PROCESSSAFETY

By Ken Bingham and Scott Lawson

42 | June 2007 | PROCESSWest

Flir-IPP&T.Full.Page.May18

ith the Western Canadian economy booming, particularly the oil and gas sector, many hydrocarbon processing facilities are trying to increase production to meet rising demand. These plants, initially designed and engineered, sometimes decades ago, to deliver a specific level of production, are being expanded or revamped in some way. When new gas production sources are tied into a gas plant, for example, the existing pipelines and processing equipment face the risk of overpressure in excess of design capacity. This may result in the unplanned release of hydrocarbons into the atmosphere via a triggering of a mechanical relief device such as a PSV (pressure safety valve), the undesirable burning of these hydrocarbons through the flare system or the worst case scenario of a rupture, fire and explosion. With the adoption of various standards including ASME, API, and the performance based, non prescriptive standards IEC 61508 and IEC 61511, conventional thinking is evolving to include the application of high reliability safety instrumented systems (SIS) to replace and lessen the need for additional PSVs and expanded flare systems. HIPPS, an abbreviation for high integrity pressure protection system, is a specific application of a SIS designed in accordance with IEC 61508 which is growing in popularity in Western Canadian. With HIPPS, the protection against overpressure is achieved by quickly isolating the source causing the overpressure, as compared to conventional relief systems where the overpressure is relieved to atmosphere. A typical HIPPS system includes a SIL rated logic solver (PES - programmable electronic system), input sensors (typically three pressure sensors (PIT) on the same process variable), and final elements (typically at least two actuators/safety shut-off valves). See Figure A. The logic solver monitors the sensors, compares the value of the process against predetermined trip points, and trips the final end elements (valves) within a predefined time. If any two out of three (2oo3) sensors reach the trip value of the process variable, the logic solver will cause the valves to close (1oo2). The valve closing isolates the downstream piping and prevents overpressure,

HiPPS
potential rupture and loss of containment. The standards require that on loss of power, all equipment defaults to a safe state where the outputs are de-energized to trip and the valves are designed to fail to a safe state. Situations where facility operators have used
Figure A: Typical HIPPS architecture. Note: A HIPPS will often regress to 1oo2 voting if one of the three input sensors fault.

High Integrity Pressure Protection Systems

...for cost-effective risk reduction

and the standards governing its use, instrument and valve manufacturers now provide equipment with TV approved SIL ratings in accordance with the same IEC standards. Using SIL rated equipment can make the design and engineering of HIPPS systems relatively straightforward, once the amount of risk reduction required is understood. ACM recently completed a HIPPS project for a senior E&P company on one of their Western Canadian plants undergoing expansion. For this project, the desire for increased production resulted in the need to increase processing capacity and required twinning the free water knock outs on the plant inlet. Initially, a risk assessment, following the HAZOP (Hazards and Operability) method, identified that either the existing flare system needed expansion or an instrument protection system was required to prevent overpressure scenario. Further safeguarding analysis using the LOPA (Layer of Protection Analysis) method identified a HIPPS system as a technically viable risk reduction solution to protect against overpressure. It was also much cheaper than expanding the flare system. Once the amount of risk reduction required had been identified, a critical step as per the IEC standards, a HIPPS system was designed, engineered, installed and commissioned. The final design provided a local HMI for maintenance staff to monitor the HIPPS operation and communication to the plant DCS via ethernet. It also incorporated a high level of diagnostics on the sensors and end elements. Hardware selection criterion including being field-proven and having a TV approved SIL rating. The E&P's operations and maintenance staff was then trained in the application and procedures developed. This HIPPS solution enabled the company to achieve their aggressive production targets safely without expensive expanPW sion of the flare system.

HIPPS systems include: Piping spec breaks - a spec break indicates a change in maximum operating pressure and also a potential point of over pressure due to downstream blockage (i.e. a valve tripping closed or a compressor tripping off downstream of pipe spec break can result in overpressure of the low pressure side of the pipe spec break) Bullets and spheres - liquid storage facilities require protection against loss of containment where venting to atmosphere is not acceptable Flare systems - undersized flare systems or those which must be re-licensed by the Alberta Energy and Utilities Board if expanded New processing equipment - where it is integrated into existing systems which could create a potentially hazardous situation caused by the high pressures and temperatures needed to push more fluids through existing piping and equipment or transfer more heat with higher flow rates Safety instrumented systems like HIPPS are increasingly becoming a preferred risk mitigation solution based on their cost effectiveness and ease of implementation. On processing plants, HIPPS can eliminate the need to upsize the flare system and potentially replace it. At the wellhead or pressure source, a HIPPS system allows the downstream piping to be lower pressure rated. Furthermore, with the evolution of HIPPS

Readers can contact the authors, Ken Bingham and Scott Lawson of ACM Facility Safety, a division of ACM Automation Inc. for more information by email: ken.bingham@acm.ab.ca or scott.lawson@acm.ab.ca and by phone at 403-264-9637.

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