye-7SPS, MiG-21PFS (Izdeliye 94) MiG-21PFM (Izdeliye 94, 94A) Ye-7R MiG-21R (Izdeliye 03, 94R, 94RA) MiG-21R (94R late) Ye-7S MiG-21S/SN (Izdeliye 95/95N) MiG-21M (Izdeliye 96) MiG-21SM (Izdeliye 95M/15) MiG-21MF (Izdeliye 96F) MiG-21MT/SMT/ST (Izdeliye 96T/50/50) MiG-21bis (Izdeliye 75/75A/75B)
* = limited (3-minute) extra-power reheat at altitudes 4,000 meters (13,120 ft.) or less. See MiG-21 Engine Overview below.
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Verify the AIP discusses the known engine failure and failure modes. This is one of the most significant safety issues with the MiG-21. Engine fires are common, and their cause needs to be understood. Typical R-11 and R-13 engine failures include both compressor and turbine (HP) failures. Engine seizures and are nozzle failures were common. As in many other cases, an engine failure translates in the failure of other critical systems, such as hydraulic failure. See MiG-21 Accident Case Study Afterburner Failure and The Case of 908 (1983) below. Additional Information: This 1972 account of a Romanian AF MiG-21 accident illustrates the issue: Just after take-off, while the aircraft was at 3-400 meters and going at 700 km/h in full afterburner two compressor blades detached and punctured fuselage fuel tank no. 7. The leaking fuel tank exploded seconds later, at 5600 meters altitude. The tail and engine detached from the rest of the plane, which glided for another 7 km before crashing in a field. http://www.ejection-history.org.uk/Country-By-Country/Romania.htm. Another example is noteworthy. On October 12, 1965, aircraft 805, an East German Air Force MiG-21PF had an engine seizure. The pilot ejected and survived. A detailed account of another such incident, by the same pilot, sheds some light into this common failure: Wolfgang Bohla subsequently landed the first MiG-21 safely with a seized engine. In that case, the cause of the seizure was the bearing between high-and low-pressure rotor. The bearing was sufficiently lubricated. The impact was felt if the throttle lever was moved to under 90%. Captain Bohla flew almost to the threshold of the runway with 90% power (i.e. insanely fast) and brought the power down after touch down. Because he brought the aircraft back, the cause was found. Afterwards, Captain Bohla was honored by the Mikoyan design bureau. The Soviet specialists flew in to examine the intact machine and to determine the cause of the failure. Later, another type of bearing was installed. http://home.snafu.de/veith/verluste8.htm. See Polish AF May 7, 1999 MiG-21bis Accident below. The following 1999 Polish AF account of a MiG-21 accident is provided to illustrate a MiG-21 turbine blade failure, in this case traced to manufacturing and materiel defects which remained undetected by routine maintenance inspections. Additional Information: Further details are now known about the loss of Polish AF 41 PLM MiG-21bis Fishbed-N 8861. Just after take-off from Malbork at around 320 knots, the pilot turned off the afterburner, leaving the throttle at the maximum operation mode. At the same time he heard an unnatural sound from the engine, which he described later as screaming. He checked out the engine control panel, and noted no variations from normal operating indications. Following commands from the Base Flight Supervisor on the necessity of maintaining allocated flight level, the pilot reduced thrust to some 70% of its dry power. At the same time, the creaming of the engine decreased and became more bass, the pilot reported. The aircraft then made a turn to port with 40 bank and the velocity decreased. Immediately afterwards the [pilot] reported to the Base Flight Supervisor in turn on back course, alternating current generator not operating, drop in pressure in amplifying installation/ Following the command of the Base Flight Supervisor, the pilot initiated a 5-10 climb with starboard wing banking of around 20. The pilot pushed the throttle forward to increase thrust, which resulted in a dramatic increase in the screaming. Noting this, the pilot automatically pushed back the throttle that brought the aircraft into level flight. After a few seconds, pressure in amplifying hydraulic installation dropped. During a turn to starboard, the aircraft spontaneously initiated a bank to port and started to descend. Unable to recover it, the pilot decided to eject. Following a detailed examination of the crashed airframe and powerplant debris, and after hearing the pilots and witnesses accounts, the report of the Polish MOD Commission of Air Accidents Investigation stated that the aircraft failure was related to the power plants malfunction. No traces of foreign object damage were found and damage to the engines turbine first stage blades and the blades of the turbines second stage driving apparatus, was noted. Microscope examination confirmed fatigue cracks on a part of the turbines second stage blade. The Commission determined that there was fatigue-related mechanical damage to the power plant turbine. However, from the evidence available, the direct cause of the damage to the turbine could not be explicitly determined. According to the final report, the accident was due to production, construction, technological and material-related faults caused by the supplier. Attrition, Air Forces Monthly, No. 176 (November 2002). Verify the AIP addresses the life limit of engine components. The engine life-limit is not necessarily applicable to all components and/or accessories. The AIP needs to be clear on this. On condition inspections are not acceptable. Additional Information: There might be differences between engine types and variants (R-11 vs. R-13-300) and between Soviet and Chinese engines (R-11 or WP-7).
163.
Failures and Failure Modes
164.
Polish AF May 7, 1999 MiG-21bis Accident
165.
Engine Components Life Limits
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Verify the applicant has established the proper inspection intervals and TBO/replacement interval for the specific engine type and variant (i.e., R-11, R-13, and R-25) and adhere to those limitations and replacement intervals for related components. These vary depending on the engine and variant. Soviet Engine Inspections and Time Between Overhaul (TBO) (General) Additional Information: While the TBO varies, it is likely to be around 150-200 hours. Verify whether there is also life-limit (i.e., 1,500 hours) and calendar requirements. Justification and FAA concurrence is required for an inspection and TBO above those set in the appropriate aircraft/engine inspection guidance. Clear data on TBO/time remaining on the engine at time of certification is critical, as is documenting those throughout the aircraft life cycle. Noteworthy is that some R-11 engines have a TBO of just 100 hours. In some cases, if documented, the TBO of the R-25 could be as high as 500 hours, while 300-400 have been documented in the MiG-21bis. This can be an issue because many represent a R-11 engine as only having 120 hours or he hopes the engine will be good for well over 300 hours and some people have told him that it could actually run for up to 1,000 hours without any major problem. Mormillo, 2002. These types of statements are misleading and not acceptable for purpose of certification. If the aircraft is equipped with an R-13-300 engine, verify that the AIP provides for the required 500 hours TBO and 1,500 life-limit. Some references note 300-400 hours. The actual TBO needs to be verified. 167. R-13-300 TBO and Life-Limit Additional Information: Justification and FAA concurrence is required for an inspection and TBO above those set in the appropriate aircraft/engine inspection guidance. Some operators assumed that an in-house overhaul resets the clock on the engine. That is not so. At 1,500 hours, the engine is no longer to be used, regardless of any refurbishment. Only the manufacturer can validate additional use of the engine and components. If installed in the aircraft, recommend that SARPP-12 data be recorded in the AIP at the appropriate time or inspection cycle. 168. R-13-300 SARPP-12GM Data Additional Information: For example, in the MiG-21MF, operation of the R-13F-300 engine is monitored by the SARPP-12GM recording equipment. It records 6 analog signals and 6 discrete signals. Analogue signals are recorded in the course of change of engine speed. Discrete time signal is recorded and the maximum power on the afterburner. http://www.leteckemotory.cz/motory/r-13/. Also see SARPP-12 Flight Recorder below. Verify the applicant has established the proper inspection intervals and TBO/replacement interval for the specific WP-7 and WP-23 engine types and variants and adhere to those limitations and replacement intervals. 169. Chinese WP-7/WP-23 Engine Inspections and Time Between Overhaul (TBO) Additional Information: While the TBO varies, the TBO of the WP-7 is very low, with some at 100 hours and other at 200 hours for early models. In the case of the WP-7F, the TBO was 300 hours while the WP-7B had a lower TBO of 250 hours. Justification and FAA concurrence is required for an inspection and TBO above those set in the appropriate aircraft/engine inspection guidance. Clear data on TBO/time remaining on the engine at time of certification is critical, as is documenting those throughout the aircraft life cycle. Also, WP-7 and WP13, like their Soviet counterparts, had a calendar time limit, and this must be followed as well. If the aircraft is equipped with a Chinese WP-7B engine, verify that the current modifications level is incorporated, which are also one of the reasons why WP-7 components are not interchangeable with Soviet R11 or R-13 counterparts. Other reasons include manufacturing techniques and QA. For example, as of 2004, the WP-7B has had 56 modifications incorporated into its design and manufacturing. Some of the modifications were implemented for standardization while others for durability and safety. Verify that the AIP and related SOPs reflect the applicable R-11 limitations, including Soviet/Russian (Bulletin) # 58207512AB. Additional Information: Recent postings by MiG-21 operators explain the issue: below is the updated explanation on the R-11 ground run RPM limits.This advice is not part of the technical description for the R11-300 (37F2 + series). It is in force since March 1973 by the Russian AD # 58207512AB where on the ground the RPM N1 75-84% and 95 98%, so called Transition RPM, must be avoided. This is valid for all R-11 series, and again, valid only for ground runs. Reason were some dramatically accidents during ground run, caused by resonance frequencies at those RPMs which caused cracks in the front compressor disk with following disintegration during the ground run....ending up in a big fire ball...At this time, on all engines a special inspection with ultra-sonic NDT Uzedl was performed....a number of engines were removed. Since we have raised the index finger now.....please remember that on the Ground the duration for MAX RPM (Mil Power) and afterburner work is limited to 15 sec only! Please distribute. Bernd. http://www.classicjets.org/forum.
166.
170.
Chinese WP-7B Modifications
171.
R-11 Limits (Bulletin) # 58207512AB
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Verify the AIP includes adequate procedures (i.e., USAF, NATO), including checks and signoffs for returning an aircraft to airworthiness condition after any work on the engine. 172. Engine Check Additional Information: As an example, as part of its investigation of a fatal former military aircraft accident in 2004, the NTSB found after an engine swap-out the week before the fatal accident, the mechanics had warned the newly installed engine was not operating correctly. The record also shows the A&P mechanic who oversaw and supervised the engine change did not sign off any maintenance records to return the airplane to an airworthy status. Before the fatal flight, two engine acceleration tests failed, and multiple aborted takeoffs took place in the days leading up to the crash. Verify the AIP includes measuring actual thrust of the engine and tracking engine operating temperatures and other parameters as per the applicable technical guidance. Additional Information: The MiG-21 engines (i.e., R-11, R-13, and R-25) use EPR settings, like the civil JT-8 for example. As an example, take-off EPR ranges from 8.6 on the R-11 to 9.55 on the R-25. These engines effectively have three indications: Temperature, RPM, and EPR. Verify that the AIP provides for the adequate maintenance, inspection, replacement (at life-limit), and calibration of the starter/generator system. This is critical to prevent fires. Additional Information: For example, operationally, with the MiG-21F-13 and R-11 engine, engine fires on start-up were not uncommon, especially in tropical conditions if the starter was not properly adjusted. In the MiG-21F, starting was electrical by means of a starter/generator and is controlled by a single push button. Initial light-up is accomplished using fuel from an auxiliary tank. In aircraft equipped with the R-13-300 engine, the starter system provides triggering on the ground and in flight mode and turns on additional burning. The system is an electric engine. It is constituted by a starter-generator GSR-ST-12000 VT, a fuel system main combustion chamber, an additional fuel combustion chamber system, an engine electrical system and an oxygen system engine. When you start the engine on the ground, after the connection to the source of electrical current starter-generator GSR-ST-12000VT spins through a two-speed drive and an armoire drives spinning rotor turbo compressors high pressure. Once you reach the idle revs the engine two speed drive switches starter-generator GSR-ST-12000VT of trigger being mode to generator mode, wherein supplying direct current to aircrafts systems. The trigger fuel system ensures the main combustion chamber during startup regulated supplies fuel to two 'lighters' in the main combustion chamber according to the overall air pressure (compression) from engine "P2C" with the MKPT-9AF electrohydraulic valve. See http://www.leteckemotory.cz/motory/r-13/. See O2 Relight System below. If the aircraft is so equipped (i.e., the MiG-21PFM has a separate SGO-8 generator supplying 115 V AC), verify that the AIP provides for its inspection, maintenance, and replacement (the life-limit as prescribed) as per the applicable technical guidance. Verify that the AIP provides for the adequate maintenance, inspection, and replacement (at life-limit) of the PURT-1F electro-mechanical engine control system. Additional Information: Along with the main and afterburner fuel pumps (aka afterburner booster pump), it ensures smooth operation of the engine through the speed range from ground idle to afterburner settings. Verify that the AIP provides for the adequate maintenance, inspection of the gaseous oxygen system that is part of the system to facilitate relight at high-altitude and low forward speed. 177. O2 Relight System Additional Information: The O2 system delivers oxygen into the engine's main combustion chamber for engine start during flight. The oxygen system operates with an oxygen pressure of p = 0.9 to 1.05 MPa. Also see Engine Starter above. Verify that the AIP provides for the inspection of the gearbox and all of its related components as per the applicable guidance, including any life-limits. Verify that the AIP provides for the inspection and functionality of the exhaust fuel dump pipe as per the applicable guidance. Additional Information: The high number of back-end fires in the MiG-21 dictate that all fuel lines in that area of the aircraft be properly inspected, even when they are open lines, like the fuel dump pipe.
173.
Engine Thrust and Temperatures
174.
Engine Starter
175.
SGO-8 Generator
176.
PURT-1F Engine Control System
178.
Accessory Gearbox
179.
Fuel Dump Pipe
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Verify that the AIP and related inspections (engine) address the afterburner (A/B) control box and related fuel lines. This is to include replacement well. This needs to be done as per the applicable technical guidance. It will likely include a ground run to test the system functionality and safety. Adequate precautions, such as fire guard and trained personnel in the cockpit are also an important issue to consider. Unfortunately, in operational service, afterburner failures have been linked to failure of these components. Additional Information: The following narrative illustrates the difficult nature of the failure: After 15 minutes, one aircraft taxied back. The pilot reported that the after-burner was not getting engaged. It was obvious that if that aircraft didnt fly we would not achieve 100% serviceability. From the input of the pilot it appeared that it was a snag related to the after burner (A/B) electrical control system. Decision was taken to change the A/B control box and carry out a ground run. The aim was to clear the fault at the earliest and offer it for flying and achieve 100% serviceability. The suspected component was replaced within 30 minutes. The aircraft was prepared for a full performance ground run. Testers were connected to the engine to check the satisfactory engagement of A/B. As a mandatory requirement the A/B fuel gauge was also required to be connected to measure the A/B fuel pressure. After a short delay, the engine fitters found a fuel gauge with fuel pipe and connected to the engine A/B fuel manifold. As I was keen to offer the aircraft for flying, I decided to give the ground run myself and check the A/B parameters. The ground run started with all precautionary measures. Everything was satisfactory till the max dry run. When I engaged the A/B and was checking its parameters, the Gang I/C indicated for an emergency cut off of the engine. As I was checking the gauges inside the cockpit, I couldnt switch off the A/B immediately. When I eventually looked back from the cockpit I could sense the gravity of the situation. The ground crew was running away from the aircraft shouting cut off. I could see a stream of fuel gushing out from the engine. The engine was running in the A/B regime. So I immediately switched off the A/B and brought the throttle to idle position. The technician indicated that the fuel leak had stopped. But, there was a heavy smoke from the engine compartment. I switched off the engine immediately and came out of the cockpit. The CFT crew was ready to start their operation. The smoke remained for a few minutes and eventually stopped. As the engine was cut off without proper cooling and running in idle there was fuel accumulation in the jet pipe which was cleared after cooling off the engine. When I went and checked the engine compartment I was shocked to see that the A/B fuel pressure pipe (gauge to read the fuel pressure) had come off from its clamp fitting. The clamp was found on the A/B fuel pressure tapping. Had the engine not been switched off in time, it could have lead to uncontrolled fuel gushing out from the A/B fuel pressure tapping. Spreading of fuel in the engine compartment in the hot zone could have lead to fire on the engine subsequently to a major catastrophe. On investigation, it came to light that the fuel gauge along with the fuel pipe was unserviceable. It was kept in the engine section for local repairs. The engine fitter detailed for the ground run was not aware of the fact as the ground run was organized without sufficient preparation time, the engine fitter couldnt cross check the serviceability of the gauge with his section I/C. Subsequently we brought a serviceable gauge from the nearby squadron and accomplished the ground run successfully. This aircraft was offered in the last detail of the day flying. http://indianairforce.nic.in/fsmagazines/Jan12.pdf. See Afterburners, Nozzle, and Related Components above. Verify the AIP specifically addresses the inspection of the afterburner system and the augmentor nozzle and related hydraulic actuators (a total of 3) and gears (including gear pinions). Nozzle failures have been linked to several accidents. Nozzle gear pinions have a history of failure. Additional Information: This has been documented in the Indian Air Force, and it was attributed to poor quality. Other afterburner components include the afterburner nozzle-jack cooling air intake, exhaust nozzle fairing, 3 hydraulic actuators, and the afterburner cooling intake. Heat insulation should, also be included. The diffuser is critical. The following Indian Air Force incident illustrates this: On September 29, 2011, [two mechanics] were detailed for Afterburner Diffuser change of an R-13 aero engine of a MiG-21 aircraft. After removal, during pre fitment checks of new diffuser, they noticed a crack along the longitudinal axis of the structure of second stage nozzle diaphragm assembly at 11 30 position. The location was remote and could not be traced on an intact engine. On detailed inspection, it was found that the metal was bent at one end of the crack. http://www.indianairforce.nic.in. Another account drives the point home: On April 21, 2010, during the course of a check, a mechanic noticed abnormal and excessive movement of one of the vanes of radial flame stabilizer of the after-burner diffuser. Further investigations revealed that the vane center mounting had cracks. http://indianairforce.nic.in. See Afterburner Control Box and Related Fuel Lines below. Note: An afterburner is a device used for increasing the thrust of a jet engine by brining additional fuel in the uncombined oxygen present in the turbine exhaust gases.
180.
Afterburner Control Box and Related Fuel Lines
181.
Afterburners, Nozzle, and Related Components
Page 3-39
Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Verify that the AIP provides for the inspection, maintenance, and replacement (at the required life-limit) of the fuel pump (i.e., NR-21F, NR-22F2M2, NR-44, and NR-54F2). These are not necessarily interchangeable, that is from a MiG-21F to a MiG-21PF, or from an R-11 engine to an R-25 engine. These pumps are known to leak. Additional Information: The following 1988 Polish Air Force MiG-21 accident narrative illustrates the consequences of a fuel pump failure: Pilot Lieutenant Engineer Jaroslav Grecki had 510 hours in airplanes, about 241 hours in type. It was a night IMC flight. The pilot performed an afterburner take-off from Wroclaw. After leaving the ground, the height of 15-20 meters, during the climb, there was a short circuit in the fuel pump and the engine afterburner stopped working. Pilot made no attempt to bailout despite the RP team. http://aviacrash.ucoz.ru/load/aviacija_pnr/katastrofy_1971_1980_chast_3/6-1-0-91. Another accident, this time in May 1970 also illustrates the issue: Pilot: Lieutenant Larkin LP Letchik. Circumstances: after 22 minutes, 30 seconds after takeoff, the engine stopped. The pilot reported the engine had stopped. He was instructed to turn on the switch air ignition and initiate a climb of 10 degrees. The engine speed started to increase up to 68% on WFD and 45% of LPR, then fell sharply. This process was repeated twice by the pilot. The pilot was eventually ordered to eject. The pilot ejected from the aircraft in level flight at an altitude of 500 meters and a speed 300 km/h. He landed safely, avoiding injury. Reason: The reason for the engine stopping in flight was the engine limiter which resulted in a low pressure rise in the pump, as evidenced by the damage countertops valves, piston, and piston sleeve. This was traced to poor design and manufacturing defects. http://aviacrash.ucoz.ru. Verify that the AIP provides for the inspection, maintenance, and replacement (life-limit may apply) of the diffuser casing. 183. Diffuser Casing Additional Information: The following is an example: November 23, 2011, [an engine mechanic] was detailed to check leakage from the main fuel pump during wet cranking of a MiG-21 Bison aircraft. During checks, he observed minute dampness from the top of diffuser casing of the engine and the wet cranking was aborted. Subsequently, detailed checks revealed, that there was a crack in the mounting of diffuser casing at 10 Oclock position. The diffuser casing was withdrawn. Had this gone unnoticed, it could have led to a fire during start up. http://indianairforce.nic.in/fsmagazines/SEP%2012.pdf. Verify that the AIP covers the proper type and installation of the fuel restrictors. Additional Information: The following Indian Air Force account sheds detail into this issue: One day, I was detailed to give a final ground run (FGR) to one of the MIG 21s. After completing the DI [daily inspection) and obtaining clearance from all tradesmen, I started the engine. During warm up, I had moved the throttle to reheat for engagement of afterburner. However, when the afterburner did not engage, I moved the throttle back below the reheat regime. Suddenly, a loud bang emanating from the engine was heard and I immediately switched off the engine. This sound was so loud that it attracted the attention of everyone working in and around Tech Flt. An investigation was ordered to unearth the cause for this unusual sound. During the investigations, all the restrictors were removed and checked for proper size and fitment. It was revealed that the flow restrictors of EM-6 and EM-7 (afterburner carburetor valves) were interchanged. The maximum flow value restrictor (EM-7) was fitted towards the minimum value side (EM-6) and the minimum flow value restrictor was fitted towards the maximum value side. Due to this inter change of flow restrictors, there was a delay in engagement of afterburner to light up which had caused the loud bang. The flow restrictors ensure that required proportion of fuel is delivered to form a fuel-air mixture in carburetors. The carburetors supplied fuel-air mixture in atomized form to the after burner igniter. The restrictor design was such that while seeing it from the bottom it was difficult to distinguish between EM-6 and EM-7 restrictors especially if an individual had limited knowledge and experience. Both restrictors were identical and installed in a similar fashion in close proximity to each other. As a supervisor, I had deliberated at length with my subordinates on the proper procedures of fitment and identification of EM-6 (outward) and EM-7 (inward) restrictors and the consequences of wrong fitment. Similarly, in the hydraulic decelerator of the main fuel pump there were two restrictors known as forward flow restrictor and reverse flow restrictor (which were nick named hydraulic decelerator top (Reverse Flow Restrictor) and bottom (Forward Flow Restrictor). Forward flow restrictor was provided for a definite rate of RPM reduction with abrupt backward movement of the throttle lever. If these components were to be interchanged, then the throttle lever would get hydraulically locked above idle rating. Thus, the engine could not switch off until the fuel shut off valve was closed which in turn would lead to dry running of all the pumps. The MiG-21 fighter is nearing completion of its total technical life and design improvement may not be possible due to the aircraft vintage and cost effectiveness. Unfortunately, construction and design of all MiG-21 series engine remains the same. With little care and continuity classes at regular intervals, recurrence of such mistakes can be avoided. http://www.indianairforce.nic.in/fsmagazines/Jun10.pdf.
182.
Fuel Pump Failures and Failure Modes
184.
Fuel Flow Restrictors
Page 3-40
Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Verify that the AIP and related engine inspection tasks address the engine rotary slide valve in the engine. Engine malfunctions have been linked to this failure. Additional Information: The following narrative illustrates such an incident: There were two incidents I witnessed while in service with HAL. The first one was an incident of an R-25 engine flame out, during the engine test run. The defect investigation revealed, that the engine flame out was due to the jamming of rotary slide valve, which supplies fuel to the engine combustion chamber. This valve is a part of the main fuel pump, which slides to and from inside the assembly rotating at 4,500 rpm. The clearance between the valve and the body is between 5 to 15 . It was concluded that, due to contamination of fuel, some particles got trapped between the clearances and led to the jamming of the rotary slide valve. Later, modification was carried out to improve the surface hardness of the rotary slide valve. Several stages for checking the quality of fuel were also introduced. http://indianairforce.nic.in/fsmagazines/Dec10.pdf. Verify that the AIP addresses the inspection and maintenance of the aero-engine (starter) and related components, including the AWD 7-44-5 Engine Start Control Box. Additional Information: The following illustrates the need for such inspections, including line inspections: On July 26, 2011, [a mechanic] was detailed to carry out [a pre-flight inspection] on a MiG-21 aircraft. During the inspection, he found two loose rivets in the periphery of air-to-air radiator. These rivets were in air intake passage just before the aero-engine. Subsequent inspection revealed that the rivets were loose from the base. Had it gone unnoticed, these rivets would have sheared off in subsequent sorties, causing irreparable damage to the aero-engine. http://indianairforce.nic.in/fsmagazines/Jan12.pdf. Note: In the MiG-21, The starter/generator drives the engine by a multiple disc clutch, and by ratchet or roller clutch. Recommend the AIP incorporate Borescope inspections of the engine at 25 hours per the applicable inspection procedures. Recommend a calendar schedule be also used in addition to the hourly inspection. AC 43.13-1 can be used as a reference. Additional Information: Also see FAA 8083-32 Aviation Maintenance Technician HandbookPowerplant Volume 2, U.S. Department of Transportation, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, Flight Standards Service, 2012. Verify that the AIP provides for the inspection of all the engine related support structures in the aircraft. This is particularly important during engine removal and installation. Additional Information: The following 1990 accident involving an East German Air Force MiG-21bis illustrates an afterburner-related engine failure which involved the aircrafts structure. On that day, aircraft 844, a MiG21bis (factory number 75 051 400, use beginning 10/1977), was lost as a result of engine damage. Following the third time the afterburner was selected, there was a knock in the engine. The pilot deselected the afterburner. The pilot of the other aircraft could see holes in the fuselage. At an altitude of 1,200 meters, full engine power no longer possible, and a loss of speed and altitude occurred. The pilot ejected and survived. In the MiG-21, the engine is connected to the torque tube by a ring. A connection had come loose, and engine and tube partially separated. As a result, hot gases under pressure escaping. The consequence, in addition to the very high likelihood of a fire, was that it resulted in the loss of thrust encountered. http://home.snafu.de/veith/verluste8.htm. See MiG-21 Tail/Engine Separation below. Verify the AIP incorporates action(s) following a change in the spool down time of the engine(s) after shutdown. This is critical as it could be an indicator of an upcoming problem with the engine. Verify the engine goes through a ground run and check for leaks after reassembly. Confirm it achieves the required revolutions per minute for a given exhaust gas temperature (EGT), outside air temperature, and field elevation. In addition, it is essential that this process ensure an adequate level of safety during testing. 190. Engine Ground Run Additional Information: As an example, on January 7, 1963, an East German Air Force MiG-21F-13 was involved in a fatal accident in such circumstances. 4 ground personnel were killed. During engine testing on a contaminated ramp surface (ice), the aircraft jumps over the pads, and shot across the airfield, crashed into a tanker car, and caught fire. Verify that the EGT systems and all of its components are properly inspected, maintained, and replaced as per the appropriate guidance. Many EGT malfunctions have been documented, and in many cases, due to faulty thermocouples.
185.
Rotary Slide Valve
186.
Aero-Engine Inspection
187.
Borescope Engine
188.
Engine Support Structure
189.
Spool Down Time
191.
EGT System
Page 3-41
Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Verify the AIP addresses how the use of different fuels may require changes or additions to the engine inspection and maintenance programs. Use of Different Fuels and Fuel Quality Additional Information: The fuels used in the MiG-21s engines were T-1, TS-1, T-2, and T-7. Some of these may have a high Hydrogen content. Note: High hydrogen content was used to clean out the combustion and reduce exhaust smoke trail. On the other hand, it increased the level of condensation trails (contrails) at high-altitude. Suitability of all Western fuel should be checked, and the AIP should include a table describing the types of Western fuels (i.e., Jet A, JP-4, JP-5, JP-8) that can be used. The AIP should also address fuel quality. Many MiG-21 accidents were the result of fuel contamination. See Rotary Slide Valve above. It should not be assumed that Soviet engines can take anything, as some have argued. Verify adequate tail/engine separation (at frame 28/28A) by using proper procedures and support equipment to prevent structural and serious engine damage. An engine change requires removing the whole tail, and this is a big event which takes a long time to complete. Access to related units and assemblies is very difficult. In addition, it requires the specialized tail and engine dollies. Proper bolts and nuts are also needed. Unless properly accomplished, this task could seriously damage not only the engine but the surrounding structure. No fork lifts should be been used for this all-important task. See Engine Support Structure above. Additional Information: The following narrative illustrates the complexities of such a task and the need to be knowledgeable on the process: It was a weekend in the winter season and our squadron had just returned back from successful detachments. A rum punch was planned on that day. I was attached to R&SS (now Tech Fit), as the manpower from the squadron use to be attached to R&SS, for second line servicing. The afternoon task was to complete Rear Fuselage (RF) fitment on a MiG-21 aircraft. The aircraft was to be made available for functional checks and Full Performance Ground Run, the next working day. I, along with one supervisor, was detailed to meet the task pertaining to our trade (Elect). I was very excited to complete the task as I knew that this would be followed by a Rum Punch get together celebrations. I and my supervisor decided to share the task in hand and after getting necessary clearances, we began our job. In the mean time, the sun light had gone down inside the hanger. While the supervisor was giving connection to different plugs at R/F joints, I was fitting the Transmission Pieces near R/F joints. The fitment of Transmission Pieces requires a good source of localized lighting, besides continuous focus and attention. But, I had done this job a number of times before, so I knew there would be no major deterrence in my task. There was one servicing ladder placed near the R/F joint and it was being used by all tradesmen along with me. One of the Transmission Piece was successfully fitted and I was fitting the next one. I was holding a torch with left hand and tightening this with my right hand. During the process, the spanner slipped from my hand and slid away in the R/F. I tried a lot to trace it with the help of torch but did not succeed. I informed my supervisor about the issue, to which he also made his share of attempts to find the spanner, but failed. We informed the WO in-charge of the afternoon shift and a combined effort was made by many tradesmen to trace the spanner in the R/F. Many different methods were applied but all went in vain. In the mean time the Engineering Officer also tried but could not succeed. I was feeling ashamed and guilty for this situation, knowing well that R/F removal was the only solution to the problem in hand. After deliberations by various supervisors, it was finally decided to remove the R/F. As we finished sliding out the R/F, we could locate the spanner, which was a great relief to all. I cannot forget this incident, as a silly mistake of mine resulted in loss of a lot of man power and man hours. I made it a point to draw lessons from it and changed my working style, for the better. Sgt. Kumar http://indianairforce.nic.in/fsmagazines/Nov11.pdf. If equipped, verify the serviceability of the fire detection and suppression system. The operator should establish an inspection process (reference the appropriate technical guidance) to ensure the validity of the fire warning system. Note: there have been cases of in-flight fire warning indications due to fuel leaks in front of the fire warning transducer. This occurred twice to the same aircraft (N315RF) in 2000 during Phase I flight testing. Additional Information: Note: A typical MiG-21 fire suppression system is as follows: A 2-liter fire extinguisher bottle is located at frame 20 (in the right wheel well) , with a pyrotechnical valve and a steel manifold distributing the extinguishing agent in the engine bay, ensuring fire suppression in flight and on the ground. An IS-2MS (or, on late version, IS-3) fire warning system is provided with flame sensors installed at fuselage frame 29. Gordon, MiG-21, 2008.
192.
193.
MiG-21 Tail/Engine Separation
194.
Fire Detection and Suppression System
Page 3-42
Attachment 3
Issue(s)
The AIP and related SOPs (i.e., flight line support) need to emphasize the all-important engine compressor hatch (door) on the MiG-21. Additional Information: The following account illustrates the need not only to have trained but safety conscious personnel: On 14 January 1975, 849, a MiG-21PFM/SPS (factory number 94 5115) crashed around noon in the city Cottbus. It was caused by an engine failure due to the loss of the compressor hatch (not properly secured). The aircraft crashed on approach into house (factory). The pilot and five Polish workers were killed. In addition, there were 10 injured civilians. The cause of the disaster was human error. Pilots and mechanics were involved. 849 had been the only spare aircraft that day. The mechanic secured the compressor hatch (in the wheel well) and probably attached it with only 4 of 36 screws. This was a common because the inspection of this area is part of the walk around and the pilot would check that area of the engine called engine control room. To save time, the hatch was attached with four screws cross wise. Only after the pilot had checked the area, would the engine hatch be closed with all of the 36 screws and the aircraft readied. On that day, the pilot had landed with an unserviceable aircraft and immediately requited the spare, 848. To avoid delay, the pilot did not complete a comprehensive pre-flight. The ground crew assisted the pilot in the start-up. However, during this hectic episode, the mechanic did not secure all of the 36 screws. The aircraft took off normally. Even the flight was normal. During flight, the attached screws loosened, likely due to vibrations. With the retracted left landing gear, the hatch held. However, when the landing gear was lowered, it got loose and separated. This led to the engine failure. The pilot was ordered to eject, but because the aircraft was over a populated area, the pilot remained with the aircraft. In the investigation, the compressor hatch was never found. http://home.snafu.de/veith/verluste1.htm. Verify that the AIP incorporates the maintenance and inspection of the firewalls, which are critical safety items, especially in light of the record the aircraft has concerning engine fires. Additional Information: For example, in the MiG-21F, firewalls made of high-carbon stainless steel are located in the engine bay at frames 29, 34, 35A, and 36. Verify that the AIP provides for the required inspections and maintenance of the flap system in the aircraft. The flap system and their complexity, varies depending on the aircraft type and variant. Additional Information: For example, the early versions of the MiG-21U used area-increasing TsAGI flaps (modified Fowler flaps) with flap settings of 24 30 for take-off and 44 30 for landing. On the other hand, single-seat MiG-21 PFS onwards, as well as MiG-21US and UM had blown flaps with a fixed rotation axis. In that case, flap settings were 25 for take-off and 45 for landing. In the case of the blown flaps, or BLC, the inspection of addition components (i.e. ducts) is required. See SPS System (Blown Flaps) below. Additional inspections may be required since this may have developed into an issue previously not well-documented. Inflight failure has been documented. Case in point, in May 2008, a flap on a Croatian AF MiG-21bis separated in flight during low altitude maneuvering. That air forces MiG-21 fleet was temporarily grounded as a result. Recommend that the outcome of the Croatian AF investigation be considered. Verify the AIP includes procedures for inspecting and ensuring the serviceability of the engine bleed air. Verify maintenance, servicing, preflight, and post-flight activities include fire guard precautions. This is a standard USAF/NAVAIR/NATO safety-related procedure and it should be followed. Note: As a reference, the engine start in a MiG-21 will include a good amount of fuel leakage onto the ground from the drain lines. Verify the AIP includes procedures for documenting all unsuccessful starts. If the MiG-21 version being certificated is equipped with the SPS system (blown flaps Sduva Pogranichnovo Sloya) (i.e. MiG-21US), their inspection and maintenance needs to be covered in the AIP as per the appropriate guidance. Particular attention should be given to the respective air ducts for leaks and the integrity of the flaps honeycomb structure. 201. SPS System (Blown Flaps) Additional Information: Note: In late model MiG-21s, like the PFM, the engine (R-11F2S-300) was adapted to the SPS system, which improved takeoff and landing characteristics. The SPS system was introduced into production with a model designated MiG-21 PFS or MiG-21PF (SPS). Note: The bleed pipes go straight from the large connections on each side of the combustion chamber casing to the wing-root spars on each side, and hence along the front of each flap to terminate in a fishtail pipe very similar to that of Western flap-blowing systems. The flaps themselves are of slightly greater chord than the original pattern. Instead of running out and down on tracks at each end they are simply hinged, pulled down by a hydraulic actuator at the flap midspan point. The prominent actuator fairing immediately shows the presence of SPS flaps. Gunston, 1986.
195.
Compressor Hatch (Door)
196.
Firewalls
197.
Flaps Inspections
198. 199. 200.
Bleed Air (General) Fire Guard Unsuccessful Engine Start
Page 3-43
Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Ensure the operator warns servicing personnel via training and markings of the fire hazard of overfilling oil, hydraulic, and fuel tanks. Additional Information: Lack of experience with the MiG-21 servicing is a safety concern. Require supervision of servicing operations and fire safety procedures. Improperly securing the oil cap has caused several MiG-21 accidents. The following 1977 Soviet Air Force accident report illustrates this: Pilot: Captain Shevaldov Yu, senior pilot, the pilot class 1. On April 13, 1977, the pilot was flying MiG-21R 383/483 during a training mission. The incident occurred 29 minutes into the flight to the combat course for photographing objects at the tactical polygon, and an altitude of 600 meters and a speed of 700 km / h. On slowing down the aircraft, engine speed started to fall; reducing the intensity of the cabin lighting, the generator failure light came on, followed by a spontaneous engine shutdown. After stopping the engine, the pilot reduced speed to the necessary speed and attempted to start the engine in the air. When the engine did not start and at an altitude of 450 meters and a speed of 500 km / h, the pilot reported the failure, and was ordered to eject. He did. The aircraft collided with the ground in 7 kilometers from the landfill, exploded and burned. The reason for the engine failure was the destruction of the middle bearing ball bearing rotor for lack of cooling due to oil starvation. The cause oil starvation was leaking oil from the oil tank due to improper installation filler cap. http://aviacrash.ucoz.ru. Verify maintenance, servicing, preflight, and post-flight activities include fire guard precautions. This is a standard USAF/NAVAIR/NATO safety-related procedure and it should be followed. Note: As a reference, the engine start in a MiG-21 will include a good amount of fuel leakage onto the ground from the drain lines. Verify the AIP includes procedures for documenting all unsuccessful starts. Review engine storage methods and determine engine condition after storage. Evaluate calendar time since the last overhaul. 205. Engine Storage Additional Information: For example, the use of an engine with 50 hours since a 1991 overhaul may not be adequate and a new overhaul may be required after a specified time in storage. Note: Experimental exhibition of former military aircraft is that engines that have exceeded storage life limits are susceptible to internal corrosion, deterioration of seals and coatings, and breakdown of engine preservation lubricants. Verify the AIP includes up-to-date wiring diagrams consistent with the appropriate guidance (i.e., NATO) and includes the appropriate inspection procedures. Any reference to the applicable guidance must address modifications. Additional Information: In addition to the appropriate guidance, another reference is NA 01-1AA-505, Joint Service General Wiring Maintenance Manual. Verify adoption of a FOD prevention program (internal engine section, external, and air intake). Additional Information: Use and properly inspect the air intake screen (FOD guards) provided with the aircraft and designed for the aircraft. See Airframe and Engine Covers below. Verify that the AIP provides for and that the operator has the required airframe and engine covers. These are essentials safety items. Additional Information: In the MiG-21, these include: engine exhaust cover, engine intake cover, main landing gear well covers, and auxiliary air inlet covers. Verify that the AIP provides for the use of the correct turbine oil for the aircraft. The proper oil must be used for Soviet turbine engines. Additional Information: For example, references for the R-11F-300 engine refer t to MK-8 mineral oil and later VNII NP-50-1-4F synthetic oil. The appropriate Western equivalents are needed, and the AIP should have a table providing this information. This is a major issue (prone to confusion) in civil use as shown by the excerpts below from a MiG-21 blog: I contacted everyone in the oil business yesterday and there is no substitute available for 1010 (Royco 481) for the MiG-21. The 3SP in not available in the USA and does not meet flash point requirements for the Russian governing body; and they will not sign a waiver with Shell in America. You can import it, but it was not advised. I also checked on synthetics, but they are not compatible with the engine seals. So, 1010 it is 1010 will work just fine though. http://www.classicjets.org/forum/viewtopic.php.
202.
Servicing, Engine Fire Servicing Personnel Unfamiliar with the Aircraft Create Hazardous Situations
203. 204.
Fire Guard Unsuccessful Engine Start
206.
Wiring Diagram and Inspection
207.
Engine Foreign Object Damage (FOD)
208.
Airframe and Engines Covers
209.
MiG-21 R-11/R-13 and R-25 Turbine Oil
Page 3-44
Attachment 3
Issue(s)
As part of the engine maintenance schedule, recommend an engine Spectrographic Oil Analysis Program (SOAP) be implemented with intervals of less than 15 hours. If baseline data exists, this can be very useful for failure prevention. If manufacturer baseline data does not exist, this may still warn of impending failure. Engine Condition Monitoring (Oil Analysis) Additional Information: For the latest guidance on SOAPs refer to Joint Oil Analysis Program Manual, Volume III: Laboratory Analytical Methodology and Equipment Criteria (Aeronautical) (Navy) NAVAIR 17-15-50.3, (Army) TM 38-301-3, (Air Force) TO 33-1-37-3, and (Coast Guard) CGTO 33-1-37-3, dated July 31, 2012. This document presents the methodology for evaluating spectrometric analyses of samples from aeronautical equipment. The methodology enables an evaluator to identify wear metals present in the sample and their probable sources, judge equipment condition, and make recommendations that influence maintenance and operational decisions. Following these recommendations can enhance safety and equipment reliability and contribute to more effective and economic maintenance practices. Note: Operationally, SOAPs have showed signs of high iron content in R-11 engines. Recommend that independently of other guidance (i.e., daily inspection), the AIP include detailed lubrication, hydraulic and servicing charts. NAVAIR, USAF, or NATO guidance can be sued. Additional Information: Below is a sample lubrication and hydraulic fluids chart:
210.
211.
Lubrication, Hydraulic, and Servicing Charts
Source: Joint Oil Analysis Program Manual, Volume III: Laboratory Analytical Methodology and Equipment Criteria (Aeronautical) (Navy) NAVAIR 17-15-50.3, (Army) TM 38-301-3, (Air Force) TO 33-1-37-3, and (Coast Guard) CGTO 33-1-37-3, dated July 31, 2012. 212. Systems Functionality and Leak Checks Verify procedures are in place to check all major systems in the aircraft for serviceability and functionality. Verify the leak checks of all systems are properly accounted for in the AIP per the USAF/NATO requirements. Recommend that the de-icing system and tank (front upper bay) be disabled and the appropriate W&B corrections made. If the system is retained operational, it must be done in accordance with the applicable technical guidance, to include the correct fluid. See Visual Meteorological Condition (VMC) and Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) Operations for operational restrictions.
213.
De-Icing System
Page 3-45
Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Additional Information: The typical de-icing system in the MiG-21 is as follows: On early versions, the cockpit windshield is equipped with an ethyl alcohol de-icing system featuring a 4.5-liter tank in the forward avionics/equipment bay, a spray manifold, and pneumatic valve. The tank is pressurized to 3 kg/cm2. Gordon, MiG-21, 2008. Very that the AIP retains the original color-coding such as fuel lines (yellow), oxygen (blue), hydraulic (grey), fire extinguisher system (red), and pressurization (black). Specific guidance to these functions should be discussed in the document to avoid confusion with any Western or civil standards.
214.
System and Lines Color Codes
Verify that the AIP provides for the maintenance and inspection of the hydraulic reservoir and related components, i.e., valves. 215. Hydraulic Reservoir and Valves Additional Information: In some versions of the MiG-21, total capacity of both system (primary and booster) is 36 liters. The hydraulic reservoir is divided by a vertical wall into two unequal sections for primary and actuator (booster) supply system holding 10.5 liters and 7.2-8 liters respectively. The tank is pressurized to 1.7-2.3 kg/cm2. The hydraulic reservoir and valve units are located between frames 31-34 and this compartment is heat-insulated. Gordon, MiG-21, 2008. Verify the AIP includes procedures for inspecting and replacing fuel, oil, and hydraulic lines according to the applicable technical requirements, i.e., NATO. Additional Information: In Indian Air Force service, one of the issues that have cause accidents is related to the fuel lines. In 2006, IAFs Director General (Inspection & Safety) Air Marshal P S Ahluwalia noted that an ultra-fine hole, or the slide valve on the fuel pipe of the aircraft, was gathering dust, thus constricting the fuel supply. This led to the flame-out condition resulting in an accident. He said the fault was noticed and rectified by silver-plating the orifice and providing more holes to ensure an uninterrupted fuel supply. http://news.oneindia.in/2006/06/06/iaf-brings-down-accident-rate-including-of-mig21-to-new-low1149597267.html. The hydraulic problems with the aircraft have also affected Chinese J-7s variants. In fact, one of the biggest flaws of early J-7 aircraft (likely to be sold to private entities) was in its hydraulic system, which suffered leaks. As many as 70% of the J-7s in some PLAAF Squadrons were grounded due to this issue. The following Indian Air Force incident illustrates a hydraulic leak: On November 25, 2009, a [mechanic] was detailed for take off inspector duties on a MiG-21 Bison. During inspection, he traced minute hydraulic oil leak to the rear air brake. The leak was difficult to detect due to fuel spillage from a drain pipe in the same region. The intensity of the leak was so minute that it could have gone unnoticed. Subsequent investigation revealed that the leak was from the thermal valve which could have resulted in a main hydraulic failure in the air. Despite his limited experience displayed keen sense of observation and averted a potentially hazardous situation. http://www.indianairforce.nic.in/fsmagazines/May10.pdf. An oil leak in an Indian Air Force is described in the following narrative: On January 18, 2010, Cpl. Kumar was performing runway controller duty in the after noon shift. At about 1435 hours a Bison aircraft lined up for routine training flying. He observed white smoke emanating from the port undercarriage. [Kumar] informed this to the tower on R/T. The pilot monitored the call, reduced the throttle and cleared off on the ORP and switched off the engine. Post incident inspection revealed oil leak through the centrifugal breather outlet. Cpl. Kumar displayed a keen sense of observation and dedication to duty and prevented a potentially hazardous situation. http://indianairforce.nic.in/fsmagazines/Aug10.pdf/. MiG-21 engine seizures have been linked to clogged oil lines. The following narrative illustrates this: an incident of engine seizure of a MiG aircraft. The defect investigation revealed that the lubricating oil transfer pipe from oil pump to the rear support bearing was clogged with carbon deposits. Hence, no oil was supplied to the rear bearing, which led to thermal expansion of the engine component due to high temperature. This led to the seizure of the engine. After this incident, mandatory cleaning of the oil channel inside the tube with brush was introduced during the overhaul of the engines. http://indianairforce.nic.in/fsmagazines/Dec10.pdf.
216.
Broken/Blocked Systems (Fuel, Oil, and Hydraulic) Lines
Page 3-46
Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Verify the AIP includes detailed information on the inspection(s) of the MiG-21 hydraulic system and its vulnerabilities, a term commonly used in Soviet aircraft terminology. It needs to be done as per the applicable technical guidance. It is a system that may have many single-point failures and many aircraft have been lost to its malfunction. Additional Information: A US MiG-21 restorer notes some observations on the aircrafts hydraulic system: On jacks, [the aircraft] is about to go through gear retraction and extension cycles. Our external mule allows the hydraulic system to be isolated and checked before we move on to testing the engine. Ground tests are an important milestone in the restoration and certification process. However, the same operator may be deviating from the applicable technical guidance when it notes that improvisation is sometimes necessary. A few liters of hydraulic fluid needed to be injected into a hydraulic reservoir through this service port, so we modified a bug sprayer from the local hardware store to do the job. http://blog.cwam.org. Note: There have been cases where of metal shavings were found in the hydraulic cylinder which operates the flaps. In one such case, it caused the loss of the aircraft. The following account illustrates one of the issues with the hydraulic system: On February 19, 2010, Junior Warrant Officer Gopal Airframe/Fitter was detailed to carry out take off inspector duties. During the inspection of a MiG-21 aircraft, he noticed a minute trace of hydraulic oil near the standard undercarriage bay. The position and size of the leak was such that it could have easily gone unnoticed. Subsequent investigations revealed that the leak was from the pipeline of the emergency U/C lowering system. Had this gone undetected it could have resulted in a hydraulic failure in the air. [His] observationaverted a potentially hazardous situation. http://indianairforce.nic.in. Another such incident occurred on January 11, 2011: Sqn. Ldr. Mishra was supervising full performance ground run of a MiG-21 aircraft which was on 200-hour servicing and AOG build up. Preliminary checks after aircraft start up were satisfactory and no leak from any of the panels was observed. During warm up, he noticed some fluid leak from the ventral fin close to ADF sense antenna. He immediately identified it as hydraulic leak and quickly indicated to switch-off the engine. After the engine was shut down the power ring of jet pipe caught fire. Sensing the gravity of situation, he asked the crew to operate the fire extinguisher. The fire was soon extinguished with minimal damage to the aircraft. http://indianairforce.nic.in/fsmagazines/Oct11.pdf. Verify procedures are in place to identify and use a list of equivalents of materials for replacing oil, fuel, and hydraulic fluids. Many operators include a cross-reference chart for NATO and U.S. lubricants as part of the AIP. Additional Information: For example, some references to the aircrafts hydraulic system note that the system uses AMG-10 oil-type hydraulic fluid. Gordon, MiG-21, 2008. Verify that the AIP provides for the specific maintenance, inspection, and replacement (when appropriate by the specific life-limits) of the electrical system and its components as per the applicable technical guidance, in English. 219. Electrical System Additional Information: A typical MiG-21 electric system is as follows: A 28.5 V DC main electrical system with a 12-kW GSR-ST-1200VT-2I starter/generator as the main power source. Backup DC power is provided by two 15STs-45A (28 V, 45 A) silver-zinc batteries in the forward avionics/equipment bay, 115 V/400 Hz singlephase AC power is provided by two converters, PO-1500-VT-2I and PO-750A, two more converters, PT-500Ts and PT-125Ts, provide 36 V/400 Hz three-phase AC. These supplies serve all avionics and instrumentation, lighting, and armament controls. The MiG-21PFM has a separate SGO-8 generator supplying 115 V AC. A ground power receptacle is located ahead of the port wing root. Gordon, MiG-21, 2008. Verify that the AIP includes the inspection of the battery compartment (and its heat resistant housing) behind the nose-wheel bay for condition, evidence of leaks, high-temperature damage, and other failure indicators. Verify that the AIP provides for the inspection, maintenance, and replacement of the fuses in the electrical system. The AIP needs to address any limitations these may have as well as provide for the source of any replacements. Additional Information: As with many Soviet aircraft, including many manufactured in the 1970s (like the MiG23), the MiG-21s electrical system includes fuses.
217.
Hydraulic System Vulnerabilities
218.
Oil, Fuel, and Hydraulic Fluids
220.
Battery Compartment
221.
Fuses
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
222.
Electrical System and Batteries Compatibility and Upgrades
Verify that the AIP provides for the functionality of the electrical system and its components as per the applicable technical guidance and ensure the compatibility of the aircrafts electrical system with any new battery installation or other system and component installation or modification needs to be addressed. Avoiding overload conditions is essential because this is a known problem with the aircrafts electrical system. Additional Information: Note: The typical battery (2 of them) installed in the MiG-21 (MiG-21MF) is the 15SCS-45 45Ah 24 volt battery. These two batteries can supply the vital systems for a 15-minute period in case of generator failure, and this capability may be an issue. See Electrical System below Verify that the AIP addresses the inspection and replacement of the alternating current converter (i.e., PO750). See Electrical System above. Verify compliance with all applicable 14 CFR requirements (that is, 91.411) concerning the pitot/static system, exterior lighting (that is, adequate position and anti-collision lighting), transponder, avionics, and related instruments. If the RV-UM radio altimeter is fitted, ensure that is it properly addressed in the AIP. Verify the AIP addresses the proper inspection and calibration of the PWD-5 or PWD-7 pitot and air data tube systems (mounted on the pitot tube) as appropriate. There are major differences between aircraft and systems. This needs to include the require pitot pressure checks and may require specific equipment. Adequate protection (cover) is also needed. Additional Information: For example, the PVD-7 differs in having two pairs of vanes, one of which measures angle of attack, the other sideslip, feeding the data to the air data computer. The PVD-18 (DUAS deviance, yaw, and pitch deviations) is found in the MiG-21MF. See Angle of Attack (AOA) System below. Because some MiG-21s, like the MiG-21MF have vanes (AOA, air data sources) located on the side of the front fuselage (i.e., the DVA-3A AOA sensor on MiG-21UMs for example, associated with the AP-155 autopilot), verify that the AIP provides for their inspection and calibration. See PWD-5 and PWD-7 Pitot Tube and Air Data Probes above and Angle of Attack (AOA) System below. Verify that the AIP provides for the maintenance and inspection of the auxiliary pressure tube (i.e., TP-156M). If the S-13-100-OS (left wing) or S-13-300-OS (right wing) or D camera pod are fitted to the wing of the aircraft, verify that the AIP provides for its inspection as well as the pylon. See External Stores (General) below. Launch rails must be disabled, that is, no live connection or ejectors. Verify that the AIP not only provides for the inspection of the missile rails (air-to-air missile rails) but also that the rails themselves are permanently secured. Additional Information: In 2010, at Air Venture, a missile rail on a MiG-21U came separated during the takeoff roll, and resulted in an aborted take-off. Note: Early-production MiG-21F-13s the launch rails were of the APU-28 type; later models had these replaced by APU-13 rails. Some MiG-21s also have the APU-7, and they may not be interchangeable. Other rail types include: APU-13M1, APU-13MT, and APU-68. Emphasize inspection of the oxygen system (KKO-5 on the MiG-21F) and any modifications as per the applicable technical guidance. Compliance with 91.211, Supplemental Oxygen, is required. Moreover, per FAA Order 8900.1, change 124, chapter 57, Maintenance Requirements for High-Pressure Cylinders Installed in U.S. Registered Aircraft Certificated in Any Category, each high-pressure cylinder installed in a U.S.-registered aircraft must be a cylinder manufactured and approved under the requirements of 49 CFR, or under a special permit issued by the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) under 49 CFR part 107. There is no provision for the FAA to authorize on condition for testing, maintenance, or inspection of highpressure cylinders under 49 CFR (PHMSA). Additional Information: This is important because depending on the version of the aircraft, location, type, and size of the tanks may vary, and it is essential to ensure that the correct configuration is used. Depending on the version and variant of the aircraft, O2 tanks can be located in the aft dorsal area (additional tanks) and in the bottom wing area in the landing gear compartment. In the latter case, the possibility of damage due to FOD or other activities is real. Recommend adherence to 23.1441, Oxygen Equipment and Supply.
223.
Alternating Current Converters Pitot/Static, Lighting, and Avionics and Instruments RV-UM Radio Altimeter
224. 225.
226.
PWD-5, PWD-7, and PVD18 Pitot Tube and Air Data Probes
227.
Forward Fuselage Vanes and Sensors Auxiliary Pressure Tube S-13 or D Camera Pod
228. 229.
230.
Missile Rails/Launchers (i.e., APU-28 and APU-13 Rails)
231.
Oxygen System Tanks (General)
Page 3-48
Attachment 3
Issue(s)
If the aircraft is a two-seater, i.e., MiG-21U, UB, UM, verify that the AIP provides for the specific and regular inspection and replacement of the O2 lines, especially those than run under the cockpit. The following accident narrative illustrates this. Additional Information: On May 9, 1984, aircraft 255, a MiG-21UM (serial number 516995046), crashed near Eisenhuettenstadt, East Germany. The 2 man crew was killed. In this type (Two-seater), the oxygen supply to the pilot line runs beneath the seats. This line was damaged by the rear seat and the exiting oxygen ignited by a parallel heating cable. In addition, a short circuit caused the trim drive to a maximum nose-down attitude. The two pilots had no chance to recover from the steep dive. Another pilot was flying next to the accident aircraft and saw a bright flash in the rear cockpit. This created the impression that it was something explodes in the cabin. As it turned out, this problem only occurred when the two-seater and was resolved by replacing the lines (other installation). See http://home.snafu.de/veith/verluste8.htm. Note: In some MiG-21 versions, such as the MiG-21F-13, the tank containing the gasoline for the starter system was installed close to an oxygen bottle just aft of the cockpit. Note: Chinese J-7/F-7 aircraft are generally equipped with the Jianghuai YX-3 oxygen system. Emphasize the proper inspection of any pressure cylinders. Per FAA Order 8900.1 change 124, chapter 57, each high-pressure cylinder installed in a U.S.-registered aircraft must be a cylinder that is manufactured and approved under the requirements of 49 CFR, or under a special permit issued by PHMSA under 49 CFR Part 107. There is no provision for the FAA to authorize on condition for testing, maintenance or inspection of high-pressure cylinders under 49 CFR. For example, the fire bottles are time sensitive items, and may have a limit of 5 years for hydrostatic testing. Non-U.S. bottles may remain installed as long as they are within their hydrostatic test dates. A problem arises when removing the bottles for hydrostatic testing. Additional Information: Maintenance programs require these bottles to be hydrostatic tested. Once the non-U.S. bottles are removed from the aircraft, they are not to be hydrostatic tested, recharged, or reinstalled in any U.S. registered aircraft. Moreover, those bottles cannot be serviced (on board) after the testing date has expired. 234. Fuselage Cooling Vents Verify that the AIP and associated procedures cover the fuselage cooling vents, especially engine related ones. Verify the serviceability of both aircraft systems (that is, anti-G valve) and the anti-G suit, if installed. There have been instances of anti-G valves being stuck in the open position. If the anti-G valve fails, it can blow scorching hot air into the cockpit. 235. Anti-G Suit System Additional Information: Note: A G suit, or the more accurately named anti-G suit, is a flight suit worn by aviators and astronauts who are subject to high levels of acceleration force (G). It is designed to prevent a blackout and G-induced loss of consciousness (G-LOC) caused by the blood pooling in the lower part of the body when under acceleration, thus depriving the brain of blood. Blackout and G-LOC have caused a number of fatal aircraft accidents. If installed, the AIP needs to address the maintenance and inspection (and functionality) of the autopilot (i.e., KAP-2K, RAU-10T). 236. Autopilot Additional Information: Earlier versions may be equipped with an earlier auto-stabilization system working only on the pitch-and-roll axes and fitted with a q-feel unit. The inspection of the autopilot actuators need to be included in the AIP. Note: Some references mention the GA-135T autopilot unit. Verify all cockpit markings are legible and use proper English terminology and units acceptable to the FAA. Some operators do not even translate the cockpit instrumentation to English, and this is a serious safety issue. Additional Information: The following 2007 posting illustrates this: We have recently acquired a Czech built MiG-21 and find ourselves searching for some help. When the Czechoslovakians built the MiG-21 they not only labeled the switches in Czechoslovakian but they moved some of the switches to different locations than in the Russian or Polish MiG-21s. We are looking for someone who can read aeronautical Czechoslovakian and translate the switch labels. Using English Czechoslovakian dictionary doesnt quite do it http://www.classicjets.org/forum/.The AIP should address inspection of all cockpit instruments with regular intervals for each subsystem. Care should also be taken to inspect modifications, including communications, navigation, or other upgrades to the cockpit. The AIP should address cockpit indicators calibration processes to ensure accurate indications for essential components. Note: All MiG-21 instrumentation is metric.
232.
Oxygen System (O2 Lines) in MiG-21U (Two-Seaters)
233.
Other Pressure Cylinders
237.
Cockpit Instrumentation Markings
Page 3-49
Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Verify the AIP incorporates the inspection of the pressurized sections of the aircraft and its system(s) as per the appropriate technical guidance. Note pressure cycles and any repairs in the area. Verify the AIP incorporates related documentation and manuals, in English. Additional Information: The following is a description of the typical MiG-21 air conditioning and pressurization systems: The MiG-21 has a ventilation-type cockpit, which is pressurized to 0.25 kg/cm2 (about 3.6 psi) and air-conditioned. The temperature is maintained at 15+/-5C. On later versions, the air conditioning system features a cooling turbine, an overpressure check valve, a shut-off cock, an ARD-57V automatic pressure regulator, a TRTVK-45M temperature regulator and a connector for a mobile air handling unit. Gordon, MiG-21, 2008. As background and to illustrate the complexities of the system, the following is a description of the cabin pressurization and environmental control systems the MiG-21US: Cabin air temperature is regulated by a 3-way switch which is labeled Hot, Cold, and Automatic. This switch is directly linked to the main air distributor. In the automatic mode, air temperature is regulated to a preset value. This cannot be accomplished by the pilot; it must be preset by ground personnel. Should the temperature become uncomfortable, the pilot can select either Cold or Hot resulting in either hot or cold air entering the cabin. Once the desired temperature has reached, he must switch back to the original position. It should be noted that, due to limitations of the distributor flap motor, the pilot must expect a lag of 30 seconds before airflow temperature reverses which requires some pre-planning. In addition, it is advisable that, should a descent be commenced in certain meteorological condition, the pilot should switch to the hot setting to prevent ice formation on the outside of the canopy and condensation on the inside of the canopy. In order to pressurize the cabin, air is bled from the number 6 compressor stage at 350 degrees C which is then channeled to the distributor where it is separated. Hot air is channeled directly to the cabin via check valve and main airflow valve whereas air that is used for cooling is bled to two heat exchangers. Once the air is initially cooled, further cooling is accomplished by an air conditioning turbine which, essentially, is a compressor. The cool air is then channeled via check valves to main airflow valve. It should be noted that, regardless of the main airflow valves position, air is always bled from the engine and cooled for the purpose of pressurization. The main valve, in closed position, merely inhibits pressurized air from reaching the cabin. The amount of pressure differential is governed by outflow valve in conjunction with the chamber for constant differential pressure and the aneroid chamber for increasing differential pressure. This system ensures a constant differential pressure of 220 Torr or 0.31 bars. The safety valve will open if differential pressure rises to 0.34 bars. It should be noted that cabin pressure remains the same as ambient pressure up to 6000 ft., after which cabin pressure decreases in direct ratio with altitude maintaining the afore mentioned cabin pressure differential (0.31 bar; see diagram). Air used for the G-pants is bled directly from the compressor section and channeled to a paper filter and thence to pressure regulator. The regulator senses G-loads imposed on the pilot and thereby regulates air flow to the G-pants which is then distributed via coupler. Excess air is bled directly to the cabin. These are safety valve which opens, should the preset pressure valve from the A/C turbine exceed 0.9 +/- 0.1 bars, and pressure limiter which is activated, should pressure deviate by more than 0.12 bars. The cabin safety valve is set to 0.34 bars. A ground check valve is incorporated into the system, should ground tests of the pressurization system become necessary. http://www.topedge.com. Verify that as part of the pressurization maintenance and inspections, the AIP addresses the cabin pressure regulation system, such as the AD-6E in the MiG-21F. It includes the outside venturi. See Pressurization Vessel and Environmental Control above. The AIP should include steps to inspect and maintain the integrity of the caution light systems (annunciator panel) in the aircraft as per the applicable guidance. The main annunciator panel(s) should be translated and replaced with one in English. 240. Caution Lights System (Annunciator Panel) Additional Information: The USAF evaluation of the aircraft (MiG-21F) noted that the warning lights were very poor because they were placed in three different locations on the instrument panel and were very dim. In the bright sun, the pilot often could not see the warning lights. In addition, the color coding was inconsistent with USAF practice. As an example, the take-off trim light was red and remained on when in the take-off trim condition. Have Doughnut (U) Technical, 1969. Verify appropriate MiG-21 safety markings and stencils required by the technical manuals (i.e., that is, warning notes, Remove Before Flight banners) and to NATO standards have been applied and are in English. Additional Information: These markings provide appropriate warnings/instruction regarding areas of the aircraft that could be dangerous. These areas include intakes, exhaust, air brakes, and ejection seats. In the case of ejections seat systems, and as noted in FAA Order 8130.2, paragraph 4074, a special airworthiness certificate will not be issued before meeting this requirement.
238.
Pressurization Vessel and Environmental Control
239.
Cabin Pressure Regulation System
241.
Safety Markings and Stenciling (NATO Standard)
Page 3-50
Attachment 3
Issue(s)
The AIP needs to emphasize the inspection of the pneumatic system and any modifications. Unlike many Western aircraft, Soviet design philosophy included a significant number of pneumatic systems, and thus, many critical systems in the aircraft are pneumatic. The brakes area good example. Additional Information: The typical MiG-21 pneumatic system is as follows: two subsystems (main and emergency). The main system actuates the wheel brakes, brake parachute deployment/release, and is responsible for cockpit pressurization. It also actuates the canopys alcohol de-icing system. The emergency system is responsible for emergency landing gear extension (in the event of a hydraulic failure) and emergency braking. Basic pressure in both systems is 110-130 kg/cm2. Nose wheel brake pressure and main wheel brake pressure is 15 kg/cm2 and 19 kg/cm2 respectively. Emergency braking system pressure is 17.5 kg/cm2. Compressed air for the main system is supplied by two-spherical 2-liter air bottles and a cylindrical 4.4-liter bottle in the starboard main wheel well, plus two 2.23-liter air reservoirs incorporated into the main gear struts. The emergency system is served by two 1.3-liter spherical bottles in the port main wheel well. The bottles are changed on the ground from outside sources. The charging connectors are in the starboard main wheel well at frame 20. Gordon, MiG-21, 2008. The following illustrates a pneumatic malfunction in the MiG-21: On March 15, 2010, Flight Officer Chahal was authorized to fly a 2 Aircraft lowlevel tactical sortie on a MiG-21 aircraft. After an uneventful sortie, while carrying out V/As on D/W the pilot noticed that the pneumatic pressure was reading zero. He announced the same on R/T and carried out a precautionary landing. After touchdown, he switched off the engine and maintained directions with the help of rudders and deployed the tail chute. Subsequently he applied emergency brakes to stop the aircraft on R/W. Post flight inspection revealed a leak from the canopy seal which had led to the pneumatic failure.. http://indianairforce.nic.in/fsmagazines/Feb11.pdf. Recommend that the intake safety guard (frame) is used when the aircraft is parked or displayed. This device can prevent injury to ground personal and/or airshow attendees. Verify the AIP addresses thorough inspection and cleaning of the cockpit area to preclude inadvertent ejection, flight control interference, pressurization problems, and other problems. Additional Information: This is a standard USAF/NAVAIR/NATO practice and should be practiced in the MiG21 with much more thoroughly than in any GA aircraft. If installed, verify that the AIP addresses the SARPP-12 automatic flight parameters recorder. Recommend that it be retained in an operational condition. See R-13-300 SARPP-12GM Data above. 245. SARPP-12 Flight Recorder Additional Information: Note: Some Bulgarian AF MiG-21s may have the a new FDR with Control N (solid state memory), which provides for data downloading, data storage, mission analysis, system parameters, flight profiles and pilot actions, and airframe and engine condition monitoring. This type of instrument would yield significant safety benefits in since data can be used for training, performance, and safety management. If the aircraft is equipped with a flight test recorder (not the same as the SARPP-12 mentioned above), recommend that it be maintained. Additional Information: In operational service with the Finnish Air Force, these devices yielded valuable data on the daily operational service of the aircraft. If the aircraft is equipped with HUMS (Health and Usage Monitoring System), recommend that it be maintained and its data used. Additional Information: Although technologically outdated by modern standards, HUMS was designed to provide maintenance crews with data to expedite and enhance (targeting) routine maintenance of the aircraft. Check compliance with applicable Federal, State, and local requirements for all explosives and propellants in terms of use, storage, and disposal, in addition to verifying service (NATO) requirements are followed. Where appropriate, recommend the AIP incorporates adequate provisions on HAZMAT handling. Refer to Gamauf, Handling Hangar Hazmat, August 2012. Some materials used in the aircraft are hazardous. An example is the engine asbestos lining. Test canopy seals for leaks (that is, use ground test connection). 250. Canopy Seals Additional Information: Several pressurization problems in the MiG-21 were traced to seals. Deterioration of the material itself is also an issue.
242.
Pneumatic System
243.
Intake Safety Guard
244.
Cockpit FOD
246.
Flight Test Recorder
247.
HUMS
248.
Explosives and Propellants HAZMAT
249.
Page 3-51
Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Ensure the AIP addresses the proper maintenance and operating condition of all canopy locks, including the required power supply (electrical cable and connections), and including the attachment of the Plexiglas panels with the frame. Problems with locking mechanism have been an issue with the aircraft, including some case s involving US civil MiG-21 operations. USAF MiG-21 operations include at least two instances of canopy failure. Additional Information: A USAF pilot had a canopy fail on a MiG-21 because the Plexiglas itself was starting to come apart from the framing and shattered during flight. He managed to safely land the MiG-21. Canopy failures are not just related to Plexiglas. The mechanism(s) are also an issue. For example, a March 1985 account by a Cuban MiG-21 pilot illustrates this while recovering from a dive at 480 knots while at 16,000 feet: coming out of the dive, I feel this loud bang all over the aircraft. There I was, alone, in an emergency situation. The canopy of the old MiG-21 had exploded during the depressurization process. The airflow took away my helmet. The aircraft was in a climb, I lower the noseRapidly, I cut the power to reduce the air flow over the cockpit, and I move my forward behind the windshield. Quickly, I glace at the ejection handles, not to forget that they were there. I told myself to calm down, look at the engine, it works, and all was not lost. The bird has lifeStabilizing the aircraft as much as I could, reducing the airspeed to 320 knots, lower would not be safe in the MiG-21 and I have reducing manoeuvring capabilities. The warning panel is not light, except for the red depressurization light. Unknown to me, debris form the canopy has punctured a fuel tank behind the cockpit and damaged the elevator controls. The engine was still working. On my right, another piece of debris, which looked like scissors appeared ready to cut lose and cut my head clean off. I turned to the airfield. I line up. Seeing this, ATC though I was smoking, but in reality it was the fuel streaming out. They were ready for me. I landed, and stopped near the rescue trucks.The next day; they called me in and congratulated me for returning the aircraft to the airport. However, I was later accused of not having securely closed the canopy, which I though was absurd because the final closing is done from the outside by the ground crew, which cannot be done unless the inside lever is properly secured.they also wanted me to pay for the helmet that flew off into the airstream Gonzlez, 2012. Note: The canopy is a pneumatically operated clamshell hinged aft for access to the cockpit. The windshield is flat and is made up of 2 layers of for a total thickness of 19 mm. The side panels are single pane sections and 12 mm thick. The hinged canopy is 10 mm thick. In earlier MiG-21 models, the one-piece canopy hinges forward. Note: Canopy lock issue has been a safety concern not only with the MiG-21 but other military jet types. This type of failure can be catastrophic. For example, in February 2007, such a failure caused the crash on take-off of an Indian Air Force HTJ-36 jet. Ensure proper transparencies maintenance for safe operations. Replacement may be necessary within shorter periods of time when compared to Western aircraft. The AIP should provide for the monitor/inspect canopy (and side panels where applicable depending on the version or variant of the aircraft) for crazing every 10 hours of flight. This includes the inspection, and replacement of canopy rubber seals and sealing putty. Separation of the Plexiglas panels from the frame was also documented. See In-Flight Canopy Separation above. Canopy covers should be used. Additional Information: Canopy failures, de-laminations, and Plexiglas deterioration are common with Soviet Bloc transparencies. Procedures should address this in the AIP and as part of post-flight procedures. For example, operationally, it was not uncommon, depending of the operating environment that cockpit transparencies began to deteriorate rather quickly, that is, in a matter of months. A Soviet account of MiG21F operations noted that with the passage of time, another serious issue fault emerged the cockpit transparency would start to become opaque and hairline cracks appeared due to the ultraviolet radiationThe process proved to be irreversible despite the efforts made by the maintainers. New transparencies had to be flown in from the Soviet Union to replace the old ones. Gordon, MiG-21, 2008. The following account describes in detail the USAF experience with the MiG-21 canopies: One of them was the matter of fatigued or failing canopies. This had first occurred before Gennin arrived, according to Matheny: Toast had already had a canopy start to come apart on him in the MiG-21 before he was killed in the MiG-23, but on that occasion although the canopy had started to raise, he had managed to get the MiG back down again. The problem wasnt that the canopy latches were failing, but rather that the Plexiglas itself was starting to come away from the framing in which it was mounted. In addition, recalled Bucko, Some of the canopies were getting spider web or crazing cracks all on the front canopy wind blast panel. We were worried about the things imploding, but we each knew it would happen to someone else. That someone else was Matheny. It became standard to keep a close watch on the integrity of the canopy, but one day the former auto mechanic was involved in an incident that nearly killed him: I was at about 18,000 ft, in full afterburner, doing about 500 knots. I was doing a performance profile as an initial sortie for deployed pilots and was going to do a 180-degree turn in afterburner to show how much energy the MiG-21 bled in a turn. I was expecting to end up at about 200 knots, and the F-15 was to stay inside my turn circle to see how he could maintain it using mil power while the MiG bled airspeed like crazy. I racked the jet into the turn, and the entire canopy imploded on me.
251.
In-Flight Canopy Separation and Opening
252.
Transparencies Problems (Plexiglas and Perspex) Part I
Page 3-52
Attachment 3
Issue(s)
253.
USAF E Transparencies Problems (Plexiglas and Perspex) Part II
It broke my helmet and oxygen mask off, knocked me unconscious, and cut my head up real bad. I regained consciousness headed straight down at the ground. I started hauling back on the stick, and tried to pull the throttle back, but there was a piece of Plexiglas jamming it fully open. Theres a lot of land coming up towards me and I am now supersonic heading straight down. Thinking quickly, he reached over and pulled the Plexiglas from the throttle, and then managed to pull it to idle. He then pulled back hard on the stick to return to level flight, and started throwing the bigger pieces of canopy over the side. Massively disorientated, unable to communicate because his flight helmet and mask were gone, covered in Plexiglas, and unable to see forward because the MiG-21s bulletproof forward canopy had shattered, Matheny was in trouble. I had to stick my head out to see where I was going, but the real problem was that now the air was rushing over this unclean surface of the cockpit, a harmonic frequency began to develop. It was like somebody had taken an ice pick and stabbed it into my shoulder and then started stirring it around. It was tremendously painful. He decided to put the Fishbed down on a dry lakebed, and was setting up to land on Mud Lake in the northwest corner of the ranges. I was concerned that I would pass out again. But then it dawned on me, I can see the runway from here. Why land on a lakebed? So, I flew on a little and landed at Tonopah. As I was on base to land, Billy Bayer, our GCI, was able to talk the F-15 pilots eyes back on me. When he saw the missing canopy he communicated this to Billy who passed it on to our ops so they had a clue what the problem was. As soon as the nose wheel touched the runway, the pain in my shoulder stopped. Bucko was about to take-off in a MiG-23 just as Matheny landed: He did an amazing job getting the plane on the ground and saved a very valuable asset. I was taxiing down the center of the runway to go to the far end and make a 180 turn and then take-off when I see Thugs jet at the far end. I get there to find Jim lying on the runway with blood all over his face and people attending. Then I am cleared to make a 180, go up the runway a little, and quickly take-off because we had a satellite overfly time window that I had to make. It was not very comforting to see him on the ground and it was definitely in the back of my mind ten minutes later when I was doing 800 knots trying to show a couple of F-15s that they were not going to catch me. Once again, my mindset like most successful fatalistic fighter pilots is, It aint going to happen to me. I know this machine. I am in charge of it. It will do what I say. And if I [screw] it up, I will fix it or at least look good as I hit the ground. Another pilot in a MiG-21 taxied past the broken jet and equally broken Matheny, took one look, turned around and taxied back to parking. He decided it was not a good day to fly! Matheny joked. The implosion was simply the result of age, it was later determined. They made superb canopies that were extremely clear, but we later learned that they replaced them quite often. At the time, we didnt know that, or if we did, we just blew it off as unimportant, Matheny explained. Naturally, Henderson became involved in the research and reverse engineering process for MiG canopies. A static test program on the canopies followed, and the pilots were briefed in the interim to conduct daily visual checks for early indications that a failure might be about to occur. Eventually, Henderson and Nelson located a company in southern California, Swedlow Plastics, which specialized in transparent plastics for various engineering and domestic uses. A small number of its staff signed contracts committing them to silence, and were then sent the Perspex canopies from which to make molds. The reverse-engineered copies were shipped direct to Tonopah. Davies, Red Eagles, 2008. Depending on the MiG-21 version and variant, verify that the AIP provides for the inspection of the bulletproof triplex glass screen. Additional Information: This item is 62 mm thick on the MIG-21F, and the quasi-oval optically flat triplex glass windscreen (14 mm thick) on later models, i.e., MiG-21PF, MiG-21Fl, and MiG-21MF. The inspection of these components and related procedures may differ from Plexiglas. Verify the AIP includes testing the emergency canopy jettison mechanism, if so equipped. It must be functional and properly inspected per the applicable technical guidance. Verify adequate procedures are in place for grounding the aircraft. Static electricity could cause a fire or explosion, set off pyrotechnic cartridges, or result in any combination of the above. Refer to USAF T.O. 00-25172, Ground Servicing of Aircraft, and Static Grounding/Bonding, dated August 2012, as the baseline for information on grounding. Additional Information: In grounding the aircraft, it is essential that all electrical tools are grounded and industry-approved explosion-proof flashlights or other lighting sources are used. See USAF T.O. 00-25-172 below.
254.
Triplex Windshield and Side Panels
255.
Emergency Canopy Jettison Mechanism
256.
Grounding
Page 3-53
Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Verify use of proper (approved) tires (including inner tubes) and adherence to any tire limitation, such as allowed number of landings, inflation requirements, ply type (i.e., 11 ply), and the use of retreaded tires, which are not recommended. The appropriate technical guidance (maintenance, inspection, and servicing) are required and it needs to be in English. As an example, the main tires in the MiG-21MF are KT-92 800x200 mm wheel/tires at 8.09 kg/cm2. Not all tires are common items. For example, the KT-92 wheel/tires are not used in the MiG-21F. The MiG-21 F had 660x200mm wheel/tires at 10.38 kg/cm2. Chinese parts are not necessarily acceptable for Soviet MiG-21s. See Chinese J-7/F-7 Wheels, Tires, and Brakes below. The type of tire may dictate the number of landings. Case in point, some references, including references made by US civil operators, notes the number of landings per tire at 10. Other sources, notably by the Finnish Air Force, refer to 40 landings, but only when the landing technique is modified. There should not be the tires look good approach but rather a replacement time. A simple visual inspection as performed in some GA aircraft will not suffice to detect a serious and potentially catastrophic tire failure. 257. MiG-21 Tires Additional Information: The levels of energy absorbed during landings due the high landing speed and landing technique have a significant impact. Also relevant is that US MiG-21 operators are having difficulties locating tires. The following 2012 exchange illustrates this: Does anyone know of a source for MiG-21UM main and nose tires? Also is anyone interested in going together to get some hose kits made http://www.classicjets.org. Wheels must be properly and regularly inspected and balanced. Many former military high-performance aircraft have a long history of tire failures, one of the leading causes of accidents. For example, many MiG-21 accidents have occurred due to tire burst. The following is such an incident: On December 6, 2010, Flt. Lt. Dash was performing the duties of DATCO. While a MiG-21, T-75 aircraft was on landing roll, he observed a puff of smoke emanating from the port undercarriage and identified it to be a case of tire burst. Immediately the crash bell was sounded and the safety services promptly swung into action. The safety crew after reaching the site confirmed the observed that the port side undercarriage tire had burst. In addition it was also observed that fuel was dropping close to the undercarriage. Sensing danger, [extinguishing agent] was applied at the undercarriage, extinguishing smoke. http://indianairforce.nic.in. Emphasize a detailed inspection of the brake assemblies, adhere to applicable inspection guidelines and replacement times (i.e., NATO), and consider more conservative inspections. Chinese parts are not necessarily acceptable for Soviet MiG-21s. See Chinese J-7/F-7 Wheels, Tires, and Brakes below. The MiG-21 has a wellknown reputation for weak brakes. Additional Information: One of the brake systems used is the KT-92b. On the MiG-21U two-seaters, other references include the KT-38 nose wheel (with twin expandable brakes) and the KT-102 (later models, with disc brakes). Late versions could also be equipped with the KT-90D featuring cerametallic disc brakes. Some MiG-21F-13 models have KT-27 main wheels. Recommend brake inspection at 20 to 30 landings. Also recommend that the AIP and related SOPs provide for a clear understanding (and conservative approach) to braking speeds. The following account illustrates the critically of the MiG-21 brakes and their proper inspection and repair: On April 7, 1967, 807, a MiG-21PF (serial number 760512) was destroyed. Following a so-called pattern maintenance for an average inspection and repair after 300-350 hours of flight at VEB Flugzeugwerft Dresden (FWD), and after completion of the repair, there was flight testing. It started with taxi tests to verify certain systems, including brakes. During the taxi test (rolling test), the aircraft did not stop and overran the runway, crashing, and bursting into flames. The airport fire department responded, quickly extinguished the blas, but the canopy was jammed, smoke was in the cabin, and the pilot was killed. As part of the investigation, it was determined that much had to be learned about the knowledge of the relationship between rolling speed and the efficiency of the brakes. The following narrative, from a current US operator restoring a MiG-21 describes some of the issues with the MiG-21 brake system: TheMiG-21 wheels and brakes are massive, as you might expect. The size of the wheel allows a larger brake assembly to be housed inside, provides more area for heat dissipation from the brakes, and allows for a larger diameter tire to provide more tread area to absorb high landing wear. The MiG lands at about 200 mph (330 km/h) and a set of tires may typically last for only ten landings. In earlier and smaller aircraft, drum brakes were used. Disk brakes were developed when military and commercial aircraft got larger and faster and needed more efficient breaks to stop on reasonable length runways. This brake stack has four rotor plates that rotate with the wheel and five stator plates that remain stationary with the wheel hub. The tabs on the rotor plates must be lined up and slid into the grooves on the inside of the wheel rim shown above. That is what causes them to rotate with the wheel between the stationary plates. When pressure is applied to the stators, the moving and stationary plates are squeezed together eventually bringing the wheel to a stop. All of the excess energy from the speed of the aircraft is turned into heat. Brakes get very hot after a landing and must be allowed to cool before another landing cycle. http://blog.cwam.org. Note: There have been cases of weak brakes because the brake cable from the control stick handle to the control valve broke.
258.
Brake System and Related Actions
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
If the aircraft is a Chinese J-7/F-7, verify that the AIP provides for the correct documentation in English. 259. Chinese J-7/F-7 Wheels, Tires, and Brakes Additional Information: Chinese J-7/F-7 types use different wheel and bakes such as a 500 x 180 mmm nose wheel tire (102 psi), LS-15 dual action brake, and 600 x 200 mm tires (167 psi) with LS-16 disc brakes. Chinese tires, brakes and those of the MiG-21 are not interchangeable. Verify that the AIP incorporates the maintenance, and inspection of the anti-skid system (i.e., UA-24 or UA24/2M-5 anti-skid braking systems, and UP-53/1M electro-pneumatic valve), as per the appropriate guidance. 260. Anti-Skid System Additional Information: The functionality of the system, to the correct specifications is essential in mitigating the MiG-21s high-landing speed and propensity for overruns. Note: The UA-24 anti-skid sensor is mounted on the main wheels outer rim. An electro-pneumatic valve powers the anti-skid system, which prevents brake locking during ground operations. Inspect and replace hoses and cables appropriately, as per the applicable guidance and specifications. Due to the age of many of the former military high-performance aircraft, and in many cases, poor storage history, it is essential to ensure thorough inspections of all hoses and cables (multiple systems) and replace them in accordance with the guidance and requirements (i.e., USAF. NAVAIR, NATO, RAF). 261. Hoses and Cables Additional Information: This is an issue because operators revert to fabricating their own. Specifications and quality are unknown. Case in point, the following advertisement illustrates this: Specialty Hose has made up hose kits for the MiG-17 and is now considering doing the same for the MiG-21, if there is enough interest. If you are interested in such a product you can calland let him know how many sets you would be interested in. traerosales@specialtyhose.com. http://www.classicjets.org/forum. If applicable to the aircraft in question (i.e., Chinese F-7FG), ensure that the AIP provides for proper slat condition and functionally (i.e., lubrication, freedom of movement of the rollers, re-alignment). The wing slats may stick and create asymmetric lift during maneuvering. Verify that the AIP addresses the inspection of the anti-flutter weights on the horizontal stabilizers (external) and the rudder mass balance weights (internal). Ensure that the AIP and related tasks (i.e., daily, preflight) check the wing fences on the aircraft. Additional Information: These are critical for control the airflow near the ailerons. 265. Tailplane Control Hydraulic Group Verify that the AIP incorporates the inspection and maintenance, and replacement (of components) in the tailplane control hydraulic group located in front and at the base of the vertical stabilizer. Use TO 00-25-172, Ground Servicing of Aircraft and Static Grounding/Bonding, dated August 2012, as the baseline for all servicing functions. Also see Grounding above. 266. USAF T.O. 00-25-172 Additional Information: This manual describes physical and/or chemical processes that may cause injury or death to personnel, or damage to equipment, if not properly followed. This safety summary includes general safety precautions and instructions that must be understood and applied during operation and maintenance to ensure personnel safety and protection of equipment. Ensure the AIP covers the adequate inspection and calibration of the AOA system and AOA indexer, as per the applicable guidance. This should be a required system for flight. It includes the UA-1 AOA indicator. Additional Information: Early MiG-21 (i.e. MiG-21F) did not have an AOA, while later models (MiG-21-PFM did). It is a critical piece of equipment for safe operations. It is believed that all of the MiG-21/J-7s in the US have the AOA system. Also see PWD-5 and PWD-7 Pitot Tube and Air Data Probes above. The AIP needs to address the inspection and maintenance (and possibly replacement) of the ARU-3V automatic system, which controls the stabilizer deflection as a function of speed and altitude. The AIP needs to address the inspection and maintenance of the RP-21MA temperature probe (or other, depending on the version and variant of the aircraft). Verify the AIP incorporates the inspection of all rivets in critical load areas such as trailing edges where inspections regularly noted loose rivets.
262.
Leading Edge Slats
263.
Anti-Flutter Weights
264.
Wing Fences
267.
Angle of Attack (AOA) System
268. 269. 270.
ARU-3V System RP-21MA Temperature Probe Rivets on Load Areas
Page 3-55
Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Verify any original antennas are compatible with all installed electronics. In addition, verify the AIP includes the appropriate inspections of the antennas. 271. Antennas Additional Information: Some new avionics may impose airspeed limitations. Over the years, many different antennas were installed in this type of aircraft. For the basics on this issue, refer to Higdon, David. Aircraft as Antenna Farm. Avionics, Vol. 49, No. 9 (September 2012). Verify hard landing and over-G inspection programs are adopted. The correct technical guidance for the MiG21 or J-7 needs to be used. 272. Hard Landings and Over G Situations Additional Information: NATOs is acceptable since several NATO countries still operate the MiG-21. This is especially important when acrobatics are performed or when the aircraft is involved in military support missions outside the scope of its experimental certificate (that is, PAO), and in light of safety concerns with the wing and flight control surface cracks and delamination. Verify the AIP incorporates the inspection of the aircraft if an overspeed situation took place. In the MiG-21, this is likely to occur before gear retraction. Ensure the AIP provides for all the required NDI (Nondestructive Inspection/testing) as per the appropriate technical guidance, to include USAF and/or NATO guidance, if necessary. 274. Nondestructive Inspection (NDI) Additional Information: Consideration of modern non-Soviet guidance may be necessary because the NDI technology for the MiG-21 may not be sufficiently adequate to address certain known (i.e., structural, corrosion, steel/aluminum combinations) and developing safety issues. See Chapter 5, Nondestructive Inspection (NDI), and AC 43.13-1 for additional guidance. Verify that the AIP includes the proper inspection of the exhaust trail areas. Engine exhaust deposits are very corrosive and give particular trouble where gaps, seams, hinges, and fairings are located downstream from the exhaust pipes or nozzles. 275. Exhaust Trail Areas Additional Information: For example, deposits may be trapped and not reached by normal cleaning methods. Pay special attention to areas around rivet heads and in skin lap joints and other crevices. Remove and inspect fairings and access plates in the exhaust areas. Do not overlook exhaust deposit buildup in remote areas, such as the empennage surfaces. Buildup in these areas will be slower and may not be noticed until corrosive damage has begun. http://www.faa.gov/library/manuals/aircraft/amt_handbook/media/faa-808330_ch06.pdf. The AIP needs to provide for the maintenance and inspection of the approved external fuel tanks (PTB-490 and PTB-800) as per the applicable technical guidance. Additional Information: Also see Fuel System and Description above. Not all external fuel tanks may be interchangeable. The external fuel tanks are pressurized to 0.81-0.83 kg/cm2. Note: An in-flight centerline fuel tank failure may have been the cause of a civil MiG-21 accident. Chinese external fuel tanks may not be used in Soviet MiG-21s. 277. Chinese J-7/F-7 External Fuel Tanks Additional Information: For example, a Chinese 720-liter centerline fuel tank may not be approved for some of the Soviet MiG-21s versions or variants. If such practices are contemplated, there should be technical data to validate the installation. Verify that the AIP provides for the maintenance, inspection, and replacement (at the appropriate life-limit) of the fuel pumps. Additional Information: For example, in some MiG-21s, the Model 495B electric centrifugal pump is uses in No. 3 and 4 tanks, while the Model 422 pump is used for No. 2 tank. These fuel pumps are driven by fuelcooled electric motors. Other references for MiG-21 fuel pumps include the NR-21F engine driven fuel pump. Verify that the AIP provides for the inspection and replacement of the fuel filters as per the applicable technical specifications. Many engine failures were traced to clogged filters, particularly due to excessive dusty conditions. Recommend that on issues concerning fuel tank inspections, and in addition to the applicable technical guidance, Inspection and Repair of Aircraft Integral Tanks and Fuel Cells, T.O. 1-1-3, December 22, 2009, Change 10, February 17, 2013, be also used as a guiding document.
273.
Overspeed Inspection
276.
Soviet MiG-21 External Fuel Tanks
278.
Fuel Pumps (i.e., Model 495B Pump)
279.
Fuel Filters
280.
Fuel Tank Inspections T.O. 1-1-3
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Verify that the AIP provides for the detailed maintenance, inspection, and replacement (of components) of the fuel system and related structures. The systems complexity varies depending on the version and variant. Additional Information: The following illustrates this: On the MiG-21 F and early-production MiG-21F-13s up to and including Batch 6, internal fuel was carried in six bladder tanks in the fuselage around the engine inlet duct and two integral tanks in the wings ahead of the front spar holding a total of 2,160 liters. The bladder tanks have an inner layer of fuel-resistant rubber 0.5 mm (0.0197 in) thick and an outer layer of rubberized fabric 1.1-29.5 mm (0.043-1.16 in) thick. They are housed in special metal containers integrated into the fuselage structure. The No. 3 tank is the service tank. A special valve in this tank ensures stable engine operation in inverted flight for up to 15 seconds at full military power or five seconds in afterburner mode. On MiG-21F-13s from c/n N74210701 up to and including c/n N74210814 the internal fuel capacity was increased to 2,280 liters while retaining the same number of tanks. From MiG-21F-13 c/n N74210815 onwards a second pair of integral wing tanks was added aft of the main spar, increasing total capacity to 2,470 liters; some sources state 2,480 liters. The wing tanks are all connected to the No. 2 fuselage tank. The fuel was distributed as follows: No. 1 fuselage tank, 235 liters); No. 2 tank, 720 liters; No. 3 tank, 265 liters; No. 4 tank, 200 liters); Nos. 5 and 6 tanks, 240 liters; Forward wing tanks, 175 liters; Rear wing tanks, 110 liters each.
281.
Fuel System and Description (General)
The MiG-21 PF/MiG-21PFS, MiG-21PFM, and MiG-21FL had a reshaped fuselage spine housing a rigid No. 7 strap-on fuel tank (saddle tank); the bladder tanks inside the fuselage were all new and the forward wing tanks were slightly enlarged. The distribution of internal fuel was as follows: No. 1 fuselage tank. 60 liters); No. 2 tank, 930 liters; No. 3 tank, 335 liters; No. 4 tank, 175 liters; No. 5 tank, 245 liters; No. 6 tank, 185 liters each; No. 7 tank, 170 liters; forward wing tanks, 180 liters each; rear wing tanks, 110 liters each. This gave a total capacity of 2,680 liters. The MiG-21R, MiG-21S/MiG-21M and MiG-21SM/MiG-21MF had the No. 1 bladder tank deleted but the saddle tank was enlarged to hold 510 liters; the internal fuel capacity totaled 2,800 liters. The MiG-21 MT and MiG-21 SMT had an even larger saddle tank. Formally this increased the total capacity to 3,250 liters; yet the maximum permitted fuel quantity was restricted to 2,950 liters. The MiG-21bis features a new saddle tank which is smaller than the one on the MiG-21SMT but larger than the MiG-21 SMs. The internal fuel capacity totaled 3,041 liters. On the trainer versions, internal fuel is carried in five bladder tanks inside the fuselage, a saddle tank and four integral tanks in the wings. This gave a total capacity of 2,350 liters for the MiG-21 U and 2,450 liters for the MiG-21 US/MiG-21UM. The fuselage tanks are pressurized to 0.210.23 kg/cm2 (3.0-3.28 psi) and the wing tanks to 0.41-0.43 kg/cm2 (5.85-6.14 psi). The fuel pumps are driven by fuel-cooled electric motors. Model 495B electric centrifugal pumps with 14,000 liters per minute delivery rate are in the Nos. 3 and 4 tanks, and a Model 422 pump with 8,000 liters per minute delivery rate is in the No. 2 tank. All versions have a wet center line pylon permitting carriage of a 490-liter PTB-490 drop tank; the tank is of circular cross-section with a pointed nose and cruciform fins. The tank weighs 70 kg (154 lb.) empty and 470 kg (1,036 lb.) full. Single-seat versions from the MiG-21 R onwards have wet outer wing pylons allowing additional PTB-490 drop tanks to be carried; they can also carry an 800-liter (176 Imp. gal.) ovalsection PTB-800 center line drop tank with no fins. The drop tanks are pressurized to 0.81-0.83 kg/cm (11.5711.85 psi). The fuel metering system indicates when internal fuel is down to 450 liters (99 Imp gal) and the fuel in the drop tank(s) down to 100 liters (22 Imp gal). http://www.kamov.net/general-aviation/mig-21-fuelsystem-and-tank-capacity/. Also see Fuel Tank Inspections and Related Structures above. If the aircraft is equipped (i.e., MiG-21 SMT, MiG-21bis) with a saddle fuel tank (mounted on the spine), very that the AIP provides for its maintenance and inspection. Additional Information: This type of tank has a number connections and components that may have to be inspected by removal of the tank itself. Verify that the AIP addresses the inspection, maintenance and replacement of the fuel flow transmitters, i.e., ARTS-16A fuel flow transmitters.
282.
Saddle Fuel Tanks
283.
Fuel Flow Transmitters
Page 3-57
Attachment 3
Issue(s)
The AIP and related SOPs need to address the high potential for fuel leaks. This poses a serious safety concern, not just for the aircraft in flight for example (in-flight fire and explosion), but also in terms of ground safety. It is exacerbated by the age and condition of the aircraft. The fuel bladders are a specific concern. Additional Information: Operationally (i.e., Cuban Air Force service), these were known to leak, and in some cases, leaks developed rather rapidly in the aircrafts operational life, in some cases within months following outdoor storage, especially in moist air. The following account of a ground crewman detecting a fuel leak illustrates the issue: On 19 May 11, 2011, the [mechanic] was detailed to carry out night turn around servicing on a MiG-21 trainer aircraft. While carrying out this inspection, he observed some fuel droplets leaking out from the rear dive brake of the aircraft. In spite of inadequate lighting at night and leak being not very prominent, he decided to investigate the cause and reported the matter to the engineering officer. Further analysis revealed a puncture on the main fuel pipeline in the heat zone of the aircraft. Had the leak gone unnoticed, it could have led to a serious incident/accident. http://www.indianairforce.nic.in. Another incident, this time involving two-seater points out to another source of fuel leaks: On November 23, 2009a MiG-21 trainer was lined up for take-off. [He] observed, fuel leakage from both connectors of the central drop tank. He immediately transmitted the abnormality on RT. The fuel leakage was also confirmed by other aircraft. Finally, the aircraft returned to dispersal. http://www.indianairforce.nic.in/fsmagazines/Apr10.pdf. Another MiG-21 fuel leak incident deserves to be noted: On May 20, 2010, a [mechanic] realized that the metallic flange fitted between tank no. 2 neck and saddle tank was of different size and shape. The longer neck of this metallic flange induced stress on the tank No. 2 neck and ruptured its vulcanized portion which had twice caused fuel leak on two different tanks. Had this gone unnoticed, the snag would have recurred causing fuel leak either on ground or in the air. http://indianairforce.nic.in/fsmagazines/Feb11.pdf. Verify the AIP includes procedures for inspecting, and when appropriate, the replacement of the bladder fuel tanks. Soviet bladder fuel tanks had life-limits, usually about 10 years. Deterioration of bladder tank (bag) and the sealant can pose a safety problem, especially because of the aircrafts age and storage, as well as the difficulty of the inspection (and access to the fuel tanks) itself. It does not necessarily take long for the bladders to deteriorate. Additional Information: The typical MiG-21 bladder tanks are composed of an inner layer of fuel-resistant rubber 0.5 mm thick and an outer layer of rubberized fabric 1.1-29.5 mm thick. They are housed in special metal containers integrated into the fuselage structure. Fuselage tanks are typically pressurized at around 0.21-0.23 kg/cm2. For comparison, integral wing tanks are pressurized to 0.41-43 kg/cm2. Tank deterioration is a big issue. For example in 1962, MiG-21F were deployed by sea to Cuba, and up arrival after about twoweeks in transit, it was found that the tanks were leaking due to cracks developed in the folds of the empty tanks. This type of damage required the replacement of the bladder tanks. Bladder-type fuel tank safety is not necessarily ensured by only on-condition inspections and may require more extensive processes, including replacements. In any event, adequate data must be provided for any justification to inspect rather than replacing the fuel tanks at the end of their life limit. The issue is to get acceptable tech data (i.e., inspection results and findings, USAF inspection guidance) to somehow validate some level of continuing the use (with a limit) beyond manufacturers calendar limit, that is, validate and substantiate an equivalent level of safety, as required in 8130.2. There is a need to go beyond just its fine because it does not leak or the Soviet life-limit is bogus as some in industry have argued. An acceptable process may include the following: A reasonable periodic inspection schedule. This inspection would not be a requirement that runs in perpetuity. For example, the inspection could be done at 5 years initially, deceasing over time and inspection cycle to ensure safety; 5 years, then each 4, and so on. The idea is to move carefully with the understanding that there will be a point at which safe operation can no longer be assured; Must include the actual removal of the cells for inspection; Inspection procedures and the technical basis of the inspection(s) would be to acceptable technical standards, i.e., USAF Tech Oder on fuel cells with the appropriate references, i.e. type of cells, type of material, type of storage, type of fittings, etc.; Use Inspection and Repair of Aircraft Integral Tanks and Fuel Cells, T.O. 1-1-3, December 22, 2009, Change 10, February 17, 2013 as the main guiding document; Provide for adequate/acceptable storage requirements, i.e., not outdoors for years or sitting empty for long periods of time; Document Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) concepts and data, that is, the inspection program becomes a living document that can be adapted or adapt to what is found in terms of the inspection(s); Report to FAA (FSDO) all defects, leaks, repairs concerning the fuel system/tanks.
284.
Fuel Leaks
285.
Bladder Fuel Tanks Inspections
Page 3-58
Attachment 3
Issue(s)
286.
Hydraulic Pumps
Verify that the AIP provides for the maintenance, inspection, and replacement (at the appropriate life-limit) of the hydraulic pumps; the main engine-driven pump (i.e., NP-34M-1T), the boost pump, and the emergency pump (i.e., NR-27), which provides hydraulic power in the event of engine failure. Additional Information: In case of a main and booster hydraulic system malfunction, the electrically driven NP-27T emergency pump provides pressure for 15 minutes to the stabilizer and aileron boosters.
287.
Wings and Tail Bolts and Bushings
Ask about inspections and magnafluxing of wings, and tail bolts and bushings. Recommend the AIP incorporate other commonly used and industry-accepted practices involving NDI if not addressed in the manufacturer or NATO maintenance and inspection procedures. Verify whether any of the structural components of the aircraft, namely wings and vertical stabilizers are exFinnish Air Force components (MiG-21F-13s). If so, verify that the structures were not tampered with. Additional Information: This is important because in some cases, disposed Finnish Air Force MiG-21s had those structures cut or otherwise destroyed for storage purposes and they cannot be repaired to any airworthy condition. Verify that the AIP includes the required inspections and maintenance of the horizontal stab bearings. Failure to properly lubricate/inspect the bearings or improper reinstallation could result in loss/failure of the bearings and in-flight loss of control. The AIP must address the inspection and maintenance of all steel components. As with many Soviet aircraft, the MiG-21 has a significant amount of steel components, including major structural elements, many embedded within aluminum structures. Additional Information: For example, in the MiG-21F, the main spar is an I-beam made of steel (30KhGSA high-strength chrome steel), while crossing ribs are pressed Duralumin sheet, while the skin is generally V95 aluminum alloy varying in thickness from 1.5 to 2.5 mm (other aluminum types used in the aircraft include V65 and ML5-T4). Some of these steel components are located in areas not usually found in Western aircraft. The issue of aluminum/steel corrosion is critical. Note: Dissimilar Metal Corrosion. Extensive pitting damage may result from contact between dissimilar metal parts in the presence of a conductor. While surface corrosion may or may not be taking place, a galvanic action, not unlike electroplating, occurs at the points or areas of contact where the insulation between the surfaces has broken down or been omitted. This electrochemical attack can be very serious because in many instances the action is taking place out of sight, and the only way to detect it prior to structural failure is by disassembly and inspection. The contamination of a metals surface by mechanical means can also induce dissimilar metal corrosion. The improper use of steel cleaning products, such as steel wool or a steel wire brush on aluminum or magnesium, can force small pieces of steel into the metal being cleaned, which will then further corrode and ruin the adjoining surface. Carefully monitor the use of nonwoven abrasive pads, so that pads used on one type of metal are not used again on a different metal surface. Refer to FAA 8083-30, Chapter 6, and FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 43-4A, Corrosion Control for Aircraft. Verify the AIP provides for the inspection and replacement of all bonded honeycomb structures per the applicable guidance (i.e., USAF, NATO). Verify flight controls were balanced per the applicable maintenance manual(s) (i.e., USAF, NATO) after material replacement, repairs, and painting. Verify proper rigging and deflection. Additional Information: In several former military aircraft, damage to flight controls has been noticed when inadequate repairs have been performed. If there are no adequate records of the balancing of the flight controls, the airworthiness certificate should not be issued. Verify that the AIP provides for the proper flight controls rods. For example, in the MiG-21, there are 20 such rods, of varying types, length, diameters, and thickness. Verify that the AIP provides for the detailed inspection of the ailerons, before and post-flight as well and possibly expands upon the original guidance. Several MiG-21 accidents have been cause by aileron failures, in some cases, actual in-flight separations. In some cases, manufacturing defects were found. Recommend that the AIP addresses (in the appropriate sections) the varying qualities that exist between aircraft, components, and parts. This is a typical result of Soviet aircraft manufacturing techniques because the MiG-21 was manufactured at many different facilities, and quality control was substandard. This can have an impact on maintenance, inspection, adherence to standards and spare parts use.
288.
Ex-Finnish Air Force Wings and Vertical Stabilizers (MiG-21F-13) Horizontal Stab Bearing Inspection and Lubrication
289.
290.
Steel Components
291.
Honeycomb Structures
292.
Flight Control Balancing, Deflection, and Rigging
293.
Flight Control Rods
294.
Aileron Inspections
295.
Varying Quality (General)
Page 3-59
Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Verify that the AIP provides for the inspection and maintenance of all flight control elements and components, rods as per the applicable guidance. The AIP should have comprehensive guidance to this effect, including the layout of the system and components. See Boosters System below. Additional Information: For example, in a MiG-21F, flight control elements include: All rods, and rudder foot control bars; aircraft control stick; Artificial feel mechanism of aileron system; Transmission ratio non-linear change mechanism (both wings); Boosters, Type BU-45A; aileron attachment points; Automatic transmission ratio controller, Type APU-3V; Artificial feel mechanism; Booster, Type BU-51MS (BU-210B on MiG-21MF), stabilizer control system; Bell crank for stabilizer attachment beam; Trimming mechanism, Type MR-100M.
296.
Flight Controls System
Verify that the AIP provides for the specific inspection of the trim system (pitch) (i.e., Type MR-100M). There have been several cases on fatal accidents caused by a runway trim. 297. Trim Failure (Pitch) Additional Information: For example, on September 17, 2001, an Indian Air Force MiG-21 crashed because a trim runway had caused excessive pitch-up just after getting airborne. It appears that the pilot overcorrected in darkness at a height of only 820 feet and a high speed (370 knots). This resulted in almost immediate impact 2 miles from the runway end. Attrition, Air Forces Monthly No. 192 (March 2004). Verify that the AIP provides for the inspection, maintenance, and replacement of the flight control boosters, i.e. BU-45, BU-51, and BU-210B units. Additional Information: The following description illustrates this important system: the actuator supply system caters exclusively for the aileron actuators and the other chamber of the tail plane actuator (the other chamber is operated by the primary system, not the booster system). Normally, the latter is served by both systems; in the event one of the systems fails, the actuator remains operational, but delivers only 50% power. Gordon, MiG-21, 2008. The following incident illustrates these important items: On October 27, 2009, Sqn. Ldr. S. Gupta was authorized to fly a two aircraft BFM mission in a MiG-21 aircraft. During a scissoring maneuver, the pilot experienced Booster Hydraulic Failure with pressure reading zero at a distance of 50 km from the base. The pilot took prompt actions by lowering undercarriage on emergency and recovering the aircraft off a flapless approach on priority. Post-flight inspection revealed a heavy leak from the BU-45 Aileron Booster as the seal of the banzounion valve had worn out. Sqn. Ldr. Gupta displayed a high degree of professionalism and averted a possible incident. http://www.indianairforce.nic.in.
298.
Boosters System
Page 3-60
Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Verify the AIP provides for the regular landing gear retraction test and related maintenance tasks, including documentation, per the applicable procedures and required equipment. NATO MiG-21 guidance an also be used. Additional Information: The following provides some background on the MiG-21 landing gear system: The MiG-21 Landing gear was hydraulically retractable tricycle type, with single wheel on each unit. Nose unit retracts forward, main units inward into wings and fuselage; in the process the main wheels rotate 87 around the oleos by means of mechanical links to lie almost vertically beside the inlet duct. On the MiG21F/MiG-21F-13, MiG-21PF/PFS and early-production MiG-21PFMs, as well as MiG-21 U trainers up to and including Tbilisi-built Batch 6, the levered-suspension nose unit attached to fuselage frame 6 has a 500 x 180 mm (19.68 x 7.08 in) KT-38 nose wheel set in a fork and equipped with twin pneumatic expander-tube brakes. Late-production MiG-21PFMs and subsequent single-seaters, as well as trainers from MiG-21 U c/n 01665107 onwards, have a KT-102 nose wheel of identical size equipped with an eight-piston disc brake. On the MiG-21F and the first production MiG-21F-13s the main units had 600 x 200 mm (23.62 x 7.87 in) KT-82 wheels; later MiG-21F-13s and early-production MiG-21PFS had main wheels of the same model but equipped with wider 600 x 220 mm (23.62 x 8.66 in) tires. The wheel track was 2.692 m (8 ft. 9 in) and the wheelbase 4.78 m (15 ft. 8). Late-production MiG-21PFS and subsequent versions, including the two-seaters, had new 800 x 200 mm (31.49 x 7.87 in) KT-92 main wheels with 12-piston pneumatic disc brakes; this resulted in the wheel track being increased to 2.787 m (9 ft. 1 in) and the wheelbase being shortened to 4.71 m (15 ft., 5 in). The latest versions of the MiG-21 could be fitted with KT-90D main wheels featuring cerametallic disc brakes. Tire pressure is 7+0.5 kg/cm2 (100+7.14 psi) for the nose wheel and 8+0.5 kg/cm (114.28+7.14 psi) for the main wheels. Brake system pressure is 19.4 kg/cm (277 psi). All three units have oleo-pneumatic shock absorbers. The oleo stroke is 86+2 mm (3.38+0.078 in) for the nose unit and 230+2 mm (9.05+0.078 in) for the main units. Shock absorber oil capacity is 650 cm3 (39.65 cu in) for the nose unit and 2,200 cm3 (134.2 cu in) for the main units; nitrogen pressure in the oleos is 3.7+0.1 MPa for the nose unit and 3+0.1 MPa for the main units. The latter have torque links; the upper portions of the main gear struts double as air bottles of the main pneumatic system. On the MiG-21 F/MiG-21F-13, the nose unit is castoring; steering on the ground is by differential braking. Late versions have a hydraulically steerable nose gear unit. http://www.kamov.net. The following accident illustrates the consequences of a landing gear failure. In May 1996, a Romanian Air Force MiG-21US was involved in a landing accident. During a touch and go at night, the left main gear strut collapsed. The aircraft exited the runway at high-speed and collided with a radio guidance installation. The right wing broke off. The rest of the aircraft rolled upside down and caught fire. While the pilot in the front seat was rescued rapidly, the IP, in the back seat, was not so lucky. He was trapped and suffered burns on 30% of the body, but was finally saved by ARFF personnel. See http://www.ejection-history.org.uk/Country-ByCountry/Romania.htm.
299.
Landing Gear Retraction Test and Related Maintenance, and Description
Page 3-61
Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Verify that the AIP addresses the proper inspection, maintenance, condition, deflection, and warning signage of the speed brake as per the applicable guidance (I.e., USAF, and NATO). 300. Speed (Air) Brakes Additional Information: There are two door-type air brakes, located one to each side of the under-fuselage, below the wing root leading edges, and one door-type air brake just forward of the ventral fin. All of these air brakes are hinged at their forward edges and activated hydraulically. Insufficient hydraulic power results in slightly drooped air brakes on parked aircraft. Note: Both forward air brake housings have access panels to the nozzle adjusting unit (starboard) and throttle connecting rod, both located just aft of the hydraulic actuators. See Air Brake T-Handle below. The AIP should emphasize the correct use (i.e., trained personnel) and safety issues with using this T-handle. Pulling the handle on the port side causes a short circuit which enables the air brakes to be opened manually for inspection and access to the panels mentioned in Speed (Air) Brakes above. The accidental operation of this device can cause injury. Verify that the AIP contains the necessary inspections and maintenance of the ventral fin under the tail. Verify that the AIP provides for the inspection and replacement of the static dischargers. These are commonly known as static wicks or static discharge wicks. Additional Information: They are high electrical resistance (6-200 Megohm) devices with a lower corona voltage than the surrounding aircraft structure. They control the corona discharge into the atmosphere, isolating noise and preventing it from interfering with aircraft communication equipment. They are used on aircraft to allow the continuous satisfactory operation of onboard navigation and radio communication systems during precipitation (p-static) conditions. Precipitation static is an electrical charge on an airplane caused by flying through rain, snow, ice, or dust particles. When the aircraft charge is great enough, it discharges into the surrounding air. The discharge path is through pointed aircraft extremities, such as antennas, wing tips, vertical and horizontal stabilizers, and other protrusions. The discharge creates a broadband radio frequency noise from DC to 1000 MHz. This RF noise can affect aircraft communication. During adverse charging conditions (air friction), static dischargers limit the potential static buildup on the aircraft and control interference generated by static charge. Static dischargers are not lightning arrestors and do not reduce or increase the likelihood of an aircraft being struck by lightning. Static dischargers are subject to damage as a result of lightning strike to the aircraft, and should be inspected after a lightning strike to ensure proper static discharge operation. Static dischargers will not function if they are not properly bonded to the aircraft. There must be a conductive path from all parts of the airplane to the dischargers, otherwise they will be useless. Access panels, doors, cowls, navigation lights, antenna mounting hardware, control surfaces, etc., can create static noise if they cannot discharge through the static wick. Verify any the yaw damper is addressed in the AIP as per the applicable guidance (I.e., USAF, and NATO). Review original W&B paperwork. Verify adherence to the applicable guidance (supplemented by USAF, and/or NATO) as well as FAA-H-8083-1, Aircraft Weight and Balance Handbook, if documentation by the applicant appears to be inadequate. Additional Information: Several former military aircraft accidents have been linked to center of gravity miscalculations. Over simplistic procedures have also been issues. Identify the type of ejection seat fitted to the aircraft. MiG-21s were equipped with several ejection seats, such as the KM-1 (aka SK-3), PSMs2, SK-1, and SM-1. There were variants to these. Additional Information: For example, the KM-1 seat could be a KM-1I, KM-1M, or KM-1V. Regardless, the type of seat changes many aspects of operations and maintenance. For example, parts and support for an earlier SK-1 seat will likely be very difficult to obtain, while parts and support for later models of the SM-1, may not. See Ejection Seat Components Life Limit below. The seat/aircraft combination must be approved by the airframe manufacturer. Note: Related equipment in a KM-1 installation would include the emergency oxygen supply (KP-27M) and the survival kit (NAZ-7). While some of the KM-1 seats have zero-zero capability, the SK seats did not, and have very limited ejection envelopes. Another significant issue between early MiG21s and older models is not only the ejection seat (SK vs. KM-1) but the actual ejection sequence. If the aircraft is a Chinese J-7 or F-7, identify the type of seat. Many Chinese J-7s have been equipped with the Chinese Jali HTY-2 ejection seat (Type 2), and Type III. The newer HTY-4 Zero-Zero seat has also been cleared for later J-7 models (i.e., J-7 III). Chinese ejection seats are not interchangeable with Soviet MiG-21s.
301.
Air Brake T-Handle
302.
Ventral Fin
303.
Static Dischargers
304.
Yaw Damper
305.
Accurate Weight & Balance (W&B)
306.
Type of Ejection Seat System (Soviet)
307.
Chinese Ejection Seats
Page 3-62
Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Recommend that the ASI become familiar with the basic ejection seat functionality. This is necessary to properly ascertain how the AIP addresses this important item. Additional Information: The following description is provided as background for an early KM-1 ejection seat fitted to the MiG-21: relative to western seats of that era, the most interesting features of this Russian-design are (a) the Seat Man Separation (SMS) mechanism integrated in the chute pack, (b) the use of mechanical altitude-triggered timer exactors, and (c) the use of a mechanical aircraft speed/altitude-triggered timer exactors. On the left knee guard is a black inertia reel handle. On the other leg guard is a red handle for ground egress or manual override situations. In the [front] you can see the lower harness connections. The main ejection handles have been sun-faded from red to an off-white color. The foot restraints are shown in the closed position in all photographs, while the arm restraints are shown retracted in the front and 3/4 right view and in the deployed state in the other photos. The lower right side of the seat mounts two mechanical actuators for various functions of the seat sequencing. The upper one is a PPK-1P which is armed by a cable from the first drogue chute which is attached to the red loop of the starter key. This is the primary seat separation initiator. The lower PPK-2P is actuated by seat motion withdrawing its starter key (the blue loop). This provides a failsafe function by having it perform the seat separation actions after 3.5 seconds if below 10,000 ft. The cables from both PPK units can be seen leading back to the aft end of the seat pan. The back view shows many points of interest. Starting at the top center and moving clockwise, the top of the black catapult tube is missing some parts. To the right of the shoulder of the catapult tube is a green box which is the inertia reel/shoulder harness control. Four cables can be seen entering the top of this unit. They connect to the roller units visible outboard of the springs on the top of the seat. (Those springs are used to flip up the headrest/drogue container to release the second stabilization chute.) The two green tubes running vertically along the right edge of the rear are the arm restraint extender (thin, light green), and retractor (thicker, darker green) units. The arm restraints are extended at seat initiation, and retracted as part of the seat man separation. Outboard of these at shoulder height is the pyro mechanism for the canopy release. It also has an interlock to prevent firing the catapult of the seat until the canopy has separated and withdrawn the interlock. The lower right of the seat contains mechanisms which are used to release the harness at seat separation on command from the PPK mechanism cables. To the left of the base of the catapult/rocket tube is a silver cylinder which is an electrical motor to drive the seat pan up and down for height adjustment. Above it on the outboard left side is a large silver box, which is the KPA-4 Speed/Time computer. Actuated by a key being pulled by a cable in the first inch of seat travel, it determines the 'mode' of the seat based on the sensed airspeed. We believe the airspeed is sensed via the black hose running out of the base of the unit. Next to the KPA-4 is a cylindrical structure with a right-angle turn at the top. This is the rocket initiator unit. Above it, horizontally mounted behind the catapult is the initiator for seat man separation. It is fired by a cable from the KPA-4 running up and over the pulley near the top of the seat. The cable is protected by a clear plastic shield running up from the outboard edge of the initiator. http://www.ejectionsite.com/km1seat.htm.
308.
KM-1 Ejection Seat Overview (Early Model)
Page 3-63
Attachment 3
Issue(s)
309.
OEM Ejection Seat Support
Ask the applicant whether the ejection seat OEM still supports the ejection seat system, and whether it control part supplies. It is critical to clearly understand if and how the OEM supports both the earlier or upgraded ejection seats. There is a possibility that some MiG-21 may incorporate the Martin-Baker Mk. 10 or Mk. 16 ejection seat. This is because (1) this seat (Mk. 16) was in fact cleared and installed in the IAI MiG-21-200 upgrade, and (2) the Mk. 10 is installed in some Chinese J-7/F-7s. Additional Information: Recent Chinese J-7/F-7 aircraft can, and have, been equipped with a Martin Baker seat, the Mk. 10. The Pakistan Air Force opted to fit their F-7s with the Martin Baker PL10LZ (Mk. 10) ejection seat. If this is the case, adequate technical data is required. There are no homemade ejection seat installations. With the new the ejection seat, ejection envelope can be significantly increased. The seat can expand the ejection envelope from a low speed of 55 kt. and high of 550 kt. to a zero speed/zero altitude and 600-kt. capability. The safety margin provided by these new Martin-Baker ejection seats, and the easier and more reliable support chain for the seats, are other features of the upgrade that rate as very positive. For more information, refer to Escape System Upgrade Program, T-38 Aircraft at http://www.wpafb.af.mil. As with the SK and KM-1 ejection seats and as part of the ejection seat system, in the MK. 16, the parachute (must an approved parachute for that ejection seat system) must be maintained and inspected in accordance with the USAF procedures and standards. Note: In recent years, the Mk. 10 ejection seat has been involved in fatal and serious accidents (seat malfunctions). In 2007, the rear seat in a RAF tornado separated inflight (no ejection) killing the occupant. In 2010, a RAF red Arrows pilot was killed when the seat inadvertently fired on the ground. In 2012, both seats in an USAF T-6A fired on the ground at Columbus AFB, and in this case, both pilots survived. These events clearly illustrate the dangers of ejection seats, even modern ones. If the aircraft is a Chinese version, J-7/F-7, and the Martin Baker Mk. 10 ejection seat is fitted, it is recommended that manufacturer support be used in the maintenance of the Martin Baker ejection seats in the aircraft. Additional Information: Unlike many other older types of ejection seats, Martin Baker, the manufacturer, still supports its older seats. Through its Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul (MRO), Martin-Baker can carry out maintenance if a customer requested this service. The company now offers a dedicated Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul (MRO) service, including a facility by one of its subsidiary, Martin-Baker America, in Johnstown, PA. Ensure life-limit requirements concerning the ejection seat are followed. No deviations or extensions should be permitted. If the seat is not properly maintained, including current pyrotechnics, it must be disabled. It covers both the SK and KM seats. Additional Information: There is history of KM-1 ejection seat pyrotechnics malfunctioning. For example, on June 10, 1992 the pilot of a MiG-21MF was killed following a loss of control when the ejection seat system failed. After the accident, and following the inspection of other KM-1 ejection seats, the Czech Air Force determined that some pyros failed. Examples of the pyrotechnic devices on the SK or the KM-1 (not interchangeable) seat include: PK-3M-1 pyrotechnic cartridge (SK), TSM-2500-38 solid rocket motor (SK), PZ-1 rocket motor (KM), PZ-M rocket motor (KM-1M), and PV-50 pyrotechnic cartridge (KM-1M); KAP-3 separation device, KAP-4 parachute opener (KM-1M), AD-3U time computer, ORK-11 connector, and PS-1 recovery parachute;
310.
Martin-Baker Ejection Seats (Mk. 10 and Mk. 16)
311.
Martin Baker MRO Support (Chinese F-7 Versions)
312.
Ejection Seat Components Life Limit
Other SK/KM components (not interchangeable or necessarily time-limited [has to be confirmed] ) include:
313.
Crew Harnesses Ejection Seat Modifications Ejection Seat System Maintainers Training
Verify the harness used by the crew is the required type for the ejection seat used. Accidents have been fatal because of harness issues. Prohibit ejection seat modifications unless directly made by the manufacturer or permitted under the applicable and current technical guidance (i.e., NATO). The use of the modified seat must be allowed by the airframe manufacturer or applicable service guidance. Require adequate ejection seat training for maintenance crews. Additional Information: On May 9, 2012, an improperly trained mechanic accidentally jettisoned the canopy of a former military aircraft while performing maintenance and was seriously injured.
314.
315.
Page 3-64
Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Ensure maintenance and inspection of the ejection seat and other survival equipment is performed in accordance with the applicable guidance in English (i.e., USAF, NATO) by trained personnel. In the Hungarian Air Force, this included an annual check of the seat (KM-1) involving seat removal. If the seat is Chinese, the applicable technical guidance must also be in English. Additional Information: The operational history of the MiG-21 includes many instances of ejection seat malfunctions. These failures, coupled with the many types of seats fitted to the aircraft (i.e., see Type of Ejection Seat System above) makes maintenance of these systems a critical issue. The AIP needs to include specific inspections and recordkeeping for all pyrotechnic devices, related systems, and other mechanisms. Ejection seat system replacement times must be adhered to. No on condition maintenance may be permitted for rocket motors and propellants. Make the distinction between replacement times, that is, shelf life vs. installed life limit. For example, a 9-year replacement requirement is not analogous to a 2-year installed limit. If such maintenance documentations and requirements are not available, the seat must be deactivated. A particularly poignant incident occurred in 1972 which more than illustrates the challenge of ejection seat maintenance. On May 3, 1972, aircraft 617, an East German AF MiG-21M, crashed near Cedynia, Poland. The ejection seat system telescopic pole partially fired out of the seat by itself. This means that the seat could not be used. The pilot, Lt. Col. Neumann, attempted an emergency landing, but did not survive. The pilot was the East German Air Forces flying inspector in command. Particularly tragic was the fact that he was the head of a commission of inquiry, which was created to study such accidents (telescope tube) in MiG21s. A 1965 Polish Air Force fatal MiG-21 accident also illustrates the need for proper maintenance: October 13, 1965. Pilot Captain Eugeniusz Bronislaw Mahnitski (800 hours in airplanes) was performing a night flight. After take-off, he reported that he had a hydraulic failure and that he was returning. He reported that he will eject. The bailout was too at too low an altitude. He did not separate from the seat, and the pilot hit the ground. It was found that the AD-3 cable has not been connected to the seat. http://aviacrash.ucoz.ru/. If the RV-UM radio altimeter is operational (includes the T-shaped dipole antenna), verify that the AIP provides for its maintenance and inspection as per the applicable technical guidance. Verify the AIP provides for the proper maintenance of all required approved ground support equipment for the aircraft. Related technical guidance must be available as well. Verify that the AIP includes the inspection and functionality of all maintenance access panels, including markings. For example on the wing alone, there are 20 such panels. Verify the word EXPERIMENTAL is located immediately next to the canopy railing, on both sides, as required by 45.23(b). Subdued markings are not acceptable. Verify the marking required by 45.25 and 45.29(b) concerning the registration number (N-number), its location, and its size are complied with. If non-standard markings are proposed, verify compliance with Exemption 5019, as amended, under regulatory Docket No. 25731. The following listing is provided to illustrate some of the deficiencies found in a MiG-21 AIP. No revisions to the inspection document and no dates in the Inspection Program. The AIP reads like a check list and not referenced like an inspection program. There is no master list of revision levels of manuals and document, and no samples of documents. Confusing RESPONSIBILITIES between the owner and the operator. For return to service, there is no approved data used to accomplish work. AIP needs to address overhaul vs. other lesser levels of maintenance, repair, and inspections. AIP needs to clarify exactly what training and experience is required to perform work on things like ejection systems, or other sensitive or dangerous areas (example: who knows how to properly pack a drogue-chute for your MiG-21). Where is the history of modifications and where are those records kept and is it part of the AIP? Lack of metric conversion data, and important terms no defined. Cannibalization, or removed and missing parts tags and tracking, not found in AIP nor is spare parts storage discussed. No information on the qualification of personnel - example ejection seats, drag chutes, drop tanks. There is no data on combining intervals. No program outlining short, long term or return for service by maintenance or by the pilot. Lacks a section and any technical data or required tools or training.
316.
Ejection Seat System Maintenance
317. 318. 319. 320.
Radio Altimeter Ground Support Equipment Maintenance Maintenance Access Panels Experimental Markings
321.
N-Number
322.
Sample Deficiencies in MiG-21 AIPs
Page 3-65
Attachment 3
Issue(s)
The following listing is provided to illustrate some of the maintenance issues and defects found by the USAF during a comprehensive evaluation (February 11, 1968 March 27, 1968) of a MiG-21F with a total time of 135 hours. Ground Inspections: Cracks in top or right wing, forward flap; Asbestos cloth worn through in aft section right side; Gasket bad at aft drain bottom of drop tank; Hydraulic leak in primary reservoir; Fabric covers torn on right side of vertical stabilizer; Boot missing from horizontal stabilizer rods inside aft fuselage; Both rudder pilot bearings dry and dirty; Bonding broken on rudder bell crank at fuselage break; First stage compressor blades rusty; Corroded battery containers; Main hydraulic system pressure gauge INOP; Nose wheel axle nut threads stripped; Cracks on landing gear lower fairing door; Cracked stringers in top of left main landing gear well; Fuel leak in aft section right-hand side; AMP-Hour meter INOP; Hydraulic leak forward of stabilizer actuator;
Flight Discrepancies: 323. USAF MiG-21 Evaluation (Maintenance Issues) February 11, 1968 - Cabin pressurization instrumentation failure; February 12, 1968 - #1 boost pump INOP; February 19, 1968 Gear would not retract, both main tires worn on the inside; February 20, 1968 Pressure cap found leaking on external connection of booster system, new seals needed; February 24, 1968 EGT fluctuation, two thermocouples leads with insulation were burned off; February 25, 1968 Hydraulic leak on the underside of the fuselage because of a ruptured booster system external hydraulic pressure connection; February 27, 1968 - Poor brake action on one side; February 28, 1968 Weak brakes because the brake cable from the control stick handle to the control valve was partially broken; March 2, 1968 Nose wheel shimmy excessive due to wear; March 3, 1968 EGT was first low and then fluctuated during g flight due to faulty thermocouples; March 5, 1968 Both main tires worn beyond limits with a total of 53 landings. Oil SOAP showed signs of high iron content; March 7, 1968 Brakes still sensitive and tend to lock. The drag chute button cover was found to be broken. Rivets popped on leading edge of the left wing, and also on the right flap inboard of the top leading edge. March 8, 1968 Brakes still grab; March 11, 1968 No EGT indication due to probe malfunction; March 12, 1968 Both main tires worn on the inside; March 14, 1968 - Canopy disconnected from forward hooks; March 15-16 1968 Pneumatic line on left strut leaking. N 1 and N 2 rotor Tach generators had to be calibrated. Hydraulic leak in right aileron booster swivel fittings. Cracks in radar compartment hood aft end. Multiple rivets popped. March 24, 1968 Nose tire worn beyond limits.
Page 3-66
Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Recommend that as part of the AIP design, the applicant/operator review and consider the Aircraft Structural Integrity Program or ASIP concepts discussed in the RAND Corporation 2006 report entitled A Survey of Aircraft Structural-Life Management Programs in the U.S. Navy, the Canadian Forces, and the U.S. Air Force. This document provides great insight into the manner in which the military services address many of the issues associated with operating older aircraft from a structural risk management perspective. It is relevant to any civil MiG-21 operation. Additional Information: The report summary notes: The U.S. Air Force owns and operates approximately 6,000 aircraft to meet its force requirements. The average age of these aircraft is approximately 22 years and is expected to continue to rise. Many of the older aircraft are facing aging issues, such as structural deterioration due to fatigue, and many aircraft are expected to encounter such issues as the Air Force plans to keep aging aircraft in service for many years. Fatigue is a process in which damage accumulates in material subjected to alternating or cyclic loading. This damage may culminate in cracks, which will eventually lead to complete fracture after a sufficient number of load cycles. Concern is growing in the Air Force that structural deterioration in aging aircraft is increasing the maintenance workload, reducing aircraft readiness, and potentially increasing safety risks (Pyles, 2003). Since 1958, the Air Force has relied on its Aircraft Structural Integrity Program (ASIP) to achieve and maintain the structural safety of its aircraft. ASIP provides a framework for establishing and sustaining structural integrity throughout the aircrafts life.1 The programs overarching objective is to prevent structural failures and to do so cost-effectively and without losing mission capability. ASIP is a key contributor to the Air Forces force management processes, and the programs ongoing viability will be critical as the Air Force continues to operate an aging force to meet operational needs. In recent years, some issues have been raised about inadequate implementation of ASIP. The concern is that an aging force, budget pressures, diminishing program regulation, and challenges in communicating structural condition and structural needs to decision makers may be leading to omission or incomplete performance of ASIP tasks. A further concern is that these factors may result in loss of control of ASIP, lack of visibility into the structural conditions of aircraft, and resource-allocation challenges for ASIP. The effectiveness of ASIP could be degraded, which would adversely affect operational effectiveness, flight safety, and fleet sustainment costs. This report surveys aircraft structural-life management programs in the U.S. Navy, the Canadian Forces, and the U.S. Air Force to offer insights into how the Air Force could strengthen ASIP, particularly in enabling (1) independent and balanced regulation, (2) clear and timely communications, and (3) adequate and stable resources to achieve ASIP effectiveness. Table S.1 compares the technical and operational backgrounds for each service, and Table S.2 summarizes the key characteristics of each program. See http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG370.html.
324.
Aircraft Structural-Life Management Program
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Notes, Action(s) and Disposition
Issue(s)
MiG-21 Operating Limitations and Operational Issues

325. 326. AIP and Related Documentation Understanding of the Operating Limitations Require adherence to the AIP and related documentation as part of the operating limitations. Require the applicant to sign the Acknowledgment of Special Operating Limitations form. Ensure the operating limitations address PIC requirements. Direct transition from a modern corporate jet to a high-performance former military aircraft with minimum training is not a safe practice. Refer to the appropriate plot training and checking requirements in FAA Order 8900.1, volume 5, chapter 9, section 2. In addition to holding the required Experimental Authorization, airplane category, the MiG-21 PIC should have: (1) 10 hours dual training in the MiG-21U in preparation for pilot authorization flight check; (2) A structured ground school (similar to at least an USAF Short Course); (3) 1,000 hours in high-performance fighter/fighter-bomber experience, including experience in second generation aircraft such as the T-38 and F-4 (F-16, F-18, and F-15 can be used for the total); (4) Proficiency and currency of 3-5 hours per month and 5-6 takeoffs and landings, and (5) Follow standard USAF proficiency standardization check procedures (see below). Additional Information: Experience with only straight-wing jets, such as the L-39 or T-33 is not sufficient. In 2008, and in the words of Air Chief Marshall Tipnis, the MiG-21 is a high demand aircraft. It certainly is a quantum jump for an inexperienced pilot who has just finished his training on sub-sonic jet trainers like Kiran or Iskra. http://rupeenews.com/2008/09/world-record-200th-indian-flying-coffinmig-29-crashes/. A current US MiG-21 pilot notes that the MiG-21 requires constant attention and respect from its pilot. You must always be at 100 per cent performance to dominate it. Stars and Stripes MiG Town, 2012. See Currency, Recent Flight Experience, and Conversion Training below. Recommend currency and recent flight experience of 3 to 5 hours per month and 5-6 takeoffs and landings. The typical general experience of at least three takeoffs and three landings within the preceding 90 days is not sufficient for the safe operation of the MiG-21. Many MiG-21 operators admit the difficulty to keep proficient and some note that they limit activity to around 20 hours per year. Stars and Stripes MiG Town, 2012. Recommend proficiency and currency of 3 hours per month and 5-6 takeoffs and landings. Conversion training should be at least 10 hours in type. Additional Information: Some flexibility could be provided in addressing this issue such as combining hours and landings (that is, 1 hour and 3 landings) and interjecting (but not replacing all MiG-21 flights with the specified period) certain high-performance flight profiles in another high-performance military jet such as the MiG-21U, TA-4J, or T-38. Lack of currency and recent flight experience in the MiG-21 plagued many former Soviet Bloc countries in the 1990s. In 1997, Polish Navy MiG-21 pilots were only able to reach 65 hours per year in the aircraft, a number considered low, and especially so when compared to the NATO minimum of 120 hours. In the 1990s, Hungarian Air Force MiG-21 pilots were only able to get 65-80 hours per year, considered by that air force as extremely low, down from 140 per year in the 1980s. In the Romanian Air Force, MiG-21 pilots fly about 100 hours per year, or about 230 sorties per year. This is not to suggest that all civil MiG-21 pilots get 100--120 hours a year, but it points to the fast that more than the bare minimum provide dun the regulations is necessary for the MiG-21. The Bulgarian Air Force, another MiG-21 operator which continued to operate the aircraft as a member of NATO, had similar problems with minimum pilot currency, where the 50 hours per year per so that its pilots were accumulating was deemed inadequate. On the other hand, in the 1960s, Iraqi Air Force MiG-21F pilots were able to fly about 20 hours per month, reaching a very high-level of proficiency and currency in the type. Conversion training is another issue. For example, starting in 1997-1998, the Indian Air Force, a large MiG-21 operator (still as of 2013), extended the training requirements for its MiG-21 pilots to 20 hours before solo (70 hours total) and also extended the ground school portion of the training by six months. These actions were necessary as an attempt to curb down the high accident rate of the MiG-21 in Indian Air Force service, due in great extent, to the difficulty of transition inexperienced pilots to the aircraft from straight-wing, low-power trainers like the HAL HIT-16 Kiran. In the Finnish Air Force, MiG-21 conversion training was comprised by about 12-19 flights totaling about 10-15 hours. In the Bulgarian Air Force, pilot operational conversion and rating in the MiG-21 includes 100-150 hours and takes place over 2 years, while Indian AF MiG-21 pilot conversion to operational status is about 125 hours in type. See Romanian Air Force MiG-21 Conversion Training below.
327.
Pilot in Command (PIC) Requirements (General)
328.
Currency, Recent Flight Experience, and Conversion Training
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Issue(s)
Recommend that in establishing training and conversion requirements, the Romanian Air Force standards be considered. Romanian Air Force MiG-21 Conversion Training Additional Information: In 2002, conversion to the MiG-21 Lancer is divided into two categories. First, pilots fresh from flight training go though a 60-day theoretical course before logging 21 hours in the air. Only then is the pilot posted to a unit, but when there, he still ahs much training to accomplish. Second, the pilots converting from the old MiG-21 (or other types) spend 25 days in the classroom studying the lancers avionics. The practical part of the course consist of seven flights in the lancer-B two-seater before going solo in the Lancer-A. See Currency, Recent Flight Experience, and Conversion Training above. As a reference to establish adequate training guidelines, it is recommended that the Indian Air Force MiG-21 conversion training can be used. 330. Indian Air Force MiG-21 Conversion Training Additional Information: Following extensive ground school (about 10-14 days), the pilots completed: A 10-hour course in a simulator; Up to 10 flights in a two-seater MiG-21U and 10-hours in a single-seat.
329.
331.
Annual Checkout
Recommend the some type of PIC annual proficiency be considered, such as an annual checkout on the aircraft type. This is a critical safety issue because in civil use in the US, MiG-21 pilots have flown less than 15-20 hours annually. This level of low currency, regardless of other operational flight, such as corporate or Part 121 flying is very low and safety can be compromised, especially in those cases where the PIC does not have a former military fighter-type experience. Additional Information: The MiG-21 is not an aircraft that forgives inexperience and lack of currency. This issue was and continues to be a safety concern for many MiG-21 military operators. In fact, when several former Soviet Bloc countries joined NATO in the late 1990s and early 2000s, NATO standard (in terms of number of hours/sorties flown per year) were implemented to mitigate these risks. Recommend that training and checkouts procedures incorporate the tasks and function as discussed in the Emergency Procedures section of the applicable MiG-21 AFM. In the Soviet format, these emergencies are documented in terms of (a) symptoms, and (b) actions. See Checkout Procedures above. Additional Information: For example, the emergency procedures section in the MiG-21UM AFM (Section VII) includes, but is not limited to the following emergency procedures: Engine Fire and Powerplant Failure on Take-Off; Powerplant Surge and Engine Flameout; Engine in-Flight Starting and Engine Jamming; Failure of Air-Intake Cone Control System; Drop of Fuel Pressure and Drop of Oil Pressure; Failure of Both Hydraulic Systems With Engine Operating; Failure of Booster Hydraulic System With Engine Operating; Failure of main Hydraulic System With Engine Operating; Failure of Aileron Booster; Failure of APY Controller and Failure of Autopilot; Failure of the Oxygen System and Cabin Depressurization; Smoke in the Cockpit, Icing of Aircraft, and Misting of Canopy Glazing; Tire or Wheel Damage on Take-Off; Failure of the Landing Gear to Extend When Normal Procedure is Used; Emergency Extension of Landing Gear and Failure of One Main LG Strut to Extend; Failure of Nose Strut to Extend; DC Generator Failure and Failure of Inverter; Failure of Pitot Failure of Gyro Horizon and Failure of Directional System; Off-Airfield Landing; Abandoning Aircraft in Flight and Ejection Procedures; Emergency Escape From the Aircraft on the Ground;
332.
Emergencies Procedures
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Issue(s)
333.
Checkout Procedures
Recommend the establishment of a pilot checkout certification process similar to the military operator, as part of the Experimental Authorization. See Emergency Procedures below. Additional Information: This training should include a structured ground school process and documentation covering the operation of the aircraft with an emphasis on emergency procedures. Recommend the operator limit the number of tactical jets the PIC stays current on.
334.
PIC Currency in Number of Aircraft
Additional Information: The USAF and USN restrict the number of aircraft types a pilot could hold currency on to two or three. This should be considered by operators who have several aircraft types in their inventory. Ensure the PIC operates the aircraft as specified in the most current version of the flight manual for the version of the aircraft being flown, and with the appropriate technical English translation. Additional Information: It is recommended that the manuals be of a NATO country which is either still operating the aircraft or has. The applicant/operator should provide for and the PIC should have differences training between MiG-21 models. The differences between a MiG-21F and a MiG-21PFM are rather marked. Significant differences include engine (throttle response), afterburner, weight (19,800 lb. to well-over 22,000 lb.), ejection seats, blown flaps, and various systems (i.e., fuel, brakes). The differences are especially vital in any situation involving a Soviet MiG-21 and a Chinese F-7 for example, where the differences can be significant.
335.
Flight Manuals
336.
MiG-21/J-7 Differences Training
Additional Information: Case in point, the handling and performances differences between a MiG-21 and a Chinese J-7EH and the F-7MG, which has a double delta wing (57 inner wing portion and 42 outer wing portion), forward sweep trailing edge, and no stall fences, are substantial. Also, some significant differences exist between single and two-seat versions, both the Soviet MiG-21U and the Chinese JJ-7. For example, Soviet two-seaters have many switches and functions in the back seat that do not exist in the single-seat. In addition, the afterburner in the two-seater R-11 engine is a hard light while that in the single-seat R-13 is a more sequenced event. This difference must be understood as should the differences in spool-up times between engines. The tendency for the aircraft to balloon on landing would also depend on the version and variant of the aircraft. Also see MiG-21R below. If the aircraft in question is a MiG-21R (fighter-Reece), SOPs should establish the adequate operational limitations of the aircraft. Due to its operational capabilities, including external loads, the MiG-21R has limitations that may not be found in other versions. Additional Information: For example, the aircraft had a minimum airspeed of 240-270 km/h, and prolonged flight at Mach 0.85-0.89 was prohibited because the aircraft was prone to vibration and suffered from a lack of roll stability at these Mach numbers. Verify the applicants annual program letter contains sufficient detail and is consistent with applicable regulations and policies.
337.
MiG-21R
338.
Adequate Annual Program Letter
Additional Information: Many applicants/operators submit inadequate and vague program letters or fail to submit them on an annual basis. Also verify the proposed activities (for example, an air show at a particular airport) are consistent with the applicable operating limitations (for example, avoiding populated areas) and do not pose a safety hazard, such as the runway being too short. There may be a need to review the proposed airports to be used.
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Issue(s)
Ensure program letters accompanying an application for an experimental airworthiness certificate meet the requirements of 21.193. The letter must be detailed enough to permit the FAA to prescribe the conditions and limitations necessary to ensure safe operation of the aircraft. Additional Information: The letter must include 1. The purpose for which the aircraft is to be used (such as R&D, crew training, or exhibition). 2. The purpose of the experiment. The letter must describe the purpose of the experiment and the aircraft configuration or modifications, and outline the program objectives. 3. The estimated number of flights or total flight hours required for the experiment and over what period of time (for example, days, or months). 4. The areas over which the experiment will be conducted. A written description or annotated map is acceptable. Specifically describe the area. Describing the operating area as the 48 states, is not acceptable. The FAA may establish boundaries of the flight test area, including takeoff, departure, and landing approach routing to minimize hazards to persons, property, and other air traffic. However, it is the responsibility of the operator to ensure safe flight of the aircraft. 5. Unless converted from a type certificated aircraft, three-view drawings or three-view dimensioned photographs of the aircraft. 6. Any pertinent information found necessary by the FAA to safeguard the general public. The letter must also include any exemptions that may apply to the aircraft, such as non-standard markings or using an experimental aircraft for hire. 7. If using the aircraft for multiple purposes or roles, (1) documentation of all operations for each purpose, (2) a description of any configuration changes that will occur between each purpose to include adding or removing external stores and enabling or disabling systems, and (3) a separate section for each purpose. For example, an aircraft could have an experimental airworthiness certificate for the purposes of R&D and exhibition. The same aircraft may also conduct military, State, or public aircraft operations (PAO). In this example, the program letter must describe all three roles with the same level of detail. While the airworthiness certificate is not in effect, nor can the FAA prescribe limitations for PAO, the FAA cannot determine the appropriate certification without knowing the aircrafts use. R&D Describe program purpose for which the aircraft is to be used (14 CFR 21.193(d) (1)), i.e., R&D providing chase for Major Airplane Manufacturer for certification testing of their next business jet. Aircraft Certification Office X is the project office. The assigned project number is ACOXzzz; Provide the following information as it pertains to your Program Letter (a) estimated flight hours required for program, i.e. 75 hours, (b) estimated number of flights required for program, number of flights, i.e. 50, (d) estimated duration for programs (14 CFR 21.193(d)(2)), i.e. 150 days; Describe the areas over which the flights are to be conducted, and address of base operation (14 CFR 21.193(d) (3)), i.e., the flights will take place within 150 nm of airport KAAA, excluding the airspace over City-X. The maximum altitude is FL 240. The base of operations is Major Airplane Manufacturer Hangar, 12345 Tower Drive, City, etc.; Describe the aircraft configuration (attach three-view drawings or three-view dimensioned photographs of the aircraft (14 CFR 21.193(d) (4) and include a description of how the configuration is different from the other purposes listed). See attached. Exhibition Describe program purpose for which the aircraft is to be used (14 CFR 21.193(d)(1)) such as exhibition at the following events over the next 8 months, i.e., AirVenture, August 1, 2013; Provide the following information as it pertains to your Program Letter (a) list estimated flight hours required for program, i.e., 13 hours exhibition, including the flights to and from the events. 10 hours for crew training; (b) list estimated number of flights required for program, and (c) list estimated duration for programs (14 CFR 21.193(d)(2)), i.e. 8 months; Describe the areas over which the flights are to be conducted, and address of base operation (14 CFR 21.193(d)(3)), i.e. crew training flights will take place within 125 nautical miles of Any Town, USA airport with a maximum altitude of 10,000 feet. The base of operations is the address listed above; Describe the aircraft configuration (attach three-view drawings or three-view dimensioned photographs of the aircraft (14 CFR 21.193(d) (4) and include a description of how the configuration is different from the other purposes listed). See attached;
339.
Additional Program Letter Guidance
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Date, Name and Title (Print or Type), and Signature. Consider requiring review (before flight) of all flight manual warnings, cautions, and notes. Such a review will greatly enhance safety, especially in those cases where the PIC does not maintain a high level of proficiency in the aircraft. 340. Flight Manual Warnings, Cautions, and Notes Additional Information: The following definitions apply to warnings, cautions, and notes found throughout this instruction. Warning: Explanatory information about an operating procedure practice, or condition that may result in injury or death if not carefully observed or followed. Caution: Explanatory information about an operating procedure, practice, or condition, which may result in damage to equipment if not carefully observed or followed. Note: Explanatory information about an operating procedure, practice, or condition, which must be emphasized. The PIC must operate the aircraft as specified in section discussing Operating Limitations, in addition to the FAA-approved operating limitations. Verify the applicant/operator has incorporated the applicable safety supplements into operational guidance as appropriate. Additional Information: The most current version of the AFM/NATO/NATOPS/Pilot Notes usually provides a listing of affected safety supplements and this can be used as a reference. Verify whether the aircraft includes aircraft-specific restrictions. If those restrictions exist, the operator must understand those restrictions before flight, especially any post-restoration flight. Verify the aircraft is operated with qualified crew chief/plane captains, especially during preflight and post-flight inspections as well as assisting the PIC during startup and shutdown procedures. Additional Information: Recommned that ground personnel training addresses the following areas and issues: Flight controls check; FOD; Marshalling signals; Servicing and handling amrkings; Exterior drains and vents; Normal refeuling and defueling; Access doors and panels; Covers and guards; Cockpit area safety checks; Danger areas; Blast effects; Pushing; Towing; Electrical connections; Pneumatic connections; Hydraulic connections; Landing gear and tire servicing;
341.
Operating Limitations
342.
Safety Supplements
343.
Foreign Aircraft Particularities and Restrictions
344.
Maintenance and Line Support
See Assisted Flight Control Checks below. 345. 346. Restrict Acrobatics Engine Operating Limits Mach Meter and Airspeed Calibration Accelerometer Restrict acrobatics per the appropriate flight manual and require a minimum of 10,000 feet AGL. Adhere to all engine limitations in the applicable flight manuals. Require the installation and calibration of a Mach meter or verify the PIC makes the proper Mach determination before flight. Additional Information: Unless the airspeed indicator is properly calibrated, transonic range operations may have to be restricted. If provided, ensure the aircrafts accelerometer is functional. This instrument is critical to remain within
347.
348.
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
the required G limitation of the aircraft.
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
349.
BD-66-21N Rack
The installation of the BD3-66-21N special weapon (nuclear weapon) rack is prohibited. Require adequate ejection seat training for the PIC and crew, if applicable, for the type of seat installed. There should not be a general ejection seat training program. It needs to be specific to the seat installed, i.e., SK or KM. The PIC must also be able to ensure any additional occupant is fully trained on ejection procedures and alternate methods of escape. Evidence shows the safety record of attempted ejections in civilian former military aircraft is very poor, typically indicating inadequate training leading to ejections outside of the envelope. The ejection envelope is a set of defined physical parameters within which an ejection may be successfully executed. Additional Information: Critical in ejection seat training is the seat itself. One of the most common MiG-21 ejection seats is the KM-1 seat. It can be found in MiG-21PFM, M, and MF. The MiG-21F, F-13, PF, and some MiG-21PFMs have the older (and less effective) SK ejection seat. The SK cannot be used on the ground, on takeoff up to (about) 170 m (550 ft.) and on landing below 200 m (600 ft.) depending upon speed and pitch angle. See SK Ejection Seat below. The MiG-21bis uses a slightly improved KM-1M which has a different leg restrain mechanism. The KM-1 ejection seat is propelled from the aircraft by an ejection gun which is assisted by a rocket motor (commonly referred to as pyros). The ejection seat system includes an automatic ejection sequencing system. In the two-seat MiG-21U, the front canopy separates before the rear canopy followed by the pilot in the aft cockpit and the pilot in the front cockpit last. This occurs when the ejection is initiated by either pilot through the ejection handles. The following provides additional details on the seat sequencing and mechanisms: In Type 68 (MiG-21US) both canopies will be jettisoned if one of the emergency canopy jettison handles is pulled. In Type 69 (MiG21UM) the rear canopy can be jettisoned separately. However, both canopies jettison if initiated by the pilot in the front cockpit. If necessary, ejection can be accomplished at ground level between 75 knots and 280 knots. If faster than 280 knots, an altitude of 100 ft. or higher should be observed. http://www.topedge.com/panels/aircraft/sites/kraft/km1.htm. Verify the safety of ejection seats on the ground. Verify ejection seats cannot be accidentally fired, including prohibiting untrained personnel from sitting on the seats. Additional Information: As an example, on January 25, 1963, aircraft 654, a MiG-21F-13 (serial number N74212011, use beginning 28/07/1962), was involved in an ejection seat (SK) related accident. Because of the failure to observe the safety regulations, one of the pyros was accidentally armed and fires the seat with the pilot in it. Because the SK seat was not a Zero-Zero seat, the pilot was killed. As NAVAIR states, the public shall be denied access to the interior of all aircraft employing ejection seats or other installed pyrotechnic devices that could cause injury. In addition, operators should provide security during the exhibition of the aircraft to prevent inadvertent activation of the ejection system from inside or outside the aircraft by spectators or onlookers. The PIC on a recent former military jet operation noted: Recently we had a case where a guest in the back jettisoned the rear canopy on the ground at the parking position while trying to lock the canopy with the lever on the R/H side The canopy went straight up for 6 m (20 ft.) and fell back on the ground, right in front of the left wing leading edge next to the rear cockpit (fortunately not straight back on the cockpit to punish the guy). A fatal 2011 accident involving the Red Arrows is also a reminder: November 9, 2011. Flight Lieutenant Sean Cunningham was killed yesterday when his ejection seat fired while his aircraft was at a standstill. Despite the accidental firing of the seat, the pilot should have been able to parachute down to safety but it appears that the parachute never deployed. Sean Cunningham died of his wounds a short time after the incident. This type of accident is extremely rare but, although modern ejection seats are very effective, they are very complex and potentially dangerous pieces of equipment. http://www.worldwarbirdnews.com. Note: Any ejection seat training must include survival and post-bailout procedures, based either on U.S. Navy, USAF, or NATO training, as appropriate for the equipment being used. Note: As a result of accidents, DOD policy prohibits the public from sitting on armed ejection seats. Require the PIC to carry the aircrafts escape system safety pins on all flights and high-speed taxi tests.
350.
Ejection Seat System PIC Training
351.
Ejection Seat System Ground Safety
352.
Ejection Seat System Safety Pins
Additional Information: As a recommendation stemming from a fatal accident, the U.K. CAA may require operators of civil registered aircraft fitted with live ejection seats to carry the aircrafts escape systems safety pins (a) on all flights and high-speed taxi tests (b) in a position where they are likely to be found and identified without assistance from the aircrafts flight or ground crews. Except for those that are part of the ejection seat system, the installation, and use of any pyrotechnics, including those installed as part of pylons and ejector units in external stores are prohibited. Prohibit explosive pylon charges (ejectors). The related pylon/ejector assemblies cannot be functional.
353.
Pyrotechnics and Pylon Ejectors
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
354.
Parachutes (Live Ejection Seat)
As part of the ejection seat system, the parachute (must be an approved parachute for that ejection seat system) must be maintained and inspected in accordance with the manufacturers (or applicable NATO) procedures and standards. The parachute must be rated for the particular ejection seat being used. Comply with 91.307, Parachutes and Parachuting.
355.
Parachute (De-Activated Ejection Seat)
Additional Information: This regulation includes parachute requirements (1) that the parachute be of an approved type and packed by a certificated and appropriately rated parachute rigger, and (2) if of a military type, that the parachute be identified by an NAF, AAF, or AN drawing number, an AAF order number, or any other military designation or specification number. Concerning parachutes, track parachute log books along with serial number, dates of manufacture and service life limits. The parachute must be packed, maintained, or altered by a person who holds an appropriate and current parachute rigger certificate. Additional Information: The certificate is issued under Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 65, subpart F. Note: Some operators deactivate the ejections seat but continue to carry the parachute. Such practices need to be properly documented and adequate training and procedures instituted. Prohibit the installation of external stores or equipment that was not approved by the military service, i.e., NATO. Under FAA Order 8130.2, only aircraft certificated for the purpose of R&D may be eligible to operate with functional jettisonable fuel tanks or stores, but the safety of people and property on the ground still has to be addressed. Additional Information: As the NTSB stated in 2012 following the fatal accident of a high-performance experimental aircraft, the fine line between observing risk and being impacted by the consequences when something goes wrong was crossed. In many cases, the pilots may understand the risks they assumed, but the spectators presumed safety has not been assessed and addressed. Unless properly documented (i.e., DER data) or originally cleared for the aircraft, prohibit the installation of any external device to the aircraft, including cameras, and the S-13 pod. The GP-9 gun pod is also covered, even if installed for esthetic reasons. There are many safety-related issues with homemade installations. It would also be applicable to travel pods. See Travel Pod above. Additional Information: As an example, when the Bulgarian Air Force attempted to modify and adapt an ELINT pod from the MiG-21R to the MiG-21MF, flight test showed that directional stability was considerably affected, especially during the landing phase. Mladenov, April 2001. The following 2005 exchange concerning such as installation in a MiG-21 illustrates the issue: Anyone have any ideas on mounting a small video camera somewhere on the MiG-21 to get external shots? The Soviet method is a monstrosity mounted in an under wing pylon.I realize that this is not going to be a 400 MPH duct tape job. It has to be safe and legal. Maybe facing aft in the IFF ant area atop the vertical stabilizer? In the structure, not on it? I have taken many videos with a wide angle 8 mm digital from the back seat of your old "U" N315. I would like to get a different perspective, ideally from outside the cockpit either looking forward or aft. Bottom of the aircraft would make a unique video. I have been thinking about remoting a very small camera in the IFF area atop the vertical stabilizer. In the compartment, with a lipstick type camera jutting out slightly and looking forward. These cameras are available and they would transmit to a recorder in the backseat There is a small panel up there that could be modified to permit this. The radio frequency and the aerodynamics would be looked at very carefully. A wide angle view from that perspective would be worth the hassle. http://www.classicjets.org/forum. Prohibit explosive pylon charges (ejectors). The related pylon/ejector assemblies, including the pylon ejector mechanism cannot be functional. Additional Information: For example, in 1967, an East German ground crewman was killed when the pyros on an external fuel tank fired. The operating limitations (as well as SOPs) should incorporate the specific drop tank limitations related to (1) takeoff and landing performance, (2) G limits, (3) airspeed, and (4) fuel in the tanks.
356.
Parachute Data (Crew Parachutes)
357.
External Stores (General)
358.
Externally Mounted Devices
359.
Pylon Ejectors and Explosive Release Units
360.
External Tank Limitations
Additional Information: The crash of a civil MiG-21 in 1999 is believed to have been caused by the pilot exceeding the airspeed limitation of the external fuel tank, which failed in-flight, leading to the loss of the aircraft due to a loss of control.
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Verify the type, condition, installation, and removal of external fuel tanks meet the applicable requirements, i.e., NATO. Only external tanks cleared for use by the applicable military service (i.e., NATO, Indian AF) may be used on the aircraft. Additional Information: These include the PTB-490 and PTB-800 tanks. MiG-21 fuel tanks vary, but two typical tanks include the 490 liter drop tanks and the 800 liter centerline tank. External fuel tank installation is not a simple task nor should they be homemade proven by a simple flight test. Drop tank clearance relies on elaborate engineering and flight test processes that can be compared to a simple flight to show that they hold in Phase I. There are serious issues with air loads, fittings, G limitations, flutter, limitations on the amount that can be used, take-off, and landing performance, W&B issues, and fuel sloshing, and so on. The AIP needs to address their inspection and maintenance. There should not be any means of jettisoning these tanks while on the ground or in flight. The safety issues with these systems is not covered by 91.15 Dropping objects. There is a distinction between removable and jettisonable tank. A MiG-21 operator in the US explains that we have removable drop tanks on ourMiG-21 We sometimes fly to airshows with the tanks on, remove the tanks for the show, and then put them back on for the flight home. Removable vs. droppable. http://eaaforums.org. Finally, there should not be any modifications to the drop tanks except when to prevent jettisoning. Note: The drop tanks would typically have data plates. Prohibit the dropping or release of ordnance, including training ordnance. Although Part 91 and FAA Order 8130.2 provide some references to dropping objects (i.e., 91.15 and droppable in R&D certificates in 8130.2), the fact is that neither contemplated (1) ordnance release, and (2) considered the many dangers of such activities. Part 91 and the Order were designed to address civil purposes, not combat testing, and training. Additional Information: From a practical standpoint, under 91.319 and related guidance, including SMS, the issue is one of (1) identifying the risks, and (2) mitigating them within the valid civil purposes. In some cases, some risks cannot be mitigated, and that needs to be recognized. It is inadequate to consider issuing a civil airworthiness certificate to permit ordinance and other loads to be releasable (as a matter of fact, that is drop whatever you want as you wish) solely based on (1) a review of 91.15 and 8130.2 guidance, (2) and the claim that the aircraft used to do that in the military argument. There is much more to such activities. To illustrate the dangers of such activities, the following listing provides some, but not all, of the issues/dangers/risks that have to be addresses or mitigated (not necessarily in a priority order): 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. Liability; 49 U.S.C. 47107(a) concerning restricting airport access (federally-obligated airport) on the grounds of safety; Adherence to a significant applicable guidance and safety requirements; Storage safety; Handling and installation safety (procedures); Handling and installation (personal training, i.e., Aviation Ordnanceman rating); For example, personnel directly involved in ordnance handling must be qualified and/or certified according to the Navy's current qualification/certification programs; Ramp safety; Safety of any signal cartridge and fuzing safety; Safety or any propellants, and HAZMAT considerations; Mechanical v. pyrotechnical release; Only service (i.e., cleared ordnance, configurations, and parameters); Weapon (system) specific separation testing and associated limitations to address air loads, fittings, G limitations, flutter, limitations on the amount that can be used, take-off, and landing performance, W&B issues. Impact on aircrafts structure; Impact on aircrafts electrical system; Safety of people and property on the ground; Flight route safety and ATC coordination; Safe altitudes, and range safety; Emergency and inadvertent release;
361.
MiG-21 External Fuel Tanks
362.
Dropping Ordnance
In summary, the FAA is not in a position to assume responsibility for handling the issues above and incorporate them in the civil airworthiness certification process.
Page 3-76
Attachment 3
Issue(s)
363. 364.
(ESRH) Master Armament Switch
Disable the Emergency Stores Release Handle (ESRH), if applicable. Disable and disconnect the master armament switch from any system. Weapon-related buttons (bomb/rocket button, trigger) on the control stick grip and panels must also be disabled and disconnected from all systems. Supersonic flight is prohibited. Recommend limiting transonic operations to 0.9 Mach. This provides a good safety margin [such as avoiding q (dynamic pressure) limitations], and could be addressed in the operating limitations, the AFM, and related SOPs.
365.
High-Speed Restrictions and Max q
Additional Information: This is particularly important at low level. For example, at MiG-21 pilot noted that at low level, the speed of the MiG-21F-13 was limited to Mach .98. We would experience severe buffet if attempting to fly any faster Cooper, Arab MiGs, 2011. Aerodynamically, in the MiG-21, q or dynamic pressure is restricted to a maximum indicated airspeed of 595 knots below 16,000 feet. At this point, excessive buffeting and structural problems are encountered. Also, even skilled pilots find the aircraft difficult to maneuver at speeds above 510- knots. Recommend, at a minimum, all flight tests and flight test protocol(s) follow the intent and scope (and not necessarily duration) of acceptable USAF/U.S. Navy/NATO functionality test procedures. The aircraft needs detailed Phase I flight testing for a minimum of 10 hours.
366.
Phase I Flight Testing
Additional Information: Returning a high-performance aircraft to flight status after restoration cannot be accomplished by a few hours of flying around. It is not analogous to the 2 FCFs performed after a main overhaul when the aircraft was operational. Safe operations also require a demonstrated level of reliability. Note: In 1986, when the first MiGs were considered for an airworthiness certificate, the FAA required not only 15 hours in Phase I but also that the testing be done at the Mojave Airport for safety reasons. Entrekin, 2012. Recommend post-maintenance flight checks be incorporated in the maintenance and operation of the aircraft and TO 1-1-300, Maintenance Operational Checks and Flight Checks, dated June 15, 2012, be used as a reference. If operational procedures require the establishment of a controlled bailout area, ensure it (1) does not endanger people or property on the ground in any way, (2) follows established USAF/NAVAIR/NATO procedures, and (3) addresses the possibility of erratic flight paths after ejections. Refer to Flight Over Populated Areas above. Ensure that there are conservative G limits. Recommend limiting to +3 Gs and half of its original negative G limit. Not all MiG-21s have the same G limits. Many of these aircraft have structural problems dictating this prudent approach. There is no justification to take the aircraft anywhere near its original limitations.
367.
Post-Maintenance Check Flights
368.
Controlled Bailout Area
369.
G Limitations
Additional Information: The fact that the aircraft could be G loaded does not mean such performance should be attempted or is inherently safe. This is especially true given the aircrafts age and historical use. Maximum G limits should be established below design specifications based on the age and condition of the airframe. Particular attention to the condition of the wings is required because in-flight breakups with the original wings have occurred recently. Day VMC operations only. IFR operations are prohibited. Many MiG-21 accidents were caused by spatial disorientation. Note: Stability, instrumentation, and lighting are inadequate for IMC operations. Additional Information: The MiG-21 was not an easy aircraft to operate at night or in low visibility. Known icing needs to be prohibited. One of the main issues is the unnatural representations by several of the cockpit instruments, notably the AI. See Early Attitude Indicators (AI) and Cockpit Familiarization below. Unless a high-level of proficiency and currency in the aircraft in instrument conditions and at night, it is unsafe to permit such operations. In fact, at the height of the Vietnam War in December of 1972, of the 185 qualified MiG-21 pilots, only 34 were night qualified following training in the Soviet Union. A 1975 MiG-21MF report noted that the [Soviets] seem strictly to avoid flying on instruments although the MiG-21 has a full blind-flying panel with attitude and heading instruments driven by a remote central gyro platform. This was non-toppling in roll but locked and reset slowly at the top of a loop, producing briefly misleading or inadequate information. Loss of control and disorientation at this stage, sometimes resulting in the loss of the aircraft, were not unknown. ttp://www.flightglobal.com.
370.
Visual Meteorological Condition (VMC) and Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) Operations
Page 3-77
Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Prohibit all flights over populated areas, including takeoffs and landings. The consequences of a MiG-21 accident in a populated area would be devastating. Strict operating areas must be established for the MiG-21. While the experimental category may allow a reduced level of safety for the aircraft when compared to a standard category aircraft, an equivalent level of safety for the public must be maintained. In all instances, there must be adequate and detailed egress and ingress routes in and out of all airports that are used to avoid flights over and near populated areas. Additional Information: Recommend the general avoidance of populated areas be accomplished by keeping the aircraft a certain distance away from those areas (that is, 2 nautical miles), not just clear underneath and not to direct energy at those areas such as keeping the populated areas behind the forward 180 quadrant in relation to the aircrafts flight path. This requires rigorous flight planning. To address this, any airport used must be evaluated as part of the program letter. As the NTSB stated in 2012 following the fatal accident of a high-performance experimental aircraft, the fine line between observing risk and being impacted by the consequences when something goes wrong was crossed. Specifically tailor geographic proficiency areas, not just in terms of distance, but also taking into account specific populated areas. It is necessary to review egress and ingress routes in detail. Rigorous flight planning is needed from the PIC. Simply flying a route that is not directly over populated areas but that near such areas may not provide an adequate level of safety. Ejecting from an aircraft that is not directly over a populated area is not enough to prevent the aircraft from impacting people and property on the ground a short distance away. Case in point, in many military aircraft like the MiG-21, the loss of hydraulic power (not uncommon) can lead to a severe if not a total loss of control. Therefore, the pilot becomes unable to further direct the aircraft and the aircraft will choose its own impact point. If the loss of control occurs at a certain altitude, it is actuality possible (if not highly likely) that the probability of the aircraft impacting an area away from the intended rather than directly underneath the flight path is actually greater. Thus, it is important to remember that the applicant that the PIC is responsible for complying with the operating limitation restricting flights over populated areas. The PIC must be aware of the areas above which the flight is taking place and coordinate with ATC accordingly. Regardless, the very nature of this type of aircraft dictates that the operator must be the one to find a way to avoid the populated areas, and if in some cases, their overfly cannot be avoided, then it is incumbent upon the operator, as per the limitations, to find an alternate airport from which operate of transit in and out of. The dangers of operating such an aircraft over populated areas are best illustrated by the June 8, 1998 accident where a MiG-21 MF and a MiG-21UM of the Czech Air Force crashed into apartment buildings in the town of esk Budjovice due to bad weather by arriving from an air show. See http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/ for photography of this accident. Another MiG-21 accident, this time in Indian in 2002 was more catastrophic: On May 3, 2002, an Indian Air Force (IAF) MiG-21bis crashed into a bank in Jalandhar, Punjab, India, killing eight and injuring 17 people on the ground. The pilot, who ejected from the aircraft, survived. A number of by passers were also injured as they attempted to rescue people trapped in the buildings. The aircraft, piloted by Flt Lt SK Nayak, had taken off from Adampur Air Force airbase about 10:00 am, five minutes prior to the crash. The pilot reported that he "he heard some unusual noise followed by an explosion in the engine, and ejected. The aircraft crashed in a heavily-populated residential and commercial section of the city. The crash started a large fire in the bank and the adjoining lumber store. Pieces of the aircraft also landed on nearby homes. The first firefighting units to respond could not find water sources with which to fight the blaze, which was not attacked until Indian Army trucks with foam arrived on scene. It took 40 fire units five hours to contain the fire. At least one news source reported that a copilot had also ejected, however the MiG21bis is a single seat aircraft. Following the crash, the IAF suspended all MiG-21 flight training operations. http://en.wikipedia.org. Prohibit the carrying of passengers (and property) at all times. The MiG-21 is a Group 6 aircraft because it cannot comply with 91.117 in normal cruise configuration. Flight training is permitted only in accordance with an FAA-issued letter of deviation authority (LODA). No rides. Prohibit intentional stall and spins. The MiG-21 is susceptible to accelerated stalls at lower speeds. Sink rates are very high. Recommend using TO 00-80G-1, Make Safe Procedures for Public Static Display, dated November 30, 2002, in preparing for display of the aircraft. This document addresses public safety around aircraft in the air show/display environment. It covers hydraulics, egress systems, fuel, arresting hooks, electrical, emergency power, pneumatic, air or ground launched missiles, weapons release (including inert rounds), access panels, antennas, and other equipment that can create a hazard peculiar to certain aircraft.
371.
Flight Over Populated Areas
372.
Carrying of Passengers, 91.319(a)(2) Stall and Spins
373.
374.
TO 00-80G-1 and Display Safety
Page 3-78
Attachment 3
Issue(s)
375.
Occupant (Other than PIC) Training and Limitations
Implement adequate training requirements and testing procedures if a person is carried on the back seat [refer to Carrying of Passengers, 91.319(a) (2) above to allow the performance of that crews position responsibilities per the applicable Crew Duties section of the Flight Manual. This training should not be a simple checkout, but rather a structured training program (for example, ground school on aircraft systems, emergency and abnormal procedures, off-limits equipment and switches, and actual cockpit training). The back seat qualification should also include (1) ground egress training (FAA-approved ejection seat training), (2) ejection seat and survival equipment training, (3) abnormal/emergency procedures, and (4) normal procedures. Additional Information: In addition to any aircraft-specific (that is, systems and related documentation) training, it is recommended that the Naval Aviation Survival Training Program (Non-aircrew NASTP Training) or/and the United States Air Force Aerospace Physiology Program (AFI 1 I-403, Aerospace Physiological Training Program) be used in developing these programs. In addition, passenger physiological and high-altitude training should be implemented for all operations above 18,000 ft. This issue can be addressed as part of the operating limitations by requiring the rear seat training and incorporating the adequate reference (name) of the operators training program. Regardless of flight functions and other training (as discussed above), require that any person seating in the aft cockpit of the aircraft receives an adequate check-out on this particular panel.
376.
Aft Cockpit Override and Control Panel
Additional Information: This is important because the two-seater MiG-21s are equipped with an override and control panel in the rear cockpit and the pilot in that seat can override they front seaters actions and provide system failure inputs. The safety consequences of not being properly trained on this panel are obvious. See Use of Aft Cockpit Controls, Features, and Switches (MiG-21U) below. Prohibit operations above FL 410. Above, FL 290 appropriate RVSM approval is required. Operations above FL 410 are too risky to be mitigated under civil use and without specific training, equipment (i.e., approved Soviet high-altitude suit and equipment, such as the VKK-6M pressure suit, GSh-6, GSh-4MS or ZSh-3 full-face pressure helmets (not necessarily interchangeable), and the KM-32M oxygen mask, maintained as per the proper requirements and technical data), inspections, and strict operational procedures. The aircrafts pressurization system, its age, condition, and maintenance are safety concerns.
377.
Maximum Altitude
Additional Information: When discussing operations above 50,000 feet, a MiG-21 pilot noted that flying a MiG-21F-13 at such altitudes was exceptionally dangerous and required plenty of skill, particularly as the engine was prone to stall and the aircraft became unstable. Several cases are known where a catastrophic disintegration of the airframe occurred. Cooper, Arab MiGs, 2011. Note: At heights above 50,000 feet, even with 100% oxygen, a person will quickly become hypoxic, because the ambient pressure is so low that the lungs will not absorb the oxygen. It is at this altitude that a pressurized flight suit must be worn. Any altitude above 50,000 ft. is labeled as space equivalent zone. Also see High-Altitude Training below. Recommend the PIC complete an FAA-approved physiological training course (for example, altitude chamber). Refer to FAA Civil Aerospace Medical Institute (CAMI) Physiology and Survival Training website for additional information. USAF Aerospace Physiological Training Program, AFI 11-403, November 30, 2012 can also be used. Additional Information: Refer to FAA Civil Aerospace Medical Institute (CAMI) Physiology and Survival Training website for additional information. USAF Aerospace Physiological Training Program, AFI 11-403, November 30, 2012 can also be used. If pressure suits are used, require pressure suit training as per the applicable USAF guidance. This includes original and refresher pressure suit training and refresher training.
378.
High-Altitude Training
379.
Pressure Suit Training
Additional Information: Original training is a one-time requirement provided upon initial assembly and fitting of the pressure suit assembly. Refresher pressure suit training is required every 5 years for those who have undergone original pressure suit training. The reference is Aerospace Physiological Training Program, AFI 11-403, November 30, 2012.
Page 3-79
Attachment 3
Issue(s)
380.
Minimum Equipment for Flight
Ask the applicant to specify minimum equipment for flight per applicable guidance, and develop such a list consistent with the applicable requirements (i.e., USAF, NAVAIR, NATO) and 91.213. Additional Information: These documents list the minimum essential systems and subsystems that must work on an aircraft for a specified mission or flight. Recommend the establishments of post-flight and last chance inspection per the applicable guidance (i.e., USAF, NAVAIR, and NATO). Additional Information: Last chance checks may include coordination with the airport and ATC for activity in the movement areas. Prohibit the use of JATO or RATO (SPRD-99) rockets in all applications, including R&D.
381.
Post-flight and Last Chance Check Procedures
382.
JATO/RATO Rockets
Additional Information: This would include any internal booster system like the N 12-51 or U-21 rocket booster added to a fairing in the tail. The very high hazard and risk factors involved with these rockets have no place in civil applications. Establish adequate jet blast safety procedures per the appropriate guidance (i.e., USAF, NATO). Prohibit explosive pylon charges (ejectors). The related pylon/ejector assemblies cannot be functional. Any change in external loading for the MiG-21 (e.g., a change in a pylon, rack, or external store) from configurations previously approved by the manufacturer, NATO or some operators (Soviet Air Force, Indian Air Force) should be justified via analyses, test, and data. Ensure the applicant verifies ground personnel are trained for operations with an emphasis on the potential for fires during servicing. Prohibit non-trained personnel from servicing the aircraft. Recommend a Flight Servicing Certificate or similar document be used by the ground personnel to attest to the aircrafts condition (that is, critical components such as tires) before each flight to include the status of all servicing (that is, liquid levels, fuel levels, hydraulic fluid, and oxygen). Additional Information: Specific servicing areas may include: oxygen tanks and filler, fuel fillers, engine oil tank, brake control units, batteries, external power receptacles, rain removal system, single-point refueling (needs to be disabled), emergency air bottle and filler, and hydraulic reservoir.
383. 384. 385.
Jet Exhaust Dangers Pylon Ejectors Changes in Approved External Aircraft Configuration
386.
Servicing and Flight Servicing Certificate
387.
Ground Support Equipment Aerial Target Towing Asymmetric Wing Mounted Stores
Verify all required ground equipment is available and in a serviceable condition. Prohibit all aerial towing. Notwithstanding the standard language in the FAA Order 8130.2 limitations concerning towing, the aircraft is not to be used for towing targets because such operations pose a danger to property and people on the ground and endanger the aircraft. Prohibit asymmetric wing mounted equipment regardless of the applicable manuals. Prohibit formation takeoffs and landings. There is no civil use, including display, to justify the risks involved, especially lateral control and power response deficiencies with the MiG-21. Additional Information: As noted by the USAF during its evaluation of the MiG-21F, engine response was poor, the engine accelerated slowly even at high-power setting. The poor engine response precluded precise formation flying. Have Doughnut (U) Technical, 1969. Safe operations require the use of the adequate personal flight equipment and attire compatible with the aircraft and ejection seat system.
388.
389.
390.
Formation Take-Offs and Landings
391.
Personal Flight Equipment
Additional Information: Compatibility of the MiG-21 and its systems is not guaranteed with all Western (US, NATO) equipment. Some NATO MiG-21 operators adopted British helmets, but retained the Soviet KM-34 oxygen mask and related tubing. Other attire includes a helmet, oxygen mask, fire retardant (Nomex) flight suit, gloves (that is, Nomex or leather), adequate foot gear (that is, boots), and clothing that does not interfere with cockpit systems and flight controls. Operating with a live ejection seat requires a harness, and thus only approved harnesses compatible with the ejection seat can be used.
Page 3-80
Attachment 3
Issue(s)
The minimum runway length for MiG-21 operations is 8,000 feet. One of the safety issues with the MiG21 in the civil use in the US has been runway overruns, not surprising because the aircraft has a history of overruns. A conservative and adequate runway length is essential beyond the specifics in the performance books for the aircraft. In addition, ensure the PIC verifies, using the appropriate aircraft performance charts (Performance Supplement), sufficient runway length is available considering field elevation and atmospheric conditions. To add a margin of safety, use the following: For Takeoff 1. No person may initiate an airplane takeoff unless it is possible to stop the airplane safely on the runway, as shown by the accelerate-stop distance data, and to clear all obstacles by at least 50 ft. vertically (as shown by the takeoff path data) or 200 ft. horizontally within the airport boundaries and 300 ft. horizontally beyond the boundaries, without banking before reaching a height of 50 ft. (as shown by the takeoff path data) and after that without banking more than 15 degrees. In applying this section, corrections must be made for any runway gradient. To allow for wind effect, takeoff data based on still air may be corrected by taking into account not more than 50 percent of any reported headwind component and not less than 150 percent of any reported tailwind component.
2.
For Landing 3. No person may initiate an airplane takeoff unless the airplane weight on arrival, allowing for normal consumption of fuel and oil in flight (in accordance with the landing distance in the AFM for the elevation of the destination airport and the wind conditions expected there at the time of landing), would allow a full stop landing at the intended destination airport within 60 percent of the effective length of each runway described below from a point 50 ft. above the intersection of the obstruction clearance plane and the runway. For the purpose of determining the allowable landing weight at the destination airport, the following is assumed: o The airplane is landed on the most favorable runway and in the most favorable direction, in still air. o The airplane is landed on the most suitable runway considering the probable wind velocity and direction and the ground handling characteristics of that airplane, and considering other conditions such as landing aids and terrain. o No credit is applied for use of thrust reverse or drag chute.
392.
Minimum Runway Length
Additional Information: MiG-21 operators worldwide use the minimum runway concept as a means to reduce the likelihood of an overrun, either on landing or as a result of an aborted take-off. For example, the shortest of the 4 Egyptian AF air bases where MiG-21s and F-7 fighters are based is 8,300 feet. The following NTSB narrative concerning the 2012 MiG-21 overrun at Eden Prairie (see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2vf389pwxsg) explains the implication of a drag chute fa8lure: On June 12, 2012, at 0958, a Mikoyan Gurevich MiG-21MF, was substantially damaged when it ran off the runway while attempting to land on Runway 10R at Flying Cloud Airport (FCM), Minneapolis, Minnesota. The pilot was flying to Flying Cloud Airport so the MiG-21 could be part of an exhibition that was being held there that weekend. He said the en route portion of the flight was uneventful. Prior to landing, he made several low passes over the runway to burn off fuel. As the pilot turned onto final approach, he established an approach speed of 165 knots and landed approximately 300 feet down the 5,000-foot-long runway. Approximately 3-4 seconds after touching down, the pilot deployed the drag chute. As the chute deployed, it snapped off the back of the airplane. The pilot then used the anti-skid braking system to slow the airplane, but it did not decelerate as he expected. When he realized that he was going to go off the runway, the pilot maneuvered the airplane onto the grassy area adjacent to the runway to avoid crossing a state highway. The airplane struck a berm and a chain link fence before coming to a stop upright. According to one inspector, the airplane landed on runway 10R. When it was approximately halfway down the runway, the drag chute deployed. Before the chute fully opened, it departed the airplane and landed on the runway. The airplane continued down the runway at a high rate of speed before it veered left near the east end of the runwaybefore it came to a rest near the edge of Highway 212. The pilot said he tested the drag chute approximately three weeks before the accident in preparation for this particular flight and there were no malfunctions of the system. He also said that he had successfully deployed the drag chute about 6 or 7 times prior to this accident. The pilot held an airline transport pilot rating for airplane single-engine land and sea, and multi-engine. He is also type-rated in an A-320, B-737, and DC-6. The pilots last FAA First Class medical was issued on March 26, 2012. At that time, he reported a total of 21,000 total flight hours. http://www.ntsb.gov.
Page 3-81
Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Consider accelerate/stop distances, balanced field length, and critical field length in determining acceptable runway use per CJAA guidance. 393. Runway Considerations Additional Information: To enhance operations, it is recommended takeoff procedures similar to the USAF minimum acceleration check speed (using a ground reference during the takeoff run to check for a pre-calculated speed) is adopted. Recommend restricting use to airports with appropriate runway safety areas (RSA) and Runway Protection Zones (RPZ) to add a margin of safety. A runway safety area (RSA) is defined as the surface surrounding the runway prepared or suitable for reducing the risk of damage to airplanes in the event of undershoot, overshoot, or excursion from the runway. 394. Runway Safety Areas (RSA) Additional Information: The RSA is an integral part of the runway environment. RSA dimensions are established in AC 150/5300-13, Airport Design and are based on the Airport Reference Code (ARC). The RSA is intended to provide a measure of safety in the event of an aircrafts excursion from the runway by significantly reducing the extent of personal injury and aircraft damage during overruns, undershoots and veer-offs. Refer to FAA AC 150/5300-13, Airport Design. FAA Order 5200.8 Runway Safety Area Program provides additional insight into the value of RSAs. In addition, where possible, recommend USAF Potential Loss of Aircraft Zone (PLAZ) standards be used as well. Recommend that, in conjunction with RSA consideration, runways with EMAS should also be considered. This is important because When it is not practicable to obtain a safety area that meets current standards, consideration should be given to enhancing the safety of the area beyond the runway end with the installation of EMAS. Additional Information: AC 150/5220-22, Engineered Materials Arresting Systems (EMAS) for Aircraft Overruns, pertaining to the installation and use of EMAS, provides details on design to be considered in determining feasibility of this alternative. EMAS uses crushable concrete placed at the end of a runway to stop an aircraft that overruns the runway. The tires of the aircraft sink into the lightweight concrete and the aircraft is decelerated as it rolls through the material. Ensure all airports to be used are properly vetted in terms of suitability (that is, runway length, RSAs, emergency equipment). Requiring prior coordination with the airport management and fire rescue would not be unreasonable in some cases. 396. Suitable Airport Additional Information: If this is contemplated, coordination with the Appropriate FAA Airports District Office (ADO) and FAAs Airports Compliance Division, ACO-100, is required to ensure compliance with the applicable 49 U.S.C. airport access requirements as outlined in FAA Order 5190.6 FAA Airport Compliance Program. This order sets forth policies, procedures, interpretation, and the administration of the various federal requirements associated with FAA airport funding, which includes requirements for safe operations and terms and conditions for airport access at federally obligated airports. Recommend the use of a barrier (MA-1A) system be considered where available. These were and are available, if not required, for MiG-21 operations not only in the Soviet and Warsaw Pact air forces, but currently at NATO and Indian Air Force bases as well. Barrier MA-1, MA-1A, and BAK-15 Additional Information: If a barrier system is used, ensure procedures be developed for this. Refer to AC 150/5220-9, Aircraft Arresting Systems on Civil Airports, dated December 20, 2006. The military installs and maintains aircraft arresting systems when certain military operations are authorized at civil airports. Aircraft arresting systems serve primarily to save lives by preventing aircraft from overrunning runways in cases where the pilot is unable to stop the aircraft during landing or aborted takeoff operations. They also serve to save aircraft and prevent major damage. Aircraft arresting systems must be installed according to the latest official criteria of the military aircraft operational need. In most cases, the criteria can be found in AFI 32-1043, Managing, Operating, and Maintaining Aircraft Arresting Systems. Recommend the applicant/operator restraint from operating the aircraft on any runway that has standing water. The aircrafts propensity to overruns, poor barking, and high-landing speed justify this restriction. Prohibit operations in and under Class B airspace unless prior ATC permission is obtained before flight.
395.
Engineered Materials Arresting Systems (EMAS)
397.
398. 399.
Wet Runway Class B Airspace
Page 3-82
Attachment 3
Issue(s)
400.
Drag Chute
Required that the drag chute be maintained, inspected, and re-packed per the applicable technical guidance (i.e., Soviet, USAF, and NATO), and by trained personnel. It must also be the correct type and approved drag chute for the aircraft in question. For MiG-21 operations, the drag chute is mandatory in IAF service. Additional Information: See Drag Chute (General), Approved Drag Chute, Drag Chute and Systems Technical Guidance, USAF T.O. 00-25-241 (Chute Logs and Records), and Civil Drag Chute Guidance above. Note: A drag chute is a small parachute (usually stowed in the tail of the aircraft) used specifically to slow the aircraft down during landing. Prohibit hot and pressure refueling. There are too many dangers with these types of operations. Additional Information: The following narrative of an incident involving the refueling of a MiG-21 is a good example: In the early nineties, I was posted to a MiG 21 squadron in one of our forward western base. The weather was clear. Due to the impending Aircrew Examination Board (AEB) visit the quantum of flying had increased, both by day and night. The squadron was operating from the blast pens dispersed all over the airfield. The daily servicing section (DSS) had been set up in blast pens X and Z. The DSS was on a two-shift routine with nearly 60% man-power dedicated for the night shift. On this eventful night, flying was scheduled from pen X and Y. One Sergeant (Sgt.) and one Leading Aircraftsman (LAC) were in-charge of servicing operations from Pen X. The aircraft in this pen flew two missions that night, amounting to two separate details. After the last flying detail got over, the LAC was asked to refuel the aircraft as part of Last Flight Servicing (LFS). The aircraft refueler was hence summoned to Pen X to refuel this aircraft. A novice refueler operator accompanied the aircraft refueler. He did not have sufficient experience in night operations especially in dispersed locations. Though he was well trained in taking all precautions for prevention of fuel contamination, he was not comfortable in executing them during the reduced visual orientation required of night operations. The LAC responsible to refuel the aircraft assumed that the refueller operator was comfortable in the current situation and so he promptly climbed on top of the aircraft to be refueled. After opening the refueling hatch, he asked for the refueling nozzle. The refueller operator dutifully unwound the nozzle and passed it to the LAC. They then commenced refueling the aircraft. The LAC sitting astride the saddle tank on top of the aircraft noticed, despite the low light conditions in the pen, that the delivery pressure was very low. Apparently the refueller operator had not opened the out-pressure valve to the correct setting, perhaps he had not watched the delivery pressure meticulously, when initially opening the valve. Anticipating an extended time for refueling a single aircraft and subsequent unnecessary delay in the LFS, the LAC asked the refueling operator to increase the delivery pressure. The novice refueller operator was not careful of gradually increasing the pressure to the required value on the gauge. He simply increased the delivery pressure. The area of the refueling nozzle was fixed so the increased pressure translated into a rapid increase in the force per unit area of the refueling nozzle diameter. The LAC sitting astride the aircraft saddle tank did not anticipate such an increase in the refueling nozzles normal reaction to the increased fuel flow. The refueling nozzle rapidly rocketed back, out of the filling point and hit the LACs chest. With nothing to hold on to, the LAC was thrown off the top of the aircraft he was refueling, along with the refueling nozzle with a great force. With the strong impact on his chest, he landed unconscious on the hard concrete floor of the pen in a pool of jet fuel now gushing out of the refueller nozzle. The shocked novice refueller operator fumbled to shut off the fuel supply first before going to the aid of the LAC. Luckily, the Sqn DSS was in the same pen. A technician available at the DSS desk rushed to the spot and promptly gave first aid to the victim. The LAC was rushed to the Station Medical Centre in the COs car. The Duty Medical Officer gave him immediate medical attention and prevented possible fatal consequences of the accident. The LAC had suffered major injuries. In addition to the broken ribs due to the impact of the refueling nozzle, he also had external injuries due to the dangerous fall. He was admitted to the Military Hospital for three months and then was forced to go on forty-five days of recuperative sick leave. He recovered from the accident but only after sustaining injuries, which were likely to affect him later in his service career, all attributable to service. An insignificant action of opening a fuel outlet valve a little too fast caused a valuable life to be at stake. The Squadron missed the output of the LAC for a hundred and thirty-five days! A lot of highly inflammable jet fuel caused a definite fire hazard before going down the drain. Had the refueller operator followed the correct SOP of checking the gauge pressure when adjusting the delivery pressure, all the consequences would have been prevented. It is for all of us to remember that SOPs are not merely for efficient tasking but also to ensure the personal safety of the technicians. SOPs help in avoiding situations which might lead someone into a tight spot, whether in the air or on ground and thus foster aerospace safety. In fact, actually and contrary to what many people believe, SOPs are saviors of personnel who set forth to enhance the operational edge. http://indianairforce.nic.in/fsmagazines/Jan11.pdf.
401.
Hot and Pressure Refueling
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Coordinate with Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) personnel at any airport of landing. A safety briefing should be provided and include: an ejection seat system overview; making the ejection seat safe, including location and use of safety pins; canopy jettison; fuel system, fuel tanks; intake dangers, engine shut-off throttle; fuel; batteries; flooding the engines; fire access panels and hot exhaust ports; and crew extraction-harness, oxygen, communications, and forcible entry. Additional Information: ARFF personnel should be provided with the relevant sections of the aircraft AFM and other appropriate references like Fire Fighting and Aircraft Crash Rescue, Vol. 3, Air University, Maxwell AFB, 1958. An additional reference is the NATOPS U.S. NAVY Aircraft Firefighting and Rescue Manual, NAVAIR 00-80R-14, dated October 15, 2003. The FAA maintains a series of ACs that provide guidance for Crash Fire Rescue personnel. Refer to AC 5210-17, Programs for Training of Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting. Note: On November 1, 2012, the NTSB issued Safety Recommendation A-12-64 through -67. The NTSB recommends the FAA require the identification of the presence and type of safety devices (such as ejection seats) that contain explosive components on the aircraft. It further stated that that information should be readily available to first responders and accident investigators by displaying it on the FAAs online aircraft registry and that the FAA should issue and distribute a publicly available safety bulletin to all 14 CFR part 139-certificated airports and to representative organizations of off-airport first responders, such as the International Association of Fire Chiefs and the National Fire Protection Association, to (1) inform first responders of the risks posed by the potential presence of all safety devices that contain explosive components (including ejection seats) on an aircraft during accident investigation and recovery, and (2) offer instructions about how to quickly obtain information from the FAAs online aircraft registry regarding the presence of these safety devices that contain explosive components on an aircraft. The applicant must provide objective evidence that the airport manager of the airport where the aircraft is based has been notified regarding both the presence of explosive devices in these systems and the planned operation of an experimental aircraft from that airport. Coordinate with ATC before any operation that may interfere with normal flow of traffic to ensure the requirement to avoid flight over populated areas is complied with. 404. ATC Coordination Additional Information: ATC does not have the authority to waive any of the operating limitations or operating rules. It is the PIC responsibility to integrate the operating limitations of the aircraft and ATC. In this respect, it is possible that IFR operations (not IMC) may have to be curtailed to comply with the operating limitations. Require the operator to obtain a declaration of PAO from the contracting entity or risk civil penalty for operating the aircraft outside the limits of the FAA experimental certificate. Some operators may enter into contracts with the DOD to provide military missions such as air combat maneuvering, target towing, and ECM. Such operations constitute PAO, not civil operations under FAA jurisdiction. Additional Information: Verify the operator understands the differences between PAOs and operations under a civil certificate. For example, the purpose of an airworthiness certificate in the exhibition category is limited to activities listed in 21.191(d). Note: The following notice, which was issued by AFS-1 in March 2012, needs to be communicated to the applicant: Any pilot operating a U.S. civil aircraft with an experimental certificate while conducting operations such as air-to-air combat simulations, electronic counter measures, target towing for aerial gunnery, and/or dropping simulated ordinances is operating contrary to the limits of the experimental certificate. Any operator offering to use a U.S. civil aircraft with an experimental certificate to conduct operations such as air-to-air combat simulations, electronic counter measures, target towing for aerial gunnery, and/or dropping simulated ordinances pursuant to a contract or other agreement with a foreign government or other foreign entity would not be doing so in accordance with any authority granted by the FAA as the State of Registry or State of the Operator. These activities are not included in the list of experimental certificate approved operations and may be subject to enforcement action by FAA. For those experimental aircraft operating overseas within the limitations of their certificate, FAA Order 8130.2, section 7, paragraph 4071(b) states that if an experimental airworthiness certificate is issued to an aircraft located in or outside of the United States for time-limited operations in another country, the experimental airworthiness certificate must be accompanied by appropriate operating limitations that have been coordinated with the responsible CAA before issuance. For additional information on public aircraft status, refer to 76 FR 16349, Notice of Policy Regarding Civil Aircraft Operators Providing Contract Support to Government Entities (Public Aircraft Operations), March 23, 2011.
402.
ARFF Coordination
403.
Coordination With Airport
405.
Military/Public Aircraft Operations
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
MiG-21 Risk Management, SOPs, Training, and Best Practices

In addition to using existing FAA SMS (Safety Management Systems) guidance recommended that an ORMlike approach be implemented by the MiG-21 owner/operator. This process has been successfully used by the US Navy in managing risk and reducing mishaps. A similar process is used by the USAF. The use of ORM principles in OPNAVINST 3500.39C will go a long way in enhancing the safe operation of tactical aircraft like the MiG-21 aircraft. The US Navys ORM employs a five-step process: (1) Identify hazards, (2) Assess hazards, (3) Make risk decisions, (4) Implement controls, and (5) Supervise. ORM is a systematic, decision making process used to identify and manage hazards. ORM is a tool used to make informed decisions by providing the best baseline of knowledge and experience available. Its purpose is to increase safety by anticipating hazards and reducing the potential for loss. For additional information and guidance, see Wirginis, Ted. ORM Corner: Understand the process. Approach (May-June 2008).
406.
Use of Operational Risk Management (ORM) (Part I)
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Use of Operational Risk Management (ORM) (Part II)
Additional Information: The ORM process is utilized on three levels based upon time and assets available. These include: (1) Time-critical: A quick mental review of the five-step process when time does not allow for any more (that is, in-flight mission/situation changes), (2) Deliberate: Experience and brain storming are used to identify hazards and is best done in groups (that is, aircraft moves, fly on/off), (3) In-depth: More substantial tools are used to thoroughly study the hazards and their associated risk in complex operations. The ORM process includes the following principles: Accept no unnecessary risk, anticipate and manage risk by planning and make risk decisions at the right level. Refer to OPNAVINST 3500.39C, ORM, July 2, 2010. Source: OPNAVINST 3500.39C. Note: The following Air Force press release is a ORM-based analysis of a 2011 jet trainer accident: CULTURE OF RISK TOLERANCE CITED IN CRASH PROBE 9/1/2011 RANDOLPH AIR FORCE BASE, Texas Investigators found that the Feb. 11 crash landing at Ellington Field, Texas, resulted from a series of mistakes by a fatigued pilot during landing, and they admonished the pilots squadron for creating a culture of risk tolerance. The pilot, from the 14th Flying Training Wing at Columbus Air Force Base, Miss., became disoriented and misjudged the landing runway, lost altitude too quickly and allowed his airspeed to fall below a safe level, according to the Air Education and Training Command accident investigation report. This resulted in catastrophic damage to the [aircrafts] landing gear and right wing. The mishap occurred during the fourth sortie of the day as a night solo continuationstraining mission into Ellington Field, near Houston, on a squadron cross-country sortie. The pilot safely departed the aircraft when it came to rest on the ground, and he sustained only minor injuries. In addition to the culture of risk tolerance, the report cited inadequate operational risk management of the crosscountry weekend plan. Inappropriate supervisory policy, combined with inadequate ORM, led to the mishap pilot flying a high-risk mission profile, the report said. The board further found that the pilots fatigue, resulting from the aggressive flight plan approved by his squadron, substantially contributed to the mishap. Outside of these cross-country weekends, it was rare for an (instructor pilot) to fly four sorties in one day. There was a mindset that a day consisting of four continuation training sorties was generally less risky than a day consisting of three student pilot instructional sorties, the report said. The sortie was (the mishap pilots) fourth sortie of the day and was flown entirely at night... This mishap was caused by the authorization and execution of a mission having an unnecessarily high level of risk relative to the real benefits. Damage to the [aircraft] landing gear, engines, right wing, and tail section was assessed at $2.1 million. The impact also caused minor damage to the runway, but no damage to private property, the report said. According to Col. Creig A. Rice, AETC director of safety, risk mitigations were put in place to address the issues outlined in the accident investigation report. See http://www.torch.aetc.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123277394.
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Recommend the use of MIL-STD-882B, System Safety Program Requirements, in the operation of the aircraft. Additional Information: This guidance is also useful in the maintenance and operation of highperformance former military aircraft. It covers program management, risk identification, audits, and other safety-related practices. MIL-STD-882B discusses the system safety requirements to perform throughout the life cycle for any system, new development, upgrade, modification, resolution of deficiencies, or technology development. When properly applied, these requirements should ensure the identification and understanding of all known hazards and their associated risks; and mishap risk eliminated or reduced to acceptable levels. The objective of system safety is to achieve acceptable mishap risk through a systematic approach of hazard analysis, risk assessment, and risk management. This document delineates the minimum mandatory requirements for an acceptable system safety program for any DOD system. See http://www.faa.gov/library/manuals/aviation/risk_management/ss_handbook/media/app_h_1200.PDF. Recommend the establishment of safety culture policy and associated processes for the operator. Although this will vary depending on the size and type of operator, the basic concepts can still be applied even to the smallest type of MiG-21 operation. Additional Information: The applicability of safety culture is not just limited to the pilot and the cockpit. It involves other aspects of the operation, from maintenance, expenses, and record keeping. Recognizing the risks involved with the operation of the aircraft and acting upon them, is, by far, one of the most critical aspects of any adequate safety culture. For example, not acting upon a series of incidents will likely pave the way towards a major accident, and this is especially true in high-performance aircraft like the MiG-21. Safety culture is descriptive of organizations where each person involved in the organizations operations recognizes and acts on his or her individual responsibility for safety, and actively supports the organizations processes for managing safety. The outcome is that the organizations ability to manage safety continues to improve because decision makers at all levels work to use their knowledge of safety risk to learn and adapt, thus improving the systems ability to support safety outcomes. Recommended the applicant and operator adopt a CRM-type program for aircraft operations. It goes without saying that the safe operation of a high-performance fighter like the MiG-21 requires many skills that CRM/SRM-like process can contribute greatly to overall safety. While CRM focuses on pilots operating in crew environments, many of the concepts apply to single-pilot operations. Many CRM principles have been successfully applied to single-pilot aircraft, and led to the development of SRM. SRM is defined as the art and science of managing all the resources (both on board the aircraft and from outside sources) available to a single pilot (prior and during flight) to ensure the successful outcome of the flight. SRM includes the concepts of Risk Management (RM), Task Management, Automation Management (AM), Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) Awareness, and Situational Awareness (SA). Additional Information: SRM training helps the pilot maintain situational awareness by managing the automation and associated aircraft control and navigation tasks. This enables the pilot to accurately assess and manage risk and make accurate and timely decisions. Integrated CRM/SRM incorporates the use of specifically defined behavioral skills into aviation operations. Standardized training strategies are to be used in such areas as academics, simulators, and flight training. Practicing CRM/SRM principles will serve to prevent mishaps that result from poor crew coordination. At first glance, crew resource management for the single pilot might seem paradoxical but it is not. While multi-pilot operations have traditionally been the focus of CRM training, many elements are applicable to the single pilot operation. The Aircraft Owners and Pilots Associations (AOPA) Flight Training described single-pilot CRM as found in the realm of aeronautical decision making, which is simply a systematic approach that pilots use to consistently find the best course(s) of action in response to a given set of circumstances. Wilkerson, Dave. September 2008. From a U.S. Navy standpoint, OPNAVINST 1542.7C, Crew Resource Management Program, dated October 12, 2001, can be used as guidance. Also refer to CRM For the Single Pilot. Vector (May/June 2008). FAA guidance includes: Summers, Michele M., Ayers, Frank Ayers, Connolly, Thomas Connolly, and Robertson, Charles. Managing Risk through Scenario Based Training, Single Pilot Resource Management, and Learner Centered Grading, 2007, and Chapter 17, Airplane Flying Handbook FAA-H-8083-3A. Note: Consider the use of AFI 11-290/AETC Sup 1, Cockpit/Crew Resource Management Training Program.
407.
System Safety MIL-STD-882B
408.
Safety Culture
409.
Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) and Single-Pilot Resource Management (SRM)
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Recommend that MiG-21 operator consider the use of LOSA or Line Operations Safety Audits as part of its operation. It is being promoted by the Indian Air Force, one of the largest MiG-21 operators in the World. LOSA is one method for monitoring normal flight operations for safety purposes. This program facilitates hazard identification through the analysis of actual in-flight performances. Additional Information: Line Operations Safety Audits (LOSA) is one method for monitoring normal flight operations for safety purposes. It facilitates hazard identification through the analysis of actual in-flight performances. It facilitates understanding the situation that may have precipitated the exceedence of flight parameters by the crew. It is a tool for understanding of human errors in flight operations. It is used to identify the threats to aviation safety that lead to human errors, to minimize the risks that such threats may generate and to implement measures to manage these errors within the operational context. LOSA enables operators to assess their resistance to operational risks and errors by front-line personnel. Using a datadriven approach, they can prioritize these risks and identify actions to reduce the risk of accidents. LOSA facilitates understanding both successful performance and failures. Hazards originating from operational errors can be identified and effective countermeasures developed. Data from LOSA also provide a picture of system operations that can guide strategies in regard to safety management, training, and operations. Data collected through LOSA can provide a rich source of information for the proactive identification of systemic safety hazards. LOSA identifies examples of superior performance that can be reinforced and used as models for training. (Traditionally, the aviation industry has collected information on failed performance and revised training programs accordingly.) For example, based on LOSA data, CRM/SRM training can be modified to reflect best practices for coping with particular types of unsafe conditions and for managing typical errors related to these conditions. ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization) endorses LOSA as a way to monitor normal flight operations. ICAO has published a manual, Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA) (Doc 9803), to provide guidance to operators regarding LOSA programs. During normal flights, crews routinely face situations created outside the cockpit that they must manage. Such situations increase the operational complexity of their task and pose some level of safety risk. These threats may be relatively minor (such as frequency congestion), through to major (such as an engine fi re warning). Some threats can be anticipated (such as a high workload situation during approach) and the crew may brief in advance, for example, In the event of a go-around... Other threats may be unexpected. Since they occur without warning, no advanced briefing is feasible. Errors are a normal part of all human behavior. Flight crew errors tend to reduce the margin of safety and increase the probability of accidents. Errors may be minor (setting the wrong altitude, but correcting it quickly) or major (not completing an essential checklist item). LOSA employs five categories of crew errors. These include: (a) communication error, (b) proficiency error, (c), operational decision error, and (d) procedural error. Since threats and errors are an integral part of daily flight operations, systematic understanding of them is required for safely dealing with them. LOSA offers an informed perspective on threats and errors from which suitable coping strategies can be developed. Specifically, quantifiable LOSA data are useful in answering such questions as: What type of threats do flight crews most frequently encounter? When and where do they occur, and what types are the most difficult to manage? What are the most frequently committed crew errors, and which ones are the most difficult to manage? The most effective countermeasures go beyond trying to simply prevent errors. We must identify unsafe conditions early enough to permit flight crews to take corrective action before adverse consequences result from the error. In other words, we must trap the error. The most effective countermeasures seek to improve the everyday work situation in which flight crews face the inevitable threats to safe performance measures which give crews a second chance to recover from their errors. Such systemic countermeasures include changes in aircraft design, crew training, standard operating procedures, management decisions, etc. We have to evaluate the data obtained through commitment exists to act upon the lessons of LOSA, to identify those hazards posing the greatest risks to the organization and then take the necessary actions to address them. LOSA can only reach its full potential if the organizational willingness and must have an assurance that the data output will not be used against them. Data-driven programs like LOSA require data quality management procedures and consistency checks. The database must be validated for consistency and accuracy before a statistical analysis can proceed. As the data are collected and analyzed, patterns emerge. Certain errors occur frequently, certain airfields or activities are problematic, certain SOPs are ignored or modified, and certain maneuvers pose particular difficulties. These patterns become targets for enhancement. An action plan can be developed and implemented. Through subsequent LOSA audits, the effectiveness of the changes can be measured. After a LOSA is completed; a feedback is provided to the operators. Pilots are interested not only in the results but also managements plan for improvement. See http://indianairforce.nic.in/fsmagazines/JAN%202013.pdf.
410.
Indian Air Force (IAF) LOSA Program
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Recommend that applicant and operator consider implementing a ProSEF-like approach to flight operations and accident prevention. This proactive accident reduction program has many benefits that can be sued by a civil operator, especially an operator of a high-performance former military aircraft like the MiG-21. This process fits with existing SMS guidance and other risk management tool discussed in this document. Additional Information: The following description by the USAF Air Force Safety center explains ProSEF: Use correlating data streams for hazard identification and risk mitigation to prevent mishaps and more safely accomplish the mission. Foster a culture of mishap prevention throughout the Air Force by inculcating the value of evidence-based proactive safety throughout the Major Commands, by providing operators and maintainers with guidance and encouragement for implementing Military Flight Operations Quality Assurance, Aviation Safety Action Program, and Line Operations Safety Audit, and by performing meta-analysis and trending for all participating Air Force aircraft types. Traditionally, safety investigation boards (SIBs) have revealed those small events that link together to create disproportionate and disastrous effects. Proactive safety (ProSEF) is taking corrective action based on leading safety indicators that fall outside of traditional historical metrics of incident and accident reporting. We are transforming Air Force safety by studying leading indicators of mishaps, while continuing to investigate trailing indicators as revealed through SIBs. After all, mishap precursors are often detectable prior to mishaps, but often only through concerted (proactive) effort. Historically, we have practiced "active safety," which can be described as managing known hazards. Proactive safety entails searching for and measuring precursors that are hidden or not obvious to all. Proactive safety is an attempt to systematically and scientifically understand the gap between desired and actual flight performance. Traditionally, we have only understood that gap after the findings, causes and recommendations of a SIB are released. But, why wait for a mishap to occur in order to investigate mishap precursors? To understand the gap between desired and actual flight performance, there must be a continuous exchange of real operational information between aircrew who are embedded in an organizational culture, safety professionals who can detect unsafe trends, and leaders who can implement hazard management and measure the success of their efforts. Proactive safety brings together technology and human ingenuity to analyze and take action on previously undetected or insufficiently assessed hazards. Over the past 50 years, the aviation industry has developed three key programs for detecting such mishap precursors prior to accidents or serious incidents, and though we are not the airline industry, the initiatives that have proven very successful for civilian aviators can be modified and used in military settings as well. Over a decade ago, the Air Force started analyzing the routine recordings of aircraft data to detect mishap precursors, a program known as Military Flight Operations Quality Assurance (MFOQA). We have 10 Mission Design Series (MDS) currently participating in MFOQA, with more on the way. Three years ago, the Air Force started a program for voluntarily reporting threats and errors to flight operations, an initiative we call Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP). We have received hundreds of reports about threats and errors that never would have been exposed otherwise. This past year we started training experienced pilots to fly as jump seat observers to detect systemic safety problems in our operations, a program we call Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA). Proactive safety programs reach their peak potential for mishap prevention when used together. Each program has particular strengths. MFOQA is excellent at scientifically measuring what is happening. ASAP provides unique insights into why specific hazards exist. LOSA provides a broad-view of cultural and systemic issues that impact flight safety. We currently have several MDS communities using all three programs, which results in a nuanced and in-depth ability to prevent mishaps. There are two widespread misconceptions about proactive safety. First, though some people think these programs are for heavy drivers only, our F-16 and T-6 MFOQA programs and the F-15 and F-16 ASAP reports provide excellent safety insights. Second, some aircrew members worry that these programs will be used against them. All three programs are non punitive approaches to mishap prevention. The air Force believes very strongly in protecting the identity of participating aircrew and in protecting aircrew from punitive action, except for cases of suspected willful disregard of regulations and procedures. On this website you will find detailed descriptions of MFOQA, ASAP and LOSA. Each program has provided us with outstanding mishap prevention information. In fact, some of you reading this page may be alive today because of those programs. But we need your input into all three programs and your help to continue growing the programs and saving lives. Welcome to the cutting edge of mishap prevention. Welcome to proactive aviation safety! http://www.afsec.af.mil/proactiveaviationsafety/prosef.asp
411.
USAF Proactive Safety (ProSEF)
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Recommend that applicant and operator review and consider the safety management benefits included in the US Navy OPNAV INSTRUCTION 1500.75B Policy and Procedures for Conducting High-Risk Training, March 4, 2010. The policies and procedures discussed in this document have many benefits that can be sued by a civil operator, especially an operator of a high-performance former military aircraft like the MiG21. As with the USAF ProSEF above, this process fits with existing SMS/ORM guidance and other risk management tool discussed in this document. Although heavy with Navy terms and acronyms, the following excerpts from OPNAV 1500.75B explains the purpose and value of this guidance: This instruction establishes policy and procedures to abate or minimize mishaps during high-risk training. Due to recent changes to the Navys training organization, this instruction has been extensively revised and should be read in its entirety. Naval operations often require aggressive training programs to prepare personnel to perform mission essential high risk tasks in a variety of environments. All leaders must recognize that risk cannot be mitigated merely through written procedures. Therefore, planning and execution of high-risk training shall incorporate the program elements and principles of ORM per reference (a). The expectation is to maximize the benefits of ORM where essential skills are practiced, perfected, and tested. While the goal is zero mishaps in training, this policy does not establish a requirement to eliminate all exposure to risk where valid training objectives are established. Perform risk assessments of training per reference (a). OPNAV 1500/54 Deliberate Risk Assessment shall be used to perform a basic risk assessment. Designate high-risk training courses under their cognizance and maintain a list of these courses by title and course identification number (CIN). Develop and implement safety oversight criteria that meet at least the minimum requirements of this instruction, and any further requirements, as the training environment may dictate to ensure subordinate activities comply. Include a self-assessment program, which quantitatively and qualitatively evaluates the effectiveness of the established oversight program. Establish additional qualification requirements for military, civilian, or contracted TSOs and assistant training safety officers (ATSOs) at subordinate training activities as applicable. Incorporate ORM and safety awareness training into instructor training. Training shall include all three levels of ORM per reference (a), safety policy and directives per references (e) and (f) as applicable, precautions in technical manuals and publications, and lessons learned from training related mishaps and injuries or best practices provided by COMNAVSAFECEN and other appropriate data sources. Ensure high-risk training safety reviews are conducted, as defined in enclosure (1), on a recurring basis at least triennially by COs and OICs of training activities. Convene safety reviews subsequent to a training mishap, near miss/hit, major curriculum changes, and major course revisions. Active senior leadership involvement is imperative to the success of these reviews and consideration of leaderships planned rotations or transfers is highly encouraged, as many mishaps occur relatively close to turnover periods. Put in place and adhere to curricula safety requirements. Conduct training following only approved course curricula and high-risk evolutions only where necessary to meet graduation requirements of the course. Ensure all training includes specific and related ORM training per reference (a). Establish an instructor certification process for all high-risk instructors as directed by the training agent. Establish an evaluation program that assesses high risk instructors in classroom and laboratory or field settings on a recurrent basis, in percentages commensurate with the amount of time spent instructing in those environments. Conduct quarterly procedural walk-through(s) and fully exercise and validate emergency action plans (EAPs) annually. Include all emergency response agencies, where practicable. Include training time out (TTO) procedures in all high-risk course curricula. Include drop on request (DOR) procedures in all voluntary high-risk curricula. Ensure students are thoroughly briefed on TTO and DOR policies prior to commencement of training. Designate a qualified safety officer as the high risk TSO for safety oversight on all courses assessed as high risk. For activities without a safety officer billet, a trained and qualified collateral duty safety officer or independent TSO may be designated in writing to perform those duties. The designated TSO will be directly responsible to the CO or OIC for the safe conduct of high-risk training. Where safety officer and TSO duties and responsibilities need to be separately established for organizational structure, ensure amplifying procedures and policies define their duties, roles, and responsibilities relative to mishap reporting and investigation of mishap events. Report and record all training related mishaps and injuries per reference (d). Establish a mishap analysis program to examine near miss/hit and mishap data as well as student critique feedback on unsafe conditions and practices identified in high-risk courses. Mishap analysis should be closely aligned with the training staff to enable lessons learned or best practices to be expeditiously incorporated into the conduct of high-risk training. See http://doni.daps.dla.mil/Directives/01000%20Military%20Personnel%20Support/01500%20Military%20Training%20and%20Education%20Services/1500.75B.pdf.
412.
OPNAV Instruction 1500.75B
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Recommend using a risk matrix in mitigating risk in routine and daily aircraft operations. A risk matrix can be used for almost any operation by assigning likelihood and severity. In the case presented, the pilot assigned a likelihood of occasional and the severity as catastrophic. Additional Information: As one can see, this falls in the high risk area. The following is a risk assessment tool presented in figure 17-5 of the Airplane Flying Handbook, FAA-H-8083-3A.
413.
Risk Matrix and Risk Assessment Tool
Source: FAA 414. 415. AFM Addendums Training Guidance (General) Consider additions or restrictions to the AFM. Operational restrictions should be also addressed in the AFM. Recommend the applicable USAF/NAVAIR/NATO/RAF training manuals and materials be used as an integral part of the operation of the aircraft. Recommend consideration of SOPs and training incorporate the current USAF Phases of Training. Additional Information: USAF Phases of Training include 416. USAF Phase Training Initial Qualification Training (IQT). This training is necessary to qualify aircrew for duties in the aircraft. Mission Qualification Training (MQT). This training is necessary to qualify aircrew for specific unit mission or local area requirements. Continuation Training (CT). This training is necessary for qualified aircrew to maintain their assigned level of proficiency and/or increase flight qualifications. It provides minimum ground and flight training event requirements.
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Revise the pilot checklist and back seat occupant (MiG-21UB) briefing to emphasize (that is, warning caution) the proper closing of the canopy. See Canopy Opening in Flight (Case Study) below. Additional Information: The following incident illustrates how not adhering to the proper procedures (with training) can be dangerous: summer afternoon. Bison aircraft were being inducted into a squadron and after a stint of eight months at HAL, the squadron was ready to ferry out the initial lot of aircraft back to their parent base. The entire manpower was aware that this was the beginning of the end of the long and drawn out TD. I, for myself, was planned for a sortie in the morning followed by ferry of a Trainer aircraft back to base. The sortie went through as planned, albeit after a delay, due to the first wave of ferry out aircraft. I realized that the squadron EO was to be my passenger in the Trainer for the ferry. I checked up on the readiness of the Trainer aircraft and was told that it was ready for ferry out. Thirty minutes to go for departure and I sent my small overnight kit to be put in the aircraft nose bay. The EO had still not turned up for briefing and I was getting worked up for the same. I had to decide whether to delay the ferry or go ahead and I did the right thing of delaying the ferry even at the cost of getting stranded midway in the ferry, at the TRS base. I first helped the EO to adjust his flying clothing and wear it and then commenced my briefing for the ferry. I covered all the relevant safety aspects which is must know to sit in the cockpit. A quick check for clearances for delayed departure and we were ready to walk to the aircraft. The summer sun was shining bright and with high relative humidity the comfort index was non-existent on the tarmac. I took the EO to the aircraft and personally showed him all the relevant switches in the cockpit. I told him to strap up while I did my round of externals of the aircraft. By the time I had completed, the EO was strapped up and I had a good look at all his connections. The poor guy was sweating profusely. I should have personally got the canopy closed and checked for locking but that may have meant an additional 10-12 minutes of intense baking for the young man in the rear cockpit till start up. And anyone who has flown in a MiG-21 knows that the air conditioning becomes active only after reaching a certain altitude in the air, meaning that the EO would be in uncomfortable temperatures for more than 30-35 minutes. So I benevolently decided to keep the canopy open in the rear cockpit till start, after confirming from the EO that he was familiar with the canopy closing procedure. Obviously, the EO knows how to close the canopy. A quick start, after start checks and we were ready to taxi. Only one small problem, the differential pressure was indicating very close to zero instead of normal 0.02 kg/cm2. This trainer had a known issue of low differential pressure build up on ground which was an indication problem than actual one. I quickly reconfirmed from the rear cockpit if the canopy was closed and sealed, which was replied to in affirmative. I thought of getting it rechecked from the Armament tradesman, but decided to believe in the EOs affirmative and taxied out. All my attention was now focused on the differential pressure during taxi and Vital Actions. I asked the EO to recheck whether his sealing was on which he replied confidently in affirmative. I recollected one Trainer Captain discussing the same problem some days back and [it was] mentioned that the problem was of the indication due to calibration and was to be sorted out after ferry back to base. I also recollected the Trainer Captain saying that the problem did not exist in air after takeoff. All these inputs had to be simultaneously processed and a decision taken whether to continue or to return back to dispersal. Pros for continuing on were many. The probability of returning back to dispersal with a serviceable aircraft weighs very heavily on any fighter pilots mind. And that too when the squadron is ferrying back to base and there is a requirement of the trainer back at base for syllabus progression. The factor of get homeitis can never be discarded altogether from the decision making process. So I reconfirmed from the rear cockpit that his sealing was on as that doubt lingered on in my mind, as I lined up for take-off after a vehement confirmation from the rear seat. As I opened up RPM for warm up, the differential pressure rose a wee bit above zero or was it my imagination? I reduced the RPM and increased it again and YES, there was a very slight movement of the differential gauge needle. I DECIDED TO CONTINUE WITHOUT VERIFYING MY DOUBT, thinking that everything will turn out alright as it always does. We got airborne and the differential pressure gauge started to register but in negative. It was clear that there was definitely some problem in the canopy sealing. All required precautions were taken and a priority landing was executed. The Airframe tradesman was informed of the snag on switch off and I reflected back on the stupid mistake I had made under some perceived pressures. The Airframe tradesman came in after sometime to inform that there was no problem of differential pressure and the indications were normal. He was immediately followed by the young EO, who was looking sheepish and embarrassed. He informed me that he had not sealed the rear canopy as it involved movement of two levers in the MiG21 trainer, as against one single movement of hand in the fighter to lock the canopy and seal it. Thus ended my day with me being let off very lightly by my fate for leaving things to chance in aviation but enriched by the lessons learnt. Wing Cdr. Lohokare http://indianairforce.nic.in/fsmagazines/Oct11.pdf.
417.
In-Flight Canopy Separation, Failure, and Opening
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
The following account is provided to illustrate the potentially fatal consequences of a canopy opening in flight, either as a cause of human error (pilot not latching the canopy) or mechanical failure (locking mechanism failure). See In-Flight Canopy Separation, Failure, and Opening above. Additional Information: ON 10-01-2009 AT APPROXIMATELY 10 AM LOCAL TIME, THE SAME MIG-21 N315RF TAXIED OUT TO RUNWAY 26R AT BROWN FIELD (SDM) TO TAKE OFF FOR A LOCAL FLIGHT. BY WITNESS ACCOUNTS, THE FOLLOWING SEQUENCE OF EVENTS OCCURRED: MIG-21 N315RF TOOK THE RUNWAY 26R FOR TAKEOFF @10:10AM LOCAL TIME. THE MIG-21 APPLIED TAKEOFF POWER AND BEGAN ACCELERATING WESTBOUND ON RUNWAY 26R. AT OR ABOUT ROTATION (APPROXIMATELY 3000' FEET DOWN THE RUNWAY) THE MIG-21 LIFTED AND WAS OBSERVED THAT THE AIRCRAFT "DIPPED" TO THE LEFT AND THEN "CORRECTED" TO THE RIGHT. AT THIS POINT, IT WAS ALSO OBSERVED THAT THE CANOPY WAS NOT CLOSED AND "THE PILOT APPEARED TO BE TRYING TO CLOSE IT. NEXT THE MIG-21 BEGAN A DESCENT AFTER REACHING ABOUT 75-100' ABOVE THE RUNWAY AND AT THE END OF RUNWAY 26R WAS IN A SLIGHT LEFT DESCENDING TURN, CROSSING THE WEST END OF TAXIWAY ALPHA....TOWARDS THE DIRT SOUTHWEST OF THE RUNWAY. IT WAS THEN WITNESSED THAT THE MIG-21 TOUCHED THE MAIN LANDING GEAR TIRES IN THE DIRT AND STAYED DOWN FOR APPROXIMATELY 100' FEET BEFORE AGAIN BECOMING AIRBORNE. THE MIG-21 CLIMBED INTO THE RIGHT TRAFFIC PATTERN AND MADE THREE CIRCUITS BEFORE LANDING AGAIN ON RUNWAY 26R. THERE WAS NO COMMUNICATION WITH THE MIG-21 FROM TOWER PERSONNEL, AND ON ONE CIRCUIT THE MIG WAS LINING UP WITH THE 905 FREEWAY THAT PARALLELS RUNWAY 26L TO THE SOUTH. AFTER THE MIG-21 LANDED, HE ROLLED OUT AND PARKED THE AIRCRAFT. HE WAS MET BY SENIOR OPERATIONS MANAGER CHRIS COOPER. COOPER IDENTIFIED THE PILOT AS REG [THE PILOT] WHOM HE HAD MET ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS AT THE AIRPORT. COOPER SAID [THE PILOT] HAD BLOOD ON HIS CHIN AND THAT THE BACK SEAT PASSENGER, MIKE MCKENNA WAS GETTING OUT OF THE REAR SEAT SAYING THAT HE HAD VIDEO OF THE FLIGHT. COOPER DESCRIBED THE EVENTS OF THE FLIGHT TO [THE PILOT] AND SAID THAT [THE PILOT] DENIED MANY ASPECTS OF WHAT WAS DESCRIBED TO HIM BY COOPER. (COOPER WITNESSED THE ENTIRE EVENT FROM MID-FIELD) COOPER TOOK [THE PILOT] TO THE SITE WHERE HE TOUCHED DOWN IN THE DIRT. COOPER TOLD ME THAT WHEN [THE PILOT] SAW THE DEBRIS AND THE LANDING GEAR TRACKS IN THE DIRT HE SAID, "IN MY 50+ YEARS OF FLYING, I'VE NEVER COME THIS CLOSE. COOPER SAID HE GAVE [THE PILOT] A RIDE BACK TO HIS PLANE. DURING THE RIDE BACK [THE PILOT] MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS: ON OR ABOUT ROTATION THE CANOPY CAME OPEN AND THE BLAST BLEW HIS HELMET, MIC AND GLASSES OFF HIS HEAD. THIS CAUSED HIM TO LOSE COMMUNICATION AND IMPAIRED HIS VISION GREATLY. HE HAD TROUBLE RE-LATCHING THE CANOPY WHILE TRYING TO FLY AND CONTROL THE STICK AND THROTTLE. HE SAID HE DID NOT THINK HE DESCENDED LOW ENOUGH TO STRIKE THE DIRT WITH HIS MAINS. DURING THE PATTERN CIRCUITS, HE SOMEHOW TRANSFERRED THE FLYING TO THE BACK SEATER WHO EVENTUALLY HAD DIFFICULTY RELINQUISHING CONTROL BACK TO [THE PILOT]. REFERENCE THE CANOPY; [THE PILOT] SAID THAT WHEN HE LINED UP ON THE RUNWAY THERE WAS NO CANOPY LITE ILLUMINATED. HE SAID AS HE ROTATED AND WAS ALREADY CLIMBING, THE CANOPY POPPED OPEN. [THE PILOT] SAID HE IMMEDIATELY GRABBED THE CANOPY AND FOUGHT TO SECURE IT. SIMULTANEOUS WITH THAT, HE LOST HIS HELMET, MIC AND GLASSES, WHICH MADE IT DIFFICULT TO SEE. [THE PILOT] SAID HE SLIGHTLY DECREASED HIS THROTTLE ON THE CLIMB OUT IN HOPES TO REDUCE THE AIRFLOW AND ALLOW HIM TO SECURE THE CANOPY. HE SAID THIS MAY HAVE ALLOWED THE AIRCRAFT TO SETTLE SLIGHTLY. [THE PILOT] SAID AS HE FOUGHT TO SECURE THE CANOPY IT BECAME EVIDENT THAT HE WOULD NEED TO CLIMB UP TO PATTERN ALTITUDE AND AT LEAST FLY THE PLANE AROUND TO THEN LAND IT AGAIN. HE SAID HE DID SO AND THAT SEEING WAS DIFFICULT AT BEST BECAUSE ALL OF HIS HEAD GEAR HAD BLOWN ALL OVER THE COCKPIT. [THE PILOT] ALSO STATED THAT THE REAR SEATER HAD A VERY FIRM GRIP ON THE REAR CONTROL STICK AND IT MADE IT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO FLY THE PLANE. [THE PILOT] EVENTUALLY GOT COMPOSED ENOUGH TO GET FULL CONTROL AND LAND THE MIG-21 SAFELY. AFTER THE FLIGHT [THE PILOT] SAID HE DID A THOROUGH INSPECTION OF THE AIRCRAFT AND THE CANOPY SYSTEM. HE APPLIED MORE LUBRICANT TO THE LATCH ASSEMBLY AND IT GROUND CHECK GOOD. SAN-FSDO IS WORKING CLOSELY WITH [THE PILOT] ON HIS MAINTENANCE PROGRAM TO ENSURE THAT [THE PILOT] STAYS IN COMPLIANCE WITH HIS AAIP. [THE PILOT] HAS SINCE STATED HE PLANS TO MOVE THE MIG OPERATION TO MOJAVE DESERT. CASE WILL BE CLOSED WITH A WARNING LETTER TO [THE PILOT]. PTRS entry.
418.
Canopy Opening in Flight (Case Study)
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
419.
Fuel Mismanagement
Require special emphasis on fuel starvation and fuel management. This is an important item, especially for a short-legged aircraft like the MiG-21. The complexities and variations of the fuel system must also be included in SOPs and training. See Fuel System and Description above. See SFC below. Verify actual aircraft-specific range (nautical air miles traveled per pound of fuel used).
420.
Specific Range
Additional Information: As with Fuel Management above, this is an important item, especially for a shortlegged aircraft like the MiG-21, and when some aircraft are involved in extensive cross-country operations for airshow purposes. See SFC below. Because of the aircrafts notorious short range, recommend that in addition to Bingo and minimum landing fuel (see above), operators consider SOPs that rely on using a very conservative flight time block (i.e., maximum of 45 minutes) to ensure an additional level of safety to mitigate against any low-fuel situation, especially in cross-country operations. Recommend that SOPs and training address the Specific Fuel Consumption t (SFC) rates for the specific engine type and variant installed. Additional Information: For example, in the R-11-300 engine, SFC at take-off is (with full afterburner) is 1.96 kg/kgp hour, while cruise is 0.94 kg/kgp hour. Also see TSFC below. Recommend that consideration be given to engines Thrust Specific Fuel Consumption (TSFC). This can assist in understanding the fuel consumption and performance of the engine. Recommend establishing SOPs addressing minimum landing fuel for IFR operations as provided in 91.151, Fuel Requirements for Flight in VFR Conditions, in addition to 91.167, to add a level of safety.
421.
Flight Time Block and Cross-Country Operations
422.
SFC
423.
TSFC
424.
Bingo and Minimum Landing Fuel
Additional Information: In addition, a Bingo fuel status (a pre-briefed amount of fuel for an aircraft that would allow a safe return to the base of intended landing) should be used in all flights. Note: Bingo fuel and minimum landing fuel are not necessarily the same, in that a call for Bingo fuel and a return to base still require managing the minimum landing fuel. See Flight Time Block and Cross-Country Operations below. Recommend SOPs address minimum landing fuel. SOPs should also address the minimum amount (i.e., 800 lb.) of fuel for a circuit, landing, and possible going around. Additional Information: The MiG-21 has a 450-liters fuel remaining warning light. Recommend that SOPs and training cover the possibility (not an actual simulation) of a flapless landing. Additional Information: The following account of such an actual incident provides insight into this emergency: I was a young flying officer full of spirit and aspiration just posted to a squadron. After lot of studies, ground training and spending hours in the cockpit (the ac being on ground), we started flying the MiG-21. It was my third solo sortie wherein I was supposed to fly a handling profile in sector. The sortie was uneventful till rejoin on downwind, when after lowering u/c, my main hydraulic failure warning came on. I declared the emergency, then took a moment to ascertain the situation and went over the actions. I reported dead side again, completed my actions and landed off a flapless approach in the next circuit which is considered quite tricky on the MiG-21. I was debriefed the following day, in fact I was praised, and my actions at such limited experience were appreciated. I was quite happy with myself and continued flying with a newly gained confidence. I even got a commendation through the flight safety channel for my emergency handling. But about six months down the line when I gained sufficient experience on the MiG21, I realized that my actions had not been very correct, in fact they were wrong. When I realized that I had an emergency on downwind, all I had to do was continue in the circuit and land. But I elected to go around and carry out one more circuit which could have led to an aircraft fire as I already had a hydraulic leak. All is well that ends well. But the point to ponder is that why was this point not brought out to give a lesson to other youngsters in the squadron. In the interest of flight safety, I write this and implore those young pilots flying this aircraft to apply system knowledge to the emergency encountered so that they do not land up complicating the emergencies encountered. Flt. Lt. Mahale. http://indianairforce.nic.in/fsmagazines/Jun12.pdf.
425.
Minimum Landing and Landing Pattern Fuel
426.
Flapless Landing (Hydraulic Failure)
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
427.
Asymmetric Flap Condition
Recommend that SOPs and training address the possibility of an asymmetric flap situation. This has happened in MiG-21s. The issue is not only related to extension and retraction malfunctions, but also an actual in-flight separation. Additional Information: In May 2008, a flap on a Croatian AF MiG-21bis separated in flight during low altitude maneuvering. The pilot was able to maintain control despite the asymmetric configuration and land the aircraft. However, the issue was very serious and it resulted in the temporarily grounding of MiG21s in the Croatian AF. Verify the speed limit of the aircraft is adjusted to address installed avionics, which may have speed limitations. This can be an issue due to the fact that many modern avionics are fitted to the aircraft along with their antennae. If the aircraft is a MiG-21U (two-seater), ensure SOPs address the command ejection issue, that is, who ejects first, per the appropriate guidance (i.e., USAF, NAVAIR, NATO), before the flight if the back seat or rear seat is occupied.
428.
Speed Limitations Due to Avionics and Other Equipment
429.
Command Ejection
Additional Information: Relevant to the command ejection issue, not all ejection systems in the MiG-21 are similar even between variants. For example, in the MiG-21UM, the canopy system was modified, allowing both canopies to be jettisoned from the front cockpit. However, the instructor could jettison his canopy independently with the forward canopy already gone. SOPs and special training should be provided concerning the unusual characteristics of the SK ejection seat fitted to early MiG-21s. This type of seat arrangement carries dangers not usually found in any other system, old or new. Additional Information: In the early MiG-21s, the canopy was hinged at the front, and connected with the ejection seat by gimbaled mountings to leave the aircraft with the seat, so providing the pilot with some protection from the slip-stream blast. This is very unfamiliar set-up when compared not only to later models, but to Western ejection seat systems. In addition, the interlock between the SK ejection seat and the canopy release proved unreliable, primarily due to its complicated structure and mechanism. Similar if not greater deficiencies (cruder manufacturing tolerances) exist with the Chinese version of the earlier SK seats fitted to Chinese F-7As. The diagram below illustrates this unusual set-up. See Ejection Seat System PIC Training above.
430.
SK Ejection Seat
Source: USAF.
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
431.
Weight and Height Limits for the Ejection Seats
If the ejection seat is active, procedures should ensure that for every flight, the weight and height of any occupant meets the seat requirements. Additional Information: This is a common limitation in all Soviet ejection seats, including the SK and KM-1 seats fitted to the MiG-21. It is also found in many of the Western ejection seat systems. Recommend an adequate and thorough check-out (and SOPs) on the aircrafts brake and steering system has been given to the PIC and anyone taking control of the aircraft on the ground. Additional Information: The following account of a Soviet MiG-21 overrun in 1984 illustrates not only a brake failure, but inappropriate procedures: Due to the lack of spare parts, the emergency switch of the air system equipment was rearranged several times from one aircraft to another. On the next flightafter landing gear retraction, the tap into the neutral position was not set, and did not engage the wheel lock system. As a result, the air from the main switch of the air system bled. [this description needs to be verified against the technical for accurate translation] In addition, the reverse on the air valve of the brake parachute was faulty [this description needs to be verified against the technical for accurate translation]. Upon landing, the pilot squeezed the trigger brakes no brakes, pressed the brake parachute parachute came out, pulled the emergency brake valve from the experiences of thought, and it did not work total failure! already rolling on the ground and the pilot waited for the runway end. The plane did not disappoint. It ran the whole runway, rolled to the ground, broke through the fence airport, and gave way to the trench front rack, stopped. The pilot did not get a scratch. Immediately it became a question of who is to blame, and how to report back to the top. The pilot could be blamed... but they (maintenance) had a finger in the fluff. A compromise was quickly foundsigns of impacts by the enemy. http://www.airforce.ru/history/localwars/afganistan/part9.htm. Recommend the use of the afterburner be limited to those phases of flight where it is actually necessary, such as takeoff. This is because there a long history of afterburner failures in the MiG-21, including instances where it resulted in engine failure and engine fires. This concern varies depending on the aircraft. For example, in early R-11 equipped aircraft, engaging full afterburner at altitudes below 5,000 meters, and increase speeds to beyond 510 knots, the fuel pumps may not be able to keep up with the engines requirements. Additional Information: For example, in the MiG-21bis, the R-25-300 engine has a three-minute emergency (air combat) afterburner rating that can be used at low level. However, it is not recommended that this setting be used. The following narrative illustrates an afterburner failure: On November 23, 2010, during the period of his duty a two aircraft formation of MiG-21 aircraft lined up for take-off. On the takeoff roll, the runway controller saw the reheat of the ac suddenly going offHe immediately transmitted this abnormalityNo 1 who in turn aborted his takeoff. http://indianairforce.nic.in. Recommend that SOPs and training limit rates of roll to below than 90/sec. This was a standard Soviet Air Force limitation instituted to minimize LOC incidents. Any acrobatic maneuvers should account for this. Ensure SOPs emphasize the risk of high AOA operations and AOA usage not only during landing or in the landing configuration, but also on go-arounds, and maneuvering. The limitation discusses this. Additional Information: Note: More than 20% of all the Bulgarian Air Force MiG-21 losses were attributed to stalling and subsequent departure from controlled flight during basic fighter maneuvering and air combat exercises. In the Hungarian Air Force, pilots [regarded] it [AOA system and limiter] as the most important instrument during aerial combat maneuvering. Buza, MiG-21MF, 1993. As an example, the MiG-21Fs operational AOA limit was 10-11. Other sources note 20 for the MiG-21MF, while the MiG-21bis mention 15. Regardless, action on this item must be specific to the aircraft and system fitted. See High AOA, Loss of Control (LOC), and Abrupt Maneuvering below. In the MiG-21U, Soviet flight test data indicates that the aircraft has a tendency to increase the AOA after landing gear retraction during a take-off at full military power, a tendency neutralized by forward stick motion. This was not encountered during afterburner takeoffs.
432.
Brake and Steering System
433.
Limit the Use of the Afterburner
434.
Roll Limitation
435.
High AOA
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
It is essential that if any flights are conducted in the vicinity of another aircraft, the wake turbulence and jet blast of the MiG-21 and its impact on other aircraft be clearly understood. This is an item specifically mentioned in the AFM for the aircraft. Recommend separation limitations for flight near another aircraft, especially in terms of horizontal and vertical separation. Additional Information: In fact, in 2006, a Piper PA-42 Cheyenne was destroyed and the pilot and four passengers killed with it entered the wake turbulence of a MiG-21 during an aerial photography session. The following excerpt from the NTSB accident report illustrates this: The MiG pilot flew the airplane at 9,000 feet mean sea level in a 30-degree right-hand turn at 200 knots (about 90 percent power set) with approach flaps selected (approximately 25 degrees). He continued to circle in that configuration to allow the Cheyenne to rendezvous with the MiG. The MiG pilot reported that he observed the Cheyenne meet up at his 5 o'clock position about 300-400 feet behind him and about the same altitude. The MiG pilot looked forward and when he looked back to the Cheyenne, he could not see itThe MiG pilot waited to hear back from the Cheyenne pilot, but when he did not receive any additional information, he asked the Cheyenne pilot to repeat because he did not understand the last transmission. The Cheyenne pilot did not respond and the MiG pilot never received additional information. The MiG pilot continued flying in that manner and tried to reach the Cheyenne pilot over the radio. After a couple of minutes he observed a column of smoke rising from the desert terrain and became concerned about the Cheyenne. The MiG pilot called the Prescott air traffic controller and asked if they were receiving because he could not see the Cheyenne; could not reach him over the radio, and could now see a column of smoke in the area in which they were flying... The NTSB found that probable cause of the accident was the failure of the pilot following a jet aircraft to maintain adequate separation from the high velocity jet core exhaust. The separation of the T-tail due to contact with the high velocity jet core exhaust was a factor. Ensure SOPs and training not only emphasizes the risk of high AOA operations and considers asking that procedures/training be adopted accordingly, but also limits the possibility of a LOC event due to abrupt maneuvering. It is well documented that the MiG-21 is not a forgiving aircraft in some flight regimes and flight envelop areas. The MiG-21 is prone to LOC events. Additional Information: Many MiG-21s have been lost due to LOC, especially in simulated ACM and abrupt maneuvering. An Israeli Air Force evaluation noted that the fighter could not maneuver as well as the Mirage in some regimes and had high stick forces. The nose and low wing tended to drop in high-speed turns. This could result in a snap into a spin that, at low altitude, could prove fatal. Norton, 2004. Below is a graph showing the variation of the aircraft (MiG-21bis) lift coefficient (Cy) with the Mach number. Also see Stability and Controllability below.
436.
MiG-21 Wake Turbulence and Jet Blast
437.
High AOA, Loss of Control (LOC), and Abrupt Maneuvering
438.
Stability and Controllability
Recommend that SOPs and training cover in detail the Information on Aircrafts Stability and Controllability section in the AFM. Also see High AOA, Loss of Control (LOC), and Abrupt Maneuvering above.
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Recommend that SOPs and training focus on the likelihood of an in-flight engine fire, a common occurrence in the MiG-21. False indications are also common. It is critical that the PIC be properly trained and SOPs in place on how to handle an engine fire in the aircraft. Additional Information: The following analysis of an Indian Air Force MiG-21 incident provides a needed insight into such failures: It wasnt long before all pairs hit Bingo and peeled off for base. I however was still loaded with bags of fuel (a miracle in a MiG-21) and so decided to carry out a few hard turns before I rejoined. RPM 100%, trim her for 750 IAS, approaching about 820 IAS, roll into the turn while engaging reheat, kick, and generate. That is when it happened. The master blinker came ON like an alarm clock in the middle of the night. An instinctive glance at the T-10 panel indicated that the Fire Warning light was on. Even as my mind cursed my luck and the prospect of being grilled by a COI sent icy fingers up my spine, my left hand switched off the reheat and throttled her back to 85% as I rolled out of the turn. And lo and behold! Voila! Another miracle! Even as my eyes scanned the JPT gauge for any indications of fire, the master blinker went off, fire warning light went off, and the JPT remained steadily normal. A scan in the rear view revealed no smoke or fire. Darn it! Why couldnt these emergencies behave as per the celebrated ever evolving (evolving even as I write) emergency flip card of the MiG-21. As I turned towards base and announced my emergency to the SU and then ATC, I wasnt sure if I really had an engine fire or it was just a spurious warning. Should I operate the fire extinguisher or not? To be or not to be? There were absolutely no indications of fire now. What if I were to operate the fire extinguisher and it turned out to be a spurious warning? The engine would be withdrawn for servicing and the Flight Commander would chew me. I decided against using the fire extinguisher since it appeared to be a spurious warning anyway. By now I had announced my intention of a priority landing off a descending circuit, partial flap approach and switching off after touchdown. The SFS piped up in the mean time, Whats up man? I told him the whole story, my actions, and intentions. No comments from him except, Dont switch off on touchdown. Clear off the runway on to the apron and switch off Nice steady approach with partial flaps, 340 IAS on threshold, chute below 280 IAS and grinding halt abeam one marker to go. Opened RPM to BLC to cock the nose and jettison chute off the runway when the master blinker came ON again, this time with both fire warning light ON an JPT shooting up like mad. HP off, pumps off, battery off and I jumped out to run upwind totally out of wind. They later found that all the flame tubes had melted and there was a large hole in the combustion chamber. I guess I had been really close to final recall there. But hey! No story is complete without the customary and all important mistakes made and lessons learnt. Given the circumstances and my relative inexperience, I thought it was a spurious fire warning. Therefore I did not operate the fire extinguisher in the air. The SFS fell for it too despite his experience. Spurious fire warnings are rather rare in the MiG-21bis. The SFS negated my decision to switch off after touchdown and asked me to switch off after clearing off on the apron. In hindsight, I should have operated the fire extinguisher before switching off the battery and carrying out a quick exit, when the fire indications came on the second time, on the ground. Lessons learnt: Emergencies dont necessarily turn up the way they are given in the emergency flip card. They are like little evil goblins which hide in nooks and crannies much like melting flame tubes in weak engine designs. They de-rated the [MiG-21] bis aero engine after this incident to cater for the flame tubes which had a certain tendency to melt. Know your aircraft systems like the back of your hand. Aircraft do not give you leeway for inexperience, nor do they show respect for rank and bags of experience. As captain of the aircraft, even a young and junior pilot can negate a senior who is in an advisory capacity. It is the captain who having signed for the aircraft is responsible for its safety and that of its crew. If you are convinced about the correctness of your decisions then never devolve this responsibility to anyone else. I should have switched off on touchdown despite the SFSs suggestion to the contrary. Wing Cdr. Dhar. http://indianairforce.nic.in.
439.
Engine Fires
440.
Project Have Doughnut Evaluation
Recommend that the USAF Project Have Doughnut evaluation (December 1968, declassified in 1998) of the MiG-21 be considered as part of training. See MiG-21 USAF Guidance above. Additional Information: Many aspects of the aircraft are included and it provides a valuable source of information. Have Doughnut (U) Technical report is or particular interest. Recommend SOPs and training focus on the proper application of braking action during landing, especially in unusual circumstances.
441.
Brake Application
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
442.
Spool Down Time
Ensure SOPs incorporate the PIC recording the spool down time of the engine after shutdown. This is critical, as it could indicate an upcoming problem with the engine. Recommend that the SOPs, training, and documentation incorporate a detailed understanding of the MiG21 V-G/V-N diagrams. Additional Information: A chart of velocity versus load factor (or V-n diagram) is another way of showing limits of aircraft performance. It shows how much load factor can be safely achieved at different airspeeds. The V-G Diagram is a relatively unfamiliar diagram to most non-military pilots. However, its full understanding and practical implication is absolutely critical to upset recovery for example. The operating flight strength limitations of an airplane are presented in the form of a V-N or V-G diagram. This chart usually is included in the aircraft flight handbook in the section dealing with operating limitations. Each airplane type has its own particular V-N diagram with specific Vs and Ns. The flight operating strength of an airplane is presented on a graph whose horizontal scale is airspeed (V) and vertical scale is load factor (n). The presentation of the airplane strength is contingent on four factors being known: (I) Aircraft gross weight; (2) Configuration of the aircraft (clean, external stores, flaps and landing gear position, etc.); (3) Symmetry of loading (since a rolling pullout at high speed can reduce the structural limits to approximately two-thirds of the symmetrical load limits); and (4) Applicable altitude. A change in any one of these four factors can cause important changes in operating limits. Below is an example of a V-N diagram for a MiG-21F:
443.
V-N Diagram
Source: USAF. For additional information, see NAVPERS 00-8-T-80, Aerodynamics for Naval Aviators, January 1965. If the aircraft is equipped with an early Soviet or Chinese DG, recommend that SOPs and training mitigate the instruments limitations, such as its compass card and airplane index. For example, with the compass card adjusted so that north was at 12 Oclock and the flight path was east, the airplane index would point 90 at 3 Oclock. Entrekin, 2012.
444.
Directional Gyro (DG)
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Recommend that the SOPs, training, and documentation incorporate a detailed understanding of the MiG21 E-M (Energy Maneuverability) in addition to the V-G / V-N diagrams. Additional Information: An aircrafts Energy and Maneuverability (E-M) diagram is an excellent way to graphically see the relationship between two dynamics operational maneuverability and energy management. This may assist in remaining inside the envelope and avoid high-risks maneuvering. Such a graph, used by the USAF is provided below:
445.
E-M Diagram
An E - M diagram combines three essential parameters on one chart: (1) aircraft structural limitations, (2) turn performance data (turn rate data and turn radius curves), and (3) specific power data in the form of Ps curves. The E-M diagram provides a few crucial data points can be derived. These include: Corner Velocity: This point at the intersection of the aircraft G limit and l i f t limit equates to the corner airspeed. Corner airspeed has been previously defined as the lowest airspeed at which the maximum g is available. The turn rate at this point is the best instantaneous turn rate. The tradeof f for maneuvering the aircraft at this point is the energy loss. All maneuvering beyond is energy depleting. Additionally, the E - M diagram shows the effect each maneuver will have on the aircrafts turn radius. Maximum Sustained Rate: This point is the maximum sustained turn rate. As a result, it is possible to identify a particular (i.e., 19 degree per second) sustained turn rate without losing energy. This becomes significant when operating on the deck where altitude cannot be traded for airspeed.
For additional information, see at http://navyflightmanuals.tpub.com/P-821/P-8210204.htm. External Tank Limitations and Handling The SOPs and training should address the external fuel tank limitations. These are not limited to takeoff and landing performance, G limits, airspeed, or fuel remaining, but, depending on the version of the MiG21, other significant limitations as well. Additional Information: For example, in many versions and variants, the carriage of a belly drop tank disables the speed brake (or brakes in case of the F-13 then had no air brakes when carrying a drop tank). The SOPs and training should address the impact that external fuel tanks and their use have on aircraft handling, which is seriously affected, and performance. This can be aircraft type and variant specific. Additional Information: The issue is not limited to a heavy aircraft or more runway length is needed when operating with full tanks. For example, in the MiG-21SMT, there was instability (controllability) when flying with full tanks, especially at high density altitudes. This will vary depending on the version. Ensure SOPs and training address the possibility of a runaway trim. 448. Runaway Trim Additional Information: Emphasize this concern in the airworthiness review and note the need for adequate corrective action as per the Flight Manual and Checklist.
446.
447.
External Tanks Impact on Handling and Performance
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Recommend SOPs and training focus on configuration checks. Additional Information: In 1999, a Romanian MiG-21 Lancer B two-seater was involved in a totally preventable accident. During a training flight, the aircraft was unable to gain sufficient speed and altitude after takeoff. It was found that the flaps were set for landing instead of take-off, and both the student and the instructor failed to notice it. The aircraft crashed some 2 miles from the runway at Bacau military airfield. Another configuration issue with the MiG-21 is attempting take-off with the air brakes extended. This is common. The following incident is one of many such instances: On September 17, 2010, Sgt. Kumar was performing the duties of l/C Ops from ATC tower. On takeoff roll of a MiG-21 (Bison) aircraft he noticed that the air brakes of the aircraft are in extended position. He promptly informed the DATCO which was immediately transmitted to the pilot of the aircraft. The pilot acknowledged the same and retracted the air and continued with the take off. http://indianairforce.nic.in/fsmagazines/Mar11.pdf. Recommend that SOPs (not just for maintenance, but servicing and flight crew as well) address and with extreme caution, the high potential for fuel leaks in the MiG-21. 450. Fuel Leaks Additional Information: This poses a serious safety concern, not just for the aircraft in flight but also in terms of ground safety. Over time, there is a tendency by operators to treat fuel leaks as a common occurrence, and in due time, this has created serious, and sometimes, fatal situations. Recommend SOPs and training require the pilot to perform the PRICE check on the oxygen equipment (Pressure, Regulator, Indicator, Connections, and Emergency) before flight. 451. Oxygen Check Additional Information: The acronym PRICE is a checklist memory-jogger that helps pilots and crewmembers inspect oxygen equipment. Mix and match components with caution. When interchanging oxygen systems components, ensure compatibility of the components storage containers, regulators, and masks. This is a particularly important issue because the age of the aircraft may require the use of modern equipment, at least for some components. Ensure SOPs and training address the possibility of a runaway trim. 452. Runaway Trim End of Runway (EOR) Check Additional Information: Emphasize this concern in the airworthiness review and note the need for adequate corrective action as per the Flight Manual and Checklist. Recommend SOPs and training emphasize the importance of an EOR (or Last Chance) check. This was a common Soviet practice, even when the aircraft was not armed. If the aircraft is equipped with an early Soviet or Chinese AI, recommend that SOPs and training mitigate the instruments limitations. For example, these early AIs were black and white (not blue/brown) and were non-toppling. In a loop, it locked near the top and then took some time to reset. This as because the gyro was non-toppling on all axis. This issue can surprise an unfamiliar pilot. Additional Information: In its evaluation of the MiG-21, the USAF noted that the attitude gyro in the aircraft was extremely poor and precessed excessively. The artificial horizon/airplane presentation was opposite to our presentation; consequently, the pilot tended to make the wrong correction in roll to bring the aircraft back to wings level flight. Have Doughnut (U) Technical, 1969. The following account by a US civil pilot illustrates some of the cockpit and instrumentation issues with the aircraft: The instrument panel is typical for Soviet fighters The attitude-director indicator (ADI) is also distinctively Soviet in being earth-stabilized rather than aircraft stabilized.it features a drum which rotates in the vertical plane to indicate pitch attitude, with a separate symbol which rotates through 360 of arc to denote angle of bank. The pilot has to integrate these two cues mentally to get a full attitude representation. I had found this instrument disconcerting when I encountered it Lambeth, 1994. An experience MiG operator commented on another type of Soviet and Chinese AI: The face of the instrument was blue on the bottom and brown on the top. Think about that for a second and try to visualize in your minds eye the gyro in your aircraft. This is, of course, the exact opposite of the orientation of a standard Western attitude indicator and, to say the least, quite confusing during actual instrument meteorological conditions. That the USA day VFR only limitation during Constant Peg now begins to make sense! At least bank angle did correspond to the direction of turn. The idiosyncrasies of this primary instrument fostered an old Marine Corps adage of improvise, adapt, and overcome. To that end, I simply ignored the gyro and referred to turn and needle and vertical speed indicator and flew partial panel in IMC Entrekin, 2012. See Visual Meteorological Condition (VMC) and Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) Operations VMC Day above.
449.
Configuration Checks
453.
454.
Early Attitude Indicators (AI)
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Ensure that SOPs and training properly provide for correctly identifying and handing an engine surge in the MiG-21. Additional Information: The following account illustrates this: On September 6, 2009, Sqn. Ldr. Dham was authorized to fly a Bison [MiG-21] aircraft as a CAP in 4 + 3 vs. 3 missions. The aircraft was in 3 D/T configuration and also modified with SPP system (Anti Surge System). During initial engagement at an altitude of 3.5 KM on pressing missile firing button he experienced loss of thrust. On checking engine parameters, he noticed RPM winding down to flight idle and then again building up to 100% after a delay of 6 seconds with throttle lever stationary at full dry power. He also noticed ignition light illuminated on the failure warning panel. The sequence of RPM dropping and then rising again repeated. The pilot correctly identified this as a malfunction of Anti Surge System and promptly switched off the Anti Surge CB. He called off the mission and recovered the aircraft safely on priority. Sqn. Ldr. Dham, despite his limited experience on type, displayed a keen sense of observation and a high degree of professionalism in preventing a possible incident/accident. http://www.indianairforce.nic.in/fsmagazines/Feb10.pdf. Recommend computation of a 2,000 ft. acceleration check speed anytime the computed takeoff roll exceeds 2,500 ft. 456. Acceleration Check, and Takeoff Computations Additional Information: Practically, this involves an acceleration check speed, which is using a ground reference during the takeoff run to check for a pre-calculated speed. When the computed takeoff roll is 2,500 ft. or less, use the actual takeoff distance versus the computed takeoff distance to evaluate aircraft performance. Compute a refusal speed for all takeoffs. This is a standard USAF practice. Recommend that SOPs and training address the proper take-off technique, including proper rotation attitude and the use of the afterburner. 457. Take-Off Technique Additional Information: In 2010, a MiG-21 take-off was marginal, possibly due to improper technique. Footage of the incident shows that immediately after getting airborne, the aircraft became unstable shown by a pronounced wing (unintentional) rocking. See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wHEqXNjoD-Q. Recommend that SOPs and training properly balance a safe minimum operating speed within the scope of the applicable regulations [91.117 (d)] and aircraft operating procedures (AFM). Additional Information: For example, in the MiG-21, as airspeed decreases below 270 knots, both stability and control effectiveness start to deteriorate rapidly and could create a less-than desirable situation. The aircraft's poor lateral stability at low speeds can make maintaining aircraft control challenging during takeoff, landing or maneuvering and the pilot instructions encourage transitioning through certain airspeed ranges quickly. The pilot instructions also describe airspeed ranges that have instability characteristics that requires forward stick during speed reduction. Maintaining lower airspeeds with the resultant instability needs to be properly considered in conjunction with any regulatory maximum airspeed, such as the 250knot limit below 10,000 feet. In other words, balancing the safety of the aircrafts operation with that of other traffic, and ATC, must be considered. It could, in some cases, require alternate mitigating measures such as not operating within certain types of airspace. On this issue, coordination between the operator and the air traffic organization must take place. References to consider include 91.117 Aircraft Speed and FAA Order JO 7110.65U Section 7- Speed Adjustment. Recommend establishing SOPs for troubleshooting suspected in-flight control failures, that is, specific checklist procedures, altitude, and clear location. This is very important due to the MiG-21s history of flight control problems. Recommend SOPs and training address the abort decision. Many MiG-21 accidents occurred because of poor planning and execution concerning an aborted take-off. Additional Information: In fact, at AirVenture 2010, such a serious incident took place, where the pilot aborted the take-off at rotation. For footage of the incident see http://www.youtube.com. Two witnesses noted that he barely made it off the runway and above the tree line on the second attempt. We were right on the flight line further down, and I thought for sure he was done, and looks like an afterburner flameout, or something. The all MiG-21s (F-13, MiG-21bis, and the UM you saw) need afterburner for takeoff. So pretty much take your pick: Scrub the take-off or stall out eventually and slam into residential houses! http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ykAIWQtdb0M. This emphasizes the need for a runway length of at least 8,000 feet. See Minimum Runway Length above.
455.
Engine Surges and the SPP System
458.
Minimum Flying Speed and 91.117
459.
Suspected Flight Control Failure
460.
Rejected/Aborted Take-Off
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Recommend emphasizing, though SOPs and training, that the PIC knows the automatic fuel sequencing on the MiG-21 (with or without external fuel tanks) and familiarity to address any of the aircrafts sensitivity to CG changes due to fuel consumption. 461. Fuel Consumption and CG Shifting Additional Information: For example, and depending on the version or variants, only two thirds of internal fuel can be used before the CG, which moves progressively aft with fuel burn-off, passes beyond the rear limit, rendering the MiG-21 virtually uncontrollable at low speeds. In the MiG-21MF, which carries 2,600 liters total internal fuel (about 570 gal), 800 liters (about 176 gal) are unusable. Fuel burn-off moves the e.g. aft until, at 800 liters, it passes out of limits and the aircraft may then diverge uncontrollably nose-up at low speed, making it impossible to land safely. http://www.flightglobal.com/. Emphasize susceptibility to PIO on landing and takeoff. This phenomenon must be clearly understood by the PIC. Proper rotation and landing/flare technique is critical. Many MiG-21 crashed because of PIO. 462. Pilot Induced Oscillation (PIO) Additional Information: An Indian Air Force narrative noted that on March 1, 2011, [an airman] was detailed to perform [support] duties and video recording of take-off/landing. During the tour of his duty, a MiG-21 aircraft met with an accident during the landing, wherein the aircraft was observed to have entered PIO. The airman continued to record all the events occurring at the time of the accident. This footage proved to be of immense value during the investigation, and a valuable debrief aid for future reference. http://indianairforce.nic.in/fsmagazines/Oct11.pdf. Recommend that the operator consider, as per the appropriate guidance for the aircraft version and variant in question, the benefits or lack thereof (i.e., pros and cons) of landings without a flare and landings with a flare. This may be an issue because some literature concerning Soviet flight techniques (many of which would survive and be incorporated into flight manuals) indicate that Soviet techniques may have emphasized the aircraft hit the runway without a flare. This was implemented in order to reduce LOC events before touchdown and to better manage the aircraft high-airspeed requirements (see MiG-21 Landing Characteristics and Overruns above). 463. Flare vs. No-Flare Landings Considerations Additional Information: However, in operational service, some operators, such as the Finnish Air Force, researched and developed landing techniques that incorporated a normal flare. As a result, and as one of the benefits, wheel tire life went up dramatically and in some case searched 200 landings per tire rather than below 40 or even lower. However, operators need to be cautioned to properly ascertain the benefits of such techniques, that is, ensure that they are not trading saving tires at the expense of a higher overrun probability or risking low-speed LOC at touchdown. Note: During flight testing, the Soviets tried landing techniques with 16-18 AOA and pilots found that the stabilator authority was insufficient during these high-AOA landings, and that the unusually high nose-up attitude and high-position of the cockpit above the ground complicated the landing approach, demanding special skill, and concentration on the part of the pilot. The flight test report also noted that the fighters longitudinal stability was insufficient [degraded] at certain CG positions (for example, 37.5% MAC). Gordon, MiG-21, 2008. Recommend the establishments of training and SOPs to address the slow spool-up time of the R-11, R-13, and R-25 engines. Many MiG-21 accidents, especially those equipped with R-11, due to the slow spool-up time. The same is true of the Chinese WP-7. This was an issue not only in the pattern environment, such as being slow and low on final or in a go-around, but also during maneuvering. Additional Information: A MiG-21 pilot recalls during practice of zooming maneuvers that the R-11 engine responded very slowly to input from the throttle and he pulled up before his engine was in full afterburnerthe forward movement dropped to less than 200 km/h: the plane ended standing on its tail with the nose pointing high into the sky before flipping out of control Cooper, Arab MiGs, 2011. Note: R-11 throttle response was slow from idle to military thrust. This is a dangerous characteristic for pilots with experience in only modern jet engines (both civil and military) with a higher spool times. This is also an issue in differences training. A Finnish Air Force pilot noted that the engine spool-up time is longer than your patience. So as I said, dont practice these things at circuit heights. On occasion pulling the throttle back and then trying to get back to higher settings has made me feel like the engine has failed. So, dont do that at low altitude, because it may increase your heart rate significantly! Laukkanen, 2004. A description of the MiG-21 flown by the USAF noted that the axial flow engine in the MiG-21 is slow to spool up, requiring about 15 seconds to accelerate from idle to MIL (Military Power) (10 seconds from 85% power to MIL power) or full throttle without afterburner. Afterburner light-off requires another three to five seconds after reaching MIL. Peck, 2012, and Have Doughnut (U) Technical, 1969.
464.
Throttle Movements and Spool-Up Time
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Ensure that SOPs and training focus on the landing characteristics of the aircraft. This has been, by far, one of the most critical safety issues with the aircraft, not just in operational military service, but in civil use as well. Sink rates at near stall have been characterized as spectacular. In Soviet MiG-21 flight training forced pilots to be very conservative in handling procedures such as forbidding full-flap landings and required a very cautious approach to low speeds. The Soviets forbade full-flap landings because the MiG-21 balloons as the flaps move out and then decelerates and sinks rapidly. Another account notes that the reason for forbidding full-flap landings in nearly all versions was that on first depressing the flaps fully the aircraft balloons severely, gaining perhaps 200 feet, whereupon the immediate reaction is to stuff the nose down. This comes just as speed bleeds off fast and the aircraft begins to sink uncontrollably. A lot of MiG21s were lost in full-flaps landings Gunston, 1986. Forward visibility is restricted during the landing in several Russian fighter types, and the MiG-21 is no exception. Additional Information: A MiG-21 MF report noted that at the low-speed end of the flight envelope, the MiG-21MF begins to judder at about 180 mph, 290 km/hr., and aileron effectiveness declines at 150 m.p.h., 240 km/hr. Normal touch-down speed is 170 mph, 270 km/hr. [Soviet] circuit technique is to fly a very wide, square pattern at circuit height with a very long, straight final approach. http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1975/1975%20-%201967.html. In fact, the high landing speed of the aircraft was an issue even for pilots with previous fast jet experience like the Hunter. In any case, airspeed management in final is essential. A USAF F-16 pilot who flew a MiG-21 with Bulgarian Air force in 2010 described that this was brought home to me during landing while in the backseat of a 1st Squadron jet at Graf Ignatievo, Bulgaria. The pilot maintained 310 mph in the final turn to land, which is approximately 124 mph faster than the F-16. I was wondering if we were going to perform a touch-and-go as the distance remaining boards raced by at an alarming rate. Luckily, the front-seater decided to pull the drag chute before any impolite questions had to be asked. It was very different experience than flying an American fourth generation fighter. Tyleloss, 2010. The following account by a ne w Indian Air Force MiG21 pilot illustrates the aircrafts characteristics further: After my Stage 3 training on Kiran MK-II aircraft, I was posted to my first Fighter Squadron at a premier Fighter base in the West, for syllabus [training] on MiG-21 T-96 aircraft. The morale was high and so were the spirits. The station housed two fighter squadrons operating the same type of aircraft. So, the atmosphere with 22 flying officers wasnt very different from that in Training Command. Every morning ushered in unlimited visibility and high serviceability; one could hear reheat after reheat, and it filled us with thrill. Soon, my ground training was over and I commenced flying on what was called the real fighters. She was sleek and fast and could take anyone for a ride. The time on downwind got over in a flick and there was no time to get our parameters and carry out vital actions, leave alone the situational awareness on the circuit traffic. A few days later, the first guy in the course cleared his solo check and was launched in a fighter for his first solo. With most of us due for our solo checks in a few days, we proceeded along with the ACP pilot to see the first solo landing of our course. He was our very own Call Sign 919. After about 20 minutes, we heard Call Sign 919 on R/T for the rejoin. He reported dead side and turned downwind. In the first overshoot, he was correctly on glide path, after which he turned for downwind. In this time, Prowler formation that had gone for a BFM sortie to the sector, too had rejoined. Prowler 2, a trainee, joined circuit behind 919, and the leader maintained overhead to regulate gravy. 919 reported downwind, followed by Prowler 2. I picked him up visually on finals but wait a second! These were two aircraft in close proximity!! 919 while carrying out his downwind vital actions had delayed his base leg turn and Prowler 2 had turned at the correct base leg turning point. As a result when Prowler 2 rolled out on finals he was dangerously close to 919. The ATC in a panic gave a call to Prowler 2 to go around and 919 to continue. However 919 also initiated go around in a panic. The ACP pilot intervened and told Prowler 2 to go around on dead side. On seeing 919 in such close proximity while going around, Prowler 2 put on a vicious bank with undercarriage and flaps down and yanked back towards dead side. The ACP pilot in a horror yelled on R/T to offload, but the aircraft with nose up and at very low speeds continued towards dead side and started a wild wing to wing rocking which is a symptom of approach of stall. But much to everybodys relief, it thereafter gradually lowered nose, and spaced out to the correct dead side. Both aircraft were recovered safely subsequently. Lessons Learnt: The MiG-21 requires careful handling at low speedshttp://indianairforce.nic.in/fsmagazines/Jun12.pdf. Recommend the operator consider implementing SOPs to refrain from 360-degree overhead patterns at uncontrolled airports. See AIM, Section 5-4-27 for additional information. Recommend the operator consider implementing SOPs that refer to conservative crosswind limitations (possibly more conservative than those in the AFM) and adhere to the appropriate crosswind landing techniques.
465.
MiG-21 Landing Characteristics and Overruns
466.
360-Degree Overhead Pattern Technique Crosswinds
467.
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Recommend that SOPs and training focus on the correct power settings on final. Additional Information: The following account involving a two-seater MiG-21U illustrates this: we encountered bad weather and therefore decided to abort the mission. The decision was taken to return to base as we also got a message that base weather was deteriorating. On reaching overhead and checking our fuel status we realized that we had to burn up fuel to get to the landing fuel figure. This marked the beginning of the chain of events that were to ensue. The trainer captain gave a call that instead of burning up fuel he would like to carry out circuit flying for benefit of the U/T. I followed his plan and decided to carry out circuits myself. By this time we could see a rain patch close to the airfield however decided to stick to our plan. We both fed into the circuit pattern. All was well till I initiated overshoot [go-around] on my first circuit where I encountered rain on cross wind leg. In the second circuit the rain patch had come closer and was now between runway and downwind displacement. Therefore it became difficult to keep the trainer aircraft that was ahead of me in visual contact. There are very few amongst us who actually build up spacing only on takeoff heading. After the second circuit while going round my attention got diverted in visually picking up the trainer so as to build up the correct spacing. In hindsight I think I was actually reluctant to rapidly accelerate during overshoot for fear of catching up and getting too close to the trainer aircraft ahead of me. These perhaps led me to either not open full power or inadvertently maintain the throttle back below the maximum dry power. I did not realize this and as a result my speed started washing off. The situation hit me when I retracted my undercarriage and the aircraft instead of going up and away from the ground actually started going down. There I was just about 80-100 meters above ground with my undercarriage retracted and the flight path of the aircraft taking me towards the runway and I could see the runway numerals getting bigger and bigger. A lot of thoughts crossed my mind in those few seconds (which felt like a lifetime at that time).... this could not be happening to me!! ....what would happen if I landed the ac with undercarriage in up position.... or should I eject ... (and of all things under the hazy sun!) will I still be able to go for the QFIC. Luckily, may be because of my preoccupation with my future or my years of training, I did not pull back on the stick, opened max thrust and the ac slowly accelerated and started responding to my control input and I went around from a height of 10-15 m after giving heart attacks to the runway controller and the people in ATC including the SFS. After landing it took a while for me to come out of the ac and walk back as my now wobbly legs were still shaking due to shock. After reaching the flight complex, I reported the entire episode to the flight commander and CO. They both told me to relax for the day and the next day I was made to cover the episode during morning emergency session and every one of us in the squadron analyzed the events that led to the situation. The trainer captain in his exuberance to take out some benefit from the sortie decided to continue with circuits even with approaching bad weather, I as a leader, did not exercise control and submitted to No. 2s decision as he was the Flt Cdr. The SFS did not intervene despite having the entire picture as he thought the flight commander must have taken the correct decision. On my part, I was also at fault of not carrying out the correct go round checks which clearly specify that the max dry light had to be checked after opening full power on initiating go round. We however missed out on the essential (heartfelt) participation by the runway controller, bird watchers, DATCO and the [weather officer], who would have probably assumed by then that such occurrences were quite normal once in a while ! This brings out the importance of sticking to the SOPs, the need for us to exercise control and not give in to the gradient of the formation. However, the best thing that happened that day was I lost my swagger and the false sense of being invincible. Wing Cdr. Gupta. http://indianairforce.nic.in/fsmagazines/Nov10.pdf. Recommend the use of AC 91-79, Runway Overrun Prevention. According to AC 91-79, safe landings begin long before touchdown. 469. FAA AC 91-79 Additional Information: Adhering to SOPs and best practices for stabilized approaches will always be the first line of defense in preventing a runway overrun, common in MiG-21 operations, military or civil. Recommend review of George, Fred. How Much Ruwnay is Enough? Business & Commercial Aviation (October 2012) for insight into best practices to avoid ovevruns. Recommend the use of AC 61-107, Operations of Aircraft at Altitudes Above 25,000 ft. MSL and/or Mach Numbers (MMO) Greater Than 0.75. 470. FAA AC 61-107 Additional Information: This AC can be used to assist pilots who are transitioning from aircraft with less performance capability to complex, high-performance aircraft like a MiG-21. It also provides knowledge about the special physiological and aerodynamic considerations involved in these kinds of operations.
468.
Power on Final
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Recommend that SOPs and training focus on possible multiple failure. These are common with the MiG-21 and can quickly overwhelm the crew. Additional Information: The following Indian Air Force MiG-21 incident illustrates such a situation: On November 16, 2009, Wing Cdr. Thomas and Sqn. Ldr. Sharma were authorized to fly a sortie in a MiG21U aircraft. After take-off, on selecting undercarriage lever up, the landing gear failed to retract with associated indication on T-6 panel going off. Immediately, the undercarriage lever was selected down but still no indications of the undercarriage position were available in the cockpit. Subsequently, trim, main and booster hydraulic warning lights were also seen going off in the cockpit with angle of attack lights behaving erratically. An undercarriage check was carried out subsequently, in which the landing gear was reported down. Flaps and airbrakes were found non-operational. A precision approach was executed. On landing, the chute did not deploy and antiskid did not function as well. Despite all abnormalities the aircraft was safely decelerated. http://www.indianairforce.nic.in/fsmagazines/Jun10.pdf. Ensure the PIC trains and assumes drag chute failure for all flights when applicable, that is, in the MiG-21 that are so equipped (installation provided in the design). This is because of the very high number of drag chute failures, including a recent MiG-21 overrun in Eden Prairie, Minnesota in 2012. Recommend the establishments of training and SOPs to focus on this. Drag Chute Failures (SOPs) Additional Information: Effectively, the aircraft should not be operated with total dependence on the drag chute system to stop on available runway. The brake parachute is not to be relied upon to enable planned landing at a field shorter than that which would be required without this parachute. Note: The operation of the drag chute requires proper procedures, starting on the ground. The following MiG-21 incident illustrates the commonalty of the problem: On 25 Nov 09, Flt. Lt. Parthasarthy was detailed for aerodrome controller duties in the morning shift. During his shift, a MiG-21 was on take-off roll when the controller observed that the tail chute of the departing aircraft had deployed. The controller promptly transmitted the emergency on [radio] which enabled the pilot to abandon take off safely in time. http://www.indianairforce.nic.in/fsmagazines/May10.pdf. Recommend that SOPs and training address the high-likelihood of tire burst with the MiG-21, including actions to reduce that likelihood. Additional Information: The following incident narrative illustrates an all-too common event: On Jan 21, 2011, Flt. Lt. Parthasarthi noticed smoke coming from the starboard undercarriage of a MiG-21 aircraft which had just landed. Further observation revealed tire pieces hitting the starboard wing. He asked the pilot to switch off the aircraft on runway and immediately activated the safety services. Prompt intimation helped the pilot in taking tire burst actions in time. He also diverted three fighter aircraft which were in air as the runway was blocked. Timely activation of safety services and diversion of aircraft in air helped in providing quick assistance to the emergency aircraft and safe recovery of aircraft in air at the diversionary airfield. http://indianairforce.nic.in/fsmagazines/Sep11.pdf. See Landing Gear Retraction Test and Related Maintenance, and System Description below. Recommend establishing SOPs to address the aircrafts sensitivities to weather, including hydraulic seal failures and leakages, freezing moisture, transparencies, air intake, and exhaust protection if necessary. 474. Outdoors Additional Information: The MiG-21 electrical system is highly susceptible to moisture, and there have been cases where moisture has caused short circuits leading to electrical malfunction, including total power loss. As an example, during the Vietnam War, many North Vietnamese MiG-21s were not airworthy following even limited exposure to tropical and moisture conditions. Recommend that SOPs and training include the need to have a qualified crew chief assist the pilot with all of the flight controls checks. This is to be accomplished after engine start and before taxiing. SOPs and training should note that lateral damping and lateral-directional stability may be poor. The USAF evaluation (of the MiG-21F) noted that for all conditions tested, the damping following abrupt lateral control pulses was deadbeat, and dynamic lateral-directional s damping was fair to poor. It also noted that in turbulent conditions the aircraft was not acceptable platform for instrument flying, in part because of weak lateral-directional damping. Also see High AOA, Loss of Control (LOC), and Abrupt Maneuvering and Stability and Controllability above.
471.
Multiple Failures
472.
473.
Tire Bursts
475.
Assisted Flight Control Checks
476.
Lateral Control and Dynamic LateralDirectional Stability
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Ask the applicant/operator to report (to the FSDO or MIDO) incidents, malfunctions, and equipment defects found in maintenance, preflight, flight, and post-flight inspection. This would yield significant safety benefits to both operators and the FAA. See Accident, Incident Histories, and Risk Factors above. Additional Information: A 2011 study for the U.S. Navy points to the effectiveness of such practices. It stated: The data analysis carried out was a comprehensive attempt to examine the strength of the link between safety climate and mishap probability. Our findings would seem to support the premise that safety climate and safety performance are, at best, weakly related. Mishaps are rare events, and they describe only part of the spectrum of risks pertaining to a work system. We suggest that measuring workers self-reported safety attitudes and behavior is an alternative way to assess the discriminate validity of safety climate. OConnor, October 2011. In other words, reporting safety issues, such as malfunctions, goes a long way in preventing an accident. As an element of reducing accidents, notably MiG-21 accidents, the Indian Air Force uses the Air Force System on Error Management (AFSEM) process. This process provides a platform to all operational personnel to report any type of unsafe act/event, errors, and violations which may undermine safety of the IAF. It facilitates reporting of the faults and utilizes them as a vital source of information for predictive capability and subsequent formulation of accident preventive program. Aviation history has shown that for every single fatal Cat-1 accident [Class A Mishap] which has occurred in aviation field, there were 10 non-fatal accidents preceded by 30 reportable incidents which were further preceded by 600 unreported, unsafe acts. The IAF today faces the challenge of addressing the unreported and unsafe acts/ errors related with flying operations at the field units. The errors, violations and unsafe acts, if left neglected, have proved to be a potent source of incidents and accidents. http://indianairforce.nic.in/fsmagazines/Dec11.pdf. Recommend detailed and comprehensive SOPs/training (not unlike the military-style training known as blindfold cockpit check with boldface items conducted in a cockpit or cockpit simulator) be instituted to ensure adequate cockpit familiarization for the PIC. The MiG-21 cockpit layout does not conform to normal standards familiar in civil or Western military types. Recommend that if the aircraft has an original functional autopilot (i.e., KAP-1, KAP-2K, AP-155, AP-17, or Chinese KJ-11 two-channel autopilot), that it be thoroughly understood. Additional Information: For example, and depending on the system, it may have functions that may be unfamiliar, such as dumping stabilizers, which can be used for landing, or the horizontal flight function, in case of disorientation. Others, like the earlier KAP-1 only had roll control, essentially a wings leveler. Earlier versions may be equipped with an earlier auto-stabilization system working only on the pitch-androll axes and fitted with a q-feel unit. A reference to the KAP-2 autopilot notes that it is a single-channel system stabilizing the aircraft on the roll axis only. The KAP-2 limited the aircrafts bank angle to +/- 35. It had two operating modes. One addressed roll damping, the other stabilization. In the former mode, it damped the aircrafts toll oscillations, monitoring the roll rate. In stabilization mode, it kept the wings level and brought the aircraft into wings-level flight from any attitude. Gordon, MiG-21, 22008. On the other hand, the AP-155 operates in all axes. Recommend that SOPs and training address the correct use of the ARU system, which controls the stabilizer deflection as a function of speed and altitude. The correct utilization of the auto stab system is a critical safety of flight issue. This will vary depending on the aircrafts version and variant. Additional Information: A Finnish Air Force pilot noted that once on base leg, slow downand check again that the gear is down and locked and pressures are OK. Check also that the stabilizer light is illuminated to advice you that the ARU is in the correct gearing to give you full stabilator movement for landing. Laukkanen, 2004. In the MiG-21MF, the controls are very heavy, though fully powered, and the stick tailplane loading is automatically adjusted in accordance with speed and altitude. The MiG-21 has auto stabilization in pitch and roll but not in yaw. http://www.flightglobal.com. In the MiG-21F was originally equipped with a choice of two gear ratios manually selected by the pilot. A complex panel instrument displayed Mach and altitude, and indicated when to change from one tailplane regime to the other. Gunston, 1986. Recommend the PIC and any occupants received training, including techniques to mitigate the potential effects of high-G exposure if operations above 3 Gs are contemplated. This is consistent with a 2012 NTSB recommendation (A-12-11) for high-performance aircraft.
477.
Reporting Malfunctions and Defects
478.
Cockpit Familiarization
479.
Autopilot
480.
ARU-3V System
481.
High-G Training
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Accidents have occurred with two pilots on board when both pilots thought the other was in control. It is recommended that before the flight, the PIC discuss with any other pilot (i.e., back seater in the MiG-21UB) the circumstances under which the PIC would (1) intercede and (2) take control of the aircraft. 482. Transfer of Aircraft Control (MiG-21U) Additional Information: The transfer of control, could include the following exchange: PIC: You have the flight controls Other pilot: I have the flight controls PIC: You have the flight controls. During the discussion, it is also recommended to establish whether the PIC wishes the other pilot to conduct any flight crew ancillary tasks. If so, these should be clearly specified to avoid confusion between the PIC and the other pilot. This is particularly important when events are moving quickly and the aircraft is in critical flight segments such as take-off or final approach to landing. SOPs and training should provide for procedures to ensure that all controls, features, and switches in the aft cockpit are not inadvertently operated or in any way interfere with the PIC in the front seat. Additional Information: The MiG-21U is equipped with switches and functions in the back seat allowing an instructor to disable some instruments in the front cockpit to simulate failures. This is the large control panel in front of the pilot, over the main instrument panel in the back cockpit. In addition, certain functions operated from the back seat will disable the similar function in the front seat, and this can create serious hazards unless properly understood and communicated. One such example is the trim control switch. An Egyptian Air Force pilot explained how to manually engage a gear tang on the throttle control system if it slipped out of synchronization while transitioning from the afterburner setting back to the military power setting. It cannot be engaged from the front cockpit, so if it slips it must be reengaged from the era cockpit, to avoid an in-flight engine emergency situation. Gunston, 1986. Also see Aft Cockpit Override and Control Panel above. Recommend the applicant/operator consider aircrew medical fitness as part of flight qualifications and preparation. In addition to meeting any ejection seat limitations (that is, weight and height) and seatspecific training, relevant U.S. military medical fitness standards could be used to ensure survival after ejection is maximized and injuries minimized. Additional Information: Ejection records show that when survivable, many ejections inflict serious injuries. Examples of aeromedical guidance include AFI 48-123, Medical Examinations, and Standards, dated May 22, 2001, and Army Regulation 40-501, Standards of Medical Fitness, dated June 14, 1989. Also refer to Defense and Civil Institute of Environmental Medicine, Department of National Defense, Canada. Ejection Systems and the Human Factors: A Guide for Flight Surgeons and Aeromedical Trainers, May 1988. Recommend SOPs and training address the abort decision. Many MiG-21 accidents have been caused by inappropriate procedures during an abort. 485. Rejected Takeoff (RTO) Additional Information: A rejected takeoff (RTO) or aborted takeoff is the situation in which it is decided to abort the takeoff of the aircraft. There can be many reasons for deciding to perform a rejected takeoff, but they are usually due to suspected or actual technical failures, like an engine failure, poor acceleration, configuration issues, and inadvertent drag chute deployment. Recommend that SOPs and training address whether or not an engine-out landing should be attempted and how the guidance in the AFM should be followed. The survivability of such an attempt needs to be considered. Additional Information: The MiG-21 was designed to do flame-out landings. The following account is of an USAF pilot who had such an experience: the Soviet philosophy was that you punched out if you lost your engine. We did it because we had experience in single-engine fighters and we trained for it by putting out our speed brakes to simulate the drag of the stalled engine, and flying certain parameters. I was now flying these parameters for real, one of which was to maintain at least 250 knots so that the engine would windmill and keep the hydraulics working. This was crucial: the hydraulics drove the MiGs flight control surfaces. Without the hydraulics the surfaces would freeze and cause Scott to lose control. The problem was that you couldnt touch down at 250 knots in that airplane. The drag chute was made for a maximum of 190 knots and the brakes werent strong enough to stop you. As advertised, I popped the chute and it disintegrated or ripped itself out of the housing. That left the rabbit catcher, the netting that would catch the airplane and stop it. Scott became the first pilot to test the MiG-21 with the barrier at the end of the runway, thankfully with positive results. Davies, 2008.
483.
Use of Aft Cockpit Controls, Features, and Switches (MiG-21U)
484.
Medical Fitness for Ejection Seats
486.
Engine Out (Flame-Out) Landing
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Ask the applicant/operator to adopt open and transparent SOPs that promote the use and requirements of 49 CFR Part 830, Notification And Reporting Of Aircraft Accidents or Incidents and Preservation of Aircraft Wreckage, Mail, Cargo, and Records, because there have been many instances where accidents and incidents are not reported, hindering safety. 487. 49 CFR Part 830 Additional Information: Occurrences, which are events other than an accident or incident (that requires investigation by the Flight Standards Service for its potential impact on safety), should also be reported. Occurrences include the following when no injury, damage, or 830.5 reporting requirements are involved: (1) aborted takeoffs not involving a runway excursion, (2) air turn-backs where the aircraft returns to the departure airport and lands without incident, and (3) air diversions where the aircraft diverts to a different destination for reasons other than weather conditions. Reference should be made of FAA Order 8020.11, Aircraft Accident and Incident Notification, Investigation, and Reporting. Recommend that to the extent practicable, operations of the aircraft consider the basics of mitigating the hazards of bird strikes. 488. BASH (Bird Strike Management) Additional Information: While all military aircraft are very vulnerable to bird strikes, and the risks are highly dependent on varying issues such as geography and time of year, the operational history of the MiG21 includes a very high number of bird strikes accidents where the aircraft was actually destroyed (primarily due to engine failure) and in many cases, crew killed. This appears to indicate rather high vulnerability due to the air intake position. USAF guidance, such as Bird/Wildlife Aircraft Strike Hazard (BASH) Management Techniques, AFP 91-212, February 1, 2004, can be used. Recommend the relevant sections of Aviation Safety AFSP-1(A), NATO, March 2007, be incorporated into the appropriate operational aspects of the operations to enhance overall safety. Additional Information: This document, which incorporates many safety issues concerning the safe operation of combat aircraft, sets out aviation safety principles, policies, and proceduresin particular those aimed at accident prevention. This document is a basic reference for everybody involved in aviation safety, both in occurrence prevention (starting from the development, testing, and introduction of material and procedures) and in its aftermath (the determination of the causes of an occurrence and the implementation of measures to prevent its recurrence). It is also recommended this process include internal safety audits. Safety audits help identify hazards and measure compliance with safety rules and standards. They assist in determining the adequate condition of work areas, adherence to safe work practices, and overall compliance with safety-based and risk-reduction procedures. Recommend the incorporation of USAF AFI 91-202, The Mishap Prevention Program, August 5, 2011, as part of the operation of the aircraft. Recommend the incorporation of USAF AFI 11-218, Aircraft Operations, and Movement on the Ground, October 28, 2011, Change 1, November 1, 2012, as part of the operation of the aircraft. Recommend the applicant/operator establish and maintain processes to address aircrew qualifications and records. This could include pilot certification, competency, ground and flight training (records, instructors, conversion training, command training, and proficiency), medical, duty time, and flight time records. Recommend the applicant/operator join a MiG-21 type club or organization. This facilitates safety information collection and dissemination. Recommend that operator become familiar with the Transportation Security Administrations (TSA) Security Guidelines for General Aviation Airports, Information Publication A-001, May 2004. Additional Information: This guidance document was developed by TSA, in cooperation with the General Aviation (GA) community. It is intended to provide GA airport owners, operators, and users with guidelines and recommendations that address aviation security concepts, technology, and enhancements. The recommendations contained in this document have been developed in close coordination with a Working Group comprised of individuals representing the entire spectrum of the GA industry. This material should be considered a living document which will be updated and modified as new security enhancements are developed and as input from the industry is received. To facilitate this, TSA has established a mailbox to collect feedback from interested parties. Persons wishing to provide input should send Email to General.Aviation@dhs.gov and insert GA Airport Security in the subject line.
489.
NATO Aviation Safety Guidance
490. 491.
USAF AFI 91-202 USAF AFI 11-218 Aircrew Records Type Clubs or Organizations
492.
493.
494.
TSA Publication A-001
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
Recommend that the Indian Air Force Defect Investigation/Failure Analysis for the MiG-21 be consulted, and to the extent practicable, be considered as part of the operation and maintenance of the aircraft. Additional Information: This study/program by the IAF tracks and analyses premature withdrawals of equipment and components from frontline units and reviews and investigates the causes for defects/failures. As a byproduct, repetitive cases are then taken up for in-depth study and modifications are incorporated in the units to minimize the recurrence of such defects/failures in future. Such data will be very valuable in ensure a higher level of safety in any MiG-21 civil operation. The Indian Air Force is the largest MiG-21 operator in the World and the most experienced (having started MiG-21 operations in 1962). As a reference, in 2007, there were still over 270 MiG-21s in service. The versions and variants were the MiG-21bis, MiG-21Fl, MiG-21 Bison, the MiG-21M/MF, and MiG-21U two-seaters. There is an extensive amount of data on the safety of MiG-21 aircraft in Indian Air Force service. The following excerpt by an Indian Air Force official not only describes the upgrades the MiG-21 has had in Indian, but also remains of the limitations of the aircraft itself: The starting point was of course the MiG-21bis fleet itself, which was the last variant of the large MiG-21 family of aircraft produced under license in India. The proposal for 125 MiG Bis aircraft with an option to upgrade 50 more aircraft at a total cost of approximately $630 million was cleared in January 1996. The upgrade was to include major modifications by MiG-MAPO which would incorporate Western Avionics as well as indigenously developed components. The aircraft which was given the nomenclature of MiG-21bis UPG came to be known as the Bison in the Indian Air Force (IAF). The Bison was indeed an ambitious upgrade program but there were some major issues with regard to time and cost overruns which marred the upgrade scenario. The last i.e. 125th Bison work was completed only in 2007, almost five years behind schedule. This has had serious repercussions on the residual life of the upgraded aircraft, some of which will not even see 10 years of useful operational life post the upgrade, as the entire fleet is scheduled to be retired between 2014 and 2017. The second shortcoming is that while the avionics and weapon systems were impressive in their upgraded avatar, the old airframes and aero engines continued to pose flight safety problems. A number of upgraded MiG-21 Bisons have already been lost in CAT-I accidents because of these issues. The overall serviceability state of the fleet has also been a matter of concern. http://www.spsaviation.net/story_issue.asp?Article=1078. Recommend the MiG-21 applicant/operator participate at the National Warbird Operator Conference. Additional Information: Founded in 1993, the annual NWOC event brings together warbird owners, operators, and museum directors to address particular events facing warbird owners and to discuss common goals related to the ever-changing economics, operations, and regulations pertaining to flying exmilitary aircraft. NWOC focuses on the exchange of ideas and information concerning the safe operation and restoration of warbird aircraft. This unique educational conference offers programs to enhance pilot skill and knowledge, expand aircraft maintenance technician and restorer knowledge, develop awareness of medical and insurance facts, and address aircraft-specific topics to ensure continued flight for these unique historic aircraft. http://www.warbirdconference.com/. It is recommended that the applicant/operator acquire the adequate type of insurance coverage. This is, and continues to be, an issue for many operators. However, the important role of insurance as part of an overall safety culture should not be underestimated. 497. Insurance Additional Information: For example, EAAs Warbirds of Americas insurance program emphasizes SAFETY, utilizing various training syllabuses and safety forums, and includes discounts available for participation in approved ground and flight safety programs. The adequate type of insurance coverage will greatly contribute to the safe operation of the aircraft because it involves an additional level of safety oversight that complements both the operators and the FAAs. Recommend that the applicant/operator review and consider the MiG-21 safety guidance that is available from various military operators. Additional Information: A good example is the Indian Air Force, the largest MiG-21 operator toady. Many of the IAFs experiences are recorded in this document, but additional guidance is still available. Attachment 4 below provides additional guidance. Recommend the applicant/operator institute emergency plans and post-accident management SOPs that ensure the consequences of major incidents and accidents to aircraft are dealt with promptly and effectively.
495.
IAF Defect Investigation/Failure Analysis
496.
National Warbird Operator Conference (NWOC)
498.
Military MiG-21 Operators Guidance
499.
Emergency Planning and Preparedness
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
The following is provided to illustrate several of the safety issues with the MiG-21 in an operational setting. Additional Information: It was the 29th of September 1969 and I was Archer One. There has been an accident, they sang out in unison. A trainee pilot from Eighth Pursuit had crashed on takeoff. The aircraft was a write-off and the pilot was seriously injured. I felt sad. Getting youngsters to convert into high performance aircraft was never easy. Babi (Wing Commander PKD) had just taken over the Eighth and I felt sorry for him. A few minutes later there was a call from the Command HQ. Wing commander MS was on the line. There has been an accident, he repeated the news. I said, yes, I have heard about it. Are any details known? No, he said. We only know that it was a crash on takeoff. We are putting you in as the president of the court of inquiry. Just get there quickly and start the proceedings. I will get the list of your team members shortly. That was that. I went home and packed my bags. Half an hour later an IL-14 came to pick me up. A mournful journey began. I first had to sequester all the technical documents pertaining to the aircraft that had crashed as well as all the training documents related to the pilot. This posed no problem. The units flight safety officer had already gathered all the documents in anticipation of my arrival; he now handed these documents over to me. I met the AOC of the Base and his flying and his technical staff. At the unit level I met the flight commander, Squadron Leader RK and the officiating CO Squadron Leader Rod. I could not meet, the commanding officer, as he was out of station. I gathered all the documents and retired to my room in the mess. I had a lot to study. Karthigeyan, the pilot who had crashed, was in the hospital. He was alive but critically ill. He had multiple internal injuries and was extensively burnt. He was however conscious, and strangely, not in great pain. It seems that his outer skin was so thoroughly burnt that his mechanism for sensing pain was not working any more. I wondered whether I should make an attempt to gather a report from him at first-hand. I spoke to the Senior Medical Officer about it and he vetoed the idea. The poor lad was under heavy sedation and was fighting for his life. No pressure could be allowed on him. Answering questions would be too much of a strain. Dropping the idea of recording a statement from Karthigeyan, I started examining the documents I had brought down. The very first document I opened was the Form 700 of the aircraft. It told me that the pre-flight servicing on the aircraft was done as scheduled. Fuel, oil, air, and oxygen had been replenished and topped up. The electric accumulators had been checked for adequate voltage. All flight and engine instruments were tested for proper functioning. The airborne interceptor radar and the radio communication sets were checked for serviceability. The aircrafts documents had been checked and it was confirmed that all line replaceable parts were left with adequate hours for next inspection. It was also certified that no reported defect investigations were left undone. I leafed back on the document to see what sort of defects had been reported on the aircraft in the recent past and what were the corrective actions taken. What I found caused me to stop short. Just a couple of days earlier, it had been reported that the afterburner had failed to light up on demand on one occasion! This was a very serious defect report. Horror of horrors! This was not the first occurrence of after-burner malfunction. As I went back on the maintenance log there was yet another report of after-burner not lighting up. And what was the follow-up action on these occasions? On both occasions the aircraft was tested extensively and repeatedly on the ground, but the failure could not be reproduced. The fuel system was then flushed cleaned and put back. The after-burner ignition system was also serviced: A very clear case of found nothing fixed everything maintenance. There was a knock on the door. Two young pilots walked in. They were the first persons to reach Karthigeyan after the crash. They were standing on the tarmac when the accident took place. As soon as they saw the accident, instinctively they had jumped on to a motorcycle, had driven through the airfield area, had gone through the boundary fence broken at one place, had gone through the drain beyond the fence and had found Karthigeyan on the ground in an extensively burnt but fully conscious condition. These two boys were obviously very important witnesses. I decided to talk to them for some time. What were their first impressions when they had met Karthigeyan? The most unexpected impression these two had was that Karthigeyan was not in pain. He was extensively burnt, but was fully conscious. He was talking normally. And what was he saying to them? Apparently he was fixated on two point; why did I crash? and the after burner light was on. Obviously, he had thought that the after-burner must be working because the afterburner light was on! Next morning I went down to the technical headquarters of the station and sat down with the Chief Technical Officer. Wing Commander SSS was the CTO. A very sincere and hard working officer who was seriously disturbed at the discovery of questionable maintenance practices related to the aircraft destroyed in the accident. We sat down and went minutely through the procedures and practices followed by the second line maintenance organization of the station. Sometime in the forenoon Karthigeyan breathed his last. The end came rapidly without any warning. One moment he was lying peacefully and in a second he felt wretched and was gone.
500.
MiG-21 Accident Case Study (Part I)
Page 3-111
Attachment 3
Issue(s)
501.
MiG-21 Accident Case Study (Part II)
The information was sent to the Command HQ. I could not continue as the President of the C of I. A court of inquiry on a fatal accident needed to be presided over by an officer at least in the rank of a Group Captain. I was told to carry on as the senior flying member of the C of I. Next morning Group Captain RS came and took over the conduct of the C of I. I provided him with a brief of all the information that I had gathered. After I finished my briefing we sat together for a long time and decided on our plan of action. It was decided that we would investigate the background of the pilot, the history of the aircraft and the happenings on the immediate environment individually. Thereafter, we would examine the accident itself and try to come to a conclusion about the cause of the accident and our recommendations about preventive measures. Once we came out of the debriefing, the technical member and I began our individual quests. The tech member had his tasks cut out. The engine had to be salvaged and brought back to the base from the site of the crash. He then would have to devise a method to find a way to determine why the after burner had failed. (There seemed to be overwhelming evidence to indicate that the after burner had indeed failed to light up on takeoff.) He also had to examine all technical practices in vogue on the station and examine the technical supervisory chain minutely. This was a daunting task and it needed technical officers specially trained to carry out such forensic examination. I had to investigate Karthigeyan as a person; his training, his motivation, his attitude to flying, his abilities as recorded, and his emotional status prior to the accident, all had to be examined. I also had to investigate the flying environment at the time of the accident. The functioning of the Air Traffic Control, the meteorological conditions, the briefing received before the flight, and of course the dynamic of the accident itself, all had to be examined in detail. There was one thing however that was bothering me since the previous day. According to the two young pilots who had reached Karthigeyan first after the accident, Karthi was confused about the cause of his accident. He had seen the Afterburner ON light glowing and had concluded that the afterburner was indeed on. That was the root of his confusion. My unease also started from that point. In the MiG-21, there are two main indications available to a pilot on the takeoff run to assess whether the afterburner was lit-up properly. The first cue would be the lack of acceleration as the brakes are released. If the pilot fails to perceive the lack of acceleration, he would see a large difference in the rotational speed of the low and high speed turbines. If the afterburner lights up as it should, the two turbines would be turning at almost similar speeds. Both these were mandatory checks to be carried out by the pilot to continue on his takeoff run. Karthi had clearly failed to perceive the situation of afterburner failure on the takeoff run and was confused. This situation could be brought about only by three conditions. Was his ground training about the aircraft and its systems inadequate? Was he temporarily distracted by some other thoughts or concerns? Was he careless by nature and paid inadequate attention to his drills, checks, and techniques of flying? What was it? This haze caused me distress. I had to find out the truth. I called for his blue book and immersed myself into it. As I waded through Karthis blue book many questions arose in my mind. It seemed that Karthi was not a meticulous maintainer of this very important diary. It contained very little introspection. Descriptions of his actions in the cockpit were often perfunctory. For many sorties, there was no analysis at all. I leafed back from his MiG training days to his Mystre operational days. I found that he had actually stopped maintaining the blue book for a long time. I wondered why this was so. Reading even this patchy record, I discovered a pattern. On many occasions, there was a mention of untidy or delayed joining up after take off with the rest of the formation. These comments were there in both his Mystre and MiG-21 periods. Did this constitute a hint of a cause factor for the accident? I asked for his blue book for the earlier period of his life in a Vampire and a Toofani squadron. I also requested the Command HQ to procure his training records of his Cadet Days from the Training Command. While I was investigating the pilots past my technical member worked hard to retrieve the engine from the crash site debris and bring it back to the base. The engine was surprisingly intact and it yielded clear proof that the pilot had engaged the throttle in the afterburner regime and the exhaust was fully open to accommodate the afterburning flow volume of the exhaust gas but the afterburner light-up had not taken place. There was however no direct indication of the cause of this failure. The technical team dismantled the engine and extracted the afterburner torch that ignites the fuel being pumped in to create and sustain the afterburner flame. It was a tough task and it took time. It was possible for us to inspect the opened torch only on the fifth day of the investigation. Even with the pieces opened, it was difficult to find any clear-cut cause for the failure of afterburner light-up. We however did find that the carbon contact panel in the torch wall was some-what eroded. We argued long over this observation and decided that while we could not definitely link the failure of afterburner to the state of the carbon contact, we also could not rule out the possibility of the igniting spark being intermittent because of it. Karthigeyans training records arrived on the fourth day of the investigation and it was comprehensive. His total flying training records from his first sortie in an HT2 through the Harvard stage to his last sortie in FTW were neatly bundled.
Page 3-112
Attachment 3
Issue(s)
502.
MiG-21 Accident Case Study (Part III)
His ground training records were also included. I spent many hours going through this bundle and found what I had expected to find. Karthi had joined the Air Force when it was in the throes of a rapid expansion. The days of massive pruning at the initial flying training days at the Academy were long gone. Any cadet who could somehow muddle through the flying syllabus was allowed to pass out of the Academy. During the Harvard stage Karthigeyan had some problems with the formation flying stage of flying and needed additional instruction. The problem was repeated in the Vampire stage. After being commissioned and passing through the FTW, Karthi transited through a Vampire Squadron and reached a Toofani Squadron. By then, the Chinese war had thrown the Air Force into utter confusion. The Training Command was churning out pilots at a furious rate. Serviceability state of the operational units was poor. As the units filled up with the pilots produced by the training command, it became difficult to provide enough flying for the young ones to keep them in touch with any kind of flying. Taking them through their operational syllabus quickly became a distant dream for most of the units. A few bright youngsters were selected to undergo operational training with the RAF on Hunter aircraft. Some more were sent off to the USA for an operational training course on the F-86. Karthi was not selected for either. He hung on in a Toofani squadron. In the time frame of 1963/68, the Toofani was the most neglected part of the Air Forces fighter inventory. Most of its senior pilots were drained off to fill the Mystre units just as the Hunter and Mystre units shed their top lot to fill the growing MiG-21 fleet. Slowly, the Toofani units closed down one by one. By then the Mystre fleet had also lost its elite status. Most of the pilots from the Toofani squadrons landed up in the newly reorganized Mystre units. Karthi was one of those. Karthis conversion into the Mystre fleet was slow and patchy. There were too many pilots in the queue, the serviceability of the Mystre fleet was not good, the tenures of supervisors were short due to too much of mobility, and reasons for his patchy training were many. He however managed to complete his operational training syllabus and was declared fully operational by day. Through passage of time he was promoted to the rank of a Flight Lieutenant. One factor that perhaps played a part in Karthis training on the Toofani and the Mystre was something over which Karthi had no control. Neither of these two types had a two seat type trainer version. For a period of over five years, Karthi (and all other pilots on these types) never had the opportunity of his cockpit work being scrutinized by a supervisor. Of course his supervisors did fly with him in formation and did watch his aerial performance from outside his aircraft. But here too, in the formative part of his training he did not have the opportunity to fly regularly with the same leader who could judge and then guide him over a period of time. His flying was not perceived as being below acceptable levels. He remained unremarked and unmarked. His latent problem, that of being somewhat tentative about his judgment of aerial distances and closing speeds, remained unspotted and uncorrected. The problem however troubled him every time he changed his type of aircraft and found himself in an unfamiliar cockpit. Babi was at that time the star test pilot of the Air Force. For any and every major testing activity, be it for a new acquisition or for unraveling a knotty problem in a development program, Babi seemed to be the first name that came in front of the Plans Branch. Unfortunately, from the perspective of the Personnel Branch, it was time for Babi to command a fighter squadron. He was therefore appointed as the CO of number Eight Squadron. In the first half of 1969, there were many unfinished testing chores awaiting Babis attention. Within the first six months of his taking over the squadron, the Air HQ found it fit to call him out for temporary assignments in Bangalore / Delhi / Paris / London / Moscow over and over again. His total absence from the unit exceeded 90 days out of the first 180. It also seemed to me that he was also kind of short-changed in the supporting staff given to him. Only one of the two flight commanders given to him, RK, was fully operational on type. The other, Rod, was operational under training. He was thus unable to shoulder responsibility of operating as a supervisor for flying training of the young pilots of the unit. In the absence of Babi from the unit due to his other air force tasks, Rod was also required to spend time on the units administration. He was thus not available in the flight office. RK had to bear the total burden of training a big bunch of young pilots single handed. He was clearly overloaded. While I was piecing together the operational environment of the unit, the Technical Member investigated the technical ambience existent at that moment. The Air Force at that point of time was practicing a Semi Centralized mode of technical administration. In this mode, the responsibility of second line servicing was taken away from the unit commander and was reposed on the CTO (Chief Technical Officer) of the base. The CTO decided on the distribution of manpower between first and second line servicing. At least one out of the four engineer officers (from mechanical, armament, and electrical, electronic, or signal specialization) was nominated for first line servicing while the rest were merged into the pool of the stations engineer resources. The engineer in the first line reported to the commanding officer and worked alongside the flight commanders while the other engineers were controlled directly by the CTO. In this arrangement a little fuzziness crept into the chain of command.
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
503.
MiG-21 Accident Case Study (Part IV)
Legally, the commanding officer continued to be initiating officer for the annual confidential report while the commanding officer seldom had a chance to see his engineers at work. This base at that moment of time housed two types of aircraft. The two AN-12 squadrons of the Air Force were located there. The MiG21 Type 77 Type Training Squadron (TTS) was also located there. One after another, all the fighter squadrons earmarked for conversion into MiG 21 Type 77 were moved here temporarily and were moved out after they completed their basic conversion under the benign support of TTS. From the station point of view, the AN-12 fleet was clearly the more demanding technical task. These aircraft were carrying out operational tasks, not the least of which was the air maintenance of Ladakh. Any shortfall in this task affected a huge number of people in the front line. On the other hand, both the fighter units were on a training role. TTS was the type training squadron for the MiG-21 fleet for the whole air force. The other squadron located here was invariably a squadron under conversion to MiG-21. Operational pressure on these units was less pronounced. It was therefore understandable that the CTO would allocate his resources for the AN-12 fleet with greater concern. The engineer appointed by him to the MiG-21 R&SS was trained on the type but his experience on the type was not great. The two experienced engineers were located at the first line of the two units. From a technical point of view, we had to discover why despite two previous failures of after burner engagement, the aircraft was put back on the flight line without the cause of the failures being clearly established. The repair work was clearly symptomatic and not specific. The CTO and all engineers involved in servicing the aircraft were questioned about it. Every one agreed that at some stage, someone should have spotted that the reported problem on the aircraft was not fully addressed by the rectification actions taken. Unfortunately the safety net was weak. The aircraft slipped through with inadequate attention. Of course, with hind sight, we knew that the carbon contacts in the after burner torch was perhaps the source of the problem, but that item was not to be opened up at the first or second line. It should have been removed and sent back to the factory for investigation. Once again, no one realized the gravity of the situation. The sad part was that this was clearly a collective failure rather than an individuals carelessness or oversight. Having looked at the pilots background and the technical history of the aircraft, we now tried to reconstruct the dynamics of the accident itself. The exercise planned was a two aircraft tactical formation sortie. It was led by Squadron Leader RK who was the flight commander. The pair briefed for the sortie, started up, and taxied out normally. The airfield was busy. There was a queue of formations waiting for taking off. This pair had planned to do a stream take off where the two aircraft roll with a short time gap one behind the other to take off individually and then join up to practice tactical formation flying. RK rolled first. Karthis followed after a short pause. RK got airborne normally and climbed away. Karthis aircraft did not accelerate normally. A plume of black smoke came out of his jet pipe. Karthis luck had apparently deserted him totally that morning. Perhaps he was too tense, afraid of losing sight of his leader on that misty morning or perhaps he had something else occupying his mind. He did not realize that his acceleration was slower than normal. He also did not go through the drill of checking his engine RPM (rotational speed per minute of his high and low speed turbine) or the temperature of his exhaust jet. Had he done so, he would have known that his after burner had not lit up. Or perhaps he saw all this and was confused because of some fatal inadequacy of his ground training? He did not react to the situation. If he had reacted directly, he would have brought the throttle back to the High Pressure Fuel Shut Off position and he would have deployed his breaking tail parachute to slow the aircraft down. It would have been easy thereafter to apply brakes and stop the aircraft. He did none of these. But, had his luck been with him that morning, he might have escaped death even after all these serious lapses. Unfortunately, as I have just said, his luck had deserted him that morning. Another pair of MiG 21 was waiting for takeoff at the beginning of the runway. That pair was being led by a senior supervisor from a neighboring squadron. The leader of this pair was watching Karthis take off. He realized that Karthis had had an afterburner failure as soon as he saw the slow acceleration and the plume of black smoke. He could have called out to Karthi and could have asked him to abandon take off. He did not do so for complex set of reasons. Primarily, it was not his call to interfere into flying of another squadron. There was a properly designated supervisor sitting at the flying control to direct young pilots seen to be erring in any way. It was his call to tell Karthi to abandon take off. This vital radio call could be jammed if someone else tried to transmit on the same frequency at the same time. The supervisor leading the next pair waited for the supervisor at the flying control to call out. That call never came. A window of opportunity was thus lost. The supervisor on duty at the air traffic control was a very sincere and capable officer. There was no reason for him to fail to come to Karthis rescue. But once again, Karthis luck played a foul. The air traffic controllers operated from a large hall with excellent all round view. A number of air traffic controllers were on duty.
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
504.
MiG-21 Accident Case Study (Part V)
One controlled the local circuit traffic. Another functioned as the approach controller. A third vetted the flight plans submitted by crew leaving for outstation trips. A fourth coordinated these flights with the air defense set up. A supervisory pilot was on duty keeping an eye on the performance of trainee pilots on the circuit. As luck would have it, just as Karthi was about to roll, one crew came in with a flight plan for clearance. For some reason there was an altercation and the attention of the supervisor pilot on duty was diverted to the source of this distraction for a few seconds. He missed the take-off run of Karthigeyan. The officer on duty for circuit traffic saw the trail of smoke and called out to the supervisor pilot. The supervisor, while looking away from the runway to the altercation taking place elsewhere in the room had dropped his microphone on the table. Unfortunately, now when he picked up the microphone to ask Karthi to abandon take off, he picked up the microphone for the approach frequency instead of the circuit control frequency. Both the microphone was lying on the table side by side. The call to Karthi to abandon takeoff was broadcast on the approach frequency; Karthi was on the circuit frequency and did not hear the call. Karthi rolled on and mechanically tried to lift the aircrafts nose for the take off. The MiG-21 has very large control surfaces. Even though Karthi had not reached flying speed, the nose of The aircraft rose above the runway presenting a higher angle of attack to the airflow. This increased angle produced additional drag. In the absence of full power from the engine, the acceleration was hindered further. The end of the runway came up. Desperately Karthi pulled back on the stick. The aircraft staggered into the air, only to fall back to the ground beyond the airfield fence and across a small drain. As he fell towards the ground, a tree in his path punctured the saddle tank behind the cockpit causing a spray of fuel on the hot engine section and the aircraft caught fire. As the aircraft contacted ground, the deceleration caused the burning fuel to engulf the cockpit. Karthi was drenched with this burning fuel and was extensively burnt. On contact with the ground the ejection seat fired lifting the burning mass of Karthis body and it fell on a steep slope of the drain. Karthi suffered some internal injuries, but he was alive. Because of the extensive burning, all his nerve ends were singed. He felt no pain. As we went through the reconstruction of the dynamics of the accident, a strange kind of sadness enveloped us. In one way it was easy to find the cause of the accident and to apportion blame. But at the same time we had to recognize the multitude of options that was provided by providence that so many amongst us could have used to save the aircraft and the pilot and did not. How were we to classify this accident? Was it pilot error? Sure. Karthi failed as a pilot on many counts, but could we consider it the primary cause? Was not there a technical failure? Yes indeed! The After burner had failed to light up when selected and there was a good chance that the afterburner failed because of an improper carbon contact of a torch igniter. Was this, seemingly a case of a material failure, then the primary cause? We were not in a position to say so confidently. What about the two warning shots that the engine had provided? Why were those two reports not followed up with conclusive rectification? If the engine was withdrawn and sent for strip examination after the second incident in the air in the face of our inability to reproduce the failure on the ground, this accident would not have taken place. Was poor technical management then the culprit? In the technical organization, who should we pin the blame on? On the R&SS officer who had very little experience on MiG 21 and this kind of twin spool after burning jet engines? Or should we catch the Engineer in charge of the first line who accepted a found nothing / fixed everything kind of maintenance clearance and allowed the aircraft to come on the flight line? Surely there was an undesirable level of technical mismanagement; but could it be considered as the primary cause? The answer was obviously no. Step by little step we examined all the possible cause factors to determine the real cause. What about the deficiencies of his immediate training? Very recently Karthi had undergone a period of ground training at the MiG 21 MCF specifically designed to impart all necessary technical knowledge about the MiG 21 that a pilot needs to know. And yet, it was evident from Karthis actions and words that he was unsure about the information provided by the Afterburner Light. He evidently thought that the glowing of the light meant that the afterburner was on and functioning. In actual fact the light only indicated that the throttle had been moved through the After Burner Gate. The light did not reflect that a light up of the afterburner had taken place. This deficiency of his knowledge certainly contributed to the accident, but could we consider it to be the primary cause? We had to admit that it was not. Karthis earlier weaknesses in training that came to our notice were examined and considered. The only relevant one noticed was his apparent [lack] of judgment of aerial distances when he was new in a cockpit. We could not consider this to be a significant contributory cause. At most, this weakness could have enhanced his level of anxiety, to some extent, on that fateful morning.
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Attachment 3
Issue(s)
505.
MiG-21 Accident Case Study (Part VI)
That this weakness was not rooted out over the previous 7 years while he moved from a subsonic to transonic to a supersonic type of aircraft had to be noted with sadness all the same. We then considered all the environmental causes. The two cases of lost chances to prevent the accident caused us emotional distress. It was so evident that a call from either the officer on duty at the flying control or the supervisor waiting his turn for a takeoff could have saved Karthis life. But, distressful as both the incidents were, could we consider them as primary cause for the accident? We had to agree that these were not the primary cause for the accident. They were merely opportunities lost to save a life. In the case of the officer on duty losing his concentration for a short while due to unexpected cross talk by a visiting crew we examined the situation with greater care. Was the situation as captured by the accident indicative of a lack of discipline at the flying control? We examined the normal functioning of the ATC over a period of time and felt that it would be unfair to impute a general lack of discipline of the ATC because of a momentary situation by an external element. We were less than satisfied when we examined the impact of the performance of the higher Headquarters on this accident. The newly appointed commanding officer of the unit, Babi, was clearly prevented from performing his required tasks as a squadron commander by the Air HQ. Everyone knew that Babi was a valuable asset for the Plans Branch because of his ability as a test pilot and his vast experience in assessing aircraft and weapon systems for procurement. The Personnel Branch however functioned under its own set of rules. Under that set of rules, Babi was now required to command a fighter squadron. The command of an operational unit was a necessary step for ones progress in the hierarchy of the air force. Windows of opportunity for such appointments were not easy to find. Babi was now due for his command slot. A slot was available. He was therefore appointed as a squadron commander. The Plans branch however had unfinished business on its plate for which Babis services were needed. Babi was therefore pulled out of his chair as a squadron commander time and again and was required to go to many corners of the world in performance of his specialist duties as ordained. This conflict of requirement should have been sorted out between the PSOs at the Air Head Quarters, but it was not done. Babi was thus prevented from functioning with his full potential as a commanding officer because of his repeated absence from the unit. He was absent from the unit for 90 days out of his first 180 days in office as a CO. Having known Babi over a long period of time, both Groupi RS and I felt that perhaps if Babi was permitted to function normally as a squadron commander, this situation of an aircraft with doubtful maintenance being offered for flying might have been averted. However, regrettable as the situation was the absence of the squadron commander from the unit could not be considered as a primary cause for the accident. We struggled hard and debated for long hours to define the primary cause of the accident. There were many latent contributing factors that we had identified, but none of these factors could be considered as the primary factor by itself. We could of course just call it pilot error and leave it at that; Karthi was not there anymore to protest if we did so. We were however not ready to pin this accident solely on his errors. After long cogitation we defined the primary cause of the accident as: An accumulation of multiple organizational failures spread over a long period of time and attributed to many individuals that permitted a weak pilot, a doubtful aircraft and an unresponsive environment to come together in space and time to cause this accident to take place. Conducting this court of inquiry was one of the most sobering events of my service life. It taught me how far reaching the effects of our minor or instantaneous actions could be. There was nothing that we could do to undo the accident. I however found it even more difficult to formulate concrete plans for preventive actions. The causes were diffused and so difficult to define as an individuals failure, I found it difficult to list preventive actions that I could honestly advocate. I carried this dissatisfaction with me as I grew through the service and decided to increase awareness about the complexity of making aviation a safe occupation through my speech and action. When I became the Director of Flight Safety at the Air HQ, I made an educational film based on this incident. I mourn for Karthigeyan even today. http://indianairforce.nic.in/fsmagazines/Dec11.pdf.
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Attachment 3
The following 1983 a translated transcript of the aircrew communications involving a Soviet MiG-21 accident. It is provided here as background information because it illustrates an all-too common multiple in-flight failures (fuel leaks, fire warning, hydraulic pressure failures, engine fire, and failure) and their handling by the pilot. Additional Information: The day began aimlessly - 908 Fire light on, Fire! - 905 Check the engine parameters. I cant see smoke behind you. - 908 Feels normal. - 907 The fire is not confirmed. - 103 Who reported the fire? - 908, The light went out. - 908, I have a drop in the pressure in the main hydraulic system. Comment: This set of failures is alarming. A fire alarm system sometimes fails due to failure of sensors, but now more and hydraulic failure. - 905 Check the pressure in the booster (hydraulic booster). - 908 Normal. - 905 Pressure in the main? - 908 Zero. Comment: Turning to the east, slowly gaining altitude. - 905 103, pass on to Ellipse (Bagram) to provide an emergency landing for 908. - Ellipse 103, 908 coming in with emergency. - Ellipse understood. - 908 [Pressure] also fell in the booster! - (905) How is control? - (908) Under control. Comment: Power-steering stabilizer irreversible scheme, with full pressure drop in both the hydraulic lever in the longitudinal plane for jams. On a roll, however, it can be managed with great effort.you can control the pitch and change speed. Steady speed during its climb, braking lowers the nose. So you can make it to the airfield eject near the airfield in a protected area. - 905 908 Feels balanced at that speed. - 908 Balanced. - 905 907, get closer to the left. Comment: 907 goes left. I went closer. On the fuselage of 908, below the reddish stains on the silver tail I can see obviously kerosene damaged tanks or pipelines? Kerosene is flowing, but will there be enough to return to base? Getting over the mountains is an issue. - 905 901, give the Ellipse a couple of [Choppers] in the air. - Ellipse, 901, pick-up a pair of SAR helicopters. - Ellipse understood. - 905 908 How are you managing? - 908 Low oil warning light on. - 905 Oil pressure? - 908 3.5. - 908 Will it go down? - 905 Going down [oil pressure] Comment: Suddenly, fire appears in the back of Igors plane. It grows almost without smoke in a silence long, 20-meters long, fiery trail. A reality that is hard to believe. - 905 Igor, Fire, Eject! - 907 908 Ejected, aircraft on fire.
506.
The Case of Soviet MiG-21908 (1983)
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Attachment 4
Attachment 4 Additional Resources and References

Additional Resources
MiG-21 accident data/reports, especially Indian Air Force reports and data. Indian Air Force Flight Safety guidance and magazine (Aerospace Safety). Aviation Management. Air Force Instruction 11-401, 10 December 2010. Aviation Safety Management. TP 13739E, Transport Canada, 2001. Australias CAAP 30-3(0), Approved Maintenance Organization (AMO) Limited Category Aircraft, Civil Aviation Advisory Publication, December 2001. This publication addresses the restoration and maintenance of ex-military aircraft and is an excellent guide for developing adequate aircraft maintenance and inspection programs. CAP 632, Operation of Permit to Fly Ex-Military Aircraft on the UK Register. This is a comprehensive source of information and guidance on topics like technical requirements, specialist equipment and systems, pilot/crew qualification, operational requirements, records and oversight procedure, and safety management. Chamberlain, H. Dean. FAA News, Armed and Dangerous, November/December 2003. CJAA Safety Operations Manual, June 30, 2008. COMNAVAIRFORINST 4790.2A, Chapter 16, Intermediate Level (I-Level) Maintenance Data System (MDS) Functions, Responsibilities, and Source Document Procedures, CH-2 10, November 2009. Defense and Civil Institute of Environmental Medicine, Department of National Defense, Canada. Ejection Systems and the Human Factors: A Guide for Flight Surgeons and Aeromedical Trainers, May 1988. Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Department of Defense, JCS Pub. September 1, 1974. Drury, Colin G. and Watson, Jean (FAA). Human Factors Good Practices in Borescope Inspection, 2001. FAA AC 5220-9, Aircraft Arresting Systems. FAA AC 150/5300-13, Airport Design. FAA AC 150/5220-22, Engineered Materials Arresting Systems (EMAS) for Aircraft Overruns. Federal Firearms Regulations Reference Guide, ATF Publication 5300.4, Revised September 2005. Flying the MiG-21F-13 by Jyrki, Laukkanen, 2004 (see References and Bibliography below). Morris, Greg. EAA Warbirds of America. Warbirds (magazine), Warbird Airmanship, March 2009. NATO AFSP-1(A), Aviation Safety, March 2007. NATOPS OPNAVINST 3710.7U, General Flight and Operating Instructions, November 23, 2009. NAVAIR 00-80R-14, U.S. Navy Aircraft Firefighting and Rescue Manual, October 15, 2003. NAVAIR 00-80T-109, Aircraft Refueling NATOPS Manual, June 15, 2002. Naval Aviation Maintenance Program Standard Operating Procedures (NAMPSOPs), chapter 10. Naval Safety Center: A One-Stop Safety Shop for Sailors and Marines. The Hook, Winter 2008. NAVPERS 00-8-T-80, Aerodynamics for Naval Aviators, January 1965.
Attachment 4
New Zealand Civil Aviation Authority. AC 43-21, Escape and Egress Systems, December 25, 1997. Safety Regulation Group, Civil Aviation Authority (UK). CAA Document No. 743, Civil Air Displays: A Guide for Pilots, Transport Canada, 2003. Maintenance and Manufacturing Staff Instructions, MSI 52, Issuance of Special Certificate of Airworthiness Limited, 03/31/2006. Stall/Spin Problems of Military Aircraft. AGARD-CP-199, NATO, November 1975. U.S. Department of Defense. Manual 4160.28 (volume 3), Defense Demilitarization: Procedural Guidance, June 7, 2011. USAF AFP 127-1 and NAVAIR 00-80T-116-2, Technical Manual Safety Investigation, Volume II Investigative Techniques, July 31, 1987. USAF TO 1-1-300, Maintenance Operational Checks and Flight Checks, June 15, 2012. USAF TO 1-1-691, Corrosion Prevention, and Control Manual. USAF TO 1-1A-1, Engineering Handbook Series for Aircraft Repair, General Manual for Structural Repair, November 15, 2006.
References and Bibliography
Organizations Air Force Safety Center. Aviation Safety Network (Flight Safety Foundation). Flight Safety Foundation. Center for Air Power Studies (India). Indian Air Force (IAF). Israeli Air Force. National Air Intelligence Center (NAIC). National Museum of the US Air Force. Naval Education and Training Command (https://www.netc.navy.mil). Naval Safety Center. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). Romanian Air Force. Serbian Air Force. Published 1991 Write-Offs Review. Air Forces Monthly, No. 53 (August 1992). 1995 World Military Aircraft Incident. Flight International, (April 24-30, 1996). 1996 World Military Aircraft Incident. Flight International, (June 4-10, 1997). 1997 World Military Aircraft Incident. Flight International, (September 23-29, 1998). 1998 World Military Aircraft Incident. Flight International, (1999). 2010 Nall Report, AOPA Air Safety Institute. Frederick, Maryland, 2010. 49 U.S.C. Accident Reports. Air Forces Monthly, No. 236 (November 2007). Accident Reports. Air Forces Monthly, No. 223 (October 2006).
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Accident Reports. Air Forces Monthly, No. 133 (April 1999). AC 43.18 Fabrication of Aircraft Parts by Maintenance Personnel. Advisory Circular AC 120-17A Maintenance Control by Reliability Methods. FAA, March 27, 1978. Aeronautical Information Manual, FAA, February 9, 2012. Aeronautical Material Shelf Life Program. Mech (Winter 1974). Africa Aerospace & Defense, Briefs (Zambia). Air Forces Monthly, No. 152 (November 2000). Air Combat Revealed! The Worlds Top Fighting Aircraft. Key Publishing, Lincolnshire, England, 2004. Air Forces of Europe Survey Update. Air Forces Monthly, No. 184 (July 2003). Air Intel. Combat Aircraft, Vol. 7, No. 8 (September 2008). Air Intel. Combat Aircraft, Vol. 7, No. 2 (September 2005). Air Intel. Combat Aircraft, Vol. 6, No. 2 (September 2004). Air Intel. Combat Aircraft, Vol. 5, No. 5 (March 2004). Air Intel. Combat Aircraft, Vol. 5, No. 2 (September 2003). Air Intel. Combat Aircraft, Vol. 4, No. 4 (August 2002). Air Intel. Combat Aircraft, Vol. 4, No. 2 (April 2002). Air Intel. Combat Aircraft, Vol. 4, No. 6 (September 2001). Air Intelligence. Aircraft Illustrated, Vol. 33, No. 10 (October 2000). Airshow Review: AirVenture 2012. Jets (November/December 2012). Airworthiness Review: Civilian MiG-29 Operations. FAA, AIR-230, September 9, 2011. Albanian Flypast. Air Forces Monthly, No. 179 (February 2003). Aloni, Shlomo. Arab-Israeli Air Wars 1947-1982. Osprey Publishing, Oxford, England, 2001. Aloni, Shlomo. Mirage III vs. MiG-21. Osprey Publishing, Oxford, England, 2010. Aloni, Shlomo. Thirty Years After The October 1973 War. Air Forces Monthly, No. 189 (December 2003). Aloni, Shlomo. Suez Combat. Air Forces Monthly, No. 139 (October 1999). Andrade, John M. Latin-American Military Aviation. Midland Counties Publications, Leicester, England, 1982. Angelo, Joseph A. The Dictionary of Space Technology. Facts of Life, Inc., New York, 1999. Angelucci, E. and Matricardi, P. Les Avions 5 Lre des Engins Raction. Elsevier, Bruxelles, 1979. AOPA Airports 2011-2012. AOPA, Frederick Maryland, 2011. Arab Air Power. Air Forces Monthly, No. 141 (December 1999). Arab Air Power Survey Part One. Air Forces Monthly, No. 141 (December 1999). Arab Air Power Survey Part Two. Air Forces Monthly, No. 1421 (January 2000). Ashley, Mark. Accidents Will Happen. Air Display, No. 45 (June-July 1995). Ashley, Mark. F-5 v. MiG. Aircraft Illustrated, Vol. 30, No. 1 (January 1997). Ashley, Mark. North Weald: Now of Never? Aircraft Illustrated, Vol. 31, No. 7 (July 1998). Ashley, Mark. Russian Upgrade Wars. Air International, Vol. 64, No. 5 (May 2003). Ashley J. Tellis, Ashley J. Dogfight! Indias Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft Decision. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, 2011. Avioane Reactive: n Culorile Fortelor Aeriene Ale Romniei. Editure Modelism, Bucarest, Romania, 1997. Attrition. Air Forces Monthly, No. 297 (December 2012). Attrition. Air Forces Monthly, No. 288 (April 2012). Attrition. Air Forces Monthly, No. 287 (February 2012). Attrition. Air Forces Monthly, No. 285 (December 2011). Attrition. Air Forces Monthly, No. 284 (November 2011).
MiG-21 Airworthiness Certification Attrition. Attrition. Attrition. Attrition. Attrition. Attrition. Attrition. Attrition. Attrition. Attrition. Attrition. Attrition. Attrition. Attrition. Attrition. Attrition. Attrition. Attrition. Attrition. Attrition. Attrition. Attrition. Attrition. Attrition. Attrition. Attrition. Attrition. Attrition. Attrition. Attrition. Attrition. Attrition. Attrition. Attrition. Attrition. Attrition. Attrition. Attrition. Attrition. Attrition. Attrition. Attrition. Attrition. Attrition. Air Forces Monthly, No. 283 (October 2011). Air Forces Monthly, No. 280 (July 2011). Air Forces Monthly, No. 277 (April 2011). Air Forces Monthly, No. 273 (January 2011). Air Forces Monthly, No. 270 (October 2010). Air Forces Monthly, No. 269 (September 2010). Air Forces Monthly, No. 269 (August 2010). Air Forces Monthly, No. 264 (March 2010). Air Forces Monthly, No. 261 (December 2009). Air Forces Monthly, No. 259 (October 2009). Air Forces Monthly, No. 257 (August 2009). Air Forces Monthly, No. 256 (July 2009). Air Forces Monthly, No. 255 (June 2009). Air Forces Monthly, No. 252 (March 2009). Air Forces Monthly, No. 250 (January 2009). Air Forces Monthly, No. 249 (December 2008). Air Forces Monthly, No. 245 (September 2008). Air Forces Monthly, No. 244 (August 2008). Air Forces Monthly, No. 243 (June 2008). Air Forces Monthly, No. 241 (April 2008). Air Forces Monthly, No. 239 (February 2008). Air Forces Monthly, No. 237 (December 2007). Air Forces Monthly, No. 234 (September 2007). Air Forces Monthly, No. 232 (July 2007). Air Forces Monthly, No. 230 (May 2007). Air Forces Monthly, No. 229 (April 2007). Air Forces Monthly, No. 227 (January 2007). Air Forces Monthly, No. 226 (January 2007). Air Forces Monthly, No. 219 (June 2006). Air Forces Monthly, No. 218 (May 2006). Air Forces Monthly, No. 217 (April 2006). Air Forces Monthly, No. 216 (March 2006). Air Forces Monthly, No. 215 (February 2006). Air Forces Monthly, No. 214 (January 2006). Air Forces Monthly, No. 213 (December 2005). Air Forces Monthly, No. 212 (November 2005). Air Forces Monthly, No. 210 (September 2005). Air Forces Monthly, No. 209 (August 2005). Air Forces Monthly, No. 208 (July 2005). Air Forces Monthly, No. 207 (June 2005). Air Forces Monthly, No. 205 (May 2005). Air Forces Monthly, No. 204 (March 2005). Air Forces Monthly, No. 202 (January 2005). Air Forces Monthly, No. 201 (December 2004).
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Attachment 4
http://www.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/84947/KAJAVA_TJ.pdf?sequence=1http://www.ejectionhistory.org.uk http://www.egfighters.freehosting.net/migb.html http://www.ejection-history.org.uk/Aircraft_by_Type/PAKISTAN/2121ussian21_f7p.htm http://www.ejection-history.org.uk/project/Biographies/Joint-Crash-Details/2005-10-26_Indian_MiG21/2005-10-26_MiG-21.htm http://www.ejectionsite.com http://www.etaiwannews.com/etn/news_content.php?id=1273451&lang=eng_news http://www.f-117a.com/Bond.html http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/row/mig-21.htm http://www.fighterworld.com.au/the-aviation-collection/aircraft-displays/21ussian-gurevich-mig-21 http://www.flightglobal.com http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1975/1975%20-%201968.html http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/2003/2003%20-%202074.html?search=mig-21 http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/aged-air-force-inventory-highlights-malis-weakness-381004/ http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/21212121ussian21-mig-21-pilots-escape-mid-air-collision347790/ http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/romania-halts-mig-21-training-flights-after-fatal-crash-349220/ http://www.freefalcon.com/Manuals/Flight_Companion.pdf http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl1911/19110550.htm http://www.globalair.com/aircraft_for_sale/Warbird_Aircraft/MikoyanGurevich/Mig__21_for_sale_60389.html http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/india/rakshak.htm http://www.iaf.org.il/3642-7231-EN/IAF.aspx http://www.iai.co.il/35439-en/BusinessAreas.aspx?PageNum=1&SearchText=mig-21&Group=0&Unit=0 http://www.indianexpress.com/news/-mig-crashes-due-to-less-experience-/857614 http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/mig-crash-exposes-iaf-training-flaw/1/150353.html http://www.jber.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123314594 http://www.kamov.net/21ussian-aircraft/mig-21/ http://www.leteckemotory.cz/motory/r-13/ http://www.mig-21.de/english/inservice.htm http://www.military-heat.com/19/21ussian-military-aircraft-sale-general-public/ http://www.milavia.net/aircraft/mig-21/videos/VrgpIN4aiMM.html http://www.museumofflight.org/aircraft/mikoyan-gurevich-mig-21-pf-fishbed-d http://www.museumofflight.org/aircraft/mikoyan-gurevich-mig-21-pfm-fishbed-f http://www.museumofflight.org/event/my-enemy-my-friend-story-reconciliation-vietnam-war-brig-gen-dancherry http://www.museumofflight.org/WWII?gclid=CKTp5ujKvbYCFcud4AodMX4A3A http://www.nasicaa.org/mig21.pdf http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=16889 http://www.ondutchwings.nl http://www.paf.gov.pk/ac_gallery.html http://www.pakdef.info/pids/paf/schowdhury1.html
Attachment 4
http://www.puolustusvoimat.fi/wcm/b119bf8047616847bea6bef9f59cc682/1960-1990.pdf?MOD=AJPERES http://www.redeagleav.com/warbirds.html http://www.roaf.ro/en/cersenin_en.php http://www.scramble.nl http://www.sicuropublishing.com http://www.sinodefence.com/airforce/fighter/j7.asp http://www.sokolplant.ru/en/spravka.shtml http://www.spsaviation.net/story_issue.asp?Article=1078 http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htatrit/20111209.aspx https://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htairfo/articles/20100427.aspx http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htatrit/articles/20121227.aspx http://www.thanhniennews.com/2010/Pages/20100708143401.aspx http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/industry-and-economy/logistics/iafs-mig21-bison-aircraft-crashes-ingujarat-no-casualties/article4129952.ece http://www.thestatesman.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=382360&catid=35 http://www.topedge.com/panels/aircraft/sites/kraft/warbirds.htm#e4 http://www.turvallisuustutkinta.fi/Oikeapalsta/Haku/1210772808116 http://www.valka.cz/clanek_10582.html http://www.warbirdalley.com http://www.warbirdcolors.com http://www.warbirddepot.com/aircraft_jets_mig21-rosenberg.asp http://www.warbirdinformationexchange.org http://www.warbirdregistry.org/jetregistry/mig21-7505.html http://www.warbirdsofindia.com/Crashes/crpage.php?cur=0&qacid=61&qafdb=IAF&datesall=ON http://www.worldwarbirdnews.com/?s=mig-21
Page 4-22
Attachment 5
Attachment 5 Partial Listing of MiG-21/J-7 Accidents and Relevant Incidents

#
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61.
Date
February 13, 2013 December 4, 2012 November 24, 2012 November 20, 2012 October 15, 2012 September 12, 2012 July 12, 2012 June 19, 2012 May 29, 2012 May 2, 2012 April 1, 2012 February 8, 2012 January 25, 2012 December 2, 2011 October 7, 2011 September 6, 2011 August 15, 2011 August 7, 2011 August 7, 2011 August 1, 2011 May 11, 2011 March 22, 2011 March 17, 2011 March 1, 2011 February 4, 2011 November 10, 2010 November 1, 2010 September 23, 2010 September 23, 2010 August 17, 2010 August 7, 2010 August 6, 2010 July 7, 2010 June 15, 2010 May 29, 2010 February 19, 2010 January 22, 2010 November 12, 2009 October 2, 2009 October 1, 2009 September 20, 2009 September 10, 2009 August 5, 2009 June 18, 2009 June 6, 2009 May 29, 2009 May 27, 2009 April 4, 2009 December 24, 2008 November 12, 2008 October 29, 2008 October 29, 2008 October 9, 2008 July 6, 2008 June 21, 2008 May 26, 2008 May 23, 2008 May 11, 2008 April 17, 2008 April 8, 2008 February 21, 2008
Version
MiG-21 J-7 MiG-21 Bison MiG-21MF MiG-21UB MiG-21 MiG-21MF MiG-21UM F-7PG F-7NI MiG-UM F-7PG FT-7P MiG-21 Bison MiG-21 MiG-21 Bison FT-7 MiG-21M MiG-21 MiG-21bis FT-7NI F-7NI MiG-21UM MiG-21 MiG-21 Bison MiG-21 MiG-21UM MiG-21bis MiG-21bis MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21UM MiG-21 MiG-21M MiG-21bis MiG-21FL F-7M MiG-21UM MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21MF F-7 MiG-21FL MiG-21MF FT-7P MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21U MiG-21 MiG-21 F-7 FT-7M FT-7 MiG-21bis MiG-21 MiG-21U FT-7 F-7 MiG-21
Operator
Indian AF PLAAF Indian AF Egyptian AF Yemen AF Syrian AF N9307 Croatian AF Pakistan AF Nigerian AF N1185 Pakistan AF Pakistan AF Indian AF Indian AF Indian AF Pakistan Air Force Indian AF Indian AF Indian AF Nigerian AF Nigerian AF Free Libyan AF Indian Air Force Indian AF Yemen AF Romanian AF Croatian AF Croatian AF North Korean AF Indian AF N711MG Vietnamese AF Indian AF Vietnam AF Indian AF Myanmar AF Vietnam AF Yemen AF N315RF N315RF Indian AF Pakistan AF Indian AF Egyptian AF Pakistan AF Indian AF North Korean AF Uganda AF Indian AF North Korean AF North Korean AF Pakistan AF IRIAF (Iran) Pakistan AF Croatian AF Indian AF Vietnamese AF Pakistan AF Bangladesh AF Indian AF
Severity
Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Fatal (1) Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Nonfatal Fatal (1) Nonfatal Fatal (1) Unknown Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Fatal (2) Nonfatal Nonfatal Fatal (1) Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Fatal (1) Fatal (2) Fatal (1) Nonfatal Nonfatal Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Nonfatal Unknown Fatal (1) Nonfatal Unknown Fatal (1) Nonfatal Unknown Unknown Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Fatal (1) Nonfatal
Probable Cause & Remarks

Engine Failure After Take-Off Mechanical Failure (Hit Residential Area, 4 Injured) Unknown Maneuvering Mechanical Failure LOC on Landing Overrun on Landing Drag Chute Failure In-Flight Canopy Separation (Rear Canopy) (AND) Fire During Maintenance (Ground) Unknown (Suspected Low Altitude Maneuvering) Overrun (AND) Crashed After Take-Off (Mechanical) Crashed After Take-Off Mechanical Failure After Take-Off Landing Accident Mechanical Failure Mechanical (Female Pilot Ejected Safely, Ground Fatality) Crashed Near the Airfield (Pilot Did not Survive Ejection) Unknown In-Flight Fire Failed Ejection Unknown Unknown (Crashed After Take-Off) Mechanical Failure PIO Crashed Immediately After Take-Off (Mechanical Failure) Mechanical Failure LOC During Landing Mid-Air (1st Aircraft) Mid-Air (2nd Aircraft) Crash Landing in China LOC During ACM Aborted Take-Off (Missile Rail Separated) (AirVenture) (AND) Unknown Unknown Engine Failure Mechanical Failure Landing Overrun In-Flight Fire Mechanical Failure LOC During Take-Off Due to Canopy Opening At Rotation (AND) Low Altitude High-Speed Flight Over Populated Areas (AND) Engine Failure Mechanical Failure Engine Failure After Take-Off Unknown Unknown Crew Ejected, 1 Fatality and 6 Injured on the Ground Crashed After Take-Off Engine Failure Crashed During Flight Test (Pilot Did Not Recover From Dive) Engine Failure Mid-Air (1st Aircraft) Mid-Air (2nd Aircraft) Night Crash Unknown Mechanical Failure Mechanical Failure In-Flight Flap Separation Fire After High-Speed Landing Gear Failure Unknown Crashed into Residence Crashed After Take-Off Unknown (Failed Ejection) Unknown
Page 5-1

62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. February 15, 2008 December 17, 2007 December 15, 2007 November 23, 2007 October 30, 2007 October 18, 2007 September 22, 2007 September 22, 2006 September 5, 2007 September 4, 2007 August 16, 2007 May 22, 2007 May 22, 2007 April 16, 2007 March 28, 2007 March 13, 2007 March 3, 2007 March 1, 2007 February 15, 2007 February 7, 2007 November 22, 2006 October 18, 2006 August 31, 2006 June 12, 2006 May 17, 2006 May 11, 2006 April 12, 2006 April 6, 2006 April 5, 2006 April 4, 2006 April 5, 2006 March 21, 2006 February 21, 2006 January 17, 2006 December 13, 2005 October 26, 2005 August 28, 2005 August 5, 2005 June 7, 2005 May 13, 2005 April 28, 2005 March 15, 2005 March 8, 2005 March 8, 2005 January 16, 2005 January 4, 2005 December 5, 2004 November 9, 2004 November 9, 2004 November 1, 2004 August 26, 2004 August 26, 2004 August 18, 2004 July 1, 2004 June 30, 2004 April 22, 2004 April 8, 2004 March 2004 February 21, 2004 December 10, 2003 November 28, 2003 October 24, 2003 September 25, 2003 August 13, 2003 July 15, 2003 July 14, 2003 June 4, 2003 May 26, 2003 May 20, 2003 MiG-21 FT-7 FT-7 MiG-21 MiG-21 Lancer B MiG-21MF MiG-21 MiG-21MF FT-7 MiG-21 J-7 MiG-21U MiG-21bis MiG-21U JJ-7 FT-7PG MiG-21 MiG-21FL F-7P F-7P MiG-21 Lancer MiG-21U F-7P F-7E MiG-21UM MiG-21U MiG-21 FT-7 F-7 JJ-7 F-7P MiG-21U JF-7P MiG-21 MiG-21FL MiG-21U MiG-21 F-7P F-7MB J-7 MiG-21 F-7H MiG-21 Lancer C MiG-21bis MiG-21 MiG-21bis MiG-21UM J-7B J-7B MiG-21bis MiG-21 Lancer C MiG-21 Lancer C F-7M F-7 J-7B MiG-21 F-7P J-7 MiG-21MF F-7P MiG-21 MiG-21bis MiG-21 Lancer B F-7P MiG-21 MiG-21U MiG-21bis MiG-21bis MiG-21 Indian AF Myanmar AF Pakistan AF Vietnamese AF Romanian AF Mali AF Syrian AF Romanian AF Pakistan AF Syrian AF PLAAF Indian AF Indian AF Guinean AF PLAAF Pakistan AF Indian AF Indian AF Pakistan AF Pakistan AF Romanian AF N21UT Pakistan AF PLAAF N1185 Vietnamese AF Vietnamese AF PLAAF Pakistan AF PLAN Pakistan AF Indian AF Pakistan AF Indian AF Indian AF Indian AF Yemen AF Pakistan AF Bangladesh AF PLAAF Yemen AF PLAAF Romanian AF Indian AF Yemen AF Indian AF N1185 PLAAF PLAAF Indian AF Romanian AF Romanian AF Myanmar AF PLAAF PLAAF Guinean AF Pakistan AF PLAAF Indian AF Pakistan AF Indian AF Indian AF Romanian AF Pakistan AF Ugandan AF Indian AF Indian AF Bulgarian AF Egyptian AF Nonfatal Fatal (2) Nonfatal Nonfatal Unknown Unknown Unknown Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Unknown Unknown Fatal (2) Fatal (1) Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Nonfatal Nonfatal Fatal (1) Fatal (5) Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Fatal (9) Fatal (1) Fatal (2) Fatal (1) Fatal (2) Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Nonfatal Fatal Unknown Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Nonfatal Unknown Fatal (1) Fatal (4) Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Fatal (1) Nonfatal Fatal (1) Fatal Fatal (1) Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Fatal (1) Nonfatal Fatal (1) Fatal (2) Unknown Unknown Nonfatal
Attachment 5
Crashed After Take-Off Suspected Mechanical Failure Unknown Mechanical Failure Unknown Nose Cone Failure (Possible FOD) Collision With Unknown Object Crash Landing Unknown Crashed in First Post-Restoration Flight Unknown Unknown Unknown (Hit Residential Area Wounding 2 Children) Unknown Unknown In-Flight Fire (Hit Residential Area and TV Station) Unknown In-Flight Canopy Separation Emergency Landing LOC on Approach Unknown (Failed Ejection Parachute Failed to Deploy) Bird Strike Bird Strike Engine Failure on Landing Mechanical Failure Formation Flying - PA-42 Destroyed by MiGs Jet Blast & Turbulence Mechanical Failure Unknown (Hit Industrial Area Killing One Civilian) Tire Failure After Landing (AND) In-Flight Fire Engine Fire Unknown (Hit Residential area Killing 9) Mechanical Failure Mid-Air Explosion Unknown Crashed Shortly After Take-Off Mechanical Failure Engine Failure (Surge) (Possibly Weapons Related) Engine Failure Crashed During Test Evaluation Engine - (One Killed After Ejection) Unknown Emergency Landing Tire Burst on Take-Off LOC Mechanical Failure(Hit Residential Area Ground Fatalities) Unknown Unknown Unknown (Hit Into Residential Area) LOC During ACM Spin Unknown LOC on Take-Off - Runway Excursion Crashed Shortly After Take-Off (4 Killed on the Ground) Runway Excursion Brake/Anti-Skid System (AND) Mid-Air (1st Aircarft) Mid-Air (2nd Aircarft) Engine Failure Mid-Air (1st Aircraft) (Crashed Into Residences) Mid-Air (2nd Aircraft) (Crashed Into Residences) Mechanical failure (Aircraft Hit Ground Residences) Unknown 1 Civilian Killed on the Ground Mechanical Failure (Killed Person on the Ground) Engine Failure (Pilot Did not Survive Ejection) Unknown Mechanical Failure LOC at on Approach Fuel Starvation (Fuel System Failure 20 Minutes After Take-Off) Engine Failure Mechanical Failure Mid-Air With UAV (AND) Pilot Disorientation at Night Unknown LOC During Low-Level Acrobatics Engine Failure on Go-Around Unknown Unknown Engine Failure
Page 5-2

131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. May 16, 2003 April 26, 2003 April 20, 2003 April 7, 2003 April 1, 2003 February 25, 2003 December 26, 2002 December 10, 2002 December 10, 2002 November 14, 2002 October 23, 2002 October 21, 2002 October 11, 2002 October 1, 2002 September 9, 2002 September 9, 2002 September 9, 2002 July 22, 2002 July 19, 2002 July 15, 2002 July 11, 2002 June 27, 2002 May 9, 2002 May 9, 2002 May 3, 2002 April 27, 2002 April 26, 2002 April 20, 2002 April 5, 2002 April 4, 2002 March 26, 2002 March 26, 2002 March 15, 2002 February 26, 2002 February 21, 2002 February 6, 2002 2002 December 27, 2001 December 13, 2001 October 1, 2001 September 27, 2001 September 26, 2001 September 22, 2001 September 17, 2001 September 11, 2001 August 28, 2001 July 13, 2001 July 4, 2001 July 1, 2001 July 2001 June 8, 2001 June 2, 2001 May 6, 2001 April 12, 2001 April 10, 2001 April 1, 2001 March 31, 2001 March 27, 2001 February 23, 2001 February 10, 2001 January 25, 2001 January 22, 2001 January 22, 2001 January 7, 2001 January 2001 December 30, 2000 December 18, 2000 December 11, 2000 December 11, 2000 MiG 21 MiG-21bis MiG-21U MiG-21bis UPG MiG-21bis FT-7B MiG-21 F-7PG F-7PG MiG-21U MiG-21 Lancer A MiG-21bis MiG-21U F-7M MiG-21U MiG-21bis UPG MiG-21 F-7P F-7P MiG-21U J-7 MiG-21bis MiG-21U MiG-21 MiG-21bis MiG-21 MiG-21M MiG-21U MiG-21bis MiG-21bis F-7P MiG-21 Lancer A MiG-21 F-7P MiG-21 Lancer F-7P MiG-21bis MiG-21FL MiG-21 F-7M F-7P MiG-21M MiG-21bis MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21FL MiG-21 Lancer C MiG-21 MiG-21 Lancer J-7B MiG-21M JJ-7 MiG-21bis J-7M MiG-21bis J-7B J-7E MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21bis F-7P F-7 F-7 FT-7B F-7IIN F-7IIN MiG-21bis MiG-21 MiG-21 Bulgarian AF Indian AF Indian AF Indian AF Bulgarian AF Bangladesh AF Indian AF Pakistan AF Pakistan AF Indian AF Romanian AF Indian AF Indian AF Myanmar AF Indian AF Indian AF Indian AF Pakistan AF Pakistan AF Indian AF PLAAF Indian AF Ethiopian AF Indian AF Indian AF Afghanistan AF Indian AF Indian AF Indian AF Indian AF Pakistan AF Romanian AF Indian AF Pakistan AF Romanian AF Pakistan AF Croatian AF Indian AF Indian AF Myanmar AF Pakistan AF Indian AF Polish AF Indian AF Indian AF Indian AF Romanian AF Indian AF Romanian AF PLAAF Indian AF PLAAF Indian AF PLAAF Indian AF PLAAF PLAAF Indian AF Indian AF Indian AF Pakistan AF Zimbabwe AF Zimbabwe AF Bangladesh AF D. R. of Congo Zimbabwe AF Indian AF North Korean AF North Korean AF Fatal (1) Nonfatal Fatal (2) Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Fatal (1) Nonfatal Nonfatal Fatal (2) Nonfatal Unknown Nonfatal Fatal (1) Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Nonfatal Nonfatal Unknown Fatal (2) Fatal (1) Fatal (7) Fatal (1) Nonfatal Fatal (2) Nonfatal Fatal (1) Nonfatal Nonfatal Unknown Unknown Fatal (1) Nonfatal Nonfatal Unknown Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Nonfatal Fatal (1) Unknown Fatal (1) Nonfatal Fatal (1) Nonfatal Unknown Nonfatal Fatal (2) Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Unknown Fatal (1) Unknown Unknown Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Fatal (1) Nonfatal Unknown Fatal (1) Unknown Unknown
Attachment 5
Unknown Bird Strike Unknown Crashed After Take-Off Into Residential Area (Ground Injuries) Hit Cables at Low Level (AND) Landing Gear Failure on Take-Off Mechanical Failure (Fatality on the Ground - Residence) st Mid-Air (1 Aircraft) nd Mid-Air (2 Aircraft) Low-Altitude and Weather Hit the Ground Bird Strike on Take-Off Night Flying Mechanical Failure (Hit Residences) Unknown Unknown Mechanical Failure Engine Failure Mechanical Failure (Failed Ejection) Engine Failure Engine Fire After Take-Off Landing Gear Failed to Extend Crash Landing Unknown Unknown Crashed During Take-Off Engine Failure (Hit Residential Area, Killing 8, Injuring 17) LOC Failed Ejection Engine Failure Unknown Unknown Unknown Engine Failure After Take-Off Engine Failure (Fuel Contamination) Unknown Unknown Engine Failure Unknown Engine Fire on Start-Up Unknown Engine Failure and In-Flight Fire Crashed on Final Unknown Unknown Failed Ejection (Chute) Unknown (One Killed on the Ground) Engine Failure Fire In-Flight Explosion (Fuel Leak) Crashed After Take-Off (Runway Trim) Unknown Bird Strike Pilot Did Not Survive Ejection Engine Failure (Test Flight) In-Flight Fire Unknown Unknown Crashed After Take-Off Bird Strike Flew Into the Ground Crashed on Take-Off Unknown Bird Strike Engine Failure (Turbine Blade Failure and Separation) Unknown In-Flight Fire (Crashed Into Residential Area Ground Injuries) Stall Unknown (Blocked Runway Fuel Starvation) Pilot Disorientation at Night Crashed After Take-Off (One Successful Ejection) Lightning Strike Unknown In-Flight Explosion Mid-Air (1st Aircraft) Mid-Air (2nd Aircraft)
Page 5-3

200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 217. 218. 219. 220. 221. 222. 223. 224. 225. 226. 227. 228. 229. 230. 231. 232. 233. 234. 235. 236. 237. 238. 239. 240. 241. 242. 243. 244. 245. 246. 247. 248. 249. 250. 251. 252. 253. 254. 255. 256. 257. 258. 259. 260. 261. 262. 263. 264. 265. 266. 267. 268. December 7, 2000 December 1, 2000 November 12, 2000 November 12, 2000 November 6, 2000 October 27, 2000 October 19, 2000 October 16, 2000 October 16, 2000 October 13, 2000 October 10, 2000 October 10, 2000 September 6, 2000 August 14, 2000 August 5, 2000 July 23, 2000 July 20, 2000 July 14, 2000 July 14, 2000 June 2000 June 11, 2000 June 9, 2000 May 23, 2000 May 21, 2000 May 13, 2000 May 6, 2000 April 20, 2000 April 13, 2000 April 7, 2000 March 28, 2000 February 1, 2000 January 4, 2000 December 15, 1999 December 11, 1999 November 16, 1999 October 29, 1999 October 27, 1999 October 27, 1999 September 14, 1999 September 13, 1999 August 25, 1999 August 18, 1999 August 18, 1999 August 17, 1999 July 15, 1999 June 23, 1999 June 19, 1999 June 17, 1999 June 17, 1999 June 17, 1999 June 2, 1999 May 31, 1999 May 13, 1999 May 7, 1999 April 20, 1999 April 18, 1999 April 7, 1999 March 26, 1999 March 23, 1999 March 17, 1999 March 16, 1999 March 15, 1999 February 18, 1999 February 15, 1999 February 9, 1999 December 13, 1998 November 18, 1998 October 27, 1998 October 26, 1998 F-7IIN MiG-21 MiG-21MFN MiG-21MFN MiG-21 MiG-21 F-7 MiG-21U MiG-21FL MiG-21 MiG-21MF MiG-21MF MiG-21UB MiG-21 MiG-21 FT-7BS F-7P MiG-21bis MiG-21UM MiG-21US MiG-21R MiG-21US MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21bis MiG-21 F-7P J-7E MiG-21UB MiG-21bis MiG-21FL MiG-21 MiG-21U MiG-21bis MiG-21bis MiG-21bis MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21US MiG-21bis MiG-21bis MiG-21 Lancer B MiG-21bis MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21MF MiG-21UM MiG-21bis MiG-21UM F-7M MiG-21 MiG-21bis MIG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 F-7M F-7M MiG-21 MiG-21U F-7M F-7M F-7P F-7M J-7 MiG-21 FT-7M Zimbabwe AF Indian AF Czech AF Czech AF Indian AF Indian AF Myanmar AF Indian AF Indian AF Indian AF Czech AF Czech AF Kazakhstan AF Polish AF Indian AF Sri Lankan AF Pakistan AF Polish AF Indian AF N315RF Polish AF N315RF Indian AF Indian AF Indian AF Indian AF Ethiopian AF Indian AF Pakistan AF PLAAF Uzbekistan AF Indian AF Indian AF Indian AF Yemen AF Polish Navy Indian AF Indian AF Indian AF Indian AF N9242N Indian AF Indian AF Romanian AF Ugandan AF Indian AF Indian AF Czech AF Czech AF Indian AF Bulgarian AF Zimbabwe AF Indian AF Polish AF Ethiopian AF Indian AF Indian AF Indian AF Zimbabwe AF Zimbabwe AF Indian AF Indian AF Zimbabwe AF Zimbabwe AF Pakistan AF Zimbabwe AF PLAAF Indian AF Bangladesh AF Unknown Unknown Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Nonfatal Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Non-fatal Fatal (2) Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Nonfatal Unknown Fatal (1) Nonfatal Nonfatal Fatal (1) Fatal (2) Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Fatal (1) Unknown Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Fatal (2) Unknown Nonfatal Fatal (1) Fatal (2) Nonfatal Nonfatal Unknown Unknown Nonfatal Fatal (2) Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Fatal (2) Fatal (1) Fatal (2) Unknown Nonfatal Nonfatal Fatal (9) Unknown Nonfatal Fatal (1) Unknown Unknown Nonfatal Nonfatal Unknown Unknown Fatal (1) Unknown Nonfatal Fatal (1) Fatal (1)
Attachment 5
Unknown Mechanical Failure st CFIT (1 Aircraft) nd CFIT (2 Aircraft) Unknown Unknown Killed Person on the Ground Unknown st Mid-Air (1 Aircraft) nd Mid-Air (2 Aircraft) Crashed Into 18 Houses (Two Children Killed) st CFIT (1 Aircraft) nd CFIT (2 Aircraft) LOC at on Landing Unknown LOC After Take-Off LOC on Touchdown Mechanical Failure Emergency Landing (AND) Stall at Low Altitude While Maneuvering Late Ejection Engine Failure Fire Warning (Transducer) Fuel Leak (AND) (2nd Event) Hit Ground Obstacle During Flyby Fire Warning (Transducer) Fuel Leak (AND) (1st Event) Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Crashed Into Residential Area Unknown Unknown LOC Mechanical Failure Mid-Air Unknown Mechanical Failure Unknown Unknown Unknown st Mid-Air (1 Aircraft) nd Mid-Air (2 Aircraft) Unknown In-Flight Fire LOC in Flight (Possible Failure of External Fuel Tank) Erroneous Ejection LOC on Wake Turbulence During Take-Off Failed to Get Airborne (Flap Settings) Unknown Unknown Crashed Into Residential Area Bird Strike Mid-Air (1st Aircraft) Mid-Air (2nd Aircraft) (Low Altitude Ejection) Unknown Crashed After Take-Off (Mechanical Failure) Unknown Unknown Engine Failure (Turbine Fatigue Cracks) Hit Pylon Crashed Into Residential Area Killing 8 on the Ground Unknown Bird Strike Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Engine Failure (Cracked Engine Compressor) Unknown Unknown
Page 5-4

269. 270. 271. 272. 273. 274. 275. 276. 277. 278. 279. 280. 281. 282. 283. 284. 285. 286. 287. 288. 289. 290. 291. 292. 293. 294. 295. 296. 297. 298. 299. 300. 301. 302. 303. 304. 305. 306. 307. 308. 309. 310. 311. 312. 313. 314. 315. 316. 317. 318. 319. 320. 321. 322. 323. 324. 325. 326. 327. 328. 329. 330. 331. 332. 333. 334. 335. 336. 337. October 22, 1998 October 7, 1998 October 1998 September 15, 1998 September 7, 1998 September 1, 1998 August 18, 1998 August 14, 1998 July 30, 1998 July 27, 1998 July 16, 1998 July 9, 1998 June 24, 1998 July 23, 1998 July 9, 1998 June 8, 1998 June 8, 1998 June 4, 1998 May 21, 1998 May 12, 1998 April 27, 1998 April 27, 1998 April 18, 1998 March 21, 1998 March 14, 1998 January 21, 1998 December 10, 1997 October 21, 1997 October 3, 1997 September 17, 1997 September 7, 1997 September 7, 1997 September 2, 1997 August 23, 1997 June 25, 1997 June 25, 1997 June 10, 1997 June 9, 1997 June 1997 June 1997 June 1997 May 25, 1997 May 22, 1997 February 24, 1997 January 29, 1997 January 28, 1997 January 23, 1997 January 1997 December 27, 1996 December 17, 1996 December 12, 1996 November 14, 1996 November 14, 1996 November 13, 1996 September 18, 1996 October 22, 1996 October 22, 1996 October 17, 1996 October 11, 1996 October 9, 1996 September 18, 1996 September 15, 1996 September 3, 1996 September 2, 1996 August 14, 1996 July 29, 1996 July 18, 1996 June 28, 1996 May 8, 1996 JJ-7 MiG-21bis J-7L J-7EB F-7P MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21bis F-7P MiG-21 MiG-21MFR MiG-21MF MiG-21bis MiG-21MF MiG-21MF MiG-21MF MiG-21UM MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21M J-7D J-7D F-7P MiG-21bis MiG-21bis MiG-21M MiG-21UM MiG-21UM F-7P MiG-21bis F-7P MiG-21FL MiG-21FL jJ-7 MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21PFM MiG-21 J-7EB J-7EB J-7EB F-7M MiG-21 F-7P MiG-21bis MiG-21MF MiG-21MF J-7 MiG-21UM MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21bis MiG-21bis MiG-21bis MiG-21bis FT-7 MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21bis F-7P MiG-21MF MiG-21MF MiG-21 MiG-21bis MiG-21 MiG-21bis F-7 PLAAF Indian AF PLAAF PLAAF Pakistan AF Indian AF Yemen AF Indian AF Pakistan AF Indian AF Bulgarian AF Bulgarian AF Indian AF Vietnamese AF Bulgarian AF Czech AF Czech AF Indian AF Serbian AF Indian AF PLAAF PLAAF Pakistan AF Indian AF Hungarian AF Indian AF Romanian AF Polish Navy Pakistan AF Indian AF Pakistan AF Indian AF Indian AF PLAAF Indian AF Indian AF Polish Air Force Indian AF PLAAF PLAAF PLAAF IRIAF Romanian AF Pakistan AF Indian AF Bulgarian AF Czech AF PLAAF Vietnamese AF North Korean AF North Korean AF Yugoslav Republic AF Yugoslav Republic AF Yugoslav Republic AF Hungarian AF Pakistan AF North Korean AF Indian AF Polish AF Indian AF Hungarian AF Pakistan AF Polish AF Czech AF Croatian AF Polish Navy Indian AF Polish Air Force Bangladesh AF Nonfatal Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Unknown Unknown Unknown Nonfatal Fatal (6) Nonfatal Nonfatal Unknown Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Fatal (1) Nonfatal Fatal (4) Nonfatal Fatal (1) Nonfatal Unknown Unknown Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Unknown Unknown Unknown Nonfatal Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Unknown Nonfatal Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Nonfatal Nonfatal Unknown Nonfatal Nonfatal Unknown Fatal (1) Unknown Unknown Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Unknown Nonfatal Unknown Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Unknown Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Fatal (1) Nonfatal Nonfatal Unknown Fatal
Attachment 5
Landing Gear Failure During Touch and Go (Ejections) Possible Mechanical Failure Possible CFIT Low Altitude Acrobatics Unknown Unknown Unknown Engine Fire After Take-Off (Injured on the Ground) Engine Failure (Seized) (Crashed into Street, Killed 6, Injured 25) Mechanical Failure (Possible Engine Failure) Stall Unknown Unknown Mechanical Failure LOC - Stall on Final Mid-Air (1st Aircraft) (Crashed into Apartment Building) nd Mid-Air (2 Aircraft) Unknown Mechanical Failure Engine Failure Crashed Into Crowded Mall Mid-Air (1st Aircraft) Mid-Air (2nd Aircraft) Engine Failure Unknown Unknown Engine Failure Engine Failure(Fuel System) Overrun on Take-Off Bird Strike Mechanical Failure Unknown Unknown Unknown Bird Strike Mid-Air (1st Aircraft) Mid-Air (2nd Aircraft) Unknown Bird Strike Mid-Air (1st Aircraft) nd Mid-Air (2 Aircraft) Mid-Air (3rd Aircraft) Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Bird Strike (Engine Failure) LOC on Landing Runway Excursion Unknown Mechanical Failure - Crashed After Take-Off Unknown Unknown Mid-Air (1st Aircraft) Mid-Air (2nd Aircraft) Bird Strike Unknown Unknown Unknown Mechanical Failure Engine Failure on Take-Off - Aborted Take-Off - Overrun Engine Fire on Approach Afterburner Failure/Hydraulic Failure Mechanical Failure Unknown Flew Into Trees (Severe Injuries) LOC During Break for Landing Engine Failure and Fire Engine Failure Unknown Unknown
Page 5-5

338. 339. 340. 341. 342. 343. 344. 345. 346. 347. 348. 349. 350. 351. 352. 353. 354. 355. 356. 357. 358. 359. 360. 361. 362. 363. 364. 365. 366. 367. 368. 369. 370. 371. 372. 373. 374. 375. 376. 377. 378. 379. 380. 381. 382. 383. 384. 385. 386. 387. 388. 389. 390. 391. 392. 393. 394. 395. 396. 397. 398. 399. 400. 401. 402. 403. 404. 405. 406. May 8, 1996 April 24, 1996 April 4, 1996 April 1996 March 28, 1996 March 23, 1996 March 13, 1996 March 6, 1996 February 11, 1996 February 6, 1996 August 29, 1995 August 14, 1995 July 27, 1995 July 15, 1995 June 9, 1995 April 21, 1995 April 16, 1995 March 25, 1995 March 22, 1995 March 21, 1995 March 21, 1995 March 1, 1995 February 27, 1995 February 14, 1995 February 4, 1995 January 6, 1995 1995 December 28, 1994 December 12, 1994 November 14, 1994 October 27, 1994 October 18, 1994 October 14, 1994 September 29, 1994 September 23, 1994 September 17, 1994 September 4, 1994 August 31, 1994 August 25, 1994 August 11, 1994 June 29, 1994 June 26, 1994 June 1, 1994 June 1, 1994 June 1, 1994 May 17, 1994 May 2, 1994 March 29, 1994 March 15, 1994 March 10, 1994 March 5, 1994 March 1, 1994 February 25, 1994 February 21, 1994 February 14, 1994 September 30, 1993 September 15, 1993 September 15, 1993 August 25, 1993 August 8, 1993 August 8, 1993 July 28, 1993 June 15, 1993 June 26, 1993 May 19, 1993m April 27, 1993 April 15, 1993 April 13, 1993 April 13, 1993 MiG-21US MiG-21bis MiG-21FL MiG-21UM MiG-21 F-7P MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 FT-7 MiG-21UM MiG-21bis MiG-21UM F-7P MiG-21 MiG-21bis MiG-21bis F-7P MiG-21bis F-7P F-7P F-7M F-7M MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21bis MiG-21bis MiG-21bis MiG-21bis F-7M MiG-21bis MiG-21M MiG-21MF MiG-21MF MiG-21U MiG-21U F-7 F-7P MiG-21FL MiG-21bis MiG-21MF MiG-21bis MiG-21UM MiG-21bis MiG-21bis MiG-21MF MiG-21F MiG-21bis MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21PF MiG-21 MiG-21bis MiG-21FL MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21MF MiG-21MF MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21MF MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21U MiG-21UM MiG-21 Romanian AF Hungarian AF Indian AF Romanian AF Indian AF Pakistan AF Indian AF Mali AF Indian AF Pakistan AF Romanian AF Croatian AF Romanian AF Pakistan AF Indian AF Croatian AF Croatian AF Pakistan AF Finish AF Pakistan AF Pakistan AF Zimbabwe AF Zimbabwe AF Vietnamese AF Vietnamese AF Indian AF Finnish AF Bulgarian AF Indian AF Zimbabwe AF Indian AF Indian AF Romanian AF Romanian AF Vietnamese AF Indian AF Bangladesh AF Pakistan AF Indian AF Indian AF Romanian AF Angolan AF Hungarian AF Yugoslav Republic AF Yugoslav Republic AF Romanian AF South Yemen AF Indian AF Indian AF Indian AF N121MG Indian AF Polish Air Force Indian AF Indian AF Indian AF Czech AF Czech AF Indian AF Yemen AF Yemen AF Czech AF Yugoslav AF Indian AF Yugoslav AF Indian AF Indian AF Romanian AF Romanian AF Nonfatal Nonfatal Fatal (1) Nonfatal Unknown Unknown Nonfatal Fatal (1) Unknown Nonfatal Nonfatal Unknown Fatal (2) Nonfatal Nonfatal Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Nonfatal Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Unknown Fatal (1) Unknown Unknown Nonfatal Nonfatal Fatal (1) Nonfatal Unknown Nonfatal Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Nonfatal Fatal (2) Fatal (2) Unknown Fatal (1) Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Nonfatal Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Nonfatal Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Nonfatal Nonfatal Unknown Fatal (1) Unknown Unknown Nonfatal Nonfatal Unknown Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Nonfatal Unknown Unknown Nonfatal Unknown Fatal (2) Fatal (2) Nonfatal
Attachment 5
Landing Gear Failure on Landing Runway Excursion Hard Landing Fogged Windshield Engine Failure Failed Ejection (Capsule Separation Failure) Crashed on Final Approach Fuel Tank Mechanical failure (Not External Tanks) Mid-Air Engine Failure on Take-Off Unknown Unknown Unknown Engine Failure Unknown Unknown Mechanical Failure Unknown Mechanical Failure Hit Trees During Low Level Flight Mechanical Failure Engine Fire Unknown Mechanical Failure Unknown Engine Failure Unknown Unknown Bird Strike Collided With Aerial Tow Target (AND) Auto-Pilot Related Engine Problems LOC on Landing (Rolled Over) Unknown Mechanical Failure Unknown Pilot Error Unknown Aborted Take-Off Hit Ground Vehicle During Emergency Landing Unknown In-Flight Canopy Failure Failed Landing Burst Tires on landing Runway Excursion - Overturned Mechanical Failure Bird Strike Unknown Unknown (One Pilot Did Not Eject) Mid-Air (1st Aircraft) nd Mid-Air (2 Aircraft) Flew Into the Ground During low Altitude Maneuvering Unknown In-Flight Canopy Failure CFIT Crashed on Landing on the Runway Drag Chute Failure (AND) Caught Fire on the Ground Due to Fuel leak Unknown Unknown Crashed on the Runway During Landing Unknown Mid-Air (1st AircarfT) (AND) Mid-Air (2nd AircarfT) (AND) Unknown Mid-Air (1st Aircraft) Mid-Air (2nd Aircraft) Landing Gear Failure (Failed to Extend) (AND) Unknown Unknown Engine Failure Tire Burst on Landing Engine Failure After Take-Off (Late Ejection) Mid-Air (1st Aircraft) Mid-Air (2nd Aircraft)
Page 5-6

407. 408. 409. 410. 411. 412. 413. 414. 415. 416. 417. 418. 419. 420. 421. 422. 423. 424. 425. 426. 427. 428. 429. 430. 431. 432. 433. 434. 435. 436. 437. 438. 439. 440. 441. 442. 443. 444. 445. 446. 447. 448. 449. 450. 451. 452. 453. 454. 455. 456. 457. 458. 459. 460. 461. 462. 463. 464. 465. 466. 467. 468. 469. 470. 471. 472. 473. 474. 475. March 13, 1993 March 13, 1993 December 15, 1992 December 3, 1992 November 20, 1992 November 20, 1992 November 11, 1992 November 4, 1992 September 25, 1992 September 15, 1992 August 28, 1992 August 5, 1992 June 10, 1992 June 4, 1992 May 13, 1992 April 16, 1992 April 22, 1992 April 8, 1992 February 27, 1992 February 4, 1992 January 28, 1992 November 5, 1991 October 31, 1991 October 1, 1991 September 12, 1991 August 25, 1991 August 22, 1991 August 7, 1991 July 19, 1991 July 9, 1991 July 1991 June 27, 1991 June 12, 1991 June 1991 April 22, 1991 April 22, 1991 March 19, 1991 March 1, 1991 March 1, 1991 1991 1991 1991 December 28, 1990 November 21, 1990 November 16, 1990 November 14, 1990 September 11, 1990 July 31, 1990 June 29, 1990 June 10, 1990 March 8, 1990 February 19, 1990 February 16, 1990 1990 December 14, 1989 November 23, 1989 November 10, 1989 October 13, 1989 October 11, 1989 October 5, 1989 September 13, 1989 September 8, 1989 August 4, 1989 July 20, 1989 July 20, 1989 June 19, 1989 June 14, 1989 May 10, 1989 May 3, 1989 MiG-21UM MiG-21 MiG-21bis MiG-21 MiG-21 PFM MiG-21PFM MiG-21bis MiG-21 MiG-21bis MiG-21bis MiG-21MF MiG-21bis MiG-21MF MiG-21 MiG-21bis MiG-21 F-7P MiG-21UM MiG-21 MiG-21MF MiG-21UM MiG-21bis MiG-21PFM MiG-21MF MiG-21MF MiG-21 MiG-21bis MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21UM MiG-21 MiG-21bis MiG-21 MiG-21R MiG-21MA MiG-21MA MiG-21U MiG-21 MF MiG-21bis MiG-21PF MiG-21SPS MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21bis MiG-21 MiG-21R MiG-21MF MiG-21bis MiG-21 MIG-21 SPS MiG-21bis MiG-21MF MiG-21bis MiG-21bis MiG-21MF MiG-21 MiG-21PF MiG-21UM MiG-21PFM MiG-21PFM/SPS MiG-21MF MiG-21MF MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21bis MiG-21 Romanian AF Romanian AF Indian AF Indian AF Polish Air Force Polish Air Force Finnish AF Romanian AF Indian AF Indian AF Czechoslovakian AF Polish Air Force Czechoslovakian AF Indian AF Indian AF Indian AF Pakistan AF Romanian AF Romanian AF Czechoslovakian AF Bulgarian AF Finnish AF Czechoslovakian AF Czechoslovakia AF Hungarian AF Yugoslav AF Hungarian AF Indian AF Indian AF Romanian AF Russian Air Force Russian Air Force Czechoslovakian AF Romanian AF Czechoslovakian AF Czechoslovakian AF Hungarian AF Polish Air Force Indian AF Laos AF Polish AF Romanian AF Indian AF Angolan AF Polish Air Force Indian AF Soviet Air Force Romanian AF Hungarian AF Afghanistan AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte DDR Luftstreitkrfte Czech AF Bulgarian AF Angolan AF Czechoslovakian AF Indian AF Czechoslovakian AF Congo AF Bulgarian AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte Romanian AF Angolan AF Indian AF Indian AF Zimbabwe AF Mozambique AF Indian AF Indian AF Fatal (2) Fatal (2) Fatal (1) Unknown Unknown Unknown Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Unknown Fatal (1) Unknown Fatal (1) Unknown Fatal (2) Fatal (2) Fatal (1) Nonfatal Fatal (1) Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Fatal (2) Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Unknown Fatal (1) Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Unknown Unknown Nonfatal Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Fatal (1) Nonfatal Nonfatal Unknown Nonfatal Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Unknown Fatal (1)
Attachment 5
st
Mid-Air (1 Aircraft) nd Mid-Air (2 Aircraft) G-LOC Unknown Unknown Unknown Spatial Disorientation Unknown LOC During Maneuvering (High Density Altitude) G LOC Spin Low Level Demonstration Unknown LOC (High AOA) Failed Ejection Pyros Malfunction Unknown LOC During ACM Failed Ejection Unknown Engine Failure (Killed Two on the Ground) Unknown Unknown (Night Flight) Landing Accident Spatial Disorientation Landing Gear Failure on Landing Landing Accident (AND) Engine Failure Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Crashed After Take-Off Unknown Engine Failure on Approach Spin Landing Accident (AND) Unknown Mid-Air (1st Aircraft) Mid-Air (2nd Aircraft) Emergency Landing Oil Pressure System (AND) Mid-Air Crashed into Hill on Approach Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Spatial Disorientation Loss of Airspeed on Final CFIT In-Flight Fire Hydraulic Leak Engine Failure Engine Fire Engine Failure (Afterburner Failure) Unknown Unknown Crash Landing (Lost/Fuel) Engine Failure (Surge) Unknown Unknown Unknown PIO Flight Control failure on Approach Gear-Up Landing Unknown Unknown Fuel Starvation (Pilot Lost) Engine Fire Failed to Get Airborne on Take-Off Overrun - Fire Attempted to Land in Strom Engine Flame-Out Unknown
Page 5-7

476. 477. 478. 479. 480. 481. 482. 483. 484. 485. 486. 487. 488. 489. 490. 491. 492. 493. 494. 495. 496. 497. 498. 499. 500. 501. 502. 503. 504. 505. 506. 507. 508. 509. 510. 511. 512. 513. 514. 515. 516. 517. 518. 519. 520. 521. 522. 523. 524. 525. 526. 527. 528. 529. 530. 531. 532. 533. 534. 535. 536. 537. 538. 539. 540. 541. 542. 543. 544. April 20, 1989 April 19, 1989 April 18, 1989 April 13, 1989 April 11, 1989 May 24, 1989 May 10, 1989 March 15, 1989 March 14, 1989 March 14, 1989 February 23, 1989 December 13, 1988 December 2, 1988 December 2, 1988 November 22, 1988 November 8, 1988 November 2, 1988 October 14, 1988 September 24, 1988 August 18, 1988 August 13, 1988 August 4, 1988 July 9, 1988 July 5, 1988 June 21, 1988 June 17, 1988 June 16, 1988 June 10, 1988 June 3, 1988 May 27, 1988 May 25, 1988 May 21, 1988 May 6, 1988 May 6, 1988 May 4, 1988 May 4, 1988 April 21, 1988 April 21, 1988 April 21, 1988 April 15, 1988 April 7, 1988 March 16, 1988 March 14, 1988 March 4, 1988 January 11, 1988 December 27, 1987 December 27, 1987 December 26, 1987 December 12, 1987 November 25, 1987 September 3, 1987 September 2, 1987 August 19, 1987 July 30, 1987 June 27, 1987 July 21, 1987 June 22, 1987 June 8, 1987 June 8, 1987 June 3, 1987 March 15, 1987 February 20, 1987 February 1987 January 31, 1987 December 29, 1986 December 19, 1986 December 13, 1986 November 21, 1986 September 30, 1986 MiG-21UM MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21bis MiG-21U MiG-21PF MiG-21bis MiG-21 MiG-21bis MiG-21bis MiG-21F MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21SMT MiG-21bis MiG-21PFM MiG-21U MiG-21 MiG-21bis MiG-21MF MiG-21bis MiG-21bis MiG-21MF MiG-21bis MiG-21bis MiG-21bis MiG-21bis MiG-21 MiG-21F MiG-21 MiG-21bis MiG-21UM MiG-21PFM MiG-21MF MiG-21MF MiG-21F MiG-21F MiG-21PFM MiG-21 MiG-21bis MiG-21 MiG-21bis MiG-21MF MiG-21 MiG-21bis MiG-21bis MiG-21bis MiG-21MF MiG-21MF MiG-21bis MiG-21bis MiG-21bis MiG-21UM MiG-21F MiG-21 MiG-21bis MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21R MiG-21bis MiG-21bis MiG-21bis MiG-21bis MiG-21MF MiG-21MF MiG-21bis MiG-21bis MiG-21bis Romanian AF Cuban AF Indian AF Polish Air Force Czechoslovakian AF Slovakia AF Indian AF Angolan AF Hungarian AF Hungarian AF Czechoslovakian AF Angolan AF Indian AF Indian AF Soviet Air Force Indian AF Czechoslovakian AF Czechoslovakian AF Indian AF Hungarian AF Angolan AF Angolan AF Angolan AF Angolan AF Soviet Air Force Polish Air Force Polish Air Force Hungarian AF Nigerian AF Czechoslovakian AF Indian AF Yugoslav AF Hungarian AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte Czechoslovakian AF Czechoslovakian AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte DDR Luftstreitkrfte Czechoslovakian AF Czechoslovakian AF Angolan AF Indian AF Angolan AF Polish Air Force Indian AF Angolan AF Angolan AF Angolan AF Angolan AF Angolan AF Indian AF Angolan AF Angolan AF Angolan AF Czechoslovakian AF Indian AF Angolan AF Indian AF Sudan AF Polish Air Force Angolan AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte Finnish AF Angolan AF Angolan AF Angolan AF Angolan AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte Finnish AF Fatal (2) Fatal (4) Nonfatal Unknown Fatal (2) Unknown Unknown Fatal (1) Nonfatal Nonfatal Fatal (1) Fatal (11) Unknown Unknown Nonfatal Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Fatal (2) Unknown Fatal (1) Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Fatal (1) Fatal Unknown Nonfatal Fatal (13) Unknown Fatal (1) Nonfatal Nonfatal Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Nonfatal Fatal (1) Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Unknown Fatal (1) Unknown Fatal (1) Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Fatal (1) Unknown Unknown Fatal (1) Nonfatal Fatal (1) Unknown Nonfatal Nonfatal Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Nonfatal Nonfatal
Attachment 5
LOC at Low Altitude Unknown Killed 3 on the Ground In-Flight Fire Unknown Stall at Low Altitude (High AOA) Unknown Engine Failure Crashed on Landing st Mid-Air in IMC (1 Aircraft) nd Mid-Air in IMC (2 Aircraft) Possible Pilot incapacitation (O 2 ) During Test Flight Engine Failure - Crashed Into Structure Killed 11 st Mid-Air (1 Aircarft) nd Mid-Air (2 Aircarft) Mechanical Failure Crashed During Flyby Possible Flight Controls Failure Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Stall on Landing Crashed During Final Approach at Night (LOC) Unknown Unknown Mechanical Crashed Into residential Area Killed 12 on the Ground Unknown (AND) Unknown Unknown Unknown Mechanical Failure Mid-Air (1st Aircraft) Mid-Air (2nd Aircraft) Mid-Air (1st Aircraft) Mid-Air (2nd Aircraft) LOC (High AOA) Fuel Starvation on Final Unknown Unknown Unknown Engine Failure Unknown Unknown (1st Aircraft) Unknown (2nd Aircraft) Unknown Unknown Unknown Crashed During Low-Level Flight Unknown Unknown Unknown Flew Into the Ground Unknown Unknown Unknown Crash Landing LOC at Low Altitude (Distraction) Unknown Engine Failure Runway Excursion (AND) Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Total Power Loss (Electrical) Engine Failure
Page 5-8

545. 546. 547. 548. 549. 550. 551. 552. 553. 554. 555. 556. 557. 558. 559. 560. 561. 562. 563. 564. 565. 566. 567. 568. 569. 570. 571. 572. 573. 574. 575. 576. 577. 578. 579. 580. 581. 582. 583. 584. 585. 586. 587. 588. 589. 590. 591. 592. 593. 594. 595. 596. 597. 598. 599. 600. 601. 602. 603. 604. 605. 606. 607. 608. 609. 610. 611. 612. 613. September 22, 1986 September 17, 1986 September 17, 1986 August 29, 1986 August 27, 1986 August 27, 1986 August 19, 1986 July 17, 1986 July 2, 1986 June 17, 1986 June 14, 1986 March 25, 1986 February 23, 1986 January 10, 1986 January 9, 1986 1986 December 19, 1985 December 16, 1985 October 3, 1985 August 6, 1985 July 31, 1985 July 25, 1985 June 28, 1985 June 22, 1985 June 1, 1985 May 24, 1985 May 21, 1985 May 11, 1985 May 10, 1985 April 27, 1985 April 11, 1985 April 9, 1985 April 1, 1985 March 15, 1985 March 8, 1985 March 8, 1985 February 15, 1985 November 28, 1984 October 22, 1984 October 16, 1984 September 22, 1984 August 24, 1984 August 16, 1984 August 9, 1984 June 17, 1984 June 5, 1984 June 5, 1984 May 16, 1984 May 9, 1984 April 25, 1984 April 12, 1984 April 11, 1984 March 21, 1984 March 1, 1984 February 23, 1984 February 18, 1984 January 27, 1984 January 20, 1984 December 30, 1983 December 21, 1983 December 9, 1983 December 2, 1983 November 29, 1983 November 10, 1983 November 2, 1983 October 2, 1983 September 1, 1983 July 12, 1983 July 7, 1983 MiG-21MF MiG-21SMT MiG-21SMT MIG-21 PFM MiG-21UM MiG-21 MiG-21MF MiG-21UM MiG-21PFM MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21PF MiG-21F-13 MiG-21R MiG-21PFM MiG-21UM MiG-21MF MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21UM MiG-21bis MiG-21MF MiG-21PF MiG-21MF MiG-21M MiG-21 MiG-21PF MiG-21UM MiG-21MF MiG-21 MiG-21F-13 MiG-21M MiG-21F MiG-21M MiG-21UM MiG-21UM MiG-21UM MiG-21M MiG-21MF MiG-21UM MiG-21M MiG-21bis MiG-21bis MiG-21bis MiG-21M MiG-21MF MiG-21MF MiG-21bis MiG-21UM MiG-21 SPS-K MiG-21bis MiG-21PFM MiG-21bis MiG-21 MF MiG-21bis MiG-21PF MiG-21MF MiG-21bis MIG-21 SPS MiG-21PFM MiG-21UM MiG-21MF MiG-21 MF MiG-21bis MiG-21 MiG-21UM MiG-21PFM MiG-21US MiG-21bis Angolan AF Soviet Air Force Soviet Air Force DDR Luftstreitkrfte Bulgarian AF Indian AF Angolan AF Hungarian AF Polish Air Force Indian AF Indian AF Hungarian AF Polish Air Force Soviet Air Force Soviet Air Force Cuban AF Czechoslovakian AF Yemen Indian AF Polish Air Force Angolan AF Hungarian AF Czechoslovakian AF Bulgarian AF Indian AF Indian AF Polish Air Force Polish Air Force Czechoslovakian AF Indian AF Bulgarian AF Indian AF Czechoslovakian AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte Yugoslav AF Yugoslav AF Yugoslav AF Romanian AF Bulgarian AF Hungarian AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte Finnish AF Yugoslav AF Angolan AF Bulgarian AF Hungarian AF Hungarian AF Hungarian AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte DDR Luftstreitkrfte Hungarian AF Czechoslovakian AF Soviet Air Force Polish Air Force Hungarian AF Polish Air Force Bulgarian AF Yugoslav AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte Polish Air Force Yugoslav AF Polish Air Force Polish Air Force Angolan AF Indian AF Angolan AF Polish Air Force Czechoslovakian AF Hungarian AF Unknown Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Unknown Fatal (1) Unknown Fatal (2) Unknown Fatal (1) Fatal (13) Nonfatal Unknown Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Unknown Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Unknown Fatal (1) Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Nonfatal Unknown Fatal (1) Fatal (11) Unknown Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Fatal (1) Nonfatal Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Fatal (1) Nonfatal Fatal (2) Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Unknown Fatal (1) Unknown Unknown Nonfatal Nonfatal Unknown Nonfatal Unknown Unknown Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Fatal (2) Unknown Unknown Unknown
Attachment 5
Unknown Ground Collision With Landing Aircraft (Runway Incursion) Collision With Aircraft on the Runway (Runway Incursion) Engine Failure Unknown Unknown Unknown Crashed After Take-Off (Possible Engine Failure) Unknown Unknown (One Killed on the Ground, 10 Injured) Mechanical Failure (Hit Residential Area, Killing 13) Engine Failure Unknown Spatial Disorientation Unknown (Disappeared Debris Found in 2006) Unknown Crashed on Instrument Approach (Short of the Runway) Mechanical Failure Unknown Unknown Landing Accident Unknown Engine Failure After Take-Off (Surge) Engine Exploded on the Runway (Compressor Blade) Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Fire After Emergency Landing Unknown Unknown Crash After Take-Off (Hit Residential Area, 11 killed) LOC Hydraulic Failure (Line) (Aircraft Crashed Into University Dorm) Unknown (1st Aircraft) Unknown (2nd Aircraft) Unknown Unknown Loss of Power Bird Strike Unknown Oil Loss (Cap Opened in Flight) Unknown Fuel Starvation Unknown Mid-Air (1st Aircraft) nd Mid-Air (2 Aircraft) Unknown (AND) Oxygen-Fueled Fire in the Cockpit Landing Gear Failure (Failure to Extend) Unknown Engine Failure Overrun (Brake Failure AND Drag Chute Failure) Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Mechanical Failure Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Acrobatic Practice Unknown Crashed During ACM Unknown Unknown Unknown
Page 5-9

614. 615. 616. 617. 618. 619. 620. 621. 622. 623. 624. 625. 626. 627. 628. 629. 630. 631. 632. 633. 634. 635. 636. 637. 638. 639. 640. 641. 642. 643. 644. 645. 646. 647. 648. 649. 650. 651. 652. 653. 654. 655. 656. 657. 658. 659. 660. 661. 662. 663. 664. 665. 666. 667. 668. 669. 670. 671. 672. 673. 674. 675. 676. 677. 678. 679. 680. 681. 682. July 7, 1983 July 1, 1983 June 2, 1983 May 28, 1983 May 21, 1983 May 13, 1983 May 12, 1983 May 6, 1983 April 23, 1983 April 20, 1983 March 9, 1983 January 28, 1983 January 21, 1983 1983 1983 1983 December 12, 1982 December 1982 November 17, 1982 November 8, 1982 October 29, 1982 October 8, 1982 October 7, 1982 October 2, 1982 September 22, 1982 June 17, 1982 June 11, 1982 June 1, 1982 May 31, 1982 May 17, 1982 May 3, 1982 April 27, 1982 March 29, 1982 March 3, 1982 February 9, 1982 January 27, 1982 January 17, 1982 1982 1982 October 25, 1981 October 25, 1981 October 13, 1981 September 22, 1981 September 22, 1981 September 1, 1981 August 27, 1981 August 12, 1981 August 11, 1981 July 23, 1981 July 9, 1981 July 7, 1981 June 19, 1981 June 9, 1981 June 5, 1981 June 5, 1981 May 22, 1981 May 6, 1981 April 21, 1981 April 7, 1981 April 2, 1991 January 26, 1981 January 8, 1981 January 6, 1981 1981 1981 December 12, 1980 December 7, 1980 November 1980 October 24, 1980 MiG-21bis MiG-21bis MiG-21UM MiG-21PFM MiG-21F MiG-21 MiG-21PFM(SPS) MiG-21MF MiG-21 MiG-21bis MiG-21bis MiG-21UM MiG-21US MiG-21 SPS MiG-21 SPS MiG-21 MiG-21UM MiG-21 MiG-21M MiG-21 MiG-21U MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21M MiG-21bis MiG-21F-13 MiG-21 MiG-21F MiG-21 MF MiG-21 MiG-21 SPS-K F-7A MiG-21MF MiG-21U MiG-21bis MiG-21M MiG-21MF MiG-21 MiG-21MF MiG-21MFs MiG-21bis MiG-21F MiG-21F MiG-21PFM/SPS MiG-21bis MiG-21MFs MiG-21PFM F-7 MiG-21 MiG-21bis MiG-21MF MiG-21bis MiG-21 UM MiG-21UM MiG-21PFM MiG-21bis MiG-21MF MiG-21PF MiG-21MA MiG-21bis MiG-21 SPS MiG-21bis MiG-21MF MiG-21F MiG-21PFM MiG-21U MiG-21bis MiG-21PFM Hungarian AF Soviet Air Force Bulgarian AF Czechoslovakian AF Czechoslovakian AF Nigerian AF Polish Air Force Bulgarian AF Angolan AF Yugoslav AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte Hungarian AF Czechoslovakian AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte DDR Luftstreitkrfte USAF 4477th Angolan AF Czechoslovakian AF Polish Air Force Czechoslovakian AF Indian AF Indian AF Indian AF Indian AF Polish Air Force Polish Air Force Finnish AF Indian AF Czechoslovakian AF Polish Air Force DDR Luftstreitkrfte DDR Luftstreitkrfte Albanian AF Czechoslovakian AF Hungarian AF Yugoslav AF Polish AF Bangladesh AF USAF 4477th Yugoslav AF Yugoslav AF Hungarian AF Czechoslovakian AF Czechoslovakian AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte Hungarian AF Yugoslav AF Czechoslovakian AF Pakistan Air Force Polish Air Force Hungarian AF Nigerian AF Hungarian AF Polish Air Force Polish Air Force Polish Air Force Yugoslav AF Czechoslovakian AF Hungarian AF Czechoslovakian AF Polish Air Force DDR Luftstreitkrfte Polish Air Force Cuban AF USAF 4477th Polish Air Force DDR Luftstreitkrfte Hungarian AF Yugoslav AF Unknown Nonfatal Fatal (1) Unknown Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Unknown Fatal (1) Unknown Nonfatal Nonfatal Fatal (1) Fatal (2) Unknown Unknown Nonfatal Fatal (2) Unknown Unknown Unknown Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Unknown Unknown Unknown Fatal (1) Nonfatal Nonfatal Unknown Nonfatal Nonfatal Fatal (1) Unknown Fatal (1) Nonfatal Unknown Unknown Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Unknown Unknown Unknown Fatal (1) Unknown Nonfatal Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Unknown Fatal (1) Unknown Unknown Nonfatal Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Nonfatal Nonfatal
Attachment 5
Unknown Tire Burst on Landing (AND) Unknown Engine Failure High-Speed Landing Runway Excursion Fatal Ground Ejection Unknown Unknown LOC on Landing (Disorientation) Unknown Unknown Engine Fire Unknown Flew Into a Hill st Mid-Air (1 Aircraft) nd Mid-Air (2 Aircraft) In-Flight Canopy Failure (AND) Crashed During ACM Unknown Engine Failure Engine failure (Compressor) Bird Strike on Take-Off (One Ejection) Crashed During Low-Level Flyby Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Spatial Disorientation Engine Fire Stuck Throttle Unknown In-Flight Engine Fire (Landed) Engine Failure on Take-Off Bird Strike Unknown LOC (Wake Turbulence) Unknown Unknown Unknown In-Flight Canopy Failure (AND) Unknown (1st Aircraft) Unknown (2nd Aircraft) Unknown Mid-Air (1st Aircraft) Mid-Air (2nd Aircraft) Spatial Disorientation at Night Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Flight Controls Failure Unknown (AND) Flight Controls Failure Unknown Canopy Opened in Flight Unknown Unknown Engine Failure (Emergency Landing) (AND) LOC Spatial Disorientation LOC Maneuvered Into the Ground Unknown (AND) Unknown
Page 5-10

683. 684. 685. 686. 687. 688. 689. 690. 691. 692. 693. 694. 695. 696. 697. 698. 699. 700. 701. 702. 703. 704. 705. 706. 707. 708. 709. 710. 711. 712. 713. 714. 715. 716. 717. 718. 719. 720. 721. 722. 723. 724. 725. 726. 727. 728. 729. 730. 731. 732. 733. 734. 735. 736. 737. 738. 739. 740. 741. 742. 743. 744. 745. 746. 747. 748. 749. 750. 751. October 1, 1980 October 1, 1980 September 17, 1980 September 1980 September 1980 September 1980 July 22, 1980 July 12, 1980 July 1, 1980 May 8, 1980 April 10, 1980 April 9, 1980 February 25, 1980 February 15, 1980 February 1, 1980 January 9, 1980 October 8, 1979 October 1979 September 10, 1979 September 10, 1979 August 3, 1979 August 3, 1979 August 2, 1979 June 20, 1979 June 8, 1979 June 8, 1979 May 29, 1979 April 9, 1979 March 26, 1979 March 22, 1979 March 11, 1979 January 17, 1979 1979 December 28, 1978 December 28, 1978 December 1978 September 4, 1978 August 22, 1978 August 14, 1978 August 5, 1978 July 30, 1978 July 28, 1978 June 27, 1978 June 21, 1978 June 14, 1978 June 14, 1978 May 26, 1978 April 27, 1978 March 23, 1978 March 1, 1978 January 19, 1978 January 17, 1978 January 16, 1978 January 16, 1978 December 13, 1977 November 21, 1977 November 19, 1977 November 15, 1977 November 14, 1977 October 15, 1977 October 12, 1977 September 30, 1977 October 3, 1977 September 26, 1977 September 20, 1977 September 20, 1977 September 8, 1977 August 17, 1977 July 28, 1977 MiG-21 UM MiG-21UM MiG-21M MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21MF MiG-21U MiG-21PFM MiG-21 SPS MiG-21PF MiG-21F MiG-21 PFM MiG-21PFM MiG-21FL MiG-21PFM MiG-21 MiG-21R MiG-21U MiG-21U MiG-21bis MiG-21UM MiG-21F-13 MiG-21M MiG-21F MiG-21F MiG-21F MiG-21F MiG-21FL MiG-21F-13 MiG-21PF MiG-21MF MiG-21UM MiG-21F-13 MiG-21M MiG-21PFM MiG-21UM MiG-21M MiG-21F-13 MiG-21F MiG-21M MiG-21 MiG-21MF MiG-21bis MiG-21M MiG-21U MiG-21 F-13 MiG-21F MiG-21 SPS-K MiG-21UB MiG-21 SPS-K MiG-21 SPS-K MiG-21M MiG-21U MiG-21bis MiG-21S MiG-21F MiG-21F MiG-21 MF MiG-21MF MiG-21 F-13 MiG-21 MiG-21F-13 MiG-21F MiG-21 MF MiG-21 US MiG-21 MiG-21MF MiG-21 SPS-K Polish Air Force Polish Air Force Bulgarian AF Afghanistan AF Afghanistan AF Afghanistan AF Czechoslovakian AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte Yugoslav AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte Hungarian AF Czechoslovakian AF Polish Air Force Yugoslav AF Indian AF Yugoslav AF Romanian AF Soviet Air Force Yugoslav AF Yugoslav AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte Czechoslovakian AF Polish Air Force Polish Air Force Czechoslovakian AF Czechoslovakian AF Yugoslav AF Czechoslovakian AF Indian AF Polish Air Force Polish Air Force Czechoslovakian AF Cuban AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte DDR Luftstreitkrfte Soviet Air Force Czechoslovakian AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte Polish Air Force Czechoslovakian AF Polish Air Force Indian AF Hungarian AF Yugoslav AF Polish Air Force Polish Air Force DDR Luftstreitkrfte Czechoslovakian AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte Nigerian AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte DDR Luftstreitkrfte Polish Air Force Polish Air Force Hungarian AF Soviet Air Force Finnish AF Czechoslovakian AF Polish Air Force Czechoslovakian AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte Romanian AF Polish AF Czechoslovakian AF Polish Air Force Polish Air Force Romanian AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte DDR Luftstreitkrfte Fatal (1) Unknown Unknown Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Nonfatal Fatal (1) Nonfatal Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Unknown Unknown Nonfatal Fatal (1) Nonfatal Fatal (1) Nonfatal Fatal (2) Fatal (2) Nonfatal Nonfatal Unknown Unknown Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Fatal (1) Unknown Nonfatal Unknown Nonfatal Nonfatal Fatal (1) Fatal (2) Nonfatal Unknown Nonfatal Unknown Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Unknown Unknown Nonfatal Nonfatal Fatal (1) Fatal (16) Nonfatal Nonfatal Fatal (1) Unknown Nonfatal Fatal (1) Nonfatal Fatal (1) Unknown Unknown Nonfatal Unknown Nonfatal Nonfatal Unknown Unknown Fatal (1) Nonfatal Fatal (1)
Attachment 5
Fire in the Cockpit Inadvertent Ejection Unknown Unknown st CFIT (1 Aircraft) nd CFIT (2 Aircraft) rd CFIT (3 Aircraft) Pilot Disorientation in Clouds Accessories Drive Shaft Failure Unknown Unknown Unknown Weather Related Unknown Unknown LOC During ACM Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Mid-Air Engine Failure (Compressor) Unknown Unknown Mid-Air (1st Aircarft) Mid-Air (2nd Aircarft) Unknown Pilot Incapacitation Engine Fire Stall (High AOA) Unknown Unknown Unknown Barrier Engagement Fuel Starvation (Debris Hit Kindergarten) Possible Inadvertent Ejection Unknown (Pilot Error) Landing Gear Failure (failed to Extend Ejection) Unknown Unknown (Pilot Error) Unknown Mid-Air with Hunter Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown (Pilot Error) Spatial Disorientation (Fatal High-Speed Ejection) Collision With F-27 Airliner at the Airport Unknown LOC During ACM Crashed During Circling Approach Unknown Unknown Tow Low on IFR Approach Landing Gear Failure to Extend (Pilot Ejected) Cracked Canopy (Supersonic Impact) Unknown Mechanical Failure Unknown Unknown Unknown Pilot Ejected Having Misdiagnosed an Engine Failure Unknown Unknown Unknown Engine Failure Bird Strike Hit the Ground
Page 5-11

752. 753. 754. 755. 756. 757. 758. 759. 760. 761. 762. 763. 764. 765. 766. 767. 768. 769. 770. 771. 772. 773. 774. 775. 776. 777. 778. 779. 780. 781. 782. 783. 784. 785. 786. 787. 788. 789. 790. 791. 792. 793. 794. 795. 796. 797. 798. 799. 800. 801. 802. 803. 804. 805. 806. 807. 808. 809. 810. 811. 812. 813. 814. 815. 816. 817. 818. 819. 820. July 24, 1977 July 13, 1977 July 9, 1977 June 21, 1977 June 21, 1977 June 15, 1977 May 24, 1977 March 1977 April 13, 1977 February 10, 1977 January 18, 1977 January 13, 1977 October 23, 1976 October 2, 1976 October 1, 1976 September 25, 1976 September 6, 1976 September 1, 1976 August 9, 1976 August 3, 1976 July 28, 1976 July 13, 1976 July 7, 1976 July 1, 1976 June 1, 1976 May 20, 1976 May 18, 1976 May 11, 1976 April 1976 March 20, 1976 March 3, 1976 January 29, 1976 January 25, 1976 January 23, 1976 January 9, 1976 December 31, 1975 December 31, 1975 December 31, 1975 December 18, 1975 November 19, 1975 September 8, 1975 August 18, 1975 August 12, 1975 August 12, 1975 August 1, 1975 July 8, 1975 June 12, 1975 June 1975 May 15, 1975 April 11, 1975 April 11, 1975 April 1, 1975 February 25, 1975 January 14, 1975 January 11, 1975 1975 November 14, 1974 November 12, 1974 September 29, 1974 September 23, 1974 August 26, 1974 August 7, 1974 July 1974 June 20, 1974 June 1, 1974 June 1974 April 11, 1974 March 25, 1974 March 21, 1974 MiG-21PFM MiG-21MF MiG-21M MiG-21M MiG-21M MiG-21MF MiG-21F MiG-21R MiG-21R MiG-21PFM MiG-21MF MiG-21SPS MiG-21F-13 MiG-21PFM MiG-21MF MiG-21MF MiG-21MF MiG-21F MiG-21U MiG-21bis MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21US MiG-21F MiG-21F MiG-21 MiG-21PFM MiG-21U MiG-21MF MiG-21F MiG-21F-13 MiG-21 SPS MiG-21 MIG-21 SPS MiG-21MF MiG-21 MF MiG-21 MF MiG-21M MiG-21MF MiG-21F MiG-21F MiG-21R MiG-21 MF MiG-21 MF MiG-21U MiG-21R MiG-21UM MiG-21R MiG-21F-13 MiG-21FL MiG-21FL MiG-21FL MiG-21U MiG-21PFM/SPS MiG-21 F-13 MiG-21PF MiG-21 SPS-K MiG-21PF MiG-21F MiG-21F MiG-21M MiG-21R MiG-21 MiG-21U MiG-21FL MiG-21R MiG-21PFM MIG-21 PFM MiG-21F Yugoslav AF Hungarian AF Yugoslav AF Bulgarian AF Bulgarian AF Polish Air Force Czechoslovakian AF Romanian AF Soviet AF Yugoslav AF Hungarian AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte DDR Luftstreitkrfte DDR Luftstreitkrfte Nigerian AF Hungarian AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte Czechoslovakian AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte Hungarian AF Indian AF Romanian AF Polish Air Force Czechoslovakian AF Yugoslav AF Romanian AF Yugoslav AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte Angolan AF Czechoslovakian AF Finnish AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte Ugandan AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte Czechoslovakian AF Polish Air Force Polish Air Force Polish Air Force Hungarian AF Czechoslovakian AF Finnish AF Czechoslovakian AF Polish Air Force Polish Air Force DDR Luftstreitkrfte Soviet AF Romanian AF Soviet Air Force Hungarian AF Indian AF Indian AF Indian AF Indian AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte Czechoslovakian AF Bulgarian AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte Czechoslovakian AF Czechoslovakian AF Czechoslovakian AF Bulgarian AF Soviet Air Force Romanian AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte Indian AF Soviet Air Force DDR Luftstreitkrfte DDR Luftstreitkrfte Czechoslovakian AF Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Unknown Unknown Fatal (1) Unknown Unknown Nonfatal Nonfatal Unknown Nonfatal Nonfatal Unknown Unknown Unknown Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Unknown Fatal (1) Unknown Nonfatal Nonfatal Fatal (1) Nonfatal Fatal (1) Nonfatal Nonfatal Unknown Nonfatal Fatal (1) Nonfatal Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Nonfatal Nonfatal Fatal (1) Unknown Unknown Nonfatal Fatal (1) Fatal (2) Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Nonfatal Fatal (1) Nonfatal Fatal (12) Nonfatal Unknown Fatal (1) Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Fatal (1) Unknown Nonfatal Unknown Unknown Fatal (1) Nonfatal Unknown
Attachment 5
Unknown Unknown (AND) Unknown Unknown Unknown Fuel Starvation Failed Ejection Mechanical Failure Unknown Engine Failure (Oil System Failure) Unknown Unknown Collapsed From Jacks (AND) Aircraft Jumped the Chocks During Engine Run (AND) Mechanical Failure Unknown Unknown Mid-Air with Mi-4 Landing Gear Failed to Extend (AND) FOD on Start-Up (Total Loss) Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Engine Failure Unknown Unknown Unknown Hard Landing Hydraulic Failure Mechanical Failure (Canopy) Unknown Unknown Low Altitude Maneuvering Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Engine Failure (Bearings and Loss of Oil) Engine Failure (HP Turbine Failure) Hit Terrain Unknown Unknown Fuel Pump Failure LOC Bird Strike Unknown LOC Flew Into the Ground LOC During ACM Failed Ejection st Mid-Air (1 Aircraft) Mid-Air (2nd Aircraft) Bird Strike In-Flight Fire Engine Failure (Compressor Hatch) Fatalities in Residential Building Mechanical Failure Unknown Possible LOC Hit Residential Area, Wounding Civilians Unknown Engine Failure Unknown Unknown LOC Stall (High AOA) Unknown Nose Wheel Failed to Extend (Ejection) Engine Failure Unknown Explosion During Ground Run (Mechanic Killed) Engine Fuel Pump Failure Engine Failure
Page 5-12

821. 822. 823. 824. 825. 826. 827. 828. 829. 830. 831. 832. 833. 834. 835. 836. 837. 838. 839. 840. 841. 842. 843. 844. 845. 846. 847. 848. 849. 850. 851. 852. 853. 854. 855. 856. 857. 858. 859. 860. 861. 862. 863. 864. 865. 866. 867. 868. 869. 870. 871. 872. 873. 874. 875. 876. 877. 878. 879. 880. 881. 882. 883. 884. 885. 886. 887. 888. 889. November 8, 1973 September 29, 1973 September 7, 1973 August 30, 1973 August 24, 1973 August 15, 1973 August 1, 1973 August 1, 1973 July 9, 1973 June 26, 1973 June 26, 1973 June 23, 1973 June 23, 1973 June 1, 1973 May 31, 1973 May 30, 1973 May 14, 1973 May 10, 1973 March 26, 1973 March 16, 1973 February 15, 1973 February 10, 1973 January 26, 1973 January 16, 1973 December 1, 1972 December 1, 1972 November 25, 1972 October 3, 1972 September 4, 1972 September 19, 1972 August 29, 1972 August 16, 1972 July 21, 1972 June 15, 1972 June 6, 1972 June 1972 May 26, 1972 May 3, 1972 April 6, 1972 April 4, 1972 March 20, 1972 February 15, 1972 January 6, 1972 November 3, 1971 October 1971 September 21, 1971 September 9, 1971 September 2, 1971 August 31, 1971 August 31, 1971 August 25, 1971 August 2, 1971 July 27, 1971 July 8, 1971 July 2, 1971 May 18, 1971 May 11, 1971 May 11, 1971 May 6, 1971 April 27, 1971 April 23, 1971 April 15, 1971 February 16, 1971 November 9, 1970 October 28, 1970 September 26, 1970 September 18, 1970 September 11, 1970 September 3, 1970 MiG-21R MiG-21UM MiG-21 MiG-21MF MiG-21 F-13 MiG-21SPS-K MiG-21 SPS-K MiG-21FL MiG-21U MiG-21 SPS MiG-21M MiG-21MF MiG-21MF MiG-21UM MiG-21F-13 MiG-21FL MiG-21 SPS-K MIG-21 SPS MiG-21MA MiG-21FL MiG-21 MiG-21 SPS-K MiG-21 PF MiG-21F MiG-21FL MiG-21FL MiG-21FL MiG-21F-13 MiG-21 MiG-21PF MiG-21U MiG-21MF MiG-21R MiG-21PFM MiG-21 SPS-K MiG-21 MiG-21US MiG-21M MiG-21U MiG-21FL MiG-21 PF MiG-21PFM MiG-21PFM MiG-21M MiG-21PFM MiG-21R MiG-21F-13 MiG-21F-13 MiG-21 PFM MiG-21 PFM MiG-21U MiG-21 SPS MiG-21 MF MiG-21 MiG-21F MiG-21F MiG-21M MiG-21F-13 MiG-21 MiG-21PFM MiG-21PF MiG-21F MiG-21PFM MiG-21PF MiG-21F MiG-21F-13 MiG-21 PFM MiG-21UM MiG-21M Czechoslovakian AF Czechoslovakian AF Yugoslav AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte Polish Air Force DDR Luftstreitkrfte DDR Luftstreitkrfte Indian AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte DDR Luftstreitkrfte DDR Luftstreitkrfte DDR Luftstreitkrfte DDR Luftstreitkrfte Indian AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte Indian AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte DDR Luftstreitkrfte Czechoslovakian AF Indian AF Egyptian AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte DDR Luftstreitkrfte Czechoslovakian AF Indian AF Indian AF Indian AF Hungarian AF Romanian AF Czechoslovakian AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte Czechoslovakian AF Czechoslovakian AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte DDR Luftstreitkrfte Romanian AF Czechoslovakian AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte Hungarian AF Indian AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte Czechoslovakian AF Czechoslovakian AF Bulgarian AF Czechoslovakian AF Czechoslovakian AF Hungarian AF Hungarian AF Polish Air Force Polish Air Force DDR Luftstreitkrfte DDR Luftstreitkrfte Polish Air Force Yugoslav AF Finnish AF Czechoslovakian AF Polish Air Force Polish Air Force Polish Air Force DDR Luftstreitkrfte Hungarian AF Czechoslovakian AF Polish Air Force Polish Air Force Czechoslovakian AF Hungarian AF Polish Air Force DDR Luftstreitkrfte Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown Nonfatal Fatal (1) Unknown Nonfatal Nonfatal Unknown Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Unknown Nonfatal Fatal (1) Nonfatal Nonfatal Unknown Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Nonfatal Nonfatal Unknown Unknown Unknown Fatal (1) Unknown Nonfatal Unknown Nonfatal Unknown Unknown Fatal (1) Nonfatal Nonfatal Unknown Fatal(1) Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Unknown Unknown Nonfatal Nonfatal Unknown Nonfatal Nonfatal Unknown Unknown Unknown Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Nonfatal Unknown Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Unknown Unknown Unknown Nonfatal Unknown
Attachment 5
Unknown Unknown Unknown Stall During Maneuvering Engine Failure Hard Landing and Subsequent Fire Unknown Bird Strike Throttle Jammed, Engine Remained in Afterburner LOC Dive Landing Accident st Mid-Air (1 Aircraft) nd Mid-Air (2 Aircraft) Engine Failure Overrun Landing Gear Failure (AND) LOC During ACM (Mushed into the Ground) Engine Failure (Turbine Blades) Engine Failure Unknown Unknown Flew Into the Water at Low Level Landing Gear Failure (Failed to Extend) Engine Failure on Start-Up Engine Fire (Aircraft Destroyed) Unknown Bird Strike Crashed After Take-Off Engine Failure Unknown Engine Failure During Take-Off (Compressor Failure) Unknown Engine Failure (Fuel Pump Failure) Unknown Unknown Mid-Air With Su-7 PIO on Landing Gear Collapsed Fire Unknown (Night Flight) Unknown In-Flight Partial Ejection (Telescope Tube Partially Deployed) Unknown Bird Strike Overrun Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Mid-Air Unknown Engine Failure PIO on Landing Hard Landing Gear Collapse Unknown Unknown Hit Trees at Low Level Unknown Unknown Mid-Air LOC Over Airfield Hit MiG-15UTI on the Ground Hit the Ground Flight Controls Failure Unknown LOC Spatial Disorientation Mid-Air Unknown Unknown Unknown Spatial Disorientation Unknown
Page 5-13

890. 891. 892. 893. 894. 895. 896. 897. 898. 899. 900. 901. 902. 903. 904. 905. 906. 907. 908. 909. 910. 911. 912. 913. 914. 915. 916. 917. 918. 919. 920. 921. 922. 923. 924. 925. 926. 927. 928. 929. 930. 931. 932. 933. 934. 935. 936. 937. 938. 939. 940. 941. 942. 943. 944. 945. 946. 947. 948. 949. 950. 951. 952. 953. 954. 955. 956. 957. 958. September 1970 August 12, 1970 August 11, 1970 May 14, 1970 May 8, 1970 May 6, 1970 April 2, 1970 March 18, 1970 March 16, 1970 March 4, 1970 February 25, 1970 February 5, 1970 January 10, 1970 January 6 , 1970 January 6, 1970 November 6, 1969 September 29, 1969 September 25, 1969 September 25, 1969 August 13, 1969 August 12, 1969 July 17, 1969 July 10, 1969 July 1, 1969 July 3, 1969 June 5, 1969 May 27, 1969 May 16, 1969 May 10, 1969 May 10, 1969 April 29, 1969 April 18, 1969 April 16, 1969 April 10, 1969 March 8, 1969 February 24, 1969 January 29, 1969 January 24, 1969 December 16, 1968 December 12, 1968 November 25, 1968 November 25, 1968 October 17, 1968 September 2, 1968 August 20, 1968 August 17, 1968 August 10, 1968 August 9, 1968 August 8, 1968 August 4, 1968 July 20, 1968 July 5, 1968 June 18, 1968 June 1, 1968 May 23, 1968 May 23, 1968 May 18, 1968 May 16, 1968 May 3, 1968 May 3, 1968 April 22, 1968 March 29, 1968 March 25, 1968 March 25, 1968 March 12, 1968 January 30, 1968 January 29, 1968 January 23, 1968 January 23, 1968 MiG-21F MiG-21MA MiG-21F MiG-21U MiG-21SN MiG-21F MiG-21PF MiG-21F MiG-21F MiG-21F-13 MiG-21FL MiG-21PF MiG-21U MiG-21PFM MiG-21PFM MiG-21F-13 MiG-21 MiG-21F-13 MiG-21F MiG-21PFM MiG-21 MiG-21F-13 MiG-21F MiG-21FL MiG-21F-13 MiG-21F-13 MiG-21F MiG-21 SPS MiG-21U MiG-21F-13 MIG-21 PFM MiG-21F MiG-21U MiG-21PFM MiG-21U MiG-21 F-13 MiG-21 SPS-K MiG-21PFM MiG-21 SPS-K MiG-21U MiG-21F MiG-21F MiG-21PF MiG-21PF MiG-21F MiG-21F-13 MiG-21 F-13 MiG-21PF MiG-21F-13 MIG-21 PFM MiG-21 SPS-K MiG-21F MiG-21F MiG-21PFM MiG-21 PFM MiG-21PFM MiG-21 SPS MiG-21F-13 MiG-21PFM/SPS MiG-21PFM/SPS MiG-21PF MiG-21FL MiG-21F MiG-21F MiG-21F-13 MiG-21PF MiG-21FL MiG-21 PFM MiG-21 PFM Czechoslovakian AF Czechoslovakian AF Czechoslovakian AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte Polish Air Force Finnish AF Polish Air Force Czechoslovakian AF Czechoslovakian AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte Indian AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte DDR Luftstreitkrfte Czechoslovakian AF Czechoslovakian AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte Indian Air Force DDR Luftstreitkrfte Czechoslovakian AF Polish Air Force Polish Air Force Hungarian AF Czechoslovakian AF Indian AF Hungarian AF Hungarian AF Czechoslovakian AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte DDR Luftstreitkrfte Hungarian AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte DDR Luftstreitkrfte DDR Luftstreitkrfte Bulgarian AF Hungarian AF Polish Air Force DDR Luftstreitkrfte Polish Air Force DDR Luftstreitkrfte DDR Luftstreitkrfte Czechoslovakian AF Czechoslovakian AF Hungarian AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte Czechoslovakian AF Hungarian AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte Bulgarian AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte DDR Luftstreitkrfte DDR Luftstreitkrfte Czechoslovakian AF Czechoslovakian AF Czechoslovakian AF Polish Air Force Polish Air Force DDR Luftstreitkrfte Hungarian AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte DDR Luftstreitkrfte Hungarian AF Indian AF Czechoslovakian AF Czechoslovakian AF Hungarian AF Hungarian AF Indian AF Polish Air Force Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown Unknown Fatal (2) Nonfatal Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Unknown Unknown Nonfatal Fatal (1) Nonfatal Nonfatal Unknown Unknown Nonfatal Fatal (1) Nonfatal Unknown Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Unknown Unknown Fatal (1) Unknown Unknown Unknown Fatal (1) Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Fatal (1) Unknown Unknown Fatal (1) Nonfatal Fatal (1) Nonfatal Fatal (2) Unknown Unknown Nonfatal Nonfatal Unknown Nonfatal Nonfatal Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Nonfatal Nonfatal Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Fatal (1) Unknown Nonfatal Fatal (1) Unknown Fatal (1) Unknown Unknown Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Unknown Unknown Unknown
Attachment 5
Unknown Unknown Unknown Crash Landing Engine Failure Unknown LOC Pilot Disorientation Unknown Unknown LOC on Landing - Overturned Unknown Brake Failure During Landing (Hit Airfield Structure) (AND) Hard Landing Gear Failure Runway Excursion st Mid-Air (1 Aircarft) nd Mid-Air (2 Aircarft) Overrun Landing Gear Failure Afterburner Failure During Take-Off Mechanical Failure Undershoot - (Emergency Landing) Mechanical Failure-Crash Landed 400 Meters Short of the Runway Flew Into the Ground After Take-Off Flew Into the Ground Unknown Mechanical Failure Aborted Take-Off Overrun Unknown Unknown Mechanical Failure Hit the Ground Flight Controls Failure Unknown Mechanical Failure Premature Gear Retraction (AND) Lightning Strike (One Pilot Did Not Survive the Ejection) Unknown Unknown In-Flight Explosion Failed Ejection Engine Failure on Take-Off Flew Into the Ground LOC on Approach (Aircraft Flew on for 20 Miles) Mechanical Failure Mechanical Failure Unknown Unknown (Night Flight) Overrun Brake Failure Mechanical Failure Unknown Unknown LOC on Turn to Final LOC on landing - Overturned Mechanical Failure Mechanical Failure Mechanical Failure Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Ground Collision with AN-2 Engine Failure (Fuel Contamination) - Parachute Failed to Open Unknown Unknown Mid-Air (1st Aircraft) Mid-Air (2nd Aircraft) Unknown Unknown Pilot Disorientation Unknown Unknown
Page 5-14

959. 960. 961. 962. 963. 964. 965. 966. 967. 968. 969. 970. 971. 972. 973. 974. 975. 976. 977. 978. 979. 980. 981. 982. 983. 984. 985. 986. 987. 988. 989. 990. 991. 992. 993. 994. 995. 996. 997. 998. 999. 1000. 1001. 1002. 1003. 1004. 1005. 1006. 1007. 1008. 1009. 1010. 1011. 1012. 1013. 1014. 1015. 1016. 1017. 1018. 1019. 1020. 1021. 1022. 1023. 1024. 1025. 1026. 1027. January 23, 1968 January 22, 1968 January 22, 1968 1968 December 21, 1967 December 7, 1967 October 12, 1967 October 10, 1967 October 5, 1967 September 28, 1967 September 27, 1967 September 21, 1967 September 7, 1967 August 31, 1967 August 18, 1967 August 16, 1967 August 11, 1967 August 7, 1967 July 27, 1967 July 20, 1967 July 14, 1967 June 19, 1967 June 19, 1967 June 7, 1967 June 1967 May 13, 1967 May 11, 1967 April 17, 1967 April 17, 1967 April 7, 1967 April 4, 1967 March 8, 1967 March 1967 January 28, 1967 November 30, 1966 November 9, 1966 October 22, 1966 October 14, 1966 September 13, 1966 September 5, 1966 June 30, 1966 June 30, 1966 June 23, 1966 June 28, 1966 June 1, 1966 June 3, 1966 May 20, 1966 May 5, 1966 May 5, 1966 May 2, 1966 February 23, 1966 February 23, 1966 December 4, 1965 October 13, 1965 October 13, 1965 October 12, 1965 August 30, 1965 August 23, 1965 August 13, 1965 July 27, 1965 June 30, 1965 June 25, 1965 June 23, 1965 June 23, 1965 May 25, 1965 April 18, 1965 February 26, 1965 February 3, 1965 January 16, 1965 MiG-21 PFM MiG-21F-13 MiG-21PF MiG-21F MiG-21F-13 MIG-21 SPS MiG-21 F-13 MiG-21F MiG-21F-13 MiG-21PF MiG-21 F-13 MiG-21 SPS MiG-21F-13 MiG-21F-13 MiG-21F-13 MiG-21 F-13 MIG-21 PFM MIG-21 SPS MiG-21F-13 MiG-21F MiG-21F-13 MiG-21PFM MiG-21PF MiG-21F-13 MiG-21F MiG-21U MiG-21F-13 MiG-21F-13 MiG-21PF MiG-21PF MiG-21 PFM MiG-21 F-13 MiG-21US MiG-21PF MiG-21F MiG-21U MiG-21 F-13 MIG-21 PFM MiG-21F-13 MiG-21PF MiG-21F-13 MiG-21PF MiG-21F-13 MiG-21PF MiG-21F MiG-21PF MiG-21F-13 MIG-21 PFM MIG-21 PFM MiG-21F-13 MiG-21 F-13 MiG-21PF MiG-21PF MiG-21F-13 MiG-21 F-13 MiG-21 PFM MiG-21PF MiG-21F MiG-21 F-13 MiG-21 F-13 MIG-21 PFM MIG-21 PFM MiG-21F-13 MiG-21 F-13 MiG-21 PFM MiG-21 F-13 MiG-21 F-13 MiG-21 F-13 MiG-21F-13 Polish Air Force Polish Air Force Polish Air Force Indonesian AF Hungarian AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte DDR Luftstreitkrfte Czechoslovakian AF Hungarian AF Polish Air Force DDR Luftstreitkrfte DDR Luftstreitkrfte Hungarian AF Hungarian AF Hungarian AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte DDR Luftstreitkrfte DDR Luftstreitkrfte DDR Luftstreitkrfte Czechoslovakian AF Hungarian AF Polish Air Force Czechoslovakian AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte Czechoslovakian AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte Hungarian AF Polish Air Force Polish Air Force DDR Luftstreitkrfte Polish Air Force Polish Air Force Soviet Air Force Polish Air Force Czechoslovakian AF Indian AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte DDR Luftstreitkrfte Hungarian AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte Polish Air Force Polish Air Force Hungarian AF Bulgarian AF Czechoslovakian AF Polish Air Force Hungarian AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte DDR Luftstreitkrfte Hungarian AF Polish Air Force Soviet Air Force Czechoslovakian AF Polish Air Force Polish Air Force DDR Luftstreitkrfte Czechoslovakian AF Czechoslovakian AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte DDR Luftstreitkrfte DDR Luftstreitkrfte DDR Luftstreitkrfte Polish Air Force Polish Air Force DDR Luftstreitkrfte DDR Luftstreitkrfte Czechoslovakian AF Romanian AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte Unknown Fatal (1) Unknown Unknown Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Nonfatal Unknown Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Nonfatal Fatal (1) Unknown Nonfatal Unknown Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Fatal (1) Unknown Fatal (1) Unknown Unknown Nonfatal Unknown Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Unknown Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Unknown Fatal (1) Nonfatal Fatal Unknown Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Unknown Unknown Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Unknown Fatal (1) Unknown Nonfatal Nonfatal Unknown Unknown Fatal (1) Unknown Unknown Fatal (1) Nonfatal Unknown Unknown Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Unknown Fatal (1) Nonfatal Unknown Nonfatal Fatal (1) Nonfatal
Attachment 5
Unknown Autopilot Failure Spatial Disorientation Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Engine Failure Unknown Unknown Too Low on Instrument Approach Unknown Spatial Disorientation Unknown Engine Fire After Landing Unknown Unknown Mechanical Failure Bird Strike Ground Accident Inadvertent Firing of the Pyros on Fuel Tank Engine Failure Unknown Unknown Engine Failure Overrun Aborted Take-Off Mechanical Failure LOC Near the Ground Hydraulic Failure Unknown CFIT Brake Failure on Landing - Overrun Unknown Failed to Set Proper Climb Gradient Hit Trees Engine Fire on Take-Off Abort - Overrun LOC on Landing Did Not Survive Ejection Mechanical Failure LOC on Landing Mechanical Failure Engine Failure Unknown Exploded on Start-Up Unknown Unknown Unknown Stall Unknown Spatial Disorientation Unknown Mechanical Failure Fuel Starvation Unknown Unknown Afterburner Failure After Take-Off Mechanical Failure Unknown Hydraulic Failure Ejection Seat Malfunctioned Engine Failure (Engine Seized) Mechanical Failure Unknown Mechanical Failure Engine Failure Engine Failure (Engine Seized) (Ejection Seat Malfunction) Mechanical Failure Unknown Engine Failure Engine Failure (Engine Seized) Unknown Undershoot (Landed Short) Unknown Engine Failure Crash Landing
Page 5-15

1028. 1029. 1030. 1031. 1032. 1033. 1034. 1035. 1036. 1037. 1038. 1039. 1040. 1041. 1042. 1043. 1044. 1045. 1046. 1047. 1048. 1049. 1050. 1051. 1052. 1053. 1054. 1055. 1056. 1057. 1058. 1059. 1060. 1061. 1062. 1063. 1064. 1065. 1066. 1067. 1068. 1069. 1070. 1071. 1072. 1073. 1074. 1075. 1076. 1077. 1078. 1079. 1080. 1081. 1082. 1083. 1084. 1085. 1086. 1087. 1088. 1089. 1090. 1091. 1092. 1093. 1094. 1095. 1096. January 15, 1965 December 13, 1964 December 1964 October 1, 1964 September 29, 1964 September 26, 1964 September 19, 1964 August 4, 1964 July 14, 1964 July 10, 1964 May 20, 1964 February 5, 1964 February 12, 1964 1964 1964 1964 1964 1964 1964 1964 1964 1964 1964 1964 1964 1964 1964 1964 1964 1964 1964 1964 1964 December 21, 1963 December 21, 1963 November 29, 1963 November 20, 1963 November 20, 1963 September 30, 1963 September 13, 1963 August 12, 1963 May 16, 1963 March 25, 1963 January 7, 1963 May 28, 1958 1961 1961 1961 1961 1961 1961 1961 1965 1967 1970 1971 1972 1974 1975 1976 1978 1978 1980 1982 1982 1984 1985 1985 1985 MiG-21F-13 MiG-21 F-13 MiG-21F MiG-21 F-13 MiG-21 F-13 MiG-21F MiG-21F-13 MiG-21F-13 MiG-21F-13 MiG-21F-13 MiG-21F MiG-21F-13 MiG-21F-13 MiG-21F MiG-21F MiG-21F MiG-21F MiG-21F MiG-21F MiG-21F MiG-21F MiG-21F MiG-21F MiG-21F MiG-21F MiG-21F MiG-21F MiG-21F MiG-21U MiG-21F MiG-21F MiG-21F MiG-21F-13 MiG-21F MiG-21F MiG-21 F-13 MiG-21F-13 MiG-21F-13 MiG-21 F-13 MiG-21 F-13 MiG-21F-13 MiG-21F-13 MiG-21F-13 MiG-21F Ye-6 MiG-21F MiG-21F MiG-21F MiG-21F MiG-21F MiG-21F MiG-21F MiG-21F MiG-21F-13 MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 F-7 MiG-21PF MiG-21 MiG-21bis MiG-21 MiG-21bis MiG-21US MiG-21bis MiG-21bis MiG-21US MiG-21 MiG-21 DDR Luftstreitkrfte DDR Luftstreitkrfte Czechoslovakian AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte Romanian AF Czechoslovakian AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte DDR Luftstreitkrfte Hungarian AF Hungarian AF Finnish AF Hungarian AF Hungarian AF Soviet Air Force Soviet Air Force Soviet Air Force Soviet Air Force Soviet Air Force Soviet Air Force Soviet Air Force Soviet Air Force Soviet Air Force Soviet Air Force Soviet Air Force Soviet Air Force Soviet Air Force Soviet Air Force Soviet Air Force Soviet Air Force Soviet Air Force Soviet Air Force Soviet Air Force Syrian AF Indian AF Indian AF Polish Air Force Polish Air Force Polish Air Force DDR Luftstreitkrfte DDR Luftstreitkrfte Hungarian AF Hungarian AF DDR Luftstreitkrfte DDR Luftstreitkrfte Soviet Air Force Soviet Air Force Soviet Air Force Soviet Air Force Soviet Air Force Soviet Air Force Soviet Air Force Soviet Air Force Indian Air Force Hungarian AF Yugoslav AF Yugoslav AF Yugoslav AF Albanian AF Bulgarian AF Nigerian AF Yugoslav AF Nigerian AF Yugoslav AF Bulgarian AF Yugoslav AF Ethiopian AF Bulgarian AF Nigerian AF Nigerian AF Nonfatal Nonfatal Unknown Nonfatal Fatal (1) Unknown Nonfatal Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Fatal (1) Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Nonfatal Nonfatal Unknown Fatal (1) Unknown Unknown Nonfatal Fatal (1) Nonfatal Fatal (1) Fatal (4) Fatal (1) Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Nonfatal Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Unknown Unknown Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Unknown Nonfatal Fatal (1) Unknown Fatal (1) Fatal (1)
Attachment 5
Overrun on Landing Barrier (AND) Flight Controls Failure (Aileron Failure) Unknown Mechanical Failure Unknown Unknown Aborted Take-Off Due to Power Loss (AND) Canopy Opened During Take-Off Unknown Engine Failure Engine Failure Unknown CFIT in Snow Storm st Unknown (1 Aircraft) nd Engine Failure (2 Aircraft) rd Unknown (3 Aircraft) th Engine Failure (4 Aircraft) th Unknown (5 Aircraft) th Engine Failure (6 Aircraft) th Unknown (7 Aircraft) Engine Failure (8th Aircraft) Unknown (9th Aircraft) Engine Failure (10th Aircraft) Unknown (11th Aircraft) Engine Failure (12th Aircraft) Unknown (13th ircraft) Engine Failure (14th Aircraft) Unknown (15th Aircraft) Engine Failure (16th Aircraft) Unknown (17th Aircraft) Engine Failure (18th Aircraft) th Unknown (19 Aircraft) Engine Failure Mid-Air (1st Aircraft) Mid-Air (2nd Aircraft) Unknown CFIT Unknown Engine Failure (Engine Seized) Engine Failure Engine Failure Failed Ejection Engine Failure Engine Problems Inadvertent Ground Ejection on the Ramp Aircraft Runaway During Engine Run, 4 Ground Crew Killed Engine Failure Hydraulic Failure Surge Emergency Landing Unknown (1st Aircraft) Engine Failure (2nd Aircraft) Unknown (3rd Aircraft) Engine Failure (4th Aircraft) th Unknown (5 Aircraft) Engine Failure (6th Aircraft) Unknown (7th Aircraft) Unknown Engine Fire on Take-Off Abort Unknown Unknown (Did Not Survive Ejection) Collision With Parachute (Did Not Survive Ejection) Mechanical Failure Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown (Pilot Did Not Survive Ejection) Hard Landing Unknown Unknown (Training Flight) Unknown Unknown (1st Aircraft) Unknown (2nd Aircraft)
Page 5-16

1097. 1098. 1099. 1100. 1101. 1102. 1103. 1104. 1105. 1106. 1107. 1108. 1109. 1110. 1111. 1112. 1113. 1114. 1115. 1116. 1117. 1985 1985 1985 1985 1985 1986 1987 1987 1988 1988 1988 1989 1989 1990 1996 1996 1996 1996 1997 1998 2001 J-7II J-7II J-7II J-7II J-7II MiG-21 MiG-21bis MiG-21bis MiG-21MF MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21bis MiG-21bis MiG-21bis MiG-21bis MiG-21 MiG-21bis MiG-21bis MiG-21U PLAAF PLAAF PLAAF PLAAF PLAAF Nigerian AF Yugoslav AF Yugoslav AF Bulgarian AF Nigerian AF Nigerian AF Nigerian AF Nigerian AF Bulgarian AF Polish Navy Polish Navy Ethiopian AF Indian AF Ethiopian AF Ethiopian AF Ethiopian AF Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Nonfatal Fatal (1) Nonfatal Nonfatal Unknown Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Nonfatal Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Unknown Fatal (1) Fatal (1) Fatal (2)
Attachment 5
Unknown (1st Aircraft) nd Unknown (2 Aircraft) Unknown (3rd Aircraft) th Unknown (4 Aircraft) Unknown (5th Aircraft) Unknown Engine Failure Unknown Unknown st Unknown (1 Aircraft) nd Unknown (2 Aircraft) st Unknown (1 Aircraft) nd Unknown (2 Aircraft) High Speed Maneuvering (Excessive AOA) st Unknown (1 Aircraft) nd Unknown (2 Aircraft) Runway Excursion Nozzle Failure (Gear Pinion) Unknown Hit trees During Low Level Training Flight Unknown
Page 5-17
Attachment 6
Attachment 6 Glossary and Abbreviations

8100-1 # AAIB A&P AAM A/B ABO AC ACMI AD ADM AEP AFM AFS AGC AIM AIP AIR-200 AIR-230 AloS ALQ AloS AOA AOPA AND AP APU ARFF ASI ATC ATF AVS CAA CAR CAS CFIT CFR CG (c.g.) CJAA Class A Mishap Conformity Inspection Record Degrees Pounds Aviation Accident Investigation Board (UK) Airframe & Powerplant (Mechanic) Air-to-Air Missile Afterburner Aviators Breathing Oxygen Advisory Circular Air Combat Maneuvering Instrumentation Airworthiness Directive Aeronautical Decision Making FAA Office of Aviation Policy Planning and Environment Airplane Flight Manual Flight Standards FAAs Office of the Chief Counsel Air Intercept Missile Aircraft Inspection Program FAA Production & Airworthiness Division FAA Airworthiness Branch Acceptable Level of Safety ECM Pod(s) Acceptable Level of Safety Angle of Attack Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association Aircraft Not Destroyed Air Publication Auxiliary Power Unit Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting Aviation Safety Inspector Air Traffic Control Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives FAA Aviation Safety (Line of Business Designator) Civil Aviation Authority Civil Air Regulations Close Air Support Control Flight into Terrain Code of Federal Regulations Center of Gravity Classic Jet Aircraft Association Accident Classification Used by USAF and U.S. Navy
Page 6-1
MiG-21 Airworthiness Certification CoA COS CP DAR DER DDR DHS DOD EAA ECM EEJ EO EOR EPR FAA FBO FCF FL FOD Form 700 Form 781 FMEA FSIMS FSDO Ft GA GAF Gsh-23/30 HAL Hg HUD IAI IAF IAS ICAO IFF IMC INOP IRAN IRST JATO JP-4/JP-5 KM-1 Kts
Attachment 6
Certificate of Airworthiness Continued Operational Safety Center of Pressure Designated Airworthiness Representative Designated Engineering Representative Deutsche Demokratische Republik (East Germany) Department of Homeland Security Department of Defense Experimental Aircraft Association Electronic Counter Measures Experimental Exhibition Jets Engineering Order End of Runway Engine Pressure Ratio Federal Aviation Administration Fixed Base Operator Functional Flight Check Flight Level Foreign Object Damage Aircraft Record (RAF) Aircraft Flight Data Record Failure Mode and Effects Analysis Flight Standards Information Management System Flights Standards District Office Feet General Aviation German Air Force MiG Aircraft 23/30 mm Cannon Hindustan Aeronautics Limited Mercury Heads Up Display Israel Aircraft Industries Indian Air Force Indicated Airspeed International Civil Aviation Organization Identification Friend or Foe Instrument Meteorological Conditions Inoperative Inspect and Repair as Necessary Infrared Search and Tracking Jet Assisted Take-Off (aka RATO Rocket Assisted Take-Off) Military Designations for Jet Fuels Soviet Ejection Seat Knots
MiG-21 Airworthiness Certification LABS Lb./lbs./lb. LOA LOC LOSA LOX Luftwaffe Mach Martin Baker MEL MIDO mm MTBF NASIC NATO NDI NDT NFE NTSB O2 OEM OKB ORM Pa PAO PIC PIO PLAAF PPH Psi q R&D RAC RAT RCR RHAW RM RN RPZ RSA RSC RTO RuAF MA-1A
Attachment 6
Low Altitude Bombing System Pounds Letter of Authorization Loss of Control Line Operations Safety Audits Liquid Oxygen German Air Force Speed of Sound Manufacturer of Ejection Seats Fitted to the Hunter Minimum Equipment List Manufacturing Inspection District Office Millimeters Mean Time Between Failure National Air and Space Intelligence Center North Atlantic Treaty Organization Non-Destructive Inspection Non-Destructive Testing Non-Federal Entities National Transportation Safety Board Oxygen Original Equipment Manufacturer Mikoyan-Gurevich Design Bureau Operational Risk Management Pascal Public Aircraft Operations Pilot in Command Pilot Induced Oscillations Peoples Liberation Army Air Force Pound per Hour Pounds per Square Inch Dynamic Pressure Research and Development Russian Aircraft Corporation Ram Air Turbine Runway Condition Reading Radar Homing and Warning Risk Management Royal Navy Runway Protection Zone Runway Safety Area Runway Surface Condition Rejected Take-Off Russian Air Force USAF Arresting Barrier
MiG-21 Airworthiness Certification MAF Major Service MRO NAS SAS SFA SIC SME SMS SOAP SRM TAM TBO TCTO TO T.O. TSA UHF UK USAF USN VFR W&B ZU-BEX
Attachment 6
Maintenance Action Form (U.S. Navy) RAF Equivalent of U.S. Depot Level Inspection Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul National Airspace System Stability Augmentation System Special Flight Authorization Second in Command Significant Military Equipment Safety Management Systems Spectrometric Oil Analysis Program Single Pilot Resource Management TbilAviaMsheni Aircraft Plant Time Between Overhauls Time Compliance Technical Orders Take-Off Technical Order Transportation Safety Administration Ultra High Frequency United Kingdom United States Air Force United States Navy Visual Flight Rules Weight and Balance South African Civil Registration for a Lightning T5 (Accident aircraft)
Page 6-4
Attachment 6
Attachment 6

Appendix 14-MiG-21 Airworthiness Certification

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Appendix 14-MiG-21 Airworthiness Certification

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Cover Photograph: Chris Lofting. Back Cover Photograph: USAF.

MiG-21 Airworthiness Certification Attachment 1 Overview of this Document Purpose

FAA Airworthiness Certification Branch (AIR-230)

MiG-21 Airworthiness Certification This Document

FAA Airworthiness Certification Branch (AIR-230)

Page Intentionally Left Blank

MiG-21 Airworthiness Certification

Attachment 2 Background Information on the MiG-21

FAA Airworthiness Certification Branch (AIR-230)

MiG-21 Airworthiness Certification

FAA Airworthiness Certification Branch (AIR-230)

MiG-21 Airworthiness Certification

MiG-21 Airworthiness Certification

MiG-21 Airworthiness Certification

MiG-21 Airworthiness Certification

FAA Airworthiness Certification Branch (AIR-230)

MiG-21 Airworthiness Certification

FAA Airworthiness Certification Branch (AIR-230)

MiG-21 Airworthiness Certification

MiG-21 Airworthiness Certification

FAA Airworthiness Certification Branch (AIR-230)

MiG-21 Airworthiness Certification

FAA Airworthiness Certification Branch (AIR-230)

MiG-21 Airworthiness Certification

FAA Airworthiness Certification Branch (AIR-230)

MiG-21 Airworthiness Certification

FAA Airworthiness Certification Branch (AIR-230)

MiG-21 Airworthiness Certification

FAA Airworthiness Certification Branch (AIR-230)

MiG-21 Airworthiness Certification

FAA Airworthiness Certification Branch (AIR-230)

MiG-21 Airworthiness Certification

MiG-21 Aircraft in the FAA Registry (January 2013)

Number of Aircraft Assigned

MIKOYAN GUREVICH MIKOYAN GUREVICH

CAMELOT AVIATION LLC MIKOYAN GUREVICH

05630IW 05602Q5 05602PQ 0560644

CAMELOT AVIATION LLC MIKOYAN GUREVICH MIKOYAN GUREVICH MIKOYAN GUREVICH

MIG-21UM MIG-21US MIG-21UT MIG-21VN

FAA Airworthiness Certification Branch (AIR-230)

MiG-21 Airworthiness Certification

FAA Airworthiness Certification Branch (AIR-230)

MiG-21 Airworthiness Certification

MiG-21 Airworthiness Certification

FAA Airworthiness Certification Branch (AIR-230)

MiG-21 Airworthiness Certification

FAA Airworthiness Certification Branch (AIR-230)

MiG-21 Airworthiness Certification

FAA Airworthiness Certification Branch (AIR-230)

MiG-21 Airworthiness Certification

FAA Airworthiness Certification Branch (AIR-230)

MiG-21 Airworthiness Certification

FAA Airworthiness Certification Branch (AIR-230)

MiG-21 Airworthiness Certification

FAA Airworthiness Certification Branch (AIR-230)

MiG-21 Airworthiness Certification

FAA Airworthiness Certification Branch (AIR-230)

MiG-21 Airworthiness Certification

FAA Airworthiness Certification Branch (AIR-230)

MiG-21 Airworthiness Certification

FAA Airworthiness Certification Branch (AIR-230)

MiG-21 Airworthiness Certification