Workers’ Compensation
Court of Appeals
July through September 2007
Case summaries published are
those prepared by the WCCA
Causation
Evidence – Expert Medical Opinion
Substantial evidence, including lay witness testimony and the adequately founded opinion of the
independent medical examiner, supports the compensation judge’s determination that the employee
did not sustain a work-related pneumothorax injury in December 2004.
Affirmed.
Causation
Substantial evidence supports the compensation judge’s finding that the employee’s work-related
right shoulder injury was not a substantial contributing cause of the employee’s inability to work
overtime hours and resulting decreased earning capacity.
Affirmed
Where all issues before the compensation judge in the current proceeding were issues of medical
benefits left open by a previous full, final, and complete settlement, where there was no petition for
attorney fees yet before the judge, where the judge awarded payment of some of the medical
expenses at issue to two intervenors and did not in any way support her finding denying attorney
fees, the compensation judge’s apparently legal conclusion that the employee’s attorney was “not
entitled to attorney’s fees on payments made to intervenors” was reversible error.
Reversed.
Summaries of Decisions
Where it is asserted that an insurer provided coverage for a joint employer of a Minnesota resident
injured out-of-state, the insurer is properly joined as a party to the pending case.
Affirmed.
Where the issue on appeal had to do with the employee’s repeated noncompliance with discovery
requests and court orders and not with the nature of the employers’ and insurers’ defenses, and where
the employee had clearly been afforded more than ample notice and opportunity to respond to the
judge’s orders prior to the judge’s dismissal of her claim, the compensation judge’s order dismissing
the employee’s claim with prejudice, after the claim had not progressed seven years after it was first
filed and eleven years after the alleged injury, was neither factually unreasonable nor legally
erroneous.
Affirmed.
Substantial evidence supports the compensation judge’s findings that the work offered did not meet
the employee’s work restrictions and that the employee did not unreasonably refuse a written job
offer.
Affirmed.
Where the employee had worked for the employer as an appliance repairman for more than 19 years
prior to his work-related specific knee injury in 1999, where the employee had been working for the
employer at what was essentially a desk job from 2000 to 2005, during which period his specific
knee injury had resolved, the court concluded that the employee’s Gillette injury claim in 2005 could
not be construed so narrowly as to be alleging trauma cumulative over only the past five years of the
employee’s employment, and the compensation judge’s conclusion that the employee’s deteriorated
knee condition in 2005 was not work-related was remanded for reconsideration.
D-2 • COMPACT • November 2007 *This case is on appeal to the Minnesota Supreme Court.
Summaries of Decisions
Where the employee was injured in Michigan, the compensation judge erred in relying on Minnesota
Statutes § 176.041, subd. 4, and Pauli v. Pneumatic Systems, Inc., 328 N.W.2d 743, 35 W.C.D. 551
(Minn. 1983), in dismissing the employee’s claims in Minnesota.
Reversed.
Evidence – Privilege
Minnesota Statutes § 176.138(a)
The compensation judge did not err by sustaining the employee’s objection to the employer’s attempt
to elicit the employee’s authorization to solicit a medical opinion report from the employee’s treating
physician under Minnesota Statutes § 176.138(a).
Causation
Substantial evidence, including expert opinion, adequately supported the compensation judge’s
decision that the employee’s erectile dysfunction was causally related to his work-related low back
condition.
Affirmed.
An injured worker is not forever bound to his employer in order to retain his entitlement to benefits,
and, where the employee was subject to restrictions related to his work injury at all times during the
period of this claim, the fact that the employee accepted an early retirement incentive from his
employer while still physically able to perform his post-injury job with the employer was not
relevant to the question of whether the employee’s loss of earning capacity in his post-retirement job
was causally related to the work injury, and the compensation judge’s award of temporary partial
disability benefits was not clearly erroneous and unsupported by substantial evidence.
Rehabilitation – Eligibility
That rehabilitation is “necessary” in a case does not mean that it is “indispensable,” only that it will
materially assist the injured employee in restoring his capacity to earn a livelihood, and, where it was
supported by the opinion of a vocational expert, the compensation judge’s award of rehabilitation
D-3 • COMPACT • November 2007
Summaries of Decisions
benefits was not clearly erroneous and unsupported by substantial evidence, notwithstanding the fact
that the employee had already, without the aid of professional assistance, achieved his goal of
obtaining full-time post-injury employment.
Affirmed.
Notice of Injury
Where the employee testified that he was treated by the employer with a splint and taping for a right
hand injury in 1978 and again for a left wrist injury in 1979, where there was an employer’s record
of his being treated with taping for the wrist injury in 1979, where the employee’s testimony was
consistent with details of the history that he had given to a doctor two years before hearing, and
where there was expert medical opinion supporting a causal connection between the 1978 and 1979
splintings and tapings and the employee’s eventual development of latent Dupuytren’s contracture
bilaterally, the compensation judge’s conclusion that the employee gave proper notice of injury
related to his 2003 claim to benefits based on the Dupuytren’s contracture was not clearly erroneous
and unsupported by substantial evidence.
Where there was no basis for concluding that treatment for the employee’s 1978 and 1979 hand and
wrist injuries with taping and splinting was not “meaningful” treatment, was not treatment
voluntarily provided for an admitted work injury, and was not treatment for an injury precipitating
the Dupuytren’s contracture condition for which the employee sought benefits, and where the judge’s
decision was not otherwise unreasonable, the compensation judge’s conclusion that the statute of
limitations was tolled by the 1978 and 1979 treatment relative to the employee’s 2003 claim for
benefits was not clearly erroneous and unsupported by substantial evidence.
The jurisdiction of the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals is “limited to the issues raised by
the parties in the notice of appeal,” Minnesota Statutes § 176.421, subd. 6; an appealing party’s brief
on appeal may address only issues raised in that party’s notice of appeal, Minnesota Rules part
9800.0900, subp. 1; and an issue raised for the first time on appeal is not properly before the court
and will not be addressed, Malinoski v. North American Cable Sys., slip op. (W.C.C.A. Dec. 14,
D-4 • COMPACT • November 2007
Summaries of Decisions
1989). Where there was no reference to issues of apportionment or credit related to the employee’s
1980 knee injury either in the transcript of hearing or in the Notice of Appeal or in the compensation
judge’s Findings and Order, issues of apportionment or credit were not proper subjects for the court’s
review and were not addressed.
Where the employee’s claim for wage replacement during several years beginning decades earlier
was supported by tax and other financial records and by the employee’s testimony as to his job
search, and where the employer and insurer offered no evidence to rebut the employee’s claim that
his earning capacity was reflected in his actual earnings, the compensation judge’s award of
temporary partial disability benefits was not clearly erroneous and unsupported by substantial
evidence.
Earning Capacity
Job Search
Where the employee’s tax records reflected minimal earnings during the years in question, and where
the employee offered minimal testimony regarding his efforts to find work during those years, the
compensation judge’s denial of wage replacement benefits for three years in the early 1990s for
which the employee claimed wage replacement in 2003 was not clearly erroneous and unsupported
by substantial evidence, notwithstanding the fact that the employer and insurer presented no
evidence to rebut the employee’s claim that his actual earnings reflected his earning capacity.
Affirmed.
Where the employee was working full time, at a wage loss and with significant restrictions related to
his injury, and where there was no evidence of higher-paying work available to the employee, no
evidence that the employee refused higher-paying work, and no evidence that the employee failed to
cooperate with rehabilitation efforts during the period in question, substantial evidence did not
support the compensation judge’s denial of temporary partial disability benefits.
Reversed.
The compensation judge’s orders denying a motion to dismiss a claim petition on grounds that the
claim is barred by res judicata and denying an evidentiary motion are not appealable.
Appeal dismissed.
Where the requirements of Minnesota Statutes § 176.042, subd. 2, were not all met, the compensation
judge reasonably concluded that the petitioner was an employee of the subcontractor and was not an
independent contractor at the time of his injury.
Substantial evidence supports the compensation judge’s determination that the petitioner and
subcontractor were not working in a partnership relationship, either formally or in the nature of an
“ostensible partnership” or a partnership by estoppel as described by Minnesota Statutes § 323A.0308.
Subdivision 1 of 176.042 applies where the individual claiming to have employee status has been
injured, and does not apply to determine a subcontractor’s relationship with a general contractor.
Substantial evidence supports the compensation judge’s findings that the subcontractor was not an
employee of the general contractor at the time of the petitioner’s injury.
The wording of the statute is mandatory and requires an uninsured employer to pay a penalty of 65
percent of all workers’ compensation benefits paid on its behalf to an injured employee. The statute
does not designate a general contractor as an “employer” for purposes of paying the 65 percent
penalty to the Special Compensation Fund, and although the general contractor here is liable for
payment of workers’ compensation benefits, the general contractor is not required to pay the 65
percent penalty to the Special Compensation Fund.
Minnesota Statutes § 176.215, subd. 1, provides for a lien in favor of the Special Compensation
Fund against the general contractor, as the general contractor is liable for payment of benefits in
view of the uninsured status of the subcontractor. Minnesota Statutes § 176.215, subd. 2, provides
the general contractor with a subrogation interest against the subcontractor, for all workers’
compensation benefits that the general contractor has been ordered to pay.
Minnesota Statutes § 176.183, subd., 2, provides for a lien in favor of the Special Compensation
Fund against the uninsured employer for the 65 percent penalty imposed on the employer.
Given her previous unappealed findings and our instructions on remanding the matter, the
compensation judge erred in concluding that injuries the employee sustained in Texas constituted a
superseding, intervening cause of the employee’s disability, including wage loss, need for treatment,
and permanent partial disability.
Causation
Apportionment – Permanent Partial Disability
Where a Minnesota work injury and Texas work injuries were all substantial contributing causes of
the employee’s permanent partial disability, and no specific permanency rating was assigned solely
to the Texas injuries, the employee was entitled to benefits for the full extent of his permanent partial
disability from the Minnesota employer, with credit for permanent partial disability benefits paid, if
any, by the Texas employer.
Reversed.
Retraining
Substantial evidence, including expert vocational opinion, supported the finding that the employee’s
proposed retraining plan was not reasonable or necessary.
Rehabilitation Expenses
Substantial evidence supported the compensation judge’s determination as to the amounts the
employee had proven that she paid for the skill enhancement seminars for which reimbursement was
awarded.
This court need not consider whether the compensation judge’s refusal to admit the employee’s
proposed post-hearing exhibits was an abuse of discretion, where the admission of the exhibits
would not have materially changed the results in the case.
Intervention
Minnesota Statutes § 176.361
Where the employee’s training seminar expenses were partly paid by her and partly by a post-injury
employer, but her contract with the post-injury employer did not require her to repay training
seminar expenses it paid on her behalf, the post-injury employer did not have a right to intervene in
the employee’s claim for reimbursement for those expenses.
Affirmed, as modified.
The doctrine of a superseding, intervening cause does not apply where an employee sustains a
reinjury or aggravation while performing work activities. Where the July 29, 2003, injury occurred
while working for the employer, the defense of a superseding, intervening cause cannot provide a
viable defense to liability for the admitted March 25, 2003, personal injury.
Substantial evidence supports the compensation judge’s award of a 5 percent permanent partial
disability to the thoracic spine as a result of the employee’s March 25, 2003, personal injury.
Where the compensation judge’s finding of permanent total disability is based, in part, upon medical
opinion which the judge rejected, and, in part, on medical opinion that concluded the employee’s
inability to work was not causally related to the personal injury; and where the restrictions and
limitations resulting from the work injury, and the effect of the employee’s work injury on his ability
to work are not clear from the judge’s decision, the findings relating to permanent total disability are
vacated and remanded to the compensation judge for reconsideration.
Where the medical records reflected that the employee’s subjective complaints remained at a high
level, that her pain continued, that her function had not increased significantly, and that her objective
findings were unchanged in the medical records, the compensation judge’s conclusion that the
employee’s physical therapy was not sufficiently effective in “maintaining functional status” to
entitle the employee to treatment beyond an additional twelve visits under Minnesota Rules Part
5221.6200, subp. 3B(2), was not clearly erroneous and unsupported by substantial evidence.
Substantial evidence, including expert medical opinion, supports the compensation judge’s denial of
approval for payment of expenses related to additional physical therapy.
Where the employee’s condition did not qualify for a permanency rating under the permanency rules,
the compensation judge did not err in accepting expert medical opinion to that effect, and the
compensation judge’s denial of the claim for permanent partial disability benefits is affirmed.
Affirmed.
An award of fees on appeal under Minnesota Statutes § 176.511 is not includable in the $13,000 cap
on attorney fees established under Minnesota Statutes § 176.081.
Reversed.
The employee has experienced an unanticipated substantial change in condition since an award on
stipulation was issued in 2001 and the employee’s petition to vacate is granted.
Causation
Substantial evidence supports the compensation judge’s finding that the employee’s carpal tunnel
syndrome continues to be a substantial contributing cause of the employee’s ongoing disability and
need for restrictions.
Affirmed.
Employment Relationship
Dependency Benefits
Where only the petitioner and not her deceased husband had been expressly hired by the alleged
employer to haul freight on the date at issue, where the parties stipulated that the deceased was given
permission to ride along with his wife but was expressly told that he must not drive, where the
alleged employer was aware of the deceased’s serious health issues, and where there was no
evidence that the deceased was being paid as a “ride-along helper” to the petitioner, the deceased’s
previous employment by the alleged employer was irrelevant, and the compensation judge’s
conclusion that the deceased was not an employee at the time of his fatal accident while driving as
his wife slept in the truck in the course of their delivery trip was not clearly erroneous and
unsupported by substantial evidence.
Affirmed.
Appeals – Record
Where no record was made of the hearing below on the employee’s counsel’s petition for attorney
fees, the findings and order must be vacated and the matter remanded for reconsideration.
Where the sole dispute involved ascertainable medical expenses, the employee’s attorney is entitled
to contingent attorney fees under the 25/20 statutory formula on medical benefits awarded. If this fee
is inadequate to reasonably compensate the employee’s attorney, an additional hourly fee may be
assessed. The employee has the burden of proving the claim for attorney fees, including submission
of exhibits establishing the amount of the medical expenses awarded.
The uninsured employer failed to establish grounds for vacating an award for a mutual mistake of
fact where any mistake was one of law and there was no showing of mutuality.
The Special Compensation Fund cannot be compelled to enter into a settlement agreement. Where
the employee sought only settlement of future medical expenses and made no claim for payment of
medical benefits, there was no justiciable controversy and the compensation judge properly
dismissed the employee’s claim petition.
Affirmed.
Where the employee’s QRC failed to provide the employer and insurer with relevant information
concerning the employee’s unpaid work activities, it was reasonable for the judge to conclude that
the employer and insurer had lost confidence in the QRC’s neutrality, justifying a change of QRCs in
the “best interest of the parties.”
Affirmed.
Causation
Causation – Pre-Existing Condition
Where it was not unreasonable for the employee himself, and so for the examining physician the
next day, to initially associate the employee’s symptoms with his pre-existing non-herniated low
back condition, and where the first medical report of a work-related mechanism of injury about a
month later, after symptoms had become more clearly radicular, had been already corroborated by
the employer’s First Report of Injury two weeks earlier, the compensation judge’s finding of primary
liability for a work-related injury was not clearly erroneous and unsupported by substantial evidence.
Where the treating doctor had found a “quite significant foot drop weakness” that had merely
“improved” since the “not complete” resorption of the employee’s herniated lumbar disc, and where
the employee had continuing very substantial radicular-like pain symptoms in his leg and there was
MRI evidence of continuing disc herniation, it was not unreasonable for the compensation judge to
conclude that the doctor’s foot-drop finding qualified as an “objective radicular finding” of “nerve
root specific muscle weakness in the lower extremity” under Minnesota Rules Part 5223.0390,
subpart 4E, and the judge’s award of compensation for a 13 percent whole-body impairment based
on that subpart and subpart 4E(1) of that rule, for persistence of symptoms, was not clearly
erroneous and unsupported by substantial evidence.
D-11 • COMPACT • November 2007
Summaries of Decisions
Where Minnesota Rules Part 5223.0390, subpart 3, required that, for a rating for lumbar pain
syndrome, there be symptoms of pain and stiffness substantiated by “persistent” objective clinical
findings, and where the employee had not had any treatment for his low back for nearly fourteen
months prior to his work-related lumbar disc herniation, the compensation judge’s denial of
apportionment of 10 percent of the employee’s 13 percent permanent partial disability rating to the
employee’s pre-existing lumbar pain syndrome was not clearly erroneous and unsupported by
substantial evidence.
Affirmed.
Substantial evidence, including the reports and opinions of the employer and insurer’s medical
experts, supports the finding that the employee’s February 2006 work injury was temporary and had
resolved by August 2007.
Affirmed.
Attorney Fees
Substantial evidence supports the compensation judge’s finding that permanent partial disability
voluntarily paid by the employer and insurer was not a disputed benefit, and that a fee award based
on it was not appropriate.
Affirmed.
A determination that the attorney’s hourly rate and time expended were reasonable does not
automatically entitle the attorney to the total fee claimed. Rather, a reasonable fee is to be
determined based on all of the factors listed in Irwin v. Surdyk’s Liquor, 599 N.W.2d 132, 59 W.C.D.
319 (Minn. 1999), and those factors need not be given equal weight.
Affirmed.
Causation
Substantial evidence in the form of MRI reports, treatment records, and the opinion of the
employee’s surgeons supports the compensation judge’s determination that the employee’s work
injury was a substantial contributing factor in the employee’s current condition and disability.
Substantial evidence supports the compensation judge’s determination that MMI had not been
reached before the date of hearing where the only evidence of MMI before that date was in an IME
report using a diagnosis not accepted by the compensation judge.
Job Search
Substantial evidence exists to support the compensation judge’s finding of a job search sufficient for
an award of temporary total disability benefits given the employee’s significant obstacles in finding
employment, and her cooperation with rehabilitation services.
Affirmed.
Minnesota
Supreme Court
July through September 2007
Case summaries published are
those prepared by the WCCA
• James E. Gluba, deceased by Lorraine Gluba v. Bitzan & Ohren Masonry and Grinnell
Mutual Group, A06-1849, July 26, 2007
S Y L LAB U S
Relator has not established that Minnesota Statutes § 176.101, subd. 5(2) (2006), violates the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection because he has failed to demonstrate that the statute’s
eligibility thresholds for certain workers’ compensation benefits (1) do not apply uniformly to all
injured workers; (2) do not reflect genuine and substantial distinctions among injured workers;
and (3) do not effectuate the purpose of the workers’ compensation law.
Affirmed.
Decision of the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals filed April 9, 2007, affirmed without
opinion.
• Mark J. Jeffrey v. Banana Republic, and American Home Assurance, administered by AIG
Claim Services, Inc., A07-1033, Aug. 21, 2007
Decision of the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals filed May 1, 2007, affirmed without
opinion.