A. Philip Randolph as a Charismatic Leader, 1925-1941 Author(s): William H. Harris Source: The Journal of Negro History, Vol.

64, No. 4 (Autumn, 1979), pp. 301-315 Published by: Association for the Study of African American Life and History, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2716940 . Accessed: 21/02/2011 09:39
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A. PHILIP RANDOLPH AS A CHARISMATIC LEADER, 1925-1941

William H. Harris* The historian August Meier has suggested that while A. Philip Randolph pioneered in mobilizing the black masses to protest for political and economic advancement, MartinLuther King, Jr. was the most charismaticindividualthe 1 Meieris rightin his assessment of King, but civil rightsmovementhas produced. no one has yet written about Randolph's charisma.2During his long and distinguished career Randolph combined charismatic qualities with effective use of publicity and propagandato propel himself to the center of American life. The public perceived him as brilliant and fearless. Yet his public militance did not carry over into private dealings. Inside, he was a mild man who avoided direct confrontation. The place to study Randolph'sleadershipstyle and to considerwhetherhe truly functioned as a charismaticfigure is the period duringwhich he developed as a national figure. As the historian Robert C. Tucker puts it, "When we study a
case . . . of charismatic leadership, we should go back to the beginnings of the

leader-personality's emergence as a leader, rather than start with the status achieved at the zenith of his career." 3 Thus, analysis of Randolph'swork with the Brotherhoodof Sleeping Car Porters (BSCP) (a period Randolphconsiders the foundation of his later success) suggests significant parallels between the two periods of his life.4 As we will see, Randolph's BSCP career demonstratesthe limits of charismaticleadershipand provides helpful insights into understanding the methods he would employ in later years. His agitated style in the BSCP prefigured his later role in the National Negro Congress and the March on WashingtonMovement. Charismatic leadershipmeans "a certainqualityof an individualpersonalityby which he is set apart as endowed with supernatural,superhuman,or at least specifically exceptional powers and qualities."5 Such leaders usually originate underconditionsof stress, show an absence of formalrules or routineadministration, reject rationaleconomic conduct, and usually prevailfor only short or intermittent periods. Moreover, charismatic leaders have the ability to issue statements clearly at variance with facts and have their words accepted as truth, and Such individuals they demonstrateat all times an air of personalincorruptibility.6 usually attain for themselves prestige and influence out of proportionto their achievements.

*WilliamH. Harrisis Associate Professorof History and,Associate Dean of the GraduateSchool, IndianaUniversity, Bloomington,Indiana.

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Randolphpossessed basic charismaticqualities. Handsome, almost exquisite in bearing,and a masterof the arts of oratoryand rhetoric,his speech had a hypnotic effect upon his audience. He carriedhimself with an air that exuded such confidence that opponents found it almost impossible to deny the wisdom of his arguments and supporters were loyal almost to his every word. So powerful was of Randolphas a speakerthat in 1926Roy Lancaster, nationalsecretary-treasurer the BSCP, instructed district leaders to take up collections at mass meetings before Randolphspoke because he was "sure to breakup any meeting" and send participantsscreaminginto the streets, too enthused to contributeto the cause.7 Yet despite his abilityto stimulatepeople, Randolphpossessed few routine skills. He moved in the public realm, stirringup debate on questions of black unionism and generatingpropagandato publicize his views and the goals of the BSCP. He left the daily operationsof the union to trusted lieutenantswho were loyal to him personally and to his ideas. Thus, the actual work of organizingand buildingthe BSCP was done not by Randolph,but by dedicatedunion leaders aroundthe country, the most important of whom was MiltonWebsterof Chicago.In truth, Randolphfunctionedmainlyas a symbolic figure and spokesman. He was in the tradition of those black leaders -they can be seen in the churchand black advancementorganizations,as well as in politics-whose influence has derived largely from rhetoric and personal presence. But despite his superbrhetoricalabilities and presence, Randolph was indecisive and prone to compromise. Indeed, the critic who complainedthat Randolphwanted to build a successful labor union simply on talk had a point.8 Earlyin 1925,portersin New York invited Randolphto addressa meetingof the Pullman Porters Athletic Association. He accepted and spoke to the group on trade unionism and on the porters' need to organize in order to improve their conditions at Pullman. Shortly thereafter Randolph met secretly with a small groupof these men and laid plans for a union of porters, and in August he chaired a mass meeting of porters and nonportersin Harlem. At that session, in which no attendancewas taken or votes recorded,the groupendorsed the idea of a porters' union, accepted Randolphas generalorganizer,and adoptedhis Messenger magazine as their official organ.9In the absence of a constitution, and given the strict rules of secrecy the union placed on its membership, Randolph embodied the BSCP and as general organizerhad unlimitedpowers to act to ensure the union's success. When the porters accepted Randolphas their leader, they did not get a man of proven leadershipability, or one experienced in trade unionism. Randolphwas already thirty-six years old in 1925, and, aside from the confidence he inspired, there was little in his backgroundthat would make him attractive to a group of workers thinking of starting a union. Indeed, in the view of one observer, he Born in CrescentCity, Florida, seemed a man "whose time had passed him by." 0o Randolphgrew up in Jacksonvilleand moved to New York City in 1911.He spent his earliest years in New York as a rovingbachelor, pursuinghis dreamof becoming an actor. He attendedclasses in economics and history at City College and the

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Rand School of Economics and eventually joined the Socialist Party. In 1917, Randolph joined anotheryoung Socialist, ChandlerOwen, in foundingMessenger magazine,a journalof radicalblack economic and social thought.The Messenger, which Langston Hughes later described as "God knows what," a magazinethat "reflected the policy of whoever paid best at the time," did well for a few years, but by 1925 its radicalism had faded and the magazine was experiencing deep I In 1925, Randolphneeded a job. financialtrouble." Randolphwas poorly thoughtof in some black circles. He carriedhimself with such pride and dignity that some people considered him haughty and aloof. The English accent he affected, full of "maasses and claasses," did not help matters. In the view of one critic, Randolph's problem was a "bootlet superioritycomplex." Moreover, some black spokemen distrusted him. Soon after the union's organizational drive got underway,one newspaperwrote that Randolphhad failed in everythinghe had tried to do, and added that "the path of failuresis said to be bedecked with shady deeds." Randolph, the claim went, was using the porters only to enhance sales of the Messenger. 12 Whateverthe criticisms, Randolphmoved quickly to create a nationalorganization of sleeping car porters and to personify what that union would be. Writing that "public opinionis the most powerfulweapon in America," he was convinced that a favorable image, especially among influentialwhites, was as importantto the success of the union as were porters. He spent much of his time tryingto line up supportfor the BSCP amongestablishedblack leaders and organizationsand in soliciting aid and money from liberal whites. For example, his first action was aimed not at bringingin porters, but ratherat attractingoutside financialsupport. In September 1925,he appealedto the GarlandFund, a New York based foundation that supportedradicaland unpopularcauses. In the name of the "biggest and most significantmovement amongNegro workers ever startedin America," Randolph asked for money not for organizationalwork among porters, but to subsidize the Messenger. He asked the Fund to "relieve the financialembarrassment of the publication [because] all porters [accepted it] as their mouthpiece." The Fund respondedfavorably,but made its check payable to the BSCP ratherthan to the Messenger or Randolph.13 Randolph's appeal to the GarlandFund was representativeof how he would function in coming years. He was to serve as a high moralforce who articulated the porters'aspirationsand demandsand served as a symbol of their struggle.The chore of bringingin members fell to his lieutenants. Within months he had put together a networkof agents across the country: Websterat Chicago, Dad Moore at Oakland,California,BenjaminSmith at Detroit and Pittsburgh,and E. J. Bradley in St. Louis. Except in rare cases, those men remained in their positions throughoutthe long strugglefor recognitionand displayed strongpersonalloyalty to Randolphand his ideas. Likewise, Randolphsecured money and endorsements from black and white groups and assembled a batteryof white legal and economic experts to work for the union, many of whom served without compensation.14

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Randolphhungeredfor publicityand respectabilityfor his strugglingunion, and believed that the only way the BSCP would succeed would be to maintaindiscussion of the porters' grievances at a high volume. He filled the Messenger and favorable newspapers with derogatorycomments about Pullman'slabor policies and punctuatedhis speeches and other writings with attacks against his opposition, black as well as white. He was particularly caustic towardporterswho would not immediatelyjoin the union, referringto them as "Uncle Toms" and in other uncomplimentaryterms. Black opponents of the union were "conscienceless crooked and corrupt, . . . mad dervishes" who used their "murderousfingers of graft and corruption"in efforts to destroy the union.15The strategy did not contribute much to recruitment, but it did gain press exposure for the union and marked Randolphas fearless and committed to his cause. If much of the press opposed Randolphand what he was doing, his style made it impossiblefor newspapers to ignore his activities. Indeed, their opposition only added to Randolph's reputation.Because his organizationwas weak and without tradition, Randolph was able to operate on a hit or miss basis, formulatingpolicy as he went along, projectinghimself as a man of initiative, creativity, and daring.16 BSCP leadersfaced two problems.One was how to achieve the specific goals of the organization,which requiredimpressingupon a largenumberof men what was to many the revolutionaryidea that they could improve their standardsof living throughcollective bargaining,to say nothingof easing their fear of Pullmanreprisals. Moreover,in 1925approximately12,000portersworkedfor Pullman,making the company the largest single employer of blacks in the United States. This fact had gained Pullmanwidespreadsupportamong Afro-Americanspokesmen. During the same years, blacks were generally hostile toward organized labor. The Brotherhoodsaw its strugglein largerterms than simply confrontingthe Pullman Company. Indeed, the second problem for BSCP leaders involved changingthe general economic and political awareness of black Americans.17 Given his aims, Randolph's style had more effect on the public than on the porters. If BSCP sources and favorablenewspapersreportedlarge and enthusiastic crowds showing up to hear his speeches, attendanceat rallies did not translate into union membership.Despite secret rolls, untiringefforts of BSCP organizers in various districts, and suspension of enrollmentfees to encourage membership, fewer than half the porters ever signed up. Of those who did, only thirtypercent paid regulardues. And most portersmaintained loyalty to local leadersratherthan to Randolph.18 Randolphwas a living contradiction. Though his public rhetoric promised to bringPullmanto its knees and exuded militanceand courage, privately he was a cautious individualwho shrankfrom confrontationand sought to attain his goals by indirect means. As early as 1926 Randolphdemonstratedthe dichotomy between public utterancesand privatereluctanceto meet Pullmanhead on, a development that was to recur in 1928. Some BSCP officials wanted to order their portersto boycott a Pullmancompanyunion election in 1926.Randolphdisagreed. His refusalto go along caused grave consequences for the BSCP, both from within

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and outside the union. One organizerresigned in disgust and claimed that others threatenedto join him.19 Randolph'scontinuous talk about action and his simultaneous failureto move led some observers to conclude that he was afraidand had no plan. Many arguedthat he should place more emphasis on organizingporters and less on public appearances.20 Yet, such critics did not understand Randolph and the way he functioned. Attainingrecognitionfor the BSCP was Randolph'sprimarygoal, but he also had in mind the additional aim of teaching trade unionism to the masses of black workers,using the BSCP as a vehicle for his participation as a nationalspokesman and leader. Randolphemphasizedthat the problemsof black people in the United States were essentially economic and that the remedy lay in organizedlabor, and he believed that if the BSCP succeeded the lesson would be driven home. If the union failed, his life-long goal of finding a way to improve conditions for the masses would fail with it. Randolphalso recognizedthat his personalfortuneshad become intertwinedwith the BSCP. If the union failed, so would he. Thus, if he talked big, he moved with caution, sacrificing immediate gains for long-range
success.21

At the same time, the disparitybetween his brave words and cautious behavior caused problemsfor the union. Some of his staunchestsupporterstook issue with his non-assertivepolicy, and the rank and file began to give up on the union. By the summerof 1928, conflictingviews and a series of union failuresled to a crisis in the Brotherhoodand threatenedRandolph'scareer as a laborleader. The union suffered three major defeats between August, 1927 and June, 1928. It failed to achieve a meeting with Pullmanto discuss porters' grievances; it failed to raise porters' pay by having the InterstateCommerceCommissionoutlaw tipping;and it failed in its threat to stage a strike against Pullman.22 Duringthe same period, the Brotherhoodlost the supportof the PittsburghCourier, until then its staunchest defender. Placingfull blame for the union's failureon Randolph,the Courier's influentialpublisherpersonallydemandedthat Randolphserve the porters' cause by resigning.23 Partly because of animosity between district offices and union headquarters, but also because of differences over Randolph's policies, BSCP officials took steps during late 1927 and early 1928 to decentralize operations and to reduce Randolph'scontrol of Brotherhoodpolicy. The central figure in this reorganization was Milton P. Webster.24 Unlike Randolph, Webster was a practical individual with few pretensions. Where Randolphwas introspective and had a deep and abidingfaith that justice eventually would prevail, Webster was a believer in action. An intelligent but uneducatedman, Websterwas a minorfunctionaryin ChicagoRepublicancircles when he joined in organizingthe BSCP in 1925. By 1928, he had succeeded in bringingofficials fromoutside Randolph'sNew York groupinto the union'spolicy making circle when power was transferredfrom the general organizer to the Brotherhood'spolicy committee.25

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From his new position as Policy CommitteeChairman,Webstermoved quickly to change the union's tactics. He had long argued that the only way the BSCP could extract recognitionfrom Pullmanwas to strike, and now led his colleagues in laying plans for the confrontation.Randolphsupportedhis efforts reluctantly. Indeed, it appearedthat Randolphhad lost some of his old self-confidence. Much distressedabout callingmen offjobs they mightbe unableto regain,he clearly was afraidto call a strike in 1928.26 In the end, the strike threat was only part of Randolph'spolicy of operating from a position of weakness, using his skills and contacts to bring influential individuals and organizations to support his cause. Characteristically,his announcementof an imminentstrikewas for publicconsumption.He wanted only to raise enough noise about the probabilityof a strike against Pullmanto cause the federal government to intervene on the BSCP's behalf under provisions of the But on this occasion Randolphfound himself caught Watson-Parker Act of 1926.27 between the need to appear militant and firm in the eyes of Pullman and the mediationboard and at the same time allay the fears of porters about what they could expect from the strike. His actions duringthe springof 1928-such as making public statementsto the portersthat "a strike vote does not necessarily mean that the porters will strike" convinced both the PullmanCompanyand federal mediatorsthat the whole episode was little more than a gesture. Manyportersalso came to question his intent. The mediationboard, recognizingthe contradiction, called Randolph's bluff and refused to recommend emergency measures. The BSCP, despite endorsementof the strikeby a majorityof the porters, did not carry through on its threat.28Randolph's activities of 1928 amounted to a bluff that failed. Randolph'sfailure to act, though perhaps wise in light of elaborate plans the Pullman Company undertook to ensure that the strike would fail, nonetheless caused a severe crisis for the Brotherhoodand markedthe end of a period in the union's development. Randolph'sstandingreached a low ebb even among fellow organizers, while rank and file members left the union in droves. Randolph's mood duringthe strike episode so troubled Webster that he believed Randolph, given his current state of emotional despair, would destroy the union. The Chicago leader took upon himself responsibilityof maintainingthe union's militancy and increasingparticipationin policy making or organizers from outlying regions. Routine administrativefunctions were now much more crucial to the BSCP's survivalthan propagandaand publicity, for as Webster wrote Randolph, the BSCP was clearly "past the point of stirring things up." At a meeting of Brotherhoodofficials in July 1928, Webster insisted that in the future the policy committee would control BSCP decisions in fact as well as in name.29 Although Webster left that meeting as the most influentialorganizerin BSCP circles, he recognized Randolph'ssuperiorabilities to articulatethe union's goals and did not challenge Randolph'sposition as national leader. But just as important, Randolph understood Webster's talents for bringing in members and his standingamong other Brotherhoodleaders. Above all, Randolphrecognized that

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he must have a firm organizationalbase in order to continue to speak out on national issues. Thus, despite their differences in styles, Randolphand Webster had the mutualrespect and trust as well as recognitionof the uniquetalents of the other needed to harness their efforts in makingthe BSCP an example for black Americansof the importanceof union organizationfor economic advancement. After 1928, the BSCP lost organizationalrigidity as various organizers transcended their formerroles and became a social group, a "unity of persons rather than technicians." Since close associations during shared failures had forced strong bonds among them, they were able to reach their new organizationalrelationship with a minimumof friction. Erosion of BSCP membershipthat began after the strike debacle of 1928continued, and as the nation moved into the Great Depressionthe Brotherhoodbecame little more than a cell. Of the 4,632 members in the union in 1928, only 658 remainedin 1933, and more than a third of those were in Webster'sChicagolocal. The BSCP could hardlyconsider itself a national organization.But its leaders were convinced that if they kept the doors open, the union would triumphin the end.30 With the union's doors barely open, the period between the crisis of 1928and the coming of the New Deal markeda hiatus in Randolph'sstyle as the needs of the union demanded that he take on routine functions. The BSCP changed its tactics and sought to attain its goal of recognition throughfederal courts rather than through the press and propaganda.Indeed, Webster became the union's major figure and, for all practical purposes, Brotherhoodheadquarters-as did Randolph-moved from New York to Chicagofrom which site Webster directed the court fight and maintained the union's organizationalstructure. Randolph continuedto devote full attentionto the BSCP, but he utilized differentmethods than before, toning down his rhetoricand workingthroughthe AmericanFederation of Labor (AFL), in which organizationthe BSCP attainedquasi-membership in 1929. From the strike fiasco to the coming of the New Deal, the Brotherhood remainedlargely a paper organization,strugglingsimply to survive as its leader waited for an opportunityto reassert his rare abilities. Randolph'sfailure to perform a miraclein 1928had dampenedhis followers' faith in his charismaticqualities and he had to await a victory before he could function as a symbolic figure
again.31

The New Deal, with its liberalizedlabor laws and the emphasis the new administrationplaced on organizedlabor, opened new fields for Randolphand provided renewed opportunityfor him to operate with the initiative and daring that had characterized his leadership of the BSCP in the days before June, 1928. The Amended Railway Labor Act of 1934assured for the first time federal supportof the BSCP's claim to the right to represent porters. Under protection of that legislation, Randolphconvinced an overwhelmingmajorityof porters, many of them non-membersof the BSCP, to endorse the Brotherhoodas their bargaining agent in disputes with Pullman.After it won a bitter campaignwith the Pullman Porters and Maids Protective Association-a company front-for endorsement from the porters, the BSCP gained recognition from Pullman as the legitimate

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representativeof porters and maids in 1935.32 The victory identified Randolph again as a majorfigure among black spokesmen. Randolph'sstandingamong black leaders derived from more than the BSCP's success in gainingrecognitionfrom Pullman.Long concerned about the impact of policies on the economic status of black workers, Ranthe AFL's discriminatory dolph had made numerous appeals to AFL leaders to alter the Federation's policies. After New Deal legislation practically guaranteedthe BSCP's success with Pullmanin 1934, Randolph,capitalizingupon what he saw as his increased stature among both labor leaders and blacks, changed his action on the floor of AFL conventions from begging for improved opportunityfor blacks within the Federationto demandingthat necessary changes be made. At the convention that year, with supportfrom a few powerful industrialunions and a mass demonstration of blacks underNAACP leadership,Randolphforced the AFL to establish a in Federationaffiliatesand to reportthe followcommitteeto study discrimination ing year.33 The hearingsin 1935of the Committeeof Five on Negro Discriminationin the AFL broughtenormousprestige to Randolphas he used every effort to make the sessions an event of importanceto all blacks. He broughtbefore the committee testimony from the NAACP and the National Urban League, other black spokesmen, and some Afro-Americanworkers.34When the AFL leadershipat the convention of 1935 determinedto sabotage the committee's findings of widespread racial discrimination,Randolphenhanced his standingeven more by the straightforward mannerin which he carriedto the floor the fight to save the report and His efforts ended makethe Federationresponsive to the needs of black workers.35 in failure. in organizedlabor, Yet Randolph'seloquent appealfor an end to discrimination the AFL's decision to grantthe BSCP an internationalcharterin 1935,the publicthe Brotherhood'sofficial talks with Pullmanwhich commenced ity surrounding that year, and the press coverage thatfollowed this complex individual,catapulted the BSCP president to prominence among black leaders and spokesmen. Randolph enjoyed wide-spread name recognition. And though his actual accomplishments in organizing the BSCP touched only a small number of AfroAmericans(and his efforts before the AFL had resulted in moralvictories at best) he had in fact attained a positive goal in the economic sector while others had contented themselves with theorizing. Moreover, Randolphpossessed the ability to make the most routine "moral" victory appearas if he and his followers had achieved broad practical success, and he could turn the narrowest of activities into movements for advancementof the general black population.The masses of blacks, and some leaders, seemingly unaware of the nebulous quality of his achievements, looked on Randolphas the man to lead efforts to solve their social and economic problems. He was the one individual who combined articulate expressions of the hopes and desires of blacks with practicalexperience in trade union matters.Thus, when representativesof numerousblack groupsconvened in Chicagoin February1936to form the National Negro Congress(NNC), a broadly

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based organizationfounded on a "minimumprogram"which all Afro-Americans could endorse, Randolphreluctantlyyielded to a draft and consented to serve as nationalpresident of the NNC.36 Randolph'stenureas presidentof the Congresswas one of failureas the organization abandonedthe broad base and endorsed the philosophies of the American Communist party and those of white unions associated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations(CIO). There is no simple explanation for this shift, though Randolph's activities were partly responsible. The BSCP leaders were unable to devote much time to NNC affairsfor two reasons. Duringthe first two years of the Congress Randolphwas deeply involved in BSCP-Pullman negotiations, trying to secure a favorable contract and gain support among nonmember porters. Moreover, Randolphwas ill and did not have the physical energy to head two national organizations. The fact is, then, that Randolphwas president of the NNC, but he was not its leader. The actual leaderwas John P. Davis, the Congress' executive secretary. It was Davis who as early as 1937determinedthat NNC would concentrateon the Communistline.37Randolph'srelationshipwith Davis and the Congress, a relationship in which the president desired to function largely as symbolic leader of the NNC while others did the routine duties of running the organization-the manner in which he had operated in the BSCP-did not succeed. The failure underlinesthe importanceof loyal supportersto the success of charismaticfigures. Though Webster and other BSCP organizers argued with Randolph from time to time on both policys and tactics, in the end they maintainedtheirloyalty to the common goals of the organizationand did not attemptto sabotageRandolph's program.Unlike Randolph'sexperiences in the BSCP, Davis and others in NNC did not agree with his philosophies. Thus, in his absence from the daily activities of the organization,they pushed aside his views and substitutedtheir own. By the time the Congress convened for its third session in 1940, the Davis element had succeeded in pushing the NNC into the Communistcamp and Randolph was forced to resign or be denied reelection to his post. Far from resigning in disgrace, Randolphmusteredall his presence and oratoricalpowers and quitthe NNC with remarkable dignityand aplomb. RalphBunche, who was present at the session, considered Randolph'sresignationspeech-in which he warned blacks against simplisticsolutions to the problemsof black people and of the inadvisability of depending upon whites for leadership and financing of their organizations-one of the most importantstatementsever made to black leaders of what was and spokesmen.38 Yet, thoughRandolphshowed deep understanding happeningto NNC and to much of black leadership, the Congress had reached that state largely because of the way he functioned. Moreover, Randolphdid not even have his union's full backingin this endeavor. To the public, Randolphwas the leader of the National Negro Congress, but power within the organization depended on delegates, and the Davis group had the delegates. Most NNC members did not recognize Randolph's charismatic qualities and thus he exercised little influence over them.39

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Randolph'sacceptance of the presidency of NNC was atypical and defied the canons of charistmaticleadershipbecause he took a position to which he had been elected and did not himselfrespondto a crying need and devise a movementof his own. Weber points out that charismausually does not rest on vested authority, nor can charismaticfiguresfunctionwithinlimits that are set for them by others.40 Unlike his role in the BSCP in which he defined the premises and directionof the movement, in the NNC randolphfound his freedom to exercise his rare abilities constrained by the corporate structure. In no other sphere of his work is the failure as clear as this. Despite his failure in NNC this man of enormous self confidence and sense of mission remained undaunted and went on to found the March on Washington Movement (MOWM)in January, 1941. Randolphattained nationwide fame and acclaimfrom activities connected with this ad hoc groupwhich aimed at mobilizing thousandsof blacks to marchon Washingtonto demandan end to employment discriminationin developing war industries and in the armed forces. A question that has perplexed scholars of the 1940sand of Randolphis whether the MOWM representedan actual threatto domestic tranquilityor was simply a "magnificent bluff."41 But in many ways that is not the crucial question. Of greaterimportance is why the bluff worked. If MOWMhad charteredno buses or trainsto transport marchersto Washington,if no arrangementshad been made to provide food and toilet facilities for the expected masses, if leadingblack organizationsoffered only nominalsupportto the marcheffort, and if-as Eleanor Roosevelt warned-the Washingtonpolice were girded to clear the marchingblacks out of the city, why did thousands of Afro-Americans still maintain that they intended to go to Washingtonat the appointed time? Moreover, given the enormous sources of informationavailable to the Presidentof the United States, why could not President Roosevelt ascertainthat the march was a meaninglessthreat? The answers to these questions lie in large part in the inspirationalleadership and presence of A. Philip Randolph. People still intended to march because he stood at the forefront of the movement. Embodying in himself the symbol of courage and perseverence, Randolphconvinced the masses that the effort could end only in success. Likewise, his stalwart image of incorruptibilityand righteousness apparentlyconvinced even the president that the day was near when masses of blacks would be paradingin protest on the malls of the capital. The president's decision also demonstratedthe colossal lack of attention whites paid to blacks in the United States. Had Randolph been white, clearly Roosevelt's advisors would have known of his bluff against Pullmanin 1928. In any event, President Roosevelt established the Fair Employment Practice Committee (FEPC)and outlawed racial discrimination in governmentemployment, and Randolph called off the march.42 Some have concluded that Randolph accepted far too little in this arrangement;43the executive order did not even mention the armed forces. But there is another side to that question. In accepting Roosevelt's FEPC in exchange for calling off the march, Randolph did compromise on what he had demanded in

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January. Yet, Randolph had accomplished the important result of putting the federalgovernmentofficially on recordfor the first time againstracialdiscrimination in employment.The action achieved little immediateresults for blacks, but it did cause an end to official racism in that importantsector.44 Despite its questionableresults, MOWMmade Randolphone of the best known and most widely respected black leaders. Many considered him willing to use militant leadership to mobilize the black masses in activities to improve their living conditions and their self-awareness as people. His name became a household word. Accolades and commendations, as well as offers of support of his work, poured in from across the country. But by the end of 1942 much of Randolph's support had melted away and he was once again just another among numerousblack spokesmenin Harlem.4sWhateverone mightsay aboutthe actual effectiveness of MOWMin the long run, the fact is that as long as it remainedan ad hoc organizationdirected at stimulatingthe masses and attaininga single goal, Randolph was able to function with style and effectiveness. And yet, even MOWMwent into rapiddecline when it took on routine institutionalstructureas Randolph'ssudden and brief the PermanentMarchon WashingtonCommittee.46 fame is a superb example of the ephemeralnature of charismaticleadership. In some ways, Randolph'sactivities duringthe early 1940smarka majorinterlude in his public life. Both the avowed reason for his resignationfrom the National Negro Congress-namely that blacks must finance and lead their own organizations-and the all-blackemphasishe placed on the Marchon Washington Movement, contradicted the importance of interracial cooperation that had characterizedhis past. Moreover, it contradictedthe emphasis on class that had been his hallmark.Indeed, in 1925-26 when he emerged as an individualrecognizable outside New York as a spokesman among blacks, Randolphstressed the communityof interest among black and white workers. Convincedthat all people of good will, black as well as white, shouldparticipatein improvingconditionsfor the downtrodden,Randolphhad made it a practice for the BSCP to depend heavily upon money and technical expertise gained from white sources. And he was committed to his efforts to establish black workers in organized labor as equal partnerswith whites in the continuing struggle between labor and management. Randolph'sannouncementin 1941of the creationof a National Citizen's Committee to Save the Jobs of Negro [Railroad ] Firemen, under the nominal national leadership of Eleanor Roosevelt and Mayor Fiorella La Guardiaof New York, underlinesthe contradictioneven more.47The fact is that though Randolphwas undoubtedlysincere in his desire to mobilize the black masses, he never lost sight of the need to cultivate support among influentialindividualsand organizations. An analysis of Randolph's leadership reveals that his activities, particularly duringthe years before 1942,usually resultedin "moral" victories and his following was shallow, though at times quite broad. The temporarynature of his victories accounts in part for the various periods in which numerous blacks supported his activities-for example during 1926-27, 1935-36, and 1941-and the rapidity with which they deserted him. Part of the reason was that Randolph's

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appeal, except in the BSCP, was based on conditions other than firm organization. George Schuyler, a one-time colleague of Randolph's on the Messenger, wrote of Randolph's leadership in 1942: Mr. Randolphknows how to appealto the emotions of the people and to get a great following together, but there his leadershipends because he has nowhere to lead them andwould not know if he had.... He has the messianiccomplex, considerable of the plightof the masses, but the leaderoratoricalability, and some understanding ship capacity and executive ability requiredfor the task at hand simply is not there. The originalMarchon Washingtonmove is now admittedto have been a failureelse the currentagitationwould not be necessary.... Organization is not merelya matter of ballyhoo and oratory, it is a Science, and one that is largely a closed book to Mr.
Randolph.48

Far from reflecting unfavorably on Randolph's leadership, his inability to organize the masses and to maintain a large following stemmed in part from the times. Gunnar Myrdal, in his monumental study of blacks in the United States, concluded that mass movements succeed only in organizations with limited and specific goals.49 Though undoubtedly fearful of Pullman, porters did rally to the side of the BSCP in the end. The March on Washington Movement succeeded in attaining its limited goal of forcing establishment of FEPC, but it fell apart when it took on wider aims. Meier might be right in his assessment that King was the closest to a charismatic figure produced among blacks. Yet, it is interesting, though wholly academic, to speculate on what would have been Randolph's attainments had he reached his prime in the era of television and heightened political awareness in which blacks lived during the rise to prominence of Martin Luther King, Jr.

1I am gratefulto ProfessorsDavid L. Lewis and Nancy J. Weiss for helpfulcommentsand suggestions they made on a version of this paperthat I read before the AmericanHistoricalAssociation in 1974. William H. Harris, Keeping the Faith: A. Philip Randolph, Milton P. Webster, and the Brother-

hood of Sleeping Car Porters, 1925-37 (Urbana:University of Illinois Press, 1977), discusses the Brotherhoodof Sleeping Car Porters in detail, and is complementedby BrailsfordR. Brazeal, The Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters (New York: HarperBrothers, 1946).See also Jervis Anderson,
A. Philip Randolph: A Biographical Portrait (New York: Harcourt, Brace Jovanowich, Inc., 1972), 151-225, and Theodore Kornweibel, No Crystal Stair: Black Life and the Messenger, 1917-1928

(Westport,Conn.: GreenwoodPress, 1975). 2AugustMeier, "On the Role of MartinLuther King," New Politics, IV (Winter, 1965), 52-59. David L. Lewis, King:A CriticalBiography(New York: PraegerPublishers,1970),brilliantly discusses King's charismaticqualities. 3RobertC. Tucker, "The Theory of CharismaticLeadership," in DankwartA. Rustow, ed.,
Philosophers and Kings: Studies in Leadership (New York: Braziller, 1970), 69-94. See particularly

pp. 77-78.
4Interview with Randolph,Jan. 19, 1972. 5Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: 1947), 328, 358. See also Arthur Schweitzer, "Theory and Political Charisma," Comparative Studies in Society and His-

A. PHILIP RANDOLPH: A CHARISMATIC LEADER

Theory(Princeton,1968).

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tory, 16, No. 2 (March, 1974), 150-81; and Ann Ruth Willner, Charismatic Political Leadership: A 6Weber, Social and Economic Organization, 358-62; James C. Davies, "Charisma in the 1952

Campaign,"in Heinz Eulau, SamuelJ. Eldersveldand MorrisJanowitz, eds., Political Behavior:A

Reader in Theory and Research (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956), 193-94.

7Lancasterto George Price, Feb. 3, 1926, Brotherhoodof Sleeping Car PortersChicago Division Papers,Manuscripts Division, The ChicagoHistoricalSociety. Hereaftercited BSCPChiPa.A fire in BSCP New York headquarters destroyedmany of Randolph'spapersfor the years before 1940.That tragedyleaves us unableto trace developmentof his oratoryand rhetoricthroughcompletespeeches. Instead we must depend upon fragmentsthat can be gleaned from the press. Messenger magazine containsa large volume of Randolph'swritingsthrough1928,but his writtenword undoubledlypales beside the power of his spoken voice. 8St. LouisArgus, Nov. 20, 1925;Messenger, VIII (Feb., 1926),37; Brazeal,TheBrotherhood,17. 9Messenger,VII (Dec., 1925),403. In later years the BSCP maintainedthat a small cell had been functioningeven before Randolph'stalk before the Athletic Association. The union used this ploy to counterPullman chargesthatthe unionwas an outside groupof radicalsimposingthemselvesuponthe portersagainsttheirwills. But there is no evidence to corrobrate the union's claim. In fact, Randolph himselfwrote that his speech had been a majorspur in causingportersto organize. See Randolphto ElizabethG. Flynn, Sept. 21, 1925,AmericanFund for PublicService Papers,Manuscripts Division, New York Public Library.Hereaftercited, GarlandFund Pas. ?0Murray Kempton,Part of Our Time (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1955),244. 1'Randolph to Flynn, Sept. 21 and Dec. 11, 1925,Garland FundPas; Anderson,A. PhilipRandolph,
1-150; Kornweibel, No Crystal Stair; Langston Huges, Along this Way. See also, Messenger, (19201925), passim. 12Rienzi B. Lemus in New York Age July 14, 1928;St. Louis Argus, Nov. 20, 1925;SterlingD.

Spero and AbramL. Harris,TheBlack Worker (New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 1931),395. "Randolphto Flynn, Sept. 21 and Oct. 23; Flynn to Randolph,Oct. 29, 1925, GarlandFund Pas. 14See Harris,Keeping the Faith, Ch. 2. Randolph'sassociates in the New York office included Ashley L. Totten, WilliamDes Verney, Roy Lancaster,and FrankCrosswaith.By 1928,C. L. Dellums had attaineda leadershippost in the Oaklanddistrict. l5Messenger, (1925-1928),passim; Time, IV (Aug. 31, 1925),5. ChicagoDefender, Nov. 19, 1927, contains a strikingexample of Randolph'suse of uncomplimentary rhetoric.The Black Worker,successor to the Messenger as the BSCP's official organin 1929,is replete with derogatoryand inflammatorylanguageabout nonunionporters. See particularly1935-37.
16PhilipSelznitz, Leadership in Administration: A Sociological Interpretation (Evanston, Ill.: Row

Peterson, 1957),36-37, and Daniel Katz, "Social Psychology and GroupProcesses," in C. P. Stone and D. W. Taylor, eds., Annual Review of Psychology, Vol. II (Stanford,Calif.: Annual Reviews, Inc., 1951), 144, arguethat this was commonactivity for leaders of new and weak organizations.
17Harris, Keeping the Faith, 10-25. Philip S. Foner, Organized Labor and the Black Worker:

1619-1973 (New York:PraegerPublishers,1974), 158-76, describes relationsbetween the American Federationof Labor and black workers, as does John Finney, Jr., "Negro Labor Duringand After World War I," (UnpublishedPh.D. dissertation,GeorgetownUniversity, 1967). AbramL. Harris, "Negro Labor's Quarrelwith OrganizedLabor," CurrentHistory, XXIV (Sept. 1926),903-904; T. Arnold Hill, "The Negro in Industry,"American Federationist, XXXII (Oct., 1925), 912-17; and Kelly Miller, "The Negro as a WorkingMan,"AmericanMercury,VI (Nov., 1925),310; and numerous pieces in Messenger, Opportunity, and Crisis, are useful samples of conflictingblack thoughton trade unionismduringthe 1920s. 18 Harris,Keepingthe Faith, 78-79, 99; Brazeal,TheBrotherhood, 222. For statementson payment of dues, see Randolphto Webster, June 1 and Dec. 28, 1926, BSCP ChiPa; Randolphto William Baldwin,Jan. 14, 1927, National Urban League Files, Libraryof Congress. '9RobertL. Mays to Randolph,Jan. 15, 1926,printedin ChicagoDefender, Jan. 23, 1926;Mays in Chicago Defender, Mar. 27, 1926; Milton Webster, Statement to BrotherhoodMen, Jan. 31, and Randolphto James WeldonJohnson, Feb. 1, 1926,both in NAACP Papers, Libraryof Congress.

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JOURNAL OF NEGRO HISTORY

20EvenWebstercame to hold this view. See Websterto Randolph,Aug. 31 and Sept. 28, 1928, BSCP ChiPa. See also Pittsburgh Courier,Sept, 27, 1930. 2'Randolph'sactivities in this regard were not unusual for a strugglinglabor leader. See Lois
MacDonald, Leadership Dynamics and the Trade-Union Leader (New York: New York University

Press, 1959),69-71. 22Harris, Keepingthe Faith, chs. 4 and 5. Tucker, "Theoryof Charismatic Leadership,"74, points out thatdisagreements betweenleadersand their associates do not necessarilymeanthat followersno longer accept the leader's charismaticauthority. 23Pittsburgh Courier, Apr. 7 and 14, May 5 and 12, 1928; numerous letters, BSCP ChiPa. The attitudeof the Courierinvolved more thanjust what appearedon the surface. Andrew Buni, Robert
Lee Vann of the Pittsburgh Courier: Politics and Black Journalism (Pittsburgh: The University of

Pittsburgh Press, 1974), 161-71, and Harris,Keeping the Faith, 134-40, both contain discussions of
the BSCP-Courier relationship. 24Harris, Keeping the Faith, 123-29, 140-51.

21Memorandum on Brotherhood Chiefs StrategyConference,Jan. 12, 1928,issued Feb. 2, 1928over Randolph'ssignature,BSCP ChiPa. 26Atthe time of the strikethreatof 1928,Randolph was underextremepressure.Numerousnewspapers were attackinghimas a failure.In addition,he consideredthe possibilitythat the unionmightnot win. As he said later, the responsibilityof pullingmen off theirjobs, jobs they might be unable to regain. weighed heavily upon him. Interviewwith Randolph,Jan. 19, 1972;Roy Lancasterto C. L. Dellums, Jan. 31, 1928. 27Evidencethat Randolphwanted federal interventionabounds in the files of the United States
Mediation Board, Case No. C-107, Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters v. Pullman Company, The

National Archives, Washington.Randolph'sletters to Webster duringthat period reflect the same sentiments.Randolphto Webster,March 19 and June 14, 1928, BSCP ChiPa. 28Harris,Keeping the Faith, 104-14; Board Member Edwin Morrow the Chairman Samuel Winslow, Mar. 20, 1928, Mediation Board Files; Telegram, Mediation Board to James Weldon Johnson, June 7, 1928,NAACP Papers. 29Harris, Keepingthe Faither, 141-44, containsextensive analysisof crucialorganizational changes that occurredin the BSCP duringthe aftermath of the abortedstrike. See also, Randolphto Webster, June21; Websterto Randolph,June21 andAug. 31; Webster,"Thingsto be Done" Memorandum, on back of Randolphto Webster,June 21, 1928, BSCP ChiPa. 30Brazeal, TheBrotherhood,222; C. L. Dellums to Author, Aug. 16, 1972. 3"Max Weber,"The Sociologyof Charismatic Authority,"in H. H. GerthandC. WrightMills, eds., trans., From Max Weber:Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958),245-51. 32National MediationBoardReport,BSCP v. PPMPA (July 1, 1935),BSCPChiPa;Harris,Keeping
the Faith, 202-09.

33Webster to Smith,Oct. 15, 1934,BSCPChiPa;AFL Convention,Reportof the Proceedings, (Oct. 1934),230-31, 530. 34Charles H. Houston, Memorandum to WalterWhite,July 11, 1935,NAACP Papers;Opportunity, XIII (Aug. 1935),247-49.
35AFL Convention, Report of the Proceedings, (Oct. 1935), 808-19.

J. Bunche, "The Programs, 36Ralph Ideologies,Tactics and Achievementsof Negro Betterment and InterracialOrganizations,"(UnpublishedResearch Manuscriptfor Carnegie-Myrdal Study, 1940), Vol. II, 319-71, is the best firsthand accountof events in NNC. See also LawrenceS. Wittner,"The National Negro Congress: A Reassessment," American Quarterly(January, 1951), 883-901. Two older accounts, Wilson Record, The Negro and the CommunistParty (Chapel Hill: University of North CarolinaPress, 1951), and Irving Howe and Lewis Coser, The American CommunistParty (New York: FrederickA. Praeger, 1962), discuss the Congress, but from a strong anti-Communist position. 37Howe and Coser, American Communist Party, 356; Record, Race and Radicalism (Ithaca, New York: CornellUniversityPress, 1964),96. 38Bunche,"Programs,Ideologies and Tactics," Vol. II, 360, 370-71; Wittner, "National Negro Congress," 898-901.

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39Weber,Schweitzer and Selznitz, supra, have stressed the dual nature of leadershipand have emphasizedthe need for strong and loyal followershipin order for charismaticleaders to succeed. Bunche, "Programs, IdeologiesandTactics," Vol. II, 371, points out thatNNC hadno mass following even before Randolph'sresignationas president.Wittner,"NationalNegro Congress," 886-90, disputes this view and argues that the local councils of NNC exercised wide influence in their communities. Writings of blackspokesmenof the 1930s,particularly autobiographies, suggeststhatNNC has been overplayedas a majororganization.For example, WalterWhite, a participant in the initialmeetingof the Congressand executive secretaryof the NAACPduringthe 1930s,gives it scantmentionin A Man Called White(Bloomington, Ind.: IndianaUniversityPress, Midland Books Ed., 1970),sayingnothing aboutwhatthe Congresswas, while AdamClaytonPowell, Jr.,Adamby Adam:TheAutobiography of Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. (New York: Dial Press, 1971), fails to mention NNC at all. More work remainsto be done on this subject. 40MaxWeber, "Sociology of Charismatic Authority,"245-51.
4'Herbert Garfinkel, When Negroes March: The March on Washington Movement in the Organiza-

tionalPolitics of FEPC (New York:Atheneum,1969),is a good discussionof the questionssurrounding Randolph'swork with MOWM. 42White, A Man Called White, 190-92; Garfinkel,When Negroes March. It is of course likely that FDR did know of Randolph'spast and used the nationalemergencyto do for blacks what he felt he could not do in normaltimes. Additionaldata must be analyzed before this theory can be proved. 43Garfinkel, When Negroes March, esp. pp. 65-71. 44See Randolph'sstatementin InterracialReview, XV, No. 7 (July 1942), 101.
45Garfinkel, When Negroes March, 111-24. 46Ibid., ch. 5. 47TheBlack Worker, Sept, 1941. 48Pittsburgh Courier,Aug. 1, 1942. 49GunnarMyrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy (New York:

Harperand Row Publishers,1944),853.